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DECISIONS'
old




CASES RELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS
FROM JULY, 1881, TO JUNE, 1883.
VOLUME I.
REVISED EDITION.





The first edition of this volume having been exhausted and a second
required, it was deemed advisable by the Department to revise the
work and make it uniform with the later volumes. In accordance with
such design, the form of the book has been substantially modified in
several respects; a new index, with full notes of reference, has been
prepared, together with tables of cases reported and cited, acts of Con-
gress, and Revised Statutes, cited and construed, etc. Reversed or
modified decisions have been noted, with proper reference to the later
authority. Several important decisions are also included in the present
edition that did not appear in the former, while none of importance have
been omitted.
S. V. PROUDFIT.
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,
Secretary's Office, Washington, D. C., June 30, 1887.
PREFACE.
It is desirable and important that the decisions of the Land Depart-
ment illustrating the administration of the land laws of the United
States should be published in an authentic manner, and in permanent
form convenient for reference. This will enable the several divisions
of the office to refer readily, not only to the decisions originating in the
appropriate business of each, but with equal readiness to consult the
decisions of all the other divisions, and of the Department; and, it is
believed, will greatly systematize and facilitate the operations of the
office.
For the purpose indicated, the present publication, commencing with
the beginning of the present administration of this office and extending
to this date, is directed.
It is intended to continue the publication hereafter at stated periods.
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, MILITARY BOUNTY LAND WARRANTS.
ANDREW ANDERSON ET AL.
Th Commissioner of Pensions has no authority to cancel a military bounty land
warrant in the hands of an innocent assignee.
The Commissioner of the General Land Office has jurisdiction as to the bona fides of
holders of warrants by purchase.
One purchasing a warrant issued in the name of a person deceased without heirs, or
of a fletitious person, is not an innocent purchaser.
Patents issued on warrant locations but withheld, should be disposed of as to their
delivery, under the directions of the Department, of February 28, 1881, made in
view of the decision of the supreme court in the McBride case.
Secretary Kirkwood to Commissioner McFarland, July 23, 1881.
I have examined the following reports from your office, viz:
First. Report of August 9, 1869, in the matter of the application of
Andrew Anderson to have the patent which was fully executed Sep-
tember 23, 1853, for the N. of SW. I Sec. 19, T. 98, R. 7, Iowa, located
with military bounty land warrant No. 48,552, 80 acres, delivered to
him as the owner of said lands.
From your report it appears that the Commissioner of Pensions on
the 6th of August, 1862, indorsed upon the face of said warrant that
the same had that day been canceled by him, and declared void as
against the United States, for the reason that satisfactory evidence had
been furnished that the papers upon which warrant was issued, and the
assignment of the warrant, were false and fraudulent.
Second. Report of December 8, 1880, in the matter of a tract of land
located at Elba, Ala., March 19, 1856, by William R. Barton, assignee,
with military bounty land warrant No. 31,511, 160 acres, act of 1847,
for which patent was duly executed November 10, 1857, which patent
is now in the files of your office.
In this case it appears that a caveat was filed in your office by the
Commissioner of Pensions against said warrant.
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The report shows that the Commissioner of Pensions, by letter of
November 4, 1880, declined to withdraw the caveat for the reason that
the person locating the warrant had failed to show to the satisfaction
of his office that he was an innocent purchaser of the same for value.
Third. Report of January 29, 1881, which has relation to cases gen-
erally in which patents for land located with military land warrants
are withheld in your office, and to suspended bounty land warrant loca-
tions.
These reports present for my consideration the following questions:
First. As to the authority of the Commissioner of Pensions to cancel
a land warrant in the hands of an innocent assignee.
Second. Whether the jurisdiction to determine the question whether
an assignee is an innocent purchaser of a military land warrant for
value may be exercised by the Commissioner of Pensions, or by the
Commissioner of the General Land Office.
Third. As to the delivery of patents for lands covered by warrant
locations which patents are withheld for the reason that the warrants
were falsely or fraudulently procured.
As to the first question it is not necessary for me to make any decis-
ion whatever. It was decided by Secretary Stuart, November 10, 1851,
that the Commissioner of Pensions has no such authority. He re-af-
iirmed his decision March 20, 1852, stating his reasons therefor at some
length (Lester's Land Laws, vol. 1, Nos. 621 and 622).
The same doctrine was sustained by Attorney-General Cushing in an
able and exhaustive opinion rendered to Secretary McClelland March
15, 1856 (7 Opinions, 657). The doctrine announced by Attorney-Gen-
eral Cashing was adopted by Secretary Thompson, by decisions of Jan-
uary 19 and 21, 1860 (Lester's Land Laws, vol. 1, Nos. 636 and 637).
And lastly the same doctrine was re-affirmed by Secretary Schurz in
the cases of Samuel Love and Lyman Worden, July 23, 1878, in a de-
cision addressed to the Commissioner of Pensions. The question seems
to be firmly settled; the doctrine announced by Secretary Stuart in
1851 and 1852 ought not only to be treated as having all the force of
stare decisis, but of law.
Congress has on several occasions legislated regarding the issuance,
assignment, and location of bounty land warrants since the decisions of
1851, 1852, and 1860, above referred to, were rendered, without in any
manner attempting to change the law as therein construed. A notable
instance is the revision of the laws in relation to bounty lands. (See
chapter 10 of the Revised Statutes.)
Congress therefore has impliedly and in legal contemplation sanc-
tioned the rule established by this Department as to this question, and
all officers of this Department are bound to observe it.
The definition of "innocent purchaser" given in the opinion of Mr.
Cashing and in the decision of Secretary Thompson of January 21,
1860, should be kept in view. A party purchasing a warrant issued in
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the name of a person deceased without heirs, or of a fictitious person,
cannot be deemed an innocent purchaser; for in such ease the assign-
ment would be forgery, against which it is the business of the pur-
chaser or assignee to guard.
As to the second question, it is clear that the Commissioner of Pen-
sions has no jurisdiction to determine the question of innocent pur-
chaser or bona fide assignee of military land warrants. Section 2414
of the Revised Statutes, and other sections relative to the location of
such warrants, undoubtedly confide that question to the jurisdiction of
the Commissioner of the General Land Office. It follows, therefore,
that caveats filed against, and cancellations of warrants by the Com-
missioner of Pensions in cases in which your office determines that the
warrants are in the hands of innocent purchasers, are of no force or
effect.
Concerning the third question, I deem it unnecessary to give instruc-
tions.
The rules laid down by the Department in the decisions aforesaid are
sufficient to guide your office both in the matter of suspended locations
and the delivery of patents. Moreover, the specific rules laid down by
my predecessor February 28, 1881 (Copp for April, 1881, p. 10), in view
of the decisions of the supreme court of the United States in the case
of the United States Ex ret. Thomas McBride v. The Secretary, Octo-
ber term, 1880, are deemed sufficient to cover all cases of duly executed
patents now withheld in your office for any cause.
I may add that the delay in replying to the reports of December 8,
1880, and January 29, 1881, is due to the fact that time was allowed the
Commissioner of Pensions in which to reply to the argument therein.
I have this day forwarded a copy of this letter to the Commissioner
of Pensions and instructed him to return to the files of your office at
as early a day as practicable all military land warrants heretofore with-
drawn therefrom by his office; that if hereafter it becomes necessary in
the ordinary transaction of the business of his office to examine mili-
tary land warrants that are in the files of your office, he will require
the examination to be made by his subordinates in your office.
VIRGINI.A MILITARY DISTRICT, OHIO.
JEREMIAH IHALL.
The act of May 27, 1880, has no relation to the act of March 3, 1855, and does not cure
any error or defect committed under the same. It provides for issuing patents
only where entries have been duly made but not surveyed, and carried into survey
within three years after the date of its passage.
Commissioner McFarland to Jeremiak Hall, Circleville, Ohio, October 17,
1881.
I am in receipt of your letter of the 27th ultimo, and have to inform
you in reply that the act of Congress, approved May 27, 1880, entitled
" An act to construe and define ' An act to cede to the State of Ohio the
4 DECISIONS RELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS.
unsold lands in the Virginia military district in said State,' approved
February 18, 1871, and for other purposes," has no relation whatever to
the act of Congress of March 3, 1855, to which you refer.
The said law of 1880 declares that the act of 187t, ceding to the State
of Ohio the lands remaining " unsurveyed and unsold" in the said mili-
tary district, had no reference whatever to such lands as had been en-
tered and surveyed therein founded on continental line warrants, but
the true intent and meaning of said cession was to grant to said State
only such lands as had not been appropriated and were not included in
any entry or survey within said district and founded on said warrants.
It declares valid all legal surveys returned to the "land office on or
before March 3, 1857, on entries made on or before January 1, 1852, and
founded on the above class of warrants, but gives no authority to carry
the same into patent.
By the words " land office" it is understood that the local office at
Chillicothe, Ohio, otherwise designated as the " office of the principal
surveyor of said district," is intended in contradistinction to the term
" General Land ffice."
The said act also provides in the third section thereof-and therein is
contained all that relates to the issue of paten ts-" That the officers and
soldiers of the Virginia line on continental establishment, their heirs or
assigns, entitled to bounty lands which have on or before January 1,
1852, been entered within the tract reserved by Virginia, between the
Little Miami and Scioto Rivers, for satisfying the legal bounties to her
officers and soldiers upon continental establishment, shall be allowed
three years from and after the passage of this act to make and return
their surveys for record to the office of the principal surveyor of said
district, and may file the plats and certificates, warrants, or certified
copies of warrants at the General Land Office, and receive patents for
the same." In other words, that patents shall only be issued in those
cases where entries have been duly made, but the same not surveyed,
and where such entries have been carried into survey within three years
from and after May 27, 1880, and the said survey warrant, or certified
-copy of warrant, filed in this office.
The said act of 1880 is not to affect or interfere with the title to any
lands sold for a valuable consideration by the Ohio Agricultural and
Mechanical College under the said act of February 18, 1871.
From the above you will perceive that the law of May 27, 1880, does
not cure, amend, or render valid any error or defect committed under
the act of March 3, 1855.
ON BEVIEF-I&SUE OF PATENT REFUSEFD.
Commissioner McFarland to Jeremiah Hall, April 4, 1882.
Referring to your several letters of November I and December 21,
1881, and March 9, and two of March 20, 1882, and all in relation to
the proper legal construction of the act of Congress of May 27, 1880, as,
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affecting the issue of patents for lands in the Virginia military district,
Ohio, I have to advise you that, after full and careful examination of'
the various arguments, suggestions, and statements made in said com-
munications, I am still of the opinion as set forth in full in my letter to
you of the 17th October last, viz, that said law only authorizes the is-
sue of patents for lands in said district in cases where the entries were
made prior to January 1, 1852, and the same had not been surveyed
before the passage of the said act, for which purpose of survey three
years from and after such period were allowed therefore and for the
return of the survey to the surveyor's office, and therefrom, and when
the plats and certificates, warrants, or certified copies of warrants are
filed in this office, the parties entitled might receive the patents for the
same.
The third section of the said act, the substance of which is above set
forth, contains all that is stated in or can fairly and justly be implied
from any part of the said law, as authorizing the issue of patents.
I must, therefore, decline to comply with your request in the case
of survey No. 3,487, for 400 acres, founded on Virginia military land
warrant No. 3615, issued to William Dangerfield, as desired by your
letters of December 21, 1881, and 20th ultimo, and also in the case
of certified copy of survey No. 12,017, for 200 aers, founded on warrant
No. 6508, and made in the name of Archibald Gordon, as set forth in
your communications of the 9th and 20th ultimo.
MILITR Y BOUNTY LAND WZAR B ANTS.
JEREMIAH HALL.
History of the legislation relating to the Virginia military land district in Ohio, and
proceedings under the same. Construction of the several acts, etc. There is no
authority of law under which a patent can issue in the case presented.
Commissioner McFarland to eremiah Hall, ll-ay 9, 1882.
On May 12, 1880, you filed in this office an application for the issue
of a patent on survey No. 12096, for 150 acres of land in the Virginia
military district in Ohio; you also transmitted a certified copy of Vir-
ginia military warrant No. 584, for 200 acres, issued in the name of
Aquilla Norval, a sergeant in the continental line, and also an uncer-
tified paper purporting to be a duplicate of survey No. 12096, made in
part satisfaction of said warrant.
On October 1, 1880, you filed proof of publication of notice of the loss
of the original warrant and of the original survey. The copy of survey
is defective and is not conclusive evidence that any survey was made
as alleged. But the defect is one that may be cured by the production
of the proper evidence of the existence of the survey. As it is desirable
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to reach the ultimate merits of the application made, it is deemed un-
necessary to decide what is such proper evidence.
From the papers before me, it would appear that the survey was made
of the tract described therein of December 28, 1822, and recorded in the
surveyor's office January 27, 1823. I assume for the purposes of this
decision that the survey was made and recorded as alleged. Attached
to the copy of survey is a certificate from E. P. Kendrick, surveyor of
the military district, dated December 27,187 5, stating that warrant No.
584, on which survey No. 12096, for 150 acres, was made, had not been
satisfied at that date.
The act of Congress of May 23, 1804 (2 Stat., 274), provided that par-
ties entitled to bounty lands in the reserved territory should complete
their locations within three years from the date of the act, and return
their surveys and file the original warrants or certified copies thereof
in the Department of War within five years from the date of the act.
The parties should then be entitled to receive patents for the lands
so located. If the surveys were not returned to the Secretary of War
within the time and times prescribed by the act, the land should be re-
leased from any claims for bounty lands and should thereafter be dis-
posed of as public lands of the United States. The effect of this act was
to require a completed location to be made within three years and a
survey and return thereof, together with the original or certified copy
of the warrant on which they were founded, to the Department of War
within five years from the passage of the act. These acts were condi-
tions precedent to the requirement of the right to receive patents.
It is unnecessary to cite authorities to show that conditions precedent
must be strictly performed. By a positive provision of this act all lands
not thus effectually appropriated within the prescribed times were there-
after to become released from all claims for bounty lands by virtue of
any location and survey not thus completed and returned, and were to
become the property of the United States to be disposed of as other
public lands free from any trust i favor of the soldiers of Virginia on
continental establishment (Fussel v. Hughes, U. S. circuit court, northern
district of Ohio, September,1881). The survey required was not the mere
circumstance that a chain had followed a compass around a particular
piece of land. (Jackson v. Clark, 1 Pet., 789.) It must have been re-
turned, together with the warrant, in the manner, within the time, and
to the officer designated. At the date of this act, the Secretary of War
was charged with executive duties appertaining to grants of land for
military services. These duties were subsequently transferred to and
devolved upon the Commissioner of the General Land Office. The re-
turns that, by the act of 1804, were to be made to the Secretary of War
then became returnable to the Commissioner of the General Land Office.
The provisions of the act of 1804 were continued by subsequent enact-
ments until finally, by the act of March 3, 1855 (10 Stat., 701), a further
time of two years was allowed to make the return of surveys and war-
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rants to the General Land Office. he effect of the act was to extend
to March 3, 157, the limitation of the time in which surveys and war-
rants could be returned to the proper office and patents be issued thereon.
All lands not then and thus effectively appropriated reverted to the
public domain from and after said March 3, 1857, and no patents could
issue on surveys based on military warrants and returned to the Gen-
eral Land Office after that date.
The provisions of the act of 1804 were therefore extended to March 3,
1857, when all rights thereunder finally ceased and terminated and the
unappropriated lands became public lands of the United States.
On February 18, 1871 (16 Stat., 416), the lands remaining unsurveyed
and unsold in the Virginia military district in Ohio were ceded to the
State of Ohio, reserving certain pre-emption rights to actual settlers.
On May 27, 1880 (21 Stat., 105), Congress passed an act construifig
the act of 1871, as ceding to the State of Ohio only such lands as were
unappropriated and not included in any survey or entry founded on
military warrants upon continental establishment. The second section
of this act declared valid all legal surveys returned to the land office on
or before March 3, 1857, on entries made on or before January 1, 1852,
founded on unsatisfied Virginia continental warrants. The third sec-
tion provided that parties entitled to bounty lands which had been en-
tered within the Virginia military district in Ohio, on or before January
1, 1852, for satisfying legal bounties to Virginia soldiers on continental
establishment, should be allowed three years to make and return their
surveys for record to the office of the principal surveyor of said district
and might file their plats and certificates, warrants or certified copies
of warrants, at the General Land Office and receive patent for the same.
'The first section of this act limited the cession, to the State of Ohio, of
the reverted lands to such as had not been surveyed or entered. The
effect of this section was to leave the lands that had been surveyed or
entered in the same position in which they remained after March 3,1857,
and prior to February 18, 1871; in other words not to disturb titles that
had grown up under surveys and entries made many years before but
which had never been consummated into patent. The reason for this
is obvious.
The method of acquiring the legal title to bounty lands under the act
of 1804, and the several extensions thereof, was for the party in interest
to make an entry, by virtue of the warrant, in the proper book of en.
tries in the office of the principal surveyor of the military district. Then
the party procured a survey to be made of the land so selected in satis-
-faction of the warrant, which survey was recorded in the surveyor's office.
This original survey and the original or a certified copy of the warrant
was to be then filed in the General Laud Office, whereupon patent
would issue.
As soon as the lands were entered in the surveyor's office they became
taxable under State laws without regard to the issue of patent, and the
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equitable titles created by entries were subject to assignment and in-
heritance. Many years frequently passed before the further proceed-
ings essential to the procurement of patent were had, and in many in-
stances such proceedings were not had within the statutory period.
Meanwhile the lands ad been sold for taxes or by order of probate
courts and otherwise.
Where the parties to the original entry had omitted to obtain legal
titles and the period in which legal titles might have been obtained had
passed and nearly a generation of time had subsequently intervened
and the lands had long been in peaceful possession and actual occu-
pancy under possessory rights and titles derived through tax sales orjudicial proceedings, or by purchase from the holders of the original
entry, the evidence of which was often imperfect and not infrequently
lost, there was manifestly good reason why legislation that would pro-
voke litigation and throw titles into confusion or disturb long posses-
sion under claim of title should be avoided.
The second section of the act of 1880 declared valid all legal surveys
that had been returned to the land office on or before March 3, 1857, on
entries made on or before January 1, 1851. The effect of this section
was to confirm all patents that had been issued on such surveys and to
prevent the grantees of the State, under the act of 1871, from asserting
claim to any such lands on account of defective proceedings or techni-
cal irregularities connected with the surveys and entries on which the
patents were issued.
A mistake of the land office in issuing patents where the basis of the
patent was legal but the proceedings in some manner irregular could
not thereafter be inquired into by the courts.
Surveys had been made, but not returned within the time prescribed
in the act under which they were made, but were returned before March
3, 1857.
The surveys so validated were such as had been returned to the Gen-
eral Land Office at the seat of government on or before March 3, 1857.
It has been argued before me that the office of the principal surveyor
of the Virginia military district at Chillicothe was meant as the office
to which the surveys should be returned, or that, if returned to that
office, they were validated by the act of 1880. The proposition is Ul-
tenable. The office to which the returns were to be made under former
laws, to which the provision of this act conformed, was the General
Land Office, at Washington, as successor to the Department of War for
this purpose.
- There was otherwise no evidence of the survey, and no basis on which
a patent could be issued.
The return to the General Land Office was a positive requirement of
law and a precedent condition to the acquirement of any rights under
the entry, failure in compliance with which was fatal to the legality of
the survey. Legal surveys only were affected by the provisions of the
second section.
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A survey not returned to the General Land Office on or before March
3, 1857, was not a legal survey. Notice to the world of the appropria-
tion of the land must have been given in the manner prescribed by the
statute, and a survey filed elsewhere than in the office designated by
law was not notice to anybody, and no rights could be established, main-
tained, or concluded in the absence of such notice filed in the General
Land Office within the prescribed time.
As a minor but no less effective, consideration it may be observed
that the office of the principal surveyor of the Virginia military district
is never termed a " land office." The descriptive words " land office "
and " general land office " are sometimes used convertibly; the words
" land office " and " office of the principal surveyor," etc., are never so
used.
The Land Office is an office of the government universally recognized
by this descriptive designation. The office of the principal surveyor of
the Virginia military district is not. This latter office is specifically
mentioned in the third section of the act, in relation to the record re-
quired by previous laws to be made in that office. The " General Land
Office" is also mentioned in said section, in the same relation as " land
office" is mentioned in the second section.
Obviously, there was no intention of confounding the General Land
Office with the office of the principal surveyor of the Virginia military
district, or of confusing the functions, duties, or obligations respectively
connected with those district offices.
An essential modification of a system that had been maintained from
the period of establishment of the boundary line of the Virginia mili-
tary district cannot be assumed by implication. The proposition to
which I have adverted appears to have been raised upon the point that
the initial letters of the words " land office" in the second section of the
statute are not printed in capitals. This is a mere clerical or typograph-
ical incident, and does not control the law. If it were of sufficient im-
portance to be mentioned, it might be stated that in the Report of the
Senate proceedings (Cong. Record, vol. 10, 2d sess. 46th Cong., p. 3572)
it is seen that this section as inserted in the bill by the Senate used the
words " Land Office," spelling the same with capital letters. The sub-
stitution of small letters was apparent fancy or accident of the copying
clerk.
The third section of the act of May 27, 1880, is not a revival of the
act of 1804. It is a new act and it is in effect and in fact a new grant.
The parties entitled to bounty lands under former laws, but whose
rights had lapsed by the efflux of time and the limitations of the stat-
utes, were allowed three years in which to make surveys in cases in
which by virtue of a proper warrant, entries had been made and duly
recorded on or before January 1, 1852, and where the surveys had not
been made previous to the passage of this act. The language of the
act is " shallbe allowed three years from and after the passage of this
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act to make and return their surveys,' etc. Such surveys were to be
recorded in the office of the principal surveyor, and the original platof
survey and the warrants or certified copies of warrants were to be filed
in the General Land Office in the same manner as formerly provided
by the act of 1804. This was the application of the old and familiar
method of the new grant.
An important limitation of the act is the restriction of its application
to cases where there had never been a survey and it is in such cases
only that a survey was authorized to be made in the manner and
within the time prescribed and patent authorized to be issued. Patents
could therefore be issued only on surveys made after the passage of the
act, and not on surveys made before the passage of the act.
Congress is presumed to be familiar with the subject-matter of its
legislation and the reasons which under the existing situation of titles
to lands in the Virginia military district would have sanctioned and in
justice and equity required; this limitation must be presumed to have
been the reasons which operated on the legislative mind in affixing such
limitation and restriction. After making an entry by virtue of their
warrants and obtaining surveys many parties neglected to return the
surveys and warrants to the General Land Office as required, and there-
fore never obtained legal title to the land. Whether this was mere
negligence or a design to escape taxation, is not material. The fact is
known to be that such title as the holders of entries or their assigns
originally had, passed by tax sales and otherwise to third parties and
their transferees and that the lands at the date of the passage of the
act of 1880, were as now the cultivated farms and homes of numerous
citizens.
To have authorized the issue of patents to the original holders of en-
tries or their immediate assigns who had slept on their rights for a
period of from twenty-five to seventy-five years would have been to
prefer stale equities to living rights and to provide a means of whole-
sale ejectment and dispossession of actual occupants and the speculative
acquirement after a life-long evasion of a participation in the ublie
burthens and, without compensation to the injured parties, of property
increased in value by the growth of population and the labor and means
of those who had lawfully nurtured and improved it under the protec-
tion of the laws of the State. Congress did not intend to perpetrate an
injustice of this magnitude and I find in this necessary inference a rea-
son which satisfies me that the proper construction of the third section
of the act of May 27, 1880, is that which follows the strict literal and
natural import of the words employed in the statute. If there were
any doubt upon this point it would be removed by a consideration of
the nature of the act, which I do not regard as of the essence of a re-
medial statute but as a grant de novo, operating upon lands that had
been released from all prior reservation for the satisfaction of military
claims. I do not, however, esteem the law doubtful. I do not think it
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the law or the intention of the law that ancient surveys not lawfully
returned prior to March 3, 1857, or surveys made without lawful author-
ity between March 3, 1857, and May 27, 1880, should be habilitated and
patents issue thereon under this act.
The third section comprises the sole existing authority for the issue
of patents on surveys founded on Virginia military warrants. It author-
izes patents to be issued in certain clearly defined cases; namely, where
the warrant was entered on or before January 1, 1852, and the survey
had not been made and returned to the General Land Office at the date
of the passage of the act, but should after that date be made and re-
corded in the office of the principal surveyor of the Virginia military
district and returned to the office of the Commissioner of the General
Land Office together with the original or certified copies of the war-
rants.
Patents can only be issued when specifically authorized bylaw. Spe-
cific authority is found in this section for the issue of patents in the
cases thus described in the statute. No authority exists under this act
for the issue of patents in any other case or class of cases, and if there
were any doubt upon this point it would still be my duty to decline to
issue patents in doubtful cases by the very reason of such doubt.
9 Applying the principles and views above set forth to the case pre-
sented by you, I find as follows:
1st. An entry appears to have been made by virtue of the warrant
prior to January 1, 1852, to wit: in or prior to 1822, and if so the case
is to that extent within the statute.
2d. The survey was made in 1822, as would appear from the pur-
ported copy now filed, but was not returned to the office of the Com-
missioner of the General Land Office on or before March 3, 1857, and so
far the case is not within the statute.
3d. There is no authority of law under which a patent can issue in
this case.
JEREMIAH HALL.*
Review of the case and statute, applicable thereto, and affirmance of Commissioner's
decision of May 9, 1882, ante.
Secretary Teller to Commissioner McFarland, January 31, 1883.
I have considered the appeal of Jeremiah Hall, esq., of Circleville,
Ohio, from your decision of May 9, 1882, refusing to issue a patent, upon
his application therefor as attorney of Samuel Ruggles et al., for 10
acres of-land in the Virginia military district in the State of Ohio.
The application was filed in your office on the 12th of May, 1880, and
is founded on survey No. 12096, made by virtue of Virginia military
land warrant, No. 584, for 200 acres, which warrant was granted for the
# See 4 L. D., 373.
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services of Aquilla Norvall, a sergeant of the Virginia Continental Line,
in the war of the Revolution.
The survey was made in the name of said Aquilla Norvall, and the
application for patent contains request that the patent be issued in his
name. -
The main question to be decided is does the law authorize the issue
of a patent on said survey No. 12096 A decision of this question
involves the consideration, in the light of existing law, of certain facts
relative to the warrant and survey by viitue of which patent is claimed.
In other words it becomes necessary to inquire whether said warrant
and survey have now any such vitality and force as would constitute
them a legal basis for the issue of patent as desired. It appears that
the survey was made on the 28th of December, 1822, and was recorded
in the office of the principal surveyor at Chillicothe, Ohio, on the 27th
of January, 1823. It is stated that both the warrant and the original
certificate of survey have been lost, and in lieu thereof an alleged
duplicate of copy of each was filed in your office with the application
for patent.
The paper filed as duplicate of survey is not certified, and does not
carry with it conclusive evidence that survey was made, or that it is
what it purports to be; but, as suggested by you, this technical defect
is one which might be cured, and therefore for the purpose of this de-
cision, which is to reach a conclusion on the main question, the case
will be treated as if the record were complete as to the fact of survey.
It is shown that the warrant, upon which the survey in question was
made, had not, at least as lately as December 1875, been satisfied.
Assuming that it has not yet been satisfied, the main question naturally
recurs-is there authority of law for its satisfaction at this late day
by the issue of patent on survey No. 120961 As long ago as August
10, 1790, Congress passed an act entitled "An act to enable the officers
and soldiers of the Virginia line on continental establishment to obtain
titles to certain lands lying northwest of the river Ohio, between the
Little Miami and Sciota." (1 Stat., 182.) This was followed by the
act of June 9, 1794 (1 Stat., 394), prescribing more particularly the
method of obtaining patents for such lands.
By the act of March 23, 1804 (2 Stat., 274), Congress placed certain
limitations upon the preceding acts. The second section of the act of
1804 required of those entitled to bounty land, or their legal representa-
tives, that to obtain patents they should "complete their locations
within three years," and " make return of his or their surveys to the
Secretary of the Department of War within five years after the pass-
ing of this act, and every person entitled to said lands, and thus ap-
plying, shall thereupon be entitled to receive a patent in the manner
prescribed by law."
These requirements were conditions precedent, and as such it was
necessary that they be strictly complied with before the benefits of the
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act could be enjoyed. This proposition rests upon a principle of law
too well recognized to need argument or citation in its support. The
implication of the law quoted from section 2 is that such of these
reserved lands as were not effectually appropriated within the time of
limitation were released from all claims for bounty lands, and became
subject to disposal by the United States the same as other public lands.
This, however, was not left to implication. Section 3 of the act specifi-
cally provided for the release from reservation and the disposal by the
United States of such of the reserved territory as had not been lo-
cated and the surveys whereof had not been returned within the time
prescribed by the act. As long ago as 1828, the supreme court, in the
case of Jackson v. Clark (1 Peters, 628), decided this to be the purpose
and effect of the law. In that case Chief Justice Marshall said:
Although then the military rights constituted the primary claim on
the trust, that claim was, according to the intention of the parties, so to
be satisfied as still to keep in view that other object, which was also a
vital interest.
That other object was the disposal by the United States, for the pur-
poses of another and a different trust, of the lands not appropriated
under the military trust, and on this point the Chief Justice remarked
that " unless some time might be prescribed, the other purposes of the
trust would be totally defeated, and the surplus land remain a wilder-
ness."
The fact (1) that Congress by the act of 1804 provided for the dis-
posal by the United States of all the lands in the Virginia military
reservation in Ohio not completely segregated and appropriated as
bounty lands by the location of warrants and the proper return of sur-
veys thereunder within a prescribed time, and (2) that it had a right
to make such disposal, being settled by so high an authority, the next
inquiry is, how was the act affected by subsequent legislation ?
Subsequent to 1804 successive acts, a dozen or more in number, were
from time to time passed, the principal features of which were provis-
ions extending the time for making locations, and for making and re-
turning surveys. Their general effect was to revive and continue in
force, for a limited time, the beneficial provisions of section 2 of the act of
1804. Section 3 of said act was not incorporated into any subsequent
act, but it was not repealed, and may properly be construed as a gen-
eral provision of law applicable to any subsequent act extending the
time of limitation, as well as to the act of which it forms a part, and for
the same reason. It could not become operative, even under the act of
which it was a part, until the expiration of limitation named in the act,
and when said limitation was by subsequent acts extended, such exten-
sions of time were in the nature of amendments to section 2 of the act
of 1804; and the effect was to further hold in abeyance section 3 of the
act until the expiration of limitation prescribed by said act and the
numerous acts amendatory thereto, after which it should, and did, be-
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come fully operative, according to its terms, in the same manner as if
there had been no legislation subsequent to the act of 1804 extending
the time for returning surveys. Following this view, the next question
suggested is, when did said section 3 take effect and become fully opera-
tive? It is unnecessary to review, or even to cite, all the intermediate acts
between 1804 and May 27, 1880, the date of latest legislative expression
relative to locations and surveys under continental warrant. It is suffi-
cient to say that they did not all coneet as to time of limitation-that
is, in some instances the limitation prescribed has expired and some
time elapsed before the passage of a subsequent act reviving and con-
tinuing the same. These omissions were remedied, however, by the first
section of the act of July 7, 1838 (5 Stat., 262), which, after further ex-
tending the time for completion of locations and return of surveys, also
provided that-
All entries and surveys which may have heretofore been made within
the said reservation, in satisfaction of any such warrants, on lands not
previously entered or surveyed, or on lands not prohibited from entry
and survey, shall be held to be good and valid, any omission heretofore
to extend the time for the making of such entries and surveys to the
contrary notwithstanding.
This provision of law was in terms revived and continued in force in
the several subsequent acts of extension down to and including the act
of February 20, 1850 (9 Stat., 421), which act named the 1st day of Jan-
uary, 1852, as the final limitation of time for the return of surveys and
for the operation of the proviso above quoted. After the last-mentioned
date, no entries could be made and no surveys could be returned. What,
then, became of the lands within the reservation which had not, at that
date, been effectually appropriated by the issue of patents or by loca-
tion and proper return of survey? Being no longer subject to entry as
bounty lands, were they to remain a barren wilderness-wild lands,
subject to no control-or were they released from reservation and sub-
ject to disposal by the United States? Manifestly the latter, and by
authority of section 3 of the act of 1804, which has never been repealed,
but which, being no longer held in abeyance by the numerous acts ex-
tending the time for locating Virginia military laud warrants and
returning surveys thereon, now becomes fully operative, and under its
operations located lands the surveys whereof had not been returned
to the General Land Office were as much at the disposal of the United
States as were those upon which no location had been made. The lands
thus subject to disposal must so remain until disposed of or until later
legislation changing the conditions. The next legislation in the nature
of extension of time to those entitled to Virginia military bounty lands
was the act of December 9, 1854 (10 Stat., 598). This act allowed those
who had made entries prior to January 1, 1852, two years from the
date of its passage in which to make and return their surveys of lands
covered by such entries. The provisions of the first section of the act
of 1838, relative to former entries and surveys, which had in all subse-
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quent acts down to that of 1850 been re-enacted and continued in force
are not found in the act of 1854. This act omitted to mention sur-
veys made prior to its passage. It did not, as did the preceding acts,
provide for the return of "surveys which may have heretofore been
made," but did provide for the making and returning of surveys on en-
tries made prior to January 1, 1852. In other words, it had sole refer-
ence to such surveys as might be made subsequent to the date of its
passage and within two years therefrom.
Now, it cannot be presumed that Congress inadvertently, or without
purpose, made the omission. Its purpose must have been to exclude
surveys made prior to the passage of the act. Such is the plain import
of the language of the act. On the 3d of March, 1855, Congress passed
another act (10 Stat., 701), the first section of which is a repetition in
identical words of the act of 1854, except that it further extends the
time for making and returning surveys by allowing two years from and
after its passage for such purpose. The second section repeals the act
of 1854, evidently for the reason that, this act having taken its place,
there was no longer any occasion for its existence. So we still find no
provision since the act of 1850 for returning old surveys.
The next act relative to these lands was that of February 18, 1871
(16 Stat., 416), providing for the cession to the State of Ohio. upon cer-
tain conditions, of such of them as remained unsurveyed and unsold.
This act in effect recognized the force of section 3 of the act of 1804
and the authority of the United States to dispose of the unappro-
priated lands in the Virginia military district in Ohio, and simply pre-
scribes the manner and direction of the disposal of certain of those
lands.
This brings me to a consideration, in its chronological order, of the
act of May 27, 1880 (21 Stat., 142), and its effect upon the survey in
question. The purpose of this act was, among other things, "to con-
strue and define" the act of 1871. In so doing it limited the cession
to the State to lands-
Unappropriated, and not included in any survey or entry within said
district, which survey or entry was founded upon military warrant or
warrants upon continental establishment.
This excepted (1) all lands which had been appropriated by patent
or by location and legal return of survey, and (2) all lands covered by
entry or survey which had not been legally returned. This second ex-
ception did not rest on any want of legal title in the United States to
the lands described, but was evidently made on the ground of policy
and in recognition of certain equitable rights which during a long
series of years had grown up in the occupants of said lands. The act, as
a whole, like that of 1871, recognized the vitality and operation of the
third section of the act of 1804, by authorizing the disposal to the
State. If the title were not in the government, how could it, by cession
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or otherwise, confer title; and if it did not have the right of disposal,
how could it make disposal as the act provided it should!
Section 2 of the act of 1880 declared valid "all legal surveys returned
to the Land Office on or before March 3, 1857, on entries made on or
before January , 1852." This section, like the preceding one, was in-
tended to protect certain equitable rights which by purchase and occu-
pation has attached to the lands covered by such surveys. If patent
had issued, the title of occupants holding thereunder should not be
attacked because of some technical defect in the preliminary proceed-
ings leading to that patent. If no patent had issued, the occupant,
holding under an equitable title coming to him by purchase, and hav-
ing possibly for its original foundation a tax title from the State, or
perchance a contract of purchase from the person in whose name the
survey was made, shall be protected and remain in undisturbed pos-
session, even though the actual amount of land in any case be in ex-
cess of that authorized by the warrant on which the survey was made.
Section 2 finds a basis in the maxim that " the law favors quiet and
repose." Under it the applicant for patent in this case can have no
claim, for it contains no provision authorizing the issue of patents; and
if it contained such provision, the applicant would not be benefited
thereby, because the survey under which he claims was not returned to
your office prior to March 3,1857. It is contended, for the applicant,
that the words "land office," as found in the section, mean the office of
the principal surveyor of the Virginia military district at Chillicothe,
and that as the survey No. 12096 had been filed in that office prior to
1857, it is valid within the meaning of the law. The fallacy of this
proposition has been so clearly set forth in your decision that I deem
its farther discussion unnecessary. It is sufficient to say that, in the
light of all previous legislation relative to the return of these surveys,
as well as in view of the manifest propriety and necessity of such papers
lodging in the General Land Office (in order that they may become
complete public notice of the fact of survey), there can, I think, be no
doubt that by the term " land office," as used in section 2, is meant the
General Land Office.
Does the application come within the provisions of the third section
of the act of 1880? That section allows three years from and after the
passage of the act in which "to make and return" surveys on entries
made "on or before January 1, 1852."7 It will be observed that it con-
tains two restrictions as to time: First, the entries must have been
prior to January 1, 1852; and second, the survey must be made and re
turns within three years from and after the passage of the act. The
latter restriction clearly excludes the application under consideration,
for the reason that the survey upon which it is based was made long
anterior to the passage of the act of 1880, to wit, in December, 1822.
The remarks made on foregoing pages hereof as to the effect of the
acts of 1854 and 1855, are applicable in this connection, and need not be
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enlarged upon. In this act, as in those, the language " from and after
the passage of this act to make and return their surveys" occurs, and
for reasons already given relates exclusively to surveys made after the
passage of the act. On such surveys only can patents properly issue.
The tenor of the act as a whole clearly indicates that Congress had
in view the protection and preservation of certain equitable titles to
lands within the Virginia military district in Ohio, which were held by
persons who had come into possession in the belief that they had ac-
quired full legal title. It is not to be supposed that any part of the act
having this object in view is by a strained construction to be given
such effect as would defeat and destroy the very equities it was de-
signed to protect. In other words, Congress did not intend to place in
the law a section which, as between stale equities based upon old sur-
veys made twenty-five or fifty, or, as in this case, sixty years ago, and
allowed to slumber ever since, and living rights based upon purchase
and occupancy, would favor the former to the destruction of the latter.
In these considerations is found the reason of the law for the exclusion
of surveys made prior to the passage of the act, they being surveys from
thirty to seventy-five years old. I find no authority of law for the grant-
ing of patent as asked on survey 12096, in the Virginia military dis-
trict in Ohio, and yourdecision is, for the reasons herein stated, affirmed.
MILITARY BOUNTY LAND WARRANTS.
JOHN F. TIPTON.
-The only act of Congress which confers authority to issue patents for such lands is
that of May 27, 1880, which is restricted to cases of entries made prior to January
1, 1852, and not surveyed.
Commissioner McFarland to John F. T'ipton, Bloomington, Ill., April 3,
1882.
You are informed in answer to your letter of the 10th February last,
that an examination of the records of this office shows that entry No.
386 for 1,000 acres of land intheVirginia military district, Ohio, founded
on Virginia military land warrant No. 738, for 7,000 acres, issued to
Mace Clements, a surgeon in the continental line in the war of the Rev-
olution, was made by him August 1,1787, andsame carried into survey in
his name November 13, 1787, which was "examined and recorded" in
the surveyor's office of said district, March 28, 178S, but never returned
to this office for patents.
You are further advised that there is now no authority of law for the
issue of a patent in the case, should the said survey, etc., be now re-
turned for such purpose.
The only existing act of Congress which confers authority to issue
patents for lands in the said Virginia military district, Ohio, is that
20309-VOL 1-2
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approved May 27, 1880, and this by express terms is restricted to cases
of entries made prior to January 1, 1852, and not surveyed. It author-
izes the survey of such entries at any time within three years from and
after the passage of the act, and the return thereof to the surveyor's
office for record; and upon the filing of the plats and certificates, war-
rants, or certified copies of warrants, at this office, the persons entitled
may receive patents for the same.
The entry of Mace Clements having been carried into survey long
anterior to the said act of May 27, 1880, is not embraced in the pro-
visions thereof authorizing the issue of patents.
DELrVERY OF PATENT-IYCOMPLETE RECORD.
ANTONIO D. MARTINEZ ET AL.
When patents have been prepared, signed by the President's secretary, countersigned
by the recorder, except that the day and month of signing and sealing the
President's name and the signatures of his secretary and of the recorder have not
been inserted, the record is incomplete, the title has not passed, and delivery of
patent cannot be legally demanded.
Commissioner HcFarland to Messrs. Wilshire & Sibbald, Washington,,
D. C., SMay 24,1882.
I have duly considered your application and demand of 27th ul-
timo, in which as attorneys for claimants you seek the delivery to
you of certain patents which you allege to have been heretofore exe-
cuted by the proper officers of the United States upon entries made in
the Pueblo land district, Colorado, to wit:
Final certificate No. 789, dated April 2, 1881 (homestead application
No. 1783), by Antonio D. Martinez, for southwest i sec. 32, T. 33 S., R.
63 W., th P. M., containing 160 acres.
* * * * * * *
You represent that said respective entrymen have in all respects
complied with the law, and that said patents were on the 15th day of
March, 1882, transmitted by my letter of that date to the President of
the United States, to be executed by him, and were executed on that
day in the manner prescribed by law, and on the same day were counter-
signed by the proper recording officer of this office and duly recorded
and have not been transmitted to said patentees.
An examination of said patents shows that they are signed for the
President by his secretary, and countersigned by the recorder of this
office; have the seal of this office attached, and are noted as having been
recorded in vol. 8 on certain pages thereof. The day and month of the
signing and sealing is still in blank, suchk dates not having been in-
serted in the patents.
The patent record is incomplete in that the day and month of the
signing and sealing of the patents, the President's name, and the sig-
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natures of his secretary and of the recorder of the General Land Office
have not been filled in.
It appears that on the 21st of March last John Mullan, of counsel for
coalland contestants, addressed ajetter to me, stating in substance that
the lands described in said entries would be contested as being of coal
lands, and that affidavits in support thereof would be forwarded by
mail, and asked that patents should not issue for the next few days in
order to enable said affidavits to reach this office.
The completion of patents and the record thereof was at once ss-
pended, and on March 27th affidavits were filed here alleging that the
lands covered by said entries were valuable coal lands; valueless for
agricultural purposes, and that no person resided thereon July 10, 1875,
nor since that date, nor had the land ever been improved by plowing,
breaking or otherwise, and that the proceedings for patents were fraud-
ulent.
The district land officers at Pueblo, Colo., were, on the 8th ultimo,
directed to order a hearing, under usual course of procedure, to deter-
mine the character of the land and the good faith of the homestead
claimants; and completion of the patents (in the condition aforesaid)
was suspended. w
The character of the affidavits submitted (and which were mailed to
the district land office for use at the trial) is such as to make it my clear
duty to suspend issue of patents and order such hearing unless the
patents have passed beyond Executive control, and thereby are subject
to delivery to the parties named therein as patentees, and the title to
the land has consequently passed from the jurisdiction of the Executive
Department of the government.
You insist that the patents have been duly executed; that they bear
on their face by indorsement that they have been signed, sealed, and
recorded, giving page of record, and that these are attested by the sig-
nature of the recorder; and that these things having been done, there
is nothing left to the discretion of this office; but the duty mandatory
under the statutes, as construed by the supreme court, of completing
the record and delivering the patents, remains.
In support of this construction of the law you refer to the cases of
McGarrahan v. New Idria Mining Company, p. 590, Lewis's Leading
Cases, Leroy v. Clayton, pp. 599 to 601 and 602, Lewis's Leading Cases
and to McBride v. Schurz, decided by the supreme court of the United
States and found in Copp's Land Owner, vol. 7, page 152; also to certain
other authorities.
You rely upon the case of MeGarrahan v. New Idria Mining Com-
pany, as establishing that when the patent has been signed by the
President, countersigned by the recording officer, and sealed with the
seal of the General Land Office, the patent is complete, and that the
last act required to complete the patent is the countersigning by the
recorder.
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It must be borne in mind while seeking direction from this decision,
that the point before the court and under discussion was whether the
record kept in this office for the recording of patents and relied upon
by McGarrahan, proved a conveyance by the United States of the land
in controversy; that MeGarrahan contended that the record was of itself
a grant; or ,if not, that it proved the issue of a patent which did grant
the legal title to the property involved.
In discussing the case the court said:
The record of this patent is evidence of the grant, but not the grant
itself. It is evidence of equal dignity with the patent, because, like the
patent, it shows that a patent containing the grant had been issued.
The record called for by the act of Congress is made by copying the
patent to be issued into a book kept for that purpose. The effect of the
record, therefore, is to show that an instrument such as is there copied
has actually been prepared for issue from the General Land Office. If
the instrument as recorded is sufficient on its face to pass the title, it is
presumed that the grant has actually been made; but if it is not suffi-
cient no such presumption arises.
The public records of the Executive Departments of the government
are not like those kept pursuant to ordinary registration laws intended
for notice, but for the preservation of the evidence of the transactions
of the Department.
The court found that the record did not show a patent countersigned
by the recorder, and thatit (the record) was not sufficient to prove title
in the party under whom McGarrahan claimed.
So far as said reasoning of the court can find any application in this
case, it sows that when a patent has been issued, a correct record
thereof is presumed to have been made in this office, and that a copy of
an incomplete record cannot prove the issue of a patent. To illustrate:
a copy of the record of the patents now in question would not prove
their issue.
In the case of Le Roy v. Charles Clayton et al., 2 Sawyer, 493 (Lewis's
Leading Cases, 598), the leading points passed upon by the courtrelate,
first, to the power of the Commissioner to cancel a patent after the party
entitled had refused to accept it and with his consent; and, second, his
power to cancel without the consent of the patentee. It was decided
affirmatively as to the first and negatively as to the second proposition;
but in both the patents were fully recorded and the patents completed
in all respects. That case is not identical with the one under consider-
ation, and the points decided are not those now presented. It is true
the court said:
The patent of March 1, 1870, took effect from the moment it was
signed by the President and passed the great seal, certainly from the
time it was recorded in the proper record and dispatched to the sur-
veyor-general of California to be delivered to the claimants. But this
is manifestly no guide in the present case.
This language was directed to a state of facts entirely different from
that under discussion, and even were it otherwise, it would be necessa-
rily regarded as of dubious import.
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In fact no case cited by you as authority for your present demand
constitutes a clear precedent for my action in this case.
The most recent decision relied upon is that of McBride v. Schurz.
But this case only involved the duty of the delivery of a patent, about
the perfection of which as well as the record thereof there was no ques-
tion.
The court, however, decided that title passed by matter of record.
Referring to the officers of the Land Department the court said:
From the very nature of the functions performed by these officers,
and from the fact that a transfer of title from the United States to an-
other owner follows their favorable action, it must result that at some
stage or other of the proceedings their authority in the matter ceases.
It is equally clear that this period is at the latest, precisely when the
last act in the series essential to the transfer of title has been performed.
Whenever this takes place the land has ceased to be the land of the
government, or, to speak in technicallanguage,thelegaltitlehaspassed
from the government and the power of these officers to deal with it has
also passed away.
In the case of Marbury v. Madison, this court was of opinion that
when the commission of an officer was signed by the President and the
seal of the United States affixed to it, the commission was complete,
and the officer appointed entitled to its possession, so that he could en-
force its delivery by the writ of mandamus. In regard to patents for
land it may be somewhat different, and it is not necessary in this case
to go quite so far. But we may well consider that in all nations, as far
as we know, where grants of the property of the government or of the
Crown are made by written instruments provision is made for a record
of these instruments in some public government office.
Our experience in regard to Mexican, Spanish, and French grants of
parts of the public domain purchased by us from those governments
teaches us that such is the uniform law of those countries.
We have already shown that underthe English lawsall letters patent
are enrolled, and that this is the last act in the process of issuing a
patent which is essential to its validity.
The acts of Congress provide for the record of all patents for land in
an office and in books kept for that purpose. An officer, called the re-
corder, is appointed by law to make and to keep these records. This offi-
cer is required to record every patent before it is issued and to counter-
sign the instruments to be delivered to the grantee.
This, then, is the final record of the transaction, the legally appointed
act which completes what Sir William Blackstone calls title by record;
and when this is done the grantee is invested with that title.
While this case is not identical with that under consideration, yet it
was necessary for its adjudication to determine at what stage of pro-
ceedings in the preparation of a patent the authority of the Executive
officer ceased.
The court undertook to decide, and in my judgment did decide, just
when that authority ceased, and the party claimant became entitled to
his patent. Its decision was that " title did not pass by delivery of the
patent, but that the title was ' title by record,' and that the grantee was
invested with that title when the record and patent were complete."
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The court said, referring to the recorder:
This officer is required to record every patent before it is issued and
to countersign the instrumentto bedeliveredtothe grantee. This, then,
is final record of the transaction, etc.
From this language you insist i follows that the patent having been
countersigned by the recorder, such last act has been performed; that
your clients are invested with title and delivery of patents is due.
The court, however, cannot be interpreted as intending by said lan-
guage to, specify the exact order of proceedings necessary in the issue
of a patent. It referred to said acts of recording and countersigning as
being the last acts essential to the record; and the gist of the opinion,
as I understand it, is that when these last acts have all been performed,
and nothing further is left to be done by this office in preparing, sign-
ing, sealing, and recording the patent, the " title of record " passes and
the delivery of a patent becomes a duty concerning which no discre-
tion can be exercised by the Executive officers, and no further jurisdic-
tion over the land remains in them.
The several acts of recording and countersigning and sealing the
patent are substantially contemporaneous, and altogether constitute
the title of record. The fact that any one of those acts in the order of
the proceedings is prior or subsequent to some other of said acts, all of
which are essential, and together constitute one complete proceeding,
is, in my opinion, immaterial; and until all of said acts, including the
perfection of the record, have been completed, the title remains in the
United States and in the jurisdiction of this Department.
In fact, in this case, the completion of said record was designedly
postponed in order to retain the jurisdiction essential to a determina-
tion of the questions raised by the affidavits alleging fraud.
I therefore decline to deliver said patents, and would add that after
your demand for their delivery, to wit, on the 2d instant, my previous
order for a hearing was suspended to await the disposition of the ques-
tions raised by you.
Your appeal from this ruling will be entertained, under the rules of
practice.
DELIVEIY OF PATEANT-NCOMPLETE RECORD.
ANTONIO D. MARTINEZ.
Until the record of the completed patent has been made, the Executive has retained
something of jurisdictional authority. The Department has not power to direct
the Commissioner to deliver the unrecorded patent. Commissioner's decision of
May 24, 1882, affirmed.
Secretary Teller to Commissioner JMceFarland, ]larcl 26, 1883.
I have considered the appeal of Messrs. Wilshire and Sibbald, at.
torneys for homestead claimants, from your decision of May 24 last,
declining to deliver certain undated patents, the records thereof not
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having been perfected, issued in the name of Antonio D. Martinez and
others. The appeal is in the nature of a motion for a mandamus to the
Secretary to compel the Commissioner to'deliver certain undated pat-
ents, of which there is no record-because an incomplete record is not a
record-in your office. The facts, which are undisputed, are set forth in
your opinion, and need not be repeated; and upon these facts a ques-
tion of law arises, whether the unrecorded patent is, under the circum-
stances, such a one as a court would compel the Commissioner or the
Secretary to deliver. I am of the opinion that no court would direct
either yourself or myself to give up possession of the paper which these
homestead claimants now seek. Whatever bearing the cases cited by
the attorneys for the claimants in their brief or oral argument may
have upon the question involved in this case I deem it unimportant to
discuss, as I am convinced that the case of the United States v. Schurz
(12 Otto, 378), from which you largely quote to sustain your conclusion,
completely disposes of the present application, because it shows the
latest views of the supreme court of the United States on the power of
the Land Department over patents and records by which title to public
lands from the United States is acquired, and sets forth the extent of
the jurisdiction of the supreme court of the District over the acts of
Executive officers of the government in general, and in what cases it
is the duty of the Secretary of the Interior to deliver patents when
demanded. From this decision it must be ascertained what would be
the result of an application for a mandamus by the claimants to the
supreme court of the District on a refusal by the Commissioner to deliver
an unrecorded patent. Thatcourt, following the language of the United
States v. Schurz, would doubtless hold that the Commissioner has not
exercised finally his discretion in the case at bar; his last official act
necessary to transfer title to the claimants has not been performed;
one of the conditions precedent to the issuing of patents from the Gen-
eral Land Office has not been observed, namely, the record of the com-
pleted patent has not been made in the book kept for that purpose (R.
S., 458), and until that is done the Executive has still retained some-
thing in the nature of judicial authority. The value of a delivered and
presumably recorded patent is really the question discussed by the ap-
pellant's attorneys, but that is a different question from that presented
by the record, which is, whether I have power to direct you to deliver
the unrecorded patent to the claimants, which in my opinion would be
a violation of the law.
It will be noticed that I have not discussed the question whether the
undated paper is technically a patent or not; that seems to me to be
unnecessary, inasmuch, as accepting the views of the appellants on that
subject, I still believe that I would have no right to direct you to deliver
the patent before the record of the same is made in your office.
The appeal is dismissed.
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HOMESTEAD-ABSENCE ON ACCOUNT OF DROUGHT.
MARTIN A. ADAaiS.
A homestead party absent on account of severe drought, under act of June 4, 1880,
was constructively residing upon his land, and in case the statutory period of five
years' settlement and cultivation expired during such absence final proof may be
made as though he were actually residing upon the land claimed.
fommissioner 1ilcFarland to register and receiver, Larned,Kansas, Noven-
ber 3, 1881.
I am in receipt of your letter of June 28, 1881, transmitting, on ap-
peal from the decision of your office, the final proof papers of Martin
A. Adams for the NW. , 28, 21, 21 W., rejected by you for the reason
that the claimant absented himself from the tract in question in July,
1880, under the act of June 4,1880, and has not since that time returned
thereto to resume and perfect his settlement, as required by the first
section of said act.
It appears that Martin A. Adams made homestead entry 507 on above
described land March 14, 1876, and has resided upon and cultivated the
same since December 12, 1875; that he lost his crops in the year of 1879
and also in the year 1880, on account of the severe and unusual drought
in those years, and that he was therefore compelled to go away to work
in order to support his family. I am of the opinion that the act of
June 4,1880, does not contemplate that in cases where homestead claim-
ants have left their claims under the said act by reason of extreme
drought, and where the five years from date of entry would have ex-
pired during said absence, the parties should be required to return to
their land and live thereon before being allowed to make final proof,
but rather that they are to be considered as constructively residing
upon the land embraced in their entries.
Your decision is therefore reversed, andyou will, upon payment of the
commissions due, issue final papers in the case.
HOMESTEAD-ADDITIrO.V ETRY.
ANNIE ANDERSON.
The act of March 3, 1879, comprehends and includes all persons who in any manner by
original entry or by operation of law have succeeded to the right to make fi-
nal proof.
Secretary Kirkwood to Commissioner McFarland, December 19, 1881.
I have considered the appeal of Annie Anderson (formerly Anie
Middleton) from your predecessor's decision of February 8, 1881, reject-
ing her application, as widow of Joshua Middleton, deceased, to make
additional homestead entry of the S. of NW. i of Sec. 14, T. 18, R.
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14 W., Grand Island district, Nebraska, under act of March 3, 1879.
(20 Stat., 472.)
Joshua Middleton made homestead entry No. 7338, February 20, 1878,
of the N. of the NW. i of said section, and appears to have complied
with the requirements of the law to the date of his death, October 15,
1878.
The reason given by your office for rejecting the claim was that the
right conferred by this act is a personal one, limited to the individual
who made the original homestead entry.
The act provides for additional entry upon prescribed conditions by
"any person who has, under existing laws, taken a homestead on any
even section within the limits of any railroad or military road land
grant," etc. Its provisions are remedial, and while the beneficiaries
take by descriptive words, thus confining the grant to a personal right,
the spirit of the act must be observed in recoonizing whomsoever may
have been proper objects of relief, if pointed out with reasonable clear-
ness by the descriptive language employed.
I am of the opinion that the words " who has under existing laws
taken a homestead" comprehend and include all persons who in any
manner, by original entry or by operation of law, have succeeded to
the right to make final proof and payment of fees and take the patent
for the land. As this right is cast upon the widow by operation of law,
she must be held to have taken the homestead under existing laws, and
should not by narrow and inequitable construction be deprived of the
benefit of the amendatory statute.
Your decision is accordingly reversed.
(Qz t .,q,/9HOMESTEAD-ACT OF JUNE 15, 1880.
?;L T i a- GEORGE W. MLUJGHAN.*
Purchase may be made under the second section of the act of June 15, 1880, though
the entry was void at inception.
Commissioner McFarland to register and receiver, Benson, 11innesota,
August 25, 1881.
It appears from our records that George W. Maughan made home-
stead entry No. 10236, December 10. 1879, N. i, SW. 1, Sec. 22, T. 124,
R. 43. The homestead affidavit was made before the clerk of the court,
the party alleging that he was a single man and was residing on the
land which he desired to enter.
In the case of Peter G. Gorden v. Maughan, involving the above-
described entry, anl now pending before this office on appeal, you de-
cided that the party had failed to meet the requirements of the statute
in regard to residence and cultivation, and that the entry was void
from its inception, for the reason that the testimony showed that the
claimant was not residing upon the land at the date of his entry.
* This decision was affirmed by the Secretary, April 28, 1882.
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I am in receipt of your letter of the 16th ultimo, transmitting the
application of Maughan to make cash entry of the land in question under
the second section of the act of June 15, 1880, on appeal from your de-
ciSioD rejecting the same on the ground that you held the entry to be
invalid in its inception.
It is now held by this office that a party having made entry of land,
properly subject to such entry, prior to the passage of the act of June
15, 1880, is entitled to make cash entry of the land, under the second
section of said act, although the homestead entry may have been in.
valid in its inception. You are therefore directed to allow Maughan
to make cash entry of said land, and when the purchase money is paid
and the entry made of record promptly report the fact to this office.
DESERT LAND-FINAL PROOF.
WALLACE v. BOYCE.
In the desert land act the intendment of the statute is to provide for the reclamation
of such lands from their desert condition to an agricultural state. Congress
specified water as the means to that end, but the mere conveying of water upon
the land is not a fulfillment of the law unless in sufficient quantity to prepare
such land for cultivation. The final proof must show that it has been so re-
claimed.
Secretary Teller to Commissioner McFarland, August 2, 1882.
Pursuant to departmental order of August 12, 1881, in the case of
William Wallace v. James R. Boyce, involving desert land entry No.
62 of the W. J of SE. i and SW. 1 of See. 2S, T. 10 N., R. 3 W., Helena
district, Montana Territory, a hearing was had at the local office No-
vember 10, 1881, to the end that Wallace might have an opportunity to
verify his allegations touching Boyce's failure to comply in good faith
with legal requirements.
It appears that Boyce made final proof, F. C., No. 42, September 1,
1880, whereupon Wallace filed affidavit of contest alleging (1) that the
defendant had not reclaimed and cultivated said land as required by
the desert land act; (2) that he was not the owner of enough water to
irrigate his land; (3) that he was not the owner of a ditch or ditches
from the source of supply to the land; (4) that the ditches through
which the water was conveyed were not of sufficient capacity to prop-
erly irrigate the entire tract.
The act in question, commonly called the desert land act (19 Stat.,
377), prescribes "that it shall be lawful for any citizen of the United
States, . . . . upon payment of twenty-five cents per acre,
to file a declaration under oath" with the proper register and re-
ceiver-
That he intends to reclaim a tract of desert land, not exceeding one
section, by conducting water upon the same, within the period of three
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years thereafter: Provided, however, that the right to the use of water
by the person so conducting the same, on or to any tract of desert land
of six hundred and forty acres, shall depend upon bona fide prior ap-
propriation; and such right shall not exceed the amount of water act-
ually appropriated and necessarily used for the purpose of irrigation
and reclamation, etc.
A careful examination of the testimony adduced at the hearing dis-
closes substantially the same state of facts that existed at the date of
the initiation of contest, excepting perhaps that the capacity of Boyce's
main ditch had been materially diminished meantime by reason of ob-
structions of tailings and debris from the mines along the upper part
of Dry Gulch, from which source Boyce indirectly derived his water,
not by virtue of a "bona fide prior appropriation," but by mere suffer-
ance. It thus appears that the only improvements upon the tract evi-
dencing any intention on his part to reclaim the same from its desert
state consist of a main ditch and two lateral furrows (from which the
loose earth had never been removed), and that only about fifty of the
two hundred and forty acres could be properly irrigated thereby.
You state that-
Though this office deemed it proper, in preparing the final proof
blank forms under said act, to insert questions as to the cultivation
and growing of agricultural crops upon the lands entered
there is nothing in the language of the statute requiring proof of cul-
tivation or of the growing of agricultural crops upon the land entered
as a prerequisite to the issuance of patent therefor.
It would appear from this finding that you regard the instructions
as in contravention of law. I do not so construe the act. The law
allows entry for the purpose of reclaiming by irrigation lands that
without such reclamation will not produce any agricultural crop. The
final proof must show that it has been so reclaimed "by conducting
water upon the same" as required. The forms of proof are drawn with
direct reference to the proof of such facts as will show compliance by
showing results. They are clearly in furtherance of the law, and au-
thorized by the power to make all proper regulations to enforce in the
land administration whatever is not specifically prescribed by statute.
Besides, these regulations were promulgated by your office with ex-
press approval of the head of the department, and you are not author-
ized to declare them void or violative of the law.
-S The primal question to be determined is the signification of the word
" reclaim," as the same is used in the statute. It is presumable that
Congress used this word in its ordinary acceptation, which, according
to Webster, is:
To reduce by discipline, labor, cultivation, or the like, to a desired
state; to rescue from being wild, desert, waste, submerged, or the like;
as to reclaim wild land, overflowed land, etc.
Hence, I am of the opinion that the intendment of the statute is to
provide for the reclamation of such lands from their desert condition to
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an agricuttural state. Congress specified water as the means to that
end, but the mere conveying of water upon the land is not a fulfillment
of the law, unless in sufficient quantity to prepare such land for culti-
vation. It would be imputing a vain intent to the statute to interpret
the same as requiring a mere occasional seepage of water upon such
land, which in itself would not materially change the original status
of the same so far as agricultural purposes are concerned.
Inasmuch as it has been proved to my satisfaction that Boyce has
failed to comply in good faith with what I conceive to be the require-
ments of the statute his entry should be canceled. >4X
Your decision is accordingly reversed.
DESBRT LAND ETRY-NONY-ASSIGNABLE.
CHARLES BOWLING.
The desert land act restricts entries to six hundred and forty acres each, and prohibits
one person from making more than one entry.
To recognize the assignability of desert land claims would be to acquiesce in an eva-
sion of the law and to enable one person to acquire the title to an amount of land
in excess of the legal limitation.
Commissioner ll6c1arland to the register and receiver. Lake View, Oregon,
Aarch 2, 1883.
I am in receipt of the register's letter of November 29,1882, in which
he states that Mr. Charles Bowling, Fort McDermit, Nev., claims to be
the assignee of three desert land entries made at your office, to wit:
No. 3 made by Moses Seigle, September 3, 187 ; No. 7 made by Arthur
W. Fisk, October 8, 1877, and No. 11 made by Cornelius Ryan, May 7,
1878, all upon unsurveyed land in T. 41 S., R. 42 E., in the State of Ore-
gon near the line of the Fort McDermit hay reserve.
The register states that Mr. Bowling desires to submit final proof for
the land, and asks instructions from this office in regard to the matter.
The desert land act restricts entries to six hundred and forty acres
each, and prohibits one person from making more than one entry.
To recognize the assignability of desert land claims would be to ac-
quiesce in an evasion of the law and to enable one person to acquire
title to an amount of land in excess of the legal limitation.
It has been held by the honorable Secretary of the Interior that
desert land claims are not assignable, and that no rights pass to the
purchaser when such assignments are made, S. W. Downey (2 C. L. L.
1381).
The application of Mr. Bowling is accordingly rejected.
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HOMESTEAD-ADDITIONAL ENTRY.
EDWIN D. SEWALL.
A homestead claimant, otherwise qualified, may make an additional homestead'entry
under the act of March 3, 1879, notwithstanding his original homestead entry
was changed to a cash entry under the act of June 15, 1880.
Acting Commissioner Holcomb to register and receiver, Fergus Falls,
Minnesota, July 1, 1881.
W"ith your letter of April 16, 1881, you transmitted proof made by
Edwin D. Sewall, under circular of this office, dated September 20,
1879, for the purpose of securing his right to an additional homestead
entry under act of March 3, 1879, his original entry No. 3862, N. 4 of
SW. i sec. 20, T. 128, R. 45, having been made March 19,1878, at which
time he was restricted by law to 80 acres, the land being of the double
minimum or $2.50 class.
By my letter " C, of the 29th of April, you were instructed to allow
the additional entry, although the party had not fully complied with
legal requirements respecting residence upon his original homestead.
Under date of May 14, 1881, you inform this office that Mr. Sewall
immediately after making the proof referred to above and filing his ap-
plication for an additional entry, made cash entry No. 2266, under act
of June 15, 1880, for the land embraced in his original entry, and you
ask whether under existing circumstances *' he is entitled to an addi-
tional entry under act of March 3, 1879; and, if so, what conditions are
necessary for him to obtain patent for the tract."
I am of opinion that the party's right to make an additional entry
under the act of March 3, 1879, remains, though he may have changed
his original homestead to a cash entry under the act of June 15, 1880.
Upon making such additional entry the party will be required to es-
tablish an actual residence upon the land embraced therein and con-
tinue the same with cultivation for such time as may be necessary with
the residence upon and cultivation of his original homestead, prior to
date of cash entry, to aggregate the full legal period of five years.
The act of March 3, 1879, provides that i' any person who has, under
existing laws, taken a homestead on any even section within the limits
of any railroad or military road land grant, and who by existing laws
shall have been restricted to eighty acres, may enter, under the home-
stead laws, an additional eighty acres adjoining the land embraced in
his original entry, if such additional land be subject to entry."
You will observe that the only conditions precedent are that the origi-
nal entry shall have been made prior to the approval of the act; that
the land entered shall have been of the class described; that the party
shall, at date of original entry, have been restricted by existing laws to
eighty acres, and that the land applied for must be contiguous to the
original homestead and subject to entry.
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In the case under consideration the conditions necessary to entitle the
party to additional privileges are shown to exist, and the party is un-
doubtedly entitled to avail himself of those privileges, although his origi-
nal homestead has been changed to a cash entry.
A party who had thus changed his homestead entry could not make
a new entry under the act of March 3, 1879, for the reason that there
is no provision of law under which a valid cash entry may be surren-
dered, and the act referred to requires that a party seeking to make a
new entry under its provisions must surrender his original entry to the
United States for cancellation before the right to make a new entry can
be extended to him. You will inform Mr. Sewali respecting his rights
as set forth herein, and in letter "C," of April 29, 1881, referred to
above.
In future, when submitting cases of any kind to this office, you are
requested to state fully all facts respecting the same, that instructions
necessary may be based upon a thorough knowledge of the case in point.
Your failure t embody, in your letter transmitting Mr. Sewall's proof, a
statement of the fact that he had availed himself of the privilege granted
by act of June 15, 1880 (your returns for the month in which his cash
entry was made not having reached this office at date of my letter of
April 29, 1881), was, to say the least, a careless act, and might have
caused this office to commit a serious error. District officers are ex-
pected to exercise great care in thesubmission of special cases, and make
in their letters of transmittal full and impartial statements of all facts
respectingthe same with special reference to the questions of points upon
which they desire information or instruction.
3J MILITARY RESERFATION-ENTRY-POWER OF PRESIDENT.
Where a homestead entry of public lands has been made by a settler the land so en-
tered cannot, whilst such entry stands, be set apart by the President for a mili-
tary reservation, even prior to the completion of full title in the settler. But
lands covered by a pre-emption filing may be so set apart any time prior to proof
and payment.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
Washington, D. ., July 15, 1881.
SIR: By a letter received from the chief clerk of your Department,
dated the 27th of May last, inclosing papers relative to the proposed
withdrawal of lands for a military reservation on the Rio de la Plata,
in Colorado I am informed that you desire my opinion upon this ques-
tion:
Where public lands have been surveyed, and pre-emption filings or
homestead entries have been made in accordance with law, may the
Executive, prior to the completion of full title in the settler, set apart
and declare a military reservation embracing the lands of said settler?
I have now the honor to state to you my views thereon:
That the President has ower to reserve from sale and to set apart,
for public uses, such portions of the public domain as are required by
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the exigencies of the public service to be appropriated to those uses
is too well established to admit of doubt. In the case of Grisar v.
McDowell (6 Wall., 381), the supreme court remark:
From an early period.in the history of the government it has been
the practice of the President to order, from time to time, as the exigen-
cies of the public service required, parcels of land belonging to the
United States to be reserved from sale and set apart for public uses.
The authority of the President in this respect is recognized in numer-
ous acts of Congress.
The question submitted, indeed, assumes the existence of the power,
and suggests that there is doubt only as to whether it can be exercised
with respect to lands which, at the time, are included in a pre-emption
filing or homestead entry, and to which steps have thus already been
taken by an individual to acquire title under the general land laws.
The power of the President, above adverted to, extends to lauds which
belong to the public domain of the United States and are subject to
sale or other disposal under the general land laws. It is capable of
being exercised with respect to such lands so long as they remain un-
appropriated and unreserved from the public domain, but no longer.
When an entry thereof is made under those laws (whether pre-emption,
homestead, or other) the particular land entered thus becomes segre-
gated from the mass of public lands and takes the character of private
property. "n no sense," observe the supreme court, in Witherspoon
v. Duncan (4 Wall., 218), "can lands be said to be public. lands after
they have been entered at the land office and a certificate of entry ob-
tained. If public lands before the entry, after it they are private
property."
In regard to the case of a homestead settlement, the claim of the
settler is initiated by an entry of the land. This is effected by making
an application at the proper land office, filing the affidavit and paying
the amount required by section 2290, Revised Statutes, and also paying
the commissions as required by section 2238, Revised Statutes. It is
true, a certificate of entry is not then given, the certificate being, under
section 2291, Revised Statutes, withheld until the expiration of five
years from the date of such entry, at the end of which period, upon
proof of settlement and cultivation during that period, and payment of
the commissions remaining to be paid, it is issued. But upon the entry
a right in favor of the settler would seem to attach to the land, which
is liable to be defeated only by failure on his part to comply with the
requirements of the homestead law in regard to settlementand cultiva-
tion. This right amounts to an equitable interest in the land, subject
to the future performance by the settler of certain conditions (in the
event of which he becomes invested with full and complete ownership),
and until forfeited by failure to perform the conditions it must, I think,
prevail not only against individuals but against the government. That,
in contemplation of the homestead law, the settler acquires, by his entry,
an immediate interest in the land, which (for the time being, at least)
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thereby becomes severed from the public domain, appears from the
language of section 2297, Revised Statutes, wherein it is provided that,
in certain contingencies, "the land so entered shall revert to the gov-
ernment."
The result to which this leads is, that where public land subject
to homestead settlement has been duly entered under the homestead
law it thenceforth ceases to be at the disposal of the government so
long as the claim or entry of the settler subsists.
The case of a settlement on public land, with a view to acquire a right
of pre-emption, where a declaratory statement has been filed and other
preliminary steps taken by the settler, but by whom payment for and
entry of the land have not yet been made, which remains to be con-
sidered, is relieved of much of its difficulty by the doctrine laid down
by the supreme court in Frisbie v. Whitney (19 Wall., 187), and in the
Yosemite Valley case (15 Wall., 77), respecting the right of the settler
in such case as against the government. It was there held that under
the pre-emption laws mere occupation and improve ment of any portion
of the public lands of the United States, with a view to pre-emption,
do not confer upon the settler any right in the land occupied, as against
the United States, or impair in any respect the power of Congress to
dispose of the land in any way it may deem proper; that the power of
regulation and disposition conferred upon Congress by the Constitution
only ceases when all the preliminary acts prescribed by those laws for
the acquisition of the title, including the payment of the price of the
land, have been performed by the settler; that until such payment and
entry the acts of Congress give to the settler only a privilege of pre-
emption in case the lands are offered for sale in the usual manner, that
is, the privilege to purchase them in that event in preferen ce to others-
and that the legislation thus adopted for the benefit of settlers was not
intended to deprive Congress of the power to make any other disposi
tion of the lands before they are offered for sale, or to appropriate them
to any public use. " It seems to us little less than absurd," remark the
court in the case last cited, "to say that a settler or any other person
by acquiring a right to be preferred in the purchase of property, pro-
videc a sale is made by the owner, thereby acquires a right to compel
the owner to sell, or such an interest in the property as to deprive the
owner of the power to control its disposition."
Thus it is no longer an open question that public land covered by a
pre-emption filing, but as to which there has been no payment and en-
try by the settler, may be appropriated by Congress to public purposes,
or otherwise disposed of, without thereby involving a collision with or
invasion of any right or interest of the settler in and to the lands.
The inquiry now is, can the President, in such case, under his power
to reserve and set apart lands of the United States for public uses,
make a similar disposition of the land for such uses?
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It should be borne in mind that the power of the President here re-
ferred to is recognized by act of Congress (Grisar v. McDowell, supra).
Such recognition is equivalent to a grant. ence, in reserving and
setting apart a particular piece of land for a special public use, the
President must be regarded as acting by authority of Congress; and
unless this authority is so restricted as not to extend to land covered
by a pre-emption filing (and I am not aware of any restriction of that
sort), I do not see why such land may not be as effectually reserved and
set apart by the President thereunder as by the direct action of Con-
gress. Land so covered, where payment and entry have not been made,
is subject to appropriation or disposal by Congress simply because,
although occupied with a view to pre-emption, the settler has not, by
virtue of his occupancy, acquired anyinterestwhatever therein asagainst
the government, and it still remains a part of the pa blic domain, over the
disposition of which Congress has full control. Upon the same ground
(namely, the absence of any right in the settler to the land as against
the government, and the fact that it continues in the absolute owner-
ship of the latter), such land would seem to be subject to reservation for
public uses by the President when acting by authority of Congress.
I am therefore of opinion that where a homestead entry of public
lands has been made by a settler, the land so entered cannot, whilst such
entry stands, be set apart by the President for a military reservation
even "prior to the completion of full title in the settler"; but that
where a pre-emption filing has been made of public land, the land cov-
ered thereby may be set apart by the President for such reservation at
any time previous to payment and entry by the settler under the pre-
emption law.





Acting Secretary Bell to Commissioner MlcFarland, August 5, 1851.
I have received from the honorable Secretary of War, under date of
22d ultimo, and herewith transmit for your information a copy of the
opinion of the honorable Attorney-General, rendered July 15, 1881,
touching the power of the President to establish military reservations
upon the public lands where claims thereto have been initiated by set-
tlers under the homestead and pre-emption laws respectively.
With regard to homesteads, he holds that after original entry made
the land is segregated from the public domain, so as to forbid such oc-
cupation for military purposes by Executive order; but that in pre-
emption cases there is no legal investiture of right as against the
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government until the making of final proof and payment of the pur-
chase money.
These are also the views of this Department upon the questions pre-
sented; and, having been adopted by the War Department, which has,
under the law, jrisdiction of the subject-matter of declaring military
reservations, will be treated as authoritative in the adjustment of set-
tlers' claims by your office.
HOXESTM4D-SOLDIERS ADDITIOAAL-A GENT.
BARNES AND ALLISON.
Where a soldier's additional homestead claim was filed, with all the papers then re-
quired by an agent, who also filed a power from the homesteader authorizing the
agent to prosecute the claim and receive the certified papers, they should be de-
livered to the agent if he has done all within his power to discharge his duties
although later papers were filed by another agent with a power of attorney re-
voking the elder power.
Secretary Kirkwood to Commissioner McFarland, July 22, 1881.
I have considered the appeal of S. F. Barnes from your decision of
March 12, 1881, refusing to deliver to him or to is attorneys (Messrs.
Curtis, Earle, and Burdett) the official certification of the additional
homestead papers in the case of Calvin A. Allison.
It appears that on February 12, 1879, Mr. Barnes filed powers in your
office in behalf of said Allison for an additional homestead entry, to-
gether with a power of attorney from Allisoi authorizing him (Barnes)
to act for him in said matter and to obtain a certificate. These papers
appear to have been in accordance with the requirements of your office
then in force.
Subsequently, on September 1, 1879, your office issued instructions
requiring from such claimants a further special affidavit as to their
military or naval services, identity, etc., in addition to the usual home-
stead affidavit of the party, to be corroborated by the affidavits of two
persons. A copy of these instructions was sent to Barnes, who failed
to file such affidavit, after having made reasonable effort to procure the
same from Allison as alleged.
On April 28, 1880, your office advised Barnes that new papers had
been filed by Allison's attorneys, Messrs. Heylmun and Kane, on be-
half of said claim, with a power of attorney to them revoking all former
powers. You also allowed him thirty days from that date within which
to file such special affidavit, and to show cause why such certificate, if
allowed, should not be delivered to Messrs. Heylmun and Kane. Messrs.
Curtis, Earle, and Burdett subsequently appeared in behalf of Barnes,
and were allowed twenty additional days within which to file said
special affidavit. They allege their inability so to do by reason of Alli-
son's employment of Messrs. Heylinun and Kane, as his attorneys, who
had filed such affidavit and his refusal to make another.
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Your decision that said certificate should be delivered to Messrs.
Heylmun and Kane, I think was erroneous. So far as appears Barnes
properly discharged his duties as attorney for Allison; and the only
question submitted is to which of these attorneys shall said certificate
be delivered-and this has been settled by the rulings of this Depart-
ment in like cases.
In the case of Patterson (2 C. L. L., 206), Secretary Schurz held that
for the safety of claimants and the Department, as a matter of regu-
lation in practice, the only proper course with respect to attorneys is
to continue to deal with the agent presenting the claim for your certift-
cation, and to refuse, except for good cause shown, to recognize a sub-
sequent power of attorney for the purpose of delivery of the certificate.
He also said in his decision of September 28, 1880, on application for
reconsideration of his decision of December 10, 1879, upon the rights
of certain parties to additional homestead, that-
The only question involved is, whether the original attorney or at-
torneys who filed the claimi shall, by reason of such action, be recog-
nized as entitled to receive from the Commissioner of the General Land
Office the usual certificate as to the soldier's right, or whether the same
shall be delivered to the holder of a subsequent power of attorney, re-
voking the former power under which the certification has been re.
quested. . ... Will the Department permit an attorney in
fact, who has done all that is required to be done, so far as any present
action of the General Land Office is concerned, to be dismissed fro a
case upon the mere whim or motion of his principal, without showing
any cause whatever for such removal.
And while admitting the general authority of a principal to revoke
a naked power, reiterated and affirmed his ruling in the case of Patter-
son. The same ruling was also held November 24, 1880, in his decision
of the case of Roemer.
Concurring in these decisions, yours of March 12, 1881, is reversed,
and said certificate will be delivered to Mr. Barnes.
HOMESTEAD ENTRY-ACT OF JUNE 15, 1880.
ALEXANDER Low.
An administrator cannot purchase tinder the act of June 15, 1880, the homestead right
of a deceased entrymau; but such right descends to his widow, minor orphan
cbildren, or heirs. Where a transfer of his right, or an attempt at transfer, was
made prior to the claimant's death, the right to purchase is in the party con-
cerned, to the exclusion of the widow, children, and heirs.
Commissioner AcFarland to register and receiver, East Saginaw, M1ichigan,
July 23, 1881.
Referring to my letter "C" of September 29, 1880, relative to home-
stead entry No. 3159, in the name of Alexander Low, covering the NW.
of NE. l sec. 28, T. 22 N., R. 6 E., Michigan, I am in receipt of your let-
ter of May 27, 1881, stating that Thomas W. Low, administrator of the
estate of Alexander Low, deceased, has made application to purchase
36 DECISIONS RELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS.
the above-described tract, under the act of June 15, 1880, and asking to
be instructed how to proceed in the matter.
In reply I have to inform you, that Mr. Low, as administrator, can-
not purchase the tract in question, under the provisions of the act of
June 15, 1880.
On the death of the original homestead party-if there has been no
attempt by him to transfer-the right to purchase under the act of
June 15, 1880, descends, according to the rule which governs the descent
of the homestead rights under the entry, first, to the widow, if any, and
if there be no widow or minor children, then to the heirs of the origin al
homestead party, if any.
If there has been an attempt to transfer, the right to purchase under
said act rests with the party in whose favor the transfer was attempted,
or his heirs, to the exclusion of the widow, minor children, or heirs of
the original homestead party. For instructions under said act, see
pages 17 and 18, circular of October 1, 1880. In case of entry thereunder
being allowed in favor of the heirs of the homestead party, the certifi-
cate will issue in favor of "the heirs" of sid party, and the patent
also, under which the title will inure to the heirs as if individually
named.
PRACTICE-SECOND CONTEST.
VAN OSTRAND V. LANGE.
Where one contest against a homestead entry is pending a second application to con-
test will be rejected.
Secretary Kirkwood to Commissioner Mc'arland, November 16, 1881.
I have considered the appeal of G. E. Van Ostrand from your decis-
ion of June 2, 1881, rejecting his application to contest the homestead
entry of Frank Lange, No. 7271, made February 16, 1880, upon certain
lands in Sec. 2, T. 24, R. 8 W., Norfolk, Nebr., because, prior to the
filing of said application, a contest had been initiated by one Wood-
worth against said entry and was then pending.
Your decision is affirmed.
HOMESTEAD ENTRY-CREDIT FOR SETTLEMENT.
MARGARET WALKER.
In case of settlement upon land by a married woman, who after the lapse of time be-
came a widow, and made a homestead entry of said land, credit for settlement
back of the date of her husband's decease-the time that she became a qualified
homesteader-will not be allowed.
Commissioner Moarland to register and receiver, Stockton, California,
December 9, 1881.
Homestead entry No. 3394, final certificate No. 1112, in the name of
Margaret Walker, covering the NE. , Sec. 24, T. 8 S., R. 7 E., is sus-
pended. The entry was made April 11, 1881, under the provisions of
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the act of May 14, 1880, and settlement was alleged in 1872. Final
proof was made October 3, 1881.
From the proof submitted it appears that Mrs. Walker went upon
the land with her husband in July, 1873, and resided there with him
until lie died, June 17, 1879, and continued such residence till date of
proof. The plat of survey was filed in your office March 14, 1881.
Had Mrs. Walker's husband made entry of the land she would have
been entitled to credit for residence in making final proof back to date
of settlement; but as party to the original entry she cannot receive any
benefit of settlement prior to the date she was qualified, under the law,
to make a homestead entry, which was at the date. of her husband's
death.
The entry will therefore remain suspended, and after the expiration
of five years from June 17, 1879, the date of her husband's death, she
will be required to submit supplemental proof showing continued resi-
dence from October 3, 1881, the date of former proof, and you will so
advise her.
HOMESTEAD ENTR Y-RESIDENTCE BEFORE ENTR Y.
MICHAEL MOVEY.
Where the land was settled and resided upon by claimant before making his entry,
credit could be given for such residence if the land had been vacant, bet not so
when oceupied by another party, nuder entry subsequently canceled. In that
case credit can only be given from date of such cancellation.
Commissioner McFavland to Michael Meo Vey, Sutton, INebraska, August 10,
1881.
In reply to your letter of the 24th ultimo, I have to state that the
records of this office show that you made homestead entry No. 16401 for
the S. i of SE. J, Sec. 32, T. 7, R. 5 W., under date of November 26,
1878, and you state that you have resided thereon since the year 1873,
and ask if you cannot receive credit for such part of said residence as
will be required to make up the five years required under the homestead
law, and thus make proof without further delay.
With reference thereto I will state that I find from au examination of
the records of this office that one P. M. Cillin made homestead entry for
this same tract, under date of April 17, 1872, and said entry remained
intact until October 10, 1S78, when it was canceled for relinquishment.
Hlad the tract been vacant and unappropriated when you settled
upon it, and remained so up to the date of your entry, then you could
have been allowed credit thereon from date of settlement, without re-
gard to the date of your actual entry, as provided by the third section
of the act of May 14, 1880, but in view of the existing entry youcan only
obtain credit in computing the five years required under the law from
date of cancellation of said entry-October 10, 1878.
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HOMESTEAD-ADJOINING FARM ENTRY.
THWOAS S. WETHERBEE.
The owner of an undivided)portion (less than 160 acres) of a tract of land upon which
hIe resides, if qualified, may make an adjoining farm homestead entry under sec-
tion 2289 of the Revised Statutes.
Commissioner McFarland to Thomzas S. Wetherbee, Waldo, Oregon, Sep-
tember 27, 1881.
I am in receipt of your letter of the 8th, ultimo, in which you state
that you are the owner of the undivided one halt of " an eighty-acre
tract," anti you ask if you will be allowed to make an adjoining farm
entry, embracing an area of 120 acres.
In reply you' are advised that if you are legally qualified, the fact
that your interest in the tract named is undivided would be no bar to
your making an adjoining farm entry for 120 acres.
For particulars relative to the requirements of the statute governing
this class of entries, you are referred to the district officers for the dis-
trict in which the land described is situated.
HOMESTEAD ENTRY-MARRIED WOMAN.
EDA M. CARNOCHAN.
A married woman who, prior to marriage, made a homestead entry within railroad
limits of land enhanced to the double minimum price of 2.50 per acre, and was
restricted by then existing laws to entry of eighty acres, is entitled to make an
additional entry under the act of March 3, 1879.
Commissioner XcFarland to register and receiver, Visalia, California, Sep-
tember 29, 1881.
I am in receipt of your letter of the 25th ultimo, transmitting the
application of Eda M. Carnochan to enter the S. of SE. .1 of Sec. 30,
T. 20 S., R. 25 E., under the provisions of the act of March 3, 1879, as
additional to homestead entry No. 2390, for the N. of SE. of said
Sec. 30. You refused to allow the entry for the reason that she is now
a married woman, and therefore is disqualified from making a home-
stead entry, and submit the case to this office for instructions.
The records of this office show that on May 24, 1877, Eda AT. Cady
made homestead entry No. 2390 for N. j of SE. , Sec. 30, T. 20 S., R. 25
E., and on September 13, 1879, commuted the same to cash entry No.
3230, in the name of Eda l. Carnochan, her present legal name. The
land thus entered was rated at 2.50 per acre, and she was restricted
by existing laws to a entry of eighty acres.
The act of March 3, 1879, provides that " any person who has, under
existing laws, taken a homestead on any even section within the limits
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of any railroad or military road land-grant, and who, by existing laws
shall have been restricted to eighty acres, may enter under the home-
stead laws au additional eighty acres of land adjoining the land em-
braced in his original entry, if such land be subject to entry."
Mrs. Carnochan, nee Cady, was qualified to make the original home-
stead entry, and was restricted to eighty acres. The act of March 3,
1879, is reinedial in its provisions, and in order to place those who had
already nadeentries upon an equal footing with those who night there-
after enter double ininimum land granted them the privilege of making
additional entries. The fact of Miss Cady having married does not, in
my opinion, disqualify her from availing herself of the provisions of said
act.
The additional homestead papers are herewith returned, and you will
allow Mrs. Carnochan to perfect her entry, after which you will give
the papers the current number and transmit them to this office with
your regular returns.
HOMESTEAD-COHMUTA TIOw-FLVEL AFFIDA V IT.
JOHN J. MCKAY.
Where a homestead claimant failed to nake settlement vithin six months after en-
try on the tract enteredl he Nvill not oa account of such failare be prevented from
making comumnutation entry upon proof of settlement and cultivation such as
vold entitle hini to make entry upon the pre-emption law.
Commissioner JMcFarland to register and receiver, Benson, Xinnesota,
December 31, 1881.
July 2, 1880, Johln J. McKay, of Appleton, SwifG County, Minnesota,
made hoznestead entry No. 10377, for the NW. i Sec. 26, T. 121, R. 42.
October 6, 1881, he offered to commute the entry to cash under section
2301, Revised Statutes. His proof showed that he did not establish a
residence upon the land within six months from date ot entry, the late
of perforning that act being April 7, 1881. Because of this failure to
establish residence on the land within the pei iod prescribed by home-
stead law you declined to accept the l)uchase money and issue the
usual receipt anal certificate, and transmnitted the proof to this office for
consideration with your letter of November 7, 1881.
Upon examination of the papers it was determined by this office to
submit the case to the board of equitable ad jnlication, and by letters
C of November 28 an,- December 13, 1881, W. N. Severance, of this city,
and the Hon. H. B. Strait were informed that suchi action had been
taken.
1 have reconsidered the matter, however, and amn now of opinion that
such submission is not necessary, inasmuch as section 2301 Revised
Statutes provides that-
Nothing in this chapter shall be so construed as to prevent any per-
son who has availed himself of the benefits of section 2:289, from paying
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the minimum price for the quantity of land so entered at any time be-fore the expiration of the five years, and obtaining a patent thereforfrom the government, as in other cases directed by law, on makingproof of settlement and cultivatiou as provided by law, granting pre-
emption rights.
The failure to establish residence upon the land within six months from
date of homestead entry does not, therefore, in my opinion, create a
defect in this entry. It is only required in commutation cases that theparty shall make proof of settlement and cultivation as required by
pre-emption law, and if upon examination of his proof it be fond that
such settlement and cltivation have been made as would entitle him to
make payment for the land under 1)re-emption law and receive patent,
it is immaterial whether he shall have complied with the homestead lawin respect to time of making settlement upon the land, provided no ad-
verse claim for the tract appears of record, as it is expressly provided
that "nothing in this chapter shall be so construed as to prevent " him
from making the payment and receiving patent.
Upon a re-examination of the case I find that the final affidavit is not
executed in proper form, the ordinary form (No. 4070) for homestead
proof having been used instead of that prescribed for commutation
proof (No. 4069).
The party is therefore required to execute a new affidavit upou the
proper blank, and upon receipt of the same by you with the amount of
purchase money you will issue the usual receipt and certificate in the
case and transmit the same to this office with your regular returns for
the month in which issued.
Inform the party as to the contents and requirements of this letter.
ACT OFJUNE 15, 1l880R-EPB4XJ1EI.
W. W. DEiWHURST.
A party having purchased the land embraced in his homestead entry under the act ofJune 15, 180, is not entitled to relinquish the same, or any portion thereof, for
the sole purpose of obtaining repayment of the purchase money, nor is lie en-
titled to such repayment for the reason that thzt character of the land does not
suit him.
Commissioner lIcFarland to register ad receiver, Gainesville, Florida,-
January 9, 1882.
Referring to our letter of the 22d of November last, inclosing peti-
tion of W. W. Dewhurst to amend his homestead entry, No. 4057, forlot 1, and E. of NE. 1 and W. of NE. , Sec. 32, T. 20 S., R. 36 E.,
Florida, purchased by him under the act of June 15, 1880, 1 have to
state that it appears by the records in this office that said entry was
made by Dewhurst September 22, 1876, containing 162.84 acres; that
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on the 5th of April last he made application and purchased the land
embraced by said homestead entry for cash, No. 1480, Gainesville series.
It now appears by the petition presented by Dewhurst that he de-
sires to relinquish the SE. 4 of NW. 4, or S. i of lot, 1, embraced in
his homestead entry, and have refunded to him the amount of purchase-
money paid thereon. Furthermore he desires to have the area of the
tracts retained by him computed according to the actual topography of
the land as shown by the recent coast survey, which represents that
quite a portion of the NE. 4 of NW. 4 or N. i of lot 2, and SW. i of NE.
i is covered by navigable water, and that the purchase money for that
portion actually covered by water not shown by the official plat of sur-
vey also be refunded.
On examination of the official plat of survey in this office I find that
there is quite a difference between said plat and the map of coast sur-
vey filed by Mr. Dewhurst; but in view of the fact that no evidence of
fraud in the original survey has been presented, nor any evidence that
said survey did not correctly represent the character of the lands at
the date thereof, to wit, March 1, 1848, and the lands having been dis-
posed of regularly under such survey this office has no authority of
'law to enter upon the resurvey or direct a resurvey of the lands in
question.
In relation to the request of Mr. Dewhurst to be allowed to relin-
quish a portion of his entry as above indicated, and have the purchase
money refunded thereon, I have to state that he having decided to
take the benefit of said act of June 15, 1880, and having paid the gov-
eminent price, as stipulated by the provisions of said act, there is no
authority in law whereby this office can refund the purchase money
paid on any portion of the land.
I HOMESTEAD ENTRY-DEVISEE.
7< j 27 4- rSARAH LEONARD.
A homesteader eannot by will defeat the law, which provides that in case of the death
of both father and mother, leaving minor children, the homestead right shall in-
ure to their benefit. In this case a feie sole devised her homestead to her son
and died. Held that in such cases, in order that the devisee may obtain title it
must appear satisfactorily that no infant children survived.
(Jommissioner McFarland to Rlon. IF. D. Washburn, House of Reprnsenita-
- tives, January 13, 1882.
I am in receipt of your letter of the 9th instant, inclosing one from
John Carmody, esq., dated Princeton, Minn., January 4, 1882, respect-
ing the delay in issuance of patent in Taylor's Falls, Minn., homestead
entry No. 1831, final certificate No. 1369, for N. j of SE. I and SE. i of
SE. 41, 14, 35 N., 27 W. 4th P. M.
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This entry was ma(le July 19, 1871, by Sarah Leonard, who, on the
25th day of May, 1874, executed a will devising all her right, title, and
interest in the land described to her son, John Carmody. The will was
probated and declared valid by the probate court of Sherburne County,
Minnesota, October 5, 1878, and on the 7th of that month the said Johni
Carmody was duly appointed administrator of the estate of Sarah
Leonard, deceased.
November 26, 1878, John Carmody, as devisee, made final proof as
prescribed by section 2291 of the Revised Statutes, and final certificate
and receipt were issued by the register and receiver on that day in his
name.
Section 2299, Revised Statutes provides that " in the case of the death
of both father and mother, leaving an infant child or children under
twenty-one years of age, the right and fee shall inure to the benefit of
such infant child or children," and it is held by this office that a home-
stead party cannot will away the right of infant children thus guar-
anteed by express statutory provision.
The final proof in this case does not show whether or not infant chil-
dren survived the homestead party, and in the adjudication of such
cases it is an official requirement that the proof shall be explicit upon.
this point, that the object of the law may be fully secured and that the
orphans may be protected in their legal rights.
The issuance of patent in the entry described has therefore been de-
ferred until the question pertaining to the survival of infant children
shall be satisfactorily determined. Upon the receipt of testimony upoi
this point, properly transmitted through the district land office, the
case will receive due consideration and such action will be taken in the
matter as may be warranted by the facts.
PRACTICE-SECOND COYTEST-PREFERENVCE RIGHT OF EIRY.
BENNETT V. COLLINS.
Where a second contest against a homestead entry was initiated before the determi-
nation of a prior contest, and the entry in question was canceled as a result of the
first contest, the second contestant has no preference right of entry should the
first contestant fail to make entry. The preference right cannot be transferred
or assigned.
Commissioner McFarland to register and receiver, Grand Forks, Dakota,
January 13, 1882.
I am in receipt of your letter of the 22d November last, t ansmitting
testimony and proceedings in the case of Richard Bennett v. Lizzie Col-
lins and Edmund Demers v. Lizzie Collins, both cases involving home-
stead entry No. 1337 SE. 4, 150, 51. Bennett filed his affidavit of
contest on the 26th of May, and Demers on the same day, but at a later
hour. The case of Bennett is therefore entitled to be first considered.
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The proceedings appear to be regular, and upon the testimony pre-
sented you decided that the entry should be canceled.
The cancellation of the entry resulting from the first contest, the
subsequent one by Demers necessarily falls and the testimony therein
is not considered.
Yoa ask, in connection with these cases, should Bennett fail to make
entry of the land within the period allowed him forthat purpose by the
act of May 14, 1880, or should he waive his right as contestant, would
the tract be subject to entry by the first legal applicant, or should
Demers have the preference.
The right allowed a contestant by the act of May 14, 18S0, is a per-
sonal one and cannot be transferred or assigned. Neither is it a bar to
an entry of the laud by another party, at any time subsequent to the
cancellation of the contested entry.
An entry allowed within the period during which the contestant's
right attaches would, however, he forfeited should he present his appli-
cation within the time allowed him for that purpose.
In the case in question the first legal application for the land should
be received and made of record, and should Bennett fail to exercise his
right of entry under the law it would be allowed to stand.
Demers could claim nothing by virtue of the contest instituted by
him.
HOMESTEA D-BESIDENCE-SECOND CONTEST.
NICKALS v. BIRD ET AL.
In the cases of two homesteaders who entered lan(l within the inclosure of an occu-
pant, and were prevented fron establishing permanent residence on the same
within six months from date of entry because of threats of the occupant, and a
decision of the local land officers, i a contest brougbt by the ocenpant, in favor
of the latter, rendered within the six months and thereafter set aside: Held, on
second contest brought by the occupant on the ground of abandonment, that time
should not run against the homesteaders during the period from date of said
decision of the local officers and the date that the same was set aside, and that
therefore inasmuch as abandonment for a period of over six months from date of
entry could not be shown, the entries were not subject to attack under section
2297 of the Revised Statutes.
Commissioner McFarland to register and receiver, Eureka, Nevada, Janu-
ary 13, 1882.
I am in receipt of your letter of October 24, 1881, transmitting the
testimony taken at hearings held at, your office July 11 and 12, 1881,
with a record of the proceedings in the contested cases of William WvY.
Nickals vi. the parties to the folloxing homestead entries involving the
entries, to wit: No. 159, March 23, 1880, Thompson J. Bird SW. I Sec.
17, 20 N., 52 E.; No. 101, March 23. 1880, Peter Winn, SW. I of SE.
Sec. 17, N. i of NE. A Sec. 20, and NW. ?1 of NW. i See. 21, 20 N.. 52 E.
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The entries were attacked by Nickals on the ground of abandonment,
by affidavits filed April 21, 1881, a period of a year and nearly one
month after date of the entries.
It appears that ickals has fenced a tract containing about 1,000
acres, and that the tracts in said entries are almost entirely within the
inclosure.
Nickals states that Bird appeared on the outside of the fence about
the 27th or 28th of September, 1880, and commenced the construction
of a small house, which was found partly finished a few days after, and
situated within the inclosure, and that in May, 1881, Bird again ap-
peared and put a canvas roof on the house. Nickals also states that a
spring had been cleared out and a ditch opened, requiring about two
days' work. Although the testimony of Nickals is to the effect that
Bird did not make settlement until the 27th of September, 1880, his
statement is not very positive as to the date, and is unsupported by
his witnesses. On the other hand Bird testifies positively that he com-
menced building the house on September 20, 18S0, and that he was on
the land in March and May, 1881, and, in June, 1881, went thereon and
remained there. Bird is positive from dates ad circumstances that
he commenced improving the tract on the 20th of September, 1880.
At the latter date, six months from date of entry had not expired.
Bird states that the land having been in litigation and the decision of
your office against him he felt unable to risk expenditure thereon suffi-
cient to establish a permanent residence upon the tract until informed
of the decision of this office in his favor in April, 1881. Bird referred
to the previous contest of Nickals against Burbank, Bird, Winn, et al.,
which will be referred to further on.
The testimony in the case of Winn shows that he conveyed lumber
to the land embraced in his entry May 24, 1881, and that he was then
threatened with violence by Nickals, i consequence of which he, Winn,
left the lumber and returned to Eureka. On June 5, SS1, Winn coin-
menced the erection of his house on the land, but it appears that he
was unable to finish it previous to the hearing, because of sickness and
poverty, and sought shelter with Bird, who live(l in the vicinity. Winn
was sick nearly all the time from Augiust, 1880, until May, 1881, part
of the time being in the county hospital. These facts were not dl imputed
on trial, cross-examination being waived and no evidence adduced in
rebuttal. It would appear, therefore, that it was impossible for WArinn
to have made settlement for a period commencing about five months
after entry and ending subsequently to the initiation of the contest in
April, 1881.
Bird and Winn claim under the homestead statutes for the benefit of
soldiers and sailors.
You decided that the defendants had failed to comply with the re-
quirenents of the homestead law in respect to residence, citing in your
opinion as to Bird's case the decision of the honorable Secretary of the
Interior in the case of Byrne v. Catlin (2 C. L. L. 406), in which it was
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held that going upon the land by the homestead claimant and remain-
ing over night once or twice in six months fails to establish the residence
contemplated by the homestead law. Defendants took an appeal from
your decision.
The prior contest of Nickals against the parties above mentioned
was made on the ground that the lands, being inclosed and in the
possession of Nickals, were not -subject to homestead entry. This
contest was commenced April 5, 1880. less than one month after the
entries were made, and on August 31, 1880, before the expiration of six
months from date of entry, you rendered a decision adverse to the
homestead parties. The decision of this office dismissing the contest,
dated March 31, 1881 (Copp's L. 0. for July, 1881, p. 57), which became
final, reached your office on or about April 15, 1881, in which month the
present contest was commenced. It therefore appears that the home-
stead claimants were embarrassed by the possession of Nickals and the
adverse decision of your office, rendered within six months from date
of entry and not set aside until a few weeks prior to the initiation of the
present contest. When the first contest commenced, in April, 1880,
there was ground for apprehension as to the result upon the part of
defendants, in view of the decisions then followed; besides, upon the
decision of your office in August, 1880, there was danger of ejectment
by due process of law in case of inhabitation of the tracts by them. I
do not think that it has been shown, as you conclude, that the " element
of good faith" has been lacking on the part of defendants. The case of
Byrne v. Catlin, cited by you, is not analogous to the ones under con-
sideration. On account of the circumstances mentioned I think that
time should not run against the defendants.
I have mentioned testimony relating to a period of time subsequent to
the initiation of this contest, not as relevant to the issue, but in order
that my ruling may be the better understood. It being held that time
should not ran against the defendants up to April, 1881, it follows that
the entries at the time of the contest in said month were not subject to
attack on the ground of abandonment under section 2297 of the Revised
Statutes. Your decision is reversed for the reason given.
HOMESTEAD ENTRY-REL TNQ UISHMENT.
EDWARD EZERNACK.
Relinquishment of homestead entry becanse of conflict and to avoid contest, does not
prevent party from making another entry.
Commissioner McFarland to register and receiver, Natchitoches, La., Feb.
rary 2, 1882.
Referring to your letters of June 23, September 3, and December 3,
1884, in the matter of homestead entry No. 2010, of Edward Ezernack,
made March 1, 1881, for the E. of NE. and S. of NE. 1 Sec. 20, T.
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8 N., R. W., La. Il., and subsequently found to be in conflict as to
the SE. 4 of NE. I and NE. 4 of SE. 1, with Rio ilondo claim No. 102,
in the name of James McKim, jr., and for this reason relinquished and
canceled under the act of May 14, SS0, I have to state that inasmuch
as the said entry was illegal in its inception, because of te conflict
here stated, and was for this reason, and to avoid contest, relinquished
and canceled, the act of the party thereto cannot be considered such a
voluntary relinquishment as will deprive him of the right to make
another homestead entry.
The, party is, therefore, hereby allowed to make another entry, with
credit for existing payments, and you will so inform him.
HOMfESTEAD ENTRY-RESIDENCE ON SEGREGA TED LAND.
ELI EWELL.
Credit cannot be given for residence on a homestead, under act of May 14, 1880, dur-
ing the existence of a prior entry on the land.
Commissioner McFarlan d to Eli Eivell, Spring Grove, Nebraska, February
21 188-'.
In reply to your letter of the 20th ultimo, inquiring as to making
proof upon your homestead entry, No. 6661, made April 2, 1879, for
the S. i of SW. and V. of SE. Sec. 15, T. 4, R. 20 W., alleging
that you have resided thereon for the past six years, I have to state
that the records of this office show that homestead entry No. 2544 was
made upon the tracts named in 1874 and remained of record until
January7, 1879, when it was canceled for relinquishment. Had it not
been for this.entry, and had there been no adverse claim to the tracts
for the last six years, or during your residence thereon, you could have
received credit for sch time, as provided by the act of May 14, 1880,
in computing the term of residence required to acquire title; but in
view of said existing etry you can only receive credit from the date of
cancellation of said entry.
HOMESTEAD-PRELIMIYARY AFTIDA4 FIT.
GIESEXE V. KIWILIAN.
Where an imperfect knowledge of the English language is shoWn, parties can cure a
defective entry by filing a new affidavit.
Commissioner MlcFarland to register and receiver, Benson, Mfinnesota,
February 6, 1882.
The case of Fred. Gieseke v. Martin Kiwilian, involving homestead
entry No. 9977 on the W. 4, of NW. 4 and NE. 4 of NW. I Sec. 20, T. 120
N., R. 43 W., was closed by this office June 18, 1881, Kiwilian having
purchased the land under the second section of the act of June 15, 1880,
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per cash entry No. 4S60. I am now in receipt of your letter of Decem-
ber 12, 1881, transmitting the application of Gieseke to have the cash
entry above mentioned canceled for the reason that the homestead
entry upon which it is based is wholly illegal. Gieseke alleges, and the
testimony shows, that Kiwilian made the original affidavit before the
clerk of the court for the county in which the land is situated, per sec-
tion 2294, Revised Statutes; that neither he nor any member of his
family was at that time residing on the tract.
Kiwilian testifies, however, that his knowledge of the English lan-
guage is very iperfect; that he was not aware that he made affidavit
to the statement above mentioned. It has been the practice of the
office to permit parties whose entries are found to be defective in this
respect to complete the same by filing a new affidavit, provided the
first appeared to have been made i ignorance of its contents. I see
no reason to doubt that such was the case with Kiwilian. The entry
is not, therefore, wholly void, and the purchase of the tract by Kiwilian
is,. I think, within the scope of the act of June 15, 1880.
His entry will not, therefore, be disturbed, and you will so advise the
parties.
HOMESTEAD-DE ISEE-RELINQ UISHMENT.
, 3 2 4 H. C. DODGE.
The devisee of a homestead claimant is entitled to all the privileges that would
descend to the heirs.
Commissioner fcFarlanil to register ad receiver, S ti Francisco, Cali-
irnia, February 10, 1882.
Referring to my letter of November 11th last, relative to homestead
entry No. 2762, covering the NW. Sec. 6, T. 23 S., IR. 8 E., requiring
HI. C. Dodge (devisee of N. E. Adams, the homestead claimant) to fur-
nish an affidavit explaining his connection with the case and also evi-
dence establishing the date of Adams's death, I am in receipt of your
letter of the 26th ultimo, transmitting certain papers bearing on the
case.
From all the papers in the case it would appear that on May 7, 1877,
Mr. Adams made the entry in question, the affidavit in which was
made before the clerk of the court for the county in which the land
is situated, May 3, 1877. Adams died May 24, 1877, devising his home-
stead entry to Dodge; the will was filed for probate April 28, 1879, and
letters testamentary were issued May 17, 1879, instead of 1877, as stated
in my former letter. Mr. Dodge fully explains his connection with the
case.
May 24, 1881, Escolastica Freeman initiated a contest for abandon-
ment against said entry, notice of which was served on the devisee,
who appeared before yoa at the time fixed for the hearing.
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From the testimony submitted at the hearing it appears that Mrs. Free-
man has resided upon and cultivated the W. J of NE. I and E. W of NW,
1 of said Sec. 6 since 1873, and desires to enter the same under the
provisions of the act of March 3,1879, and May 14, 1880. It also ap-
pears that Mr. Dodge entered into possession of the W. of NW. of
same section, and cultivated and improved the same by tenants for over
two years next preceding Adams's death; that Adams was entitled to a
credit of three years for service in the army during the war of the re-
bellion. The devisee relinquishes all claim to the E. -ofNW. -of said
Sec. 6, and desires to perfect title to the-residue of Adams's entry.
I am of the opinion that the devisee of a homestead claimant is en-
titled to all the privileges that would descend to the heirs, and in view
of the decisions of the honorable Secretary of the Interior in the cases
of Dorame v. Towers (2 0. L. L. 438) and Stewart v. The Heirs of Jacobs
(id. 459) the character of the proof submitted, and of your recommen-
dation, you will, after Mr. Dodge shall have given due notice that on a
certain day, to be fixed by you, he will apply for final papers covering
the W. 0 of NW. i of said Scc.T6, upon the proof already submitted, if
no objection is made, issue final papers in the case.
Homestead entry No. 2762 is this day canceled on the records of this
office, so far as it relates to the E. I of NW. I Sec. 6, T. 23 S., R. 8 E.,
and you will so note on your records. The application, affidavit, etc.,
of Mrs. Freeman are herewith returned for completion, and to be regu-
larly numbered and transmitted to this office with your regular returns.
SOLDIERS' ADDITIONAL HOMESTEAD-DATE OF FILING.
HENRY BOOTH.
The rights of a soldier making homestead entry go back to the date of his filing, pro-
viding the entry is in other respects regular, and carries with it the right to an
additional entry.
Commissioner McFarland to Hon. Thomas Ryan, House of Representatives,
February 16, 1882.
Referring to my letter of the 10th ultimo, addressed to you, rejecting
the application of Henry Booth to make a soldier's additional homestead
entry on the S. i of NW. I, Sec. 34, T. 21 S., R. 16 W., embracing 80
acres, I have to advise you that my attention having been called to said
decision by a letter filed in this office from Mr. Booth, I find the same
to have been based upon a decision by the Secretary of the Interior in
the case of J. N. Miller, dated March 18, 1880, in which it was held that
a party who had filed a pre-emption declaratory statement prior to June
22, 1874, and afterwards changed the same to a homestead entry, could
niot avail himself of the provisions of the act of May 27, 1878, in respect
to the computation of time for perfecting title from date of original set-
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tlement, because prior to the enactment of the statute of 1878 " persons
who had transmuted a pre-emption filing to a homestead entry were not
entitled to an allowance for time under their pre-emption settlement,
but the computation of time required to perfect title under their home-
stead entry dated from the day of such entry only."
The case presented by the claim of Mr. Booth differs from the case
decided by the Secretary in this particular. Soldiers' homestead rights
date back to the period of filing the declaratory statement, if the en-
tries are in other respects regular. The limitation of time in respect to
entries commuted from pre-emption filings does not exist when the
homestead entry is founded on a homestead declaratory statement in-
stead of on apre-emption filing. It therefore appears to me upon review
that'the decision of the Secretary in the Miller case is not applicable to
this case.
The facts in this case appear to be that Mr. Booth filed a soldier's
homestead declaratory statement for the NW. t of Sec. 34, T. 21 S., R.
16 W., Larned district, Kanas, on June 6, 1874. Prior to that date he
had contested the homestead entry of cne Oliver Boyd on this tract.
Before the cancellation of Boyd's entry, and while the opntest was pend-
ing, Mr. Booth made settlement on the land. One Webb also made a
pre-emption settlement on the same land during the pendency of the
contest and before the cancellation of Boyd's entry.
Upon the cancellation of Boyd's entry Mr. Booth filed his soldier's
declaratory statement, and on the same day and at about the same
time Mr. Webb filed his pre-emption declaratory statement. Booth
made his homestead entry, under his filing, on October 29, 1874. Webb
contested Booth's entry. A hearing was had, the local offices and this
office deciding in favor of Booth. r. Webb appealed to the Secretary,
who decided that the filings should be considered as having been made
at the same time; that both parties had made valuable improvements
on the land, and that their rights were equal. He therefore instructed
that a division of the land should be made in equal parts, so as to in-
clude the respective improvements of the parties, and that each should
be allowed to enter other contiguous public land, if such there should
be, so as to include one hundred and sixty acres in all.
Mr. Booth filed for one hundred and sixty acres. He actually settled
previous to filing, and his settlement became legal the day the former
entry was canceled, which was the date of his filing. His right, under
the soldiers' homestead law, related back, therefore, to the date of his
filing, which was prior to the passage of the Revised Statutes. He
made entry of one hundred and sixty acres under this right. The subse-
quent adjudication reduced this entry to eighty acres. The right to
have amended his entry so as to embrace eighty acres more of contig-
uous land, in accordance with the instructions of the Secretary, should
have inured to him under the general homestead laws if his entry had
been made under those laws. But his entry was made under the soldiers'
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homestead laws, which do not restrict additional entries to contiguous
land. He was unable to avail himself of the privilege of amending his
entry so as to include one hundred and sixty acres contiguous, and he
now applies to' make an additional entry under the soldiers' homestead
laws in lieu of the privilege of amending his former entry.
The question presented is, whether an entry can be made additional
to an original entryinitiated prior to June 22, 1874, but not consummated
until after that period. Soldiers' additional entries are allowed when a
less quantity of land than one hundred and sixty acres was entered un-
der the soldiers' homestead laws prior to June 22, 1874.
As the rights of a soldier making a homestead entry go back to the
date of his filing, if the entry is in other respects regular, and if settle-
ment was made at date of such filing, I am of the opinion that the right
of additional entry should also be deemed to relate back to the date of
such filing, when, as in the present case, there was actual settlement
on the land at date of filing, and the restriction of the final entry to a
less quantity than one hundred and sixty acres occurred from a subse-
quent adjudication of conflicting rights, which adjudication was, as a
matter of fact, in this case determined upon the basis that the home-
stead right attached at the date offiling the homestead declaratory state-
ment.
Mr. Booth will accordingly be allowed to enter the additional tract
claimed. The usual certificate of the right to make such entry will be
delivered to A. A. Thomas, esq., Mr. Booth's attorney.
ACT OF JUNE 15, 1880-BIGHT OF PUBCHASE.
WILLIAM C. PASCOE.
The right to purchase, under act of June 15, 1880, is not a personal one, and the pro-
vision that "persons who have heretofore under any of the homestead laws, en--
tered lands properly subject to such entry," comprehends and includes all persons
who, in any manner by original application or operation of law, have succeeded
to the right to make final proof and payment of fees and take a patent for the
land.
Secretary Teller to Conrissioner McFarland, April 24, 1882.
I have considered the appeal of William C. Pascoe from your decision
of June 18,1881, allowing Eunice A. Clark, widow of Frederick A. Clark,
deceased, to purchase, under the second section of the act of June 15,
1880 (21 Stats., 237), the S. of SW. Sec. 25, T. 20, R. 4 E., Olympia,
Washington Territory.
The tract was embraced in the homestead entry of Frederick A. Clark,
made May 29, 1877. He died in October, 1878, and on March 22, 1880,
Pascoe initiated a contest against him for abandonment of the tract. In
view of the facts elicited at the hearing, the local register recommended
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cancellation of the entry, and the receiver recommended a dismissal of
the contest. Your ofiEce held, on appeal, September 27, 1880, that thei
entry was valid and subsisting at the date of Clark's death, and that it
was competent for his widow to perfect it. Pascoe appealed from this
decision, but you have not yet transmitted the appeal to this Department;
nor is this important in view of the decision of the Department (Gohr-
man v. Ford, Reporter, April, 1881; Johnson v. Halvorson, Reporter,
July, 1881), that a homestead entryman will be allowed to purchase the
land embraced in his entry, after contest, and before cancellation of the
entry; and that the preferred right of a bona fide contestant under the
second section of the act of May 14, 1880 (21 Stats., 140), and his right
to continue a contest to final determination, is good as against all third
parties except an entryman claiming the right of purchase under the
second section of the act of June 15, 1880. This section authorizes
", persons who have heretofore, under any of the homestead laws, entered
lands subject to such entry to . . . . " entitle themselves to said
lands by paying the government price therefor," provided the purchase
shall not interfere with the rights or claims of others who may have sub-
sequently entered for the lands under the homestead laws.
Your decision of June 18, 1881, finds that the deceased husband of
the applicant was a qualified homestead settler, and had made a valid
entry of the tract, subsisting and complete in all essential particulars,
and that she, as his widow, was entitled to purchase it under said act.
The only material point of appeal is the allegation that the act limits
the right of purchase to the entryman, and hence that, although the
husband, in his life-time, had this right to purchase, his widow has not.
An analogous question was decided by this Department, December
19, 1881, in the case of Annie Anderson (formerly Annie Middleton,
Reporter, December, 1881), who applied to make an additional entry
under the act of March 3, 1879 (20 Stats., 472), by virtue of a homestead
entry made by her deceased husband, who had complied with the re-
quirements of the law to the date of his death. This act provided for
additional homestead entries by " any person who has, under existing
laws, taken a homestead on an even section within the limits of any
railroad or military road land grant," etc., and my predecessor held
that the provisions of the act are remedial, and while the beneficiaries
take by descriptive words, thus confining the grant to a personal right,
the spirit of the act must be observed in recognizing whomsoever may
have been proper objects of relief, if pointed out with reasonable clear-
ness by the descriptive language employed," and that the words " who
has under existing laws taken a homestead," comprehend and include
all persons who in any manner, by original entry or by operation of law,
have succeeded to the right to make final proof and payment of fees, and
take patent for the land. As this right is cast upon the widow by opera,
tion of law, she must hold to have taken the homestead under existing
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laws, and should not, by reason and inequitable construction, be de-
prived of the benefit of the amendatory statute.
The reasons apply with equal force to the second section of the act of
June 15, and authorize a purchase of the tract in dispute by the widow
of the deceased entryman.
SETTLEMENT ON APPBIOPIATED LAND.
KATE COX.
Inasmuch as appropriation of land by actual entry on the records excepts the same
from initiation of an entry by one not having a prior legal right, a party who had
settled on land previous to entry by another, is not, upon cancellation of such
entry, and entry by himself, entitled to credit for period of settlement either be-
fore or while the prior entry subsisted.
Commissioner McFarland to register and receiver, Wa Keeney, Kansas,
April 26, 1882.
Your letter of December 20,1881, transmitting upon appeal from your
refusal of the same the final proof of Kate Cox, for the S. NW. i and
N. J SW. 1 of Sec. 10 in T. 13 S., B. 21 W., based on original home-
stead entry No. 5077, made October 7, 1880, for the same tracts of land
is received.
The proof in this case was presented on the 9th day of November,
1881, and rejected by you for the reason that the records of your office
show that the NW. J of said Sec. 10, T. 13 S., R. 21 W. was entered by
Charles C. cox, August 29, 1877, per timber culture entry No. 321,
which entry was canceled by relinquishment October 7, 1880, and the
N. i SW. i of said Sec. 10 was entered by Columbus A. Powell, Feb-
ruary 27, 1879, per homestead entry No. 2931, which entry was canceled
by relinquishment May 31, 1880. You hold, therefore, that claimant
has not resided upon said tracts of land for a sufficient length of time,
since the same became subject to settlement and entry, to entitle her
to make final homestead proof thereon. I concur with you in this con-
clusion, notwithstanding it appears from the evidence presented in
this case that the claimant settled upon and has resided on the land
in question continuously since June 1874, under the circumstances
she can acquire no right by virtue of such settlement. Her right to
this land attached at the date of the cancellation of timber culture
entry No. 321, viz: October 7, 1880 (being also the date of her home-
stead entry) from which said date, to entitle her to a patent, it will
be necessary for her to continue residence upon and cultivation of the
same for the full required period, that is, five years from date of her
said homestead entry.
Further, the act of May 14, 1880, cuts no figure in this case.
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ACT OF JUNE 15, 1880-TRANSFEREE.
THoiuAs F. WEAvER.
A party purchasing of a homesteader the improvements, right of entry, and pos-
session of the same, and where the same is transferred by boea fideinstrnment in
writing, can pay the government price for the same under the act of June 15,
1880.
Secretary Teller to Connisioner Mc~arland, April 27, 1882.
I have considered the appeal of Thomas F. Weaver from your de-
cision of June 2, 1881, rejecting his application, made on the 19th of
May, 1881, to purchase under section 2 of the act of June 15, 1880 (21
Stats., 237), the W. of NE. 1 and E. of NW. , 2, 3 S., 69 W., Den-
ver, Colorado, embraced in the homestead entry of Charles Van Alstine,
No. 2696, August 20, 1873, the improvements and right of entry and
possession of the same having been purchased by Weaver, and a writing
purporting to convey the same having been executed in his favor by Van
Alstine, June 1, 1880, prior to the passage of the act. The act is as
follows:
The persons who have heretofore nder any one of the homestead
laws entered lands properly subject to such entry, or persons to whom
the right of those having so entered for homesteads may have been at-
tempted to be transferred by bona fide instrument in writing, may en-
title themselves to said lands by paying the government price therefor,
and in no case less than 1.25 per acre, and the amount heretofore
paid the government upon said lands shall be taken as part payment
of said price; Provided, This shall in no wise interfere with the rights
or claims of others who may have subsequently entered such lands
under the homestead laws.
You reject the application of Weaver because: 1. " The bill of sale
sent up to show his rights as a transferee to purchase the land does
not purport to convey the same but only the improvements." 2. " That
the said bill of sale misdescribes the tract by locating it in T. 3 orth,
when by the entry and true location it should be described as 3 south."
3. " That neither the duplicate receipt nor an affidavit of its loss has
been furnished to accompany the entry papers if admitted."
The last two of these objections appear to be purely technical and
immaterial. The land is described as being in Jefferson County. Town-
ship 3 south is in said county, while 3 north is in Boulder County, and
it is clear that the former was the tract intended.
There being no doubt whatever respecting the true location, proof of
actual transfer of possession and occupation of the improvements on
the real tract being found, and the furnishing of the receipt or affidavit
being a matter of official requirement outside the statute and capable
of being complied with at any time without affecting the merits of the
application, I see noreason for rejecting the application on these grounds.
Nor do I think the first objection sufficient. The writing denominated
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by you as a "bill of sale" is under seal, and purports "for and in con-
sideration of the sum of $200 to sell, assign, grant and set over unto
said Thomas F. Weaver all the buildings, betterments and improve-
ments of every name and kind built, erected, made or done" upon the
land described, and to "hereby authorize said Thomas F. Weaver to
enter and take immediate possession of the same."
This writing was evidently intended by the parties as a complete
transfer of all that Van Alstine possessed with respect to this home-
stead tract, and Weaver immediately took full possession under it.
The subsequent act recognizing a right to purchase by those " to
whom the right of those having so entered for homesteads may have
been attempted to be transferred by bona fide instrument in writing,"
was, it. seems to me, intended to protect the equities of just this class
of persons, who, having paid for and entered into possession of improve-
ments, were liable to lose the same by failure to anticipate all other
claimants in reaching the district office after cancellation for the pur-
pose of making entry in their own names. To insist upon all the tech-
nical niceties of a legal form of deed would work great injustice even if
warranted by the law. But the law only refers to " attempted" trans-
fers " by bona fide instrument in writing "; thereby indicating that while
the writing may be only an attempt to transfer, if it be evidently made
in good faith its precise form is immaterial.
I accordingly reverse your decision, and direct that Weaver be per-
mitted to consummate his purchase.
SECOND ENTRY-CHARACTER OF LAND.
BENEDICT LEVIN.
In exceptional cases of lack of water for domestic purposes and cultivation, second
homestead entry may be allowed with credit for fee and commissions already
paid.
Commissioner McFarland to register and receiver, Lared, Kansas, May
4, 1882.
I am in receipt of your letter of March 16, 1882, transmitting the ap-
plication of Benedict Levin to be allowed to relinquish his homestead
entry No. 6220, made February 18, 1881, upon the W. I NW. 1 and W. i
SW. 1 of Sec. 8 in T. 23 S., R. 21 W., with permission to make another
homestead entry upon some vacant tract witheredit for fee and com-
missions already paid.
It appears from an affidavit, duly corroborated, submitted by Mr.
Levin in support of said application, that he settled upon and has re-
sided on the land in question continuously since May, 1879; that in
the month of June, 1879, he dug a well to the depth of from fifty to sixty-
five feet, a portion of which was through limestone and dark-looking
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rock, like slate, and discovering no signs of water at this depth he dug
in several other places, in one instance to the depth of seventy feet, but
with no better success than at first. He further states that in his lo-
cality rain storms are few and far between, and that if he depended on
,surface water and rain he would go thirsty eleven months in the year.
He further represents that for the past three years he has cultivated
about ten acres of this land, but owing to the lack of rain his crops have
been a total failure, and that all the water used on the premises has to
be hauled from Saw Log Creek, which is about three miles distant.
I have to state that cases in which a second entry is allowed are very
Tare, but this seems to be a meritorious case and the application may be
granted.
Notify Mr. Levin accordingly.
ACT OF JUNE 15, 1880-ALrEN-N.ATURALIZATIO.V
WILLIAM H. WHITE.
Notwithstanding the homestead entry in this case was illegal at its inception on ac-
count of alienage of claimant, his widow is allowed to purchase under the act
of June 15, 1880.
Commissioner McFarland to register and receiver, Gainesville, Florida,
May 23, 1882.
On September 9, 1872, Wm. H. White made homestead entry No.
5699, Tallahassee series, upon which entry final certificate No. 1634
wasissued. The preliminary affidavit was sworn to on August25, 1872,
before the clerk of the county court of Orange County, Florida, and
recites inter alia that the applicant had declared his intention to be-
come a citizen of the United States. Mr. White died (as appears by the
final proof) on March 11, 1875, and final proof is submitted by Emma,
his widow, since intermarried with one Spenceley, to effect the consum-
mation of said entry, and to obtain a patent for the land embraced in
said entry, to wit, the N. j SW. and SW. NW. 1 of Sec. 25, and SE.
4 NE. of Sec 26, T. 20 S., R. 29 E., Florida.
There is no evidence that Mr. White ever obtained a certificate of
naturalization, and, as will appear hereinafter, he could not have ob-
tained such certificate, because he died less than two years subsequent
to the date when he declared his intention, etc. His widow, however,
would be allowed the benefit of the homestead act, if in point of fact
Mr. White had declared his intention to become a citizen at or before
the time of making the entry. The applicant's affidavit, above re-
ferred to, isprimafacie evidence of the truth of the statements it con-
tains, and as a rule is accepted by this office as sufficient. It appears
by the final proof that said White was a native of England; it also
appears by a certified copy of the records of the circuit court of
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Orange County, Florida, that Mr. White declared his intention to be-
come a citizen of the United States on October 25, 1872, a month and
a half subsequent to the date of the entry. The prima facie evidence
being thus rebutted by record evidence, it is apparent that Mr. White
was not legally qualified on September 9, 1872, to make a homestead
entry, he not having declared his intention, etc., until a subsequent
date. The entry being thus illegal, must be held for cancellation, and
sixty days are allowed to Mrs. Spenceley within which to appeal from
this decision to the honorable Secretary of the Interior.
The rule laid down in the case of Thomas Madigan (9 C. L. O., 7) does
not now obtain, and any person who has made a homestead entry prior
to June 15, 1880, and those who under the law succeed to his rights,
may purchase the lands embraced in the entry under the second section
of the act of June 15, 1880, provided no adverse rights exist, and the
land was subject to such entry.
Notify Mrs. Spenceley of the action of this office in holding the entry
for cancellation, and inform her of her rights of appeal, and that, if
she desires, she may, before said entry is canceled, purchase the land
under the act of June 15, 1880.
SECOND EATRY-CH ARACTER OF LAND.
LUDWIG P. SARSTAD ET AL.
The new homestead entry will be allowed where, from the nature of the land (the
character of which is not ascertained by the claimant until after entry) the im-
portant homestead condition of cultivation cannot be complied with.
Commissioner McFarland to register and receiver, Fargo, Dakota, allay
26, 1882.
I am in receipt of your letters of March 14 and 15,1882, in which you
transmit the voluntary relinquishments, along with the petitions of Lud-
wig P. Skarstad, who made homestead entry 8102, SW. 1 14, 133, 58,.
May 2, 1881, and of Anton 0. Rolstad, who made HI. E. 8103, May 2,
1881, for NW. 14, 133, 58, to be allowed to make new homestead en-
tries, with credit for fee and commissions already paid.
The bases on which the two claimants ask this relief being similar,
if not identical, and the tracts described being contiguous, one answer
suffices for both. From the testimony offered-which is wholly ex-
parte-it appears that the claimants, "but little learned in English
language," made homestead entries before local officers, without a pre-
vious knowledge of the land, and at a time " the prairies were covered
with an unusual amount of water," and when it was " impossible, unless,
he went by team and employed a surveyor, to find the section lines."
The testimony further showeth that as soon as "the climate al-
lowed," and " before the expiration of six months from date of said
DECISIONS RELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS, 57
entry," they went upon the land and found it unfit for cultivation, "a
barren deposit of gravel " full of stones," " unfit to plow," etc. Believ-
ing it "the policy of the government to grant a fertile and productive
tract to every bona fide settler, the deponent respectfully asks," etc.
The affidavit of Skarstad, as well as that of Rolstad, is corroborated
by two witnesses; that is, each claimant swears to the truth of the
other's statement, and calls in the services of another witness, Andrew
J. Hoistad (who made H. E. 8101, May 2, 1881, SE. 14, 133, 58, relin-
quished canceled at district office January 30, 1882). The " proof " as
to the "unfitness of the land for cultivation " is satisfactory.
The "homestead law exacts cultivation as an essential part of the
performance of contract on the part of the homesteader, and while it is
not "the policy of the government to grant a fertile and productive tract
to every bonafide settler," it is likewise not the policy of the government
to harshly exact a condition (cultivation) where from the nature of
things the condition cannot be performed.
Therefore the petition of Skarstad and Rolstad is granted, and you
will so inform them. I have this day canceled homestead entries 8102
and 8103, without prejudice, and you will note the same on your records,
referring thereon (in the usual manner) to this letter C by date.
HOMESTEAD-ACT OF JUNE 15, 1880.
JOxN W. MILLER.
The act of June 15, 1880, specifically grants the right of purchase in all cases where
the land was properly subject to the original entry, limited only by the proviso
that "this shall in no wise interfere with the rights or claims of others who may
have subsequently entered such lands under the homestead laws." A purchase
can be made after cancellation, provided it does not interfere with a subsequent
right.
Secretary Teller to Commissioner JRcFarland, June 3, 1882.
I have considered the appeal of John W. Miller from your decision of
October 22,1881, rejecting his application to purchase, under the act of
June 15, 1880, (21 Stats., 237), the E. E NE. J 6, 210, 27 E., Visalia, Cal.,
entered April 28, 1873, homestead No. 777.
It appears that your office canceled the entry June 17, 1880, on failure
of Miller to make final proof within seven years from its date; that the
land is still vacant, and that the fact of such cancellation is the only
reason assigned for refusal to allow present application, your decision
being based on that of my predecessor in the case of Maria Galliher,
June 1, 1881.
The act of 1880, section 2, specifically grants the right of purchase in
all cases where the land was properly subject to the original entry,
limited only by the proviso that " this shall in no wise interfere with
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the rights or claims of others who may have subsequently entered such
lands under the homestead law."
As no subsequent entry upon any tract taken as a homestead can be
made until after cancellation of such original homestead entry, this
proviso would have nothing in any case whatever to operate upon, ex-
eept upon the theory that the right of purchase thus limited might be
exercised as well after cancellation as before; and that the only pur
pose of Congress was to save any entry subsequently made in accord-
ance with existing law from prejudice or interference under the new en-
actment, but to bestow upon the original claimant the otherwise unre-
stricted right to acquire by purchase the land which he had failed to
secure by strict compliance with the law under which he had originally
entered.
It can make no difference to the government whether the entry has
been canceled or not. The mere act of cancellation has no force in con-
nection with the statute. In this case less than two months had elapsed
after the expiration of the seven years, and the entry was actually can-
celed after the passage of the remedial act; while there are on your
files hundreds of entries still uncanceled, where months and years have
passed since the expiration of the seven years limited by law for mak-
ing final proof. Yet the rule has not been applied to these, and the
parties making such entries have been allowed the benefit of the act of
1880, whenever applied for.
There can be no reason for this invidious distinction. Upon full con-
sideration I am convinced that the decision in case of Galliher must
have been inadvertent, and should not stand as a precedent-the true
construction, as I apprehend, being as above stated. I accordingly re-
verse your decision and direct the allowance of Miller's application.
TIMBER-C ULTURE ENATRY-TRANSAMUTATION.
ToRJus H. FLOM.
In view of the peculiar facts in this case, the party will be allowed to date his settle-
ment prior to the time his timber-culture entry covered the land now covered by
his homestead entry.
Commissioner McFarland to register and receiver, Redwood Falls, Minne-
sota, June 7, 1882.
On November 4, 1872, Torjus H. Flom filed pre-emption D. S. No. 252,
for NE. 14, 112, 43, alleging settlement thereon July 1, 1872. On
November 27, 1877, he made timber-culture entry No. 606, for the same
land and surrendered his D. S. receipt at that time, though it does not
appear that he ever executed a relinquishment of his filing. On Sep-
tember 14, 1879, he relinquished his timber-culture entry, and the same
was canceled by this office December 5, 1879. On December 26, 1879,
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he made homestead entry No. 2574, for the tract. On April 1 1882, he
made final proof claiming the benefit of residence under pre-emption
law in accordance with the provisions of act of May 27, 1878. Your
letter of May 17, 1882, transmitting this final proof to this office con-
tains the following:
The proof shows continuous residence and cultivation by the claim-
ant from September 1, 1872, to April 1, 1882, although the tract was held
by claimant under timber-culture act from November 27, 1877, to De-
cember 5, 1879. We would respectfully ask what action should be taken
thereon by this office.
Doubt as to the proper manner of proceeding in this case has prob-
ably arisen in your minds because, under rulings of this office, parties
who have relinquished timber-culture entries upon which they had es-
tablished residence, and subsequently made homestead entries for the
same land, have, upon offering final proof and claiming under act of
May 14, 1880, the benefit of residence prior to date of homestead entry,
been restricted in such claim to actual residence subsequent to the
cancellation of the timber-culture entries, it being held that a party
cannot, in perfecting a homestead entry claim the benefit of residence
upon the land while embraced in his timber-culture entry. In a genera
sense this ruling prevails, but in this case are found circumstances which
operate to form an exception.
This party's pre-emption filing remained intact during the time that
his timber-culture entry existed. Upon the relinquishment of his tim-
ber-culture entry he occupied the same position under his filing, and
was entitled to the same rights thereunder as though the timber-cult-
ure entry had not been made. He was, therefore, legally entitled to
transmute his filing to a homestead entry, and is entitled to credit for his
iesidence on the land under pre-emption law. If no adverse claim for
the land appears upon your records, you should, upon receipt of the
commissions due, issue the usual final papers in the case and report the
same in your regular returns for the month in which issued.J53 J -_
HOMESTEAD ENTRY-DESERTED WIFE.
SARAH E. PIERCE.
A deserted wife depending upon her own resources for support, who made a home-
stead entry as the head of a family, is deemed qualified as a single person to avail
herself of the homestead privilege, and, notwithstanding the return of the hus-
band, entitled to consummate the entry.
Commissioner McFarland to register and receiver, Fargo, Dakota, June
9, 1882.
Sarah E. Pierce made homestead entry 6662, July 8, 1880, for the
NE. 1 of Sec. 12, T. 134, R. 51, as "the head of a family and a citizen
of the United States."
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In your letter of January 6,1882, " proof " was transmitted, and appli-
cation to purchase the land under the requirements of Sec. 2301 R. S.
was offered.
In my letter C, January 27, 1882, additional evidence was called for,
alluded to as " a copy of this decree of separation, which appears from
her testimony to be a decree a mensa et thoro."
In reply to which you transmit in your letter of May 25, 1882, a copy
of judgment ordered by district court county of Olmstead, State of
Minnesota, in the case of Sarah E. Pierce, plaintiff, v. Job P. Pierce,
alias dictus Joseph Pierce, dated December 8,1879, in which it is shown
that defendant defaulted, and
That he willfully deserted her for more than one year nest before the
commencement of this action, that the plaintiff is the sole owner of the
real estate mentioned and described in the complaint in this action, an(d
that judgment be entered herein that the plaintiff is the sole owner of
said premises, and barring the defendant from all interest therein, and
authorizing theplaintiff to sell, convey, mortgage. and dispose of said
real estate without the defendant joining in the conveyance or mort-
gage thereof . . . . . as fully as she might or could do if she were
unmarried.
It is true as you suggest, that this is not what was anticipated, show-
ing a complete " separation from bed and board," but, although a judg-
ment relating to the disposal of certain property in Rochester, Minu.,
it establishes the fact that claimant was in the position of a deserted
wife, and as such the head of a family, also that at date of decree she
could have made a valid homestead entry. Her position at the time
she made her homestead entry was the same, as is shown by special
affidavit furnished with her " proof," nor were her equities disturbed or
her position materially altered by the fact
That since that time (September 9, 1879), and until after taking the
homestead above mentioned, viz, until November 23, 1860, she did not
live with the said Job P. Pierce, bt at said date he returned to the
place where affiant was then living in a destitute condition, and out of
compassion since that time she has supported him, but i no way has
he, the said Job P. Pierce, had any interest in and to any property
owned by her, nor has he in any way helped to support her.
The evidence also shows that she had supported this husband from
date of marriage (May, 1852) until the time-he deserted her.
From all this and from the fact that residence and improvement of
the land is shown, within the requirements of the law, I am clearly of
the opinion that Sarah E. Pierce was a single person, " the head of a
family and a citizen of the IUnited States," at the time of making her
homestead entry, and entitled to commute the same under See. 2301
R. S.
You will, upon payment of the purchase money, issue final receiver's
receipt and final certificate of current series, and not fail to furnish
"commuted homestead affidavit" (Form 4-069), which does not appear
with proof.
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NATURALIZATIOX-COUNTY COURTS IN COLORADO.
J. F. HECHTTKAN.
Record evidence of filing of declaration to become a citizen of the United States, or
of naturalization, in or by a court not having a clerk distinct and separate in
person from the judge, will not be accepted from a homestead party.
Comin missioner McFarland to J. F. Rechtman, judge of courtfor La Plata
County, Colorado, June 10, 1882.
On the 7th instant I received from you a letter, not dated, request-
ing this office to rule that county courts in Colorado not having a clerk
distinct and separate from the judge are competent to naturalize aliens,
in view of the State statute authorizing the judge to act, ex officio, as
the clerk of his court. I cannot comply with your request for the rea-
sons hereinafter stated.
The State statutes provide that the county courts shall be courts of
record, and that the judges may appoint clerks for the same or act as
such clerks. This office refused to receive record evidence of naturaliza-
tion by a county court not having a clerk distinct and separate from the
judge, and applied the same rule in respect to the declarations of parties
to become citizens of the United States. It is observed that some of
the county judges have recently appointed clerks, and their courts are
regarded here as competent to naturalize, and naturalization papers
issued by them are respected accordingly. I inclose herewith copy of
letter to the register atWaKeeney, Kans., dated April 22, 1880, wherein
the competency of State courts to naturalize aliens was dealt with at
length. In enumerating the four prerequisites of the organization of
State courts attempting to naturalize it is stated that said court " must
have a clerk." Therein were quoted judicial decisions to show that
the courts must not only have a right to have a clerk, but that they must
have one, and that said clerk must be separate and distinct in person
from the judge. The idea which I desire to convey is that no matter
what the provisions of the State laws are as to the power of county
judges to act in the double capacity of judge and clerk, the requirements
of the United States Statutes, as expounded by learned jurists, carnot
be disregarded by this office.
HOMESTEAD-ADJOINING FARM ENTRY.
Where land in a homestead entry that has been consummated, but not patented, is
sold, the purchaser may make " adjoining farm" homestead entry of a contigu-
ous vacant tract (as the law allows), at his own risk as to the patenting of the
land purchased.
Commissioner McFarland to register and receiver, Jackson, Miss., J~un e 17,
1882.
am in receipt of your letter of the 5th instant, in which you ask:
Where a party making a homestead entry makes final proof on the
same, and no patent has been issued therefor, if he sells the land em-
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braced in his entry to a third party, will the party purchasing be al-
lowed to make an adjoining farm entry to the land purchased.
In reply I have to state that if the homestead entry upon which final
proof has been made is in every respect regular, and the issuing of a.
patent is a mere ministerial act, the party so purchasing could enter a
contiguous tract as an adjoining farm homestead entry. He would do




When an additional entry is made under the act of March 3, 1879, the law does not
require that the lands embraced in the additional entry shall be actually culti-
vated to crop.
If the tract thus entered be used in connection with that embraced in the original
entry for the purposes of a home, the intention of the act of March 3, 1879, will
have been secured and its purposes attained.
Tracts mbraced in an original and additional entry are considered as a compact
body and cn]tivation of a portion of the same will be considered as a cultivation
of the whole.
Commissioner McFarlanid to register and receiver, Fergus Falls, linnesota,
June 21, 1882.
I am in receipt of the receiver's letter, dated June 12, 1882, transmit-
ting, for the consideration of this office, final proof submitted by Eben
M. Gordon in support of his claim to patent for W. I NE. J and N. i
SE. 22, 134, 37, by virtue of homestead entries No. 2980 and 5135.
It appears that the entry 2980 was made June 22, 1875, for W. NE.
* of the section described under general homestead laws; and that entry
No. 5135, for N. SE. 1 of said section, was made May 20, 1879, as ad-
ditional thereto under act of March 3, 1879.
The proof shows that the party established a residence upon the land
embraced in his original entry October 30, 1875; that he has continued
to reside upon, cultivate, and improve said tract from that date to date
of final proof-June 6, 1882-and has 53 acres thereof cultivated to
crops; that since the date of his additional entry he has cleared a por-
tion of the land embraced therein and feneed the whole tract, but that
he has not actually cultivated any part of the additional homestead.
The receiver considers this failure to cultivate the tract embraced in
the additional entry as a defect or failure to fully comply with legal re-
quirements, and for that reason submits the case for consideration.
The law does not peremptorily require that the land embraced in an
additional entry of this class shall be actually cultivated to crop. If
the tract thus entered be used in connection with that embraced in the
original entry for the purposes of a home, the intention of the act of
March 3, 1879, will have been secured and its purposes attained. It
has been held heretofore that the tracts embraced in an original and
additional entry will be considered as one compact body and residence
DECISIONS RELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS. 63
upon any portion of the same will be considered as residence upon the
whole, and I am of opinion that the same rule should apply respecting
cultivation; though in all cases of this kind improvement and use of the
additional tract as a part of the whole homestead will be insisted upon.
In my opinion, the final proof in the case under consideration is not
defective; the party has made substantial compliance with legal require-
ments, and the usual final papers should issue to him upon payment of
the commissions due.
You are therefore instructed accordingly, and will report the final
papers in your regular returns for the month in which issued.
RESIDENCE-C ULTI VATION-GO0D FAITH.
EDWARDS V. SEXSON.
When a person, although not at all times on the land, has no other recognized home,
and claims and improves the land entered, in all respects showing that his claim
is made in good faith, he has fulfilled the requirements of the statute.
In every case an actual personal continuous residence is not necessary.
The homestead act of 1862 should be liberally construed.
Secretary Teller to Commissioner McFarland, June 23, 1882.
I have considered the case of Thomas J. Edwards v. Andrew J. Sex-
son, involving homestead entry No. 5621, covering the S. W. I of See.
18, T. 3 N., R. 23 W., Nebraska, on appeal by contestant from your de-
cision of July 13, 1881, sustaining the decision of the register and re-
ceiver and dismissing the contest.
This homestead entry was made October 14, 1878. Affidavit of con-
test alleging abandonment and defective cultivation was made Janu-
ary 12, 1880, and trial was held February 20, 1880.
A question has been raised as to the admission of the oral cross-
examination of contestant's witnesses in the depositions taken before C.
H. Bane, notary public, upon written interrogatories on the part of the
contestant. For such irregularity the testimony should have been
stricken out upon the motion made for that purpose, and in considering
this case the testimony so taken will be disregarded. The testimony'
proves satisfactorily the following facts, viz: That the defendant, Sex-
son, -was a single man, twenty-nine years of age; that he made settle-
ment on the land early in April, 1879, with the intention of remaining
there; that he had a team, wagon, breaking-plow, cooking utensils,
and some other articles of personal property; that he employed help
and built a house twelve feet square, partly a dugout and partly sod,
with roof of willow and earth, and an opening for a door and window.
One witness, who had been acquainted with the land six years and
knew the house, testifies that it was like most of the first dwellings
built in that country and was fit to live in. After building the house
Sexson commenced breaking upon the lines of his land for the purpose
of setting trees or hedge, and a piece for crops the ensuing year. He
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occupied the house a short time, eating and sleeping there. About the1st of June, 1879, on account of the death of a brother, he went to theeastern part of the State to attend to some of his brother's businessand some of his own that was left with his brother. He remainedaway until September. During his absence he spent part of his timein cultivating crops left by his brother, part in attending to his ownaffairs, and part of the time worked out for wages.
He arrived at his homestead again September 16,1879. He occupiedthe house a short time, put a door in it, and otherwise made it more
comfortable for the winter. The ground was too dry for further improv-ing it, and being out of money and having no work he again returnedto the eastern part of the State. He left the house in good condition.
with a bed, table, cooking utensils, crockery, clothing, and some otherarticles of personal property in it. It was proved that a month beforethe trial the house was there and the personal property in it. WhenSexson returned, February 10, a short time before the trial, he foundthe house destroyed and all the wood-work and personal property takenaway. He had no other home and returned with the intention of re-maining.
The claimant, Sexson, seems to have acted in good faith and with theintention of appropriating the land to his own use and making a homeof it.
The facts in the case are quite similar to those in the case of Waldov. Schleiss (1 C. L. L., 234). It was held in that case that "where a per-son, although not all times on the land, has no other recognized home,and claims and improves the land entered, in all respects showing thathis claim is made in good faith . . . . . that he has fulfilled therequirements of the statute." And that in every possible case an actualpersonal continuous residence is not necessary. And to same effect seeBaker v. Hess (lb., 296).
I am of opinion that neither the charge of defective settlement andcultivation nor that of abandonment has been sustained.Your decision is therefore affirmed and the contest dismissed.The papers submitted with your letter are herewith returned.
ye/.V: 4 OMESTEAD-DEFISE1,EXECUTOR-HEIR.
JOHN J. JONES.
A devise within the meaning of the homestead law must be of the land, and not ofthe proceeds of the sale thereof which may be contemplated by the will; there-fore the executors are not entitled to a final certificate in case of their ap-pointment in the will to make such sale, although the executors are heirs. to the
.exclusion of other heirs.
Commissioner McFarland to register and receiver, Gainesville, Florida,
June 24, 1882.
I have examined the final proof submitted by Robert Jones and Will-iam Jones, executors of the last will, etc., of John J. Jones, deceased,
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who, on January 28, 1S74, made homestead entry No. 437, Gainesville
series, and upon which F. C. No. 1995 has been issued to " Robert Jones
and William Jones, executors of John J. Jones, deceased."
The testimony shows that John J. Jones died on June 14, 1878, leaving
no widow, but six children, all of whom were adults. Mr. Jones made
a will on May 31, 1S8S (a copy of which is transmitted with the final
roof, duly authenticated), which was admitted to probate, and letters
testamentary issued thereon to claimants, who are sons of the de-
ceased. That portion of the will which relates to the homestead entry
is a follows:
2dly. I want Robert Jones and William Jones, my sons, to take charge
of all my estate, and my will is that they are appointed my executors
to take charge of all my property, both real and personalty, and that
they manage it in the manner hereafter mentioned:
1st. That they take charge of my growing crop and finish cultivating
and gather it, and that they be allowed a reasonable sum for their serv-
ices in the management of said crop; also, I want my said executors, to
wit, Robert Jones and William Jones, to take charge of my lands, to
wit, that portion of the Dupont grant, together with my homestead
upon which I now live, and all my hogs, cattle, notes, and accounts, and
dispose of the same to the best advantage for my heirs; first pay all
my just debts, then sell all the rest of my property; and for my son.
Robert Jones, to have two hundred and fifty dollars; then the rest of
my property to be equally divided among my heirs, to wit, William
Jones, Robert Jones, Mary Ann Hires, Elizabeth Hires, Jane Dough-
erty, and Susan Yelvington. Also, I want my grandchildren, the heirs
of J. J. Jones, junior, viz, to wit, Robert Jones and Florence Jones, to
have the portion of one ot my heirs, and that Robert Jones, my son, is
hereby appointed to take charge of the same until they become of the
age of twenty-one years, then deliver the said estate to them. * *
Under sections 2291 and 2292 United States Revised Statutes, patent
issues in the following order:
1st. To the person making such entry, or, 2d, if he be dead, to his
widow; 3d. If both father and mother are dead, leaving an infant child
or children, then to such minor child or children. 4th. In case of the
death of the widow, and there being no minor child or children, then to
his (the homestead party's) heirs or devisees.
From the foregoing statement of facts it appears that at the time of
Mr. Jones's death he left no widow, minor child, or children, so that
patent, when satisfactory proof is made, must issue to the heirs or devi-
sees of John J. Jones, deceased; the law makes no provision for issu-
ing patent to an administrator or executor, and unless the land in
question has been devised, patent must (when issued) be issued to the
" heirs of John J. Jones, d~eeased." The only question to be determined,
then, is: Did John J. Jones, by the will above mentioned and the clause
set out, devise the land to Robert Jones and William Jones within the
meaning of Sec. 2291.
Thepersons named as executors (who are sons and consequentlyheirs)
are directed to take charge of, manage, sell, and dispose of the land, and
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after paying the decedent's debt to divide the net proceeds among the
testator's heirs. A devise within the meaning of the statute must be of
the land and not of the proceeds, and the clause referred to creates the
Messrs. Jones agents for the sale of the land and not devisees.
I hold, therefore, that the certificate should issue to the heirs of John
J. Jones, deceased.
The proof regarding residence and cultivation by Mr. Jones during
his lifetime is sufficient, but there is no evidence tending to show that
the land was cultivated from the time of his death until the expiration
of five years from the date of entry.
Inform the Messrs. Jones of the contents of this letter, and require
them or either of them to show, by an affidavit duly corroborated by at
least two disinterested witnesses, that the heirs of the deceased kept
the land in a state of cultivation from the time of the death of their an-
cestor until the expiration of five years from the date of entry.
I inclose the final certificate heretofore issued; if upon receipt of the
corroborated affidavit called for you deem the same satisfactory, the
register will issue final certificate, bearing like number with the one
hierewithreturned, in the name of the " heirs of John J. Jones, deceased,"
and transmit the same, together with the affidavits, to this office.
NVA TURALIZA TIOAN-MINOR-PROOP.
ADOLPHUS PINDER.
In case a homestead party claims to have been naturalized by reason of the naturali-
zation of his father during his (the son's) minority, he must show that he was
dwelling within the United States at the date of the father's naturalization.
Commissioner IcFarland to register and receiver, Gainesville Florida,
June 28, 1882.
Adoliphus Pinder, who made homestead entry No. 1003, Gainesville
series, and to whom F. . 1968 was issued, states in his testirnony, in
answer to interrogatory No. 4, that he is not anative-born citizen; that
he was a minor when his father Richard Pinder (a certificate of whose
naturalization accompanies the final proof) was naturalized, he (the
claimant) being about nineteen or twenty years at the time.
Section 2172 of the Revised Statutes of the United States provided
as follows:
The children of persons who have been duly naturalized under any
law of the United States . . . . . being underthe age of twenty-
one years at the time of the naturalization of their parents, shall, if
dwelling in the United States, be considered as citizens thereof, etc.
It is not shown that the claimant was dwelling in the United States
at the time his father was admitted as a citizen. You will therefore
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notify Mr. Pinder that be is required to transmit, through you, an affi-
davit, duly corroborated by at least two witnesses, showing that at the
time of the naturalization of his father, to wit, on March 20, 1867, he
(claimant) was dwelling in the United States.
ACT OF JUNE 15, 1880-TRANSFEREE.
ELLA M. HOYT.
Possession of a homestead duplicate receipt by a stranger is no evidence of the trans-
fer of the land; he is not by reason of mere possession of the paper entitled to
purchase the land under act of June 15, 1880, as a transferee.
Commissioner McEarland to register and receiver, Montgomery, Alabama,
July 10, 1882.
I am in receipt of yours of March 16 last, transmitting the appeal of
Ella M. Hoyt, by her attorney, from your decision of February 6, 1882,
rejecting her application to purchase, under the act of June 15, 1880,
the S. SE. 4 of Sec. 28, 1 N., 7 E.
In reply I have to state that the records show said tract to have been
covered by Mobile, Alabama, homestead entry No. 1272, made Feb-
ruary 11, 1873, by Charles Butler, which was canceled January 5, 1881,
for failure to make final proof within the statutory period.
Ella M. Hoyt, as widow and heir of A. G. Martin, transferee, made
application, February 1 last, to purchase said tract under the act of
June 15, 1880, which you rejected on the ground that " canceled home-
stead entries are not subject to the operation of said act, and that no
transfer by bona fide instrument in writing on the part of the home-
steader has been filed," from which decision the applicant appeals.
The ruling of the Department on which you base the first part of
your decision having been modified by the honorable Secretary's decis-
ion of June 3, 1882, in the case of John W. Miller, of Visalia, Cal.
(vide Copp's Land Owner, June, 1882, p. 57), virtually disposes of that
portion of your objection; therefore the latter clause of your decision
will only be considered at this time.
Appellant alleges that a few months subsequent to entry Butler con-
veyed his right in said land unto H. Evans and MeDuffie Mann by
merely surrendering to said parties his duplicate receipt; that said
parties subsequently conveyed their right by deed unto one Burgess
Miles, and that said Miles conveyed his right by deed unto A. G.
Martin, the deceased husband of the said Ella M. Hoyt.
The affidavit of the probate judge of the county in which the land is
situated is introduced as evidence, showing that it was the custom in
that county for homestead parties to transfer their lands by mere sur-
render of the duplicate receipt without any deed. Evidence as to what
is custom, and what is not, is inadmissible, it being irrelevant to the
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case. There is but one way to transfer real estate that is universally
recognized by the courts since the passage of the statute of frauds, and
that is by an instrument in writing; any other mode cannot be estab-
lished by cstom; it can only be done by special legislation as an
amendment to existing laws. The act referred to is remedial and not
amendatory, as the appellant's argument would seem to imply.
Possession of the duplicate receipt by a stranger is no evidence of the
transfer of the lands, nor does it carry therewith the settler's equities
,o the land; the act expressly states that "persons to whom the right
of those having so entered for homestead may have been attempted to
be transferred by bona fide instrument in writing may entitle them-
selves," etc. There is nothing in the above language thatcould becon-
strued to imply that the surrender of the duplicate receipt is equivalent
to a transfer by bona fide instrument in writing or equal to a deed of
conveyance; it would be necessary to interpolate words in order to ad-
mit of such construction. The lawmakers evidently contemplated such
a conveyance as would entitle the grantee to the same equities in the
land as the grantor possessed; therefore, your decision that the mere
surrender of the duplicate receipt is not an attempted transfer by bona
fide instrument in writing is hereby affirmed and the appeal dismissed.




A residence or settlement on an original farm will not be computed as residence on an
adjoining tract prior to entry.
Commissioner McFarland to register and receiver, Montgomery, Alabama,
July 15, 1882.
I am in receipt of yours of March 7, 1882, transmitting the appeal of
William C. Field from your decision of January 4, last, rejecting final
proof on his adjoining farm, homestead entry No. 11707, on the ground
"that adjoining farm homestead entries are not governed by the pro-
visions of the act of May 14, 1880, and that, therefore, the entry must
be of five years' standing before proof for same can be made." From
which decision applicant appeals.
The records show said entry to have been made June 1, 1881, for the
NW. SE. l of Sec. 14, 16 S. 4 W., the settler claiming ownership and
residence on the E. -SE. and SW. SE. of same section, township,
and range, with settlement thereon, relating back forty-eight years.
Final proof was offered December 27, 1881, six months subsequent to
entry, claiming the benefit of the act of May 14, 1880, as to residence
and settlement on the original farm.
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The third section of said act provides:
That any settler who has settled, or who shall hereafter settle, on any
of the public lands of the United States with the intention of claiming
the same under the homestead laws, etc.
The evidence shows that Mr. Field was born on the original farm\
forty-eight years ago, and has resided thereon ever since. He did notI
settle on the tract he entered as an adjoining farm, prior to. his entry
thereoff with the intention of claiming the same under the homestead
laws. The rights of an adjoining farm entry attach only after entry
when the land entered with his original farm are treated as an entirety.
A residence or settlement, therefore, upon an original farm constitutes
no residence upon an adjoiniflg tract prior to entry, as settlement can-
not be made at the same time upon two distinct tracts of land.
All decisions and precedents forbid the proving up of an adjoining
farm homestead entry prior to the expiration of five years from date of
entry, except where there may be credit for military or naval services
during the war of the rebellion, therefore, the decision of the register
and receiver is affirmed and the appeal dismissed.
You will notify the party in interest of this ruling and of his right to
a still further appeal.
HOMESTEAD-ACT OF JUNE 15. 1880.
GEORGE S. BisHOP.
Should a homestead entry be canceled and an adverse right to the land attach tinder
a subsequent entry, the same is not subject to purchase under the act of Jane 15,
1880, although the subsequent claim may have been asserted under a law other
than the homestead law.
Secretary Teller to Commissioner MeFarland, July 18, 1882.
I have considered the matter of the appeal of George S. Bishop from
your decision of November 10, 1881, rejecting his application to pur-
chase the SE. 4 of See. 13, T. 3 N., R. 28 W., North Platte district, Ne-
braska, under the second section of the act of June 15, 1880 (21 Stat.,
237). The record shows that Bishop made homestead entry No. 302, of
the tract, July 25, 1874, and that the same was canceled May 25, 18-7,
for voluntary relinquishment. Under date of August 17, 1878, one
Andrew Goddard made timber culture entry No. 328 of the N. I of the
said SE. I, and George A. Steeter filed declaratory statement No. 905
for the S. I of the same, alleging settlement May 13 preceding.
On August 2, 1881, Bishop applied to purchase as aforesaid, but the
register rejected his application for the reasons (1) that the said filing
and entry had been made subsequently to the cancellation of his home-
stead entry, and (2) that by reason of said relinquishment and cancel-
lation he had exhausted his rights under the homestead law and his
right to purchase under the section in question. You affirmed the reg-
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ister's action as being in conformity with the rulings of your office, and
held that under the same no application to purchase under said section
can be allowed where the homestead entry of such application has been
canceled. Such was the ruling of the Department in the case of Maria
J. Galliher, widow of Silas Galliher (S L. 0., 137), but the same was
overruled by this Department under date of the 3d ultimo in the case
of John W. Miller (9 libidem, 57), wherein it was held that the section
in question-
Specifically grants the right of purchase in all cases where the land
was properly subject to the original entry, limited only by the proviso
that this shall in no wise interfere with the rights or claims of others
who may have subsequently entered such lands under the homestead
laws. As no subsequent entry upon any tract taken as a homestead
can be made until after cancellation of such original entry, this proviso
would have nothing in any case whatever to operate upon except upon
the theory that the right of purchase thus linited might be exercised
as well after cancellation as before, and that the only purpose of Con-
gress was to save any entry subsequently made in accordance with ex-
isting law from prejudice or interference under the new enactment, but
to bestow upon the original claimant the otherwise unrestricted right
to acquire by purchase the land which he had failed to secure by strict
compliance with the law under which he had originally entered. It can
make no difference to the government whether the entry has been can-
celed or not. The mere act of cancellation has no force in connection
with the statute.
The case cited was exparte, no adverse right having intervened in
the interim of the cancellation of Miller's entry and of his application
therein drawn in question; whereas in the case at bar the adverse
claims of Streeter and Goddard have been interposed, and it is presum-
able that the land was subject to the same, as the contrary is not shown
nor even suggested. It is urged by the appellant's attorney that "only
adverse claims arising under the homestead law are a bar" to the opera-
tion of the provisions of said section. This position appears to be
taken and could only be maintained under the doctrine of the well-
known maxim " epressio unius est exclusio alterius," and if that maxim
applies to this proviso it is conclusive of the case.
But although the rights or claims of those who have subsequently
made " homestead" entries are the only rights expressly protected from
the operation of the section cited, it cannot be presumed that Congress
intended to divest any bonafide settler of vested rights.
A statute, it has been said, is to be so construed, if possible, as to give
sense and meaning to every part; and the maxim was never more ap-
plicable than when applied to the interpretation of a statute, that ex-
pressio nies est eclusio alterius. The sages of the law, according to
Plowden, have ever been guided in the construction of statutes by the
intention of the legislature, which they have always taken according to
the necessity of the matter, and according to that which is consonant
to reason and sound discretion.
Thus it sometimes happens that in a statute, the language of which
may fairly comprehend many different cases, some only are expressly
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mentioned by way of example merely, and not as excluding othcrs of a
similar nature. (Broom's Legal Maxims, 7th ed., 664.)
I am therefore of the opinion that Congress used the expression
"' homestead laws in a generic sense, intending thereby to illustrate
its intent to protect all vested rights that might intervene prior to the
application to purchase certain lands under the provisions of the act in
question. Such construction is within the reason and spirit of the stat-
ute if not within its letter, and I accordingly affirm so much of your
decision as rejects Bishop's application to purchase the N. A of the
tract in question embraced in Goddard's timber culture entry, but his
application should be allowed as to the residue, i. e., the S. 3 of the tract,
embraced in Streeter's filing, to be held subject to the latter's making
final proof and payment pursuant to legal requirements.
ADJOINING FARM ENTRY-PURCHASE.
ISAAC S. RIGGS.
Under the peculiar circumstances of this case the claimant is permitted to make his
entry as an adjoining frn entry, to date from original entry.
Commissioner McFarland to register and receiver, Huntsville, Alabama,
July 19, 1882.
I am in receipt of yours of March 15 last, transmitting for instructions
the final proof on homestead entry No. 6441, made January 19, 1876,
for the W. W SW. 4, Sec. 20, T. 7, R. 4 W., by Isaac S. Riggs.
The records show said entry to have been made for settlement and cul-
tivation. It seems that after making entry Mr. Riggs improved said
tract and built a house thereon; subsequently he found out that owing
to the back-water from Flint Creek, which flows in a serpentine form
through said land, the whole of said land is covered by water a portion
of each year, in consequence of which it is impossible for him to reside
thereon; therefore he at once purchased six acres immediately adjoin-
ing, which was not subject to such yearly overflow, on which he erected
a dwelling-house and has lived therein ever since, cultivating and im-
proving the entire tract as an adjoining farm.
After the lapse of five years he offers final proof on his entry, show-
ing full compliance with the homestead law except as to residence.
When claimant purchased the adjoining six acres, as a site for a resi-
dence, he should have applied at once through the local office for a
change of entry, as at the date of entry he was not competent to make
entry of an adjoining farm homestead, he not then being owner of ad-
joining land as required by law in such cases; and by reason of his
failure to reside on the tract entered he cannot, under section 2291 R.
S., perfect his claim thereto.
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As, however, he appears to have acted in good faith, and as present
owner of adjoining land would be authorized to make an entry of an
adjoining farm homestead (unless his right was exhausted by his orig-
inal entry), and there being no adverse claimant, I have decided to con-
sider his final proof as equivalent to an application for change of entry;
therefore his entry will be allowed to stand, and will be treated as an
adjoining farm homestead until five years shall have elapsed from date
of said constructive application, to wit, November 5, 1881, when he can
make final proof de novo, or if he desires patent before that time he may
avail himself of the provisions of the act of June 15, 1880, and obtain
title thereto by purchase.
HOMESTEAD ENTRY -TRA VSFEREE.
W. M. Bmrpus.
The attempt to transfer the land in a homestead entry by the party thereto having
been made prior to June 15, 1880, application to purchase the same by a final
transferee under act approved on said date may be allowed, notwithstanding
that the final transfer was made subsequent to date of the act.
Commissioner McFarland to register and receiver, San Francisco, Califor-
nia, July 22, 1882,
I am in receipt of your letter of the 16th ultimo, transmitting, for the
consideration of this office, the application of J. C. Rued, assignee of
Wi. M. Bumpus, to purchase, under act of June '15, 1880, the land em-
braced in homestead entry No. 2682.
The entry was made February 20, 1877, for the SE. SW. , SW. SE.
iSec. 1, and W. NE.1, Sec. 12, T. 8N., R. 12W., M.D. M. On Feb-
ruary 16, 1878, Bumpus conveyed the land, by quit-claim, to Daniel Mc-
Laren and Wm. McLaren, who, on May 4 last, conveyed the same to J.
C. Rued, and the latter party now seeks to perfect title to the land in
question under said act of June 15, 1880.
It is clearly shown that said land was subject to homestead entry and
that Bumpus was qualified to make the entry in question. As the at-
tempted transfer by Bumpus was made prior to the passage of the act,
I am of the opinion that Rued is entitled to avail himself of the pro-
visions of said act, although the deed or transfer to him as not made
until after June 15, 1880.
You will therefore allow Mr. Rued to perfect title to the land under
said act, and upon payment of a sufficient amount of money you will
issue the usual cash papers in the case and transmit the same to this
office with your regular returns. The deeds inclosed in your letter are
herewith returned.
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HOJIESTEAD ENTRY-REGISTER OF LAND OFFICE.
THOMVIAS J. SCOTT.
A homestead party may, after his appointment as register of the United States Land
Office, purchase under the act of June 15, 1880, the land embraced in his entry.
Comnissioner JicEarland to Thomas . Scott, . S. Land Office,Mont-
gomery, Alabama, August 3, 1882.
I am in receipt by reference from Paul Strobach, esq., of your letter
of the 10th ultimo, asking whether you as register can, under the
act of June 15, 1880, purchase the land embraced in a homestead entry
made by you prior to your appointment.
In reply, I have to state that section 2287 Rev. Stats. provides that
Any bona fide settler under the homestead or pre-emption laws of the
United States who has filed the proper application to enter not to ex-
ceed one quarter section of the public lands in any district land office,
and who has been subsequently appointed a register or receiver, may
perfect the title to the land under the pre-emption laws by furnishing
the proofs and making the payments required by law, to the satisfac-
tion of the Commissioner of the General Land Office.
The act of June 15, 1880, is an act of relief and is broad in its terms,
as it provides " that persons who have heretofore under any of the
homestead laws entered lands . . . . . may entitle thems elves to
said lands by paying the government price therefor," etc.
The act of May 20,,1862, does not in terms restrict registers and re-
ceivers from perfecting entries made by them under said law; but it
was held by this office that inasmuch as proof of settlement and culti-
vation must be made to the satisfaction of the local officers, that there-
fore they were barred from its privileges. While this rule was being
strictly enforced the act of April 20, 1871 (Sec. 2287 Revised Statutes),
was passed as cited above, granting certain rights to settlers, who were
subsequently appointed as register or receiver.
Under the general rule of law, the legislation thus had confirmed the
decision of the Department.
The act of June 15, 1880, does not make any distinction as to the
class of persons who may avail themselves of its benefits; and as the
deprivation of its privileges is, in effect, a punishment, it seems to me
that the officers named should not be debarred from any rights there-
under unless required by law, or necessary to secure a just and proper
administration of the homestead laws.
The reasons assigned in the former rulings of this office for denying
a register or receiver the right to perfeet a homestead entry were emi-
nently correct under the circumstances, but lo not obtain under the
act of June 15, 1880, because under that act no proof requiring the ap-
proval of the local officers is necessary.
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Therefore, I am of the opinion that if the land was properly subject
to homestead entry at date of entry, and no subsequent rights or
claims interfere, the register is entitled to purchase the land under the
act named
, l fi 7 HOMESTEAD-ACT OF JUATE 15, 1880.
JOHN D. HAY.
Alienation of the land is no bar to the original party purchasing under said act, even
though the transferee protests.
Commissioner McFarland to register and receiver, Montgomery, Alabama,
September , 1882.
I have considered the appeal of John D. Hay from your decision of
August 3, 1882, rejecting his application to purchase under the act of
June 15, 1880, the land embracedin his homestead entry No. 8584, made
August 8, 1879, for the W. NW. 1 of Sec. 3, and E. .- NE. of Sec. 4,
4 N. 27 E., on the ground that an affidavit of contest for abandonment
and alienation had been filed against said entry by John P. D. Wilker-
son, and that the contestant cannot be barred from reaping the benefits
of the act of May 14, 1880, until the allegations charged are disproved,
etc.
Upon examination I find that you have failed to forward part of the
evidence necessary in arriving at a conclusion in such cases, to wit, the
application and affidavit of the homestead claimant to purchase under
the act June 15, 1880.
The contest was brought on the issue of abandonment and alienation
of a iortion of the land, by bonafide instrument in writing.
It does not appear that the lands embraced in Hay's entry were not
properly subject thereto, nor that any one else had a subsisting entry
covering the lands in question; therefore the right of Hay to purchase
is paramount to that of a contestant prior to the consummation of the
contest, as the rights of the parties are unaffected during the pendency
of the proceedings, and no preference right is established under the act
of May 14, 1880, prior to the cancellation of the entry involved.
If the homestead party chooses to avail himself of his right to pur-
chase under the act of June 15, 1880, his action thereby defeat-s the
cancellation of the entry, and virtually disposes of the contest.
The latter issue, that a portion of the land had been transferred by
bonafide instrument in writing, is no bar to an application to purchase,
under the act named, as a conveyance in such case would be good, as
against the grantor, although the conveyance antedates the patent.
If the applicant's application is accompanied by his affidavit showing
that he is the identical party who made the entry, and lie has filed
therewith the duplicate receipt, or an affidavit accounting for its loss,
and if the records show that the land was properly subject to entry, you
will, upon payment of the government price, issue the usual certificate
and receipt.
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HOMESTEAD-FINAL PROOF-ACT OF JUNE 15, 1880.
BIURRILL V. COtTLTER.
Claimant having failed to make satisfactory final proof, under homestead entry, is
granted sixty days to make payment for the land under above act.
Acting Secretary Joslyn to Commissioner XcFarland, September 12, 1882.
In the contested case of H. P. Burrill v. Lavinia Coulter, on appeal
from your decision of May 26, 1881, holding sufficient the final proof of
the latter upon her homestead No. 1452, entered April 14, 1875, for the
SE. i Sec. 31, T. 17 S., It. 30 E., Gainesville district, Florida, I am un-
able to concur in your opinion; but in view of the effort shown by her
to retain and improve the land, T direct that you invite her attention to
the provisions of the act of June 15, 1880 (21. Stat., 237), and allow her
sixty days from service of notice to make payment for the tract. In
the mean time cancellation of the entry will be suspended.
ACT OF JUNE 15, 1880-TRANSFEREE.
CHRISTIAN G. 1,LARSEN.*
In case of an attempt by the party to a homestead entry made prior to June 15, 1880,
to transfer the land embraced therein subsequent to June 15, 1880, the transferee
is not entitled to purchase the same under act approved on said date, but the
homestead party may make purchase thereunder.
Commissioner HcFarlani to register and receiver, Salt Lake City, Utah,
September 19,1882.
Upon examination of the papers in case of homestead entry No. 4755
of Sanford Forbush, jr., dated April 23, 1880, for the SW. 1 Sec. 34, T.
18 S. R. 8 E., it appears that said applicant deeded said tract to Chris-
tian G. Larsen, under date of December 1 1880, and you permitted
said Larsen to commute the same under the second section act June 15,
1880. Said act provides:
That persons who have heretofore under any of the homestead laws,
or persons to whomn the right of those having so entered forhomesteads,
may have been attempted to be transferred by bona fide instrument in
writing, may entitle themselves to said lands by paying the government
price therefor.
It appears that said transfer to Larsen was subsequent to the passage
of said act of June 15, 1880, and that you erred in permitting said entry
to be made in the name of said Larsen. Said eash entryNo. 2325, being
illegal, is held for cancellation.
You will notify the parties in interest of this decision, and sixty days
will be allowed in which to file an appeal. At the expiration of that
period you will report the action taken.
See 3 L. D., 190.
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I would farther state that said applicant having made said home-
stead entry No. 4755 prior to the passage of said act, on the cancella-
tion of said ash entry No. 2375, he can commute the same under the
provisions of said act June 5, 1880, by full compliance with its pro
visions.
HOMfESTEAD CONTEST-ACT OF XY 14, 1880.
WEBER, V. SHAPPELL.
The purchaser of a claim and interest in a contested entry acquires no right of which
the contestant may have been possessed, and must be held as a stranger in the
case without even the right of appeal.
Prior to act of May 14, 1880, a contestant of a homestead entry had no greater right,
for his initiation of a contest, than any other person, and the land upon cancella-
tion of the entry became subject to the first legal applicant whether snch appli-
cant was the contestant or another. Nor was under that act the preference right
of entry by one who secures a cancellation of a prior entry assignable.
Sixty days allowed in which to pnrcbase the tract under act of June 15, 1880.
Secretary Teller to Commissioner HcFarland, September 20, 1882.
I have considered the case of John Weber v. William H. Shappell,
involving the W. of SE. i Sec. 26, T. 5, R. 15 W., Bloomington, Nebr.,
on appeal of James Whitesell from your decision of August 17, 1831,
dismissing the contest and reinstating the entry of Shappell.
The records show that Shappell made homestead entry of the tract
October 10, 1878, and that on August 23, 1879, John Weber commenced
a contest against him for abandonment thereof. Shappell was not pres-
ent at the bearing, but, under the proof submitted, your office found
that he had failed to comply with the requirements of the law, and
held his entry for cancellation, which became final April 21, 1880.
Shappell subsequently moved for a rehearing, which you granted,
for reasons stated, and a new hearing was ordered for July 13, 1880.
Weber failing to appear on the day assigned, Shappell moved for that
reason a dismissal of the contest, which motion was denied by the local
officers; but it appearing that Weber had sold all his claim and interest
tin and to both the contest and the land to one Jensen, who in turn had
sold the same to one James Whitesell, upon the motion of the latter he
was permitted to intervene and continue the contest in the name of
Weber, but in his own interest.
Weber had acquired no right which he could transfer to Jensen or to
Whitesell. Prior to the act of May 14, 1880, a contestant of a home-
stead entry had no greater right, for his initiation of the contest, than
any other person, and the land upon cancellation of the entry became
subject to the first legal applicant whether such applicant was the con-
testant or aother. Nor even under that act is the preference right of
entry by one who secures a cancellation of a prior entry assignable. It
is a personal right in him only who procures the cancellation. White-
sell has therefore no legal right nor interest in the contest, and must be
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held a stranger to the case without even the right of appeal from your
decision.
Weber in the interest of the United States made his case, proved the
abandonment, and final judgment for cancellation followed. Shappell
asked a new hearingto set aside the result of a former trial. This was
granted. It was now his turn as plaintiff to show cause why the can-
cellation should not stand, and the burden of proof was on him.
After his testimony closed, the United States might rebut by any
witnesses at hand whether the former prosecutor was present or not.
The good faith of Shappell was in issue, and he must show good reason
or his entry canot be reinstated. It was not the right of a third party,
but the right of the government which was in question. The register
and receiver might admit any evidence tending to contradict Shappell's
claim of compliance with law, and it was good public policy to conclude
the hearing by proper evidence rather than to dismiss it on a technical
motion and compel a new contest to be brought by a stranger.
In my opinion the fact of abandonment by Shappell was clearly
proven, both at the original and the subsequent hearing, and his entry
must accordingly be canceled. In view, however, of the provisions of
the act of June 15, 1880 (21 Stat., 237), you will allow him sixty days in
which to purchase the tract before making final the order of cancella-
tion. Your decision is nodified accordingly, and the papers transmitted
with your letter of January 20, 1882, are herewith returned.
- HOMESTEAD-RESIDENCE-GOOD FAITR.
PETER V. SPAULDING.
The facts in this case show an effort to secure land under the homestead laws with-
out complying with the important requirement of residence. Notwithstanding
only eight months from date of entry have elapsed, the entry is ordered canceled.
Secretary Teller, to Commissioner McFarland, October 2, 1882.
I have considered the case of William P. Peter v. George Spaulding,
involving the latter's homestead entry made August 21, 1878, upon the
NW. i of section 14, T. 26 B., R. 28 W., Larned, Kans., on appeal by
Peter from your decision of May 14, 1881, dismissing the contest.
This contest was initiated April 28, 1879, upon allegations of aban-
donment, and the hearing was in June following. The testimony shows
that in January, 1879, Spaulding moved upon the land a building about
6 by 8 feet in dimensions, and caused from 3 to 5 acres thereof to be
plowed,'chiefly in furrows around the exterior limits. At that time he
passed two days on the land, one in surveying it, and the other in super-
intending said work, and had not since, to the date of hearing, been
upon it.
He never slept nor .ate a meal on the land, except such as was carried
from a neighboring hotel; nor was the building ever furnished with
any housekeeping effects, except a few cooking utensils which he
brought with the building, and which remained therein when he moved
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it, but which he never used. He did not replow the land plowed in
January, nor did he ever cultivate any portion of it. Since January,
1878, he has been the traveling agent in Kansas of a Pittsburgh (Pa.)
plow company, and since that date does not appear to have had any
fixed habitation in Kansas.
On these facts the local officers found that Spaulding had failed to
establish a residence on the land, and recommended a cancellation of
his entry. Your decision holds his entry intact, because at the date of
the initiation of the contest but eight months had elapsed from the date
of his entry, and as there was not evidence of bad faith, it would be
contrary to the lenity the Department extends to claimants under the
homestead laws to forfeit it.
The clemency of the government should be extended, in cases only
where the good faith of the party is manifest, where there is no adverse
claim, and the question is simply between the government and the
party, and where the failure to comply with the law results from causes
beyond the reasonable control of the party.
The homestead law requires residence on the land to be established
within six months from the date of entry. Spaulding failing to do this,
Peter commenced his contest, and under the act of May 14, 1880, is en-
titled to enter the land if the entry is canceled. A contestant should
not be deprived of the fruit of his contest unless there are controlling
reasons why the entry should not be canceled. None are presented in
this case. Spaulding assigns no excuse for his neglect to make the
land his home. The fact that he was engaged in business elsewhere,
having no relation to the land or his entry, does not justify his laches
in this respect. Indeed, he does not appear to have been resident in
the State of Kansas, except for a temporary business purpose; and for
the ten months preceding the bearing he made no attempt to establish
a residence on the tract, or to cultivate or improve any portion of it,
with the exception named.
Regarding his acts, therefore, as an endeavor to acquire a tract of
the public land without complying with the conditions which Congress
has imposed upon such acquisitions, and as wanting in good faith, I
modify your decision and direct cancellation of the entry.
HOMESTEAD-B OARD 4F EQU TABLE ADJUDICATIOE.
C Zr(1^@ - MCCARTHY . DARCEY.
Residence is a material requirement of the homestead laws.
Where rights of other parties are affected or an adverse claim exists, an entry should
not be submitted to the board of equitable adjudication-a contestant's preferred
right inder the act of May 14,1880, is in the nature of an adverse claim.
Secretary Teller to Commissioner Mcearland, October 20, 1882.
I have considered the case of William F. McCarthy v. Michael Dar-
cey, involving the latter's homestead entry made January 30, 1880,
upon the NE. i of Sec. 9, T. 10, R. 5 W., Concordia., Kans., on appeal
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by McCarthy from your decision of November 18, 1881, allowing the
entry to stand, with a-view of submitting Darcey's final proof, when
made, to the board of equitable adjudication.
This contest was commenced October 4, 1880, on the ground of aban-
donment, and the hearing was in November and December following.
The testimony shows that Darcey improved and cultivated the tract
as required by law, and the only question involved is that of residence.
The local officers found that he had failed to comply with the law in
this respect, but in view of the short time intervening between the dates
of entry and contest, recommended that the case be submitted to the
board of equitable adjudication. Your decision follows that recommen-
dation.
I have examined the testimony and reach the same conclusion as to
Darcey's want of residence on the tract. Residence is a material re-
quirement of the homestead law, and the reasonable time of six months
is allowed the party for that purpose. Darcey had not only down to
the date of initiation of the contest, but to the date of hearing (and to
its conti nauce on December 8, a period of more than ten months) neg-
lected to reide on the land. He offers no excuse for his laches, and
was not ignorant of the requirement of the law in this respect, for he
had already contested a prior entry on the same tract, and procured
the cancellation thereof on allegations of abandonment, following which
he made his own entry. I find no reason to justify his non-compliance
with the law, and the case is not one, in my opinion, for the board of
equitable adjudication. The statute (Sec. 2457 R. S.) does not authorize
such reference in cases where the right of another claimant may be prej-
udiced, or where there is an adverse claim.
This contest having been commenced in October 1SS0, was subject to
the provisions of the act of May 14, 1880, which gives to a contestant
the preferred right to enter the tract, within a specified time from can-
cellation of the entry which he procures. The rights of McCarthy might
be prejudiced by reference of the case to the board, and his is in the
nature of an adverse claim.
I modify your decision, and direct cancellation of Darcey's entry.
SOLDIERS' DECLARATORY STATEMEVT-RESIDENCE.
GEORGE H. GARDNER.
A soldier who files or causes to be filed a declaration of his intention to enter a tract
of land under the homestead law must make a legal eptry of the land within six
months, and must remove to the tract so entered and reside upon it and cultivate
it for the period prescribed by law before he can acquire title to the land. Filings
or entries made by soldiers when they do not settle upon the land and have no
intention of doing so are false and fraudulent.
Commissioner McFarland to Geo. H. Gardner, Newv York City, November
22, 1882.
I am in receipt of your letter, inclosing a copy of a circular purport-
ing to be issued by Gazzam & C o., "d relative to the procurement of sol.
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diers' homesread entries." You state that yourself and several of your
friends have given " Gazzam & Co." powers of attorney to locate'lands
for you, and paid them $15 each; that you were afterwards called upon
for an assessment of $t0; that "Gazzam & Co." have closed up their
office and left town; and you wish to know whether there is any way
by which you can recover the money so paid.
You are informed that the alleged firm of " Gazzam & Co." is unknown
to this office; that the circular inclosed by you is a deception; and that
the statements and assurances contained therein are false in many par-
ticulars and misleading in all.
A sol(dier who files or causes to be filed a declaration of his intention
to enter a tract of land under the homestead laws must make a legal
entry of the land within six months, and must remove to the tract so
entered and reside upon and cultivate it for the period prescribed by
law before he can acquire title to the land. Filings or entries made by
soldiers when they do not settle upon the land and have no intention
of doing so are false and fraudulent.
You were advised in this circular of the requirement of personal entry
and residence; but it is dishonestly added that if "anything should
prevent you from going on to perfect your entry, we can probably dis-
pose of the right acquired by your declaratory statement and location
on such terms as to make your investment a profitable one."
This is the gist of the whole matter. The proposition is that the pro.
fessed attorney will file declarations of the intention of soldiers to make
entries of public land and afterwards sell the soldier's right, ostensibly
for the soldier's benefit.
The "investment" which is to be made profitable is the money paid
to the 'attorney for his fees. The "right" which you are led to believe
may be sold is the personal right of the soldier to make an entry of the
land himself. This right is not transferable; consequently the soldier-
who does not go upon the land in person acquires no rights and has
nothing to sell. The phrase " your location" is delusive. There is uc
" location " of land by the mere filing of a declaratory statement.
What the attorney has to sell, and what he does sell (unless he util-
izes them otherwise himself), are your powers of attorney, which enable
him, or some confederate to whom those powers are transferred, to make
a fraudulent filing in your name.
When the filing is made, which is done by the last party in whose
hands your powers fall, this last party sells his own relinquishment of
your filing to some honest settler upon whose ignorance or credulity he
can successfully impose.
The filing does not " hold the land" against an actual settler; but as.
many settlers are not aware of this fact, or do not wish to incur the risk
of contesting a claim of the merits of which they are not informed, they
are frequently induced to buy the attorney's relinquishment.
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Thus the only results of your effort to avail yourself of the plausible
promises of the "locating agent" are that you have been implicated in
an illegal transaction, and have lost the money paid to the agent or
attorney, while your powers of attorney have been used to defraud some
other soldier or settler who is actually trying to find a home on the pub-
lic lands.
I am in receipt of letters from soldiers in different parts of the country
stating that they have been victimized in the same way as yourself,
through similar circulars emanating from various sources, or 11pon0 the
application of traveling agents making similar representations in per-
son.
I desire earnestly to warn all soldiers against impositions of this
character. It should be thoroughly understood that a soldier can
acquire no right to 160 acres, or to any other number of acres, of pub-
lie lands unless he wants to remove to the land, live upon it, and culti-
vate it. As he cannot sell what he does not possess, and as lie has no
lanl, nor any right to any land, in the absence of such removal, resi-
dence, and cultivation, there is no money to be made through the agency
of land attorneys, and no land to be obtained by him unless he becomes
a settler.
Whether there is any way by which you can recover the money paid
by yourself and your friends to "Gazzam & Co." is a matter upon which
I cannot advise you.
-ADDITIONAL HOMESTEAD ENTRY.
EDWARD R. CHASE.
The failure of the local officers to properly note upon their records an original appli-
cation and amendment cannot jeopardize a claimant's right.
Secretary Teller to Commissioner YAlcFarland, December 12, 1882.
1 have considered the appeal of Edward R. Chase from your prede-
cessor's decision of May 31, 1881, rejecting his application to make ad-
ditional homestead entry under the provisions of the act of March 3,
1879 (20 Stat. 472), of lots 1 and 2 of Sec. 30, T. 36 N., R. 62 E., Eureka
district, Nevada, such entry to bear date as of December 19, 1879.
It appears from the record that Chase filed declaratory statement No.
124, April 28, 1871, for the N. J of NW. i SE. I of NW. I, and the NW.
of SE. i of Sec. 30, T. 36 N., R. 62 E., which tracts are not contigu-
ous.
In May, 1875, he applied at the local office to so amend said filing as
to embrace one hundred and sixty acres of contiguous tracts, but speci-
fied no particular tracts. Such application was allowed pursuant to
your office letter of the 26th of said month, which prescribed " that he
would be allowed to amend by taking forty acres adjoining the residue
of his claim, in lieu of the NW. I of SE. J of said section 30." August
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11 ensuing, the register reported that Chase had appeared at the local
office June 21 preceding and made homestead entry No. 63 of the E. J
of NE. 1 of said section in lieu of amending his filing. October 18 eh-
suing, he applied to so amend his entry as to embrace the E. of the
NW. of said section; which application was allowed (pursuant to your
office letter of July 19, 1877, deciding the case of E. R. Chase et al. v.
Buron et al., from which decision no appeal has been taken), as it ap-
peared to be " the land he intended to enter, and which he supposed he
had entered until the day he made his application, (and) that all his im-
provements, to the value of $2,000, are situated upon the said E. - of
NW. 4 of See. 30."
Under date of January 11, 1879, your office advised the register and
receiverthat Chase'sentry bad been corrected upon your office records in
accordance with his application to amend the same, but that his right
to the tract claimed could not antedate June 21, 1875, the date of his
entry, and that he would not be allowed to make final proof until the ex-
piration of five years from said date, unless he could show that he was
entitled to the benefit of section 2304, R. S. September 10 ensuing, your
office modified the foregoing letter of instructions by directing the reg-
ister and receiver to advise Chase to call at the local office and amend
his homestead application by writing across the face thereof the correct
description of his homestead claim, and to insert the words " or the act
approved May 27,1878," after " section 2304, R. S.," in said letter of June
11, 1879.
U nder date of January 28, 1881, your office advised the register and
receiver that " the homestead entry of Edward R. Chase is for the E. 
of NW. of Sec. 30, 36 N., 62 E., and he paid $16 fee and commissions.
The tract book sent to your office erroneously showed the government
fee paid as $5 only "; that said record, when sent, correctly showed the
entry to be of the E. of NE. J of said section; that Chase amended his
homestead application September 25, 1879, so as to describe the E. of
-NW. 1; that they were instructed by letter of November 13, 1879, to
amend their record accordingly, which should have been done upon its
receipt, and if this had not been done, that they should do so without
further delay; and if Chase should present his entry papers pursuant
to instructions aforesaid, " he will be entitled to make additional entry
for lots and 2 of NW. 1, said section, without payment of fees, if said
tracts remain vacant.
Thus it appears in the light of the foregoing summary of the history
of this case that Chase's application in question was regularly and prop-
erly made at a time when the tract applied for was vacant public land,
and therefore subject to such entry. The failure or refusal of the reg-
ister and receiver to accept and properly note upon their office records
his original application and amendment of the same could not jeopard
his rights in the premises.
Your decision is accordingly reversed.
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A4TURALIZATION-CLERI OF COURT.
JOSEPH BARBER.
In view of the laws of the State of Ohio, the judge at a probate court therein who
issues naturalization papers may be presumed to have a clerk.
Commissioner MleFarland to register and receiver, Fargo, Dakota, Decem-
ber 16, 1882.
f an in receipt of your letter of October 17, 1882, in which you trans-
mit appeal, and likewise the " rejected proof"1 of Joseph Barber, who
made. June 28, 1880, homestead entry 695, E. NE. 4 and E. SE. 4,
Sec. 30, T. 135, R. 56, and who now seeks to prove up under sections 2291
and 2303, Revised Statutes. Indorsed on said proof appears:
Proof rejected for the reason that there is no evidence filed to show
that the probate court of Muskingum County, Ohio, is a cout having
common-law jurisdiction and a clerk and sea], and luthorized to nat-
uralize aliens, as required by section 2165, 1{. S., U. S.
Thirty days from September 16, 1882, were allowed for appeal. The
iejected proof otherwise appears satisfactory, and the question seems
1o be whether an error was or was not committed in rejecting the cer-
tificate of the judge of the pro bate court of Muskinguni County, Ohio.
The appeal of S. B. Pinny, esq., attorney for Joseph Barb r, dated
October 11, 1882, sets forth at length a statement of allegations of error
on your part, and the same has been duly considered by this office.
In my letter to J. F. Hechtman, judge of court, La Plata County,
Colorado, Jane 10, 1882 (9 C. L. 0., 72), the principle is laid down that
only courts having certin tests or qualifications are competent to nat-
uralize; this would be of itself reason for your raising the question
whether probate courts in Ohio were or were not qualified to naturalize
citizens.
I find on investigation that the law of Kansas, construe(l in the Hecht-
man case (supra), is different from Ohio law. There is no rvision in
the Kansas law for a clerk of probate court. In Ohio the robate judge
may appoint a deputy clerk, and as (in this case) the probate judge as-
sumed jurisdiction in naturalization, I may presume he had a clerk.
You may issue the final certificate and receipt in this case, therefore,
and advise Mr. Pinny of this decision.
HOMESTEAD-SETTLEMENT-ENTRY.
MURPHY v. TAFT.
Land awarded to Taft, who made prior settlement, nothwithstanding prior entry
was made by Murphy.
Secretary Teller to Commissioner 31cFarland, January 3, 1883.
I have considered the appeal of Edward Murphy from your decision
of January 18, 1882, allowing the homestead entry of Charles W. Taft
upon the SE. of Sec. 31, T. 117, R. 57, Watertown, Dak.
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Murphy made homestead entry of the tract June 13, 1881, and Taft
made like entry of the same tract June 15, 1881.
The testimony shows that Taft settled on the land March 20, 1881r
with intention of claiming it under the homestead laws, since which
time he has continuously resided thereon, and has valuable improve-
ments. Notwithstanding, therefore, that Murphy made prior entry,.
Taft is within the provisions of the third section of the act of Mlay 14,
1880, which grants to persons who settle on the public lands, with the
intention of claiming the same under the homestead laws, the same
time to file their homestead applications and perfect their original en-
tries as is allowed to settlers under the pre emption laws to put their
claims on record; and their rights shall relate back to the date of set-
tlenent the same as if they settled under the pre emptiou laws. As.
Taft made his entry within the time allowed a pre-emptor for filing a.
declaratory statement, his entry must relate back to the date of his..
settlement, and takes precedence of that of Murphy.
Your decision is affirmed.
HOMESTEAD ENTRY-ACT OF JUNE 15, 1880.
HERMAN L. PHELPS.
Where a single woman makes a homestead entry, and afterwards marries, her hus-
band, in the event of her death, cannot purchase in his own name, nder the act
of June 15, 1880.
Commissioner McFarland to register and receiver, Gainesville, Florida,.
January 9, 1883.
Referring to the case of cash entry No. 1978, dated October 18, 1881p-
in the name of " erman L. Phelps, heir at law of M. A. Daggett, de-
ceased." It appears that M. A. Daggett, a single woman, n-ade home-
stead entry No. 2281, Gainesville, Fla., October 25, 1875; that on the
1st of July, 1876, she inter-married with Hermau L. Phelps, and con-
tinued the residence on the land with her husband until February 25,
1877.
On the 2d of July following, daring the temporary absence of her hus--
band, Mrs. Phelps died, leaving no child or children.
Mr. Phelps now seeks to obtain title to homestead made by his wife,.
by purchase under provisions of the act of June 15,1880, claiming such.
right as the legal heir of his deceased wife.
Under act referred to, the homestead party or his transferree may
purchase the land embraced by his homestead entry, and it has been
decided that the widow or the heirs of a deceased homestead party are
also entitled to the right of purchase; but there is no provision extend-
ing the privilege to the husband of a deceased settler.
The question as to whether Mr. Phelps is entitled to the right of pur-
chase as an heir of his deceased wife, this office is not called upon t-
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Adecide, as his heirship is governed by the statutes of Florida, and is sub-
ject to numerous restrictions and limitations which may be left to be
adjusted on a case arising in the courts. (See sections 1 and 3, chapter
92, McClellan's Digest of Florida Laws.)
The cash entry has therefore been suspended, and a patent cannot be
issued in the name of Mr. Phelps if, however, as the law allows a
l)atent to issue to the heirs, Mr. Phelps is willing to allow the purchase
to stand and patent to issue to the heirs of AS. A. Phelps, deceased, the
certificate will be returned to the district office for correction to that
extent; but if not, the cash entry will be canceled, and he may apply
for a return of the purchase money.
You will so advise Mr. Phelps, and request him to inrorm you at an
,early day, as above indicated.
PRA CTICE-NVOTICE BY P UBLICA TION.
HEWLETT v. DARBY.
When notice by publication should be given by the contestant.
,Commissioner McFarland to register and receiver, Crook-ston, Minnesota,
January 27, 1883.
I am iu receipt of your letter of J une 24, 1882, transmitting the pa-
pers in the case of Samuel Hewlett v. David A. Darby, involving T. C.
entry No. 1714, made July 31, 1880, on NW. 1-8, 154 N., 43 W. Dar-
by appeals from your decision refusing to dismiss the case on his mo-
tion, based upon the insufficiency of the affidavit and want of evidence
of proper service. It appears that defendant made defaultat the hear-
ing, and on the testimony offered you adjudged the entry forfeited.
Some three weeks subsequent to the hearing defendant appeared
specially by attorney and filed a motion to dismiss thecase, allegingthat
the affidavit did not specifically allege failure to comply with the law;
that it was not sufficient basis for a resort to notice by publication, in-
.asmuch as it merely alleges that contestant, "does not know where said
David A. Darby is or may be found."
I think the allegation of non-compliance with the law is sufficient.
As to the second count in the appeal, the rules of practice provide
that " notice may be given by publication only where it is shown by
affidavit of contestant, and by such other evidence as the register and
receiver may require, that personal service cannot be made." It seems
to me that the affidavit in this case fails to show that " service cannot
be made." It merely alleges want of knowledge of the whereabouts of
,defendant. No mention is made of any effort to ascertain his place of
residence. Diligence is of the essence of such a proceeding, and I be-
lieve that the usual practice in the courts is to require an affidavit that
it was used before making an order for service by publication. And
it appeats that in this case the residence of defendant was found before
the day of trial to be but a short distance from the local office. As the
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latter did not appear at the hearing, and afterwards made special ap-
pearance and denies your jurisdiction, I am of the opinion that he is in
time, and that his motion to dismiss should be granted.
Further, there appears to be no application to enter thetract by con-
testant, as required by the third section of the act of June 14, 1878.
For both these reasons the contest is dismissed.
PRACTICE-PROTESTANT-HE RING.
How a party, not of record, may proceed to defeat a homestead claimant who has not
complied with the law.
Commissioner McFarland to register and receiver, Humboldt, California,
January 31, 1883.
In his letter of January 10, 18S3, the register asks the following ques-
tion, viz:
When a party, not on the record, desires to contest the right of a party
who has advertised to make proof nder the act of March 3, 1879, on a
homestead or pre-eml)tioln, has he the right to cross-examine the appli-
cant's witnesses, the same as a party of record e and if not, of what
practical benefit is the act of March 3, 1879 1
In reply, I have to state that in my opinion the notice required to be
published under the act referred to is intended to give notoriety to the
fact that the claimant intends to take the proper steps to complete his
title to the land embraced in his claim, and to give ample time to any
one bavig an adverse claim to take measures to protect the same; and
also to enable any oue knowing that the claimant has failed to comply
with the requiremeuts of the statute to protest against the issuance of
patent. The protestant, in such case, however, should not be allowed
to cross examine the claimant's witnesses, or to introduce the testimony
of other witnesses. The protest, in the form of an affi(lavit duly corrob-
orated , should he transmitted to this office, with the proof, for our con-
sideration. If, from the allegations made, this office deems such action
necessary, a hearing will be ordered.
HOMESTEAD ENTRY-DEM lEM-CHILDREY.
J/@} LT D..;.;: i<PETER KACKIMANN.
Under the homestead law, the widow of a deceased entryman stands first in the line
of succession. But in considering her right to devise this homestead, other ques-
tions must be considered. Bysection2292,RevisedStatutesofthe United States,
it is provided that: " In case of the death of both father and mother, leaving an
infant child or children nnder twenty-one years of age, the right and fee shall
inure to the benefit of such infant child or children," and it is held that a home-
stead party cannot, by will, defeat the rights of the children.
Commissioner McF'arland to register and receiver, Fergus Palls, Minne-
sota, February 9, 1883.
I am in receipt of your letter of December 28, 1882, transmitting for
consideration by this office final l)roof offered by Peter Kackmann in
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support of his claim to patent for the S. t NE. i1 of Sec. 4, T. 134, R. 43,
by virtue of homestead entry No. 3527, made by Wilhelm Lindeman
April 21, 1877.
The records show that Lindemann made the entry as above stated,
and the final proof shows that the entryman established a residence
upon the land on April 7,1877, and continued to reside upon and cultivate
the same until the time of his death, in September, 1880; that he left a
widow, Fridrike Lindemanu, who remarried in the month of March,
1881, with Peter Kackmann, the claimant, and continued to reside upon
and cultivate the land until October 2, 1881, when she died, leaving a
will as follows:
I, Fridrike Kackmann, whose former name was Clausen, I give all
my property, land, cattle, and all the house furniture, farming tools, to
Peter Kackmann. This is my will.
This will is shown by the certificate of the judge of probate of Otter
Tall County, Minnesota, wherein the land lies, to have been duly pro-
bated and recorded.
The final proof shows that Peter Kackmann, whose identity as the
devisee is fully established, has resided upon and cultivated the land
from the date of the death of his wife, Fridrike Kackmann, whose iden-
tity as the former widow of Wilhelm Lindemann is established beyond
a doubt, up to October 9, 1882, the date of the final proof.
In your letter transmitting the final proof you say:
As we have never had a similar case before this office, and can find
no decisions directly bearing upon this subject, we respectfully submit
the proof for your office to decide whether or no said Kackmann is en-
titled to receive patent for above described tract.
A decision upon this case involves the question respecting the legal
qualifications of the original entryman to make the entry, the rights of
the widow to devise the homestead, and the qualifications of the claim-
ant to receive patent under the homestead law.
With respect to the first, I have to state that the entrynan alleged
in his homestead affidavit that he had declared his intention to become
a citizen of the United States, but filed no evidence corroborating the
allegation. By letter C of January 13, 1883, your attention was called
to the defect, and with your letter dated January 24; 1883, you trans-
mitted a certificate from the clerk of the district court, seventh judicial
district, State of Minnesota, showing that Lindemana declared his inten-
tion to become a citizen April 20, 1877, the day before the entry was
initiated. He was therefore a legally qualified entryman under the
homestead law.
Under the homestead law, the widow of a deceased entryman stands
first in the line of succession. And in this case the widow of Linde-
mann, who afterwards became the wife of the claimant Kackmann, was
undoubtedly entitled to all the rights respecting the land in question
of which Lindemann died possessed, and by her remarriage forfeited
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none of those rights. As the wife of Kacknann, she devised to him
her rights and interests to and in said land. So far as the legal rights
of Mrs. Kackimann,as a married woman, to devise property by will are
concerne(1, no doubt can exist, inasmuch as it is provided by State law
(Statutes of Minnesota, 1878, p. 567, sec. I.) that-
Any married woman may devise and dispose of any real or personal
property held by her, or to which she is entitled in her own right, by her
last will and testament in writing, and may alter or revoke the same, in
like manner as if she was unmarried.
But in considering her right to devise this homestead other questions
must be consi(lered. By section 2292. Revised Statutes of the United
States, it is provided that: ' In case of the death of both father and
mother, leaving an infant child or children under twenty-one years of
age, the right and fee shall inure to the benefit of such infant child
or children," and it is held by this office that a homestead party can-
not, by will, defeat the rights of the children. (See case of Sarah
Leonard, 9C. L. 0.) If, therefore, at the date of the death of Mrs. Kaeck-
mann, infant children of the entryman-Lindemann-were living, the
right inures to them, and the will devising the property to Kackmann,
so far as it applies to the homestead, is of no force, and will not be
recognized by this office.
The final proof under consideration fails to show whether infant chil-
dren of the deceased entryman were living at the date of death of the
widow, and final adjudication of the case must be deferred until proof
upon this point shall have been submitted.
Kackmann is clearly shown to be the evisee named in the will;
the authenticity of that document is satisfactorily established; his
citizenship is shown by certificate fron the clerk of the court before
which he was naturalized, and he is in all respects duly qualified to re-
ceive a patent under the homestead law. In the event that no infant
children of Lindemann survived . . . . . Mrs. KackmanD, no objec-
tion can be made to the issuance of final papers in his name upon pay-
ment of commissions due. But should it be ascertained that infant
children of Lindemann were living at that time, then the final papers
and patent must be issued to them by name after the receipt of final
proof made by them or in their behalf by a person duly authorized to
act for them. No advertisement of intention to make final proof will
be required of them, the intention of the act of March 3, 1879, having
been fulfilled by the notice of intention given by Kackmann, and they
may avail themselves of the proof already on file, except so far as relates
to final affidavit.
Upon receipt of evidence respecting the existence of infant children,
which is required by this letter, giving the ages and full names of all
such, and payment of commissions due, you may issue final papers in
the case either in the name of Kackmanu or the infant children, as the
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facts mayjustify. Remember, if there be infant children of the deceased
entryman, a new final affidavit must be executed by or for them.
The final papers hereby authorized should be transmitted to this
,office with your regular returns for the month in which issued, and
must be accompanied by the evidence required. A reference to this
letter by initial and date should appear upon the final papers and
your abstracts of entries and receipts.
CONTEST-RESIDENCE-FAMILY.
THOMAS v. THOMAS.
Residence is largely a question of intent. A contest by a divorced wife against her
absent husband's homestead entry should be treated as between parties who were
never married.
Commissioner ]lcFariand to register and receiver, Salina, Kansas, Afarck
7, 1883.
The case of Thomas v. Thomas involves LT. E. No. 20,199 in the name
of Win. B. Thomas, and is before me on appeal from your decision ad-
verse to the contestant.
It appears that the contestant, who was the wife of claimant, obtained
a divorce from him, the decree being dated March 18, 1882. It was
conclusively shown that W. R. Thomas abandoned the tract and his
family in the spring of 1880, and at the date of the hearing-June 5,
1882, -had not returned thereto. You, however, decide against the
contestant, for the reason that at the time of complaint, six months had
not elasped subsequent to the date of the decree of divorce. Thi. ap-
parently proceeds on the assumption that the prolonged absence from his
land by a homestead claimant is not cause foi cancellation, if his family
continue to reside on the same. I do not consider this assumption well
founded. The question of residence is one largely depending on the
intent of the party. While, therefore, the residence of one's family may
ordinarily be considered prima facie the residence of himself, in this case
the absence of the claimant appears to have been intentional and will-
ful; so much so, that, as before stated, the local courts have granted a
divorce to his wife.
This seems to me to be good cause for the cancellation of his entry.
Contests by a wife against her husband have been discountenanced on
sound principles of puhlic policy, in harmony with the general system
of practice in the courts; but in this case the marriage relation has
ceased to exist, and the parties have the same legal relations to each
cther as if it never had existed. I think, therefore, that there is nogood
reason why the contest of Mrs. Thomas should not be entertained. And
in view of the foregoing, I am constrained to reverse your decision, and
adjudge the entry forfeited.
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EFFECT OF PATENT; BESEB VED INDIAX LANDS.
ROCKWELL V. INDIAN WIDOWS.
The act of March 3, 1875, allows settlers, prior to 1874, to take one hundred and sixty
acres of the reserved Indian lands on certain conditions.
The patent erroneously issued for the tract now in dispute can only be vacated by
voluntary relinquishment through a proper instrument, or by proceedings in
court.
Secretary Teller to Commissioner McFarland, March 9, 1883.
I have considered the appeal of Charles Rockwell from your decis-
ion of December 23, 1879, holding for cancellation his additional
homestead entry made February 11, 1876, for the E. a of the NW. of
Sec. 21, T. 18 N., Ri. 16 W., Reed City, Mich.
It appears that on July 31, 179, the Acting Secretary of this Depart-
ment, considering the appeal of Rockwell from your predecessor's decis-
ion of January 9, 1879, holling his entry for cancellation, found that
the tract is within the reservation made for the Ottawa and Chippewa
Indians, in the State of Michigan, by the treaty of July 31, 1855, and
restored to market by the acts of June 10, 1872 (17 Stat., 381) and March
3, 1875 (18 Stat., 516); that on April 30, 1875, Wah-sah-din-o-qua
and Mee-kis-sa-see qua, widows of Indians of said tribes, applied at
the local office to enter respectively the N. 3 of the NW. and the S. 
of the NW. 4 of said section 21, as homesteads, and submitted proofs
that they had occupied and improved the tracts since 1870; which ap-
plications were refused because they conflicted with soldiers' declara-
tions Nos. 83 and 81, made April 10, 1875; that on August 31, 1875,
your office directed a hearing to ascertain the qualifications of said ap-
plicants, but which hearing does not appear to have been held; that
on December 16, 1878, the applicants renewed their applications, the
former testifying to hersettlement on the land she applied for in 1870,
her continued residence thereon, and improvements consisting of ahouse
and cultivation of five acres; and the latter of her settlement in 1870
on the tract she applied for, her continued residence thereon, and im-
provements consisting of a house and twelve acres under cultivation.
These statements were corroborated by other testimony.
There being no conflicting claim of record to the E. of said NW. 
at the date of Rockwell's additional homestead entry of February 11,
1876, it was approved and patented; but the patent was returned from
the local office, at your request, without delivery to him, and is now
among the files of the case.
Your predecessor, by his decision of January 9, 1879, held the entry
of Rockwell for cancellation, for the reason that the land embraced
therein was not subject to his entry at that date, there being a valid
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adverse claim, though not of record; and Rockwell in his appeal there-
from, alleging that the statements of the Indian applicants and their
corroborating witnesses were untrue, and it not sufficiently appear-
ing to the Acting Secretary of this Department, that the applicants
were entitled to make entries under said acts of June 10, 1872, and
March 3, 1875, he directed (July 31, 1879) a hearing to ascertain their
qualifications, the date of their settlements, and the character and ex-
tent of their improvements.
In view of the testimony taken at such hearing, you find that the
applicants, respectively, resided on te land applied for a long time
prior to the date of their applications, to wit, since the fall of 1871, and
continuously since, and had complied with the requirements of section
3 of the act of March 3, 1875, which provides that all actual, permanent,
bonafide settlers on any of the lands reserved for Indian purposes, un-
der the treaty with the Ottawa and Chippewa Indians of Michigan of
July 31, 1855, shall be entitled to enter not exceeding 160 acres of land
either under the homestead laws, or to pay the minimum price of land,
on making proof of his or her settlement and continued residence be-
fore the expiration of ninety days from the passage of the act, provided
they shall have settled upon said lands prior to January 1,
1874; and you renew your predecessor's decision of January 9,1879, and
hold Rockwell's entry for cancellation, for the reasons formerly stated.
I have examined the testimony, and afflrm your decision that Rock-
well's entry was erroneously allowed and that he should be permitted,
upon cancellation thereof. to make a new entry elsewhere, with credit
for fees and commissions paid. It appears, however, that his present
entry covers forty acres of each of the tracts embraced in the respective
entiies of the Indians, and that patent has issued therefor. Notwith-
standing the non-delivery thereof to Rockwell, it was effectual to pass
to him the title of the United States to the tract named therein (UT. S.
v. Schurz, 12 Otto, 378), and until set aside by action of the courts,- or
by his voluntary relinquishment thereof and his claim thereunder, his
legal iight to the tract must be admitted.
But in view of the erroneous issue of this patent, you will require
from him a surrender of his rights by a proper instrument conveying
to the United States the title he acquired thereby; and upon his neg-
lect or refusal so to do you will report the facts to this Department,
that measures may be taken in the courts to restore said title to the
United States.
I affirm your decision, allowing the applications of these Indian
women for tracts not embraced in the patent to Rockwell, and return
the papers transmitted with your letter of June 10, 1882.
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HOMESTEAD-ADDITIONAL ENTRY.
JOSEPH BIRCHFIELD.
'The act of March 3,1879, contemplates an existing original entry on land to which
the additional entryadjoins. If by reason of cancellation there is no original en-
try, the right of the applicant to an additional entry is extinguished.
Secretary Teller to Commissioner McFarland, April 2, 1883.
I have considered the appeal of Joseph Birchfield from your decision
,of April 25, 1882, rejecting his application to make au additional home-
stead entLy under the act of March 3, 1878 (20 Stat., 472).
It appears that Birchfield made a homestead entry upon a tract of 40
~acres, in the Montgomery, Alabama, land district, September 14, 1869,
.and that the same was canceled Febilnary 27, 1879, for failure to make
final proof within seven years. He nowappliestoenterfortyadditional
,acres.
The act of March 3, 1879, provides that-
Any person who has, under existing laws, taken a homestead on any
even section within the limits of any railroad (as Birchfield's former en-
try was) . . . . . and who by existing laws shall have been re-
stricted to 80 acres, may enter, under the homestead laws, an additional
SO ac-es adjoining the land embraced iu his original entry.
or if such person so elect he may surrender his entry to the United
States for cancellation, and thereupon be entitled to enter lands under
the homestead laws the same a the if surrendered entry had not been
made . . . . . and the residence and cultivation of such person
upon and of the land embraced in his original entry, shall be considered
residence and cultivation for the same length of time upon and of the
lan(l embraced in his additional or new entry, and shall be deducted
from the five years' residence and cultivation required by law.
This statute contemplates an existing original entry on land which
That embraced in the new entry shall adjoin, and which may be sur-
rendered, and credits the new entry with the length of residence and
cultivation under the original entry, requiring, however, actual culti-
vation and residence on the land embraced in the new entry for at least
-one year. If there is no original entry in existence, there is no land to
which that embraced in the new entry can adjoin, nor is there an entry
-which can be surrendered; and as all of Birchfield's rights are extin-
guished by cancellation of his original entry, he became thenceforth a
stranger to the land, with no entry upon which to base his additional
claim, and with no former residence or cultivation which the statute
contemplates in connection therewith.
The case of Annie Anderson, cited by appellant (Copp, February,
1882), is not authority for this. In that case there was an existing
original entry, and it was decided upon a wholly distinct question from
that herein involved.
Birchfield has no right, in my opinion, to the entry applied for, and
I affirm your decision.
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ADDITIONAL HOMESTEAD ANYTRY-RELINQUISHMENT.
M. V. B. MILLS.
An additional homestead entry under the act of March 3, 1879, is granted, notwith-
standing a contest initiated for abandonment of the original homestead entry.
Commissioner illcFarland to register and receiver, Gainesville, Florida,
April 6, 1883.
Referring to your letter of October 18, 1881, transmitting appeal of
M. V. B. Mills from your action in rejecting his application to make a,
new homestead entry under the act of March 3, 1879, I have to state
that it appears from the records of this office that said Mills made
homestead entry No. 4073, Gainesville series, September 23, 1876, for
SE. of NW. J and NE. -of SW. , See. 6, T. 3, S. R. 14 E., within 6;
miles limit of the Pensacola and Georgia Railroad. Mr. Mills sets forth
under oath that he applied to you to be allowed to relinquish his pres-
ent entry, and make a new one und3r the act above referred to, on the
ground that he had attempted to make a residence on the land in ques-
tion; that he built and erected buildings thereon, and they were torn
down several times during the night; that he planted crops and trees.
upon the place, and they were destroyed by the sane parties; and
furthermore he was driven from his place through fear of being killed
or receiving great bodily harm; but that you rejected his application
on account of a contest pending against Mr. Mills's homestead for
abandonment. In your letter transmitting the appeal of Mr. Mills,
you state that the ground of rejection was, as stated by Mr. Mills, the
pending contest.
The contest referred to, Stephen Miller v. M. V. B. Mills, was made
July 15, 1881, and was reported to this office October 8, 1881, four days.
prior to your transmission of the appeal of Mr. Mills.
The question that now arises is whether Mr. Mills is entitled to the
privilege of relinquishing his entry and making another under act of
March 3, 1879, where a contest has been initiated for abandonment. If
so, the contest must be dismissed, and the contestant would be deprived
of his thirty days' right to enter the land under act of May 14,1880, and
the land in controversy would be subject to entry by the first legal ap-
plicant.
On a full consideration of this question, I am of the opinion that the
act of March 3, 1879, gave from that date to Mr. Mills the privilege to
relinquish his entry, if he so desires, and make another entry, and that
the subsequent act of May 14, 1880, cannot be construed as in any man-
ner interfering with the provisions of said act of March 3, 1879, from
the fact that it is unnecessary, in making applications similar to that
of Mr. Mills, to show any compliance with law as to residence and cul-
tivation of the original homestead. Hence, if an abandonment was
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shown by the contest, or the party acknowledged he had not complied
with the law in every respect, it would not be considered as affecting
his right under the act of March 3, 1879.
With this view of the case, your decision is not sustained, and you
will advise Mr. Mills that he will be allowed to relinquish his entry No.
4073, and make a new one, as provided by the act referred to. When
a relinquishment properly executed as been filed with you, you will
allow the new entry to be made, after canceling the old entry on your
records, and thereafter report the cancellation to this office, when the
contest will be dismissed.
If, however, after a reasonable period, Mr. Mills fails to file such re-
linquishment, you will report the matter to this office, when action will
be taken in the contest now pending.
H]OMESTEAD-COMMENCEMENT OF RESIDENCE.
BARNEY PHILLIPS.
The five years allowed in a homestead entry, date from entry and not from the com-
mencement of personal residence on the land entered.
Commissioner McFarland to register and receiver, Croocston, Minnesota,
April 9, 1883.
I am in receipt of your letter of February 23, 1883, transmitting the
appeal of Barney Phillips from your decision of January 26, 1883, re-
jecting final proof offered by him in homestead entry No. 915, S. 4 SE.
4 14, 137, 43.
The facts are that Phillips made his entry November 6, 1877, estab-
lished an actual bona fide residence on the land March 15, 1878, and
had continuously resided thereon and cultivated the same up to date
of final proof-January 14, 1883, a period of four years nine months and
twenty-nine days from date of beginning actual residence, and of five
years two months and eight days from date of entry.
Your indorsement upon final proof is as follows: " Rejected for the
reason that the within testimony does not show an actual residence by
claimant of five years." Phillips, through his attorney, M. B. Gibson,
appeals from this decision on the ground that the same " is contrary to
law and rulings of the General Land Office," and urges that inasmuch
as his residence was established on the land within six months from
date of entry, he was not in default, and his time of residence counts
from the time he filed his homestead entry."
Your action in rejecting the final proof was erroneous, and the excep-
tions thereto by Phillips are well taken and are hereby sustained. The
proof is satisfactory, and upon the payment of commissions due, you
will issue final receipt and certificate in the case and transmit the same
to this office with your regular returns for the month in which issued.
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HOMVESTEAD ElNTRY-RESIDENCE-PUBLIC OFFICER.
GEORGE W. SEPPARD.*
A homestead entryman, who cultivates and improves the land embraced in his entry,
but who never resided tereon, is not excused because elected to a public office
which requires his residence elsewhere.
Commissioner UlfeFarland to register and receiver, Bloomington, Nebrasia,
April 12. 1883.
I have received your letter of February 8 last, transmitting an appli-
cation for the reconsideration of my decision of December 1, 1882, re-
jecting proof tendered by George W. Sheppard, on homestead entry
No. 3101, covering the SE. Sec. 23, T. 2, R., 16 W. The party filed
homestead declaratory statement No. 1088 for the land in question March
15, 1875, and the entry was made September 14, 187a. The proof shows
:'I that a house was built on the land during the following month; that
1Y about 75 acres are under cultivation, and that crops of wheat, corn, and
rye have been raised each year since 1877, but no residence has been
established on the tract by Sheppard or any member of his family. In
March, 1876, he was appointed deputy county clerk of Franklin County;
in January, 1877, he was appointed clerk vice former occupant re-
signed, was elected to the same office in the fall of 1877, and continued
to hold the same until January, 1880.
The proof, which was made October 2, 1882, nearly three years after
the expiration of his term of office, was rejected for the reason that he
had not established a residence on the land embraced in his entry, and
consequently his case did not come under the rule of the Department
which permits a person, who after establishing an actual residence
thereon is elected or appointed to a public office requiring his continu-
ous residence at some place other than his homestead, to be temporarily
absent therefrom during the term of such office.
In his application for a review, Mr. Sheppard refers to a decision
rendered by the acting Secretary of the Interior, October 25, 1873 in
the case of Benson v. Western Pacific Railroad Company; but a care-
ful examination of this decision shows that the cases are not analogous-.
So likewise the case of Solomon Males, decided by this office July 10,
1876, and which is referred to by Sheppard, cannot be accepted as au-
thority for allowing final papers to issue on a homestead entry where
no residence is shown.
I therefore decline to modify my decision of December 1,1882.
*See 2 L. D., 154.
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j/bZ'. HOMESTEAD AND PRE-EMPTION-FINAL PROOF.
W. W. BuREI.
Witnesses must be persons entirely disinterested in the claim, and cognizant of their
own knowledge of all the facts set forth in the proof during the entire period of
the alleged residence and cultivation.
The fact that a homestead or pre-emption claimant cannot furnish the necessary proof
by his neighbors, but has to depend upon his attorney and broker to make tbe
same, casts suspicion upon the transaction, and tends to show collusion in the
making of such proof.
Commissioner HcFarland to W. W. Burke, Huron, Dakota, April 17, 1883
I am in receipt of your letter of the 7th instant, calling attention to
the fact that in many instances parties in making proof upon pre-emp-
tion and homestead entries have for witnesses their attorney or parties
from whom they are borrowing money with which to perfect their
claims, people who do not reside near the land covered by the entry,
but generally reside in the towns.
You ask whether such persons are competent witnesses, being in a
measure interested parties.
In reply I have to inform you that the intent of the law is that the
corroborative testimony shoul(l be made by witnesses who actually re-
side in the immediate vicinity of the claimant and are fully acquainted
with the land and all the facts as to the claimant's residence upon and
cultivation of the same. The testimony of those who only occasionally
pass the land, or only know by common repute that the claimantresides.
there, is not competent proof. Witnesses must be persons entirely dis-
interested in the claim, and cognizant of their own knowledge of all the-
facts set forth in the proof during the entire period of the alleged resi-
dence and cultivation.
The fact that a homestead or pre emption claimant cannot furnish
the necessary proof by his neighbors, but has to depend upon his at-
torney and broker to make the same, casts suspicion upon the transac-
tion, and tends to show collusion in the making of such proof.
PURCHASE UNDER THE ACT OF JUVE 15, 1880.
SAMUEL M. MITCHELL.
The operation of this act is not affected by the cancellation of an entry. The tract.
in question was embraced in three homestead entries, which have successively
been canceled. The second entryman applies to purchase. His application is.
permitted, subject to adverse rights.
Commissioner McFarland to register and receiver, Montgomery, Alabama,.
April 1.7, 1883.
I have considered the appeal of Samuel M. Mitchell by his attorney
from your decision of March 15, 1883, rejecting his application to pur--
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chase under the act of June 15, 1880, the land embraced in his homestead
entry No. 3586, made April 19, 1871, for the SW. X of NW. 1 of Sec. 24,
10 S., 11 W., on the following grounds. viz.: " 1. The land is classed as
coal. 2. The claimant voluntarily relinquished the entry August 25,
1874."
The records show said tract to be embraced in homestead No. 1320,
made December 19, 1867, by William Masgrove, and canceled by vol.
untary relinquishment December 17,1869. Said tract was subsequently
entered by the appellant, supra, and canceled by voluntary relinquish-
ment August 25, 1874. Subsequent thereto, to wit, November 2, 1874
said tract was entered by Mary A. Hyde per homestead entry No. 5620,
which was canceled January 9, 1883, for failure to make final proof
within the statutory period.
The first objection is cured by the act of March 3, 1883, which ex-
cludes the public lands in Alabama from the operation of the mineral
laws, and provides for their disposal the same as agricultural lands.
The mere fact of the land being classed as coal, or reported as valuable
for mirerals, is not per se an objection to entry, or to the issuance of
patent therefor. The second objection, that the claimant voluntarily
relinquished the entry, is no bar to an application to purchase under
the act of June 15, 1880, as it can make no difference to the government
whether the entry has been canceled or not, and it is of no consequence
whether the cancellation, which was the act of the Department, was in-
duced by the voluntary act of the entryman or not, as the mere act of
cancellation has no effect to prevent an entry under the statute. The
only question that presents itself in considering an application under
the act, is, was the land properly subject to the original entry, and will
the p oposed entry interfere with the rights or claims of others who have
subsequently entered such lands, etc.?
The case before me presents that of a tract of land, heretofore covered
by three separate homestead entries, all of which have been duly can-
celed, and are presumed to have been legal; upon the cancellation of
the last entry, the land reverted to the public domain, and was subject
to entry by the first legal applicant thereafter. In the absence of any
equities, as between the three entrymen, their rights as beneficiaries of
the act of June 15, 1880, are equal, the first applicant being entitled to
recognition. The appellant appears to be the second entryman: there-
fore, his rights are subservient to any adverse claim that may have
attached subsequent to the cancellation of his entry, including any
equities that may exist favorable to the later entryman.
Your decision is hereby reversed, and the application of Mitchell will
be allowed, upon the payment of the government price for the land,
subject to any adverse rights that may have attached.
20309-VOL 1-7
98 DECISIONS RELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS.
HOMESTEAD ENTRY-BESIDENCE-MILITARY SER VICE.
Z ~L1D b .-
3 / W. A. JONES.
A gson ilo serving inl the Army or Navy cannot make homestead entry if his duties
wd'uld prevent him complying with the law as to residence.
Commissioner McFarland to Maj. W. A. Jones, San Francisco, California,
May 9, 1883.
In reply to your letter of the 19th ultimo, referred to this office by
the Hon. Secretary of the Interior, I have to state that a person now
serving in the Army or Navy of the United States cannot make a home-
stead entry if his duties would prevent him from complying with the
law as to residence.
In the case of Gen. Jeff. C. Davis, the Hon. Secretary of the Interior,
under date of April 9, 1879, decided that section 2308 U. S. Revised
Statutes has reference only to entries made by persons before or after
enlistment into the service during the war of the rebellion, and whose
rights were sacrificed by reason of their absence in said service; and
the said section was not intended to include persons who have served
in the Regular Army since the close of the rebellion, and that such
service cannot be construed as equivalent to actual residence.
ENTRY UNDER ACT OF JUNE 15,1880.
INSTRUCTIONS.
Acting Commissioner Harrison to register and receiver, Taylor's Falls, Min.
nesota, May 21, 1883.
I am in receipt of your letter of May 5, 1883, as follows:
In case of a man dying and at the time holding a homestead, can an
alien heir or heirs enter his homestead land under the act of June 15,
1880 9 An entryman has died here and his relations reside in Canada.
Before any heirs can legally be permitted to purchase the land em-
braced in the entry of a deceased homestead party it must be shown
that the entryman left no widow. This fact being established, the
rights of infant children under section 2292 R. S. must next be protected.
If it be shown that neither widow or infant children survive the entry-
man, then the rights of other heirs may be considered, and they may
be permitted to acquire title in any of the methods prescribed by law.
In the event that they elect to purchase the land as provided by second
section of act of June 15, 1880, it is immaterial whether they be citi
zens or aliens. There is nothing in the statutes prohibiting aliens from
purchasing lands subject to private entry, and the effect of the second
section of act of June 15, 1880, is to render lands affected by it subject
to private entry by the persons entitled to the benefit of its provisions.
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PAIENT-BOABD OF EQUTABLE ADJUDICATION.
INSTRUCTIONS.
Secretary Kirkwood to Commissioner McFarland, December 12, 1881.
Referring to your request of June 8, 1881, for instructions respecting
the requirement of the issue of final certificate before the submission to
the board of equitable adjudication of homestead cases not proved up
iil due time, I have to state that I see no necessity for a positive rule
on the subject.
Under the present practice, cases are submitted in some instances
upon the final proofs offered, without the issue of the official patent
certificate, and in others the final certificate is issued and accompanies
the papers.
While the law creating the Board provides for the issue of patent
directly upon the adjudication, thereby conveying a clear implication
that the entries to be submitted are substantially in form for such im-
mediate issue of patent, yet I am inclined to the opinion that the power
of the Board to confirm may be exercised at any period after the defect,
if the case is in such reasonable completeness as to render it possible
in due ordinary course to carry it speedily to patent.
This may be done by directing the final certificate to issue after the
confirmation, as well as by directing the patent to issue upon a certifi-
cate already returned.,
In many cases hardship might result from a too stringent regulation
in either direction, and I prefer to leave the matter open for your dis-
cretion as individual cases may arise, leaving the Board free to act
upon both classes as they may be respectively presented.
ISS UE OF XPATENT-MINOR HEIRS.
OWEN COTTON, DECEASED.
Before patent can issue to minor heirs the following evidence must be adduced:
The appointment of the guardian.
The names and ages of all children surviving the demise of the soldier.
The death or remarriage of the widow, with the date when either occurred.
Commissioner McFarland to Francis Howard, Magnolia, Wisconsin, Feb-
ruary 28, 1882.
I am in receipt of your letter of the 15th ult., inclosing a copy of letter
C from this office to the register and receiver at Worthington, Minn.,
respecting the homestead entry No. 9701, final certificate No. 4099, NE.
i, 12, 102, 44, for the benefit of -the minor heirs of Owen Cotton, de-
ceased.
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You state that " some mistake has occurred, as the mother of said
heirs is still living."' The deceased party was a soldier during the 'War
of the Rebellion, and his right to make a homestead entry descended
upon his death to his widow if living and not remarried. In the event
of the death or marriage of the widow, then the infant orphan children,
by duly appointed guardian, might initiate an entry. In the papers re-
lating to the case under consideration there is no evidence of the death
or remarriage of the widow and none of the appointment of a guardian
for the infant orphan children, nor do the names or ages of fhe children
appear. Before patent can issue upon this entry evidence must be
filed in this office showing:
1. The appointment of the guardian.
2. The names and ages of all children surviving the demise of the
soldier.
3. The death or remarriage of the widow, with date when either oc-
curred.
This evidence must be transmitted through the district land office at
Worthington, Minn., and so far as practicable should consist of certified
copies from official records and of instruments in writing, relating to
the facts to be established.
ADDITIONAL HOMESTEAD ENTRY-RESIDEYCE.
JOSEPH D. SHARP.
The act of March 3,1879, provides that no patent shall issue on new or additional
entries made thereunder until the parties have actually and in conformity with
the homestead laws occupied, resided upon, and cultivated the land at least one
year.
The act does not exclude parties having made entries thereunder from paying for
the lands upon homestead proof of inhabitation and cultivation of the home-
stead, treated as an entirety in cases of additional entry, for a period such as
would evidence good faith inpre-emption cases.
Commissioner McFarland to register and receiver, Denver, Colorado,
March 1, 1882.
I am in receipt of yours of the 29th ultimo, with affidavit of Joseph
D. Sharp, stating that he purchased the land embraced in the cash
entry referred to below, November 15,1880, and has since occupied the
same, and desires patent to issue for the entire tract. The entry as to
the S. i of SW. 4 Sec. 4, T. 4 N., R. 67 W., was suspended by letter to
you the 10th of last June in the following language
The original homesteadentry of Frank Buffmire, No.3649, January 28,
1878, and his additional entry, No. 4320, made October 6, 1880, under
the act of March 3,1879, covering the SW. A of Sec. 4, T.4 N., R. 67 W.,
were commuted to cash entry No.3248, on November 13, 1880. The ad-
ditional entry was made less than two months previous to the cash en-
try. The act of March 3,1879, provides that no patent shall issue on
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new or additional entries made thereunder until the parties have act-
ually and in conformity with the homestead laws occupied, resided upon,
and cultivated the land embraced therein at least one year; that is, one
year from date of new or additional entry. The party is regarded as
entitled to credit for the period of residence upon the original entry
tract, and cultivation of the additional entry tract, so far as relates to
the latter tract from October 6,1880, and, therefore, in view of the pro-
vision of law mentioned, he will be required to make proof not sooner
than October 6, 1881, showing such residence and cultivation for at
least one year from October 6, 1880, in order to be entitled to a patent
for this tract. When the proof is furnished the matter of issuing pat-
ent will be considered.
It appears by the affidavit of Sharp that Buffmire left the land im-
mediately after cash entry. Sharp urges that Buffmire was entitled to
commute his entry as to the latter tract under section 2301 of the Re-
vised Statutes by reason of residence on the original entry tract.
Upon a review of my predecessor's decision above quoted, I have con-
cluded to relieve the cash entry from suspension. The act of 1879 is
not regarded by me as excluding parties having made entry threunder
from paying for the land upon homestead proof of inhabitation and
cultivation of the homestead, treated as an entirety in cases of addi-
tional entry, for a period such as would evidence good faith in pre-emp-
tion cases-the period of inhabitation required by section 2301 of the
Revised Statutes. Homestead entries are made under the general pro-
visions of the original homestead law-the act of May 20, 1862, and
while additional privileges have since been conferred with certain lim-
itations, I hold that the 8th section of the original act (sec. 2301 of the
Revised Statutes) not having been repealed or modified in express terms
by subsequent statutory provisions, is applicable, according to itsletter,
to homestead entries generally.
Notify Mr. Sharp of the action taken.
LVDIAN RESERVATION-COMMON INDIAN TITLE.
W. N. BRADEN.
A permanent Indian reservation, within the meaning of the act of March 3, 1857, is a
territory with definite boundaries, set apart by the government for the use of
Indians, to which an unlimited occupancy as to time is guaranteed by the gov-
ernment.
Secretary Teller to Commissioner -MeFarland, October 20, 1882.
i have considered the question presented to me in your communica-
tion of October 3, 1882, and submitted to you in a letter addressed to
your office August 16, 1882, by Hon. W. N. Braden, auditor of the State
of Minnesota, making inquiry as to what is understood by your office
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"as permanent Indian reservation," and what is understood "as reser-
vation held by common Indian title."
August 19, 1882, you reply to such a letter, and state " that the term
permanent Indian reservation, as used in the act of Congress of March
3, 1857 (11 Stat., 200), is understood to mean lands allotted to Indians
in fee. Lands held by common Indian title are lands subject to occu-
pation in common by Indian tribes, but to which the paramount title
remains in the United States."
And in reply to a letter addressed to you August 26, 1882, by the
same party, asking whether the Sioux and Winnebago reservations were
regarded as permanent Indian reservations, you state that "they were
not so regarded."
By your communication of the 3d inst. to this Department, you sub-
mit a letter from Hon. W. S. Hahn, attorney-general of said State,
addressed to this Department, and inquiring whether the views thus
stated by you meet the approval of this Department.
I do not coincide with the views thus expressed by you. I am of the
opinion that a permanent Indian reservation within the meaning of the
act of March 3, 1857, referred to by you, is a territory of country with
definite boundaries set apart by the government for the use of Indians,
and to which an unlimited occupancy as to time is guaranteed by the
government, and of which the Indians cannot be deprived, except by
their own acts; and that a fee simple vested in the Indians is not essen-
tial to a permanent reservation.
The question was also submitted as to what is understood by "com-
mon Indian title," and to which you reply that "; lands held by the 'com-
mon Indian title ' are lands subject to occupation in common by Indian
tribes, but to which the paramount title remains in the United States."
This is, I think, correct, except in that it assumes that as to permanent
reservations the fee is in the Indians.
The term " common Indian title" seems to have been used somewhat
indiscriminately; but in its generally accepted use it refers to the res-
ervation title, and is thus distinguished from the aboriginal right of
occupancy recognized in the Indians as to the great mass of land origi-
nally occupied by them.
I have examined the several treaties under which the Sioux and Win.
nebago reservations were created, and am of the opinion that such res-
ervations were permanent reservations within the meaning of the act of
March 3, 1857.
This question does not now arise in any controversy to which the
United States is a party, but the question has been entered upon by
your office, and I have deemed it best to answer the questions thus sub-
mitted to me. The practice is not to be approved, nor are the views
here expressed to prevent a full examination of any questions which
may be presented to your office in the adjustment of any accounts with
States for such five per cent.
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FIXAL PBOOF-HEUS.
LUCINDA. HILL.
Where final proof is made for the heirs of a deceased homesteader the final affidavit
should be made by one of the heirs.
Commissioner McFarland to register and receiver, Larned, Kansas, August
6, 1881.
Referring to Ed. entry No. 522, made March 18, 1876, for northeast
quarter of section 32, township 23, range 16 west, by Lucinda Richard-
son, and to the final proof in the case (final certificate No. 1740), made
by Samuel H. Richardson, "administrator of the estate of Lucinda Hill,
nee Lucinda Richardson, deceased," I have to state that in cases of this
character the final affidavit should be made by one of the heirs for the
heirs of the deceased party, and final certificate should issue to the
"heirs of . . . . . deceased." You will so inform the parties in
interest, and when the final affidavit is made transmit the same to this
office, refering to this letter.
PRA CTICE-APPEAL-BELINQ ULSHMENT.
JOHN POWERS.
In this case, in view of the party's diligence, the defective appeal might be entertained
so far as the question of the time allowed for filing the same is concerned.
In order to give effect to a relinquishment as evidence in a contested case, so as to
inure to the benefit of the contestant under the act of May 14, 1880, it must have
been made before the closing of the testimony before the register and receiver on
the allegation of abandonment.
Acting Secretary Bell to Commissioner lcFarland, September 30, 1881.
I am in receipt of your report of the 19th instant, sending up under
rules 83 to 85 of practice, the appeal of John Powers from your decision
of March 29, 1881, holding for cancellation his homestead entry No.
10,624, Tracy, Minn., made July 1, 1880, upon the SE. i of Sec. 10, T.
106, R. 44. His appeal was denied on the 10th of August last, for the
reason that the same was not perfected within sixty days from notice
of decision. He alleges, in support of his application to have it now
considered, that he was misled by his attorney, who, being instructed
to take the appeal, failed to do so in the form required, and that as soon,
as he (Powers) discovered the negligence, he employed another attor-
ney, and perfected the same.
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On looking at the papers, I find that the former attorney appears to
have filed notice of appeal in the local office on the 13th of June, 1881,
which was defective in not being accompanied by specifications of error.
Whether or not this was actually within the time required does not ap-
pear, nor does it appear that he was notified of the defect and given the
fifteen days allowed by rule 82. The record is very loose and unsatis-
factory on these points; and I am not enlightened by your report as to
the actual condition of the case. I should therefore be inclined to waive
any technical objection on the ground of time, the fact being that he has
proceeded with all possible diligence after being advised that his appeal
had been considered defective.
The facts briefly stated are, that one Michael Kane entered this land
as a homestead May 3, 1878; that William H. Walker contested the
same for abandonment at a hearing on the 5th of January, 1880; that
the register and receiver sustained the charge and recommended can-
cellation; that no appeal was taken by Kane; that subsequently, on
the 29th of June, 1880, Kane relinquished his entry, and the land was
entered by Powers, July 1, 1880, as above stated.
In the mean time, the act of May 14, 1880, was passed, giving a pref-
erence right of entry to any person who ad contested, paid the land
office fees, and procured the cancellation of any pre-emption, homestead
or timber-culture entry.
September 8, 1880, you closed the contest, thereby virtually affirm-
ing the decision of the register and receiver, and directed them to notify
Walker of his preference right of entry as contestant, which notice
was given, and his entry, No. 10724, was made September 27, 1880.
March 29, 1881, you hehl the entry of Powers for cancellation, from
which action the present appeal is taken. The only point urged is that
you erred inr applying the act of 1880 to cases contested prior to its
date. I do not think the objection well taken. When the act was
passed the entry had not been canceled; but the case was, under
the practice then prevailing, awaiting your decision. The contestant
had paid the fees, and done what he could to procure the cancellation.
if it was canceled in pursuance of his action, he was within the descrip-
tive terms of the statute, and entitled to its benefits. I think, however,
that your rulings of March 29 and August 10 should be modified so far
as to require that, in order to give effect to a relinquishment of the
land as evidence in the contested case, so as to inure to the benefit of
the contestant under the act, it must have been made before the closing
of the testimony before the register and receiver upon the allegation
of abandonment. It is only upon the showing made by the contestant,,
while in issue before the proper tribunal as to the facts, that his pref-
erence right can be predicated. After acts of abandonment are not
provable by him, except upon new allegation, and trial duly appointed 
and if an after-obtained relinquishment be filed by a stranger, the con-
testant takes nothing thereby. In such case his right of entry must be
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determined by the issue of his contest upon the evidence produced at
the trial. That is the proceeding for which he had paid the expenses
and gone to judgment before the register and receiver. He has there-
after only the right to demand a decision upon the record, and must
abide the final determination. The decision of June 2, 1881, in John-
son v. Halvorson (opp, vol. 8, p. 56), cited by you, is in harmony with
the foregoing, although a cursory reading might perhaps lead to a
broader construction. In this, as in all classes of contest, particular
attention should be paid to rule 53 of Practice, and its requirements
observed.
The appeal of Powers is dismissed.
PRACTICE-IMPEA CHMENVT OF WITNESS-CONTINUANCE.
PACKARD V. JACKSON.
In contest against homestead entries the character of a witness may be impeached
and a continuance had to enable the opposite party to secure testimony in re-
buttal.
Commissioner icFarland to register and receiver, Harrison, Arkansas,
December 14, 1882.
I am in receipt of your letter of Nov. 30, 1882, relating to the case of
G. W. Jackson, homestead entry No. 4837, contested by P. S. Packard.
You state that at the close of the taking of testimony Jackson gave no-
tice of his intention to introduce witnesses to impeach the character of
Packardfor truth and veracity; that Ir. Packard had no previous notice
of such an intention on the part of contestant, and was from 100 to 125
miles from home; that you continued the case until January 9, 1883.
You desire to be informed whether it is proper to take testimony
touching the character of a witness in this class of contests, and
whether your continuance of said case for that purpose was proper.
I answer in the affirmative, as to both interrogatories.
I know of no reason why the ordinary methods of obtaining the facts
should not be applied to these cases; and where a party finds himself
liable to loss and injury through false testimony, the impeachment of
the character of the witness is his only recourse. In the case cited, the
question having been sprung upon the plaintiff when he had no oppor-
tunity for preparation to rebut the defendant's attack, it appears to me
that a continuance was eminently just and proper.
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PRACTICE-HEARINGS-CONTESTS.
INSTRUCTIONS.
Rule 15 of the Rules of Practice prescribes the mode of proof of notice, and must be
strictly complied with.
Purchasers of homestead claims before patent are not recognized, and they have no
standing in contest.
No testimony is to be excluded by the local officers because of supposed irrelevancy.
Thirty days' notice is not allowed where continuance of a hearing is granted, but ten
days are allowed to file cross-interrogatories where deposition of absent witness
is to be taken.
Row the affidavit required by rule 20 of Rules of Practice may be made.
Commissioner McFarland to register and receiver, Montgomery, Altabama,
December 27, 1882.
I am in receipt of yours of the 12th instant, asking the following
queries relative to proceedings in contests and hearings before registers
and receivers, viz:
1. Is it necessary where hearings are ordered by the General Land
Office for fraud in entry, or mineral character of land entered, that the
officer (United States deputy marshal) serving the notice make oath as
to service?
2. When hearing is ordered in cases for which final proof had been
made, and notices issued to the homesteader, and on the day of trial
third parties appear claiming to be holders of the land under the home-
steader (innocent purchasers), and show that no notice was served on
them, and that by mere accident they heard of the hearing before reg-
ister and receiver only a few days before trial, and have therefore had
no opportunity to prepare for a defense, can they be recognized and
made a party to the contest, and allowed a sufficient time to prepare
for trial?
3. Where at the trial of a case the register and receiver find that the
attorney for the defense is asking a lot of irrelevant questions in order
to prolong the hearing and to worry and to wear out the witness, can
they reject such questions and refnse to allow them to be put to the wit-
ness and be reduced to writing?
4. Where a continuance is asked for and granted by register and re-
ceiver, can the opposing side claim thirty days' notice?
5. Can the affidavit required in rule 20, Rules of Practice, be made
prior to the day of trial, and before an officer other than the register
and receiver?
In reply I have to submit the following answers to each of your ques-
tions in their order, viz:
1. Rule 15 of Rules of Practice prescribes the mode of proof of service
of notice.
If after trial and decision thereon the opposite party should base an
appeal on the ground that the proof of notice was wanting in any of the
essential points embraced therein, this office would be bound to take
notice thereof; therefore it is th e safest plan to comply strictly with the
terms of the rule as made and provided.
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2. No; this office does not recognize purchasers or third parties prior
to issuance of patent. Parties who purchase of settlers before patent
has issued, cannot maintain the position of innocent purchasers.
The doctrine of bonafide purchaser is not applicable to one who pur-
chases of a settler before patent. As the settler has only an equity,
such purchaser must abide by the disposition of the case made by this
Department, irrespective of notice or recognition.
3. No; rule 41 prescribes that no testimony will be excluded, etc.
It will be observed by this rule that it is not competent for the register
and receiver to judge as to the relevancy or admissibility of the testi-
mony, for the purpose of exclusion.
4. No; but in cases where the party so applying shall at the same
time apply for an order to take the depositions of the alleged absent
witnesses, ten days will be allowed the opposing party in which to file
cross-interrogatories.
5. The most natural time to make the affidavit would seem to be on
the day set for trial; but there could be no valid objection to the party
making it at any time prior thereto. The proper time, however, to con-
sider the affidavit is when the case comes up for trial. The rule pre-
sumes the affidavit to be made before the register and receiver. If the
party is represented by counsel, an affidavit by said representative made
before the register and receiver is satisfactory or it may be made before
any other officer qualified to administer oaths and using an official seal.
PRACTICE-NOTICE BY PUBLICATION.
BRONSON V. SAWYER.
How notice to non-residents in a contested case should be given.
Commissioner 21fcFarland to register and receiver, Gainesville, Florida,
January 4, 1883.
In the case of contested homestead No. 2514, Jo. 0. Bronson v. N.
K. Sawyer, I have to state that on examination of the testimony trans-
mitted in your letter of May 11, 1881, it appears that the contest was
initiated January 5, 1881; that as the homestead party was not a resi-
dent of the county wherein the homestead entry was situated, notice
of contest was given by publication, and that at the day of hearing
the contestant appeared but the defendant did not. The evidence ad-
duced shows that the homestead in question is unimproved land and
has been abandoned by the homestead party. Mr. Sawyer, the defend-
ant, files with the case his appeal from your decision in declaring a for-
feiture of his entry on the ground that under the rules of practice he
was entitled to personal notice (rule 10), where the party to be notified
is a resident of the State and such residence was known.
Mr. Sawyer further alleges that he never received notice, either per-
sonal or by publication, that a contest had been initiated against his
entry, and never knew of any proceedings until he received notice that
his homestead was declared forfeited.
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Furthermore he alleges that he has resided in Jacksonville, Fla., for
eight years last past, and that his residence in that place was well known
to you and the contestant. Ruale 10, rules of practice, requires personal
service of notice when possible, if the party to be served is a resident
of the State.
Rule 12 requires that when notice is given by publication, it must ebased upon the affidavit of the contestant that personal service cannot
be made.
Rule 14 requires that where notice is given by publication, a copy of
the notice shall be mailed by registered letter to the last-known address
of the party to be notified, and a like copy posted in a conspicuous place
on the land during the period of publication, for two weeks at least prior
to the day set for hearing.
There is no evidence that such notice was given as required, and
therefore I am of the opinion that the points of exception made by the
defendant are well taken.
In your letter transmitting the testimony in this case you state that
this contest was ordered twenty-six days prior to the date that the rules
of practice went into effect, viz, February 1, 1881; but it must be ob-
served that the rules of practice approved October 9, 1878, were still inforce and required notice to be given in the same manner as under the
present rules of practice.
In view of the above points of exception as regards notice to the de-fendant, the contest is hereby dismissed; but as the evidence in the case
shows that there are no improvements on the land, or any evidence that
theland has ever been improved, and the defendant ackncwledges thathis residence for the last eight years has been in Jacksonville, Fla.,
about two hundred miles from his homestead entry, I am constrained,
in the face of such an admission, corroborated by the testimony sub-
mitted, to hold the entry in controversy for cancellation, and it is so
held, with the usual right of appeal for sixty days.
You will so advise the respective parties i interest.
FINAL PROOF-P UBLICATION OF OTICE.
INSTRUCTIONS.
Notice of proof under act of March 3, 1879, must be published in a newspaper nearest
the land by the usual traveled routes and not by an air-line measurement.
Commissioner McFarland to register and receiver, Leadville, Colorado.
Referring to yours of the 10th instant, in respect to publication of
notices of applications of parties for patents, asking whether a paper
published nearest the land must be designated, or one published at a
place from which the land may be reached the quickest by the lines of
travel, your attention is invited, in regard to publication of notices of
applications for mineral patents, to the rule conveyed in my letter of
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the 29th ultimo, "N ," to Chas. P. Bellang, esq., Georgetown, Colo., as
follows:
Referring to your communication of 31st ultimo, I have to state in
reply that it is the duty of the register of the land office whBre an ap-
plication for patent to a mining claim has been filed to direct the pub-
lication of notice thereof, " in a newspaper to be designated by him as
published nearest the claim." (Sec. 2025 R. S.) The term "nearest"
the claim means the place nearest the claim, which is to be ascertained
by the register through the best sources of information at his command.
It also means the nearest place by usually traveled routes and not al-
ways by an air-line measurement. In a mountainous country the near-
est newspaper town in any air line from a mining claim may have an
intervening range of mountains over which communication is difficult
if not impossible, and in any event unusual, and the law, interpreted
by its spirit, certainly does not design that publication should be made
in a newspaper so situated.
Again, the register should designate a reputable newspaper of gen-
eral circulation. (See decision of Hon. Secretary Chandler, case of
Omaha mine. Sickel's Mining Decisions, p. 68.) A reputable news-
paper may generally be defined as one of established business standing-
one which derives from the community where situated a sufficient
amount of business or patronage to make it self-supporting. It is not
essential that it shall have a large circulation, but it should be gener-
ally circulated in the vicinity of publication.
It should be remembered that the duty of designating the proper
newspaper for the publication of a mining notice is a ministerial one to
be exercised by the register, over which this office can apply but gen-
eral control.
Where that officer violates the provisions of the law to the prejudice
of adverse claimants-without actual notice, this office will take such
action as the facts may warrant.
In regard to publishing notices of intention to make proof in pre-
emption and homestead cases, the rule above laid down should be
followed. The act of March 3, 1879, provides for such publication
in a paper to be designated by the 'register as "published nearest to
such land"; the mineral law employs the words published nearest to
such claim." In respect to the paper to be designated for publication
of notices, the mining law and the act of March 3, 1879, contain provis-
ions exactly alike in character.
PRACTICE-AP.PEAL-SPECITFICATIONS OF ERROR.
COLE V. PHELPS.
Appeal from Commissioners' decision must specify clearly the errors complained of
therein and must show service upon the appellee, according to Rules of Prac-
tice, or it will be dismissed.
Commissioner McFarland to register and receiver, Los Angeles, California,
February 6, 1882.
I have received your letter of the 27th ultimo, transmitting notice of
appeal, by defendant, in the case of James A. Cole v. E. C. Phelps, from
my decision of November 14, 1881, in favor of plaintiff.
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The said appeal is defective in that it does not specify clearly the
errors of which he complains in said decision. (See rule 88, rules of
practice.) Notify Phelps that he is hereby allowed fifteen days from
receipt of your notice in which to perfect his appeal. Evidence of serv-
ice thereof upon appellee should accompany the papers. (See rules 94




When notice of a decision of thee General Land Office is sent by mail to local land
offices to be served by them, ten days is allowed in addition to the sixty days
allowed under the rulings of the Department.
Commissioner McFarland to Hon. jllontgomery Blair, Washington, D. C.,.
February 10, 1882.
On your motion of 20th ultimo, to dismiss the appeal from- the de-
cision of this office of October 4, 1881, in the case of certain Valen-
tine scrip filings made by John H. Moore upon lands in T. 7 S., R. 1 E.,
M. D. M., San Francisco, Cal., which appeal was filed in this office, De-
cember 3, 1881, by J. 0. Meloy, as attorney for said Moore, I have to
advise you that I am now in receipt of a letter from the register at San
Francisco, dated 26th ultimo, transmitting an appeal in said case filed
in the local land office December 2, 1881, by T. II. Laine, attorney for
said Moore, accompanied by a specification of the errors complained of.
The register states that he notified Mr. Moore of the Commissioner's
decision on October 14, 1881. The papers do not show whether a copy
of the specification of errors was served on the opposite party or not.
A copy of the specification of errors filed by the resident attorney here
was served on the resident attorney for the opposite party here, on
December 24, 1881. You base your notice to dismiss the appeal on the
ground that service of copy of errors and argument thereon was not
made within the time allowed for that purpose under the rules of prac-
tice.
The rule allows seventy days, when notice is given through the mails
by the register and receiver, five days being then allowed for the trans-
mission of the letter from the local office, and five days for the return
of the appeal through the same channel before reporting to the General
Land Office.
My construction of this rule is, ten days are allowed as additional
time to the sixty days allowed for appeal, when notice of a decision of
this office is sent by mail to the local offices to be served by them, and
that it is immaterial whether the time actually required for the trans-
mission of the notice from the local office, or the return of the appeal
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thereto, is less or more than five days in either case; and that it is also
immaterial whether the appeal is returned through the same channel
or not. The time is allowed for that purpose, and parties may have
the benefit of that time, whatever may be the manner of service.of
notice or of the transmission of the appeal.
In the present case the notification is reported as of date of October
14. 1881. Whether this was the date of the actual notice, or the date of
the letter containing the notice, or the date of the mailing of the letter,
does not appear. Bat from October 14 to December 21, the date when
copy of specification of errors and argument was served upon the resi-
dent attorney here for the opposite party, is seventy-one days.
In view of the uncertainty as to the exact date from which the sev-
enty days allowed should be computed, and the fact that one day's time
only is in issue, it is my opinion that sufficient cause for denying to par-
ties the right to have the judgment of the appellate authority is not
shown.
I so decide and decline to dismiss the appeal.
PR4 CTICE -REVIE W OF DECISION.
RICHARDS . DAVIS.
A review of a decision, like a new trial, in the absence of new evidence will not be
granted on the ground that the decision was against the weight of evidence, if
there was contradictory evidence on both sides.
Secretary Kirkwood to Commissioner McFarland, April 12, 1882.
I have considered the motion of Charles A. Richards's attorney for a
reconsideration of my decision rendered under date of the 20th ultimo,
in the case of Richards v. Davis, holding that the contestant, Richards,
had failed to prove his allegations touching Davis's abandonment of
the NW. i of Sec. 12, T. 4 N., R. 68 W., Denver district, Colorado.
Such motion covers the identical points that were raised on appeal
and duly considered by me when the decision in question was rendered.
No new evidence is presented, nor is there even a pietence that any
such evidence has been discovered, but said motion is based upon the
ground of error in the finding of fact and application of the law.
Rule 76 of the rules of practice authorizes motions for a review or
reconsideration of the Secretary's decisions when " in accordance with
legal principles applicable to motions for new trials at law."
The rule of law is well settled that a new trial will not be granted on
the ground that the verdict was against the weight of evidence, if there
was contradictory evidence on both sides. (See citations in the matter
of the Rancho fluasna survey, 2 C. L. L. 211.)
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As I am able to discover neither error in the finding of fact nor in
the application of the law, I must decline to disturb my decision in the
premises.
The motion is accordingly denied and the same is transmitted here-
with. -)~
PEA OTICE-HEABRIYG-CONTINUANCE.
JACKSON V.JACKSON. g i of a
Where neither party appears at time and place as cited, the case should not be con-
tinned, but dismissed.
A homestead entry is not liable to contest after seven years from date of entry.
In such case, after notice, if the homestead party fails to make proof, the would-be
contestant has a preference right of entry if the sole occupant of the land.
Commissioner .3cFarland to register and receiver, Prescott, Arizona, De-
cember 22, 1882.
I have examined the case of Solomon Jackson vs. Jesse Jackson, in-
volving homestead entry No. 33, made January 5, 1875, upon the S. i
SE.I27, and N.INE.1 34, 18N.5 W.
You find that the defendant has abandoned his entry, and therefore
recommend the cancellation of the entry.
You also report that though duly advised of your decision, the defend-
ant failed to appeal therefrom within the time prescribed by the rules
of practice. Under the foregoing circumstances, your decision would
become final were I satisfied that correct conclusions of law have been
drawn by you from the facts in the premises.
But I am not so satisfied because-
First. It appears from the record that on the day set for trial (Oc-
tober 19, 1882) neither of the parties appeared, wherefore you continued
the case to the 26th of said month, on which latter date plaintiff ap-
peared and adduced evidence in support of his charge of abandonment.
No appearance was entered by or in behalf of the defendant.
You erred, I think, in thus postponing the case in the absence of any
motion from either party for a continuance, as prescribed by rule 20 of
practice.
The plaintiff failing to appear and prosecute his case at the time
designated for trial, the contest should have been dismissed.
Secondly. At date (September 12, 1882) of initiation of contest more
than seven years since date (January 5, 1875) of entry had elapsed.
Consequently the entry had expired by limitation of law, and was not
liable to contest.
Your decision is therefore reversed and the case dismissed. You will
so advise the parties, allowing the usual privilege of appeal.
In this connection you are instructed to call upon said Jesse Jackson,
if you have not already done so, to show cause within thirty days why
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his entry should not be canceled as having expired by reason of failure
on his part to make final proof thereon within seven years from date
thereof, as required by law and the regulations of this office thereunder.
In the event of the cancellation of said entry as having expired, the
said contestant would be entitled to the preference right of entering
the land embraced therein, under the act of May 14,1880; provided he
was the sole occupant thereof as an actual settler at the date of such can-
cellation; otherwise the land would be open to entry by the first quali-
fied applicant, and you will also so advise him.
At the proper time report the action taken.
PRACTICE-ALLEGATiON-JUDGMENT.
SCHELTER V. OFF.
In contests under the land laws, proofs should be confined to the allegations, as in
trials at law, and judgment rendered only on the questions raised by the record.
A further hearing may be ordered on other questions raised unless the testimony
submitted be accepted by the defendant in lieu thereof.
Secretary Kirkwood to Commissioner Williamson, June 9, 1881.
I have considered the case of Christian Sehelter v. Charles F. Off, in-
volving the latter's timber-culture entry made January 22, 1878, on the
south one-half of south-east one-fourth, and south one-half of southwest
one-fourth section 34, township 3 north, range 20 west, Bloomington,
Nebr., on appeal by Off from your decision of October 19, 1880, holding
his entry for cancellation, because the land was not subject to a timber-
culture entry, and because, also the affidavit o which the entry was
made was executed several months prior to the date of said entry.
The affidavit of contest alleges that Off has wholly abandoned said
tract, and that said tract is not cultivated by said party as required by
law." As these were the sole charges made by Schelter, Off was re-
quired to answer these only, and there could properly be no other issues
between the parties for trial. Testimony upon other matters not inci-
dent thereto was wholly foreign to the case, and should not have been
considered, either by the local officers or by your office. I contests
under the land laws proofs should be confined to allegations, as in trials
at law, and judgment be rendered on the questions raised by the record
only. A large portion of the testimony in this case, however, had refer-
ence to the character of the land, and whether it was subject to a tim-
ber-culture entry. This was a question impertinent to the issue, and
was admitted against the objections of Off's counsel.
While I concur with you in the opinion that, under the testimony,
the tract was not subject to Off's entry, by reason of the large number
of natural timber-trees growing thereon, I am also of the opinion that
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this question was not ivolved in the contest, because not so charged,
and, hence, that Off was not required to defend the same, nor should it
be regarded in the disposition of this cause.
Without, therefore, now deciding other questions raised by the ap-
peal, I direct that a further hearing be ordered touching the character
of said land, unless Off consents that, in lieu thereof, the present testi-
mony may be considered in the adjudication of that question.
Your decision is modified accordingly.
PRACTICE-NOTICE-CHARGE- V4RIANCE.
GOULD V. WEISBECKER.
Where the notice of contest against atimber-enlture entry served upon the defendant
contained the single allegation of " abandonment " and the affidavit filed before
contest contained the charge of " abandonment," and that said "defendant had
failed to cultivate said tract as required by'law," no objection having been raised
when the parties appeared for trial, it is too late after the trial has closed for the
defendant to take advantage of the variance between the notice and affidavit.
Commissioner ]klcfarland to register and receiver, Crookston, Mlinnesota,
August 31, 1881.
The register in his letter of March 16, 1880, transmitted the record
of contest in the case of Walter K. Gould v. Philip C. Weisbecker,
involving the timber-culture entry of the latter, No. 80, ated June
23, 1876, embracing the NE. I 22, 140, 48. The contest was initiated
November 18, 1879, the charges set forth in the affidavit of contest
being that said Weisbecker " has wholly abandoned said tract," and
that said "tract is not cultivated by said party as required by law."
The trial commenced on the 8th of January, 1880, all the parties at-
tended by their respective counsel being present, and the taking of testi-
mony continued from day to day until the 10th of the same month, when
the trial ended. The case was submitted without argument.
In your joint report and opinion your finding, after consideration of
the evidence, is that defendant has wholly abandoned his timber-cult-
ure entry," and "has failed to cultivate the land embraced therein as
the law requires," and you decided that said entry should be canceled.
From this finding and decision the defendant, through his attorney in
this city, appeals to this office. The appeal is based on the following
grounds: 1st. Error in hearing the case upon the charge made, that of
abandonment, citing decision of this office rendered April 15, 18SO, in the
case of Woolpert v. Betts, (7 C. L. 0. 25). 2d. Error in finding, upon
the charge of abandonment, that defendant had not complied with the
law. 3d. Error in finding that defendant has failed to cultivate the
land as the law requires. 4th. Because the decision is contrary to the
evidence.
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It appears that the noticeof contest served upon the defendant, instead
of containing the two distinct allegations of the plaintiff, abandonment
and failure, in the matter of cultivation, to comply with the law, con-
tained only the charge of abandonment, and it is now contended that,
at the trial, said defendant was not required to answer any other charge,
or to prepare himself to answer any other; that he was not made aware
that any complaint of want of cultivation had been made against his
entry, but only that he had abandoned it; that, under the decision afore-
said, in the case of Woolpert v. Betts, the notice of contest was'not good
in law, and the case should therefore be dismissed. It is to be observed
on this point, that, at the time of trial, no objection was made or ques-
tion raised, by defendant or his counsel, to the notice served, or to the
allegations contained in the affidavit of contest. Had the point been
made when the trial commenced it would have been good in abatement,
but, after pleading the general issue, it is too late to take advantage of
a variance between the writ and declaration, or the notice served which
answers for a writ, and affidavit of contest which fills the place of a
declaration. This view is supported by the supreme court of the United
States in the case of McKenna v. Fisk (I Howard, p. 241), and your ac-
tion in hearing the case is sustained.
In your finding that defendant " has wholly abandoned his timber-
culture entry," a careful review of the testimony shows that you were
in error in that respect. An abandonment is the relinquishment of a
right. It implies some act of relinquishment done by the owiier, without
regard to any future possession by himself or by any other pers'n, but
with an intention to abandon. Mere non-user does not necessarily or
actually constitute an abandonment. In this case abaudounment is not
proven.
The main question at issue, and the one to which the testimony was
confined, was, Had there been a failure on the part of the defendant to
cultivate the tract embraced in his entryas required l law l The entry
was made June 23, 1876. The evidence shows that on the 25th of the
same month defendant had ten acres broken, and that in the fall of the
same year he back-set it. In 1877 he put in a crop. In 1S78 he broke
eleven acres more, and in May of that year he planted the ten acres first
broken with elm-tree seed. It thus appears that be had complied with
the law of 1874 up to the date of the passage of the act of 1878. The
law of 1874 was mandatory upon him to plant ten acres during the sec-
ond year; that is, between June23, 1877, anidJune23,1S78. He planted
in season-May,1878-but itappears from thetestimony that the ground
was quite wet and that the seeds did not sprout, whether from the wet
season or ptherwise witness cannot say. In June, 1879, he plowed up
the ten acres and again planted with elm-tree seed.
After due consideration of all the facts elicited at the trial, and of
the arguments offered by the respective counsel, I am of opinion that
the defendant has complied with the law in the matter of cultivation in
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such a substantial way that the cancellation of his entry is not war-
ranted, and I therefore reverse your action on said entry. You will so
advise all parties in interest, allow the usual time for appeal, and at the
proper time make prompt report to this office of action taken.
PBACTICE-NOTICE-dAPPERANYCE.
MORSE v. PAYNE.
The general appearance of a respondent at a trial, without objection to irregularity
of the notice, is a waiver of such irregularity.
Secretary Teller to Commissioner McFarland, May 3, 1882.
I have examined the papers in the case of Solon 0. Morse v. Sanford'
D. Payne, transmitted with your letter of March 31 last, for the con-
sideration of this Department under practice rule 83. It appears that
Payne made a timber-culture entry of the tract involved, and that
Morse initiated a contest against him for failure to comply with the re-
quirements of the law. In view of the testimony, the local officers
recommended a cancellation of the entry. Payne did not appeal from
this decision, but subsequently applied for the reopening of the case,
that he might move the dismissal of the same, for alleged defects in
the notice of contest. His motion was refused for the reason that his-
personal appearance at the trial, and participation in the proceedings,,
without objection to the notice, cured any defect therein; which action
you sustained. He appealed from your ruling to this Department, but.
you dismissed his appeal beause it was upon an interlocutory matter,.
and therefore not appealable. He again appealed from your last ac-
tion, and you again dismissed his appeal for the reason that practice
rule 83 provides the proper method of bringing such matter before this:
Department; and the case is, upon his motion, transmitted accord--
ingly.
The only material question involved is whether the general appear-
ance of a respondent at a trial, without objection to the irregularity of
the notice, is a waiver of such irregularity. The law in such case is
well settled by the courts and by practice under the land laws.
The object of notice is, that the party defendant may have knowl-
edge of the proceedings against him; and it is immaterial how his
knowledge is obtained. If he appears at the trial, and takes part
therein, without objection to defects in the notice-whether it be by
personal service or by publication-he is deprived of no right, but has
every benefit to which the law of trial entitles him. Whatever, there-
fore, may have been the defects in the notice in this case, they were
cured by Payne's appearance, and he has no legal cause of complaint.
Finding nothing in the case to require the intervention of this De-
partment, the papers are herewith returned to you.
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PRACTICE-TIME FOR APPEAL.
THYEN v. BRYANT ET AL.
Ten days in addition to the usual thirty days will be allowed for appeal, where no-
tice of the local officer's decision is sent by mail.
The planting as shown in this case is not cultivation within the meaning of the tim-
ber-culture law.
Conmmissioner 1llcFarland to register and receiver, Watertown, Dakota,
July , 1882.
I am in receipt of your letters of the 10th October last, transmitting
testimony in the following cases, viz: Albert Marckus v. Irene B.
Canedy, T. C. E. 3051 (S. Falls series), June 14, 1878, NW. 32, 118,
51. Herman Thyen v. Mary A. Bryant, T. C. E. 3224 (Sioux Falls se-
ries), July 8, 1878, SE. I 20, 118, 51.
The proceedings in these cases appear to have been regular. You
held that the entries should be canceled on account of a failure by the
claimant in each case to cultivate during the second year after entry
the five acres broken the first year, and from your decisions appeals are
taken.
You report that the attorney of the claimant, in each case, was noti-
fied of your decision by letter mailed September 5, 1881, and the ap-
peals were filed in your office October 7, 1881.
Contestants move to dismiss the appeals on the ground that they
were not filed within thirty days from notice of your decisions.
This motion raises a question of practice which I think it proper to
consider.
In communication to Hon. Montgomery Blair, of this city, dated Feb-
ruary 10, 1882 (S L. 0., 188), this office held that in cases where no-
tice of its decisions was given through the mails by the district officers,
ten days, in adition to the sixty days allowed for appeals, should be
allowed for the transmission of the notice and the return of the appeal.
Rule 44 of the rules of practice is indefinite relative to the time from
which the thirty days allowed for appeals from decisions of local officers
should be computed. Evidently parties should be allowed thirty days
from date of receipt of notice, and not be limited to thirty days from
the day of mailing the letter containing the notice, and I do not think
that such limitation was contemplated by the rules of practice. But it
is apparent that a more definite rule is required to meet cases of appeals
from the decisions of local officers than the uncertain and frequently
impracticable one of ascertaining the date on which notice of the de-
eision is actually received.
As uniformity in practice is desirable, and as I see-no good reason
why a distinction should be made in the matter of time allowed for
transmission of notices and return of appeals, between the decisions of
this office and of local officers, when such notices are served by mail by
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the local officers, I shall hold that the rule heretofore referred to in re-
spect to appeals from the decisions of this office, is applicable to appeals
from the decisions of local officers, and that ten days additional to
the thirty days allowed for appeals from decisions of registers and re-
ceivers will be allowed for the transmission of the notice by mail and
the return of the appeal to the local office.
The motion to dismiss the appeal in the present instance is therefore
denied.
In the case of Mary A. Bryant, the second year after date of entry
expired July 8, 1880, and in that of Irene B. Canedy June 14, 1880
the testimony in each case shows that during the month of June, 1880,
the claimants had the land, broken the previous year, planted to corn.
This planting was done with a two-horse corn-planter, without any pre-
vious preparation of the soil by harrowing or cultivating, and after the
planting no cultivating was done. The only question to be considered
is, was such planting "cultivation" under the timber-culture law? This
question was considered by this office in the case of John Thyen v. Wm.
E. Canedy, T. C. E. 3102 (Sioux Falls series), and by my letter to you
of the 15th April last (C) it was held that by no reasonable construc-
tion of the law could such planting be considered as cultivation. Ap-
plying the principles of that decision to these cases, I am led to concur
in your decisions, and the entries are hereby held for cancellation, sub-
ject to the right of further appeal.
SAME, ON APPEAL.
Under rule 44 of Practice, thirty days allowed from date of receipt by mail of notice
of decisions of local officers, and ten days additional, should be allowed for trans-
mission of such notice and the return of appeal to the local office.
Secretary Teller to Commissioner M~cFarland, Mlay 17, 1883.
I have considered the case of Herman Thyen v. Mary A. Bryant, ins
volving timber-culture entry No. 3224 (Sioux Falls series), of SE. 1 of
See. 20, T. 118, R. 51, Watertown district, Dakota Territory, on appeal
by Bryant from your decision of July 1, 1882, holding her entry for
cancellation.
Bryant made said entry July 8, 1878, and Thyen initiated contest
against the same March 5,1881, upon the ground of failure to cultivate
during the second year the five acres broken during the first year after
entry, as required by law. He failed, however, to apply to enter the
tract, by reason whereof the contest was initiated without legal an-
thority, and must be dismissed pursuant to departmental decision ren-
dered November 14, 1882, in the case of Bundy v. Livingston (9 C. L. O.,
172).
I concur with you in the opinion that under rule 41 of practice thirty
days should be allowed from date of receipt by mail of notice of decis-
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ions of registers and receivers, and that ten days additional should be
allowed for the transmission of such notice and the return of appeal to
the local office. But barring such holding, your decision is reversed.
PRACTICE-NOTICE TO ATTORNEYS.
WOOD V. SOUTHWICK.
Notice of decision to one of several attorneys of a party is notice to all as well as no-
tice to the principal.
Commissioner M]eFa)land to A. B. Webb, Waslhington, D. C., January 30,
1883.
In the case of James H. Wood v. George F. Southwick, involving
timber-culture entry of the latter, Nlo. 814, on the NE. 1 18, 11, 12 W.,
land district, Grand Island, Nebr., the Hon. Acting Secretary of the
Interior, per decision rendered October 16, 1882, dismissed the contest,
and directed that one John W. Collins, who filed the relinquished re-
ceipt, covering said entry, be allowed to enter the tract in controversy
Said entry was therefore canceled by this office October 27, 1P82. and
on the same day the local officers were directed to note the cancellation
upon the records of their office and advise Mr. Collins that he would be
allowed thirty days to make entry of said tract.
From the papers on file in this case it appears that on the 6th of No-
vember, 1882, the register of the local office gave due notice to Mr.
Platt, one of the attorneys of said Collins, at Grand Island, regarding,
the aforesaid decision and preference right of thirty days in which Col-
lins could make entry, and that on the 6th of December, 1882, said
Platt, in behalf of his client, said Collins, filed an affidavit executed by
himself, said Platt, on the same day in which he stated that diligent
search had been made for said Collins; that he could not be found; that
in his opinion he could be found within thirty days, and he therefore
prayed that Collins be allowed thirty days additional time in which to
make entry. In this affidavit Mr. Platt states that he received the
notice above mentioned, given by the register, on November 6, 1882,
the day of its issue. The register in his letter of December 12, 1882,
transmitted said affidavit to this office.
The thirty days allowed having expired, after notice duly given and
admitted as above set forth, on the following day, December 7, 1882,
John R. Thompson, having made application in due form, made timber-
culture entry No. 4331, embracing the tract aforesaid.
Stating in your letter of the 17th instant that you are attorney of
record in the case, you request that the notice sent Mr. Collins to enter
said land be revoked; that a new notice be issued and the same be sent
to you.
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't would seem from an examination of the records and papers that
when the decision of the honorable Acting Secretary was made known
to the local officersas per letter of October 27, 1882, that, through some
inadvertence on the part of the clerk having the case in charge, this
office failed to inform you by direct letter of the action taken. I am of
the opinion, however, that this inadvertence, if it may be so called ,is
of immaterial importance. It appears that Mr. Collins was not only
represented before this office by yourself, but also by a firm of attorneys
in Nebraska; and in such case, due notice having been given by the
local office to one of the attorneys there and upon which he appears to
have been vigilant as regards his and yourclient's interest, such notice
must be considered as given to each and all of the attorneys represent-
ing said Collins, as well as to said Collins himself, the principal.
From all the papers submitted regarding said case I am unable to
perceive that the failure to notify you in person at the time of the action
taken, October 27, 1882, has resulted in detriment either to yourself or
said Collins, and I have therefore to inform you that your application is
denied. In closing this letter your attention is invited to rule 106 of
the rules of practice.
TIMBER CULTURE ENTRY-AGENT.
JAMES CASSIDY.
The timber-cultnre law is explicit in its requirements, and the General Land Office
has no authority to modify its provisions or power to excuse any failure to com-
ply therewith on the part of a claimant. Neither can it he responsible for any
laches by an agent. It is immaterial whether the breaking, cultivating, and
planting required by the law be performed by the claimant i person or through
an agent; but, in either case, the claimant alone is held responsible for any failure
that may occur.
Commissioner MicFarland to Maj. Gen. W. B. Hazen, Washington, D. C.,
August 3, 1881.
I am in receipt, by reference from the honorable Secretary of the In-
terior, of your letter of the 20th ultimo, transmitting a communication
from Jas. Cassidy, sergeant Signal Corps, U. S. A., stating that he has
been ordered to Point Barrow, Alaska, and, in view of his enforced ab-
sence, requesting that be be not held responsible should his agent fail
to do the necessary breaking and planting on his tree claim in Dakota.
In reply, I have the honor to state that the timber-culture law is expli-
cit in its requirements; and this office has no authority to modify its
provisions or power to excuse any failure to comply therewith on the
part of a claimant. Neither can it be responsible for any laches by an
agent.
DECISIONS RELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS. 121
It is immaterial whether the breaking and planting required by said
act be performed by the claimant in person or through an agent, but,
in either case, the claimant alone is held responsible for any failure
that may occur.
This office has no discretionary power in the premises.
TIMBER CULTURE ENTRY-WIDOV AND HEIRS.
CHARLES KING.
Jinder the timber-culture law the rights of a deceased claimant go to the heirs and
not to the widow. A relinquishment to be recognized must be the act of all the
heirs, those, if any, over twenty-one years of age acting in person, and minors
through a guardian duly appointed by the proper probate court, and with full
power to act in the premises.
commissioner McFarland to register and receiver, Fargo, Dakota, August
6, 1881.
In reply to the register's letter of the 5th of January last, transmit-
ting a communication from H. S. Back, esq., relative to the case of
Charles King (deceased), who made timber-culture entry No. 2458, for
the SW. 1, Sec. 2, T. 133, R. 50, and asking what coturse the widow should
take in order to relinquish and dispose of the claim, you are advised
that under the timber-culture law the rights of a deceased claimant
inure to the heirs and not to the widow.
In this case a relinquishment to be recognized by this office must be
the act of all of the heirs, those, if any, over twenty-one years of age
acting in person, and minors through a guardian duly appointed by
the proper probate court, and with full power to act in the premises.
TIMBER CULTURE ENTRY-PRELIMINARY AFFIDAJIT.
DAVID I. MERRYMAN.
An affidavit accompan ing an application to make timber-culture entry is unobjec-
tionable because the date of execution thereof is prior to a relinquishment of
another entry on same tract. Regard, however, must be had to the time within
which it is received at the local office.
diommissioner McFarland to register and receiver, Grand Island, Nebraska,
August 23, 1881.
I am in receipt of your letter of the 5th ultimo, transmitting the
application of David -II. Mer-ryman, to enter, under the provisions of
the timber-culture law, the SW. , 24, 11, 15 W. It appears that on
the 27th of June, 1881, timber-culture entry No. 1919, made by David
Cool, was relinquished, and you canceled the entry upon the records
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of your office, on account of such relinquishment. Cool's entry covered
the tract herein indicated, and at the same time that the relinquishment
was filed, Merryman's application to enter the land was submitted, and
accompanying said application was the affidavit required in such entries,
but which bore date of June 20, 1881, it having been executed before
an officer legally qualified to administer oaths, in the county wherein
the land is situated, on said date.
In view of the fact that this affidavit was made seven days before the
land referred to became vacant and subject to entry, you held that you
had no authority to entertain it, and a new one should be made before
the party could be permitted to enter the land. You, therefore, re-
turned the affidavit, and called upon the party to submit a new one made
subsequent to the date of the cancellation of Cool's entry upon your
records.
Said affidavit, however, was returned to you with information that
Mr. Merryman left the State of Nebraska the day after he made the
same, and it would be a great hardship to require him to return at this
time for the purpose of making a new affidavit. You submit all the
papers to this office for instructions.
Relative thereto I will state that under date of December 22, 1877,
the Hon. Secretary of the Interior directed this office to issue a circular
of instructions to the local officers upon this subject, and accordingly on
the 8th of January, 1878, an official circular was issued, Copp's Land-
Owner, Vol. 4, p. 167, in which you were instructed not to recognize affi-
davits where you knew them to have been actually made by the appli-
cant at a date prior to the time when the land applied for was legally
liable to disposal by you." In view of these instructions you acted cor-
rectly in refusing to entertain Merryman's affidavit, and you are fully
sustained in said action by this office, but, in view of the passage of the
act of May 14,1880, entitled an "Act for the relief of settlers on pub-
lic lands," I am of the opinion that the instructions referred to should
be modified.
In my opinion this act of May 14, 1880, may safely be construed to
make the simple fact of filing a relinquishment equivalent to cancella-
tion, and you are, therefore, authorized to accept applications received
simultaneously with relinquishments, whether by letter from the appli-
cant himself or through the hands of an attorney, provided always that
the application and affidavit are received within a reasonable time from
the date they bear, with reference to the time required for transmission.
It is to be understood, therefore, that an application and affidavit can
be accepted by you, when they bear a date prior to the date when the
cancellation is made at your office, but such papers should, in all cases,
be received at your office within a reasonable time from their date, as
above indicated.
Mr. Merryman's application is herewith returned and you will allow
the entry.
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/ TIMBER CULTURE-CULTIVATION.
CHAPTIIAN V. ZWECK.
Breaking is frequently done in Colorado without irrigation. A party taking up land,
in the arid country, without the means of complying with the stringent provisions
of the law, does so at his own risk. Cultivation of trees, according to the law,
would entitle a party to the relief provided, in the event of destruction of the
trees by extreme and unusual drought.
Commissioner McFarland to register and receiver, Denver, Colorado, Octo-
ber 24, 1881.
I have considered the testimony, received with your letter of the 12th
of last May, in the contested case of Clarence J. Chapman v. George
Zweck, involving the timber-culture entry of the latter, No. 98, Sep-
tember 19, 1877, for NE. Sec. 20, T. 4 N., . 69 W.
The contestant alleged in substance that claimant had failed to per-
form any act of timber culture, as required by the act of June 14,1878,
during the second and third years from date of entry. You decided
that the allegation had been sustained, and from your decision defend-
ant took an appeal.
A consideration of the appeal will involve a statement of the material
points brought out on trial. In an exhaustive argument for defendant,
John S. Hauke, esq., while admitting that Zweck failed to break any
land embraced in the entry during the second and third years after
entry, or plant trees during said period, urges that the contest should
be dismissed because, first, the affidavit of contest first filed charged
" abandonment" for twelve months prior to initiation of contest; and,
second, because the amendatory affidavit charged failure to comply
with the timber-culture act of June 14, 1878, notwithstanding that the
entry was made in 1877, under the act of 1874; and, third, because the
failure of Zweck should be regarded as not willful, but unavoidable by
reason of lack of water to irrigate, and the drought prevailing in Col-
orado in 1879 and 1880.
The first point is well taken. Twelve months prior to initiation of the
contest embraced only portions of the third and fourth years after entry.
This being the fact, I need not consider any further points connected
with this affidavit.
The second point should not, in my opinion, be sustained. A party
having made a timber-culture entry, under the act of 1874, may make
final proof under the act of 1878, byshowing that he has had a specified
number of growing trees on each acre of the number of acres required
to be planted by-the latter act. The first year after entry had not ex-
pired when the act of 1878 was approved. The party, having broken
about five acres, in 1878, contented himself with having done that'much.
If he intended to comply with the act of 1874. and thus be entitled to
plant trees the year following the breaking, instead of cultivating the
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hland to crop, or otherwise, the year following the breaking, as required
~by the act of 1878, why did he not break te acres the first year? Mr.
llauke argues that claimant has shown by his acts at the cbmmence-
-ment of the fourth year from entry that it was his intention to comply
with the act of 1874. I do not think this conclusion correct. Judging
by what claimant did the first year, he did not intend to bring his claim
under the provision of the act of 1874. He does not state, in his testi-
-mony, that he intended to do this. If we are to judge of his intentions
by his acts, there is more ground for the opinion that he intended to
-comply with the act of 1878 than there is that he intended to comply
with the act of 1874. Testimony as to what he performed the fourth
sear is not relevant to the issue. r. Hauke thinks the proceedings
should not have been aided by presumptions; that it should not have
been presumed by contestant that an entry made under the at of 1874
-could he attacked for failure to comply with that of 1878. Bt, the
-amendatory affidavit of contest charges that no cultivation had been
-performed during the second and third years. This charge, being
-proven, would involve a forfeiture of the claim under either act. The
-defendant acquiesced in a hearing based upon the amendatory affidavit
-of contest, and consented to a continuance and to go on with the hear-
ing without objection. Certainly, under these circumstances, the con-
testant is entitled to consideration of the case on the testimony ad-
-duced.
And in regard to the third point made by defendant's attorney, if it
be admitted that unusual drought prevailed in Colorado in the latter
part of 1879 and the entire year 1880, it does not excuse the claimant's
-failure to break the required amount the second year. Returning to
the testimony, it is found that the contestant and his witnesses de-
scribed what had been done upon the tract at the date of examination
-thereof by them in the latter part of the year 1880, and expressed their
-opinion that no breaking had been done within three years after entry,
except that erformed in 1878, and that no trees had been planted
within said period. Defendant admitted this and urged extenuating
-circumstances in defense. It is not alleged that unusual drought pre-
vailed in 1878, nor in the early part of 1879, yet no attempt was made
'to break any portion of the land during the second year. It is not
.shown that it was impossible to break during the second year. How did
be know that breaking could not be done the second year if he did not
make the attempt? Was it absolutely impossible to break land not un-
der ditch, in that locality, in the spring of 1879, upon the breaking up
-of winter? These are questions passed by without explanation by the
defense. I do not think that he can plead good faith when he stood
idly by awaiting the construction of an irrigating ditch at some uncer-
-tain time in the future. Breaking is frequently done in Colorado with-
~out irrigation. To do this requires a plow suitable for the purpose and
a powerful team. This is a fact well known. A party taking up land
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in the arid country without the means of complying with the stringent
provisions of the law does so at his own risk. This office, while trying
to administer the law fairly, cannot modify or change its imperative-
requirements, but must be governed by its provisions and the leading-
decisions of the Department thereunder.
Cultivation of trees according to the law would entitle a party to the
relief provided therein, in the event of destruction of the same by ex-
treme and unusual drought. The claimant in this case failed to bring
his claim underthis provision. Your decision is affirmed, and the entry-
is hereby held for cancellation.
TIMBER CULTURE-SECOND ENTRY.
W. A. LEWIS.
A party cannot be allowed to relinquish onetimiber-culture entry and thereafter maker
a second entry elsewhere.
Commissioner McFarland to T. A. Lewvis, Russell, Kansas, November 
5 r,
1881.
In reply to your letter of October 9, 1881, I have to inform you that-
there is no law under which this office can permit you to relinquish
your timber-culture entry No. 465 for the SW.-' of Sec. 8 in T. 11 S.,
R. 27 W., because you have been unsuccessful in growing timber, etc.,.
as required by the timber-culture act approved July 14, 1878, for the;
purpose of making a second entry elsewhere.
RELIN QUISHMEAT-ADDITIONAL EWTRY.
W. C. LATIMER.
A qualified party may relinquish a timber culture entry of eighty acres, and thereaf--
ter may enter the same under the act of March 3, 1879, as an additional entry, to
his original homestead entry, as described in this case, provided he is the first
legal applicant for the land so relinquished.
Commissioner McFarland to W. C. Latimer, Wilson, Kansas, November 7.
1881.
In reply to the inquiries contained in your postal of date September
28, 1881, I have to inform you as follows, viz:
1st. That if you have resided upon and cultivated the tract of land.
covered by your said homestead entry for the period required to per-
fect title under the homestead law, you may, after due publication of a,
notice of your intention to do so, make final proof thereon, in accord-
ance with the practice of this office under the act of Congress ap-
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proved May 14, 1880, i. e., crediting you with benefit of residence upon
the land prior as well as subsequent to the date of homestead entry.
2d. You may proceed under the first section of the act of Congress
approved May 14, 1880 (copy herewith), relinquish your said timber-
culture entry, containing 80 acres, and thereafter, if qualified to do so,
enter the land so relinquished as an additional entry to your original
.ionestead entry under the provisions of the act of Congress approved
March 3, 1879; provided, however, that you are the first legal applicant
for the land so relinquished, after the cancellation of the same upon the
records of the district land office.
TIMBER CULTU1E-BREAKING.
RICHARDSON . KNIGHT.
Where, as in this case, a timber-culture claimant honestly believed that he had broken
10 acres during the first two years, but which lacked a fraction of an acre of being
10 acres, his entry will not be disturbed.
Commissioner McFarland to register and receiver, Le Grand, Oregon,
November 22, 1881.
I am in receipt of your letter of July 13, 1881, transmitting the tes-
thnony in the matter of the contest initiated by Gardner D. Richardson
v. John Knight, who made timber-culture entry No. 164, December 20,
1878, for the E. of the SE. , and E. of NE. of Sec. 34, T. 3 N. of
IE. 32 E., Will. mer.
The contestant alleges in his affidavit, on which contest was initiated,
that claimant had failed to comply with the requirements of the statute
under which his entry was made, inasmuch as he did not break 10 acres
the first two years. The hearing was ordered for May 16, 1881, due
notice was given, and both parties appeared on the day set; the testi-
mony was taken and the case closed. On the 15th-of June, 1881, you
rendered your joint opinion, in which you held that the allegation of
failure to break the required number of acres had been clearly proven,
and the entry should be canceled. From your said decision the de-
fendant appeals to this office.
I find on examination of the testimony that the defendant broke more
than acres the first year; that he broke the second year what, accord-
ing to his judgment, made 10 acres, but which was found when meas-
ured by a surveyor to be 9.05 acres; that the cultivation the second
year was sufficient under the statute, and that the claimant labored
under very embarrassing circumstances. The evidence, in my opinion,
does not show such a state of facts as would justify me in the approval
of your decision, and the same is therefore overruled, the contest dis-
missed, and the entry will remain of record, subject to the required
proof at the proper time.
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The decisions of this office, and the Departm ent proper, in the cases
of Gepner v. Miller, and Gemmer v. Chandler (6 C. L. 0., 126), and
Lee v. Morgan (7 L, O., 39), are not considered to conflict with these
views, for while it is there stated that a fall compliance with the law
is required, yet I cannot construe that to mean an exact compliance
with every particular, as this construction would fail to " meet the in-
tentions of the law."
You will notify the parties in interest of this action, and advise the
contestant that he will be allowed sixty days in which to take an appeal,
and in due time make the proper report to this office.
TIMBER CULTURE ENTRY-MARRIED WOMAN.
MARY E. LOCKWOOD.
A married woman cannot make a timber-eulture entry under the act of June 14, 1878,
unless she has been deserted by her husband, or for some other good and sufficient
reason can be considered as the head of a family.
Commissioner McFarland to register and receiver, Le Grand, Oregon,
December 10, 1881.
You will call on the following-named parties who have made timber-
culture entries under the act of June 14, 1878, to furnish supplemental
affidavits. which must show whether or not they are married, as it is
held by this office that a married woman cannot make a timber-culture
entry unless she has been deserted by her husband, or for some other
reason can be considered as the head of a family. A single woman over
the age of twenty-one years, if a citizen, &c., may make a timber-cult-
ure entry. The affidavits submitted are not satisfactory as to these
points.
No. 603 by Mary E. Lockwood, for NW. 1 of Sec. 4, T. 1 N., R. 27 E.,
all in Willamette meridian.
TIMBER CULTURE ENTRY-BEIR-CULTIVATION.
COWAN V. WOODSIDE. *
Under the timber-culture laws, a father, as heir, can complete the entry of a deceased
son.
If, at the expiration of three years from date of entry, bnt few trees are growing, want
of cultivation should not be inferred therefrom.
Commissioner McFarland to register and receiver, Wichita, Kansas, Jan-
uary 6, 1882.
The case of George W. Cowan v. the heirs of Hugh Woodside before
this office on appeal from your decision -in favor of defendant, involves
timber-culture entry No. 796, on the SE. 4j Sec.. 6, T. 21 S., R. 3 W.
4This decision was affirmed by Secretary Teller, June 26, 1882.
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Said entry was made July 26, 1875, and the affidavit of contest filed
December 19, 1879.
From the testimony offered it appears that Hugh J. Woodside was an
invalid who went to Canada soon after he made the entry, and subse-
quently died there.
His father-claiming to be his heir-has had the management of his.
timber-culture claim since his death. Nofailure to break and cultivate
is shown; on the contrary, the testimony develops the fact that a large
area, thirty acres or more, was plowed and planted in 1876-'77, and 1878.
It however appears that there were but few trees upon the tract at the-
date of the commencement of the contest, and the allegation is, that it.
was the result of careless, improper planting and cultivation. I think
the testimony fails to fully substantiate the charges. The father of the:
original claimant testifies that trees or cuttings were planted upon more
than a sufficient area to comply with the law. He denies that the trees.
failed to grow, to a great extent, and that the ground had been replanted
each year up to the commencement of this case.
His testimony is largely corroborated by parties having knowledge.
of these operations, they having assisted therein.
But four full years had expired at the time the affidavitof contest was
filed, and consequently acts subsequent to that time cannot be consid-
ered.
The act of Jane 14, 1878, requires no planting until the third year,
hence to show a cause for forfeiture, failure to plant during the two years.
from July 26, 1877, to July 26,1879, should be shown, or neglect to prop-
erly cultivate and protect the trees up to the date of the initiation of the
contest.
Though, as before stated, the number of living trees upon the land
was small, it is well known that they often fail from causes beyond hu-
man control, and neglect must not be inferred from that circumstance.
I affirm your decision, and you will so advise the parties, and also




In timber-culture entries where the planting of trees on the first five acres have beenb
destroyed by drought and other causes, the same must be replanted the next suc-
ceeding year together with the breaking and planting of an additional five acres.
Commissioner ilicFarland to G. T. Co7, Porneroy, Iowa, January 9, 1882.
By your letter of the 26th ult., you state that last spring you planted
the first five acres required to be planted. on the tract covered by your
timber-culture entry, and on account of drought the timber trees planted
failed to grow, and you applied for an extension as provided by law,,
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and you desired to know whether you must next (this) year, in addition
to replanting the five acres thus destroyed, plant the second five acres
required by the law to be planted during the fourth year.
In reply you are advised that the extension referred to applies only
to the first five acres, and in order to hold the claim, you must comply
fully with the law and replant the first five acres, and also plant to
seeds, nuts, or cuttings the second five acres.
PRACTICE-B URDEN OF PROOF.
FLYNN V. STILES.
The burden of proof is upon the contestant to prove his allegations, or show that the
planting does not meet the requirements of the timber-culture law.
The testimony failing to prove non-compliance in this case, the contest is dismissed.
Secretary Kirkwood to Commissioner McFarland, February 8, 1882.
I have considered the case of Stephen Flynn v. Albert W. Stiles, in-
volving the latter's timber-culture entry of December 20, 1875, upon
the fractional SW. i of Sec. 30, T. 154, R. 50, Crookston, Mia., on ap-
peal by Stiles, from your decision of July 26, 1881, holding his entry
for cancellation. This entry was made under the act of March 13,1874,
and the contest was initiated October 17, 1879, upon Flynn's allegation
of Stiles' failure to comply with the requirements of the timber-culture
laws of March 13, 1874, or June 14, 1878.
The act of 1874 requires a party making a timber-culture entry of a
quarter section of public land to break ten acres thereof the first year,
ten acres the second year, and twenty acres the third after date of entry;
and to plant to timber ten acres the second year, ten acres the third
year, and twenty acres the fourth year, after date of entry.
The amendatory act of 1878 authorizes parties who have made entries
under the act of 1874 to complete the same under the former act, which
they may do by showing at the time of making their final proof that
they have had under cultivation, as required by the act of 1878, an
amount of timber sufficient make the number of acres required there-
by, being one-fourth the number required by the former act, and show-
ing, at that date, that they have on an entry for a quarter section
0,750 living and thrifty trees.
The testimony shows that, during the first year following his entry,
Stiles broke ten acres of the tract, and (according to his own testimony)
from eighteen to twenty acres the second year (ending December 20,
1877), and about eight acres in the spring of 1878-making in all about
thirty-seven acres. According to other testimony, his whole breaking
at the date of the contest amounted to but twenty-five acres. This dif-
ference is immaterial, because he was required to break but twenty
acres prior to December 20, 1877, and as his third year did not expire
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until December 20, 1878, he had complied with the requirement of the
law of 1874 when the act of June 14, 1878 took effect, under which lat-
ter law he could complete his entry. There was no laches, therefore,
on his part, under the act of 1874, in respect to breaking; and he had
also broken, at the date of the initiation of the contest, all that was re-
quired to be broken by the act of 1878.
The testimony also shows that, during his second year, he planted
ten acres to trees, which was all he was required to plant prior to De-
cember 20, 1877. His next year for planting dd not expire until
December 20, 1878, and in the mean while the act of June 14, 1878, took
effect, of which he could avail himself, and show upon his final proof
that, of the entire area embraced in his entry, he had cultivated in tim-
ber for the period required by the act of 1878 an area not less than one-
sixteenth part, and had, at that date, the prescribed number of living
and thrifty trees upon such cultivated area above named.
The testimony further shows that in 1877 he purchased several thou-
sand young trees for transplanting to his land, which in the fall of that
year were " heeled in " or buried, for temporary preservation, and that,
also, in the spring of 1878, he purchased other thousands, about three
thousand of which were planted near the line of his land. It does not
appear how many acres they covered. The burden of proof was upon
the contestant to show that this planting did not meet any requirement
of the law incumbent upon Stiles, which he fails to do.
I am of the opinion that Stiles complied with the law of 1874, to the
date of the act of 1878, and I find no proof that he not did comply with
the latter act down to the date of the initiation of the contest.
In view of the facts, and the apparent good faith of Stiles, I modify
your decision, and dismiss the contest.
TIMBER CULTURE ENTRY-C ULTIVATIOIV.
ENOCH W. POOR.
Under section 2 of the act of June 14, 1878, " cultivation" is such care and attention
as will best promote the healthy growth of trees; and if by properly mulching
them that end is obtained, it will be considered a compliance with the law
governing timber-culture cultivations.
Commissioner McFarland to Enoch W. Poor, Myrtle, Kansas, February
17, 1882.
I am in receipt of your letter of the 6th instant, in which you ask if
mulching the trees the first, second, or third years, instead of cultiva-
tion, would be considered a compliance with the requirements of the
timber-culture laws.
In reply I have to state that the act of June 14, 1878, after defining
how and at what time the trees, seeds, or cuttings shall be planted on
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land embraced in an entry under its provisions, provides that upon proof
that he, she, or they "have planted, and, for not less than eight years,
have cultivated and protected such quantity and character of trees as
aforesaid ..... " they shall receive a patent for the land.
The cultivation of the trees required by- the last proviso of section 2
of the act referred to, is such care and attention as would best promote
their healthy growth, and if by properly mulching them that end is ob-
tained, it will be considered as cultivation in the sense used in said pro-
viso. In fact, it would appear that in many localities such action would
be better than plowing or hoeing, as the ground would retain moisture
longer and there would be less danger of damage from frost.
The question of cultivating, mulching, or care of trees planted on a
timber-culture entry is one of fact, liable to be raised at any tine, and
unless a case should be roperly brought before this office, either in the
way of final proof or testimony submitted in case of contest, it cannot
be definitely determined whether or not the law has been complied with.
TIMBER CULTURE ENTRY-SINGLE WOMAN-MARBIAGE.
EFFIE J. THOMAS.
Where a single woman, after making and forwarding the required affidavit and ap-
plication to make timber-culture entry, marries before the entry is completed at
the local office, such entry will be legal if the law be fully complied with in other
respects.
Commissioner McFarland to S. H. Bradley, Kirwin, Kansas, February
18, 1882.
I am in receipt of your letter of the 25th ultimo, relative to the timber-
culture entry No. 1316, by Effie J. Thomas, for the NW. Sec. 26, T. 3,
R. 11 W., 6th P. M., of Kansas.
You state that on the 13th of December, 1877, Effie J. Thomas,
then a single person, and in every respect qualified to make a timber-
culture entry, made application and affidavit for the above-despribed
entry, before a notary public (duly commissioned) for ountydin which
the land is situated, and on the afternoon of the 13th December, 877,
subsequent to her making said application and affidavit, she married.
The papers in the case were sent by mail to the local office, and were
received and "platted" December 15, 1877, which is the date of her
timber-culture entry.
As attorney for the party, you ask to be advised whether the said
entry is valid, in view of the above statements of facts.
In reply, I have to state that the case is not now before me for adju-
dication, but if the applicant shall in all respects comply with the law,
it is my opinion that the entry will be held to be legal. I herewith in-
close a copy of the timber-culture affidavit of said Effie J. Thomas, on
file in this office, as requested by you.
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PRACTICE-SECO.AD CONTEST-COYD.ITIOx PBECEDENT.
SCHNEIDER V. BRADLEY.
The act of June, 1878, does not limit the right of contest to one person or to one con-
test, nor forbid a second when the first has not been sustained.
Such contest may be initiated, notwithstanding a former contest may have resulted
in favor of the claimant.
As a condition precedent to the right of an initiation of a second contest against the
same entry, the former case must have been finally adjudicated, and this state of
the case is not reached until determination of the question of appeal either by
waiver, by failure, or by prosecution to a final decision.
The rulings governing homestead contests govern timber-culture contests.
Commissioner McFarland to register and receiver, Des Moines, Iowa,
March 3, 1882.
I have considered the case of William Schneider v. Sidney S. Bradley,
involving the latter's timber-culture entry, No. 254 (Sioux City series),
made January 3, 1877, upon the N. of SE. I Sec. 28, T. 96, R. 42, on
appeal by the defendant from your decision adjudging said entry for-
feited, on the ground of non-compliance with the legal requirements.
The contest was initiated September 27, 1880, and the hearing ap-
pears to have been held before the clerk of the district court of O'Brien
County, Iowa, commencing on the 13th and terminating on the 16th day
of December following; the parties having been cited to appear before
said clerk in accordance, you report, with the ruling of this office which
sanctioned the taking of testimony in contest cases before any officer
authorized to administer oaths, upon proper notice to the defendant.
(W. T. S. May, 1 C. L. L., 251.)
In this you erred, for such was not the rule at the time Schneider
filed his complaint. The rights of parties in contested cases were then,
as now, determined upon evidence taken at trials before the register
and receiver. Depositions of witnesses could, however, under certain
circumstances, have been taken before an officer having the powers of
a magistrate or commissioner, but it was only allowed upon due appli-
cation to the local officers, and when the original notice fixed a day
certain for a hearing before the said officers. (Hon. Secretary's decis-
ion, case of Day v. Bright, reported in Hill's Leading Land and Mining
Cases, April, 1880, p. 23; and see also rules 33 and 35, Rules of Practice,
-approved December 20, 1880, and Commissioner's letter to register and
receiver, Concordia, Kans., August 2, 1880.)
The proceedings were, therefore, irregular, but as both parties ap-
peared at the place designated and no objection was made by the de-
fendant to the manner of the hearing, your action wi-l not be overruled
on that account.
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December 22, 1880, the testimony taken at the hearing, as above, was
received and reviewed by you, and on the same day you rendered your
decision in the ease.
It seems that at the date of initiation of said contest the entry in
question was in controversy in the case of E. B. Pike v. Sidney S. Brad-
ley, which was then pending before this office, on appeal from your de-
cision adverse to the defendant.
It also appears that said former case was dismissed by my decision
of Nb-veniber 4, 1880, and the plaintiff therein allowed sixty days within
which to appeal, and although you state, in reporting the case of Schnei-
der v. Bradley, that the parties in the former waived all right of appeal
from my said decision of November 4, 1880, and further represent that
written relinquishments of such right accompany the record in the case
of Schneider v. Bradley, a careful examination of all the papers trans-
mitted by you in the matter-fails to disclose any evidence of such re-
linquishments.
Besides, the action of the defendant, Bradley, in the second contest,
in moving a dismissal thereof on the ground of the Tendency of the for-
mer case, as mentioned below, would seem to negative the presumption
that any such waiver of right of appeal was made by the parties in the
former case.
In view of the premises and it appearing that when the case of
Schneider v. Bradley, now under consideration, was called for trial,
the defendant moved its dismissal on the ground that there was then
pending a contest filed by E. B. Pike v. Sidney S. Bradley, and the sixty
days allowed by law for appeal had not elapsed, the question arises as
to whether the case should have been allowed to proceed, as was per-
mitted, and the defendant compelled to adduce further testimony in
rebuttal of the additional charges.
The proceedings, you hold, were warranted by the ruling of the Hon.
Secretary in the case of Huls v. Yielding (7 . L. O., pp. 3,137), in which
it was held that the timber-culture act of June 14, 1878, does not limit
the right of contest to one person or to one contest.
In this view I do not concur, for the Hon. Secretary says in said case,
it will be noticed, that the act of June 1878 " does not limit the right of
contest to one person or to one contest, nor forbid a second when the
first has not been sustained . . . . . Such contest may be ini-
tiated, in my opinion, notwithstanding a former contest may have re-
sulted in favor of the claimant." Furthermore, when the second contest
against Yielding's entry was initiated the former case against it was not
in existence; that case had been dismissed and closed several months
previous.
On the other hand, when the case of Schneider v. Bradley was initi-
ated (September 27, 1880), no decision on the appeal of Bradley in the
former contest, then before this office, had been rendered.
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Clearly, then, the former case had not " resulted in favor of the claim-
ant," nor been unsustained, within the meaning of the Hon. Secretary's
ruling. In other woids, the true interpretation to be placed upon the
above quoted language of the Hon. Secretary is, I think, that as a con-
dition precedent to the right of initiation of a second contest against
the same entry, the former case must have been finally adjudicated,
and this state of a case is not reached, it is argued, until determination
of the question of appeal, either by waiver, by failure, or by prosecu-
tion to a final decision above.
And this view of the matter is strengthened, in my opinion, by the
Bon. Secretary's subsequent decision in the case of Van Ostrand v.
Lange, decided June 21, 1881.
In this latter case the Hon. Secretary sustained the action of this
office, in rejecting the application of Van Ostrand to contest the home-
stead entry of Lange because of the pendency of a prior contest.
I think the principles enunciated are clearly applicable to the present
case, and while it is true that but one of the decisions above adverted
to had regard to timber-culture contest, yet the views therein expressed
apply with equal force to timber-culture actions, for " the rulings gov-
erning homestead contests govern timber-culture contests." (Commis-
sioner's letter to C. B. Mayer, May 11, 1S75; Copp's Land Owner, June,
1875, p. 39.)
In the light of the foregoing rulings, I am of opinion that when a
prior contest against an entry, whether timber-culture or homestead,
has not been finally decided or disposed of at the date of initiation of
a further contest against the same entry, and on the day appointed for
trial of the second or further contest, a motion for its dismissal is made,
such motion is good in abatement and should be sustained.
But these views would not apply, however, where the second contest
had been initiated subsequent to the date on which the party in the
prior case filed his waiver of right of appeal.
Your decision in overruling the motion of the defendant in the case
of Schneider v. Bradley is, therefore, reversed, and said case is hereby
dismissed.
You will advise all parties in interest of this decision, allow sixty
days for appeal, and, at the proper time, report the action taken.
In this connection you are also instructed to report further relative
to the alleged waiver of right of appeal by the parties in the case of
Pike v. Bradley, so that appropriate action may be taken in that case
and the same regularly closed. Such waivers, if any there were, would
not, however, under the foregoing views, affect this decision.
[NOTE.-Dismissal of contest affirmed by the honorable Secretary
under decision of April 24, 1883.]
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TIMBER CULTURE-CULTIVATJONSECO.ND YEAR.
CHALLACOMBE V. HEOGUE.
Under the timber-culture act, the replowing during the second year of the five acres
broken the first year is considered as a compliance with the requirements of the
statute that the five acres broken the first year shall be " cultivated to crop or
otherwise during the second year.
Commissioner lJicFarland to register and receiver, Wa Keeney, Kansas,
larch 18, 1882.
With your letter of May 21, 1881, you transmit the testimony in the
case of John Challacombe v. Hiram M. Hogue, timber-culture entry No.
1701, October 14, 1878, NW. i Sec. 26, T. 18, R. 25.
The contest was initiated February 4, 1881, it being alleged in the
affidavit of contest that the defendant had not broken five acres during
the first year of his entry and had failed to cultivate the first five acres
during the second year to any kind of farm crops.
You decided, from the testimony submitted, that the allegation as to
the failure to break five acres during the first year was not fully or sat-
isfactorily sustained by the evidence, and that the five acres broken the
first year was replo wed the second year, but adjudged the entry forfeited
on the ground that the said five acres were not cultivated to any kind
of crop during the second year, as required by law.
Having examined the testimony in the case, I affirm your decision as
to the facts. Under the present ruling of this office, however, the re-
plowing during the second year of the five acres broken the first year is
considered as a compliance with the requirement of the statute that the
five acres broken the first year shall be " cultivated to crop or other-
wise" during the second year. (See case of Rhodes v. Avery, General
Land Office Report for 1881, p. 5.)
Your decision is modified accordingly, and the contest is dismissed.
TIMBER CULTURE-THIRD YEAR-PLATILTG.
IONDELBAUVX V. TURNER.
Where the claimant fails to do the prescribed planting on the tract or tracts embraced
in his timber-culture entry during the third year, the entry is forfeited.
Comnmissioner McFarland to register and receiver, Lincoln, N2ebraska,
M11arch 20, 1882.
The case of Mondelbaum v. Turner, before this office on appeal from
your decision in favor of the contestant, has been considered. The en-
try, T. C. No. 184, was made March 19,1874. Affidavit of contest filed
December 30, 1877. Upon the testimony taken at the original hearing,
this office, on the 10th of June, 1879, adjudged the entry forfeited.
October 13, following, a rehearing was authorized.
A very large amount of testimony was taken at various times and
after many postponements. Three complete years had elapsed when
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the contest was initiated. In order to be in a position to prove up
nder the provisions of the act of June 14, 1878, Turner need only have
planted five acres to trees, in addition to the proper breaking and cul-
tivating to crop. You found that defendant had done the required
amount of breaking, and in this view I concur, there being no doubt
that he had broken about 40 acres in 1874 and 1875. It is fully estab-
lished, also, that the required cultivation to crop was done. This nar-
rows the issue down to the question of the planting done during the
third year. It is, however, shown that Turner had been instrumental
in procuring a T. C. entry in the maiden name of his wife subsequent
to their marriage. Said entry, T. C. No. 592, was canceled by this office
September 21, 1877, it having been relinquished. As the law simply
provides that " no person shall make more than one entry under the
provisions of this act," Turner's entry cannot be affected thereby. The
loss of his rights under the T. C. act is not the penalty provided by
law, if any there be for such a transaction.
There is no doubt that Turner did some planting of cuttings during
the third year, i. e., the year expiring March 19, 1877. It also appears
certain that some of these cuttings lived. The preponderance of testi-
mony goes to show that the cuttings were set in sod land which had
not been replowed, and not in that portion of the tract which had been
cultivated to crop; that many of the cuttings were dead at the time
they were planted. I therefore conclude that Turner has failed to com-
ply with the law, and affirm your decision adjudging the entry forfeited.
TIMBER C ULTUBE EXTRY-WIDOW-HEIRS.
GEORGE TAYLOR.
The timber-culture entry of a deceased party can be relinquished only by the heirs or
legal representatives. A widow or administrator can alone relinquish when shown
to be the sole heir of the party deceased. How heirs may relinquish a timber
culture entry.
Commissioner McFarland to register and receiver, Benson, Minnesota,
March 21, 1882.
On September 18, 1873, George Taylor made timber culture entry No.
18, for SE. Sec. 30, T. 116, R. 32.
August 2, 1881, Frank Taylor, the duly appointed administrator of
the estate of George Taylor, deceased, appeared before the clerk of the
district court in and for the county in which the land is situated, and,
pursuant to a special order issued by the probate judge of said county
for the purpose of enabling him to do so, proceeded to execute a relin-
quishment of the timber-culture entry.
On the same day he executed before said clerk a homestead affidavit
and filed an application to enter the land embraced in the timber-cult-
ure entry in his own right. The relinquishment and homestead papers,
with amount required as fee and commissions, were transmitted to your
office and became matters of record therein August 15, 1881. The re-
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linquishment was reported by you on the date last mentioned under act
of May 14, 1880, and the homestead entry was reported in your returns
for August, 1881, as having been made on the 15th of that month and
numbered 11084.
The proceedings in this matter respecting the relinquishment of the
timber-culture entry and the initiation of the homestead entry were all
irregular and without warrant in law. The timber-culture entry of a
deceased person can be relinquished only by those authorized by law
to make final proof thereon and complete the same; that is, " the heirs
or legal representatives" of the deceased entry party. The right of a
widow or administrator to make final proof or execute a relinquishment
in a timber-culture entry, in the event of the death of the entry party,
cannot be recognized, unless he or she shall be found to be at law the
sole heir of the deceased.
The relinquishment in the case under consideration should not have
been accepted by you, as it does not contain evidence that the party
executing it was the sole heir of the deceased party, or that he is one
of the heirs.
*The original affidavit in this entry shows the entry party to have been
the head of a family, and direct heirs may still be living. The party in
interest will be allowed sixty days in which to show cause why his
homestead entry No. 11084 should not be canceled, and the timber-cult-
ure entry No. 18 reinstated, subject to the right of the " heirs or legal
representatives" of George Taylor, deceased, to make final proof. In-
form him respecting the contents of this letter, and at the proper time
report to this office whether any action has been taken in the premises.
Should the heirs of a deceased timber-culture entry-man desire to re-
linquisl his entry, it will be necessary that all and each of such heirs
shall be identified-a certificate from the proper probate court being
deemed the best evidence upon this point-and the relinquishment must
be duly executed and properly signed by each of said heirs.
TIMBEER CULTVRE EXTRY-TIME-4GENT.
GAIAN v. GARRETT.
In a timber-culture entry there is no restriction upon an entryman as to the time
when the work must be done, provided it is done -within the required limit.
The work can be done by the entryman, his agent, or his vendor.
If one purchases land which has been in whole or in part broken, planted, or culti-
vated by another, the spirit of the law is as fully met as if he had personally
performed the work.
Secretary Teller to Commissioner McFarland, April 1, 1882.
I have considered the case of M. J. Gahan v. James M. Garrett, in-
volving the latter's timber-culture entry of February 7, 1876, upon the
NE. i of Sec. 4, T. 12 N., R. 8 IV., Grand Island, Nebr., on appeal by
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Garrett from your decision of July 8, 1881, holding his entry for cancel.
lation for failure to comply with the requirements of the laws.
It appears that Gahan instituted a contest against this entry May
25, 1878, which, in view of the testimony, you dismissed July 31, 1879.
Gahan did not appeal from this action, but on A ugust 14, following, in-
stituted another contest against Garrett for substantially the same rea-
sons alleged in his first. Garrett's laches, therefore, if any, prior to the
initiation of the first contest should strictly be held res judicata in the
consideration of the present case. The testimony, however, at the sec-
ond hearing travels confusedly through the same matter involved in the
the first hearing, and I will consider the whole question as if this were
the only contest.
The testimony shows that Garrett, prior to his entry, purchased the
improvements upon and the possessory right to the tract of a former
timber culture claimant, who had broken and planted to trees seven
acres, and broken enough other land to amount in all to about 40 acres.
In 1877 he replanted the missing trees on the seven acres, plowed the
ground between the trees, and broke about four other acres on which
strips had been previously broken. In1878he planted additional trees,
so that, at the date of the first contest, as also at the date of the second,
he had about 13 acres of trees planted and cultivated, and in a thrifty
condition.
Garrett's entry was made under the act of March 13, 1874, but the
amendatory act of June 14, 1878, entitles him to all its benefits. This
act requires a person making an entry of a quarter-section to break or
plow five acres of the tract during the first year following his entry, and
five acres during the second year; to cultivate by crop or otherwise
during the second year the five acres broken the first year, and plant
the same to timber during the third year; to cultivate during the third
year the five acres broken the second year, and plant the same to tim-
ber during the fourth year.
Garrett had under plow and planted to trees, prior to the initiation of
either contest, more than the ten acres he was required to break and
plant by this act. There is no restriction upon an entryman as to the
time when the work must be done, provided it is done within the re-
quired time. He may do it in advance of the required time, and the
law will be satisfied. Garrett is, therefore, in no default in this respect,
as he had 13 acres broken and planted when the present contest was
commenced. Nor was he required to break land before unbroken, but
he could avail himself of that plowed and planted by his vendor, pro-
vided he replowed and cultivated and replanted the same land.
The object of the law is "to encourage the growth of timber," and
this purpose is accomplished whether the work be performed by the
entryman, his agent, or his vendor. It is not a mere personal require-
ment, and if one purchases land which has been in whole or i part
broken, planted, and cultivated by another, the spirit or intent of the
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law is as fully met as if he had personally performed the work. The
principle is aualogoustothat in Lansdalev. Daniels (10 Otto, 113), where
the court says, speaking of a pre-emptor, " it is immaterial whether he
built the dwelling-house himself or hired an agent to erect it for him, or
whether he purchased it after it was built by another, provided it ap-
pears be was the lawful owner of the dwelling-house and made the entry
and settlement in good faith, and continues to occupy and cultivate the
land as required by the pre-emption laws."
I am of the opinion that Garrett has complied with the requirements
of the act of June 14, 178, and therefore reverse your decision.
TIMBEI CULTURE-PLANTING-SLIGHT FAILURE.
KENNEDY . OLSON. I
The entry in this case should not be canceled for the slight failure on the part of the
defendant in the matter of not having planted within the required time the re-
quisite number of trees or cuttings, prompt action having been taken on his part
in doing the planting immediately thereafter. The facts show a substantial com-
pliance with the requirements of the timber-culture laws.
Commissioner ecFarland to register and receiver, Benson, Minnesota,
April , 1882.
I have considered the case of James A. Kennedy v. Andrew Olson,
involving the timber culture entry of the latter, No. 680, dated May 11,
1877, embracing the NE. 4 See. 2, T. 119, R. 39, the record having been
transmitted in your letter of April 22, 1881. The contest in this case
was initiated December 8, 1880, the charges being that defendant has
wholly abandoned said tract and failed to plant 10 acres of trees thereon
since making said entry, and that said tract is not cultivated by said
party as required by law. The trial took place before you on the 20th
of January, 1881, all the parties being present.
In your joint report and opinion you found, from the testimony, that
during the summer of 1877 the defendant broke about 10 acres of the
tract embraced in his entry aforesaid, and that he cropped the same
during the season of 1878; that in 1879 he cropped one-half of the cul-
tivated land, and summer-fallowed the remaining portion, and plowed
the whole of it during the fall of that year; that in the spring of 1880
he dragged or harrowed it, and on May 9, 1880, he planted 9,400 cotton-
wood cuttings and 150 soft-maple trees; that this lanting exhausted
his supply of trees and cuttings, and during the following week he
planted 4,000 cottonwood cuttings and 250 soft-maple trees, making in
all 13,800 cuttings and trees; that most of the cuttings have died, but
the trees all lived; that defendant cultivated the trees during the sum-
mer, but at the time he should have cultivated the cuttings he was
prevented from doing so by reason of the sickness of his wife, which
culminated in her death July 31, 880.
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You decided that, under the circumstances as developed by the tes-
timony, defendant had made a reasonable compliance with the require-
ments of the law, and that the contest should be dismissed.
Having rendered your decision on March 3, 1881, you report that
on the same day you duly notified the plaintiff by mail, addressing him
at Montevideo, Chippewa County, Minn, and advised him of his right
of appeal. Attached to the record is the appeal of plaintiff from your
decision, service of which was admitted by defendant's attorneys 'i arch
18, 1881, but said appeal was not filed in your office until April 1,
1881, a period of forty-seven days after the date you rendered your
decision. On the back of said appeal, defendant's attorneys, at Benson,
on the 21st of April, 1881, made an ndorsement to the effect that they
had no objections to the same being filed in time. Such having been
the action of defendant's attorneys, I have deemed it proper to consider
said appeal.
-A review of the record shows that the plaintiff admits the breaking
by defendant of ten acres of the land in controversy, in 1877, and the
cropping of the same in 1378 and 1879. Plaintiff also admits that, on
the 9th of May, 1880, two days before the third year of the entry expired,
defendant, with assistance, planted 9,400 cuttings and one hundred and
fifty trees, covering in all a space of three or four acres, and that he re-
turned in one week and planted 4,000 cuttings and two hundred and
fifty trees on another part of the prepared ground.
Taking into consideratiom the aforesaid admissions and all the facts
elicited at the trial, and there appearing to have been such a slight
failure on the part of the defendant to meet the full and exact require-
ments of the law during the third year of his entry, I am of the opinion
that it would not be within the intent or spirit of the law to hold the
aforesaid entry for cancellation for such slight failure as shown by the
testimony.
Your decision is therefore affirmed.
PRCTrICE-CONTEST AFFIDA VIT-CORROBORATIOS.
SCHOFIELD V. COLE.
A hearing should not be granted where the corroborating witness swears to the facts
set forth as true " to the best of his information and observation."
Comnissioner McFarland to register and receiver, Kirwin, Kansas, ilfay
13, 1882.
I have considered the case of W. 1. Schofield v. George N. Cole, in-
volving timber-culture entry No. 970, on SW. 2, 7, 14, on appeal by
the plaintiff from your decision dismissing the case.
It appears that at the date set forhearing-January 18, 1882,-both
parties appeared, and when the case was called the defendant's counsel
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moved a (lisLiissl of the same for the reason that the affidavit of con-
test and that of the corroborating witness do not set forth sufficient
grounds to warrant the granting of a hearing. You sustained the mo-
tion and dismissed the case; wherefore the plaintiff appeals to this
office.
The main point in issue and the one upon which it appears your action
nvas based, is, whether the averment contained in the affidavit of the
plaintiff's corroborating witness-that the allegations embraced in the
affidavit of contest are true " to the best of his information and obser-
vation," is a sufficient substantiation of the plaintiff's chargestowarrant
the ordering of a hearing.
That hearsay evidence is inadmissible is a rule of law too familiar to
require discussion. Hence, what the corroborating witness swears to
through information cannot be accepted. Nor is belief derived from
observation alone a sufficient corroboration. While it may be true that
without observation an actual knowledge of the condition of the land
cannot be obtained, yet, to be entitled to any weight, the belief derived
from the observation made should be verified by actual measurement
and counting of the number of acres broken, cultivated, or planted.
Besides, the observation may have been restricted-may not have been
had with regard to the whole area of the land. It is, at most, deceptive
and unreliable. Hence I think that your action in dismissing the case
oil the grounds of insufficiency of affidavit of corroborating witness to
affidavit of contest was proper; consequen tly it is hereby approved, and
you will so advise the parties, allowing the usual privilege of appeal.
TIMBER CULTUBE-BREAKING-DROUGHT.
TRITAX V. SEXPBER.
A season of drought cannot excuse the entryman from doing the breaking required by
the timber-culture laws.
Secretary Teller to Commissioner McFarland, June 30, 1882.
I have considered the case of James W. Truax v. Charles S. Semper,
involving the NE. of Sec. 24, T. 2 S., It. 69 W., Denver district, Col-
rado, on appeal by the latter from our decision of August 25,1881
holding his entry for cancellation.
It appears from the record that Semper made timber-culture entry
No. 359 of the tract, January 22, 1880, under the provisions of the act
of June 14, 1878 (20 Stat., 113).
Under date of March 21, 1881, Truax initiated contest against said
entry, alleging failure on the part of Semper to break or plow five acres
during the first year, as required by the second section of the act. Hear-
ing was had April 28 ensuing, when both parties appeared with their
witnesses. Thecontestant's allegations were sustained by the testimony,
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and Semper himself admits the truth of the same, but pleads the uu-
pi ecedeuted drought during the spring and summer of the year 1880,
in extenuation of his failure to comply with legal requirements. The
interposition of such plea can avail him nothing, as the only relief pro-
vided for by the act in question is contained in the first proviso of the
said section, to wit:
That in case such trees, seeds, or cuttings shall be destroyed by grass-
hoppers, or by extreme or unusual drought, for any year or term of
years, the time for planting such trees, seeds, or cuttings shall be ex-
tended one year for every such year that they are so destroyed.
Manifestly such relief cannot be applied to Semper, who is, by reason
of his laches, precluded from invoking the same.
Your decision is accordingly affirmed.
TIMBER CULTURE CONTEST-DEFA ULT CURED.
GALLOWAY V. WINrSTON.
There is no distinction between the requirements of the pre-emption and timbeir-cul-
ture law as respects the principle of their requirements. The one requires the
party to file his declaratory statement within a certain time, and the other requires
that certain work shall be performed within a limited time.
The court declares that, notwithstanding the statute, if the pre-emptor files his de-
claratory statement after the required time, but before another claim has inter-
vened, his right will be saved, because it is ten a question between the govern-
ment and the party only, and no one is harmed.
The object of the law-the growth of timber-is attained if at the date of final proof
the party has growing on the land the required number of thrifty trees.
Although an entry is subject to contest whenever the party is in default, there is no
valid reason for subjecting him thereto when the fault is cared.
The honest efforts of entrymen will be guarded by the Department.
Secretary Teller to Commissioner McFarland, July 24, 1882.
I have considered the case of H. H. Galloway v. Byron C. Winston,
involving the latter's timber-culture entry made September 24, 1877,
upon the S. W. I of Sec. 2, T. 139, R. 80, Bismarek, Dakota, ol appeal
by Winston from your decision of August 25, 1881, holding his entry
for cancellation for failure to comply with the requirements of the law.
This contest was initiatedSeptember 25,1880,upoa allegations that
Winston had " not broken up and planted to trees the number of acres
required by law," but the only seriously litigated question relates to
Winston's failure to break the number of acres required the first year
after his entry. The entry was made under the act of March 13, 1874
(18 Stat., 21), which requires a party making an entry of a quarter-sec-
tion to break ten acres of the land, covered thereby, during the first
year following the date of his entry.
The amendatory act of June 14, 1878, reduces the number of acres
required to be broken or plowed during the first year, on a like entry,
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to five acres, and authorizes one making an entry under the former act
to complete it under the latter. It is not necessary, in this case, to con-
sider the relation of the two acts to each other, in their practical opera-
tion, because Winston was deficient in his work the first year, under
both acts, the testimony showing that he broke about three and a half
acres only during that year.
Your decision holds that, as the statute is imperative in its require-
ment as to the first year's work, and this was not done by Winston, his
entry should be canceled, and you cite rulings of this Department in
support of that general proposition. After careful consideration of the
question involved, and the peculiar facts of the case. I think your decis-
ion was erroneous, and that this and cases hereafter arising on similar
-facts should be disposed of inder the analogous doctrine held by the
supreme court in the case of Johnson v. Towsley (13 Wall., 72).
In discussing pre-emption rights under the act of March, 1843 (Sees.
2265-6, Revised Statutes), which requires a claimant to file his declara-
tory statementwithin three monthsfrom thetime of his settlement, "other-
ise his claim shall be forfeited," and the tract awarded to the next set-
tler in the order of time, on the same tract of land, who has given such
notice and otherwise complied with the conditions of the law, and it
having been argued that as Towsley did not file his declaration within
three months from the time of settlement, his claim was forfeited and
gave him no right, the court held that the words "shall have given such
notice" presuppose a case where some one has given such notice before
the party who has thus neglected seeks to assert his right. "If no other
party has made a settlement or has given notice of such intention, then
no one has been injured by the delay beyond three months; and if at
any time after the three months, while the party is still in possession, he
makes his declaration, and this is done before any one else has initiated
a right of pre-emption by settlement or declaration, we can see no pur-
pose in forbidding him to make his declaration, or in making it void
when made. And we think that Congress intended to provide for the
protection of the first settler by giving him three months to make his
declaration, and for all other settlers by saying if this is not done
within three months any one else who has settled On it within that time,
or at any time before the first settler makes his declaration, shall have
the better right. As Towsley's settlement and possession were continu-
ous, and his declaration was made before Johnson or any one else as-
serted claim to the land or made a settlement, we think his right was
not barred by that section, under a sound construction of its meanings"
There is no material distinction between the requirements of the pre-
emption and the timber-culture law, as respects the application of this
principle. The one requires the party to file his declaratory statement
within a certain time, and the other requires that certain work shall be
performed within a limited time. But the court holds that, notwith-
standing the statute, if the pre-emptor files his declaratory statement
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after the required time, but before another claim has intervened, his
right will be saved, because it is then a question between the govern-
ient and the party only, and no one is harmed. I see no reason why
this principle should not be equally applied to the timber-culture law,
and prevent forfeiture of an entry, if, before contest and the interven 
tion of an adverse claim, the party has cured the deficiency in the first
year's work, by putting the land in the required condition, as to plow-
ing, cultivation, and the planting of trees or seeds, so that at the date
of the initiation of the contest, it is in the same condition it would have
been had the first year's work been duly performed.
The testimony shows that Winston, being a non-resident of Dakota,
employed his agent there to break five acres of the tract during the
first year, ending September 2, 1878-being the amount required by
the act of 1878, of which act he had the right to avail himself; that this
agent employed and paid another to do such work, who represented
that he had broken the five acres, whereas, in fact, he broke but about
3J acres. During the next year, ending September 24, 1879, Winston
plowed 25 acres, of which, including said 31-acres, he put about 15 acres
into crops; and that during the third year, ending September 24, 1880,
20 acres of plowing, done in the spring of that year, were " back-set "
in the fall; and that, also, in the same spring, 23 acres of the land
plowed the second year were put into crops, eight or nine more acres
were broken, and five acres were planted to trees; so that at the date of
the initiation of the contest, September 25, 1880, the land was in the con-
dition required by law, notwithstanding Winston's failure in the require-
ments of the first year's work. As the pre-emptor's rights are saved,
by filing his declaratory statement before attachment of another's claim,
so, I think, under the same principle, should a timber-culture entry be
saved, if the land is in the required state at or before the initiation or
the contest, and the party has acted in good faith, without speculative
purposes, and with an honest purpose to observe the legal duties inctin-
bent on him.
The object of the law-the growth of timber-is attained if at the
date of final proof the party has growing on the land the requirednum-
ber of thrifty trees. Although, undoubtedly, an entry is subject to con-
test whenever the party is in default, I see no valid reason for subject-
ing him thereto after the default is cured. A different rule would
permit designing persons, with knowledge of the first year's default, to
wait until near the time for final proof before initiating a contest, for
the very purpose of availing themselves of the entryman's farther labor
and improvements instead of initiating it during the continuance of
the default, and would countenance a practice against equity and not in
accordance with the principle announced in Johnson v. Towsley. Such
indefensible practice is well illustrated in the present case, where it ap-
pears that Galloway well knew of Winston's deficiency the first years
and then measured the land plowed, for the very purpose of a future
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contest, and also permitted himself to be employed by Winston the
second year in breaking and cultivating the land, for which he was paid
$147 and a span of horses, but delayed his contest until expiration of
the third year, when Winston had expended large means in improving
the tract, and when he had cured his laches of the first year. A con-
struction which admits of such conduct should not, in my opinion, be
longer adhered to.
If, on the other hand, a contest is allowable only when the party is
in default, the administration of the law will be equally effective, and
the honest efforts of entrymen will be guarded against the endeavors
of unscrupulous parties to rob them of their nearly completed titles.
The growth of timber on timberless land is an object of national as well
individual interest; and so long as an entryman in good faith meets
the requirements of the law with substantial accuracy, and his deficien-
cies are technical merely without intent to avoid any duty imposed
upon him, his laches should be leniently regarded. When, however, it
appears that his entry is for speculative purposes, and with dishonest
intent, and he fails to meet the requirements of the law, it matters not
how soon he is subjected to contest, and the land appropriated by one
more worthy of the generosity of the government.
As Winston's entry was not at the date of the initiation of the con-
test under any default, except his failure to comply with the require-
ments of the first year's work, which had been then cured, I reverse
your decision, and allow his entry to stand.
CONTEST-RELINQUISHMENT-PREFERENCE RIGHT.
HIEAsKINs V. NICHOLS.
Without reference to the fact that the allegation is that the timber-culture entry was
illegal at inception, the contestant-the entry having been transferred and relin-
quished, and no claim made under the transfer-is allowed the preference right
of entry.
Secretary Teller to Commissioner McFarland, August 1, 1882.
I have considered the appeal of Susan R. J. Buck from your decision
of July 12, 1881, allowing Edward Haskins to enter the tract in dispute,
under the second section of the act of May 14, 1880.
It appears that Peter Nichols made timber-culture entry of the NW.
J of Sec. 6, T. 8 S., R. 2 W., Concordia, Kans., September 21, 1876, and
that on M1ay 12, 1879, Haskins initiated a contest against the same, alleg-
ing Nichols' failure to comply with the law in respect to breaking and
planting the land, and that, also, the tract was not subject to a timber-
culture entry, because not devoid of timber. He also applied, at the
same time, to enter it under the homestead law, as a preferred claimant.
The local officers rejected this claim for the reason that a preferred right
20309-VOL 1--10
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cannot be acquired upon allegation and proof of the illegality of a tim-
ber-culture entry.
Without reference to the question of the illegality of said entry it is
sufficient for the purposes of this decision that the testimony shows
Nichols' failure to comply with the requirements of the law.
Susan R. J. Buck was permitted to become a party to the contest,
having filed affidavit that she had bought the'improvements on the
tract from said Nichols, her father; and it appears that about the mid-
dle of April or the 1st of May, 1879, he transferred to her, for her sole
use and benefit, his claim to the land and improvements, but without
any money consideration; and thereafter, on May 16 following, he filed
in the local office his relinquishment of the tract, in the expectation
that she would make claim thereto, which she has not done; for the
reason, probably, that (as appears from affidavits filed since the hearing).
she has married. As e parte affidavits these cannot be considered.
But it is sfficient that she has not made any claim of record, without
inquiry into the reasons therefor.
As Haskins commenced his contest prior to Nichols's relinquishment
of the tract, the relinquishment relieved him from producing evidence
in support of his allegation, and he had the right to continue the con-
test to final determination, and thus secure a preference right to enter
the tract, as held in Johnson v. Halvorson (Copp, July, 1881).
Being, therefore, the first and only applicant for the tract, and hav-
ing duly prosecuted his contest, he is entitled to the benefit of the sec-
ond section of the act of May 14, 1880, and his preferred right of entry
must be allowed.
Your decision is affirmed.
TIMBER CULTURE CONTEST-PROOF-AGENT.
(S J EWING V. RICKARD.
/In a cont4sei timber-culture entry where the entryman, endeavors in good faith to,
comply with legal requirements in point of breaking or having the requisite
amount done within the prescribed statutory period by an agent, though the agent
fails in the performance, the laches is cured if the entryman takes the necessary
steps to procure the performance of the same before the initiation of a contest.
In a proceeding involving forfeiture, the same strictness of proof is invariably required
as under a penal statute. The whole burden is on the party alleging want of
compliance, and the acts of abandonment or failure to comply with legal require-
ments must be affirmatively shown.
Secretary Teller to Commissioner J3fcFarland, October 9, 1882.
I have considered the case of William E1. Ewing v. L. M. Rickard,
involving timber-culture entry No. 257, made by the latter June 24,
1876, on the SE. of Sec. 18, T. 24 N., R. 4 W., Norfolk district,
Nebraska, on appeal by him from your predecessor's decision of March
29, 1881, adjudging his entry forfeited.
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It appears that Rickard made the entry in question under the pro-
visions of the act of March 13, 1874 (18 Stat., 21); that Ewing initiated
contest against the same on April 22, 1879, alleging Rickard's abandon-
ment of and failure to settle upon and cultivate the tract as required by
law, and that Ewing also filed his application to enter said tract.
Notice was first published the same day, and the hearing was had
May 19th ensuing, when both parties appeared.
The testimony shows that no breaking was done until July 17, 1877,
when one Thomas Eberly commenced to break about ten acres of the
land; that the breaking was fairly done; that trees were first planted
in April, 1878, but the ground was not properly prepared therefor; that
corn was planted with the trees, but it was neither cultivated nor har-
vested; that the first ten acres were replanted in the spring of 1879,
and the trees planted in 1878 were ploved up and reset. The act in
question requires entrymen of a quarter section thereunder to break or
cause to be broken ten acres of the land thus entered daring the first year
following the date of such entry. The amendatory act of June 14, 1878
(20 Stat., 114), reduces this number to five acres, and authorizes a claim-
ant under the former act to complete his entry pursuant to the require-
ments of the latter act. It will thus be seen that both of said acts
require that the breaking be done during the first year after entry
thereunder.
Rickard interposes a plea of confession and avoidance, admitting his
failure to comply literally with the said requirements, but alleging in
extenuation of such failure that he was necessarily absent from his claim,
running a ferry-boat across the Niobrara River from April to the sum-
mer of 1877; that he had an agreement with W. H. Duncan-one of the
contestant's witnesses-to break the requisite 10 acres prior to June,
1877; that he first learned July 5, 1877, upon his return to his claim,
that the breaking had not been done, and thereupon made arrangements
the next day with Thomas Eberly to have the requisite breaking done.
Duncan admits having had some conversation on the subject with
defendant, but states that there was only a verbal or partial agreement,"
no time for the breaking having been specified; that he neither knew
when the defendant made his entry nor when the breaking should have
been done, and that he never fulfilled such agreement.
It further appears that about the middle of June, 1877, while defend-
ant was on the Niobrara, he wrote to Duncan advising him when the
breaking should be done, and requesting him to do it forthwith. Dun-
can, however, denies having received such letter; on the other hand,
one J. A. Gilbert testifies in behalf of the defendant that he delivered a
letter to Duncan's wife, purporting to have been written by defendant.
Duncan's testimony must be regarded as an express admission of a con-
versation had with the defendant, and as corroborative of the latter testi-
mony touching said agreement between himself and Duncan.
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Thus it appears that Rickard endeavored in good faith to comply with
legal requirements in point of breaking or having the requisite amount
of breaking done within the prescribed statutory period; and that so
soon as he learned that such breaking had not been performed by his
agent, Duncan, he immediately thereafter took the necessary steps to
procure the performance of the same. This was done and his laches cured
before the initiation of contest.
The object of the law-the growth of timber-is attained if at the date
of final proof the party has growing on the land the required number of
thrifty trees. Although undoubtedly an entry is subject to contest
whenever the party is in default, I see no valid reason for subjecting
him thereto after default is cured. (Glalloway v. Winston, The Reporter,
Vol. 2, page 121.)
In a proceeding involving forfeiture the same strictness of proof is
invariably required as under a penal statute. The whole burden is on
the -party alleging want of compliance, and the acts of abandonment or
failure to comply with legal requirements must be affirmatively shown.
This Ewing has failed to show, and the contest is therefore dismissed.
Your decision is accordingly reversed.
TIMBER CULTURE-GOOD FAITH-AGENT.
CURTIS V. GFIFFES.
Good faith is one of the essential elements in timber-culture entries.
A timber culture entryman is not compelled to reside in the State or Territory wherein
the land embraced in his entry is situated.
Acting Secretary Joslyn to Commissioner McFarland, October 27, 1882.
I have considered the case of William W. Curtis v. James A. Griffes,
involving the latter's timber-culture entry made September 4, 1873,
upon the SE. of Sec. 4, T. 10, R. 16 W., Grand Island, Nebr., on
appeal by Griffes from your decision of September 3, 1881, adjudging
his entry forfeited for failure to comply with the requirements of the law.
This contest was initiated in Deeember, 1879. The testimony shows
that Griffes broke 10 acres of the tract in 1874, which he replowed in
1875; and that during the latter year he broke 10 additional acres and
planted more than 6,000 trees, which, although properly cultivated.
failed to reach a healthy stand by reason of fire and grasshoppers. In
1876 he broke 20 additional acres, and planted 6,500 trees; but the sea-
son was dry and they did not grow well. In 1877 he replowed 20 acres
and replanted the trees. In 1878 he caused 10 acres to be planted in
tree seed; but these were not cultivated in 1879, although he paid an
agent for the purpose. Griffes is a minister of the gospel, and was lo-
cated in Nebraska at the. date of his entry. In 1876, or thereabouts, he
moved to Kansas. In May, 1879, his church edifice was destroyed by
a tornado, and he passed most of the remainder of that season in East-
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ern States, soliciting subscriptions for its rebuilding, which fact he
assigns as a reason for not giving the land closer supervision during the
year 1879. He did not learn until the fall, when too late for cultivation
of the land, that his agent had neglected the same.
The local officers, although commending Griffes's good faith, and charg-
ing his non-compliance with the law in 187!) to the laches of his agent,
recommend, nevertheless, cancellation of his entry, because of said
non-compliance, and because, also, he is a non-resident of Nebraska.
The latter reason is without merit as the timber-culture law does not
require an entryman to be resident of the State where the land is lo-
cated. Your decision, without notation of facts, finds tat the local
officers "reached correct conclusions," and affirms their recommenda-
tions. This entry was under the act of March 3, 1873 (17 Stat., 605),
which was amended by the act of March 13, 1874 (18 Stat., 21), which
was amended by the act of June 14, 1878 (20 Stat., 113). The latter
act permits entries made under the two former acts to be completed
under its own provisions, which requires only that the entryman may
show, on final proof, that he has cultivated in timber for the period re-
quired by the act, an area not less than one-sixteenth part of the entire
area embraced in his entry, and that he then has growing upon such
cultivated area the number of "living and thrifty trees" thereby pre-
scribed.
In view of Griffes's good faith, and of all the facts, he should be al-
lowed to complete his entry under the act of 1878, and I modify your
decision accordingly.
TIMBER CULTURE ETRY-WIDOW AND HEIRS.
SALLY HICKO.
Under the Kansas statute the widow is entitled to a moiety of her husband's estate-
real and personal.
It does not appear that the widow or heirs, if any, authorized the administrator to
relinquish their right i the premises; and without such authority it was not
competent for him to relinquish said entry.
Acting Secretary oslym to Commissioner McFarland, November 9, 1882.
I have considered the appeal of Sally Hickok, from your decision of
November 12, 1881, re-instating timber-culture entry No. 1221, made by
her husband, Thaddeus W. Hickok, deceased, June 30, 1877, of the
NW. of Sec. 24, T. 5 S., R. 7 W., Concordia district, Kansas.
It appears from your recital of facts that the appellant's husband
died, and that one A. G. Storrs, as administrator of decedent's estate,
relinquished said entry. The record shows that the register and re-
ceiver thereupon canceled the same August 1, 1881, and that appellant
made timber-culture entry No. 2425, of the tract, on the 27th ofthe
same month.
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As under the timber-culture law, the rights of a deceased claimant
inute to the benefit of the heirs, if any, they only can relinquish the
entry of such decedent.
Under the Kansas statute the widow is entitled to a moiety of her
husband's estate-real and personal.
It does not appear that the widow or heirs, if any, authorized the
administrator to relinquish their right in the premises; and without
such authority, it was not competent for him to relinquish said entry.
Your decision is accordingly affirmed.
LOCAL OFFICE-BEGISTER AwND RECEIVER.
CHRISTAN F. EBINGER.
The duties of registers and receivers are distinct, and neither can discharge those of
the other in the absence of express authority therefor, but the action of each is
necessary within their appropriate sphere, to the administration of the office.
Acting Secretary Joslyn to Commissioner McFarland, November 13, 1882.
I have considered the appeal of Christian F. Ebinger from your de-
cision of October 27, 1881, rejecting his application to make a timber-
culture entry on the SW. A of Sec. 23, T. 3, R. 17 W., Bloomington,
Nebr., and allowing Daniel Hearl to enter the same tract.
It appears that on May 19, 1881-there then being a vacancy in the
office of receiver of the land office, by the death of its late incumbent-
Ebinger presented his application to the register, who rejected it for
that reason.
On June 23 following-a new receiver having been appointed-Hearl
applied to enter the tract under the timber-culture laws. His applica-
tion was rejected by reason of the application of Ebinger, but the offi-
cers recommended Ebinger should be allowed thirty days from the
reopening of the office, within which to perfect his application. He
renewed his application on June 27 following.
It was held by this Department in the case of the Dean Richmond
Mine (Reporter, August, 1882) that, where your office suspended the
register, and directed the receiver to take charge of the district.office,
which he did, performing the duties of the register, his acts were valid
as to the public and third persons having an interest therein, under
the general doctrine that the acts of an officer de facto must be recog-
nized from considerations of necessity and public policy. The reasons
for that rule do not apply where there is a mere vacancy in the office of
one of these officers.
the duties of registers and receivers are distinct, and neither can dis-
charge those of the other in the absence of express authority therefor,
but the action of each is necessary within their appropriate sphere, to
the administration of the office.
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I affirm your decision that Ebinger acquired no right by presenta-
tion of his application during the vacancy in the offiee of the receiver,
and hence that the tract was vacant and unappropriated at the date of
Heari's application, and subject thereto.
1/¶D /§Aw
PUBLIV OFFICIAL-ERRONEO US ADVICE.
SCHMIDT V. STILLWILL.
Where a party acts upon the suggestions of the officers of the government he should
lose nothing, unless required by the absolute demands of the Jaw, especially when
the adverse claim is inequitable.
Acting Secretary Joslyn to Commissioner MccFarland, November 13, 1882.
I have considered the case of Andrias Schmidt v. Charles H. Stillwill,
involving the latter's timber-culture entry made August 11, 1880, upon
SE. i of Sec. 30,T. 96,R. 58,)Yankton, Dak., on his appeal from your de-
eision of December 14, 1881, holding his entry for cancellatioii.
It appears that in January, 1879, Schmidt purchased, at an expense
of several hundred dollars, the improvements and possessory right of a
former timber-culture claimant to the tract and received a relinquish-
ment thereof, which he afterwards filed in the local office, and at the
same time applied, verbally, to enter the tract under the timber-culture
laws, and tendered the fees therefor. His application was refused,
pending action by your office upon the relinquishment, but he was in-
-structed by the officers that his rights would be protected, and his name
was entered on their records opposite the tract to indicate his claim.
He repeatedly afterwards visited the office for the purpose of perfect-
ing his entry, each time renewing his verbal application, and was each
time advised as at first. Notice of the cancellation of the former entry
reached the local office August 11, 1880, on which day the officers in
pursuance of their promise to that effect, notified Schmidt thereof by
mail. Upon the same day Stillwill made his entry. On or about Au-
gust 17, as soon as he received said notice, Schmidt again applied to
enter the tract, but his application was refused by reason of Stillwill's
entry.
I think this case is fairly within the spirit of the ruling of the su-
preme court, in case of Lytle v. Arkansas (9 How., 314), where it was
held that where an individual in the prosecution of a right does every-
thing which the law requires him to do, and he fails through the mis-
conduct or neglect of a public officer, the law will protect him. Or, if
not fully within that decision, it is manifestly covered by the ruling in
Morrison v. Stalnaker (104 U. S., 213), the register and receiver having,
for a reason entirely independent of any want of technical complete-
ness, declined to permit his entry, while at the same time recognizing
him as an applicant for the tract and entitled to the usual notice of a
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preferred claimant after cancellation by your office of the previous entry.
Schmidt visited the land office for the purpose of making his entry and
tendered the fees, and it must be presumed that he would have made a
written application but for the advice of the officers that it would not
be favorably considered. Although there appears no neglect or mis-
conduct on their part, yet their advice undoubtedly induced Schmidt to
neglect that which he purposed to, viz, to make a legal application for
the tract. The objection that he did not make a written application is
technical, and not equitable, for had he, when filing the relinquish-
ment also filed a written application, his preference right might prob-
ably have been secured. Where a party acts upon the suggestions of
the officers of the government he should lose nothing, unless required
by the absolute demands of the law, especially when the adverse claim
is so inequitable as is that of Stillwill.
Schmidt, upon his purchase, entered into immediate possession of the
tract, on which were about twenty-three broken acres, and he broke
fifteen additional acres, which facts, as well as Schmidt's claim, Stillwill
appears to have well known at the date of his entry. Schmidt is a
Russian by birth, having been in this country but two years and ignor-
ant of its language and land laws; and the Department will protect
such persons, so far as it can within the law, from the rapacity of those
who would take advantage of their ignorance to acquire their rights
and appropriate their property.
Your decision is affirmed.
TIMBER CULTURE CONTEST-APPLICATIO TO ENTER.
4 .DZE FY - BUNDY v. LIVINGSTON.
Section three of the act of June 14, 1878, restricts a contest against a prior timber-
culture entry to one who seeks to enter under the homestead or timber culture
laws, and in the absence of any such application there is no right of contest.
Acting Secretary Joslyn to Commissioner McFarland, November 14, 1882.
I have examined the appeal of Frank Bundy from your decision of
December 13, 1881, allowing George Livingston to contest the timber-
culture entry of N. P. Burgason upon the SW. of See. 10, T. 4, R. 28,
Oberlin, Kans.
It appears that Bundy and Livingston presented applications to con-
test said entry simultaneously. That of Livingston was sworn to upon
the day of, but prior to, presentation, before a clerk of a court of record.
That of Bundy was incomplete when presented, not having been
sworn to until after presentation. Your decision holds that the entry
of Burgason " was liable to contest by him who should first present an
application to contest conforming in all essential respects to the rules"-
"that the application filed by Livingston so conforming, the same should
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have been allowed," and hence that " Livingston should be allowed the
preference right to contest said entry," by which latter expression I un-
derstand you to mean that Livingston should have the preference right
to enter the tract if successful in his contest.
I concur with you in the opinion that Livingston's application, as a
mere affidavit, was complete when presented, and that Bandy's was
incomplete, and hence that, were this the only question, Livingston
would have the superior right. Your decision, however, overlooks sec-
tion three of the act of June 14, 1878, which provides-
That if at any time after the filing of said affidavit, and prior to the
issuing of the patent for said land, the claimant shall fail to comply
with any of the requirements of this act, then, and in that event, such
land shall be subject to entry under the homestead laws, or by some
other person, under the provisions of this act: Provided, That the party
making claim to said land, either as a homestead settler or under this
act, shall give at the time of filing his application such notice to the
original claimant as shall be prescribed by the rules established by the
Commissioner of the General Land Office; and the rights of the par-
ties shall be determined as in other contested cases.
This statute restricts a contest against a prior timber-culture entry
to one who seeks to enter it under the homestead or timber-culture laws.
In the absence of such application there is no right of contest. The
record fails to show that either Bundy or Livingston applied to enter
the tract, but simply to contest the former entry. The application of
each must therefore be rejected because unauthorized by law, and your
decision is modified accordingly.
TIMBER CULTURE CONTEST-BURDEN OF PROOF.
'>VLTiJ+ es CORNELL V. CHILTON.
The evidence shows that the requisite amount of work was done during the first year,
and as the second year had not expired a contest should not have been permitted.
As recently held by the Department in the case of Ewing v. Rickard, " in a pro-
ceeding involving forfeiture the same strictness of proof is invariably required as
under a penal statute. The whole burden is on the party alleging want of com-
pliance, and the acts of abandonment or of failure to comply with legal require-
ments must be affirmatively shown."
Secretary Teler to Commissioner llcFarland, November 21, 1882.
I have considered the case of Charles F. Cornell v. James Chilton,
involving timber culture entry No. 528, made by the latter May 31, 1878,
of the fractional SW, of Sec. 6, T. 137, R. 47, Crookston district, Min-
nesota, on appeal by Cornell from your decision of November 25, 1881,.
in favor of Chilton.
It appears that Cornell initiated contest against said entry May 26,.
1880, by filing the usual affidavit, wherein he alleged abandonment and
failure to settle upon and cultivate the tract pursuant to legal require-
ments. Citation issued June 26, 1880, fixing August 5 ensuing, for the
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hearing. Both parties were present pursuant to notice, and testimony
was adduced in behalf of each; whereupon the register and receiver
found contestant's allegations sustained.
The evidence shows that the requisite amount of breaking (10 acres)
was done during the first year, and as the second year did not expire
until May 31,1880, contest upon the ground alleged was not permissible
until the expiration of the latter period. Hence the testimony adduced
by virtue of such contest was inadmissible, and is not) therefore, en-
titled to consideration. But if it were competent for me to consider
such testimony, I would be constrained to hold that the contestant had
failed to sustain his allegations because, as was recently held by the
Department in the case of Ewing v. Rickard-
In a proceeding involving forfeiture the same strictness of proof is in-
variably required as under a penal statute. The whole burden is on the
party alleging want of compliance, and the acts of abandonment or of
failure to comply with legal requirements must be affirmatively shown.
This, Ewing has failed to show, and the contest is therefore dismissed.-
(The Reporter, vol. 2, p. 145.)
Your decision is accordingly affirmed.
TIMBER CULPURE-ILLEGAL ENTRY.
BENEDICT v. BoYEr.
Entry under the timber culture law is restricted to sections devoid of timber.
Secretary Teller to Commissioner McFarland, November 22, 1882.
I have considered the case of Wallace Benedict v. Frank D. Boyer,
involving the latter's timber-culture entry made September 26, 1877,
upon the W. i of the SE. 4, the SW. of the NE. i and the SE. i of
the NW, I of Sec. 12, T. 1.4 N., R. 43 B., Colfax, Washington Territory,
on appeal by Boyer from your decision of December 15, 1881, holding
his entry for cancellation.
The affidavit of contest alleges that the tract is not exclusively prairie
land, and is not devoid of timber. This is the only issue in the case.
The testimony of Boyer shows that there was at the date of his entry
from twenty to thirty growing pine trees scattered over the hillsides
of the section, varying in height from twenty to one hundred and twenty
feet, and fifty-five stumps of trees.
Other witnesses testify to pine, birch, balm and other trees, some of
which measure five feet in diameter, and also to be a growth of several
hundred young pines from one to fifteen feet high.
I concur with you in the opinion that a section, containing such trees
and stumps of trees, is not, nor any part thereof, subject to entry under
the timber-culture laws, because not devoid of timber, and hence that
Boyct's entrv should be canceled.
Your decision is affirmed.
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PR ACTICE-SIMULTANEO US CONTESTS.
SMITHi V. 0AKES.
Proceedings where a relinquishment is filed by one of simultaneous contestants of a
timber-culture entry, and preference right of entry accorded.
Commissioner McFarland to register and receiver, Oberlin, Kansas, De-
cember 1, 1882.
Your etter of September 8 last was duly received, transmitting the
duly executed relinquishment of the timber-culture entry No. 2177, on
the NW. i, 4. 3, 29 W., involved in the case of Robert C. Neeper v. Allen
B. Oakes; together with the record in the further contest initiated by
said Neeper and the record in the contest instituted by Watson Smith
against said Oakes, simultaneously on July 7, 1882.
It appears that on said date of July 7, 1882, and before the receipt
at your office of such information, this office dismissed the contest first
initiated by Neeper against Oakes and allowed the plaintiff therein the
usual sixty days within which to appeal.
At the date of the filing of the simultaneous contests, therefore, the
entry was in controversy in a prior contest then awaiting final adjudi-
cation.
You erred therefore, I think, in allowing the same to proceed to a hear-
ing-which the record in each contest discloses was the case-as your
action was in violation of the ruling, then in force, of the office in the
case of Schneider v. Bradley (Copp's L. O., vol. 9, p. 64) wherein it was
held that-
As a condition precedent to te right of initiation of a second con-
test against the same entry, the former case must have been finally ad-judicated, and this state of a case is not reached until determination of
the question of appeal either by waiver, by failure, or by prosecution
to a final decision.
The said simultaneous contests are therefore dismissed, and you will
so advise the respective parties.
As you report no appeal by the plaintiff in the first initiated contest
of Neeper v. Oakes, from my decision of July 7, 1882, that case is this
day closed.
With regard to the relinquishment submitted, it appears thatthe same
was filed by said Smith (one of the simultaneous contestants) who sub-
mits that in view of the same he is entitled to the preference right of
entry.
The matter is brought before this office on appeal by Smith from your
action in rejecting the said relinquishment and his two applications to
enter the land under the provisions of the timber-culture law, which
were presented subsequent to the initiation of his contest and the two
cases of Neeper, viz: on August 7 and September 7, 1882.
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You rejected the relinquishment and applications to enter, the first
time it seems, " because of the pendency of the other contests " and
that the relinquishment "was not properly acknowledged before an
officer having a seal "; the second, for the reason that said " other con-
tests "were still pending. I approve your action so far as it ha d refer-
ence to the first initiated contest of Neeper as that was the on ly legal
contest then pending and your action was in accordance with rule 53,
of practice.
This may seem to be at variance with the departmental ruling in John-
son v. Halvorsen (8 C. L. O., 56) that "when a relinquishment is filed be-
fore the final disposition of a contest, it should be treated as proof of
abandonment, and the contestant notified of his preferred right of en-
try," under section 2 act of May 14, 1880.
But such is not the case as it was held by the Department in the case
of John Powers (8 C. L. O., 18) that " in order to give effect to a relin-
quishment as evidence in a contested case, so as to inure to the benefit
of the contestant under the act of May 14, 1880, it must have been made
before the closing of the testimony before the register and receiver on
the allegation of abandonment," and that the " decision of June 2, 1881,
in Johnson v. Halvorsen . is in harmony with the foregoing, a]-
though a cursory reading might perhaps lead to a broader construc-
tion." Particular attention was also called in Powers to said rule 53,
and a strict observance of its requirements enjoined.
The first section of the act of May 14, 1880, provides-
That when a pre-emption, homestead, or timber-culture claimant shall
file a written relinquishment of his claim in the local land office, the
land covered by such claim shall be held as open to settlement and en-
try without further action on the part of the Commissioner o the Gen-
eral Land Office.
It would thus appear that the said rule does violence to the strict let-
ter of the law. But violence is done the letter in order to give effect
to what would seem to be the true intent of the law. It is held that the
summary action enjoined in its first section was intended to apply to
those cases only where there were no adverse claims pending or unad
judicated. A less liberal interpretation in eases lile the present would
lead to vexatious complications and confusions, for should the contest-
ant have proved his case, the entry would necessarily be subject to can-
cellation as a result thereof, irrespective of the subsequent filing of the
relinquishment, and be entitled to the preference right of entry under
section two of said act. As such right of the contestant is only de-
terminable on the final adjudication of his case, however, it is obvious
that to permit him to enter on the filing of the. relinquishment pending
final action after the hearing would be to prejudge the case in his favor
peremptorily and without sufficient warrant. On the other hand, to
throw the land open to entry or settlement by the party filing the re-
linquishment or any other qualified applicant before final action on the
contestant's case would render said section two inoperative.
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The said entry is hereby canceled on the relinquishment presented by
Smith, and you will so note on your records.
You will also advise the parties of such cancellation and that Smith
will be entitled, under the usual restrictions, to enter said land as a pre-
ferred claimant, under office decision in the case of Salem F. McEKinney(7 C. L. O., 6). In this case it was held that-
When a party secures a written relinquishment of a timber-culture
claim and files it in the proper land office with his own application to
enter, nder the timber-cultire laws, the land therein described, suchparty will, upon cancellation of the claim, be allowed to make entry as
sought.
You will advise the respective parties of this decision, allow sixty
days for appea and, at the proper time, report the action taken.
TI!BEBl C ULTUBE-SIMITAXNEO US APPLICATI ONS.
MELVILLE & KELLY.
Where applications to enter under the timber-culture law are simultaneous, the rulein Helfrich v. King applies.
All applications presented at the opening of a new land office maybe considered as
simultaneous.
The affidavit and application, in timber-culture cases, are considered as one paper,
,and if the affidavit is sworn to before the township plat is on file, the applicationfails.
Commissioner McFarland to register and receiver, Huron, Dakota, Decem-
ber 16, 1882.
I am in receipt of your letters of October 26 and November 24 last,
transmitting appeals of Messrs. Mellville and Kelly and Horace Com-
fort, attorney for claimants under certain rejected timber-culture appli-
cations. You rejected said applications because a tract on the same
section therein described had een previously entered under thb timber-
culture act. It appears that the affidavits accompanying the applica-
tions on which the tracts hereinafter mentioned were allowed by you tobe entered, were executed prior to the date on which the township plats
were filed in your office. You state that the plats aforesaid were re-
ceived and filed on the evening of October 18, after business hours. Itis now held by this office that the application and affidavit must be con-
sidered as one paper, and that there can be no legal application where
the affidavit is executed prior to the filing of the plat in the local office,
as in such case there is no record therein by which to identify the tract,
consequently nothing to apply for. It follows that you erred in allow-ing said entries, and the same are hereby canceled. Notify the partiesin interest accordingly and allow the usual time for appeal. The entries
referred to are the following, to wit:
* * * * * * * *k
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I find, upon examination of the entry papers submitted with the ap-
peals, that the affidavits were all executed prior to the date on which
the plat was filed in your office, excepting that of William H. Cooper,
which bears date October 23, 1882.
The applications were premature and illegal at the date of presenta-
tion, and the same with the appeals are therefore dismissed. Your
action in the case of Wim. H. Cooper aforesaid is sustained; allow the
arties in interest the usual time for appeal from this action.
It is proper here to treat incidentally of the point raised in the appeal
as to the simultaneousness of applications.
Ordinarily the local officers are permitted to exercise their best j udg-
ment in determining such questions, but in order to establish a uniform
rule for your guidance under certain circumstances the following is laid
down: All persons in the office immediately after opening of the same
for business, who have written applications for entry of a tract on the
same section under the timber-culture law, shall be considered simulta-
neous applicants, and you will accordingly dispose of the right of entry
under the rule laid down in elfrich v. King (2 C. IL. L. 378), which is
as follows:
1st. Where neither party has improvements on the land, it should be
sold to the highest bidder.
2d. Where one has actual settlement and improvements and the other
none, it should be awarded to the actual settler.
3d. Where both allege settlement and improvem ents, an investigation
must be had and the land be awarded to him who shows the prior actual
settlement and substantial improvements so as to be notice on the
ground to any competitor.
In explanation, I will state it appears that the attorneys of appellants
and one Van Horn (also an attorney), immediately upon the opening
of your office for the transaction of business on the morning of October
19 last, entered, each having in his possession timber culture applica-
tions for entry of a tract on the same section. You allowed entries of the
said tracts, under the Van Horn applications. It is a fact when new
plats of public lands are filed in the local offices, there is an unusual
"rush" of claimants in person and by attorney, each striving to secure
an entry of the tract or tracts desired.
It appears that your office counter is protected by a wire netting, in
which is a small aperture through which to pass applications and other
papers for consideration by you.
On the morning of October 19, the crowd was so great that it was im-
possible for all claimants to pass their applications to you at the same
time through the small opening aforesaid. Under the circumstances of
this case, and had the application been legal, it was error to regard
them other4han simultaneous. It was also error to accept Van Horn's
for the reason hereinbefore stated, to wit, the affidavits having been
executed prior to the filing of the plats in the local office.
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XENDMENT-ERROR IN PLAT-OCC UPAXOY.
BENNETT V. COTTNACH ET AL.
Entry changed to correspond with oceupancy and improvement.
Secretary Yeller to Commissioner McFarland, December 23, 1882.
I have considered the ease of W. H. Bennett v. Duncan Cottnach, to-
gether with the case of G. B. Hart v. said Duncan Cottnach, both in-
volving timber-culture entry No. 2048, made by Cottnach, and on ap-
peal from decisions made by you in both on the 17th of January last.
The facts appear as follows: Cottnach,on the 17th of June, 1878, made
timber-culture entry No. 2048, upon the NE. 4 of Sec. 23, T. 9 S., R. 20
W., Kirwin, Kans. His entry papers properly describe the tract, but
the entry was erroneously platted on the NW. I instead of the NE. l of
said section, and Cottnach's improvements under his timber-culture en-
try have been entirely on the NW. 1.
G. B. Hart contested Cottnach's right to said NW. 1 on the ground
of non-compliance with the law in the matter of cultivation and im-
provement. Having directed the local office to correct the plats so as
to agree with Cottnach's entry papers, you on the same day dismissed
the contest on the ground that the testimony therein erroneously speci-
fies the NW. of See. 23, T. 9, R. 30, as the tract abandoned by Cott-
nach. Your decision leaves said NW. : open to entry by the first legal
applicant, and in effect sends Cottnach to the NE. I specified in his en-
try papers. But we find the NE. occupied as a homestead.
As a result of the error in platting which made it appear that the
said NE. I was vacant, W. H. Bennett was on the 1st of October, 1878,
allowed to make homestead entry No. 7803 thereon. This gave rise to
a conflict between Cottnach's entry and that of Bennett, in considering
which you decide adversely to the latter, and hold his entry for can-
cellation.
In that decision I am unable to concur. So far as the facts are pre-
sented it appears that Bennett has under his entry been acting in strict
compliance with the homestead law as to residence and cultivation.
He has built a house, dug a well, and broken about 50 acres. There
has been no fault nor default on his part. His entry and improvement
were the result of the combined error of the local office and of Cott
nach-of the former in platting, and of the latter in following and
adopting the error by going upon and improving the NW. 4 instead of
the NE. 41 for two years or more after the date of entry.
It has been usual, when a party found himself upon a different tract
from that described in his entry papers, for such party to have his en-
try changed so as to cover the tract on which his improvements have
been made; and if no rights were thereby interfered with, it has been,
I believe, the practice to grant such request; but it is somewhat un-
usual for a person to voluntarily throw away two or three years' im-
provements, and ask to be permitted o go upon land on which he has
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made no improvements whatever. Such a course, if permitted in this
case, would not only cause the loss to Cottnach of his improvements
but would work injury to Bennett by depriving him of the benefit of
cultivation and improvements which he has made under his entry, as
a result in part of Cottnach's negligence in not at the proper time go-
ing upon and claiming the land under his entry. Even if the said NE.
Iwere not covered by the homestead entry of Bennett, I think it
doubtful whether Cottnach should be allowed to go upon it at this late
day, unless it were made to appear that he has in good faith been com-
plying from year to year with the law as to improvements and cultiva-
tion of the tract which he has actually occupied.
As to the NW. i of said Sec. 23, in the case of Hart v. Cottnach, I find
that after due notice of contest the register and receiver decided upon
testimony to the effect that the timber-culture law had not been com-
plied with, in the matter of cultivation and improvement, that Cott-
nach's entry should be canceled; and so recommended.
The question involved in that contest appears to be still an open one
before your office, as your decision was based upon the inapplicability
of the testimony to the entry of record, and not on the question raised
in the contest. In view of all the facts, I am of 'opinion that, by the
occupancy and the improvement of the NW. I for two years or more
without protest, Cottnach should be held to have accepted and elected
said tract as the one be desired to enter, his right to patent therefor
being subject of course to his fulfillment of the requirements of the law
in the matter of improvement, which question, as already stated, was
before you on appeal, and is undecided.
I shall therefore not now decide that question, but direct that Cott-
nach's timber-culture entry be changed on the record to the NW. of Sec.
23, T. 9, R. 20, leaving him to pursue his right to said tract under the
law and regulations.
As to Bennett's entry on the NE. J of said Sec. 23, it will be recognized
as valid, and will stand subject to his continued compliance with the
homestead law.
Your decisions are modified accordingly.
TIMBER CULTURE CONTEST-PREFERBYCE RIGHT.
BARTLETT V. DUDLEY.
The timber-culture law of June 14,1878, third section, is not inconsistent with the
act of May 14, 1880, second section. The contestant under the later act is defined
by the earlier law.
Proceedings where parties deprived of their preference right by the decision in case
of Bandy v. Livingston desire new contest.
Secretary Teller to Commissioner McFarland, February 2, 1883.
I have considered the case of Albert L. Bartlett v. Edlwin Dudley, in-
volving the latter's timber-culture entry, made March 24, 1877, upon
the NE. i of See. 4, T. 17, R. 23 E., Visalia, Cal., on appeal by Dudley
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from your decision of June 26, 1882, holding his entry for cancellation
for failure to comply with the requirements of the law. As Bartlett did
not, at the date of initiating his contest, apply to enter the tract under
either the homestead or timber-culture laws, he was not entitled to his
contest under my construction of the third section of the act of June
14, 1878, as held in the case of Bundy v. Livingston (9 C. L. O., 173).
It is, however, urged by his counsel that the decision in that case is in
violation of the preference right given a contestant by the second sec-
tion of the act of May 14, 1880, which provides that, " in all caseE where
any person has contested, paid the land-office fees, and procured the
cancellation of any pre-emption, homestead, ortimber-culture entry, he
shall be notified by the register of the land office of the districtin which
such land is situated of such cancellation, and shall be allowed thirty
days from date of such notice to enter said lands," etc., and hence that
Bartlett's preference right cannot be impaired by any construction of
the earlier act of 1878.
The act of- 1880 does not repeal that of 1878. They are both in force,
and relating to the same subject matter, must be constructed in par!
materia, so that, if possible, even though there were apparent inconsis-
tency, both may stand. (Potter's Dwarris, 183.) But I find no incon-
sistency in these acts. That of 1880 grants to the person who has con-
tested a former timber-culture entry a certain named right. This per-
son is the contestant, but who may be a contestant of such an entry is
not determined by this act, but by that of 1878.
When the latter enactment is worded in affirmative terms only, with-
out any negative, expressed or implied, it does not take away the earlier
law. The governing principle in all these cases is to construe the acts,
if possible, as reconcilable and capable of coexistence. (Maxwell on
Interpretation of Statutes, 136.)
A general later law does not abrogate an earlier special one. Hav-
ing already given its attention to the particular subject and provided
for it, the legislature is reasonably presumed not to intend to alter that
special provision by a subsequent general enactment, unless it manifests
that intention in explicit language. (b., 157.)
I am aware that the decision in the case of Bundy may have deprived
persons contesting timber-culture entries in some cases of the prefer.
ence right to which they thought themselves entitled, but-
Courts must look at hardships in the face rather than break down the
rule of law, and if, in all cases of ordinary occurrence, the law, in its
natural construction, is not inconsistent, or unreasonable or unjust,
that construction is not to be departed from merely because, in some
particular case, it may operate with hardship or injustice. (lb., 183.)
Further consideration confirms me in the opinion that the decision in
the case of Bundy was a correct interpretation of the third section of
the act of 1878, as respects a contestant, and that it is not inharmo-
nious with the second section of the act of 1880.
In order, however, that a contestant whose contest has been or here-
after may be dismissed for failure to file an application to enter the
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contested tract at the date of initiating his contest may yet have op-
portunity for entering it under a valid proceeding, I know of no objec-
tion to his initiation of a new contest with an application to enter the
tract, or that, in such case, in order to the saving of expense and de-
lay, the parties may stipulate in writing that the testimony formerly
taken may be used in the new contest, with such other testimony as
they may see fit to submit.
The new contest will, of course, be subject to any intervening right
initiated prior thereto; and, in view of the time which has elapsed since
the initiation of the former contest, should receive your early considera-
tion.
The contest of Bartlett is dismissed (with the right to a new contest
as above indicated), and your decision is moditied accordingly.
OOVTEST-CANCELLATIOIN!-RIGHT OF TRY.
12 G S4 SHANLEY V. MORAN.
he first legal applicant permitted to enter the tracts, subject to the right of the con-
testant to enter within the time allowed by law.
Secretary Teller to Commissioner McFarland, ]Jfarch 12, 1883.
I have considered the case of Charles B. Shanley v. Patrick Moran,
involving the W. of the NE. and the SE. i of the NE. and lot 1
of Sec. 10, T. 124, R. 47, Benson, Minc., on appeal from your decision
of January 20, 1882, holding the entry of the defendant for cancellation.
The land in contest was for nerly covered by timber-culture entry No.
913, made by John S&Ianley March 9, 1878. Such entry was contested
by C. S. Morau, and as a result thereof was canceled by your letter of
October 1, 1881, and said Moran, contestant, was advised, by the regis-
ter, of such cancellation by letter of October 13. 1881.
November 14, 1881, Charles B. Shanley, the plaintiff, applied to make
timber-culture entry of said land. This application was refused by the
register, upon the ground that the contestant, C. S. Moran, had forty-
five days' preferred right to make such entry; that is, that he had thirty
days under the act of May 14, 1880, and fifteen additional days according
to the custom in such register's office, because the notice was served
by mail.
It is not necessary to consider the question presented in your decision
as to the authority of the register under, the rules of practice to allow
any time additional to the statutory time on account of service being
made by mail, because in this case it appears that the contestant has
never applied to enter such land.
The plaintiff, being the first legal applicant under the well-established
practice of your office, should have been permitted to enter, even dur-
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ing the thirty days, subject to the right of such contestant to enter
within the time allowed by law.
Your decision is therefore affirmed, and the plaintiff, Charles B. Shan-
ley, should be allowed to enter, and the entry of Patrick Moran be held
for cancellation.
%. i, >PRACTICE- WITH7DRAW.AL OF COYTTEST.
DE ILANEY v. BOWERS.
When a contest has been regularly initiated and the contestant withdraws at or be-
fore the day fixed for the trial, he will be regarded as in default, and the case
will proceed and be decided accordingly.
The same party will not be permitted to renew the contest on the same ground.
Commissioner ceFarland to register and receiver, Grand Forks, Dakota,
April 9, 1883.
I am in receipt of the register's letter of the 29th ultimo, stating the
following facts and asking the instructions of this office upon the mat-
ter presented:
It appears that on November21, 1882, William E. De Laney fied an
affidavit of contest against the timber-culture entry of Charles Bowers,
No. 3127, Fargo series, made August 7, 1879, for the NE. 1 Sec. 11, T.
163, R. 54, alleging failure of compliance with law, and that the tract
was held for speculative purposes and not for the cultivation of trees;
that citation was duly issued, hearing being fixed for March 22, 1S83.
That on March 16, 1883, De Laney filed notice of withdrawal of this
contest, assigning no reasons therefor, but tiling at the same time another
affidavit of contest on the same grounds as before.
That on the day fixed for hearing in the first case Bowers appeared
at your office and filed a statement under oath, which you transmit,
setting forth that he is a farmer and actual settler upon a homestead
where he has resided for four years last past, within one mile of his
timber-culture claim; that he made his timber-culture entry in good
faith; that he has fully complied with the law in every particular; that
he has planted the required number of trees, and has about 100 acres
of the land under cultivation.
He further states that De Laney has made propositions to perma-
nently withdraw his contest for a consideration, and that he has refused
to buy off the contest.
It appears from other statements accompanying the papers in this
case that De Laney offered to settle with Bowers for $100, and that
Bowers was advised not to settle in this manner, but to submit his case
to you.,
The register states that great abuses are being practiced in a similar
manner in many cases; that parties initiate contests, withdraw before
the day of trial, then renew the contests, and so harass contestants and
involve them in continued expenses.
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You are advised that such contests cannot be regarded as made in
good faith, and that oppression and extortion under color of contest can-
not be sanctioned by this office.
When a contest has been regularly initiated and the contestant with-
draws at or before the day fixed for trial, he will be regarded as in de-
fault, and the case will proceed and be decided accordingly.
The same party will not be permitted to renew the contest on the
same ground.
You will dismiss De Laney's second contest against the entry of 13ow-
ers, and will be governed by these instructions in similar cases here-
after.
s g A 7 ENTRY-PRELIANLLARY AFFIDAVIT.
JOHNSON BARKER.
An affidavit made as the basis of an entry while the land is under appropriation by
a timber-culture entry cannot be received. And where an adverse claim has
intervened, as in this case, a supplemental affidavit cannot be permitted.
Secretary Teller to Commissioner McFarland, April 10, 1883.
I have considered the appeal of Johnson Barker from your decision
of May 9, 1882, holding for cancellation his timber-culture entry made
March 4, 1879, upon the SE. I of Sec. 25, T. 3, R. 23, Bloomington, Nebr.
It appears that one Jones formerly made timber-culture entry of the
tract, but, failing in his efforts to comply with the law, relinquished it,
intending upon cancellation of his entry to re-enter the tract under the
homestead law. His entry was canceled by your letter of February 21,
1879, but it does not appear when it was so noted on the local records
except that Barker was permitted to enter it March 4, under an affidavit
made before a notary public in the State of Nebraska March 3, and it
was therefore, presumably, so noted prior to the date of his entry.
Jones thereupon, March 10, applied for a hearing to enable him to
show that, on March 3 and 4, Barker was actually resident in the State
of Iowa, and did not and could not have made the affidavit on the day
it purported to have been made.
The testimony shows that Barker went from Iowa into Nebraska the
latter part of January or early in February, and returned thence to Iowa
between the 12th and 20th of February, 1879, and there remained un-
til June following. It follows either that he did not make the affidavit
and that the jurat is false, or that he made it prior to cancellation of
the former entry on the local records. Having been in Iowa from Feb-
ruary 20 to Jane, he could not have made it in Nebraska on March 3.
The proof that he made it prior to cancellation of the former entry, al-
though apparently made subsequently, is satisfactory, and, as held in the
case of Hiram Campbell (5 C. L., 0. 21), an affidavit, as the basis of an
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entry, made while the land is under appropriation by a timber-culture
entry, cannot be received.
Except for Jones's application to enter the tract, Barker might be per-
mitted to file a supplemental affidavit and perfecthis entry. Bt Jones's
application must be considered as an adverse claim, which excludes
such right.
I affirm your decision.
TEJIBER CULTURE-ENTRY UNDER ACT OF MARCH 13, 1874.
CUDNEY v. FLANNERY.
A timber-cultnre entry, otherwise legal, made on land containing a growth of cot-
ton-wood trees, at the time when such trees were not regarded by the Department
as timber trees, is a legal entry on land "devoid of timber." Later ralings hold-
ing such trees as timber trees, cannot affect such entry or rights acquired there-
under.
Secretary Teller to Commissioner -MiFarland, April 20, 188:3.
I have considered the case of P. W. Cudney v. William Flaunery, in-
volving the latter's timber-culture entry made December 15, 1876, upon
the W. 4 NE. I and the N. 4 of SE. ± of Sec. 4, T. 1 S., R. 5 E., Boze-
man, Mont., on appeal by Flannery from your decision of April 21,
1882, holding his entry for cancellation. This contest was commenced
April 21, 1880, upon allegation that the tracts are not subject to entry
under the timber-culture law. It is not claimed thatFlannery has failed
to comply with the requirements of the law in respect to planting of
trees and cultivation of the tracts, nor is it necessary to consider in the
present case the force of testimony which shows a scattering growth of
"1scrubby" cottonwood trees along the banks of a creek, running through
the section, the area of which is estimated at from ten to seventeen acres,
and the number of trees large enough for fence poles at from four hun-
dred to one thousand, nearly all of which are less than six inches in di-
ameter, and about one hundred and fifty of lar er size. Without refer-
ence to this the case must be decided on other grounds.
This entry was made under the act of March 13, 1874, which contained
no provision relative to the character of the land allowed to be entered,
but authorized the Commissioner of the General Land Office to prepare
and issue such rules and regulations, consistent therewith, as should
be proper and necessary to carry its provisions into effect. Under this
authority, a form of affidavit was prescribed requiring the applicant to
swear that the tract was composed exclusively of prairie land naturally
devoid of timber. What trees were timber trees within the meaning of
the act, so as to exclude the tract from the operation of the act, became
a question of frequent occurrence, but I find no ruling by your office or
by this Department that in 1876, the date of Flannery's entry, cotton-
wood trees were held of this character.
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Indeed, as late as September, 1879, this Department held in the case
of Noel et al. (2 C. L. E., 673), that such trees were not timber trees, and
did not exclude a tract from entry. Although later decisions include
this variety as among the trees which may exclude a tract from the
operation of the act, the regulations and rules of your office and of this
Department in force at the date of Flannery's entry, had the force of
law as respected a traot subject to entry. There was then no objection
to such au entry, and Flannery's was allowed as legal and made in ac-
cordance with what was considered a correct interpretation of the stat-
ute. He thereby acquired rights which cannot now, legally or equita-
bly, be repudiated-especially after his compliance with the law for
more than three years-even though such an entry might not now be
allowed. The latter rulings cannot have this retroactive effect.
I reverse your decision and allow Flannery's entry to stand.
PRIVA4TE CLAIM-RESERV7ATION.
PASO DE LAs ALGODONES.
Notwithstanding the withdrawal of the claim from before Congress, it not having
been finally disposed of nor abandoned, the lands covered by it remain in a state
of reservation.
Commissioner McFarland to U. S. surveyor-general, Tucson, Arizona,
September 13,. 1881.
Your letter of August 21 ultimo, addressed to this office and relating
to certain lands embraced within the limits of the alleged Mexican
private claim "Paso de las Algodones," is before me. In it you inquire,
in view of the facts that said claim has been reported by you adversely,
and that because of said report you are requested by representative
citizens interested in the welfare of Yuma County to restore said lands
to settlement and entry, whether you have a right, under the circum.
stances, to comply with said request, and to make an order restoring
saiNand to settlement and entry, prior to action of Congress oil the
"--Paso de las AMgodones" case.
In reply I have to say that your inquiry was evidently made upon the
supposition that the claim was pending in Congress upon your adverse
report. If that were its condition,.most clearly your inquiry should be
answered iii the negative; but it appears by the proceedings of the
House of Representatives of February 16 last (to which branch of Con-
gress the record was transmitted) that on that day leave was granted
to the claimants to withdraw from the files oi the House the papers in
the case, no action having been taken by the House upon the claim
other than its reference to committee.
This withdrawal of the claim from the action of Congress might be
supposed to place the question submitted in doubt, but the claim is
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evidently not abandoned. It is still in existence undetermined. Its
withdrawal by the claimants from before Congress was, presumably,
for the purpose of endeavoring to procure its recognition by the gov-
ernment in some other manner, and, however desirable it may be to
relieve the land i question of the existing impediment an(l make it
eligible to settlement, premature action to that end might only result in
subjecting the government to future embarrassment, and individuals
who might avail themselves of the opportunity to settle, to injury and
loss.
It is presumed that Congress will take action at an early day looking
to the adjudication and determination of all outstanding Spanish and
Mexican private claims, or their quietus by lapse of time, and until
such claims shall be adjudicated and determined or legally abrogated,
I am of opinion that neither public nor individual interests would be
subserved by inviting or permitting settlement upon lands embraced
within their limits.
You will therefore be governed in your action touching the lands
covered by the alleged claim "Paso de las Algodones," by the views
herein expressed, and hold said lands in reserve until the final deter-
mination of said claim.
PIl rATE CLAIM-RESER VATION PENDING FIEAL ACTIOY.
SAN JUAN DE LAS BOQUILAS Y NOGALES.
The lands covered by the claim, as presented by te claimant for confirmation, are re-
served from disposition by the government until the rejection, or (if confirmed)
final location of the claim; notwithstandirg a preliminary survey has been made
by the surveyor-general, excluding portions of the land within the boundaries so
claimed.
Commissioner McFarland to U. S. surveyor-general, Tucson, Arizona,
April 2, 1883.
Your letter of the 20th ultinmo is received, in which you state that the
claimants of the San Juan de las Boquillas y Nogales grant iepresent
that the granted tract was described by boundaries, but was sur¶veyed
under direction of the late Surveyor-General Wasson for the quantity
of four leagues, cutting off certain lands on the north anai on the south
belonging to the claim, although they pointed out to the deputy sur-
veyor the monuments and bounds of the land granted; that the public
surveys have been extended over a part of the land so excluded from
the survey, and that the claimants now ask you to suspend from entry
the land excluded, which has been already surveyed, and not to extend
the surveys over the portion excluded which has not been surveyed;
upon which you request to be informed what action it is proper for you
to take in the premises.
You are aware that the claim is before Congress upon the report of
the late surveyor-general, awaiting its action. By reference to the act
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of July 22, 1854 (10 Stat., 308), to establish the office of surveyor-general
for New Mexico, etc., the provisions of which were extended to Arizona
by the act of February 21, 1863 (12 Stat., 664), you will see that the
eighth section, which prescribes the duties of the surveyor-general in
regard to the examination and reporting of private land claims, pro-
vides, in its closing lines, that " until the final action of Congress on such
claims all lands covered thereby shall be reserved from sale or other
disposition by the government," etc. This provision of the statute sub-
stantially answers your inquiry. The land covered by the claim is re-
served; its bounds and extent, while awaiting the action of Congress
to be determined by the presentation of the claimants in their petition
to the surveyor-general for confirmation; the reservation to continue
until the claim is disposed of by Congress.
The survey, to which reference is made, was merely preliminary, for
the information of Congress. It does not determine either the bounda-
ries or extent of the claim. The extent may be affected by the confir-
mation if confirmation should be made. Final location cannot be made
until after confirmation. The reservation of the land claimed therefore. injustice to the claimants and inthe interest of thepublicand of individuals
who wish to settle upon public land, should preclude the extension of the
public surveys over the land reserved, as well as permission to settle




The question of what was intended by the words, " as established by the United States
authorities," having been passed upon by the proper officer, the head of the De-
partment having control of the subject matter, is thereby settled, such decision
being the final act of the Executive.
Secretary Teller to Commissioner McFarland, August 2, 1882.
I have considered your decision of February 13, 1882, upon the survey
of the eastern boundary of the Presidio military reservation in.Califor-
nia, brought before me by your report of April 14, onprotest of the hon-
orable Secretary of War, dated March 29, referred to you March 30, 1882.
This survey was made in August and September, 1881, by G. F. Allardt,
deputy surveyor, under instructions from the surveyor-general of August
19, pursuant to your directions of May 3, 188t, communicated to him
upon request of the military authorities. The order had particular ref-
erence to the establishment and marking of the southeastern corner of
the reservation, according to the decision of my predecessor, Mr. Secre-
tary Schurz, rendered March 3, 1881, in the platter of the Stratton sur-
vey of the Pueblo lands of San Francisco.
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The act of May 9, 1876 (19 Stat., 52), provided " that all the right and
title of the United States to the following described portion of the mil-
itary reservation known as the Presidio or Fort Point Reservation," etc.,
" be and the same are hereby relinquished to the said city and county
and its successors, assigns, and vendees," for the benefit of persons, etc.,
under certain ordinances of the corporate authorities, ratified by the
legislature of the State.
The land released is described by the act as-
Commencing at the southeasterly corner of the said Presidio, or Fort
Point Reservation, and thence running in a direct line due north to the
shore-line of the Bay of San Francisco; thence westerly along the said
shore-line to a point eighty feet west of the easterly line of the said
Presidio, or Fort Point Reservation, as established by the United States
authorities, said eighty feet being relinquished for a public highway or
street, named Lyon street; thence southerly to a point on the south-
erly line of said reservation, where the west line of Lyon street intersects
said line; thence easterly to the point of commencement, to conform as
near as possible to the plan of the city map of streets of San Francisco out-
side of reservation, said plan being now on file in the office of the War
Department of the city of Washington: Provided, That Lyon street
shall be extended to the Bay of San Francisco eighty feet wide, and is
hereby dedicated for a public highway and street forever: Providedfurther, That Broadway, Vallejo, Green, Union, Filbert, Greenwich,
Lombard, Chestnut, Francisco, Bay, North Point, Jefferson, Tonquin,
and Lewis streets, as laid down on the official map of the city and
county of San Francisco, be extended westerly to intersect the easterly
line of Lyon street as herein provided, be, and are hereby dedicated
as public hig hways and streets forever.
The only point involved in the present proceeding relates to the true
meaning of the clause fixing the point " 80 feet west of the easterly line
of the said Presidio or Fort Point Reservation, as established by the
United States authorities."
Your decision holds, for extended reasons therein stated, drawn from
statements of official action by the War Department prior to the Execu-
tive order of December 31, 1851, establishing the boundaries, that the
line referred to is a line parallel with Larkin street, drawn through the
southeastern corner of the reservation as marked by a monument pre-
viously established.
The War Department contends that the line referred to is the line of
the government fence erected by the authority of the department com-
mander of the Pacific, on what was at that time supposed and intended
to be the line parallel with Larkin street, but by erroneous measurement
and calculation, resulting from the rough and unimproved condition of
the intervening grounds at that time, actually deflecting several feet
to the eastward of a true parallel.
The entire matter of the occupation and establishment of the military
reservation was, as matter of course, controlled by the military author-
ities under direction of the War Department. The order of 1851 fixed
by description the location of the reservation, and by its words of de-
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scription the eastern boundary was a true north an_ south line. This
was a necessary fact from the words employed. The language was:
" all the land north of a line running in a westerly direction from the
southeastern corner of the Presidio tract." Nothing not north of it was
included, and everything north of it was included. The sketch ol file
with the original order in your office, furnished as a part of it by the
Secretary of War, also shows a red line mark for the proposed survey,
running parallel with the arrow denoting the true meridian.
In 1870 the reservation was officially platted by Lieut. Geo. M.
Wheeler, of engineers, and the map was placed on official file in the
War Department. It was also submitted to your office, and by your
predecessor, Mr. Commissioner Drummond, critically examined and ap-
proved on the 19th of August, 1872, and so remains on your files. This
survey shows the eastern line as a true meridian, and also exhibits the
city plan of streets outside and adjacent to the reservation.
The Stratton survey had been made in 1866, exhibiting another
boundary in connection with the Pueblo lands of San Francisco, but
the work was objected to by the War Department as not properly lo-
cating the southeastern corner, and has also been rejected by my prede-
cesscr's decision as wholly inaccurate.
In 1830, upon claim of an owner of an interest in the alleged "1 Ran-
cho de los Lobos " grant, since rejected as entirely false, fraudulent, and
antedated, and while the whole question of the necessary occupation'
of the coast defenses in California was under consideration by a joint
commission of army and naval officers, a recommendation was made to
accept from this claimant a deed of release of land westward of a line
through the southeastern corner, parallel with Larkin street, and with-
draw the military occupation from the lands east of such line.
This recommendation was expressly disapproved by the Secretary of
War, June 19, 1830, on the ground that the true title to all the ground
was then in the United States; but while the subject was pending, and.
previous to his decision, an order had been made by the department
commander of the Pacific to vacate the ground east of the line, and
occupy only the grounds proposed to be released to the government by
deed of the claimant, who had already offered a bond for such purpose.
The ground was vacated accordingly, and a fence placed upon the
line by the military, up to which the occupation was afterwards main-
tained-private parties and owners under city and State titles occu-
pying the vacated grounds and making improvements thereon more or
less valuable.
By mistake this fence deflected to the east from the true parallel with
Larkin street, and from this deflection arises the present controversy.
The solution appears to me very simple. On the 1st of June, 1876,
immediately following the passage of the act of Congress, Mr. A. Morell,
representing himself as the authorized agent of the city and county of
San Francisco, applied to the Secretary of War for the issuance of or-
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ders to carry out the law and make formal release of the relinquished
lands. Orders to that effect were accordingly given, after reference to
the Judge-Advocate-General and the rendition of an opinion from the
Bureau of Military Justice, to the effect that the only duty incumbent
upon the military department was " the verification and marking of the
boundaries and a discontinuance, as soon as conveniently practicable,
of such occupation of the premises as may [might] be still maintained."
Upon transmission of the order to the local military authorities the
surveying engineer reported that he could not carry it into effect, as
the newly created Lyon street would be immediately along the true
north and south line, already deflecting far to the eastward of the occu-
pied boundary, and throw back into the reservation the lands occupied
by the city and individuals between that and the established fence-a
result which it could not have been the intention of Congress to effect.
On this report the Chief of Engineers furnished the Adjutant-General,
on the 10th of July, 1876, a traced plat, marked Z, showing the position
of the lines and streets according to his construction of the act, and
stating as follows:
The words of the act " the easterly line of the said Presidio or Fort
Point reservation, as established by the United States authorities,"
means undoubtedly the present boundary fence. If any doubt, how-
ever, exists concerning the interpretation of the act of May 9, 1876, put
upon it by the Department, it is suggested that the matter be referred
to the Attorney-General for his opinion.
On submission of this report to the Secretary of War he again, on the
13th of July, referred it to the Chief of Engineers with his indorsement
as follows:
The boundary as traced on map Z (Engineer's Report), is approved.
Copy of map to be furnished Mr. Morell.
J. D. CAMERON,
Secretary of War.
On the 17th of July the Engineer Department returned the papers to
the Secretary with following indorsement: "A copy of the map has
been sent to Mr. Morell this date, as directed." The Secretary on the
following day ordered the AdjLtant-General "to carry out the decision
of the Secretary of War as contained in the fifth indorsement hereon"-
being the indorsement cited.
Orders were given accordingly, plats and surveys were completed,
Lyon street was established, the fence was removed to the, new west
line of the street, fixed as the eastern boundary of the reservation, and
under date of the 21st of October, 1876, the following letter was received
by the Secretary of the Interior from the War Department:
SIR: I have the honor to transmit herewith, for file in the General
Land Office, two maps of the Presidio Military Reservation, California.
Upon map A (a tracing of the map of the official survey of the reser-
vation), the eastern boundary, as defined by the act of Congress of May
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-9, 1876 (copy inclosed), has been marked. Map B shows, upon alarger
scale, the location of the new eastern boundary.
Thesepapers were acknowledged and referred by indorsement to your
office, where they still remain on file. They show that the question of
what was intended by the words "as established by the United States
authorities" was passed upon by the proper officer, the head of the
Department having control of the subject matter, upon whose action
and reports to Congress the act had been passed, and who must of ne-
eessitv take the proper action to execute it. His decision was the final
act of the Executive, and is binding on this Department, as the history
of the reports shows it to have been upon the city and county; and it
was so accepted by their agent, who was frnished a copy of the plat.
But even were I at liberty to cll in question the right of the War
Department to decide for itself the proper co struction of the act, and
to declare what, in fact, was the line assumed therein to have been
"established by the United States authorities," I should be of opinion
that the ineaningof the words was correctly interpreted. The act refers
to a "plan of the city map of streets of San Fran cisco outside of reser-
vation . .. . . on file in the office of the War Department of the city
of Washington." Inquiry at the Department establishes the fact that
the only map thus on file was the Wheeler map of survey, on which
was clearly marked the line of government fence, and a stone monument
at its shore-line extremity-no map'showing any line parallel to Larkin
street having ever been filed or made. The documents and records of
that Department also show that copies of said map were furnished to
the committees of Congress in connection with the proposed release of
portions of the reservation, and were reported as exhibiting the true
and established boundaries. Te reports, as vell as the papers now
before me, also show that the whole basis of the claim of private parties
to have the land released was the stated fact that the occupation had
been already actually surrendered beyond thefence, and settlements and
improvements had been made on the portions so vacated. It was never
asserted that the government use and occupation was limited by any
other line than the fence so erected to mark the intended eastern boun-
dary.
These facts being ascertained, it is clear to my mind that all Congress
intended to do was to recognize the equities claimed on the one hand
and conceded on the other; and to further provide both for the city and
the government a free and unbroken street of liberal width-extending
along the whole eastern boundary, and connected by intersecting streets,
dedicated by the act, with the already established surveys of the city.
To execute this intention the War Department has already re-estab-
lished the boundary of the reservation, relinquished the outside portion,
fixed the west line of Lyon street, and given to the city and county,
upon express application, the possession of the tract described. All
that was asked of this Department was the permanent marking of the
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southeastern corner, already established and accurately identified. The
surveyor has done more, and attempted to run a new line extending
far inside the established reservation.
You are instructed to direct him to identify and mark the line of the
presidio as established by the proper Department, and close the lines.
of the Pueblo survey upon such boundary.
an S A PRIVATE CLAIM-JURISDICTIO- 
Jd ;L,3 .2- "I RANCHo ALISAL.*
A survey made and approved before the passage of the act of June 14,1860, published
and ordered into the United States district court under that act, and pending
therein at the passage of the act of July 1, 1864, was within the jurisdiction of
said court, and its approval thereof was final.
Secretary Kirkwood to Commissioner HcFarland, January 4, 1882.
I have examined the case in the matter of the survey of the Rancho
Alisal, Maria Teresa (le la Guerra Hartnell and others, the widow
and heirs of William E. P. Hartnell, deceased, confirmees, made by
United States Deputy Surveyor J. E. Terrell, in May, 1859, on appeal
from your decision of January 15, 180, declining to approve the same,
and ordering a new survey according to prescribed instructions.
The proceedings relating to the grant by the Mexican authorities, and
the final confirmation of title by the United States district court for the
southern district of California by a dismissal of the appeal on stipulation
of the Attorney-General of the United States and the attorney for claim-
ants, at the December term 1856, are all matters of record, and suffi-
ciently set forth in your decision.
The present appeal relates solely to the matter of survey, and the
conformity thereof to the decree of confli mation.
This survey was regularly approved by the United States surveyor--
general of California, November 4, 1859, advertised in August and Sep-
tember, 1860, uinder the act of June 14, 1860 (12 Stats., 33), ordered into
court on the 19th of September, 1860, and approved by the district
court December 9, 1865.
No appeal from the decree having been taken, the surveyor-general,
on the 21st of lay, 1872, forwarded to your office for patent the survey
and papers in the case.
April 5, 1873, your office decided, on the authority of The United
States v. Sepulveda ( Wall.. 104), that the district court had no juris-
diction of the survey, under the act of June 14, 1860, and directed the
surveyor-general to make publication underact of July1, 1864(13 Stats.,.
332).
*See Rancho de Napa, 5 L. D., 320.
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This decision was affirmed by my predecessor on appeal, October 8,
1873; and the survey was accordingly published under act of July 1,
1864,and upon objections thereto a bearing was had before the surveyor-
general, the record of which was transmitted September 1, 1877, with
the opinion that the survey became final on the approval of the district
court; ad if not so, that on the objections presented it ought not to be
set aside.
The decision of your office overrules that of the surveyor-general, and
requires a new survey, ebracing a larger tract of land.
The first matter to be considered in this case relates to the question
of jurisdiction. My predecessor having ordered the present hearing
expressly upon the ground that the act of July 1, 1834, required him to
treat as void the approval of the district court, and hold the survey
solely subject as to its correctness to. the final decision of the Depart-
ment, it is necessary to inquire, the question of jurisdiction having been
again presented, whether or not I am concluded by that order from in-
vestigating for myself the condition of the survey in all its bearings,
preparatory to the issue of an order either to pass it to patent or to re-
turn it to the surveyor-general for correction.
The order was based on the assumption that the court had o juris-
diction over the final survey; such conclusions being drawn from the
absence of record evidence in your files to show that the antecedent
conditions existed on which the jurisdiction was conferred by the act
of June 14, 1860. This absence was held to be presumptively conclu-
sive that no such conditions did exist; and that, therefore, thejudgment
must be treated by you as corcom non judice, and consequently void.
It was further stated by my predecessor that the court could take no
jurisdiction under the act of 1861 because that act only " saves the juris-
diction of said court over cases then properly pending before it.' This
was a decision in affirmance of the right of the Department to have a
publication under the act of 1861, and thus try the question of the cor-
rectness of the survey; and would not ordinarily be reopened if fully
presented and considered. Bt the question of jurisdiction is one that
may be raised at any stage of the proceedings and upon slight sugges-
tion in all tribunals; and where doubt of such jurisdiction arises, it is
usual and proper to look fully into the reason and authority of the mat-
ter, in order that a judgment may not be improvidently rendered, which
may have no binding force on account of, a want of jurisdiction in the
case. C
Very little consideration seems to have been given in the present
case, and no conclusive reasons set forth for declaring void the decree
of the district court. Merely declaring that the facts bring it within
the decision of the Sepulveda case, and that no new authority to pass
upon the survey was granted by the act of 1864, because it was wrong-
fully before the court at that date, and without discussing the reasons
for so deciding upon the facts, or the power of the Department to dis-
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regard the judicial decree or collaterally set it aside, the order was
given for a new publication. In my opinion, I am not concluded from
again examining the question of j risdiction, and thereafter taking such
action in the case as shall be required by law.
Two inquiries naturally present themselves in the consideration of
this question:
1. Was the question of jurisdiction in fact rightfully determined e
2. If so, was it competent for this Department to review the decision
of the court for the purpose of disregarding its decree, or treating it
as voidl
The case may be said to have been similar to the Sepulveda case in
the fact that the survey was approved before the passage of the act of
June 14, 1860, and not ordered into court until after that date. But it
is not shown that no proceedings were pending either before the court
or the surveyor general for the purpose of contesting or reforming the
survey, that fact being merely assumed from the absence of documents
specifically recitingor showing thependency of such proceedings. There
is arong the papers a protest against the survey, filed by Mrs. Hart-
nell in behalf of herself and children as early as May, 1859, soon after
the return of the plat by the deputy surveyor.
There is also a petition found on file in the district court asking its
intervention to pass updn the survey, which it is shown, by affidavit of
the clerk, bears no date of filing, and which, consequently, so far as
this Department knows, may have been before the court at the date
of the passage of the act. The statute specifically provides-
ThatAll surveys and locations heretofore made and approved by the
surveyor-geiieral . . . . in which proceedings are now pending for
the purpose of contesting or reforming the same, are hereby made sub-ject to the provisions of this act.
With the well-settled presumption in favor of the jurisdiction when
exercised by a judicial tribunal, it can hardly be reasonable on the part
of a tribunal having no authority to review the proceedings, to declare
that the necessary facts to sustain it were wanting, simply because they
are not set out with complete certainty in the record. It is to be pre-
sumed that the court examined the question for itself, and if anything
appears which renders it probable that the facts did exist, it is suffi-
cient to support the presumption that they were found, although not
specially recited in the decree. There is nothing, therefore, sufficient
to-show that the jurisdiction was not properly assumed in ordering the
survey into court.
But whatever question there may have been prior to the enactment
of July 1, 1864, there can be none since its passage. That statute in
terms provides-
That where proceedings for the correction or confirmation of a survey
are pending on the passage of this act in one of the said district courts,
it shall be lawful for such district court to proceed and complete its
examination and determination of the matter, etc.
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My predecessor construed this language to include only such eases
as were "then property pending before it." But the act does not say
isproperly pending. The word is used without qualification, and the
grant of authority in terms makes it "lawful for such district court to
proceed and complete its examination."
Even if unlawful before, there is by this act a new jurisdiction con-
ferred. This point is clearly settled in United States v. Halleck (I
Wall., 453-4) with reference to suits pending at the date of the passage
of the act of 1860. The court say:
The new survey was accordingly returned, and exceptions to it were
filed by the claimants and purchasers under them; and proceedings
upon tWe exceptions were pending on the passage of the act of June 14,
1860. Whatever question might be raised as to the jurisdiction of the
district court to supervise the survey previous to that act, there can be
none since its passage. That act applies not merely to surveys subse-
quently made, but also to such surveys as had been previously made
and approved by the surveyor-general, and returned into the district
court upon objections to their correctness.
And in Hernshaw v. Bissell (18 Wall., 269) it is said:
The objection to the authority of the court to pass upon the survey,
because ordered into court before the act of June 14, 1860, is untenable.
The act in terms applies to surveys which had been previously returned
into court, and in relation to which proceedings were then pending.
This is in accordance with the declaration in the case of Sepulveda
(1 Wall., 108), that " the act of 1860 creates a new jrisd ction in the
court, which cannot be assumed independent of the act, and under it
should be exercised only in cases arising clearly within its language,"
and in which case the jurisdiction was denied, because not coming
within such language.
These cases are here cited to show that the term " pending," used
without qualification, means actual pendency, without reference to the
question of original jurisdiction. The opinions expressly declare that
proceedings were pending at the date of the passage of the act, and
that the new jurisdiction at once attached, whatever question might
have been raised against the original jurisdiction up to that period.
Now, the act of July, 1864, in the language before cited, refers to cases
in which proceedings were pending at the date of its passage, and de-
clares that it shall be lawful to proceed therein and complete their
determination. Te language is identical with that passed upon and
judicially construed by the supreme court under the act of 1860. The
acts cover the same subject-matter, and are in par materia. An au-
thoritative construction of the meaning of this language in the earlier
statute applies with controlling force to the latter, and governs it, even
in case it would otherwise have a different interpretation.
But in these cases there is no apparent ambiguity of measuring.
Suits are continually pending in court which are finally dismissed for
want of jurisdiction, but such dismissal does not declare that they were
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not "pending" because wrongfully before the court. Any 'order of
the court embracing " pending cases" would necessarily include them.
And the same is true of a statute so describing them. They are
within its language. In Newhall v. Sanger (2 Otto, 761), where the
word " claimed' was used in a statute attempt was made to obtain a
decision that the true meaning was "lawfully" claimed. But the court
said that " there is no authority to import a word into a statute in order
to change its meaning." So the decision of my predecessor, holding
that the word "pending" only included cases "1properly " pending
seems to have changed the meaning by importing a word not found in
the act, and consequently to have expressed a conclusion inconsistent
with the construction of the same phraseology in the cases befewe the
supreme court to which I have referred.
With reference, therefore, to the act of July 1, 1864, I conclude, in
the language of the court, that " whatever question might be raised as
to the juiisdiction of the district court to supervise the survey pre-
vious to that act, there can be none since its passage."1 Having jurisdic-
tion to approve the survey, its decision was final as to its correctness.
This leaves it unnecessary to consider the second question in its rela-
tion to the case in hand; but as it has been to some extent a practice
in this Department to assume jurisdiction over surveys already ap-
proved by the court, on the ground of a want of jurisdiction in that
tribunal, and thereby to disregard its decrees, it seems proper to in-
quire into the legality of this practice, and to determine the compe-
tency of the proceeding, in order to its correction if unauthorized by
law. In the case of the Rancho Xapa, decided by your predecessor
April 21, 187-9, and affirmed by the Department September 20, 1879, it
was held that, as the claimed jurisdiction resulted from special statu-
tory enactment, the judgment or decree may be treated as an absolute
nullity by any person, notwithstanding the fact that every court is the
judge of its own jurisdiction, and the same must be presumed until the
contrary is shown by the record.
But I do not find anywhere a decision or statute authorizing an ex-
ecutive officer of the United States to set aside the decree of a federal
court, where the United States was itself a party to the suit, represented
by the proper United States attorney, consenting by such attorney to
the proceedings, and submitting to the judgment, on a proceeding sub-
stantially in rem (see case of Elenshaw, supra), and brought for the
very purpose of ascertaining and determining the respective rights of
the government and private claimants. And I must be permitted to
say that a very strong showing should be made before asserting a
power extremely doubtful, if not entirely wanting, to set aside a decree
favorable to the government, fairly obtained by its officers, against the
objections of the claimant, himself setting them up and invoking the
intervention of the court, for the express purpose of enlarging the de-
cree by giving him what the court on a fall showing has denied him,
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and to which, it is insisted on the part of the government, he was never
entitled.
I cannot conceive any reason why the judgment of the court should
not be treated and respected as the action of a regular and competent
tribunal, so far as presumption is concerned, whose jurisdiction must
be reviewed only upon error or appeal, and whose decrees while unre-
versed are binding upon all parties and privies. This was held in
McCormick v. Sullivant (10 Wheat., 192) and I am not aware that the
doctrine as laid down has been modified. In speaking of proceedings
which it was alleged were coram non judice, on acc6unt of a want of a
sufficient showing of jurisdiction in the proceedings, the court say:
T1IA reason proceeds upon an incorrect view of the character andjurisdiction of the inferior courts of the United States. They are all
of limited jurisdiction; but they are not on that account inferior
courts in the technical sense of those words, whose judgments taken
alone are to be disregarded. If the jurisdiction be not alleged in the
proceedings, their judgments are erroneous, and may upon a writ of
error or appeal be reversed for that cause. But they are not absolute
nullities.
And further on, the doctrine appears as stated in the syllabus, that
"until reversed they are conclusive evidence between parties and
privies."
The same doctrine is asserted with a full citation of authorities, in
Grignon's Lessee v. Astor et al. (2 Howard, 319). O page 341 it is said
that the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States-
Is limited and special, and their proceedings are reversible on error,
but are not nullities, which may be entirely disregarded (3 Peters, 205).
They have power to render final judgments and decrees which bind the
persons and things before them conclusively in criminal as well as civil
causes, unless revised on error or by appeal.
And again:
There can be no judicial inspection behind the judgment save by ap-
pellate power.
And on page 342:
If the jurisdiction of the court in a civil case is not alleged in the
pleadings the judgment is not a nullity, but though erroneous is ob-
ligatory as one (Peters, 206), and in a proceeding in rem an erroneous
judgment binds the property on which it acts; it will not bind it the
less because the error is apparent, and the judgement is of complete ob-
ligation (3 Peters, 207).
It seems unnecessary to add suggestions on this point. There is no
power in this Department to review the decisions of the court in cases
like the present. Those surveys not confided to the jurisdiction of the
court are by the statute to be passed upon by the Commissioner of the
General Land Office, while in court the United States is represented by
the district attorney, and he is recited in the proceedings as present at
the rendering of the decree. No appeal being taken by either party
the same becomes final. Itmay have beenerroneous for any other cause
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as well as for want of jurisdiction, but it is not for the parties to com-
plain. The law provided a remedy by appeal and none was sought.
This Department should accept as final what was so regarded by the
proper Department having charge of the interests of the government,
and not arbitrarily attempt to review the proceedin gs or set them aside,
at the request of the disappointed suitor.
The decision remanding the survey for further correction is reversed,
and you will issue patent upon the same as finally approved by the
United States district court.
PRIVATE CLAIM-CONTROL OF LOCATION.
RANCHO SAN JACINTO NUEVO Y POTRERO.
The location of a confirmed Mexican grant, within limitsembracing largerquantity,
may be controlled by the General Land Office, as against the selection of the con-
firmee.
In making the survey, however, reasonable and not arbitrary discretion should e
exercised.
Acting Secretary Bell to Conmissioner McFarland, February 17, 18S2.
In view of the facts and considerations stated in your letter of Sep-
tember 17, 1881, respecting the survey of the Rancho San Jacinto
Nuevo y Potrero, I directed, on November 19, 18S1, a farther survey to
be made by said rancho, which should not embrace the land patented
to Gustave Mahe in 1880, within the limits of the San Jacinto tract,
and should also be within the O'Farrell survey of said Sari Jacinto
rancho.
A motion is now filed by John Mullan, esq., in behalf of the con-
firmees of said rancho, for a modification of my said direction so that
said further survey may include the lands (or a portion thereof) sold
and patented to Mahe. The motion is based on the claim that the con-
firmees of said Jacinto Nuevo have the right to select the quantity con-
firmed to them, within the boundaries of the O'Farrell survey.
This claim is not well founded, in my opinion, as against the authority
of your office to control the location. In the case of United States v.
Armijo (5 Wall., 441) it was held that-
Where a grant was for a specific quantity, within exterior limits em-
bracing a much larger quantity (as in the present case), there was no
obligation on the part of the former government, nor is there any obli-gation on the part of the present government, to allow the quantity
to be selected in accordance with the wishes of the grantee. The duty
of the government is discharged when the right confierred by the grant
to the quantity is attached to a specific and defined tract.
Under our system, the right of the grantee to direct a selection f the
quantity granted is admitted, subject only to the restriction that the
selection be made in one body and in a compact form. This right, we
say, is admitted, though strictly it is not a right; it is only a privilege
given by the generosity of the government. . . . . . The exercise
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of the right of selection given to the grantee is not permitted by the
political authorities, and when a location is subject to the control of the
courts, is never permitted by them so as to defeat the equitable prior
rights of others.
That the General Land Office, and not the grantee, may select the
confirmed lands for patent is held in the case of Van Reynegan v. Bolton
(5 Otto, 33), in which the court says:
Even if the limitation to one square league (as in that case) should
ultimately be held correct, that square league might be located in a dif-
ferent portion of the tract, by direction of the land department, to which
the supervision and correction of surveys or private land claims are in-
trusted. The confirmees could not measure off the quantity for them-
selves, and thus legally segregate it from the balance of the tract. The
right to make the segregation rested exclusively with the government,
and could only be exercised by its officers.
These principles were adopted by Secretary Chandler in his decision
of August 8, 1876, in the case of the survey of the California private
land claim " Piedra Blanca," wherein he said, inter alia:
Whether it [the right of selection by a confirmee] be called a right or-
a privilege, it is subject to the control of the proper authorities for the
protection of prior equitable rights, and, in my opinion, must be held
subservient to the public good. The claimants are entitled to their full
quantity of eleven leagues, but if the interests of the public require that
it be located in a certain place, it is the duty of this Department to di-
rect such location.
It seems well settled, therefore, by the decisions of the supreme court
and of this Department that the location of a confirmed Mexican grant,
within a tract embracing a larger amount, may be controlled by your
office as against the selection of a location by the confirmee. The dis-
cretion of the officers, however, upon whom the duty of making the sur-
vey is imposed by law, should not be arbitrary, but should be reasonable,.
and should be so exercised, in view .of the record of the case, the situa-
tion of the land, the improvements and possession of the claimants, and-
all other circumstances proper and necessary to be considered, as to ful-
fill the requirements of the decree of confirmation according to its true
intent, and thus do substantial justice as between the United States.
and the confirmees.
I am advised that the sale to Mahe in 1870 was made after survey of
the San Jacinto Nuevo grant, and after publication thereof without ob-
jection, and when apparently satisfied, so that the lands were supposed
to be subject to sale. The survey was afterwards found to have been
prematurely made (the original San Jacinto grant being pending in the
supreme court, not yet confirmed), and subsequently set aside, and a
new survey directed; and hence the error in the sale to Mahe at the
date thereof. It appears also that Mahe has conveyed portions of the
land patented to him to other parties; and that also the confirmees may
receive the quantity confirmed to them in a compact form without inter-
fering with his and their interests.
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Although the sale to Mahe may have been erroneous because the grant
was prematurely surveyed, the original grant to Estudillo not having
been confirmed until 1875, and the land embraced therein not being
subject to settlement under the pre-emption or other laws for the dis-
posal of the public domain, so long as the claim of the grantees remained
undetermined, yet it is within the jurisdiction of your office so to con-
trol the selection and location of the grant lands that the rights of Mahe
and his grantees may be preserved, as between them and the govern-
ment, and at the same time the confirmees be secured in the quantity
of land to which they are entitled. There is no inconsistency in thus
harmonizing the application of the two rules.
The motion is denied, and the survey will be made as directed by my
letter of November 19, 1881.
PRIVATE CLAIM-DECREE OF COYFIRMA LION.
RANCiHO EL SOBRANTE.
The translation of the original title papers, adopted in the decree of confirmation is
the official translation, and cannot he changed in construing the decree.
The term sobrante, means simply surplus; a grant for a "sobrante," is not a grant
by aine, necessarily including all the surplus of the tracts referred to; but is
subject to words of limitation designating the particular location of the surplus
granted.
As to boundaries and extent, the decree of confirmation must be the guide in making
the survey.
Secretary Kirkw'ood to Commissioner McFarland, February 23, 1882.
I have considered, on appeal from the decision of your office of Feb-
ruary 26, 1881, the matter of the survey of the California private land
claim known as El Sobrante rancho, situate in the counties of Contra
Costa and Alameda, and confirmed to Juan Jos6 and Victor Castro by
the Board of Land Commissioners and the United States district court
for the northern district of California, under the act of Congress ap-
proved March 3, 1851 (9 Stats., 631).
Such facts, appearing of record in your office, as are necessary to a
proper understanding of the main questions presented for consideration,
will be stated as briefly as practicable.
On the 26th of May, 1852, the said Juan Josd and Victor Castro, by
their attorneys, H. W. Carpenter and John Wilson, filed in the office
of the said Board of Land Commissioners a petition in which they set
forth, among other things, that on the 22d of April, 1841, they presented
their joint petition to Juan B. Alvarado, then governor of Upper Cali.
fornia, " for a grant of all the vacant (sobrante) land lying between the
ranches San Antonio, San Pablo, Pinole, Valencia, and Moraga, being
the surplus or overplus left between the said ranches after the bounda-
ries to the ranches " should " be ascertained and settled"; that " on the
23d of April, 1841, the said Alvarado, so'being governor, and having
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full power and authority to do so, granted the land as prayed for in the
said petition," and directed the petitioners " to appear anew before the
proper authority with a map of the land so asked . . . . . as soon as
the boundaries of the ranches narm-ed in said petition . . . . . should
be ascertained, regulated, and settled "; that they had always been ready
to comply with the direction of the governor to present themselves
anew to the proper authority, with a map of the land thus conceded to
them, but that thebotindaries of the ranchos named had not been ascer-
tained and settled; that " the said Victor, several years before the date
of the grant, had settled upon the land so granted them, had built and
resided in a house, and cultivated fields thereon "; that both the peti-
tioners " pastured their cattle, horsesl, etc., upon it," the land granted,
"before the grant was made," and had continued to do so ever since;
that the said Victor had " constantly since resided thereon," and had
cultivated three different ranchos thereon, and had, for the last fourteen
years (prior to presentation of the petition to the Board), "had and
held (and which was known to the owners of the neighboring ranches
mentioned in the grant . ) exclusive and continued possession
thereof"; and the petitioners prayed that they might " be allowed to
intervene in the cases arising out of the said ranches when the bounda-
ries thereof" were to be investigated, so that justice might be done
them and they obtain " all the vacant (sobrante) land lying between the
said ranches after the~r boundaries are properly adjudged and regu-
lated," and that their grant might be confirmed and made valid to them
" according to the fall intent of the grant at the time the same was
made." (Record of Petitions, vol. 1, p. 460, et seq., Land Commission of
California.)
On the same day, to wit, May 26,1852, the Castros filed another peti-
tion, in which they represented, as before, that they had petitioned for
a grant April22, 1841, of" all the vacant (sobrante) land lying in between
the ranches of San Antonio, San Pablo, Pinole, the ranch of Valencia,
and the ranch of Moraga, being the overplus lying between these sev-*
eral ranches, which lie in the county of Contra Costa"; that on the 23d
of April, 1841, the governor granted the same to them, " as they peti-
tioned," and directed them to " present themselves anew before the
proper authority, accompanied by a map of the land so granted, so soon
as the boundaries of the ranches named should be ascertained and set-
tled; but that the boundaries of the said ranches " had never
been ascertained and settled. They therefore prayed the Board to ascer-
tain and settle said boundaries, and then they would comply with all
their duty in the premises. They also stated that they would prove
that they had been " in the actual possession of said (sobrante) or va-
cant land so granted them ever since the date of the said grant," and
that they had " had on it a large stock of cattle, horses, sheep, etc."
They farther alleged that the grant had not been approved by the
departmental assembly, "because the boundaries of the adjoining
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ranches had not been ascertained," and set forth other matters not nec-
essary to be stated here.
They again prayed the Board to confirm their claim, etc. Ibid, p.
634-5.)
Whether this petition was to amend the one first herein referred to,
or vice versa, does not appear; but the two may be taken together as
the petition of the Castros to the board of Land Commissioners.
It may be well here to state that about the year 1853, after said peti-
tion to the Board was tiled, and before the claim was confirmed, the
county of Contra Costa, in which the petitioners alleged their land to
be situated, was divided, and part of it included in the county of Ala-
meda. There is, consequently, no variance between the general loca-
tion called for in the petition as in Contra Costa County, and that in
the Board's decree as in the counties of Contra Costa and Alameda.
In support of their claim the petitioners introdu ced in evidence the
original petition and concession, or grant, and a translation thereof,
which translation was certified as correct by George Fisher, secretary
to the Board. This official translation of said petition and grant reads
as follows:
PETITION.
To his Excellency the GOVERNOR:
The citizens, Juan Jose and Victor Castro, natives of this department,
and residents within the jurisdiction of San Jos6 de Alvarado, present
ourselves before your excellency in the most proper and respectful man-
ner, and represent that, being desirous of being finally settled upon
land of our own, for the purpose of devoting ourselves to the labors of
agriculture and the raising of cattle, in order by these means to obtain
the very necessary means of subsistence for our numerous increased
families, which is of such vital importance, we beseech your excellency
that you will deign to grant unto us a piece of vacant land which is
situate on the immediate limits (immediaciones) of San Antonio, San
Pablo, Pinole, the farm (rancho) of Valencia and the farm of Moraga,
which land is the overplus (sobrante) of the ranches aforesaid.
Wherefore we humbly pray, etc.
JUAN JOSI3 CASTRO,
VICTOR CASTRO.
MARGINAL CONCESSION OR GRANT.
MONTEREY, April 23, 1841.
As the parties interested petition for in this representation so the
land of which they make mention is granted unto them, they remaining
under obligation to present themselves anew, accompanied by a map
of the land, so soon as the boundaries of the neighboring land-owners
shall be regulated.
ALVARADO.
(Record of evidence, vol. 19, p. 107, Land Commission, California.)
Testimony was introduced to prove the genuineness of the grant, its
character, the settlement of Victor Castro thereon, the possession of the
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Castros as alleged in the petition, and also some testimony concerning
the boundaries of the Peraltas' grant of San Antonio, and the case was
submitted for decision, whereupon, on the 3d day of July, 1855, the fol-
lowing opinion and decree were rendered by the Board of Land Com-
missioners:
OPINION.
No. 96, JUAN IosE AND
Victor Castro L For a sobrante, in the county of Contra Costa.
V.
THE UNITED STATES. )
The evidence in this case establishes the following facts: That the
petitioners presented their expediente for a soibrante of land lying be-
tween ranches named in said expediente, and in pursuance of said ex-
pediente, Juan B. Alvarado, governor of California, on the 23d day of
April, 1841, issued a grant to the petitioners, and requiring them to re-
port a plat of the same as soon as the adjoining ranches could be sur-
veyed an(L the extent of the sobrante ascertained, which survey has not
been had of said ranches so as to enable the petitioners herein to defane
with certainty the boundaries of their said sobrante, and a large amount
of testimony has been taken for the purpose of settling the boundaries,
which is rendered inapplicable to the merits of this claim by the decis-
ion of the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Fremont.
The grant offered in evidence is proven to be genuine, and the proofs
in the case go to show that it was issued to the grantees in considera-
tion of services rendered to the nation and for supplies furnished for
the use of the Mexican Government.
We think this claim a valid one, and a decree will be entered con-
firming the same
DECREE.
JUAN JOSE~ CASTRO AND VICTOR CASTRO o
V. No.96.
THE UNITED STATES. S
In this case, on hearing the proofs and allegations, it is adjudged by
the commission that the claim of the said petitioners is valid, and it is
therefore decreed that the same be and hereby is confirmed.
The land of which confirmation is hereby made is situated in the
counties of Contra Costa and Alameda, and is the surplus (sobrante)
which, on the 23d of April, A. D. 1841, the date of the decree of concession
to the present claimants, existed, lying between the tracts known as
ranchos of San Antonio, San Pablo, Pinole, Moraga, and Valencia,
reference being had to the original expediente on file in this case.
(Record of Decisions, vol. 3, pp. 106 and 107, Land Commission, Cali-
fornia.)
The case was taken to the proper United States district court, as pro-
vided in section 9 of the act of 1851, above referred to, and such pro-
ceedings were had before, and decree entered by, the court as made the
decree entered by the Board the final decree in the matter.
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The contest now here on appeal arose over a survey of the claim thus
confirmed, which was executed by Deputy Surveyor William Minto, in
1878, under contract with the surveyor-general of California, approved
-by your office. The field notes of the survey were returned to the sur-
veyor-general's office August 26, 1878, and from them a plat was made,
after which, in September and October, 1878, notice of the execution of
the survey and plat was duly published under section 1 of the act of
July 1, 186 (3 Stats., 332), and the survey and plat were retained in
the office of the surveyor-general for inspection, as required by law.
Many objections to the survey, protests against the surveying of the
elaim as demanded by the owners thereof, and interventions in the case
were filed, some before and others after the period of ninety days from
the first publication of notice had expired; and thereunder a vast
-amount of testimony was introduced before the surveyor-general, which
was forwarded with the appeal. It is unnecessary to pass upon the
status of the various objectors, protestants, and intervenors, or to spec-
ify those who appeared in time and showed such interest as entitled
them to be heard, and to dismiss the proceedings of all others, under
the rule laid down by the Department May 28, 1879, in the matter of
the survey of the Rancho El Corte de Madera del Presidio (6 L. O., 52),
for the reason that the case is appealed by parties having a proper
standing therein, who have raised every point, it seems to me, that the
circumstances of the case admit, or that arises in the case.
I need not further recite connectedly the history or facts of the case,
~enough having already been stated to develop the principal questions
involved; but such other matters of record in your office as shall seem
proper to be considered will be referred to and discussed as occasion
may require.
It is proper here to state my reasons for not using and discussing the
testimony of witnesses taken before the surveyor-general. I have not
,done so for the reason that as to one branch of the case no such testi-
mony is admissible, and as to the other, from my view of the case, none
,of it is needed. The explanation is this: The decree is said to be am-
biguous. Now, if there is a patent ambiguity, it cannot be explained
by testimony unless the terms used are wholly indefinite and equivocal
and convey on their face no certain or explicit meaning, and the decree
itself furnishes no materials by which the ambiguity thus arising can be
removed. I such a case, rather than the claim which has been adjudi-
cated upon the principles of equity (sec. 11, act of 1851, 9 Stats, 633)
should entirely fail, the light of extrinsic evidence may be brought in
to ascertain the intention of the Board. But, in my opinion, the decree
is not in such a condition. I think that any patent ambiguity in the
expressed decree can be explained by reference to such matters, as, under
the rules of interpretation applicable to this case, may properly be ex-
amined for that purpose as a part of the decree. It follows, therefore,
that any ambiguity appearing upon the face of the decree itself mast
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be removed by construction and not by averment, and hence upon this
branch of the case the testimony aforesaid is inadmissible.
The latent ambiguity of the decree can, in my opinion, be sufficiently
explained by the records of your office or those of the surveyor-general's
office, and therefore the testimony of witnesses was not, and is not,
needed in this case. In other words, that which was confirmed by the
decree of the Board can be so surveved as to do substantial justice from
light afforded by the records of the Land Department, and no testimony
dehors the records would make the matter more certain.
The decree of confirmation in this case is final and conclusive as be-
tween the United States and the Castros, or those claiming under them.
If there were error or mistake in it the only remedy was by appeal. The
appeal from the decree of the Board having been dismissed by the dis-
trict court, the decree must forever stand as the court thus made and
left it. There is no authority or jurisdiction in any tribunal to correct,
alter, amend, or annul it. Nothing remains to be done except to exe-
cute it according to its true intent as the law provides. If it is ambig-
uous and requires construction, then this must be done under the rules
of the common law. The decree must serve as the guide to the sur-
veyor-general in making a survey in execution of the same. It is the
duty of the Commissioner of the General Land Office to see to it that
the survey conforms as nearly as practicable to the decree, and finally,
the Secretary of the Interior, by virtue of his supervisory powers and
appellate jurisdiction, has authority to review the action of the Com-
missioner in the premises and direct how the survey shall be made.
Each of these several propositions of law will be found fully sustained
by some one or more of the following authorities: Higneras v. The
United States (5 Wall., 827, 828, 830, 832, 834); United States v. Hal-
leck ( Wall., 439); United States v. Billings (2 Wall., 444); the Fos-
satt Case (ibid., 649); United States v. Fossatt (2 How., 447); United
States v. Sepulveda (1 Wall., 107); 12 Opins. Attorneys-General, 250;
Snyder v. Sickels (8 Otto, 203); sections 13 and 15, act of 1851, 9
Stats., 633, 634; sections 1, 6, 7, act of 1863, 13 Stats., 333, 334; section
1, act of 1812, 2 Stats., 716; section l, act of 1836, 5 Stats., 107; section
3, act of 1849,9 Stats., 395; section 453 Revised Statutes; and Decisions
of this Department of March 3, 1881, in the matter of the survey of the
pueblo lands of San Francisco, and of May 21, 1881, in the matter of the
survey of the Rancho San Jacinto Nuevo y Potrero.
It has been contended in argument by some of the able counsel that
the claim of the Castros was not such as, according to the decision of
the supreme court in numerous cases, should have been confirmed ;
because the paper constituting the petition and concession was in the
hands of the Castros until the organization of the Board of land com-
missioners, and until it was filed in the office of the board; because there
was no map accompanying the petition, no reference by the governor
of the petition for information, no report upon the petition by any gov-
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ernment officer, and the grant was not made matter of record in thee
archives-of the Mexican government; and hence, that the only title too
consideration which the claim has is the decree of confirmation. For-
these reasons it is contended that, as to the claim, the construction of-
the decree should be strictissimajw ris. Others contend that the doctrine.
applicable to public or legislative grants should be applied in constru-
ing this decree; that it should be strictly construed as against the con-
firmees. On the other hand, counsel for claimants contend that the doe-
trine above mentioned does not apply to decrees, especially not to a,
decree under the act of 1851, foundedupon the principles of equity, and
that as to such a decree the doctrine of liberal or equitable construction
should be applied.
As to the first point, it is only necessary to say that the tribunal cre-
ated by law to execute the decree cannot go behind it. The presumptionm
is that the Board and the United States district court did their duty in
the premises, and adjudicated the case upon the laws and principles by
which they were required to be governed as provided by section 11 of they
said act of 1851, and hence, that the decree is valid and binding upon
all parties thereto. Therefore, if construction is necessary, the decree,
must be considered as entitled to the same respect and consideration
as any other final decree of confirmation under said act.
As to all the foregoing propositions it may be said that the decree
must be executed according to its true intent and meaning, and that
construction should not be employed to any other end.
Sedgwick, in his work upon Construction of Statutes, etc., after hav-
ing examined many decisions of courts bearing upon the subject of'
strict and liberal construction, concludes a long chapter by giving the
judiciary and the legal profession, in the form of rules, the benefit of-
his extended researches, from which I make the following quotations:
The intent of the legislature should control absolutely the action of'
thejudiciary; where the intention is clearly ascertained, the courts hav&
no other duty to perform than to execute the legislative will, without.
any regard to their own views as to the wisdom or justice of the par-
ticular enactment.
The idea that an act may be strictly or liberally construed without;.
regard to the legislative intent, according as it is viewed either as a
penal or remedial statute, either as in derogation of the common law or
beneficial innovation, is, in its very nature, delusive and fallacious.
In cases where the intent of the legislation is ambiguous, and the effort
to arrive at it is hopeless, and in these cases only, does the power of
construing a statute strictly or liberally exist. (Sedgwick, on the Con-
struction of Statutory and Constitutional Law, 325 and 326.)
The supreme'court of the United States, in discussing the doctrine
of strict construction as applicable to legislative grants, held that the,
grant being considered by them could not extend beyond the intent it.
expressed; that-
It should be neither enlarged by ingenious reasoning, nor diminished)
by strained construction. The interpretation must be reasonable, andl
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~such as will give effect to the intention of Congress. This is to be as-
certained from the terms employed, the situation of the parties, and the
nature of the grant. If these terms are plain and unambiguous, there
-ean be no difficulty in interpreting them; but if they admit of different
meanings-one of extension, and the other of limitation-they must be
*accepted in a sense favorable to the grantor. (Leavenworth, &c., R. R.
-to. v. U. S., 2 Otto, 740.)
The harmony between the doctrine expressed by the court and that
referred to above is at once apparent. Both agree that the intention
must prevail, but when the terms employed are so ambiguous as to
render it impossible to ascertain the intention of the framers of the
act, then the doctrine of strict or liberal construction may be applied
-according to the nature of the case. The supreme court, in the partic-
ular case, held that when the terms admitted of different meanings, one
,of extension and the other of limitation, they must be accepted in the
, sense favorable to the grantor. The court supposed a case wherein it
was hopeless, from the ambiguity of the terms employed, to arrive at
-the intent of the legislature, in which case it was authorized to employ
the doctrine of strict construction as to the grantee, or to take that
-meaning which was favorable to the grantor. A meaning of extension
-and another of limitation are certainly diametrically opposed to each
other, in which case one could be taken to the exclusion of the other.
But where no such condition of affairs exists-where the intent can be
reasonably ascertained from the whole act or instrument being inter-
-preted-then there is no choice left, and the intent must govern.
In this connection it may be well to advert to the fact that the decree
refers to "the original expediente and grant on file in this case." That
instrument, therefore, may be read with the decree as a part of it (Sedg-
wick on Construction, &., 2d edit., 229 and 230; and Broom's Legal
Maxims, 7th edit., 673 et seq., and the numerous cases cited therein);
not, however, for the purpose of opening anew any question adjudicated
-by the board and district court, nor for giving to the instrument re-
ferred to any other construction or force than that given by the Board
.and court as expressed in their decree; hence, not for the purpose of
,changing the meaning of terms that are clear and unambiguous in the
expressed decree, but only to explain any ambiguity in the decree itself
(United States v. Hlalleck, 1 Wall., 455; decision of this Department of
May 21, 1881, in matter of survey of Rancho San Jacinto Nuevo y Po-
-trero). Wherein the decree on its face is clear so far as it relates to
the subject-matter of the original petition and grant, it must be held to
'be the construction of the Board and court upon those instruments,
which cannot be questioned here. Furthermore, in referring to the pe-
-tition and grant in this decree, we can only look to the official transla-
tion thereof. We cannot take any other translation and by it under-
-take to explain any dubious expression of the decree. The Board had
-the services of a secretary " skilled in the Spanish and English lan-
guages," a part of whose duty it was to act as interpreter to the board
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as the law provided (sec. 1, act of 1851, 9 Stats., 631). The secretary
certified the translation of the petition and grant above given to be cor-
rect. The Board and the district court gave consideration to the peti-
tion and grant, and adjudicated the case in view of that official trans-
lation. It follows, upon reasons too apparent to require explanation,.
that the expert testimony of witnesses before the surveyor-general,.
giving a different translation to some of the words in the original peti-
tion and concession than that certified by Secretary Fisher, is wholly
inadmissible, and that all efforts to inject into the case now any other-
translation than that which the Board and court adopted must fail.
The points raised by the objectors, protestants, etc., are very numer-
ous and need not be recited here. They are all, in some way, embraced
in the three following general questions or propositions:
First. It is contended by the owners of the grant that the decree con-
firmed to them all the land within the exterior boundaries of the five
ranchos I]amed as colindantes, which should be left or result as surplus
upon the final survey of said ranchos; that their grant is not limited,.
except as by the exterior boundaries of said ranchos and their finally
surveyed limits, and therefore that the locative call in the decree for
land " lying between the tracts known as ranches of San Antonio, San
Pablo, Pinole, Moraga, and Valencia " should be disregarded in making-
a survey under the decree.
Second. Some of the contestants insist that the claim confirmed was.
a piece of vacant land never within the exterior boundaries of the five
ranchos referred to, or any of them, but outside thereof and bounded.
by them.
Third. Other contestants admit that the land confirmed was surplus.
of said five ranchos, or some of them, but insist that it must, from the-
terms of the decree, lie between those ranchos as finally surveyed, in
the sense of being surrounded, or partly surrounded, and-bounded by*
them.
The better to understand the situation, a short explanation of the
location of the five ranchos mentioned is necessary.
The San Antonio rancho has the bay of San Francisco for its western.
boundary, the ridge of the coast range mainly for its eastern boundary,.
and extends from a small stream called the Cerrito Creek, on the north,
to the San Leandro Creek, on the south, a distance of about 12 miles.
This was a grant by specific boundaries, and was surveyed and patented,
as such.
To the north and northeast of San Antonio, at a distance of about 5
miles, is the rancho El Pinole. This, as confirmed, surveyed, and pat-
ented, was a grant of quantity within larger exterior boundaries. The
calls for the exterior boundaries of this grant were natural fixed objects,>
leaving no uncertainty as to the lines thereof.
San Pablo was a grant of quantity to be located within the bounda-
ries mentioned in the grant, which were the ranchos of San Antonio,.
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1 Pinole, and the bay of San Francisco; the southeastern boundary
being thus necessarily uncertain.
To the east of San Antonio, the southeast of San Pablo, and south
~of El Pinole, was the rancho of Valencia, called Acalanes. It was a
-grant of quantity, to be measured within the general boundaries men-
tioned in the grant as San Pablo, San Antonio, and El Pinole.
South of the Acalanes and east of San Antonio was the Moraga
rancho, called Laguna de los Palos Colorados. It was a grant of quan-
tity, to be measured within the exterior boundaries described in the
governor's formal grant, which virtually, though not expressly, called
for San Antonio and Acalanes as colindantes.
The foregoing brief explanation, and the connected map prepared by
the surveyor-general in compliance with telegraphic order from your
predecessor of October 24, 1878, from data on file in his office, which
map was certified by the surveyor-general November 22, 1878, or the
map subsequently substituted therefor by the surveyor-general, will
give a tolerasbly correct idea of the country occupied by said ranchos,
and their relative situation both as regards their exterior and their
finally surveyed boundaries; but as to a part of the exterior boundaries
there is some question as to their being accurately delineated on said
maps, which will be discussed hereafter.
It will be seen that a large tract of land is left nearly surrounded and
bounded by said ranchos as finally surveyed and patented, in addition
to which there were numerous other smaller tracts excluded by final
surveys, not surrounded by nor lying between said ranchos, but within
the exterior limits of some of them, most of said tracts being entirely
disconnected with the large tract and with each other, and scattered
about in various parts, mainly on the outskirts of the general tract em-
braced by the exterior boundaries of the five ranchos mentioned in the
decree.
Your predecessor, having decided that the decree confirmed to the
ICastros all the surplus land of the ranchos aforesaid-that is, all the
land within their exterior boundaries excluded by final survey-and
that the said ranchos were coterininons as to their exterior boundaries
in the central portion of the general tract embraced by them all, set
aside the Minto survey, and directed a new survey to be made, which
should include not only the large tract nearly surrounded by the
ranchos as finally surveyed, but all the other tracts excluded from the
final surveys, limiting his award only by the quantity of twenty-two
square leagues.
In this, it seems to me, your office did not follow the decree of con-
firmation, assuming that the tract confirmed was surplus of some of the
said ranchos resulting upon final survey thereof.
The error in the decision proceeds from premises, which, to my mind,
are not supported by the relevant facts and the law of the case, to wit,
first, that the word sobranto," as used in the grant and degree of con-
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firmation necessarily meant all of the sobrante of said ranchos, and
could not be limited by the words designating the particular location
of the sobrante, nor by the words designating it as a piece-one piece-
of land; and, secondly, that it was a grant by name of the sbrante,
and hence included all of the sobrante.
It cannot be maintained upon general principles that power was
wanting in the governor to grant, or in the board and court to confirm,
as sobrante any portion of the surplus of grants of quantity, and define
its location and boundaries. As a matter of fact the records of your
office will show that more than one such grant has been made of the
sobrante of a single grant, and the grants thus made have been con-
firmed and patented accordingly. Now, that the tract confirmed in
this case, admitting it to be sobrante of some of the ranchos mentioned
in the decree, was limited, seems clear to me, and that the srveyor has
no authority to locate or survey any land in any other locality than that
mentioned in the decree cannot be successfully questioned. In view
of the authorities hereinbefore mentioned no one will deny that the de-
cree of confirmation must be the guide in making the survey, or that
the surveyor must follow it. In the. United States v. Fossatt (21 How.,
449), the supreme court, in speaking of the powers and duties of the
Board and courts under the act of 1851, said:
But, in addition to these questions upon the validity of the title, there
may arise questions of extent, quantity, location, boundary, and legal
operation, that are equally essential in determining the validity of a
claim.
This doctrine was reaffirmed in the Fossatt case (2 Wall., 707). In
United States v. Sepulveda (1 Wall., 107 and 108) the court said:
It is true, for the determination of the validity of claims presented,
some consideration must have been had of their extent, location, and
boundaries. The petition of the claimants must necessarily have desig-
nated, with more or less precision, such extent and location.
In the light of these decisions no one can consistently say that the
surveyor-general, your office, or this department can disregard the
words of the decree that point oat the locus of the land confirmed, in
making or directing a survey thereof. The decree recitesthat the land
of which confirmation is thereby made-
is the surplus (sobrante) which, on the 23d day of April, A. D. 1841,
existed lying between the tracts known as ranchos of San
Antonio, San Pablo, Pinole, Moraga, and Valencia.
Is it possible that any land that does not lie between those ranchos
can be surveyed under this decree By what authority can the sur-
veyor-general look for land under this decree, except in that locality?
But the Commissioner suggests that the words " lying between," etc.,
constitute a false description of the land, and that it grew out of the
mistaken meaning of the words " en las inmediaciones," in the petition
for the grant, which he says were carelessly taken to be translated by
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the word "between"; and he further says that the board did well to,
refer for greater certainty to the original grant.
The answer to this has already been anticipated. The board having
thus translated and interpreted the grant, there is no tribunal that has
the power to change it. Certainly it does not lie with the claimants to
object to the translation, for the record shows it to be their own, not-
withstanding it was adopted as the official translation. The regulations
of the commissioners, found in journal, vol. 1, p. 24, required every
claimant to accompany his petition "by a copy of the original grant and
a translation," and the petition of the Castros shows that this regula-
tion was complied with, and the records do not show that said copy and
translation were rejected or objected to. Unless the board was to adopt.
the translation, if found correct, there was no object in requiring it to,
be filed.
But the idea that there is repugnance in the language of the grant
and that of the decree on this point is not well founded. Referring too
the official translation of the petition and grant, it will be found that
the Castros petitioned for " apiece of vacant land which is situated o>
(not "in" as the commissioner has it) "the immediate limits (inmedia-
ciones) of San Antonio," etc., "which land is the overplus (sobrante) of
the ranchos aforesaid."
Here we find that this tract must be "on the immediate limits of " all
of the said ranchos. Now, from the very meaning of these words, taking
the actual situation of the grants named, the land must lie between
them all in the sense of being surrounded, or partly surrounded, and
bounded by them. The word "immediate," as here used, means "not
separated in respect to place by anything intervening." (See any stand--
ard dictionary.) It was one tract that was granted and the same tract
was confirmed; and it was not a tract of land, vacant or otherwise, that
surrounded all these ranchos and bounded their outer limits. The bays
of San Francisco and San Pablo and the strait of Carquinez put an
end to such an idea, even if the absurdity of the proposition in itself
does not. Where else, then, than in the midst of these ranchos can a
tract of land be found that can lie on the immediate limits of each and
all of the ranchos named in actual contact with all of them. There is
not the slightest repugnancy between the description in the grant and
that of the decree, so far as the words "lying between" are concerned..
But it is urged that the word "between" can refer to but two objects,.
and hence was not the proper expression to use to convey the idea above
expressed. Perhaps in a literal, narrow sense this may be true; but a
definition is given it in dictionaries like this, " in the immediate space
of"; "having mutual relation to two or more of"; in fact, the word is.
quite commonly used with respect to more than two persons or things,.
as "between us, to go no further, I will tell you something," the pro-
noun "'us" embracing, perhaps, twenty individuals. But, " qui hwuret
in literah eret in corte." Such verbal criticisms as are indulged in upon
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the words "lying between," as used in the decree, are of little value in
the interpretation of written instruments. The well-known general
and comprehensive rule for the interpretation of written istruments
is that where the intention is clear, too great a stress should not be laid
on the strict and precise signification of words. One who will consider
for a moment what other word can be found to describe the locality of
a tract of land surrounded, or nearly so, by a number of ranchos, will
soon discover that no form of expression in the English language is
better adapted briefly but clearly to define its location than that it lies
between them. But if there could be any doubt as to what the board
meant by the use of the words "lying between," in the connection in
which they were employed, it would be at once resolved by reference to
the petition and grant, as has already been demonstrated.
Suppose, however, that the petition and grant did not make clear the
terms in the written decree, and that the Department were required to
look beyond them, 'then I should turn to the Board's finding of facts in
the opinion preceding the decree. The Board there says that the evi-
dence establishes the fact that the petitioners presented their expedi-
ente for a sobrante" of land ,lying between ranches named in said
expediente." If this were not satisfactory, then I should read the peti-
tions of the Castros to the Board. In the first one they describe the land
as "lying between" the said ranchos, and, as if to leave no room for
doubt as to what they really meant, in their other petition to the Board
they describe it as" lying in between said ranchos. No one knew better
than the Castros where the land was for which they petitioned. Now,
with this expression so oft repeated, it seems to me that no other local.
ity than the intervening space inclosed (or partially inclosed) by all
these ranchos could be sought for the location of the piece of land con-
firmed, even if the original grant did not so effectually settle the ques-
tion.
But there is no confusion in the decree about this matter. The mean-
ing of the Board and court as to the locality of the land is plain, espe-
cially when the papers referred to in the decree are read\
It is hardly necessary to say more on this point. The mere mention
of the rule, which is applicable to this decree as well as to other written
instruments, that the whole instrument must be construed together, so
that, if possible, every part shall stand, that no words are to be rejected
gs meaningless and none interpolated or added, would perhaps have
been sufficient to answer all that has been said in favor of the rights of
the owners of El Sobrante to have other land surveyed than that found
to lie between the five ranchos in the sense in which the Board clearly
employed the word "between," that is, within the surroundings of the
five ranchos; not between any two, or three, or four of them, but be-
tween ll of them.
Whatever the land may be, whether an independent, vacant tract
(vacant in the sense of never haviig been included within the exterior
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limits of any of the ranchos named) or vacant surplus land (sobrante,
in the sense of having been included in some of the exterior boundaries
named in the grants, and vacant in the sense of being subject to grant), it
must be found in the locality designated in the decree as above defined.
I am supported in this view by the supreme court of California. In
the case of Tewksbury v. Derosier, decided November 11, 1881 (The
Pacific Coast Law Journal, vol. 8, No. 17, p. 683), the court, speaking
of this very decree, said:
The confirmation of El Sobrante was of lands "lying between the
tracts known as ranchos of San Antonio, San Pablo, Pinole, Moraga,
and Valencia." The lands in controversy are not between the ranchos
above named. or any of them. On the contrary, they are on the shore
of the bay of San Francisco, and between it and the rancho San Pablo.
They are not even in the vicinity of any of said ranchos, unless it be the
ranchos San Pablo and San Antonio.
The land in question before the court, and of which the court was
speaking, is one of the tracts which your office directed to be included
in the new survey.
After so much has been said, it is hardly necessary to discuss the
proposition thatthis is a grant by name. Surplus is undoubtedly a name,
because it is a noun, but it was not a proper noun as used by the Cas-
tros in their petition. There is nothing in the case to show that it was
ever the nameof this rancho at or before the date of this grant. Sobrante
means in English surplus or overplus. The three words mean the same.
There is probably no foreign word that can be translated into our En-
glish with more exactness of definition than the Spanish word " sobrante "
by the English word " surplus." If the Board in its decree had put in
parenthesis the word " overplus " instead of " sobrante," after the word
"surplus," the decree would have meant exactly what it does now, each
word being the exact equivalent of the other. The use of the word
" sobraute " in parenthesis simply shows that the Board translated it by
the word " surplus." The Castros asked for vacant, surplus land.
Whether surplus of vacant public land left in the general tract occu-
pied by the five ranchos outside of and defined by their exterior bound-
aries, or of that which should remain within the exterior boundaries,
after the quantities of said grants should be surveyed, will be deter-
mined next in order. They did not ask for a place known bv the name of
Surplus, or La Sobrante, or El Sobrante; but for a piece of vacant,
surplus land. That is all the name the rancho had. That does not fill
the well-known definition of a Mexican grant, by name of the place
granted, nor the old common law case orillustration of " Black Acre."
The second proposition above set forth presents more difficult ques-
tions than the onejust disposed of.
The expressed, recorded decree describes the land confirmed as the
surplus-
Which, on the 23d day of April, 1841, the date of the decree of con-
cession to the present claimants, existed, lying between the tracts known
as ranchos of San Antonio, San Pablo, Pinole, Moraga, and Valencia.
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The supreme court of the United States has, in several instances,
described the different kinds of grants which could be made under
Mexican law and regulations by governors of the Department of Cali-
fornia, thns: 1st, grants by specific boundaries where the donee was
entitled to the entire tract described; 2d, grants by quantity, as of one or
more leagues situated at some designated place, or within a larger tract
described by out-boundaries, where the donee was entitled out of the
general tract only to the quantity specified; and 3d, grants, or places by
name, where the donee was entitled to the tract nanfed according to
the limits, as shown by its settlement and possession, or other compe-
tent evidence. (igueras v. United States, 5 Wall., 828; Alviso v.
United States, 8 Id., 339; and Hornsby v. United States, 10 id., 221.)
The claim of the Castros, having been decreed to be valid, should be-
long to one of the kinds of grants thus defined. It is clear upon the
face of the decree that it was not a grant of quantity nor one of place
by name. It therefore necessarily falls into the category of grants by
boundaries; and as no calls are given for boundaries, except the five
ranchos named, it must be limited by their boundaries and lie between
them all. If this be not so, then, although confirmed as valid, the claim
is void for uncertainty.
In United States v. Fossatt (21 How., 449), the supreme court said
that " in affirming a claim. to land under a Spanish or Mexican grant to
be valid within the law of nations, the stipulations of the treaty ofGuada-
lupe Hidalgo, and the usages of those governments, we imply something
more than that certain papers are genuine, legal, and translative of prop-
erty. We affirm that ownership and possession of land of definite
boundaries rightfully attach to the grantee." See also Fossatt's case(2 Wall., 707), and United States v. Sepulveda (1 Wall., 107 and 108).
In United States v. Grimes (2 Black, 613), the court, speaking of the
duty of the land commissioners under the act of 1851, said: "Itis their
duty to establish the boundaries as well as the validity of the Mexican
grant as between him (the grantee) and the government." The Board
and court, then, had power to fix the boundaries as they did.
Now the presumption in favor of the validity of the decree, and that
the Board and court performed their duties under the law, forces the
conclusion that the decree in some manner indicates the boundaries of
the claim with more or less certainty, which in executing it must be
ascertained with reasonable exactitude; for not to ascertain them would
render that void which the Board and court have affirmed to be valid;
hence the decree must be construed, if possible, so as not to make void
that which has thus been affirmed as valid, whether the construction be
as to patent or latent ambiguity. In doing this, so far as ascertaining
the boundaries is concerned, that which is certain should be preferred
to that which is uncertain.
Now, as regards these boundaries, the expressed decree seems to be
ambiguous, but the ambiguity is mainly latent, and, wherein it is so, it
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may be explained by matters dehors the decree or the documents re-
ferred to therein.
While there may be no uncertainty as to the ordinary meaning of the
word " surplus" or " sobrante," yet, when applied to land, it seems to me
that it may embrace lands differing in condition or status, although it
is strongly maintained that it cannot. The ordinary definition of " sur-
plus " is that which remains when use is satisfied; excess beyond what
is prescribed or wanted-overplus. Now, was the land confirmed sur-
plus of vacant public land which was left of the general tract out of
which the said five ranchos were to be satisfied, and which was never
within the exterior bounties mentioned in the governor's grants of the
said surrounding ranchos, and bounded by their exterior boundaries;
or was it surplus of those ranchos, or any of them-that which should
remain of the larger tracts when the quantity to which the donees were
severally entitled should be satisfied-bounded by said ranchos after
they should be measured off and segregated?
The decree does not clearly state of what the land confirmed was sur-
plus. But itisinsistedthat whathere tayappeartobeambiguitas latens
and subject to explanation by extrinsic evidence is explained by subse-
quent terms in the decree, and no other evidence is admissible; that
wherein the decree describes the surplus as that " which on the 23d day
of April, A. D. 1841, . . . . . existed, lying between the tracts known
as ranchos of San Antonio," etc., the board and court necessarily meant
a tract of vacant public land, in the sense of lying without the exterior
boundaries named by the governor in the grants of said tracts, and
hence surplus of the general tract of public land out of which the sev-
eral ranchos mentioned were taken, and bounded by their exterior
boundaries; that in describing the land as surplus, which existed in
1841, lying between tracts kcnown by the names mentioned, those tracts
must have had known boundaries, and that a grant of quantity which
might be located anywhere within the exterior limits mentioned would
not have been referred to as a known tract.
But it will be seen that these subsequent terms necessarily lead for
explanation and certainty to matters outside the decree itself. To as-
certain what surplus existed in 1841, we certainly must look to matters
not set forth in the decree. Were the ranchos mentioned grants from
the Mexican government? Were they completed grants ? Were they
grants by names of places, or by specific boundaries, or of quantity
within larger exterior limits ? If of quantity, had they been set off and
segregated ? If not, what were their exterior boundaries e These and
divers other necessary questions are not answered by the decree, and
the decreeitself necessarilyrefers us to extrinsic matters. This is latent
ambiguity, and the decree is by no means peculiar in this respect.
It is well settled that even the instruments referred to in the decree
cannot be read to vary the natural import of the language used, if there
be no uncertainty therein, nor to control the description of boundaries
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are certain and free from ambiguity, but only to explain an ambi-
guity (United States v. Halleck, 1 Wall., 455; decision in San Jacinto
Nuevo y Potrero, above cited), and the same may be said of all ex-
trinsic evidence resorted to.
Now, looking at the petition and grant referred to in the decree we
find that the Castros petitioned for "a piece of vacant land which is sit.
uatedon theimmediate limits (immediaciones) of San Antonio, San Pablo
Pinole, the farm (rancho) of Valencia, and the farm of Moraga, which
land is the overplus (sobrante) of the ranchos aforesaid." Here we find
the land described as both "1 vacant" and " sobrante "; but in terms as
sobrante of the ranchos mentioned in the petition. What is meant by
the word " vacant " as used in the petition oes it mean land that
was vacant in the sense of not being or having been within the exterior
limits of any of the ranchos mentioned, or vacant in the sense that it
was not occupied by any of the grantees of the said ranchos, nor
claimed as being included in the quantity to which they were respect-
ively entitled and hence subject to grant? It would appear from the
further description thereof, " which land is the overplus (sobrante) of
the ranchos aforesaid, " that the latter was meant.
The governor granted to the Castros the land of which they made
mention in the petition, and by no other description than that which
they had employed, holding them "under obligation to present them.
selves anew, accompanied by a map of the land, so soon as the bound-
aries of the neighboring ranchos should be regulated."
It would appear from this that the boundaries by which the tract was
to be defined were not then fixed and certain, and that the lines of the
neighboring ranchos had not then been regulated
As has been explained, San Antonio was a grant by boundaries,
which were as certain then as now; but San Pablo, Pinole, Acalanes,
and Laguna de los Palos Colorados were grants of quantity, which
quantity had not been segregatedinl84l. Enough appears in the rec-
ords of the land commissioners to show that as San Pablo and Aca-
lanes were claimed and occupied in 1841, there was land in the locality
named by the Castros which would not be taken to satisfy the quan-
tity to which these grants were respectively limited.
The establishment of the Castros, owners of San Pablo, was on the
part of the rancho adjoining the bays of San Francisco and San Pablo,
andthatof Valenciawas considerably eastof the western exterior bound-
ary of the large tract. It was well known that there was more land
lying between these ranchos as thus possessed than would be required
in satisfying the quantity to which the respective donees were enti-
tled. The northern limit of Moraga's raneho would not interfere with
this sobrante. The boundaries of San Antonio and the exterior bound-
daries of Pinole, as defined in the grant 1842, were natural objects;
and if surplus was thrown off of neither of them there would still be a
large tract between them, surplus of San Pablo and Acalanes. Now,
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if all the exterior boundaries of San Pablo, Acalanes, and Moraga's
rancho were clear, then there would have been no difficulty In present-
ing a map of the sobrante asked for, if it was composed of a tract
bounded by the exterior boundaries of the five ranchos mentioned.
But it does not appear that it was customary to regulate exterior bounda-
ries of grants of quantity in the sense of establishing them permanently.
Consideration was, of course, to be given them, so far as to locate the
quantity granted within them: but I think it cannot be questioned that
the boundaries to be regulated were such as defined the quantity of the
land actually granted, and remained as the boundaries of the land to
which the donee was legally entitled under the grant.
This seems to be the view takenby the Board and the court; for in the
finding of facts the commissioners say that Alvarado issued a grant to
the petitioners "requiring them to report a plat of the same as soon as
the adjoining ranchos could be surveyed and the extent of the sobrante
ascertained, which survey has not been had of said ranchos so as to
enable the petitioners herein to define with certainty the boundaries of'
their said sobrante." If the exterior boundaries of the adjoining ranchos
were the ones to be regulated, then that could have been done much
better in 1841, when witnesses were living who would be more likely to
know of them than those that can be produced at this late day. More-
over, if the Board had supposed that such boundaries were to be regu-
lated, then it was their duty to fix the boundaries with as much cer-
tainty as the case would admit, and having the governor's grant of the
said ranchos before them,andlivingwitnessesto pointouttheirbounda-
ries, they would have found them and set them forth in the decree. But
they found that the boundaries tobe regulated were to be ascertainedby
surveys. No survey, to this day, has been made of those exterior bounda-
ries of the grants of quantity. When will the surveys that were to make
these boundaries clear and develop the extent of the sobrante be made,
if the exterior boundaries of the grants were the ones intended e There
will have to be further legislation by the government to accomplish
this, for there is no provision for surveying other than the land con-
firmed by the decrees of the Board of Land Commissioners and the
courts, and the five ranchos have been surveyed and patented. Un-
doubtedly the governor referred to the regulation of boundaries that
took place under the Mexican land system upon juridical measurement,
for that was the " regulation" of boundaries required by law and or-
dinance, and which usually was expressly provided for in grants. In
all cases in which the juridical measurement had not been had under
the Mexican government, this duty of measuring and segregating the
lands granted was transferred to and devolved upon our government;
and it is fully performed by our final surveys and patents. Our official
surveys take (or rather fill) the place of the juridical measurement re-
quired under Mexican law. This has been settled beyond question
by the decisions of the supreme court. It would therefore appear that
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the boundaries to be regulated or the surveys to be made, which were
to develop the sobrante granted and- show its boundaries and extent,
are those carried into the patents of the said ranchos.
But suppose this view should be incorrect; then, looking into the con-
dition of the surrounding ranchos in 1841, no independent, vacant tract,
with certain boundaries can be found. The San Pablo grant was to be
located within the following limits, taking the description in the gov-
ernor's concessions of 1831 and 1835: "Bounded by the ranchos of San
Antonio and El Pinole, and by a portion of the port of San Francisco."
The southeastern boundary, according to these calls, was clearly not
definite and certain. It is suggested that the diseno accompanying the
petition will make the southeastern boundary more certain, but exami-
nation thereof throws very little light on this matter. It will not indi
cate from what points on the boundaries of El Pinole and San Antonio
a line should be drawn to form this boundary. The map or diseio here
referred to is found in volume 2 of maps, Land Commission Recordsl
page 421, on which the southeastern portion of the tract, within which
the quantity was to be surveyed, is limited only by the border of the
map.
The southeastern exterior line of Pablo, drawn on the Boardman map
attached to the objections of Edson Adams, does not agree with that
drawn by the surveyor-general upon the connected map hereinbefore
referred to. So it seems that, with all the light afforded by the sur-
veyor-general's office, and by actual examination in the field (see sur-
veyor-general's certificate on connected map), skilled surveyors cannot
to-day agree as to the southeastern exterior of San Pablo.
In the third and fourth conditions, both in the decree of 1834 and
that of 1835, the donees were to solicit juridical possession of the proper
judge, who should measure the tract according to law, for the purpose
of having the boundaries of the grant marked out, the surplus to remain
to the nation for proper uses.
But this measurement was not made by the Mexican government, and
it devolved upon our government to finish the work that was left undone
by the former government. Oar government has measured the quantity
and given it certain boundaries. Were not these certain boundaries the
one that the governor and the Board referred to as requiring regulation
in order to define the boundaries and show the extent of the sobrante
granted and confirmed, rather than boundaries that are never to be reg-
ulated in the sense of being accurately surveyed and established, that
are shown to be uncertain and possibly impossible of ascertainment?
Again, take Valencia's rancho, Acalanes. The governor's grant de-
scribes it as " the tract of land known by the name of Acalanes, bounded
by the ranchos of San Pablo, San Antonio, and El Pinole."
It is contended that the large tract out of which the quantity granted
to Valencia was to be measured was not bounded by San Pablo, not-
withstanding the calls in the grant; because in limiting the quantity in
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the fourth condition, and directing the udge who should give Valencia
possession to measure it comformably to ordinance, the overplus remain-
ing for the use of the nation, etc., it was said that the tract to be meas-
ured was "one league in length by three-quarters of a league in width,
according as is explained on the map," which was with the record of
proceedings; and the map had written on its margin that the place asked
for was "situated between the arroyo Galindo and the arroyo Grande,"
those streams being delineated on the map or disefio. In other words,
that the map, on which was sketched the country to the northwest as
far as the coast, should control, instead of the aforesaid calls of the
grant, because it showed the situation of the three-quarters of a square
league that was granted as being between the arroyos aforesaid. Upon
this showing it is insisted that a vacant tract is developed between the
line formed by those two arroyos (Galindo being a tributary to the arroyo
Grande or San Pablo Creek, with junction southeast of the claimed
southeastern exterior line of the rancho San Pablo) and the southeastern
exterior of San Pablo.
Now, if this were true, there would still be the uncertainty as to San
Pablo's southeastern boundary; and it is not clear how this boundary
could be " regulated " so as to define such tract. But the vacant tract
disappears, admitting the arroyos Grande and Galindo to be the north-
western exterior boundary of Acalanes, for then the southeastern ex-
terior line of San Pablo becomes certain, and comes up to said arroyos.
The grant of Acalanes ought not to be held repugnant in its terms if
they can be made harmonious. Then if the arroyos Grande and Galindo
are the western and northwestern boundaries of Acalanes, the call ex-
pressed in the grant for San Pablo as a boundary should not be repug-
nant thereto; and as the southeastern boundary of Pablo was uncer-
tain, this call brought it to the arroyos aforesaid. But I look upon the
language of the fourth condition in Valencia's grant as simply a more.
specific designation of the locality in which the quantity was to be meas-
ured, and not as contradicting the general boundaries within which it
was to be located.
It follows, then, that the mentioned ranchos had coterminous bound-
aries, and that the land confirmed was the surplus of some of them
that should be defined by their boundaries as established or regulated
by final survey.
This fulfills the legal proposition that the grant, having been on-
firmed as valid, necessarily has definite boundaries; and this was its
condition in 1841, under the well-known rule that in law that is certain
which is capable of being rendered certain. Any other conclusion would
result, it seems to me, in inextricable confusion.
It is contended that the tract confirmed could not have been sobrante
of any of the grants, because the grantees had the right of possession of
the entire tract until segregation of quantity, and hence the Castros
could not have had possession of other than land not within the exterior-
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boundaries of the grants of quantity. Such an objection might be made
to any grant of sobrante; still sobranie grants have been confirmed, sur-
veyed, and patented. While it is true, as held by the supreme court in
Van Reynegan v. Bolton (5 Otto, 33), that the right to make selection
of the qantity granted rested exclusively with the government, and
could be exercised only by its officers, and that until segregation the
grantee had the right of possession of the entire tract within which the
quantity was to be measured, yet the discretion to be exercised by the
officers charged by law with the execution of decrees in such cases was
not arbitrary but reasonable, and was to be so exercised, in view of the
record of the case, the situation of the land, the improvements and pos-
session of the donees, and all other circumstances proper and necessary
to be considered, as to fulfill the intent and requirements of the decree
and thus do substantial justice between the United States and the con-
firmees.
For example, no survey would be deemed a proper one that excluded
the improvements and actual possession of the donee against his selec-
tion of land thus improved and possessei, provided it was within the
boundaries called for.
Now, notwithstanding the donees of the grants of quantity in the
case might have had the right of possession to the limits of the.larger
tracts, yet they did not object to the occupancy and possession of the
Castros in this case. Why they permitted the Castros to occupy the
land is not a inatter of just concern of this Department. The Castros
received a concession of a tract of vacant, surplus land, and the claim
thereunder has been confirmed, and the regulation of boundaries of the
neighboring ranchos has developed such a tract in the place called for
in the grant and decree. Beyond this it is not profitable nor pertinent
to inquire.
A tract or piece of land, no portion of which shall lie east of the
western line of Acalanes, or south of the northern line of Moraga, or
west of the eastern lines of San Antonio and San Pablo, or north of
the southern line of El Pinole, as those lines have been established by
the final surveys and patents of said ranchos, will substantially fulfill
the decree, and do justice according to the record of the case as between
the United States and the owners of the sobrante grant.
The next question for consideration is, should the survey of El So-
brante embrace any portion of the rancho La Boca de la Canada del
Pinolee
As regards the La Boca tract, it is contended by the owners of the
sobrante title that it was a part of the sobrante which existed April
23, 1841, and which on that date was granted to the Castros, and sub,
sequently confirmed to them under the act of 1851; that as it is the duty
of the surveyor-general to follow the decree of confirmation, he has no
right to look at the fact that said tract has been patented in making
survey of the sobrante; that it is the duty of the Land Department,
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under the act of 1864, to include in the survey all the lands included in
the decree.
Against this the owners of the La Boca tract refer to the fact that
the survey of their claim was ordered into court under the act of 1860
(12 Stats., 33); that the owners of El Sobrante intervened in that matter
and were made parties thereto; that the decree of the court approving
the final survey of that claim was entered by consent of all the parties;
and that, therefore, the sobrante claimants are estopped from demand-
ing that any portion of the La Boca shall be included in their survey,
and your predecessor so decided. Cases are cited as supporting this
proposition.
As against this position, the sobrante owners, some of them at least,
argue in effect that under the act of 1851 the land commissioners and
courts had no jurisdiction to adjudicate upon title as between third par-
ties, but only as between the United States and claimants; that the
primary object of the said act was to separate lands owned by private
individuals from the public domain; that confirmation under the act of
1851 simply affirmed that the land embraced by the decree was private
land; that the patent of the United States under said act is but a relin-
quishment of claim, or a quit-claim, to the tract confirmed, and record
evidence of the action of our government upon the claim, operating by
relation from the time when the claim was presented to the Board of
Land Commissioners; that such patent is simply conclusive as between
the United States and the claimants and the privies of the respective
parties; that the district court of California, under the act of 1860, had
no greater jurisdiction, to say the least, than the tribunal created by the
act of 1851, for ascertaining and settling private claims; that the matter
before the court under the act of 1860 was simply upon the question of
the correctness of the survey; in other words, to determine the question
as to whether the survey was an execution of the decree of confirmation,
the same as that of the surveyor-general now under the act of 1864, or
formerly under the act of 1851; that parties to proceedings before the
court upon approval of a survey under the act of 1860 are only bound
by the decrees, and estopped as to the subject-matter before and within
the jurisdiction of the court, and that all questions of title between
third parties claiming under grants of Mexican origin were necessarily
referred to the judiciary; and cases in support of these propositions
are cited.
The foregoing statement is made in order to develop the positions of
the contending parties in this matter. However, I do not think myself
called upon, as I understand the case, to decide or express an opinion
as to which is the correct one. It would undoubtedly be necessary to
decide the question were it shown that the land patented as the La
Boca de la Canada del Pinole was vacant, sobrante, land within the
meaning of and embraced by the decree in the Sobrante case. To my
mind not only is this not shown, but it seems to me that the records of
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your office and of the surveyor-general's office show beyond question
that the land patented to the La Boca claimants was not vacant, so-
brante, or surplus of any of the five ranchos mentioned, existing as such
April 23, 1841, within the true intent and meaning of the decree of con-
firmation of this case.
The records prove with reasonable clearness that it was neither vacant
nor sobrante at that time, and it was well said by one of the contestants
in argument, that as the government has patented the La Boca, the
survey of the Sobrante should not, in any view of the case, invade such
patented territory except upon clear proof that the land so patented is
embraced by the decree of confirmation to the Castros.
The question whether the La Boca was vacant and sobrante or surplus
land of any of the ranchos mentioned in 1841, and is embraced by the
decree of confirmation, is one to be determined by the officers or tribu-
nal upon whom the duty of executing the decree is imposed bylaw; as
only vacant, surplus land, with in the meaning of the decree, can be sur-
veyed.
In the first place, the La Boca was not a grant of ihe surplus or
sob rante of El Pinole, or any of the other ranchos mentioned as bound-
aries of El Sobrante. It was not a sobrante grant in any sense, accord-
ing to its terms; but it was a grant of quantity to be surveyed within
designated boundaries.
The land commission record shows that Ignacio Martinez claimed to
have received a grant of the place called El Pinole as early as 1823.
He so represented to the Mexican authorities in 1834, stating that he
had lost his title papers, and soliciting a renewal of the same. Record
evidence was not found to support his allegations, and he was required
to petition anew, which he accordingly did November 10, 1837, stating
that as he had mislaid or lost the grant issued to him in 1823, and as it
was impossible for him to make it appear that such a grant had been
made, he was under the necessity of making a second petition. In this
petition he described the land as "1 three sitios, which are ' Canada del
Pinol,' and that which is called 'L a Hambre,' straits of Carquinez, run-
ning towards the 'Mar de la Norte,' that is called the Bay of Sonoma,
adjoining the mouth of the same Canada del Pinole, as is explained in
the adjoining plan." For reasons set forth in the petition he asked for
an additional league. (Record of Evidence, vol. 15, p. 427.)
Thus it will be observed there was nothing in the archives of the
Mexican Government in 1837 designating boundaries to the place known
as El Pinole; and, as proceedings on the petition of Martinez were
pending in 1841, when the grant was made to the Castros, and were not
terminated until Jane 1, 1842, when the first and only recorded grapt
to Ignacio Martinez was issued, it follows that El Pinole had no bound-
aries recognized by the Mexican Govern ment in 1841, and consequently
that the boundaries declared in the grant to Martinez in 1842, are the
true boundaries of El Pinole, within which the four leagues granted. to
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Martinez were to be surveyed, and within which the boundaries of quan-
tity were to be regulated, as provided in the grant and decree in the
Sobrante case. That these boundaries did not include La Boca de la
Canada del Pinole will appear from what follows.
While proceedings were pending upon the petition of Ignacia Mar-
tinez, Felipe Briones, on the 24th day of July, 1839, petitioned for a
grant of the place known by the name of El Pinole, stating that it was
then more than ten years that he had possessed said place, comprising
three " sitios de ganado mayor," more or less, as designated upon the
plan accompanying the petition. Briones further alleged that he had
built a house o the land prayed for, "planted a garden of much con-
sideration, and cultivated some lands," by which and " some milking
cattle" he had maintained his family, composed of eighteen persons.
This petition was referred to Iguacio Peralta, a justice of the peace,
who reported thereon July 29, 1839, that the rancho of El Pinole had
been occupied by Don Ignacio Martinez since 1824, by order of the gov-
ernor pro tem., Don Luis Arguello, and that Briones, in his petition, did
not make mention of the land that he (Briones) had occupied, called " El
Corral de Galindo," where he kept his cattle, and hence that it would
appear as though his petition operated injuriously by asking for the
Cafnada del Pinole, and not stating that he held the aforesaid " Corral
de Galindo." Peralta further reported that Briones went on the land
under an arrangement with Martinez, entered into in 1831, the parties
"agreeing that their ends should meet"; that Briones " should assist
at rodeos, and place his small houses immediate for company."
The report of Peralta does not make itclearwhetherBriones intended
to procure a grant for all the land occupied by Martinez and himself,
or only for that occupied by himself, giving the land he desired the
wrong name. But the tract called " Corral de Galindo," embraced a
part of the Cafnada of Pinole and it is probable that Briones intended
to ask for the land occupied by himself, known as well by the name of La
Boca de la Canada del Pinole and San Felipe, as Corral de Galindo, as
facts hereinafter mentioned will show. However this may be the mat
ter of the several petitions was pending when the governor made the
grant to the Castros, and was not finally settled until more than a year
afterward by the issuance of grants to Martinez and the widow of
Briones, respectively (Briones having died about the year 1840). That
the governor considered Briones entitled to the land occupied by him
'and so decided before he issued a grant to Martinez; that Martinez so
understood the matter, and acquiesced in the governor's decision; and
that it was well understood that the tract known as La Boca de la Cant-
ada del Pinole, in the possession of Briones, was not included within
the exterior boundaries named by the governor in his grant of El Pi-
nole to Martinez, will appear from the following:
On the 1st of June, 1842, evidently in view both of the petitions of
Martinez and Briones, and of the report of Peralta, the governor, Alva-
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rado, who made the grant to the Castros, issued a grant to Ignacio
Martinez. In the concession of that date, the tract within which the
quantity was tobe surveyed was described as "'commencing at the month
of the Canada del Pinole, eastwardly along the same until it adjoins
with the Corral de Galindo, from this place to La Caflada de la Hambre,
and from thence to the straits of Carquinez."
In the formal title issued the sane day the four square leagues granted
were to be surveyed within the following boundaries: "1 By the name of
Pinole, its limits being from the mouth of the ravine (Canada) of the
same name, in an easterly direction by the same until it joins with the
I Corral de Galindo;' from this place to the Canada de la Hambre, and
along the same to the straits of Carquinez, the boundaries to terminate
at the mouth of said Canada del Pinole into the Bay of San Francisco."
Evidently this description was not to include the " place" called "Cor-
ral de Galindo," otherwise La Boca, etc. The ravine (Caiada del Pi-
nole) was to be followed until it adjoined with the " Corral de Galindo:
from this place to the Canada de la Hambre," etc.
The same facts appear, and are placed beyond doubt, by the language
of the grant to the widow Briones, made twenty days after the grant to
Martinez.
The grant to Maria Manuela Valencia, widow of Briones, was made
upon her petition of the 8th of June, 1842, in which she set forth inter
alia that she was the " widow of the late Felipe Briones, and established
in the nouth of the Canada of Pinole (en la Boca de la Canada del Pi-
nole)"; that for more than eleven years she had "lived in peaceable pos-
session of said place, with a considerable amount of stock, consisting of
four hundred head of cattle, having also an adobe house, and more than
one thousand grapevines, together with some fruit trees"; and she prayed
the governor to concede to her " the legal ownership of the said place, con-
taining three square leagues, as shown by the accompanying diseho."
The accompaning diseho distinctly called for the land of Ignacio Mar-
tinez as a northwestern, northern, and northeastern boundary (see Record
of Maps, vol. 2, p. 489). Her allegations accorded with those of her hus-
band in his petition of 1839 as regards possession and the length of time
that the Briones family had occupied the place, as also with the report
of Peralta upon the petition of Briones. The widow's petition, having
been referred to the proper judge for investigation and report, was pre-
sented to Ignacio Martinez, adjoining owner, who stated concerning the
same, June 13, 1842, as follows: "The Seiora Manuela Valencia, who
petitions for the place, as shown by the annexed diseio, is worthy of
being heard, and what she asks may be granted to her since it does not
prejudice my land." (The underscoring in the foregoing quotation is my
own.)
On the 14th of the same month, the judge to whom the petition was
referred, Guillermo Castro, reported that in view of the report of Igna-
cio Martinez, the tract asked for might be. granted to the petitioner.
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On the 21st of June, 1842, the land was granted to the widow of Bri-
ones, the governor stating that, in view of the petition, the foregoing
reports, " and all other matters necessary to be considered (the other
matters necessary to be considered undoubtedly included all the former
petition of Briones and Peralta's report thereon), Dofia Maria Manuela
Valencia is declared owner of the place named Boca de la Canada e
Pinole, bounding with the rancho of Don Ygnacio Martinez, with that
of Don Julio Wil, and with that of Candelario Valencia"; and in the
formal grant of the same date the land is described by the same bound-
aries, being limited in the third condition to three square leagues, as
shown by the diseho, annexed, the sobrante remaining to the convenient
uses of the nation. (Exhibit 32, Adams, from the archives in the sur-
veyor-general's office.) In bounding the general tract out of which the
quantity should be surveyed to Mrs. Briones with " the rancho of Don
Ygnacio Martinez," the boundaries of El Pinole, as declared by the gov-
ernor a few days before in the grant to Martinez, were unquestionably
meant.
'When this claim was before the district court upon petition for con-
firmation, the testimony of Jose de Jesus, son of Ignacio Martinez, was
taken. Being asked what he knew in regard to the boundaries of the
tract, the witness stated that on the north it was bounded by the rancho
of Ignacio Martinez, father of the witness, called El Pinole; that the
original map (diseno) was made by him in 1841, and that it was correct;
that it was the original map presented by Doha M. M. Valencia to the
governor when she petitioned for the land, and that he made it for that
purpose; and that when he made it the houses, corral, and garden. were
on the rancho as represented on the map. The witness further stated
that he became acquainted with the boundaries of La Boca by going
over the land with a son of Mrs. Briones for the purpose of making the
map; that he had lived on his father's rancho since April, 1830, andrid-
den over the La Boca rancho "thousands of times," and that he was
well acquainted with everything connected with it. (Exhibit 58, Blum,
from archives in surveycr-general's office.)
From the foregoing I conclude that the La Boca rancho was not
within the boundaries of El Pinole as established by the governor's
grant in 1842, the first official definition of the exterior boundaries of
that place. And taking the facts above stated in connection with the
testimony of William Richardson (vol. 5, 245, Evidence), C. Briones,
and Napoleon B. Smithl (vol. 4, pp. 561 and 720, Evidence), delivered to
the board in the case of El Pinole, and the location of the tract called
Corral de Galindo, and the Cuchilla de Chemisal, as laid down on the
connected map hereinbefore mentioned and on the official map of Mr.
Minto's survey, it would appear- that the northern patented line of La
Boca very nearly represents the calls of the grant and decree in the
Pinole case for Pinole's southern exterior boundary in this locality. It
follows, therefore, that La Boca was not surplus (sobrante) of El Pinole,
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and as the district court decreed the claim of Mrs. Briones to be good
and valid to the land known by the name of " La Boca de la Caflada,
del Pinole" to the extent of three square leagues "within the boundaries
so described in the grant and map on file in the records," and as the
grant and disenio call for Acalanes and Pinole for boundaries, and as
Acalanes calls for Pinole as one of its boundaries, it necessarily follows,
from the situation of these several grants, that La Boca was not sur-
plus of any of the five grants mentioned in the grant to the Castros of
1841, the presumption of law being that La Boca was located within
the boundaries called for in the decree of confirmation.
Again, La Boca was not vacant land in 1811, withing the meaning of
the decree of confirmation in the sobranWe case. The evidence in the
case of the La Boca upon petition for confirmation, as well as that of
Jose de Jesus Martinez. hereinbefore referred to, and that of Peraltain
his report, show a continued occupancy and possession from about 1831
till long after April, 18f1, by the Briones family, the widow continuing
in occupancy and possession after the death of her husband, and that
the land was improved by them as alleged in the petitions therefor
of 1839 and 1842. It was the very land occupied and in-the possession
of her husband that Mrs. Briones petitioned for, and it makes no differ-
ence whether it is called La Boca de la Canada del Pinole, San Felipe,
or Corral de Galindo.
In the opinion of the Board in that case, it was stated that the deposi-
tions on file showedla long residence on the land by the grantee, and
established very clearly a substantial compliance with the conditions of
the grant, and that the only obstacle to confirmation was to be found in
the proof of boundaries. The decree of the Board rejecting the claim
was reversed by the district court, and the claim was decreed to be good
and valid, and it has been surveyed and patented accordingly.
It was manifestly against the policy of the Mexican government to
grant lands to one party that were improved and in possession of
another; and petitions were referred to the proper magistrate for the
purpose of ascertaining whether they called for lands occupied by
others. In the very matter of the petition of Martinez it is seen that,
although he asked for land by the name of a place that might have em-
braced the establishment of Briones, and Briones had no grant from
the government, yet the possession of Briones was reco gnized as well
as that of Martinez, and the land possessed by him was carefully ex-
cluded from the grant to Martinez.
Now, as the governor recognized and protected the possession of Bri-
ones; as that possession was continued by his widow, and was of the
same land; as proceedings were pending before the government for a
grant of this land at the time of the grant to the Castros; as upon the
death of Briones the claim for the grant was continued in the name of
his widow, she alleging the possession that had continued since 1831;
and as the grant to the widow was made in view of all the proceedings
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mentioned, and necessarily in consideration of the uninterrupted pos-
session by the Briones family since 1831; it follows that the possession
was not a trespass. The presumption is that the final survey followed
the decree of confirmation ; that it embraces the quantity of land thus
possessed as limited in the decree; that it correctly shows the bounda-
ries thereof, and that the land was surveyed within the boundaries men-
tioned in the decree; and, as the possession which continued from 1831
was not a trespass, it extended to the boundaries of the claim as sur-
veyed and patented; all of which results in this conclusion: That in
1841 the land surveyed as the rancho La Boca de la Canada del Pinole
was not vacant.
Finally, it seems to me that the Mexican authorities, having juris-
diction in the premises, decided, in 1812, that the land known as La
Boca de la Canada del Pinole was not embraced within any former
grant. The reference of the petition of Mrs. Briones to the auxiliary
judge of Contra Costa required him to report whether " the land re-
ferred to belonged to any individual, with all other matters that may
be necessary." His report, s well as that of Martinez and that of Es-
trada, the selior prefect of the district, and the action of the governor
thereon in making the grant to ]Vrs. Briones, which, he stated, was in
consideration of those reports, and all other matters necessary to 'be
considered, amounted to a decision that the land granted was not in-
cluded in any former grant.
In view of the facts and the legal conclusions relative to this matter,
it would be just as consistent to hold that the land surveyed under the
grant to Martinez was vacant sobrante land in 1841, as to hold that that
which was surveyed under the Briones grant was vacant sobrante land
at that time; and the survey of El Sobrante might as well include the
one tract as the other. The grants of Pinole and La Boca are precisely
similar in character, and were virtually the result of the final determi-
nation of the same proceedings before the Mexican governmentpending
and undecided April 23, 1841.
I therefore decide that no part of the rancho La Boca de la Caiada
del Pinole should be embraced in the survey of the rancho El So-
brante.
The Minto survey not only embraces the larger portion of the La
Boca, but also a small part of the raucho Laguna de los Palos Colorados
(Moraga's claim) as patented, and does not include all of the land em-
braced in the decree as herein construed. It is therefore set aside.
The remaining question is with regard to the tract marked " No 7 X
on the Boardman map, and as public land on the Minto plat of survey
of El Sobrante. I do not consider that that tract lies between the five
ranchos mentioned, within the meaning of the decree, and it will ac-
cordingly be excluded from the final survey.
You will therefore direct a new survey to be made of the following
boundaries: Beginning at post S. P. No. 67, at the terminus of course
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No. 195 in the patented line of the San Pablo rancho; thence in a
direct line to post P. R. No. 4, terminus of course No. 4, in the patented
line of El Pinole rancho; thence with the patented line of El Pinole to
a point therein at which the westernmost line of the rancho La Boca
de la Cafiada del Pinole as patented extended northwardly intersects
said line of El Pinole; thence with the patented line of the rancho La,
Boca de la Canada del Pinole to the point at which the western pat-
ented line of Acalanes intersects the same; thence with the said line
of Acalanes to the north patented line of the rancho Laguna de los
Palos Colorados; thence with the last-named line and the same ex-
tended west to the eastern patented line of the rancho San Antonio;
thence north, with the patented lines of the ranchos San Antonio and
San Pablo to the place of beginning.
The decision of your office is modified accordingly.
ONA PPLICATIONFOR REHEARING.
Rehearing will not be granted when the case is not brought within the rules and1
principles relating to new trials.
On the merits the arguments and briefs do not show reason for dissent from the de-
cision in the case.
Secretary Teller to Commissioner ilfcFarland, April 4, 1883.
The decision in this case upon its merits was rendered by my pred-
ecessor on appeal from your office February 23, 1882.
A petition for a rehearing on behalf of said rancho was made and
filed on the 17th day of April thereafter.
April 28, 1882, a motion to dismiss the motion for a rehearing was
made by counsel for contestants and a printed brief filed.
On the 7th day of March, 1883, an oral argument was made before me
in behalf of the petition for a rehearing.
I have considered such argument and the brief submitted therewith,
The case presented does not bring it within the rules upon which re-
hearings are generally granted, nor do I think that any ground is dis-
closed that, under the rules and well-established principles relating to
new trials, would justify me in opening the case and directing a re-
hearing. i-
Counsel for the petition, in his oral argument and brief submitted at
that time, dwelt at length upon the merits of my predecessor's decision.
I have considered such argument and brief in that respect also, and
have taken occasion to examine the briefs and papers used before my
predecessor at the time of his said decision, and see no reason to dis-
sent from the general conclusions and result reached by him.
The motion for a rehearing is denied.
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PRIVATE CLAIM-DECREE-SURVEY-PUBLICATION.
RANcHo BUENA VISTA.
When the decision of the United States district court confirming a private land claim
was announced, but formal decree not entered, a decree unc pro tune has the
same force and effect as if entered at the time of the decision.
A survev of such a claim, approved by the surveyor-g eneral, is the official survey
and must be taken as the foundation for perfecting the location. A survey made
and published subsequently, without regard to it, is of no validity.
Commissioner .31cFarland to U. S. surveyor-general, San Francisco, Cali-
fornia, April 9, 1883.
In the matter of the survey of the Rancho Buena Vista, Jesus Ma-
chado confirmee, it appears by reference to the record that the claim
was confirmed by the Board of Land Commissioners; that the decree
of the Board was taken on appeal to the United States district court
for the southern district of' California, and on the 1st of February,
1856, a decision rendered by the court affirming the de cree of the Com-
mission, but no formal decree of the court was signed or entered; that
an appeal from said decision of affirmance was taken to the supreme
court of the United States; that at the December term of said district
court, 1856, upon the letter of the Attorney-General of the United States
and stipulation on the part of the claimant and of the United States, a
decree was entered dismissing said appeal and permitting the confirmee
to proceed on the decree of confirmation as a final decree- in the case;
that in pursuance of said decree a survey of the claim was made by
United States Deputy Surveyor John C. Hays in September, 1858, and
approved by Surveyor-General Mandeville October 19, 1858, and the
plat and field notes thereof then or subsequently filed in the surveyor-
general's office; that afterwards a succeeding surveyor-general, over-
looking the facts that a survey had been made and approved as afore-
said, directed another survey of the claim, which was made by United
States Deputy Surveyor Max Strobel in September, 1868. This last-
mentioned survey was published under the act of July 1, 1864; no objec-
tions were made thereto; it was approved by Surveyor-General Day
March 25, 1870, and returned to this office under date of February 25,
1871.
In 1875 United States Deputy Surveyor Goldsworthy, in subdividing
T. 11 N., R. 3 W., made a relocation of the claim of Buena Vista. A
connected diagram of the three surveys herein mentioned was transmit-
ted here from your office with letter of December 29, 1881.
The decree of confirmation by the United States district court being
wanting in the proceedings returned with the Strobel survey, and the
record therefore imperfect, action upon the survey in this office was
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'withheld. In the mean time the United States district court for the
southern district of California having been abolished, and its jurisdic-
tion, powers, and duties transferred to and imposed upon the United
States district court for the district of California, the said last-named
court, on April 15, 1879, in a decree entered Sunc pro tune as of Feb-
ruary 1, 1856, affirmed the decree of the Board of Land Commissioners
and confirmed the claim in question to Jesus Machado, in accordance
with the decision of the United States district court, made on the day
last above mentioned.
Subsequently, on request of this office, a traced copy of the plat of
the Hays survey was returned by your predecessor to this office. Thel
field notes of that survey have also been received. The plat shows the
approval of the survey by Surveyor-General Mandeville, as above set
forth.
The case being now taken up for action, the question first arises as
to the legal validity of the Hays survey, it having been made before the
entryofthedecreeofconfirmation. Anydoubtarisinguponthatgrounali
applies equally to the survey of Strobel.
That the decision of the court hearing the case was reached al
-declared at the date named there can be no question. Appeal ws
taken from it, and subsequent proceedings founded upon it had, result-
ing in the dismissal of the appeal and a supplemental decree declaring
it final. That the decision was made and announced is settled by the
action of the court which succeeded to the jurisdiction, in directing the
entry of the nunc pro tune decree, by which the valid rendering of the
decision confirming the claim is fully recognized.
The principle upon which the entry of a decree or judgment nunc pro
tune is allowed is expressed in the rule that "the delay" (omission)
4' of the court shall prejudice no one"; and the effect of such a decree is{with the exception of the rights of third persons, which it will not
affect) that-
It must be everywhere received and enforced in the same mannerand
to the same extent as though entered at the proper time. (See Freeman
on Judgments, 2d ed., §§ 56, 66, 67.)
The Hays survey, then, as regards the status of the case at the time
of its execution, being an authorized and valid proceeding, the effect of
its approval by the surveyor-general upon the subsequent action in youk,
office, relating to the location of the claim, is to be considered. The
rule is well settled that upon the approval of the survey of a private
land claim in California by the surveyor-general, his control over it
ceases. t becomes the official survey of the claim, and as to its correc-
tion, either by amendment or by new survey, the surveyor-general has
no power of direction. The case has passed from his jurisdiction.
In the matter of the survey of the Rancho Huasna, a survey was made
by United States Deputy Surveyor Henry in February, 1859, and ap-
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proved by Surveyor-General Mandeville November 4, 1859. Without
further action upon that survey (except its erroneous publication under
the act of June 14, 1860, it not coming within the provisions of that
act), another survey was made by United States Deputy SurveyQr-
Harris in 1872, which was published under the act of July 1, 1864, after-
wards amended by Surveyor-General Hardenburgh and returned to this
office.
By the decision of this office of March 17, 1875, it was held that the!
Henry survey of 1859 was the official survey in the case; that having,
been approved by the surveyor-general prior to the passage of the act
of July 1, 1864, under the mandatory provisions of that act, it must be-
published in accordance therewith; that no question of convenience to,
this office or the parties in interest, and no agreement between the claim-
ants and contestants, could warrant this office in disobeying the plain
requirements of the law. Publication of the Henry survey, under the,
act of 1864, was accordingly directed. On appeal to the Department
this decision was affirmed October 7, 1875.
In the case of the Rancho Mission de la Purisima, the first survey
was made by United States Deputy Surveyor Terrell in November, 1860,
and approved by Surveyor-General Mandeville April 9, 1861, but not.
published. Surveyor-General Beale, succeeding Mandeville, amended.
the Terrell survey, approved the amended survey, and published it
under the act of June 14, 1860. The published survey was returned to
this office and held to have become final by the publication, it not hav-
ing been objected to thereon.
On appeal to the Department the honorable Secretary of the Interior
referred the matter to the United States Attorney-General and it was,
examined by the Assistant Attorney-General, who gave the opinion that,
the survey made by Terrell and approved by the surveyor-general after
the passage of the act of June 14, 1860, his sole remaining duty was to
publish the plat in the manner specified in said act, and that so far as
correcting the survey was concerned he was thereafterfunctus officio.
This opinion was adopted by the Department, and in accordance there--
with the decision in the Huasna case and the mandatory provisions of
the act of July 1, 1864 (the act of June 14, 1860, having been repealed).,
The Terrell survey was directed to be published under the act of 1864
as the official survey in the case.
These decisions, as applicable to the present case, establish the official
character of the Hays survey, and require its publication as the founda-
tion for perfecting the location; also the fact that the Strobel survey,,
having been unauthorized, is of no legal force or effect.
You are therefore instructed to give notice of this decision to the-
parties interested, and, if no appeal is taken within the time allowed by
the rules, to publish the Hays survey in accordance with the act of 1864,
auid at the proper time make the usual return to this office.
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PRIVATE CLAIM- BOUNDARIES-RES JUDICA TA.
RANCHO SANTIAGO DE SANTA ANA.
Where the boundary of a claim is a river which has changed its course, cutting off a
part of the claim, the change does not deprive the claimant of the excised land;
the boundary remains where the river ran at the date of the grant.
A boundary which is to terminate at the sea-shore, reaches its termination where~ it
intersects the line of ordinary high water, at the head of an inlet, or arm of the
sea.
The Commissioner of the General Land Office has authority to direct an investiga-
tion, the taking of testimony, and a further report by the surveyor-general in the
case of a survey, notwithstanding exceptions have not been taken thereto.
-In case of contiguous claims the Commissioner is not estopped by the adjudication
and location of one, from determining a location of the other that may cause them
to overlap. The previous decision is only res judicata as to the claim to which it
relates. It is made the Commissioner's duty by statute to see that the ocation
of the claim under examination by him, conforms to the decree of confirmation
as closely as practicable. Any conflict between the two locations must be de-
termined by the courts.
Secretary Teller to Commissioner McFarland, April 14, 1883.
I have considered the matter of the survey of the Rancho Santiago
de Santa Ana, Bernardo Yorba, and others, confirmees, on appeal from
,your decision of May 25, 1882.
The survey in question was made in November and December, 1857,
by United States-Deputy Surveyor Henry Hancock. It was approved
-by Surveyor-General Mandeville, June 3, 1859, and published by Sur-
'veyor-General Stratton, in October, 1874, under the act of July 1, 1864
(13 Stat., 332).
No objections were filed before the surveyor-general within the time
prescribed by the act.
March 4, 1878, John Huntly and others, as owners and residents upon
lands belonging to said Rancho Santa Ana, filed protest and objections
before Surveyor-General Ames against said Hancock survey, on the
grounds that it wrongfully excluded, on the west and on the southeast,
lands which were embraced in the said Santa Ana grant, and included
by the juridical possession.
Yon state that the surveyor-general transmitted to your office, on
January 4, 1879, the plat and field-notes of said Hancock survey, with
his report thereon, and also a report and sketch by United States
Deputy Surveyor Minto.' The surveyor-general, in his report, staled
that he refused to consider the protest and objections of Huntly and
-others, for the reason that they were not presented within the time al-
lowed by law for that purpose; but he expressed an opinion, formed
from personal examination upon the ground and from the report of
said Surveyor Minto of an examination made by him, that the survey
returned was erroneous, in that the survey as to the west line did not
follow the bed of the river which was made the boundary of Santa
214 DECISIONS RELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS.
Ana; and as to the east line from the point on the estuary, it should
follow the tide line thereof to the sea-shore, instead of crossing such
estuary and continuing in a direct line to the shore as in said survey.
Counsel having appeared for the claimants of the adjoining Rancho
Las Bolsas and for the claimants of Santa Ana respectively, counsel for
Las Bolsas filed objections in your office against the consideration of
the protest of said Huntley and others, for the reason (among others)
that it was not presented in time.
Your office, however, in view of the doubts existing as to the true.
bed of the Santa Ana River, and as to the proper location of the said-
eastern boundary, under the authority of the act of July 1, 1864, afore-
said, on the d day of Jaly, 1880, instructed the surveyor-general to
notify the parties in interest and proceed to take testimony for the pur-
pose of proving the location and course of the Santa Ana River in 1801,
or as far back as the knowledge of witnesses might extend, and to show
the changes that had taken place since that time in the courses of said
river, and to designate such changes and courses so as to show the re-
lation to the official survey; also to take proofs in reference to the
character of the inlet and the said eastern boundary connected there-
with.
Counsel for Rancho Las Bolsas thereupon, in a communication to this
Department, asked for an arrest of the proceedings to be taken under
the instructions aforesaid, upon the ground before stated, that no ex-
ceptions had been taken to said survey within the prescribed time, and
npon the further ground that because no exceptions had been taken by
the claimants of either Las Bolsas or Santa Ana, they would not be
parities to the record so as to enable them to appeal from the decision,
pres-3ent or future, of your office in relation to the survey.
Jaly 14, iSS0, this Department made a decision to the effect that your
ource had undolibted authority, under the act aforesaid, to require a
farther report from the surveyor-general, and to direct the taking of
tostimony touching the survey, and as the inquiry instituted was for
the purpose of ascertaining whether the west line of Rancho Santa.
Ana did not lie to the west of the east line of Las Bolsas, as established
by the survey, the owners of the latter rancho were among the parties.
interested and entitled to notice, to submit proofs, to be heard, and to,
appeal from decisions adverse to their interest.
Thereupon, under the instructions of your office aforesaid, an inves-
tigation was had of the matters submitted, and a large amount of testi-
mony was taken before a special United States commissioner at Santa.
Ana, near the lands in question, commencing October 11, 1880. Such
testimony was taken on behalf of the aforesaid applicants for a resurvey,
but the claimants of the Rancho Las Bolsas and Santiago de Santa Ana
introduced no evidence. At such hearing counsel appeared in behalf of
Rancho Las Bolsas and of the United States, and for the claimants of
the Rancho Santa Ana.
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The surveyor-general then allowed the parties in interest until June
1, 1881, to file documentary proofs; and under that permission several
exhibits were filed. The surveyor-general also instructed Duputy Sur-
veyor Minto-
To make such an examination of the ground as would enable him to
report from topographical features as to the course of the river Santa
Ana in the year 1801, or as far back as practicable, and as to the char-
acter of the inlet as to its being tide-water or otherwise.
Surveyor Minto made the examination required, except as to the
inlet, and whereupon the surveyor-general instructed Deputy Surveyor
Richard Egan to make such examination. This duty he performed, and
the reports of both deputies were duly filed.
The report of the surveyor-general, made upon an examination of the
testimony upon the reports of Deputies Minto and Egan, and upon the
documentary proofs in the case as to the western boundary, was in favor
of a line beginning at station 78, on the northern boundary of Las Bolsas,
and running southerly to the mouth of the present river Santa Ana by
what he deems to be "the old river bed, . . . . designated on
Minto's sketch as the channel A, D, E, H."
You decide in favor of the Minto line from the point La Posa (station
78) to the point of intersection with the present river marked D on the
Minto map, and to this extent you agree with the surveyor-general.
From the point of intersection D your line follows the present river to
the sea, while the surveyor-general, as we have seen, from D to the sea
follows what he describes as "the old river bed of 1823-4." The line so
preferred by the surveyor-general lies to the east of the present river,
and gives to Rancho Las Bolsas many hundred acres more than the line
followed by you.
Only a part of the eastern boundary line of Rancho Santa Ana is in
controversy. As to this part both the surveyor-aeneral and your office
agree in favor of a line beginning at the " small butte at the head of
the inlet, at or near the point marked B on the Coast Survey map (Ex.
C)," and frou that point following 4 the line of ordinary high-water
mark along the west line of the inlet to the sea."
From your decision an appeal has been brought in behalf of the own-
ers of Rancho Las Bolsas, and for Irvine and others, to this Depart-
ment.
The Rancho Santa Ana is situated in Los Angeles County, California.
As to its southern portion, it is bounded on the west by Rancho Las
Bolsas, on the east by San Joaquin, and on the south by the ocean.
This controversy relates only to the boundaries between Santa Ana
and Las Bolsas on the west, and Santa Ana and San Joaquin on the
east.
The respective dates of these several grants were as follows: Santa
Ana, July 1, 1810; Las Bolsas, May 22, 1834; San Joaquin, May 13,
1842. The junior grants, Bolsas and Joaquin, were, however, first sur-
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ve ed and have been patented. The official survey of the senior grant,
Santa Ana, conforms to the patented lines of said junior grants. The
Las Bolsas was founded upon a previous grant to Manuel Nieto, 1784,
and the title was derived throught that grant; but the proceedings
under the petition of Grifalba and the decree of confirmation in effect
makeit a grant junior to Rancho Santa Ana.
The Santa Ana claimants ask that the official survey shall be amended
so as to include some fourteen thousand additional acres on the west and
about a thousand acres on the southeast.
The Las Bolsas and San Joaquin caimants insist that such survey
shall be maintained and confirmed by this Department.
Counsel for Rancho Las Bolsas lpon this appeal argues at length the
proposition that the adjudication and location of the eastern boundary
of. that rancho in legal effect estops the claimants of Rancho Santa Ana
from denying that it was correctly located and that the doctrine of re&judicata must be applied.
The same question was ably and elaborately argued in the motion
before recited to arrest the proceedings which have resulted in bring-
ing the case to its present standingin this Department; such question
was decided by my predecessor adversely to the claimants of Las Bol-
sas, and an order was made dismissing the motion.
The question now in hand, and which I am required to consider is,
what is the correct location of the boundaries of the Rancho Santa
Ana?
Independently of the location of the boundaries of Las Bolsas and
San Joaquin, the claimants of Santa Ana have a right to a hearing and
an adjudication of the location of that rancho.
Section 7 of the act of July 1, 1864 (13 Stat., 334), provides:
That it shall be the duty of the surveyor-general of California, in mak-
ing surveys of private land claims finally confirmed, to follow the decree
of confirmation as closely as practicable whenever such decree desig-
nates the specific boundaries of the claim. . . . . And it shall be
the duty of the Commissioner of the General Land Offlce to require a
substantial compliance with the directions of this section before approv-
ing any survey or plat forwarded to him.
The Rncho Santa Ana was confirmed by specific boundaries, and it
therefore became your duty to see that the survey as made substantially
complied with the decree of confirmation as to such "specific bounda-
ries" "as closely as practicable." This duty was independent of the
action of your office in locating the boundaries of adjacent ranchos un-
der their decrees of confirmation. The location of those boundaries can
rot be regarded as res judicata, except as to those ranchos. The survey
of the Rancho Santa Ana under the decree of confirmation must have
come to your office and have been the subject of an express and inde-
pendent adjudication. The boundaries of the other ranchos cannot now
be considered "except in the subordinate relation of consequences."
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Surveys must necessarily follow the decrees of confirmations, and pat-
rents must conform to surveys as approved by your office (Rancho Entre
Napa, 6 . L. 0. 37). IF, after all this has been done, it be found that the
ranchos overlap and patented boundaries are in conflict, the question
Nf title must then be determined by the courts. The patents to the sev-
*.eral parties place them in those tribunals upon an equal footing.
Since the title to these Mexican grants was never in the United States,
such patents are in the nature of quitclaim, deeds only. By these pro-
Lceedings of survey and patent the United States does not undertake to
determine the title. The title derived from another government, when
thus in conflict, must be determined by the courts. (Miller v. Dale, 92
{J. S., 477; Adam v. Norris, 103 U. S., 513; United States v. Morillo, 1
Wall., 709.)
The fifteenth section of the act of March 3, 1851 (9 Stat., 631), under
which these proceedings are had, provides that "any patent to be issued
tunder this act shall be conclusive between the United States and the
said claimants only, and shall not affect the interests of third persons."
And the patents issued to the claimants of Las Bolsas and San Joaquin
contain the clause that " neither the confirmation of this said claim nor
this patent shall affect the interests of third parties." This clause was
provided for by the act probably in anticipation of conflicts which must
follow the proceedings aforesaid. (Rodriguez v. United Sta tes, 1 Wall.,
582.)
The difficulties which this case presents and the causes of the con-
flicts I have referred to are well stated by Mr. Justice Miller in the case
above cited. e says:
No class of cases that come before this court are attended with so
many and such perplexing difficulties as these locations by survey of
econflrmed Mexican grants in California. Some idea of the difficulties
which surround these cases may be obtained by recurring to the loose
and indefinite manner in which the Mexican government made the grants
which we are now required judicially to locate. That government at-
tached no value to the land, and granted it in what to us appears mag-
nificent quantitieq. When the grant was made no surveyor sighted a
compass or stretched a chain. Indeed, these instruments were proba-
bly not to be had in that region. . . . . . These difficulties have
Tather been increased than diminished by the act of Ciongress of March
3, 1851, and the course of proceedings adopted under it by the board of
commissioners and the courts. Before this Board every person having
a claim derived from the Mexican government appeared, and in his own
way and to the best of his ability established his right. . . . . But
no other private claimant was inade a party to the proceedings, and it
may well be supposed, and indeed we know, that it has often happened
that two or three claims for the same land or parts of the same were
progressing pari passu in the same court, and the land has been con-
firmed to each claimant, and probably each has received a patent for it.
I have been led to an examination of these questions at some length,
because it is strenuously urged by counsel for Las Bolsas and San
Joaquin that the line of survey of Santa Ana cannot now be extended
so as to fall within the surveyed and patented lines of those ranchos.
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The views thus expressed lead me to an examination of the survey
and the consideration of the proper boundaries of Santa Ana under the
decree of confirmation of that rancho. The western boundary will be
first considered.
The original petition for Santa Ana was in 1801, and the grant was
made in 1810. It is undisputed that the river Santa Ana formed the
western botndaryof the grant. The question of fact, and a very difficult
one to determine, arises because of frequent changes in the bed of that
river. Such changes taking place many years ago render it difficult to
determine the actual course of the river at the time the grant was made.
It hardly need be stated that a sudden change in the course of a river
by which part of the estate of one man is cat off and joined to that of
another does not deprive the original owner of the land thus separated
from his estate. Such change is known in the law as avulsion, and is
the opposite of alluvion.
The decree of confirmation of Santa Ana recognizes the fact of a
change in the river. The petition for such decree ascribes the boun-
daries as "commencing at the mouth of the river Santa Ana, where it
empties into the sea; thence running up the bends and old bed of the
eastern bank of said river." And the decree on dismissal of appeal ad-
judged that "the claim of the petitioners is valid, and it is therefore
decreed that the same be confirmed." The testimony shows that the
river as it existed in 1801 was changed, and a new channel formed by
the flood of 1811. A change took place in 1823-'24 which produced the
new or present river. The bed then left is known in the l)roofs and pro-
ceedings as the river bed of 1823 and 1821, or the "old river."
Another old channel quite well defined lies a little more than a mile
to the west of the present river; and still another, even better defined,
lies much further to the west, being to the west of the present town of
Anaheim. This last channel is evidently quite ancient, and was prob-
ably the channel of the Santa Ana River long before the Santa Ana
grant was made. In adlition to these channels there are beds more or
less defined which may have formed the channel of the river for a part
of the distance at least between La Posa (station 78) an( the sea, or
they may have been "wash-outs" or overflow channels formed at the
time of very high water in the Santa Ana River.
The cause of these numerous changes will be seen by a glance at the
report of Surveyor Minto, before referred to, who was required by the
surveyor-general to examine the ground, and "to report from topo-
graphical features as to the course of the river Santa-Ana in the year
1801.2 He says:
The Santa Ana River, where it forms the boundary between the
Ranchos Santiago de Santa Ana and Las Bolsas, runs through a sandy
plain with an average slope of about 10 feet per mile toward the sea.
In times of high water the river rises to a level with the banks, at
times overflowing them and covering the land for great distances. The
overflow, when continued for any length of time, forms auxiliary chan-
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nels somewhat varying in direction from the main river and from each
other, but of course flowing in a general way toward the sea.
The light, sandy soil is carried down by the water in such quantities.
that in times of flood the stream presents the appearance of a river of
moving sand. Any obstruction at such a time might cause a change-
in the main channel of the river, and all the topographical features.
show that such changes have often occurred.
But while it is very easy to see that changes in the bed of the river-
have occurred, it is extremely difficult to determine by observation
whether, in many cases, a given channel has been the river bed or only
an overflow channel.
The formation of the country, considered in connection with the tes-
timony in the case, proves quite conclusively that the changes in the-
river have uniformly been from west to east.
The change of 1811 was proved before the Board of Land (Jommis-
sioners. We are only interested in ascertaining what channel the river
pursued next before that change. /
In view of the conflicting opinions, and the difficulties which beset the&
inquiry, if the Hancock survey could be sustained by the evidence I
should favor its approval; but since that survey, in pursuance of your-
order, a large amount of testimony has been taken and careful exami-
nations made upon the ground; and after a careful consideration, I am
satisfied that in view of all the proofs, as well those taken at the time:
of the Hancock survey as since, that survey cannot be sustained.
I shall only refer briefly to the lines of that survey and the objections.
to it. The Santa Ana River broke away from its channel many years-
ago, at a point some 3 miles north of La Posa (station 78). From the
point of departure the new channel was a considerable distance to the.
east of the bed from which it then departed. Station 78 is on this old
bed; and although the point of departure was some 3 miles further up,.
we are only interested in tracing the line of the old bed southward from
station 78, as that is at the beginning of the boundary between Las,
Bolsas and Santa Ana, and to this point also all the surveys agree.
It is conceded that from station 78 (Exhibit D,) we must follow the old
bed for some distance, because the old bed is recognized as a boundary-
in the confirmation proceedings, not only of Santa Ana, but also upon
the disefio of the Nieto tracts, of which Las Bolsas was one, and in the
proceedings of juridical possession of the last-named rancho as granted.
to Catarina Ruiz.
From station 78 to station 79, in the Hancock survey, the course is a.
little south of east, nearly straight, and almost at right angles with the-
course of the old bed at and north of station 78. The proof to my mind
is quite conclusive that the river never ran between those points (sta-
tions 78 and 79). Station 79 is a point on the present river, as it has
been since 1825. It is proved that the river of 1825 and the present river,
are identical. Between these two points (78 and 79) there is an eleva-
tion of ground, the highest point being about half a mile from statioa
78. Surveyor Ellis thinks this elevation 12 or 13 feet. The levels.
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he took were what he calls "flying levels" and he does not claim them
-to be accurate; but other proof in the case, taken with that of Ellis,
-establishes the fact that the ground between the two points was high,
and that there was no reliable indication that the bed of the river was
-ever there. It cannot be-found, from all the testimony, that such line
-was ever the bed of the Santa Ana River; and that part of the Han-
*+Oock boundary or survey is evidently incorrect.
Resuming again the line of the official survey, from station 79 to a
-point between stations 81 and 82, the survey follows the present river.
lIt may be said that there is absolutely no proof in the case to show
that the old bed of the river was ever along or near that line.
From the last-named point the line of survey leaves the present river,
sand by various courses reaches an inlet of the sea at station 149. As
-to a part of this line, from near said station 82 to near station 118, there
is evidence of the bed of a stream; but it is well established by the
-testimony of Surveyors Ellis and Minto that such bed is a washout
--formed by the overflow of the Santiago Creek. Ellis had surveyed such
ereek. It is a stream running from the mountains in a southwesterly
,direction, crossing the Rancho Santa Ana and entering the river of that
name, and is so located as to have naturally caused such bed or wash-
.out.
As to the remainder of the line of survey there is little or no evidence
of a river bed.
As before stated, in the light of all the testimony in the case it is im-
possible to approve the official survey.
As regards the western boundary, it now only remains to be consid-
4ered whether the line fixed by Surveyor-General Wagner or the one
found by your office shall be adopted-since I am satisfied that one of
such two lines should be approved.
As has been already stated, from said station 78 (marked A on sketch
accompanying Minto's survey to D on same sketch) your line and that
-of the surveyor-general agree. D is the point of intersection with the
-present river. From D to the inlet of the sea you pursue the present
-river, while the surveyor-general from that point to the sea follows what
-he deems to be the old bed of the river, his line being indicated on the
>sketch by D E H.
I am satisfied that the part of the line thus fixed from A to D is cor-
Tect, as shown by the evidence. Minto says that it is more distinctly
~marked upon the ground than any other channel, except that of the
-present river. The surveyor-general in his report, after referring to
Minto's report just cited, says:
From the point D, however, the country has less grade, and the chan-
-nels are more numerous and less distinctly marked. There is one which,
leaving D, runs nearly south to , where it is joined by the slight de-
-pression followed by the survey of the Rancho Santiago de Santa Ana
from about section 110, and then follows a swampy channel to theinlet H.
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Minto himself, in reference to the line reported by the surveyor-gen-
eral, says:
After passing the point D it is very difficult to arrive at any satisfac-
tory conclusion.
And again he says:
After passing the point D I consider it impossible from topographical
data alone to arrive at aun definite conclusion as to the channel of 1801
or of 1825. The evidence relating to this part of the line is contradict-
ory and indefinite, and it seems to me that the documentary evidence-
of the archives affords the only solution of the question.
Minto does not examine any such documentary evidence, but reports
in favor of continuing the line from D to H, indicated upon his sketch y
and the surveyor-general follows such report and favors such line.
It will be found, however, by examination of the reports of Minto and-1,
the surveyor-general, and the testimony in the case, that such line fromn
D to the sea (H) has but little to support it. And the case is almost
destitute of proof that the river ever ran east of that line. West of
that line, and between it and the present river, there are two or three,
old beds quite well defined for some distance. These beds depart from.
the present river at several points west of D, and extend in a southerly
direction. It is quite probable that these beds and that at D were made-
by overflows of the present river; and this view is strengthened by the-
form of the river, which from D to the sea pursues a direction first
southwest, then south, then southeast, describing in its course nearly
an arc (about one-fourth) of a circle, with convex side facing westward..
It remains to consider whether the line of the river as it now runs from
D to the sea, fixed by you as the correct line of the survey, is sustained
by the proofs.
The present river is the river of 1825, formed by the change of 1823--
724. The break which then formed the new channel was several miles.,
above La Posa (station 78). The other great change was in 1811; and
we are inquiring for the river or bed of the river as it was in 1810-the
year of the concession of rancho Santa Ana.
It is not proven that the change in the course of the river was of its
entire length from the point of departure to the sea at the time of either-
change. The latest of those changes was so long ago that the oldest-
witnesses were then quite young, and the oral proof's are conflicting,
indefinite, and uncertain. The topographical examinations are quite
unsatisfactory. The old beds are many; they were formed long ago,
and the nature of the soil is such that great changes must have taken.
place in them since their formation.
In this state of the case it is important to examine some of the " docu-
mentary evidence of the archives" referred to by Minto, but not con-
sidered by him nor mentioned by the surveyor-general in his report.-
Of these the diseilo of the Ranollo Bolsas is, I think, properly regarde.
by you as highly important. This map was made in 1834, and is referred
to in the decree of confirmation of Las Bolsas. It is drawn to a scale>"
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-and bears evidence of being more accurate than most Mexican disehos.
It was made long before the present controversy arose, and is an im-
'partial witness. The several Nieto tracts are included in it. It shows
the present river from a point fi r above the break from the old bed in
1823-'24 to the sea. The old bed, from a point that seems to be identi-
.eal with the break aforesaid to a point where it unites again with the
present river, is distinctly marked upon said diseho by dotted lines, and
is designated "Caja vie jadel Rio" (the old bed of the river). The old
'bed thus marked forms part of the boundary between Bolsas and Santa
Ana, and the River Santa Ana the remaining part. The point La Posa
(station 78) is about midway on this old bed, and shown on the diseiio.
From La Posa south to the junction with the river must be nearly the
same distance as from La Posa to D, on the Minto sketch. It should
_be stated that north of Bolsas lies another of the Nieto tracts, also
bounded on the east by Santa Ana, and the part of the old bed as
shown o the diseno north of La Posa forms part of the boundary be-
tween Santa Ana and such other Nieto tract. Juridical possession of
Las Bolsas seems to have been given in accordance with this diseflo.
The elm tree (lamo), from which a branch was broken, mentioned in
the proceedings of juridical possession, seems to have been identical
with La Posa (the springs), as described in the surveys. This diseho
being made in 1834, the year of the grant of Las Bolsas, and at a period
so comparatively early after the conceded changes in the river, entitles
it to great weight as evidence in establishing the old bed of the river.
This disefio is not consistent with the Hancock survey, nor with the.
line south of D, fixed by Minto and approved by the surveyor-general;
it is only consistent with the line from D, approved by you.
No continuous channel is proved by witnesses or topographical ex-
aminations to exist east of the present river; and concur with you
that-
The weight of evidence is in favor of the 31into line from La Posa to
its intersection with the present river, marked on the Minto map A. D;
and that the channel as it shall be found located on the ground, with
continuation by the present river from the point of intersection to the
sea, should be taken as the western boundary.
The controversy with San Joaquin as to the eastern boundary of Santa
Ana involves about one thousand acres of land. This body of land lies
to the west of a navigable arm ot the sea, recognized as such upon a
Coast Survey chart submitted with the proofs, and known on such chart
as Newport Bay. This arm disconnects the land from Rancho San Joa-
quin, and it cannot be reached from the other parts of that rancho ex-
cept by transportation across an inlet or arm of Newport Bay, or by
'passing for a considerable distance across the lands of Rancho Santa
Ana.
" The testimony of Andromio Sepulveda, a son, and Salisbury Haley, a
son-in-law, of Jose Sepulveda, original grantee of San Joaquin, Domingo
Yorba, son of Jos6 Antonio Yorba, grantee of Santa Ana, Eduardo Poyo-
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reno, and Antonio F. Coronel, proves that the inlet was recognized by
the original proprietors of the two ranchos as separating them, and that
they occupied accordingly. It also proved that when San Joaquin was
sold it was with notice to the purchasers that such bay and inlet formed
the boundary between the said ranchos.
The eastern line of Santa Ana, as described in the title papers, is quite
indefinite; its terminal point, however, was the sea-coast. The line of
official survey reached the inlet at a point below tide-water, being the
small butte at the head of the inlet. There it should have stopped.
Instead of that it crossed the inlet and included in Rancho San Joaquin
the body of land already mentioned on the west side of the inlet. This
was erroneous. When that point was reached the sea-coast was found,
and the inlet and Newport Bay should have formed that part of the
boundary between the two ranchos.-(United States v. Pacheco, 2
Wall., 587.)
The result thus reached as to the eastern boundary is clearly in ac-
cordance with the rights of the parties as understood and recognized by
the original owners.
The western boundary, as hereby approved, still leaves to Las Bolsas,
as stated by you, about the quantity of land, seven leagues, originally
granted to that rancho, including the part thereof granted by Catarina
Ruiz to her brother.




The United States circuit judge having attended and held a term of the district court,
it will be presumed that the formalities prescribed by the second section of the
act of March 2, 1855, to enable him to do so, were complied with, though not
specifically appearing in the record; especially so, as the provisions referred to
appear to be merely directory.
As ajudgment or order void for want of jurisdiction is no protection to parties or
officials acting thereunder, it is competent to examine as to the question of juris-
diction; particularly when the subject is not embraced in the general powers of
the court; the jurisdiction being created by a special statute, for a special pur-
pose. The record showing the essential facts, the objection of want of jurisdic-
tion will be overruled.
Patent for a private claim in California cannot issue under Revised Statutes 2447.
That section only applies to cases where no provision is made for patent. The
several acts providing for the confirmation of such claims in California authorize
patents to issue for all confirmed claims.
Commissioner McFarland to U. S. surveyor-general, San Francisco, Cali-
fornia, April, 1883.
It appears from the record in the case of the Peter Sherreback claim,
situated within the limits of the Pueblo of San Francisco, that applica-
* See 2 L. D., 364.
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tion for the confirmation thereof, made to the Board of Land Commis-
sioners, was denied; but on appeal from said decision to the United
States district court, before Hon. Ogden Hoffman, judge of said court,
it was confirmed to the claimant for eight varas square by decree of
December 5, 1859;
That afterwards in the same court held by Hon. M. Hall McAllister,
United States circuitjudge, under section 6 of the act of March 2, 1855(10 Stat., 636), upon application on the part of the United States filed on
the 26th of May, 1860, and upon hearing of both parties, by order of
June 2, 1860, the decree of confirmation was vacated and set aside, and
a new trial and hearing granted; at which, as directed by said order,
both parties were to be permitted to present frther proofs; said order-
also recognizing a motion, on the part of the claimant, to reinstate the.
decree of December 5, 1859, and setting the same for hearing, without
further notice, on the first Monday of July, 1860;
That the motion to reinstate the vacated decree was heard in the dis-
trict court held by lion. Ogden Hoffman, district judge, on the 28th day
of August, 1860, the United States and the claimant being represented,
and denied;
That on the 20th day of June, and the 14th and 30th days of July, 1862,
orders were made in said district court by Judge Hoffman, extending
the time for closing the proofs in said case; the order of the 14th of'
July having been made on motion of claimant's counsel, and it not ap-
pearing upon whose motion the other two orders named were granted.
It does not appear in the case that further proofs were produced, or
that a new trial or hearing was ever had therein, in pursuance of the
order of the court, by Judge McAllister, of June 2, 1860.
On the 21st of October, 1882, the present claimants, by A. Everett
Ball, esq., their attorney, made application to your office for a survey of
the claim, under the decree of confirmation of December 5, 1859, as.
foundation for a patent of the same; alleging that the order setting
aside said decree was void, etc.; which application was referred by you
to this office, by your letter of October 21, 1882, for direction in the.
premises.
December 1, 1882, L. D. Woodworth, esq., entered appearance before
this office for the claimants, and, on the 21st of the same month, filed a
brief and argument in support of their application for a survey and
patent, claiming:
That patent should issue under 2447 Revised Statutes; setting forth,
as ground for the application, that the statute under which the court
was held by Judge McAllister, in which the vacating order was made,
required as preliminary steps to be taken before a judge of the circuit
court could sit in the district court:
First. That in his opinion the business of his own court must permit,.
and that of the district court require it;
Second. That a notice of thirty days must be given by the clerk f
the district court to the circuit judge; and
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Third. That the district court must be engaged in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction from decisions. of the Board of Land Commis
sioners.
And objecting:
1st. That the evidence of the " opinion " required from the circuit
judge is conspicuously absent from the record;
2d. That the record nowhere shows that the clerk of the district court
gave the notice required;
3d. That the only evidence in the record of the purpose for which the
court was sitting, is the entry in the minutes of the opening of the court,
to wit, "for the trial of land cases"; but not showing that they were
cases pending on appeal from the Land Commission, of which only the
court as constituted could have jurisdiction.
These objections are severally and forcibly urged by the counsel; the
summing up of the argument being, " that the vacating order was ultra
vires; and that the decree of December 5, 1859, is in full force."
The question presented is as to the jurisdiction of the court, and the
points of objection thereto naturally divide themselves into those that
relate to form, and that which has regard to substance. Of the former
class are the first and second objections stated in the brief of the coun-
sel; and of the latter, the third. They will be considered in their order.
First. The section of the act referred to, under which the court mak-
ing the vacating order was held, authorizes the circuit judge " at any
time when, in his opinion, the business of his own court will permit and
that of the courts of the northern and southern districts of California
require" to sit in the district court, etc.
It is hardly to be supposed that the circuit judge would attend and
assume to hold the district court, unless in his opinion the business of
the two courts presented the conditions contemplated by the statute.
On the contrary the presumption arising from his act forces the conclu-
sion that he entertained the required opinion. The statute did not re-
quire him to make either written proclamation or record of it.
Second. The statute in the cases contemplated by it makes it the duty
of the clerk of the district court " to give thirty days written notice to
the judge of the court organized under this act," (to wit, the circuit
judge)*' of the time and place of the sitting of such district court for
the discharge of such appellate jurisdiction"; etc.
The notice required was for the information of the judge merely; it
had no relation to parties; and the judge having attended and held the
term, it must be presumed that he had the prescribed notice.
The same may be said of the holding the court by the circuit judge
alone, which is not made a point of objection by the counsel.
The statute provides that-
In case the judge of such district court shall fail, from sickness or
other casualty, to attend at such time and place, the judge of the court
organized under this act is hereby authorized to hold said court, etc.
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The circuit judge having, by himself alone, constituted the court,the
contingency enabling him legally to do so, though not set forth in the
record, will be presumed to have occurred.
With regard to what must appear in the record to jstify ant upholdjudicial action, a distinction is made between the judgments of superior
and inferior tribunals. The district courts of the United States, though
their decisions are subject to review on appeal, are not, nevertheless, as
to their construction, action, and ordinary jurisdiction, though the lat-
ter is entirely statutory, inferior courts.
In McCormick and wife et al. v. Sllivant et al. (10 Wheaton, 192), the
supreme court held, as per head-note:
The courts of the United States are of limited jurisdiction, but they
are not technically inferior courts: ther judgments and decrees arebinding until reversed, though nojurisdiction be shown on the record.
It may be urged that the rule here stated applies to cases and sub-jects coming within the scope of their ordinary jurisdiction only. This
will be considered further on.
In Grignon's lessee et al. v. Astor et al. (2 Howard, 319), which was
a case in a county court having probate urisdiction, for license to sell
the decedent's estate, one question being, whether the record sustained
the jurisdiction of the court, the supreme court held as follows:
The granting the license to sell is an adjudication upon all the facts
necessary to givejurisdiction, and whether they existed or lot, is whollyimmaterial, if no appeal is taken; the rule is the same whether the lawgives an appeal or not; if none is given from the final decree, itis con-
clusive on all whom it concerns.
It may also be fairly assumed, as to the objections under consi-dera-
tion, that the provisions of the statute upon which they are founded
are merely directory; and, the main object of the statute, the holding
of the court in the manner and for the purpose intended, having been
attained, that its action cannot be defeated nor prejudiced by the want
of literal compliance with the preliminary directions, if such want of
compliance occurred.
The following is the rle applicable to this view of the subject:
When statutes direct certain proceedings to be done in a certain way,
or at a certain time, and a strict compliance with these provisions oftime and form does not appear essential to the judicial mind, the pro-
ceediugs are held valid, though the command of the statute is disre-garded or disobeyed-(Sedgwick on Construction of Statutory andConstitutional Law, 316.)
Directory acts are said to be those which are not of the substance of
the things provided for.-(Id., note a, citing McKune v. Weller, 11 Cal.,49, and see same note for examples of statues held o be directory.)Where the words are affirmative, and relate to the manner in whichpower or jurisdiction vested in a public body [and semble, a public offi-
cer] is to be exercised, and not to the limits of the power or jurisdictionitself, they may be, and often have been, construed to be directory; but
negative words which go to the power or jurisdiction itself have never,
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that I am aware of, been brought within that category. A clause is
directory, says Taunton, J., " when the provisions contain mere matter
of direction and no more, but not so when they are followed by words
of positive prohibition."-(Wells on the Jurisdictions of Courts, 56;
citing Bladen v. Philadelphia, 60 Pa. St., 466.)
The provisions contained in the act in question in this case, prelimi-
nary to the exercise of the jurisdiction conferred by it, are clearly within
the rule as declared by the authorities here cited.
The first and second objections of the counsel are overruled.
Third. The third objection goes to the substance or subject-matter of
the order vacating the decree of confirmation; and though it has been
held that courts, properly constituted, determine their own jurisdiction,
and that their judgments are conclusive and binding upon all parties,
courts, and public officers, until set aside or reversed on appeal by ju-
dicial authority, I apprehend that there is some distinction to be made;
that the broad rule here stated has application more especially to sub-
jects of ordinary or general jurisdiction, and that where the jurisdic-
tion is special, as where created by special statute and directed to a
special purpose, it should affirmatively appear by the record, tested by
the provisions of the statute. There is such a thing as judgment void
for want of jurisdiction; and if void, of course no judgment, and no legal
protection to parties or officials acting under it. Whoever is called to
execute it, must act upon his peril. (See Wells on Jarisdiction, quoted
above, p. 11, and cases cited.) It must therefore be competent, when
action is required having reference to a judgment or order founded upon
a technical and special authority, to be exercised by a court specially
constituted, to examine as to its validity.
The statute referred to, under which the court granting the vacating
order of June 2, 1860, was held, provides:
That the judge appointed under this act [the circuit judge] shall from.
to time . . . . form part of, and preside over, the said district courts
[the district courts for the northern and southern districts of California]
when either of them is engaged in the discharge of the appellate juris-
diction vested in it over the decisions of the Board of Commissioners
for the settlement of private land claims in the State of California, etc.
And said judge is authorized to sit alone, and by himself constitute
the district court in the contingency before considered.
The record in the present case shows the following proceedings: The
decree of confirmation of December5, 1859, is headed in the usual man-
ner, with a statement of the term of the court, the presence of the
judge, and the title of the case; the latter being as follows: "Peter
Sherreback v. the United States, No. 356." It then proceeds: "This
cause came on to be heard on appeal from the final decision of the
Board of Land Commissioners to ascertain and settle the private land
claims in the State of California," etc., and is signed, "Ogden Hoffman,
district judge."
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The order of Junc 2, 1SC0, vacating the above decree is headed: " In
the district court of the United States, in alli for the northern district
of California." The case is entitled,"Peter T. Sherreback v. the United
States, No. 356, district court, No. 795, Land Commission." After pre-
liminary recital it proceeds: "It is hereby ordered that the decision
and decree heretofore entered in this court, in this cause, on the 5th
day of December, 1859, be, and the same is hereby, vacated .i nd set
aside, and that there be a new trial and hearing in this action," &c. The
order is signed, "M. Hall McAllister, judge, circuit court United States,
district of California."
The minute of the court, a certified copy of which is produced by the
claimants, simply shows that the term was held by the circuit judge
"for the trial of land cases." The title and number of the case are
given, with this entry: "Order entered setting aside decree and grant
ing a rehearing."
The decree of confirmation, the order of June 2,1860, vacating it, and
the minute of the court above constitute the whole record as far as re-
lates to the subject-matter of the jurisdiction of the court making the
vacating order. The claimants do not seek to go back of the decree of
December 5, 1859, but rely upon it, making it the object of their appli-
cation. The statement in that decree, quoted above, shows explicitly
that, in making it, the court was " engaged in the discharge of the appel-
late jurisdiction vested in it over the decisions of the Board of Commis-
sioners for the settlement of private land claims in the State of California";
being the precise subject of jurisdiction as to which the circuit judge
was authorized to sit and act in the district court.
The order of June 2, 1860, was but a continuation of the former pro-
ceeding, opening the caseby vacating thedecree and granting a rehear-
ing, with permission to the partiesto produce further proofs, etc. This
is shown by the title and numberof the case in theorder and itsexpress
reference to the decree by its date. There was no new jurisdiction in-
voked, and that exercised was that which the act expressly conferred
upon the circuit judge when sitting as the district court.
The jurisdiction being shown affirmatively by the record, the claim-
ant's third objection is overruled, and the order of June 2, 1860, held to
be valid.
Patent could not issue in this case in any event under Rev. Stat., 2447,
as supposed by claimant's counsel. That section applies only to cases
where no provision is made in the confirmatory statute for the issue of
a patent. The several acts which have provided for, or had reference
to, the confirmation of private land claims in California authorize the
issuing of patents on all claims confirmed under them.
The application of the claimants is denied. It would seem that their
remedy must be sought in the United States district court, under the
order of the court granting them a rehearing in the case or otherwise.
You will notify the parties interested or their attorneys of this de-
cision, and advise this office of the date of giving such notice.
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PRIVATE CLAIAI-PATEINT-JUBI$DICTION.
RJANCHO CASALIA.
Where a survey has been approved and carried into patent, so far as the segregation
of the private land claim is concerned this Department has exhausted its powers.
If corrections are necessary by reason of mistakes or frauds, they must be sought for-
in the courts.
Commissioner McFarland to U. S. surveyor general, San Francisco, Cali-
fornia, September 30, 1882.
I have examined the case in the matter of the survey of the Rancho
Casmalia, Antonio Olivera confirmee, and find the following facts to
exist:
The rancho was first surveyed by United States Deputy Surveyor
Terrell, in 1860, in which survey be located the southeastern. corner
(which became corner C. No. 3 of the subsequent survey) in the en-
trance of the Canada Verde, as he ascertained the same to be situa ted.
The survey, however, not being approved another was ordered, and
was also made by Deputy Terrell later in the same year.
At about the same time he also made a survey of the contiguous Ran-
eho Todos Santos, making one of the corners (T. S. No. 5) at the south-
eastern corner aforesaid (C. No. 3) of the Casmalia survey.
Of the second survey of Casmalia made by Terrell, the northern
boundary was by a line beginning at a rocky point on the sea-shore,
called the Cerrito del Medio, at a post marked C. No. 1, and from thence
running north 750 east 188 chains to a live oak tree marked C. and B.
T. No. 2, and continuing on the same course 18 chains farther, 206 chains
in all, to a post marked C. No. 2.
The east line was run from station No. 2 south 50° east 395.55 chains
to an old post in the entrance of the Cainada Verde, marked T. S. No.
5 and C. No. 3, being the southeastern corner aforesaid of the first survey.
This second survey was approved and carried into patent in 1863.
Partial surveys of the rancho have been since made by Deputy Sur-.
veyors Harris and Von Schmidt, the latter under instructions from your
office, authorized by my predecessor, which surveys will be referred ta
hereafter.
In 1876 a modified survey of the Rancho Guadalupe was made by
United States Deputy Surveyor Thompson, and subsequently carried
into patent. The second course of that survey coincides with the first
course of the patented plat of (Jasmalia, running in reversed direction
from C. No. 2 south 750 west to the sea-shore at C. No. 1, which is marked
on the plat "High Rocky Point, El Morrito or Cerito del Medio (old
corner)."
The case comes before me on application of the grant owners for a.
relocation of the northern and eastern boundary lines of the raicho, or
the recognition of lines differentfrom those described in the patented
230 DECISIONS RELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS.
surveyi in effect, to change the northeastern and southeastern corners
so as to correspond substantially with the Von Schmidt survey, on the
ground that the northern line of the patented survey is wrongly de-
scribed, the live oak tree on the line, 18 chains from station C. No. 2,
being in fact, as alleged, reached by a line north 630 13' east, and the
corner at a distance from the Cerrito del Medio of 200.26 chains instead
of by a course of N. 750 east and a measurement of 206 chains to the
corner, as in the patented survey, which would place the corner C. eNo.
2 above five-sixteenths of a mile northeasterly from the patented cor-
ner; and as to the southeastern corner C. No. 3 and T. S. No. 5, that it
is wrongly located, the entrance of the Caiada Verde being as claimed
farther to the northeast, so that the corner No. 3 should be pllce(l about
five-sixteenths of a mile northeasterly from the patented corner.
The northeasterly and southeasterly corners, and the line from one
to the other, are illustrated by Von Schmidt's survey.
But it will be observed tat either he nor Harris, whose northern
lines very nearly agree, make the Cerito del Medio the starting point of
their northern lines. The identity of the Cerrito del Medio is not con-
troverted y any one. The claimant's counsel says of it in his brief:
" There is no question as to the location of the Cerrito del Medio." Cer-
rito means " little hill."
The point is described in the field notes of Terrell as 'a rocky point."
It constitutes, as before mentioned, the southwest corner of the Rancho
Guadalupe as located and patented, and is there designated as a " mor-
rito" (little overhanging lip ) and is described in the report of R. C. Hop-
kins in that case, made on personal examination, as "a bunch of dark-
looking rocks overhanging the sea."
Taking the Cerrito del Medio, as located and unquestioned, as the
point of beginning, and running the northern boundary line on the
course adopted by Von Schmidt and contended for by the claimants, and
fixing the corner No. 2 at the distance indicated on Von Schmidt's line,
would locate the corner half a mile northerly from C. No. 2 of the pat-
ented survey and seven-sixteenths of a mile northwesterly from the
corner No. 2 of Von Schmidt's survey and that distance within the pat-
ented Rancho of Guadalupe.
The same is true as to the survey of Terrell. If he had run from the
cerrito on the course designated by Von Schmidt, instead of reaching
his own or the Von Schmidt corner his line would have terminated as
above.
The only way in which Vou Schmidt and Harris could reach the cor-
ner C. No. 2 as located by them, running the northern line upon the
course adopted by them, respectively (N. 630 15' E. and N. 630 30' E.),
was by making their starting point on the sea-shore, not at the cerrito,
the acknowledged corner, but nearly half a mile southeasterly from it,
where no formation answering to a cerrito is shown or claimed to exist.
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There can be no doubt that Terrell made an actual survey upon the
ground; that he found and marked a live-oak tree upon his line, 18
chains short of the corner he established; and though Von Schmidt pro-
fesses to have found Terrell's tree and stake upon a different course and
line, it is not shown that the tree and stake described by Terrell are ab-
sent from the line and course described by him, though a stake might
readily be removed. It is easier to believe, under the circumstances
appearing, that Von Schmidt was mistaken in his identification of the
tree than to suppose that Terrell, an experienced surveyor and familiar
with the locality, made the mistake attributed to him, and while run-
ning one line described another largely variant from it, and that Deputy-
Surveyor Thompson repeated his mistake in the subsequent location of
the boundary of Guadalupe.
The southeastern corner, as located by Terrell in both of his surveys,
was adopted by Harris in his survey as correctly located. It is made
a corner, as before mentioned, in the survey of the coterminus Rancho
Todos Santos.
The corner as located by Von Schmidt, which the claimants contend
for, is about a quarter of a mile within the patented limits of Todos
Santos.
The result of the changes contended for by the claimants would be to
place the eastern boundary line a quarter of a mile or more outside of
the patented line, including lands settled upon and claimed as public
lands; to include also within the irancho Casinalia a parcel of the pat-
ented Rancho Guadalupe on the northeast and a parcel of the pat-
ented Rancho Todos Santos on the southeast producing conflicts with
both these ranchos and with the settlers interested in the lands on the
east over boundaries long since definitely and finally located.
I see no valid reason for the change asked for., I am satisfied that
the corners and boundary lines in controversy are substantially cor-
rectly located by the Terrell survey, as described in the field notes and
patent; but if errors of the character claimed have been made, I see no
way of correcting them here. The survey has been approved and car-
ried into patent, and, as far as concerns the segregation of the private
claim, this Department has exhausted its powers.
If corrections are necessary by reason of mistakes or frauds they
must be sought for in the courts. The survey by Von Schmidt is there-
fore rejected.
The only change that can be directed by this office will be to close
the public surveys upon the lines of the private claim as patented.
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,_ . PR!f ATE CLAIM-CONFIBJIATION-SUBVE.
RANCHO CORTE DE MADERA DEL PRESIDIO.
Decree of Board of Land Commissioners confirmed claim by boundaries.
Decree of United States District Court affirmed decree of Board "in all things".
Decision of Department (Delauo, Secretary) un appeal, directing a survey conform-
ing to juridical possession, was inal upon the questions of quantity and bounda-
ries (unless, within some rule of review, it could be properly opened for revision',
and it only remained to conform the survey to the decision.
The technical objection to the survey made under this decision, as to manner of its
execution not sufficient to impair its validity.
Decisions of the Department of December 31, 1877, and May 3, 1880, revoked; and
that of the Commissioner of September 18, 1878 (modified so as to exclude from
the survey Peninsular island and the small island occupied as a military reserva-
tion), affirmed.
Secretary Teller to Conmissioner McFarland, July 28, 1882.
I have considered the application for reconsideration of my prede-
cessor's decisions of December 31, 1879, and May 3, 1880, in the mat-
ter of the survey of the California private land claim known as Corte
de Madera del Presidio, heirs of Juan Read confirmees. This was
a grant made by the Mexican authorities in 1834 to said Read, ol-
lowed by juridical possession in 1835, which grant was duly presented
to the Board of Land Commissioners in 1852, and was by that tribunal
adjudged and confirmed by specific boundaries on the 13th of June, 1854.
The decree is as follows:
HEIRS OF JUAN READ)
VS.
THE UNITED STATES.)
In this case, on hearing the proofs and allegations, it is adjudged by
the commission that the said claim of the petitioners is valid, and it is
therefore hereby decreed that the same be confirmed. The land of which
,confirmation is hereby made is the same on which said Juan Read re-
sided in his lifetime is known by the name of Corte de Sladera del Pre-
.sidio; is situated in Marin County, and bounded as follows, to wit:
COomnencing from the solar which faces west at a point at the slope and
foot of the hills which lie in that direction, and on the edge of the forest
of redwoods, called Corte de Madera del Presidio, and running from
thence in a northwardly direction four thousand five hundred varas to
an arroyo called Holom, where is another forest of redwoods call Corte
,de Madera de San Pablo; thence by the waters of said arroyo, and the
bay of San Francisco, ten thousand varas to the Point Taburon, said
point serving as a mark and limit: thence running along the borders
eof said bay and continuing in a westerly direction along the shore of
the bay formed by Point Caballos and Point Taburon, four thousand
-seven hundred varas to the mouth of the Canada and the point of the
"' Sansal " which is near the estero lyingeast of the house on said prem-
ises which was occupied by said Juan Read in November, 1835, and
thence continuing the measurement from east to west along the last line
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eight hundred varas to the place of beginning; containing one square
league of land, be the same more or less: being the same land described
in the testimonial of juridical possession on file in this case, as having
been measured to said Juan Read under a grant of the same to him;
to which testimonial and the map therein referred to, and constituting
a part of the espediente, a traced copy of which is filed in the case, ref-
erence is to be had. ALPHEUS FELCH,
R. AUG. THOMPSON,
(ommissioners.
Filed in office June 13, 1854.
On the 14th of January, 1S56, in the United States district court the
decision of the Board was affirmed on appeal in terms following:
In the United States district court for the northern district -of Califor-
nia, stated term, January 14, 1856.
THE UNITED STATES, APPELLANTS, )
HEIRS OF JOHN READ, APPELLEES. '
COrTE DE MADERA DEL PRESIDIO.
TRANSCRIPT FROM% BOARD OF COMrMISSIONERS, No. 497.
On appeal from the final decision of the Board of Commissioners to as-
certain and settle private land claims in the State of California.
DECREE.
This cause came on to be heard at a stated term of court on appeal
from the final decision of the Board of Commissioners to ascertain and
settle the private land claims in the State of California under the act of
Congress approved on the 3d day of March, A. D. 1851, upon the trans-
ciipt of the proceedings and decision of the Board of Commissioners,
and the papers and evidence on which the said decision was founded;
and it appearing to the court that the said transcript has been duly filed,
according to law, and counsel for the respective parties having been
heard, it is, by the court, hereby ordered, adjudged, and decreed that
the said decision be and the same is hereby in all things affirmed; and
it is likewise further ordered, adjudged, and decreed that the claim of
the appellees is a good and valid claim; and that the said claim be, and
the same is hereby, confirmed to the extent and quantity of one square
league, being the same land described in the grant, and of which the
possession was proved to have been long enjoyed: Provided, That the
said quantity of one square league, Dow confirmed to the claimants, be
contained within the boundaries called for in the said grant, and the
map to whichthe grants refers, and if there be less than that quantity
within the said boundaries, then we confirm to the claimants that less
quantity.
OGDEN HOFFMAN, JR.,
U. S. District Judge.
(Indorsed:) Filed January 14, 1856.
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The United States having waived appeal this decree was made final
by order of the court April 2, 1857, and in 1858 a survey was executed
by R. C. Matthewson, deputy surveyor, embracing one square league
within the given boundaries, which survey and plat were approve(l byUnited States Surveyor-General Mandeville, September 19, 1959. Had
this survey been regularly transmitted to you and a patent been issued
thereon under the thirteenth section of the act of March 3, 151 ( ta t. 9,p. 631), there would have remained no further question for this Depart-
ment in the case. But on the 14th of June, 1860, Congress passed an
act (12th Stat., p. 33) which the surveyor-general understood to require
publication of the plat, and it was published accordingly.
The district court also understood the act to conferjurisdiction upon
it for the approval of the survey, and ordered it into court upon objec-
tion filed by the claimants, and proceeded to final decree of approval in
1865, but subsequently, on notice of the district attorney that he would
move to dismiss the case for want of jurisdiction, the motion was argued,
the decree set aside, and the case dismissed.
This closed the judicial proceedings, and remitted the survey for the
action of the surveyor-general and this Department under the act of
July 1, 1864. By the second section of that act the survey in qestion,
not having been approved by the Commissioner or the court, was made
subject to the provisions of section 1, which required publication, and
proceedings thereunder as set- forth in the act. This publication was
had in 1868, and after objections filed, and full compliance with the
statute, the survey came before your office, with the opinion of the sur-
veyor-general dated February 26, 1870, and on the thof May, Th71, theCommissioner rendered his final decision that the survey should be ap-
proved, subject to the right of appeal within thirty days.
Appeal was taken; and after full discussion the Secretary of this De-
partment, January 6, 1872, reversed the decision, disapproved of the
survey, and directed that another be made conforming to the juridical
possession, holding that the grant was one of boundary, not of quantity,
and therefore not limited to one square league, as surveyed by Mat-
thewson.
Under this decision a new plat of survey was executed by Leander
ransom, deputy, in September and October, 1873, and, he having de-
ceased, completed by G. F. Allardt, deputy, in June, 1874, which was
published in 1875, in supposed conformity to the requirements of the
act of 1864. During and following such publication, numerous objec-
tions were interposed by the claimants, by the United States district-
attorney, by the War Department, and by several parties, settlers upon
lands included in and adjoining the boundaries of said survey.
This survey, as stated in the decision o your office of September 18,
1878-
Adopts for its initial point a place at the southwest corner of thetract designated as the Solar (the initial point of the juridical posses-
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sion), and from thence runs south, 2.45 chains, to the center of the Ar-
royo Corte Madera del Presidio, the northerly boundary of the Rancho
Saucelito; thence follows down said arroyo to its mouth, and thence by
the shore of Richardson's Bay, Raccoon Strait, and San Francisco Bay,
by the several courses, easterly, northerly, and westerly, to the mouth
of the Arroyo Holon, at the northwest corner of the tract; thence fol-
lowing up said arroyo to the point where it changes from nearly north
and south to an almost due east and west course; and thence south-
erly to the place of beginning. It includes an area of 6,033 acres, ex-
cludes the several adjoining tracts of salt marsh tide lands, and the pa-
ninsula known as Peninsular Island, and includes the small peninsula
or island known as De Silva's Island.
Another plat, which was not published, appears to have been exe-
cuted by Ransom in November and December, 1873, and likewise com-
pleted by Allardt in June, 1874. This plat agrees with the first as to
the monuments called for in the description, but includes the salt marsh
above ordinary high tide, and also Peninsular Island, which were ex-
cluded from the published survey.
By my predecessor's advisory letter of May 28, 1879, your office was
instructed that the publication of 1873 was unauthorized by law, not
being required by the act of 1864; and it follows that each of these
respective surveys was properly before the Department under the order
of 6th of January, 1872, and subject to approval or rejection as it might
be found in conformity to or variant from that instruction.
Your predecessor decided that the Ransom survey of September and
October, 1873, completed by Allardt in 1874, should be approved, after
modification, by adding thereto the marsh lands on the north and Penin-
sular Island on the south, and excluding what is known as De Silva's
Island. This, with a slight correction, would adopt the second Ransom-
Allardt survey referred to, executed in December, 1873, and Jane, 1874.
December 31, 1879, my predecessor, Mr. Secretary Schurz, reversed
this decision and held the survey defective because, although com-
piled from previous actual surveys and referring by the field notes to
monuments already established, and although conceded to represent
accarately the land and its boundaries, it was not run and marked in
the field at all points by the deputies at the time it was executed. He
also held as the principal objection that the plat did not conform to the
judicial decree, and embraced land not within the grant and confirma-
tion.
At the same time he declared himself bound by the decision of Mr.
Secretary Delano, rendered January 6, 1872, which declared the grant
one of boundary and not of quantity, and which directed a survey to be
made conforming to the juridical possession given by the Mexican au-
thorities, as sanctioned by the Board of Land Commissioners.
He appears to have held, although not definitely stating his opinion,
that the decision of 1872, declared by him to be final, only went to the
extent of declaring that the grant was one of boundary, and did not, in
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terms, declare that the description of boundary set out by the Board
was included in the cnfirmation of the district court.
Going from this point to the decision of the court he decided that-
The court confirmed to the heirs of Read the grant as made upon the
evidence produced, but did not attempt to fix the boundaries of thegrant as the Board had done, but left that question to be determinedby the grant and expediente.
He then proceeded to again express his dissent from the decision of
Mr. Secretary Deiano, already declared final, and said:
The court evidently did not regard the grant as a grant by boundaries,but rather as a grant of quantity.
And, after citing the language ot the decree, he farther said:
Whether the boundaries described by the Board contained more than
one square league could not be determined by the court, and hence, in-
stead of adopting the boundaries given by the Board, it directed that
" the boundaries called for in the said grant and the map to which thegrant refers " should govern in ascertaining " the extent and quantity
confirmed to the claimants."
Upon application for a rehearing, the Secretary, on the 3d of May,
1880, declined to reconsider this decision, but on the 25th of the same
month he gave verbal direction to your office to suspend its execution,
and it was suspended accordingly.
After repeated propositions of various kinds, including a resort to
Congress by the claimants, Mr. Montgomery Blair, of counsel for some
of the heirs, and claiming to represent theirentireinterest, filed on the
25th of January, 1881, a proposition to accept as a compromise a patent
upon the Matthewson survey rejected by Mr. Secretary Delano in 1872.
On the 7th of March following, Mr. Schurz endorsed upon this paper
his decision declining to accept the proposition because of inability forlack of time to examine into the propriety of granting it, adding to hisindorsement that he would consider the letter as a motion for a recon-'
sideration of his decision in the case. This carried the proceeding be-
fore my immediate predecessor, Mr. Secretary Kirkwood, who, afterhearing oral argument on the proposition for compromise, declined to
accede to it, not being atisded that all the interests of the grantees
were represented by the offer-a distinct demand having been filed for
a patent upon the whole claim as allowed by the decision of your office,
and also a claim that the decision of 1879 was without jurisdiction-
that of 1872 having been made final by survey executed in accordance
with its directions. He accordingly made on the 14th of April last, an
indorsement on the files of the case to the effect that he had determined
to hear argument on all points as a guide to his judgment in making
final disposal of the whole case, including the question ofjurisdiction
as, of course, preliminary to all others.
This being the condition of the matter as it comes before me, I haveheard the argument submitted in accordance with the arrangement
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last recited, and from all that has been gathered will proceed to dis-
pose of the various questions involved.
It was said in case of the Rancho Alisal, January 4, 18S2 (Reporter,
vol. 1, p. 72; 9 . L. O., 11), that the question of jurisdiction--
May be raised at any stage of the proceedings and upon slight sug-
gestion in all tribunals; and where doubt of such jurisdiction arises it
is usual and proper to look fully into the reason and authority of the
matter, in order that a judgment may not be improvidently rendered
which may have no binding force on account of a want of jurisdiction
in the case.
Applying this to the present proceeding it becomes important to de-
termine what, if anything, has been already settled in order to see what
yet remains of executive duty and discretion. And first, it is conceded
that the Board of Land Commissioners tookjurisdiction of the questions
of extent and boundaries, and incorporated them in its decree. That
it was competent for it so to do is no less certain. United States v.
Fossatt, 20 I., 413; 21 H., 445; and 2 Wall., 649; United States v.
Sepulveda, I Wall., 104; United States v. Halleck, L Wall., 439; United
States v. Billing, 2 Wall., 444; United States v. Pacheco, 2 Wall., 587;
Van Reynegan v. Bolton, 5 Otto, 33; Act of July 1, 1864, section 7
(Stats. 13, p. 334).
Second. The boundaries thus set out by a tribunal of competent juris-
diction, based upon its examination and findings with all the papers and
testimony before it, are conclusive upon all parties, unless declared
erroneous upon appeal (see Abbott's Digest-"Operation and effect of
judgment").
It is not necessary to decide whether any other boundary might in the
judgment of the Department better answer the calls and measurements
of the grant. That question was within the jurisdiction of the land
commissioners, was considered by them, and, if not overruled by the
higher court, was concluded by their decree. The out boundaries of
the Corte de Madera del Presidio were thereby conclusively defined,
and nothing remained in locating the exterior limits but to follow the
calls of the decree.
But one further question could in the nature of things follow this
inquiry into the scope of the action of the Board. This was whether or
not the same was affirmed by the final decree of the district court. This
was disputed; and it was asserted by parties opposing the claim, and
held by the commissioners of your office, that the decree of confirma-
tion made the grant one of quantity and not of boundary, and limited
it to one square league to be located by reference to the grant and map
without reference to the lines described by the Board, or, rather, to be
taken for quantity within those boundaries, as mere exterior bounda-
ries beyond the restricted limits of confirmation.
The question, in this form, was brought by appeal to the Department.
It was considered in all its bearings. It was the sole competent ques-
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tion involved in the case presented, and was brought up at the time andin the manner contemplated by the act of July 1,1 864 (13 Stat., 332,)
viz: upon " objections to the survey,71 and by regular process of appeal.That it was his duty to decide it and that it was the proper question
for his final judgment, see Van Reynegan v. Bolton (95 U. S., 35,) whereit is thus stated:
In the case at bar, the surveyor-general for California disregardedthe boundaries established upon thejuridical possession delivered to thegrantee. Ble proceeded upon0 the conclusion that the contirmees wererestricted by the decree to one square league, to be measured out of thetract within those boundaries, which exceeded that amount by about1,500 acres. Whether the terms of the decree justified his conclusion isa question upon which it is unnecessary for us to express an opinion.That is a question which must, in- the first instance, be determined bythe Land Department in carrying the decree into effect by a survey andpatent. It is sufficient that the survey made was contested by theconfirmees, and the contest was undetermined when this action wasbrought.
This was the very contest declared sufficient to bring the matter to afinal determination by a decision on the point in question.
It was necessarily ripe for action, properly pending under regularform of appeal, and must result in a final decision. This judgment wasin no sense interlocutory. When rendered nothing remained but to
conform the survey by strictly mechanical processes to the boundariesdeclared to have been intended by the decree.
Was this decision open to review by Mr. Secretary Schurz in 1879,
upon a survey purporting to have been duly made in execution of thefinal order?
In his advisory letter of May 28, 1879, in this case, he laid down thegeneral proposition that the statute of 1864 contemplated a full andfinal settlement and decision of all questions touching the extent andboundaries of a private grant, upon presentation of the objections tothe first survey under publication; and that thereafter no objections
could be filed against such decision, under cover of objections to the
reformed or modified survey, whether it be a corrected plat or an en-
tirely new one. And I am of the opinion that this is the true scope,purpose, and intent of the law. Measured by this judgment, the de-
cision of 1872 was the final and conclusive action of the Land Depart-
ment upon the question of quantity as fixed by the decree of the district
court, and is equally binding in this Department upon the United States
and the other parties in the case.
But in view of the strenuous objections urged against this proposi-
tion, and the able arguments of counsel in support of the opposite doc-
trine, I deem it proper to consider briefly the reasons upon which the
opinion is based.
The first reason may be found in the strong mandatory terms of the
statute itself. The investigation of the questions put in issue com-
mences with the examination of the surveyor-general, after the putting
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in writing, duly signed by him or his attorney, of the objections of the
party in interest, and the filing of the proofs and affidavits in support
of them. The surveyor-general must send all these with a copy of the
survey and plat, accompanied with his own opinion, to the Commis-
sioner, whose examination and disposal of all the questions are next
required with minute specification. After such disposal he shall ap-
prove the plat. After the survey and plat have been approved, "it
shall be the duty of the said Commissioner to cause a patent to issue to
the claimant as soon as practicable."
The only interlocutory matter that can intervene here must be while
the case sent up by the surveyor-general is under examination. If a
decision be reached it is final; and after decision, if not arrested by
appeal to the head of the Department, he must (after correction or new
survey when necessary), approve the survey and plat. And after such
approval he must cause the issue of patent. These are ministerial and
mandatory acts which follow at once, " as soon as " the final decision is
reached-not before-and not as a part of such final decision. Mani-
festly the judgment of the appellate tribunal is also final; and if the
Secretary requires a new survey conforming to specific boundaries,
such requirement must be held to embody the law governing the Com-
missioner under which "a new survey and plat are made to conform to
his direction," and upon which he shall indorse" his certificate of ap-
proval. As to the survey itself, its execution becomes a mere minis-
terial act, requiring only practical knowledge and skill, without any
discretion whatever in the officer who performs the service.
But it is said that this is a decision which the Secretary may recall,
and by giving a new construction to a statute, or a different conclusion
upon the effect of the evidence, he may change his award and set aside
the former decision. Admit that he may do this arbitrarily and upon
the suggestion of parties either prej udiced by or disposed to object to
the decision made without any new facts or other reasons which would
support a motion for review in a court of justice, and you at once reach
an end of all stability and all value in the decisions of the Executive De-
partments, and open the barriers of well settled practice to the shifting
opinions of whoever in the examination of a case may chance to dis-
cover or fancy that his predecessor in the inquiry, either himself or
another, has erred in some point of judgment upon the matter confided
to his discretion and decision.
But the rule of stare deesis is well known and recognized in this De-
partment, and it is not necessary to restate the fact that a review of
its decision will not be entered upon, except in accordance with the
general principles governing rehearings, new trials, and bills of review
in the courts. In the present case no foundation had been laid for re-
questing a review of the former decision. The matter in appeal came
up on objections to the survey made in supposed conformity to the
former decision-no attempt to vary the same therefrom having been
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made by your office or the surveyor-general. It was a question of iden-
tification of established boundaries. Only the new matter arising in
the case could properly be brought .up by the appeal (12 Pet., 488; 
Cranch, 316; 10 Wheat., 431; 7 Wheat., 58; 15 How., 466; 20 HI., 481;
12 Wall., 129). See also, on the question of final decisions and review
(1 Otto, 143 and 149; and 2 Wall., 525).
For further authorities respecting the power of one Secretary to review
the decisions of his predecessor, see 13 Opins., 33; 14 do.,602; 14 do.,
253; 2 do., 9; 13 do.,387, and cases there cited; 10 do., 457. See also
the well-digested opinion of Mr. Secretary Chandler, of December 20,
1875, in case of the heirs of Murray McConnel (2 C. L. O., 49), and
authorities therein cited. I may add that a marginal reference to the
decision in question, in the opinion of the court in Van Reynegan v.
Bolton (3 Otto, 33), indicates that in the judgment of that tribunal this
was the final decision of the Land Department, previously mentioned
as necessary to a determination of the ease.
From the foregoing it is clear that whatever was decided in 1872
must stand unless within some rule of review or manifest reason it could
be properly opened for revision. And this was what my predecessor
himself decided. He says:
While I cannotconcurin the conclusions reached by my predecessor that
this grant as confirmed was a grant by boundaries and not of quantity,
still that question was settled by his decision, and I find nothing in the
case now which authorizes me to set it aside and adopt such a construc-
tion of the grant as I think should have been adopted when the case
was first presented to the Department.
Then, without appearing to notice the exact import and scope o the
decision of Mr. Secretary Delano, he proceeded to declare, as already
cited, that your office erred in following the boundaries given by the
Board, because those boundaries were (upon the theory that the grant
was " of quantity") not confirmed by the district court.
Bat it is manifest that the construction given by the Secretary in 1872
extended to every portion of the decree of the court and found that it
was an unqualified affirmation of that of the Board, and included all
its findings. He says:
I am clearly of the opinion that the construction should 'be adopted
which gives full force and effect to the action of the Mexican authorities
as sanctioned by the Board of Land Commissioners.
And again:
The Assistant Attorney-General in his opinion (copy herewith) dis-
cusses at length the questions of law and fact involved in the case, and
I fully concur in the conclusion at which he arrives.
What was that conclusion The opinion says:
With reference to this decree of theBoard there can be no controversy.
The description of the land is simply perfect. The boundaries of thejudicial possession are accurately described. *
This confirmed all the lands within the boundaries named. * *
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A careful consideration of the decree of the district court as a whole
shows, I think, that the clause in question was not intended to limit and
does not limit the general words of confirmation. * * *
The proviso was, in my opinion, intended to limit the amount of land
finally confirmed to the exterior boundaries as given. * *
I therefore recommend that the decision of the Commissioner be re-
versed, and that the surveyor-general be directed to make another sur-
vey, including the laud within the boundaries particularly described in
the decree of the district court by reference to the confirmation by the
Board of Land Commissioners.
These are a part of the conclusions which " in full " were concurred
in and made also a part of the Secretary's decision. As by settled con-
struction the adoption of a document by stated reference in another re-
qcrires them to be read as one, so this opinion must be read as part of
the decision in the case; and so must the words "the boundaries par-
ticularly described .. . .. by reference to the confirmation by the
Board of Land Commissioners" be also read together as a part of the
decree of the district court as construed by the said decision.
It follows that as to all matters in issue the decision in 1872 was in-
tended by the Secretary as a final adjudication, and by this decision the
boundaries "named"-and they are nowhere else named except in the
decision of the Board-were considered as fixed by the decree and
adopted by this Department.
In so far, therefore, as the decision of 1879 ignored that of 1872, at
the same time professing to be bound by it and to follow it, such ignor-
ing was error on the face of the record and open to review, either upon
suggestion of the parties or by voluntary action of the Secretary. And
it appears that he must have doubted the propriety of proceeding un-
der his own decision, even after he had in form denied a review; for he
suspended the execution of the order for survey, and finally left the
whole question open by his endorsement already cited.
I am accordingly at liberty to do whatever he might have done upon
the record before him; and having heard all the additional matters
presented, I am at liberty to say that in my opinion the survey should
have been examined as to its conformity to the directions of Mr. Secre-
tary Delano, and if found to conform, your predecessor was required by
the statute of 1864 to indorse upon it his certificate of approval. And
as upon appeal it is the simple duty of the higher tribunal to direct the
subordinate to do what he should have done in the first instance, all my
predecessor had before him was the question of conformity to the order
embodied in the previous decision, and judgment upon that question
should have controlled the case.
Upon this view of the case I might simply direct that the decision of
1872 be followed and, upon the rule of stare decisis alone, vacate those
of 1879 and 1880. But as my predecessor clearly expressed his belief
that there was error in the decision of 1872, that the decree of the dis-
trict court was one for quantity and intended to overrule and limit the
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decree of the Board, I deem it proper to say that I do not concur in that
opinion.
It is to be observed that by the decision of the district court it was
"ordered, adjudged, and decreed that the said decision be and the same
is hereby inall things affirmed," etc. The opinion of the court on which
the decree was rendered had unqualifiedly assertedthatthis was one of the
few cases where "every requirement of the law has been fully complied
with," closing with the words: "A decree must therefore be entered
affirming the decision of the Board of Commissioners." (Hoffman's Re-
ports, 74). cannot bring myself to the conclusion that the subsequent
mention of quantity was more than a mere estimate; nor do I believe
that the reference to the grant and map was intended to substitute
them as the only guide to the survey without reference to the descrip-
tion by the Board, but conclude that they were mentioned as exhibits
to lead to the actual lines on the ground already traced, on the disefto
described in the grant and defined by the Board. Any other conclusion
would violate the decree affirming the decision of the Board "in all
things," and compel us to regard it as in effect reversing the decree in
all things except the naked fact of a one league grant with indefinite
exterior boundaries, which would compel a surveyor to go back over all
the ground traversed by the Board and find the location, by the Com-
missioners declared certain, in some other and uncertain locality, with-
out the power to enforce testimony, and with no guide but the title
papers alone, which had formed but a part of the evidence within the
power of the Board to reach.
As the decision of 1872, in which I have also stated my own concur-
rence, requires a reference to the decree of the Board of Land Commis-
sioners in making the survey, the boundaries therein are fixed by au-
thority of the Department as well as the courts, and must be considered
as controlling.
And I am the more ready to adopt this conclusion as it seems to be
demanded by every principle of justice and fair dealing toward these
grantees, some of whom, for more than a generation, have had their
home upon the land excluded by the late ruling, and whose all is con-
centered upon the spot. During all those years no question of its being
within the grant had intruded itself upon the attention of this De-
partment up to the time of final decision of 1872.
It was included in the Matthewson survey of 1858, had been par-
titioned among the heirs, and was recognized by all the authorities as a
part of the grant. The only controversy was whether or not more land
should also be included. This leaves nothing to be determined except
the question of conformity to that decree as a matter of fact in the sur-
vey under consideration, as I do not consider the technical objection
raised against the manner ofits execution sufficient to impair the validity
of the plat.
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After careful examination of the evidence, I am satisfied that the
questions of boundary have in the main been correctly decided; and
whatever of uncertainty may exist is not sufficient to justify another
expensive and prolonged attempt to remove. That the line of ordinary
high-water mark is the limit of the grant upon its water boundary is
clearly sustained by the authority of the United States v. Pacheco (2
Wall., 587) and numerous other cases. That the Point Taburon must
be found at the water's edge is clear from the language of the decree.
We follow "by the waters of said arroyo and the bay " to the Point, and,
having reached it, we proceed " thence running along the borders of said
bay." We cannot both reach and leave it by running along the bay
and find it far inland in another locality.
But I do not concede that the phrase " along the borders of said bay"
was intended to include islands therein, nor did it probably include
what was laid down as such on all the maps and charts, and is even
now called Peninsular island, though shown by this testimonyto connect
by a narrow causeway, not over 60 feet in width, with the main land.
"Running along the borders of the bay" would the rather exclude this
land situated far out in the water, and (unless intended to be indicated
by a small circular tracing, claimed by some of the witnesses to repre-
sent a rock in the bay) not shown on the diseho. If so intended it is
excluded; and, if not shown, it is not necessarily included in the call.
I must, therefore, hold it as outside the grant, and direct that it be ex-
cluded from the survey, together with the other small island or penin-
sula now occupied as a military reserve by the United States.
The decisions of December 31, 1879, and May 3, 1880, are accordingly
revoked, and that of your predecessor, as herein modified, is affirmed;
and you will direct the survey and plat to be corrected accordingly.
ON REVIE W.
Reconsideration of decision of July 28, 1882, and direction to include, in survey,
Peninsular Island and a small peninsular east of it, which were excluded by that
decision.
Secretary Teller to Commissioner McFarland, January 31, 1883.
In the case of the private claim known as the " orte de Madera del
Presidio," heirs of Juan Read confirmees, I rendered a decision on the
28th of July last, directing a survey to be made in accordance with the
boundaries fixed by the decree of the district court by reference to the
description given by the decree of the Board of Land Commissioners.
In relation to these boundaries I was in doubt whether or not the
peninsula called Peninsular island and another small peninsula to the
eastward, near the point of the mainland, were properly included in
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the calls-for boundary, and I ordered them to be excluded. This doubt
arose from a apparent failure on the part of the original claimant to
show such peninsula on the diseiio, the water-line of indentation not
being carried up into the body of land sufficiently to mark the actual
separation to the extent shown on the maps of the survey.
On the 4th of September last, B. S. Brooks, attorney for the claimants,
filed a petition of Thomas B. Valentine, an assignee, for a portion of the
claim-embracing these tracts, asking a further examination of the mat-
ter, with a view to including them in the survey, on the ground that
the disefio and evidence connected therewith show them to have been
as matter of fact shown on the same and in the occupation of Read, the
original grantee, and necessarily included in the decree of the Board.
At the time of the oral hearing before me I was in some manner
impressed with the idea that the parties did not especially press their
claim to the peninsula, and would be satisfied with its exclusion. Con-
sequently I did not so thoroughly examine the evidence respecting the
actual showing of the same upon the diseho as I otherwise should have
done.
Having now made such examination I am relieved of all reasonable
doubt, the contour of the disefio and the location objects adjacent
to the land delineated as the claim being found to comport substantially
with the fact of the inclusion of the peninsula, while its exclusion would
render the map essentially inaccurate and unreliable. The failure to
show the full extent of the indentation is explained by the fact that the
diseio is, as appears on its face, a nautical chart, with the surroundings
of the bay marked thereon, and evidently made at low tide, by Read,
who was a sailor, and whose map or chart of the shore would be most
likely to show the extreme outline of the land at low water, with a view
to keeping his course around the point in the deep, permanent, naviga-
ble channel of the bay.
I am also in receipt of a motion, filed 27th ultimo, by J. W. and A.
St. C. Denver, attorneys for Peter Gardner, for further modification, so
as to exclude the marsh lands above ordinary high-water mark, and an
argument in support of the same.
Mr. Gardner does not allege any specific interest, and the argument
relates to the general subject, ostensibly in hehalf of a number of pur-
chasers from the State of California under her tide-land segregations,
none of whom are definitely named or represented by the counsel.
I have, however, considered the general argument in connection with
the protest of J. W. Shanklin, the, State surveyor-general, and other
papers accompanying your letter of November 10, 1882, and must de-
cline to grant the modification prayed for.
You will accordingly direct the correction of the survey to conform to
the decision of July 28, 1882, as herein modified, so as to include the
two peninsulas heretofore excluded.
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PRIVATE CAIM-CONTROL OF LOCATIONX
RANCHO SAN JACINTO NUEVO Y POTRERO.
Where a private claim for quantity, within exterior limits containing larger quantity,
was ostensibly satisfied by a survey, and while so apparently satisfied the United
States sold and patented lands within the exterior limits as public lands, which
(the original survey of the private claim being set aside) were included in a new
survey thereof: Held, on objections to said new survey on the part of said pat-
entee, there being still ample space within the exterior limits to satisfy the pri-
vate claim without including said patented lands, that it should be so satisfied,
and new survey ordered accordingly.
Secretary Kirkwood to Commissioner McFarland, November 19, 1881.
I have considered the statements in your letter of September 1'7, 1881,
from which it appears that, under the decision of the Acting Secretary
of this Department on May 21, 1881, respecting the survey of the Rancho
San Jacinto Nuevo y Potrero, you returned the survey of said rancho to
the surveyor-general with directions to ascertain whether the larger
tract, as located by the Thompson survey (being that then under con-
sideration), was not within the boundaries of said rancho as described
in the O'Farrell map of said survey, it appearing from the descriptive
notes that the 07Farrell map was ignored in said survey. You state
that the surveyor-general has made report to you, and that it is mani-
fest (for reasons stated in your letter) that the Thompson survey of said
rancho extends beyond and includes land on the north not embraced
within the boundaries of the San Jacinto tract as designated on the
O'Farrell map referred to in the decree of confirmation. You, there-
fore, suggest that the conclusions of the surveyor-general, that said sur-
vey fulfills the required conditions, is incorrect.
You also state that parts of T. 3 S., R. 3 W., S. B. M., including 12,800
acres thereof, which, with other parts of the township not included in the
survey, amounting to 14,116 acres, are included in the Thompson survey,
were sold and patented by the United States to Gustave Mahe, in 1870;
and that there is ample space within the prescribed boundaries to locate
and satisfy the quantity of land confirmed, without including the land
so sold and patented. You also state that the location of the claim, as
made by the Thompson survey, does not meet the requirement that the
measurement be commenced from the line of juridical possession of Estu-
dillo; and that a location of the tract so as to make it adjoin to a greater
extent than at present the line of the Estudillo possession would con-
form it more nearly to the measurement directed by the decree of con-
firmation, and to the compactness of form required by the act of July
1, 1864.
In view of these statements you will give the proper directions for
carrying them into effect, so that the lands surveyed may not embrace
said patented lands, and shall also be within the lines of the O'Farrell
survey.
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PRIVATE CLAIM-BES ADJUDICATA.
RANCHO DE NAPA.
On application by parties in opposition to confirmee that patent issue to him on sur-
vey published under act of 1860, and approved by United States district court,
(claiming the case to be within the Alisal decision), notwithstanding republica-
tion under act of 1864, had been ordered by Commissioner, and affirmed by De-
partment: eld, that the case proceed before the surveyor-general in the usual
way.
That, though the questions involved might be similar to those in the Alisal case, the
confirmee should have the right to present his side, notwithstanding the decision
in that case.
Secretary Teller to Commissioner McFarland, July 25, 1882.
I have considered the question of issuing a patent for part of Rancho
Napa, confirmed to Otto H. Frank, upon the application of J. A. Robin-
son, esq., attorneyfor the estate of R. B. Woodard, deceased, submitted
by your letter of May 17, 1882.
Under the act of Congress of March 3, 1851, the title to Rancho de
Napa, in Napa County, California, was finally confirmed to Otto H.
Frank and others, by the United States district court for the northern
district of California. In October, 1858, a survey was made of the whole
Rancho confirmed to Frank and others. This survey was approved
December 19, 1859. At the same time, and by the same deputy, a sur-
vey was made purporting to exhibit the particular portion of the rancho
to which Frank was entitled. This survey was approved by Surveyor-
General Mandeville January 4, 1860. These surveys were not pub-
lished, nor were they ordered into court until after the passage of the
act of Congress of June 14, 1860. February 13, 1862, certain surveys
were published by Surveyor-General Beale, successor to Mandeville;
and among them the one to said Otto H. Frank. March 11, 1862, an
order was made by the United States district court requiring the sur-
veyor general to return into court the surveys above mentioned. In
obedience to this order, May 5, 1862, Surveyor-General Beale filed a copy
of these surveys in court. In April, 1871, an order of the court was
made confirming these surveys, with certain modifications. It appears
that in the proceedings in court Frank did not appear by attorney or
take any part. On the 26th of March, 1878, Frank made a written ap-
plication to the surveyor-general for a publication of the survey under
the act of July 1, 1864, treating the proceedings in court and the publi-
cation of the survey under the act of 1860 as nullities, under the decis.
ion of the supreme court in United States v. Sepulveda (1 Wall. 104).
This application was denied. On such refusal an appeal was taken to
your office, and April 21, 1879, a decision was rendered overruling the
opinion of the surveyor-general, and instructing him to proceed to pub-
lish such survey in accordance with section 1 of the act ot July 1, 1864,
and to transmit to your office a copy of survey and plat, with certificate
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of publication as required by said act. On appeal from such decision
to this Department your decision was, on the 20th day of September,
1879, affirmed. The surveyor-general, in compliance with such decision,
advertised the survey as required by the act of July 1, 1864. Objec-
tions were filed by several parties against the survey, and a large
amount of testimony had been taken before the making of the motion
hereafter mentioned, and the case is still pending before the surveyor-
general.
February 9, 1882, J. A. Robinson, esq., attorney for the estate of R.
B. Woodard et al., made application to your office for issue of patent of
Rancho Napa-part confirmed to Otto H. Frank-upon the survey now
before your office, alleging as ground of such motion that the case came
within the late decision of this Department in the matter of the survey
of Ilancho .lisal. The motion was submitted by your office to the Sec-
retary of the Interior for instructions, and March 1, 1882, you were in-
structed to-
Allow a limited period for showing cause why such application should
not be granted, confining the argument to a showing of reasons, if any
there be, why the same does not fall within the doctrine announced in
my decision of January 4 last in the matter of El Alisal.
March 6 last you directed the surveyor-general to serve due notice of
such instructions on all the proper parties, and notice that Frank, con-
firmee, or his attorney, Mr. Aldrich, be allowed thirty days from service
of notice to show cause why the motion should not be granted. Such
notices having been duly served, and the time on the part of Frank to
show cause properly extended, on the 5th day of May last Mr. Aldrich,
on behalf of Frank, confirmee, filed his reasons and arguments against
granting such motion. His reasons, briefly stated, are:
That the case on the point involved in El Alisal has been before the
Department on application of Frank for publication, and that the Depart-
ment decided that the surveyor-general, and not the district court, had
jurisdiction; that such has been the settled practice in this Department
since the decision in Sepulveda case ( Wallace, 104); that notwithstand-
ing the decision in El Alisal may have overturned such practice, Frank
should be allowed a full trial and hearing of the case as it now stands;
that his case should not be summarily disposed of because of an adverse
decision in another case; that the questions of jurisdiction, should be
decided by you, and if you held that a patent should issue under the
late decision in El Alisal, Frank should have his right to appeal and
argue the question before this Department; that great injustice will be
done to Frank if the case is thus summarily disposed of and not heard
upon its merits, and that the ruling of my predecessor in the Alisal
case may not, upon a full hearing in this case, be sustained.
Upon a careful consideration of the question thus presented I am of
the opinion that the case pending before the surveyor-general should be
permitted to proceed in the usual manner, and if Frank, confirmee, de-
sires to present the questions arising in his case, although they may
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be similar to those in the Alisal case, he should have the privilege
of doing so, notwithstanding the decision in that case. I therefore
direct vou to decline to issue the patent asked for in the application of
February 9, 1882. You will please give notice of this order to the sur-
veyor-general, and direct him to give proper notice to the attorneys
of the parties interested.
PRIVATE CLAIMS-SURVEY-PUBLICATION.
RANcHo MissioN DE LA PURISIMIA.
Construction and application of the term " sobrante," as used in the decision of the
Department of July 21, 1873, in the " Lompoc contest."
A survey approved hy the surveyor-general is the official survey in the case, and must
be published as such. A survey subsequently made andpublished independently
of the former is invalid.
Whatever construction may be put upon the Lompoc decision, the grant cannot be ex-
tended beyond the decree of confirmation.
Survey directed to correspond with terms of decree.
Secretary Teller to Commissioner McFarland, July 19, 1882.
I have examined the case of the survey of the private land claim of
Rancho Mission de la Purisima, on appeal from the decision of the Com-
missioner of the General Land Office of May 31, 1881, addressed to the
United States surveyor general for California.
A brief history of the mission may be essential to a clear understand-
ing of the questions involved in the case. The establishment of mis-
sions in remote provinces was a part of the colonial system of Spain.
The Mission la Purisima was established in 1787. At that time Upper
California was inhabited mainly by wild Indians. The object of this
and other similar missions was to civilize and Christianize these Indians.
As fast as they were converted they were gathered into villages and
taught to labor, etc. The priests and other ecclesiast ics exercised a
temporal as well as spiritual authority within the territorial limits of
the mission. But the missionaries and Indians did not own the lands
within the limits of the mission. No title was recognized in them either
by the government of Spain or Mexico. They had only a usufruct, an
occupancy, and even that was liable to be terminated at any time by
the will of the sovereign (United States v. Cruz Cervantes, 18 Howard,
555).
The early history of California shows that La Purisima as late as 1834
was in a condition of thrift, and its lands largely and actually occupied
for the purposes of the mission. There were within its limits " 900
neophytes, 1,000 head of horned cattle, 2,000 horses, 14,000 head of
sheep, and harvested 6,000 fanegas (bushels) of cereals." (Explora-
tions of Oregon and California, by Mofras, vol. 1, p. 375.)
The missions of California generally had no defined boundaries. The
boundaries of the Mission La Purisima were not closely defined3 the
nature of the establishment and the purposes of its use only required
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that the limits should be general; yet, from the testimony in the case,
particularly the deposition of Jose A. Carrillo, the boundaries of La
Purisima could be ascertained with reasonable certainty.
August 17, 1834, the Mexican government proceeded to secularize
the missions of the Upper and Lower California.
Article 2 of the provisional regulations declared that " the mission-
ary priests will be exonerated from the administration of temporalities,
and will only exercise the functions of their ministry in matters pertain-
ing to the spiritual administration" (Doc. No. 17,-Thirty-first Congress,
first session, p. 149), and thereafter, as was declared in The United States
v. Ritchie (17 Howard, 525), the authorities dealt with these mission
establishments the same as with any other portions ofthepublic domain;
the clergy, who previously had the charge and control of them, being
confined to the spiritual government of the mission.
In 1841 La Purisima was, as a mission, both spiritually and materially,
nearly in ruins. Within its limits were about " 60 Indians, 100 head of
cattle, 300 horses, and 3,500 sheep, and it had no missionary." In 845
the departmental government, regarding La Purisima and some other
missions as abandoned, after allowing thirty days to the Los Neofitos
Indians to reunite for the purpose of occupying and cultivating the
missions, and upon their failure to do so, caused public notice to be given
that on the 4th dayof December, 1845, in the city of Los Angeles, "the
principal edifice of the Mission La Purisima, the two vineyards of Ja-
lama, the lands and movable property belonging to the mission, except-
ing therefrom the temple or church," would be sold to the highest bid-
der. At such sale Don Juan Temple became the purchaser on the
final bid of $1,110. On the 6th of the same month, the governor, Pio
Pico, executed to Temple a formal deed, which recited and declared,
"by these presents, that the said Don Juan Temple is the legal owner
of the edifice of the Mission of La Purisima, of the two vineyards, of the
lands and movable property which was sold to him for the sum of $1,110."1
It further recited that the purchaser should be " allowed to take juridi-
cal possession of the improvements, vineyards, lands, and movable prop-
erty referred to, which shall be given by the respective judge." Juridi-
cal possession was never in fact given.
September 27, 1850, for the consideration of $1,500 by an instrument
in writing, Temple transferred his interest in La Purissima to Don
Ramon Malo in the following words:
All the right and title that I may have by title or purchase in the
Mission of La Purissima.
In November, 1852, Jos6 Ramon Malo petitioned the United States
Board of Land Commissioners for confirmation of his title. This peti-
tion sets forth-
That he claims the principal edifice of the Mission of La Purisima,
together with the lands and chattels thereunto belonging, situated in
the county of Santa Barbara.
250 DECISIONS RELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS.
It further alleges, that since the conveyance to him by Temple, Sep-
tember 27, 1850, "he has been in peaceable possession, without the
knowledge of any interfering claimant."
October 17, 1854, Malo asked and obtained leave of the Board that
his petition-
Be so amended as to read, instead of the principal edifice of the Mis-
sion of La Purisima and the lands thereunto belonging, the principal
edifice of the Mission de la Purisima, and the lands thereunto belong-
ing, amounting to between two and three square leagues, having for
boundaries the lines of former or previous grants, viz: Mission Vieja
de la Purisima, Rancho Maria, Lompoc, Los Alamos, and Santa Rita.
Upon the hearing before the Board of Commissioners, Alpheus B.
Thompson was examined as a witness, and his deposition is of some im-
portance as bearing upon the extent of the grant, as it is referred to
both in the opinion of the Board and in the decree of confirmation. He
states that he is acquainted with the mission; that he knew it in 1831;
that at the time of the sale to Temple-
There were some lands then belonging to the mission, and which were
sold with the buildings. These lands were called the sobrante or lands
then remaining to the mission after deducting the lands which had been
granted. These lands (sobrante) I understood amounted to about two or
three leagues.
Question. State more particularly in reference to the location.
Answer. The rancho of Lompoc, which comprises the old Mission of
La Purisima, is situated about one mile south-southwest of the present
mission building; the rancho of Santa Rita, belonging to Ramon Malo,
is situated southeast of said mission, on the north side of the river
Santa Ynez; the Ranchos of Todos Santos and Los Alamos are situated
to the north of the Mission of La Purisina.
Upon the close of the hearing the following decree was made and filed
December 31, 1855:
Josti RAMON MALO )
v. .
THE UNITED STATES.
In this case, on hearing the proofs and allegations, it is adjudged by
the Commission that the claim of the said petitioner is valid, and it is
therefore decreed that the same be confirmed to him.
The land of which confirmation is made is situated in the county of
Santa Barbara, and is known as the principal edifice and lands of the
Mission of La Purisima, to the extent of between two and three square
leagues, excepting therefrom that portion of said premises which be-
longs to the church, and bounded by the Rancho of Lompoc. which com-
prises the old Mission of La Purisima, the Ranchos of Santa Rita, Todos
Santos, and Los Alamos, reference being had to the original grant and
the deposition of A. B. Thompson, filed in the case, for a more particu-
lar description.
The decree of the Board of Land Commissioners was taken by appeal
to the United States district court, and at the June term, 1857, upon
motion of the United States district attorney, the appeal was dismissed
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and an order made that the claimant have leave to proceed under the
decree of the commissioners as a final decree.
At this point in the history of the case the real controversy begins.
The difficulty arises in ascertaining the amount and boundaries of the
land conveyed hy the deed of Governor Pio Pico to Don Juan Temple,
and confirmed to Jos6 Ramon Malo.
For the purpose of executing the decree of confirmation, several sur-
veys have been made.
The first was made in November, 1860, by Deputy Surveyor J. E.
Terrell, and was approved by Surveyor-General Mandeville, April 9,
1861; it embraced an area of 14,927.62 acres. No publication of this
survey was made. Surveyor-General Beale amended this survey in
respect to its western boundary, extending that boundary from the
"Low Hills," and "low, broken Chamisal Hills," described in the plat
of the Terrell survey, to the eastern boundary of the Rancho Jesus
Maria. This extension increased the area to 16,455.54 acres. The sur-
vey, as thus amended, was approved by Surveyor-General Beale, and
publication thereof made by him, and upon transmission to the General
Land Office in 1870 was held by Acting Commissioner Curtis, Novem-
ber 8, 1872, in the Lompoc contest, to have become final by such pub-
lication. From such decision an appeal was taken to the Secretary of
the Interior, who referred the case to the Assistant Attorney-General,
who held the publication defective, and that the survey was also in
conflict with the Ranchos Lompoc and Mission Vieja La Purisima, in
that it extended the southern boundary of La Purisima to the river
Santa Ynez, when in fact the northern boundary of Lompoc and Vieja,
as held by him, extended across and north of that river. This opinion
being approved, and a further survey ordered, a new survey was made
in November, 1874, by Deputy Surveyor W. H. Norway. This survey
embraced a large quantity of land lying east of the west line of Santa
Rita, and a triangular piece on the north, lying between Jesus Maria,
Todos Santos, and La Parisima, as surveyed by Terrell, embracing
an area of 34,012.56 acres.
The surveyor-general refused to advertise the survey so made, and
ordered Norway to return to the field and modify his survey, which he
did. This survey was duly advertised, as provided by the act of July
1, 1864.-(Surveyor-General Rollins' opinion, April 5, 1877.)
The Norway survey, as modified, corresponded with the Terrell sur-
vey as to its eastern and northern boundaries, and made the patented
Rancho Jesus Maria the western boundary, and Lompoc and Vieja, as
patented, the southern boundary, and embraced an area of 14,735.76
acres, leaving as public land the triangular piece above mentioned and
the large parcel on the east.
Protests were made to this survey by claimants and settlers, and tes-
timony was taken in behalf of all parties interested, and a hearing had
before Surveyor-General Rollins, who transmitted the record with his
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opinion in April, 1877. In this opinion he disapproves of the modified
Norway survey, and recommends the adoption of the first Norway sur-
vey of 34,012.56 acres as the correct survey.
Upon examination made of the case in the General Land Office, the
conclusion was reached that the first survey made by Terrell, in Novem-
ber, 1860, and approved by Surveyor-General Mandeville, April 9, 1861,
embracing an area of 14,927.62 acres, was, according to the opinion of
the Assistant Attorney-General and Acting Secretary, the official sur-
vey, and if found inaccurate should be amended, instead of a new sur-
vey being executed. That survey never having been advertised, the
surveyor-general was, October 3, 1877, instructed to publish it, accord-
ing to the act of July 1, 1864, and such publication was thereupon duly
made.
Several objections to and protests against said survey have been made
and filed in the office of the surveyor-genieral. The claimants of La
Purisima object and allege:
1. That in the decision of the Lompoc contest La Purisima was held
to be a sobrasnte grant; that the present survey is not of the sobrante,
but only a small part thereof, and is not in accordance with such decis.
ion; that this survey was made long before the decision holding said
ranch to be a sobrante grant; and that the survey of Rancho Lompoc
was wrong, such grant never having been extended beyond the River
Ynez, and that since the Department goes behind the decision in respect
to La Purisima being a sobrantd grant, the owners of La Purisima claim
to the Ynez river.
2. The owners of the Ranchos Lompoc and Vieja de la Purisima pro-
test because the survey overlaps and conflicts with their northern bound-
aries, as established by the patents issued therefor, and that the ques-
tions relating to such northern boundary have been fully examined and
adjudicated by the Secretary of the Interior.
3. The owner of Rancho Jesus Maria protests because the survey
overlaps the southeast line of said rancho as patented.
4. Certain settlers upon lands claimed by the owners of La Purisima,
but included in said survey, protest against any change in said survey
that would interfere with their pre-emption rights.
Such objections being made, a hearing was had before the surveyor-
general, and testimony produced on behalf of the claimants of La Pu-
risima, the owners of Ranchos Lompoc and Vieja de la Purisiina and the
settlers aforesaid, and Surveyor-General Ames transmitted the case to
your office with his opinion, signed the 13th day of February, 1878.
The surveyor-general is of the " opinion that the survey under con-
sideration is wrong in overlapping the Ranchos Lompoc and Mission
Vieja de la Purisima," and that La Purisima is " necessarily limited by
the northern boundary of Lompoc and Mission Vieja de la Purisima, as
aforesaid," by the decision of October, 1873, and the patents issued. He
is also of the opinion that the Terrell survey of 1860, under considera-
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tion, correctly established the eastern boundary of La Purisima. He
says:
The original grant of the Rancho Santa Rita establishes such line as
its westerly boundary, and consequently limits the sobrante of Mission
de la Purisima in that direction. . . . . No objection having been
filed against the north line of the Rancho Mission de la Purisima, as
shown by the Terrell survey of 1860, and now last advertised, and the
same being in conformity with the southern boundary of the Rancho Los
Alamos, the same is no doubt the correct northern boundary.
The western boundary of the Rancho Mission de la Purisima, as fixed
on the plat of the Terrell survey now advertised, does not extend to the
eastern boundary of the Rancho Jesus Maria as patented, and the plat
should be amended by extending it to such patented line of Jesus Maria,
as has already been done on the amended plat of the Terrell survey, and
in the Norway survey of June, 1875.
Supposing the lines and boundaries above described to be the proper
limits of the (sobrante) Rancho Mission de la Purisima, then the survey
of the same made by Deputy Surveyor W. H. Norway, in June, 1875,
and approved by United States surveyor-general for California, Jan-
uary 14, 1876, is the correct survey and plat of the same.
The claimants of La Purisima insist that the decision of the Secretary
of July 21, 1873, determined that the grant in question was a sobrante,
or grant, of what remained of the mission at the time of the grant, and
that Temple by his purchase and grant took all the lands of the Mission
La Purisima that remained after taking out the grants made prior to
his purchase.
It will be seen upon a review of the facts that the grant in question
-was not claimed as a sobrante grant until after the decision of 1873.
At the time of the public sale, in 1845, it was not described as a sobrante
grant, nor is it so described by Malo in his petition for confirmation be-
fore the Board of Commissioners. In his amended petition the grant,
as he claims it, is-
The principal edifice of the Mission de la Purisima, and the lands
thereto belonging, amounting to between two and three square leagues,
having for boundaries the lines of former or previous grants, viz: Mis-
sion Viejd de la Purisima, Rancho Maria, Lompoc, Los Alamos, and
Santa Rita.
A large proportion of the lands now claimed as the sobrante lie out-
side of the interior boundaries of the above ranchos as they then existed.
The decree of confirmation is made as-
Bounded by the Rancho of Lampoc, which comprises the old Mission
of La Purisama, the Ranchos of Santa Rita, Todos Santos, and Los Ala-
mos, reference being had to the original grant, and the deposition of A.
B. Thompson, filed in the case, for a more particular description.
The deposition of Thompson described the land as amounting to about
"two or three leagues," and gives the Ranchos Lompoc, old Mission of
La Purisima, Santa Rita, Todos Santos, and Los Alamos as boundaries.
If the grant is limited by the surrounding ranchos as they were known
at the time of the grant, and as since ascertained by actual survey, the
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amount of land in La Purisima is about three leagues. The owners of
La Purisima, construing it to be a sobrante, claim about eight leagues
under the Norway survey of 1874, but in addition to that amount they
claim a large tract of land bounded north by Rancho Guadalupe, east
by Rancho Punta de la Laguna, south- by Rancho Casmalia, and west
by the Pacific Ocean; ,they also claim a very large tract lying entirely
north of Los Alamos, making in all more than 20 leagues. La Puri-
sima, regarded as a tract of about three leagues, inclosed and limited
by the surrounding ranchos as their boundaries existed at the time of
the grant, lies in a compact form; as a sobrante, in the sense claimed,
there must be added to this compact piece irregular and detached par-
cels lying outside of the boundaries of the surrounding ranchos. These
detached and irregular parcels were lands remaining after surveys were
made and patents issued for grants other than La Purisima, lying within
what is claimed to be the exterior limits of the Mission of La Purisima
as granted in 1787. All the ranchos mentioned above described as
boundaries of La Purisima have been surveyed and patented. The com-
pact tract of La Purisima, comprising about three leagues is) I under-
stand, occupied by its owners.
Malo, in his petition to tie Board of Commissioners for confirmation,
states that he has been in peaceable possession since the conveyance to
him by Temple, September 27, 1850. The parcels outside of that piece
are mainly occupied by settlers claiming under the pre-emption and
homestead laws of the United States, and this controversy as to title is
substantially between the claimants of La Purisima and the United
States.
The southern boundary of the claim in question must be regarded as
settled by the decision of this Department in the Lompoc contest, and
the northern boundaries of Ranchos Lompoc and Mission Vieja de la
Purisima, as patented in November, 1873, must be considered the south-
ern boundary of the grant in question. The eastern boundary of Ran-
cho Jesus Maria has also been settled and determined, and a patent
was issued for that rancho in September, 1871; and that line must
form the western boundary of La Purisima. Todos Santos was first
surveyed to its exterior boundary on the south, and that line formed a
portion of the north line of La Purisima as surveyed by Terrell in 1860.
Todos Santos was confirmed for five leagues. It appears that as it was
subsequently surveyed the piece known as the triangle was excluded
from the first survey, and its north line extended into the south part of
Rancho Punta de la Laguna.
The owner of Todos Santos, to avoid a contest with La Laguna on
account of such extension on the north, accepted a patent for 20,772.17
acres (being 1,421.23 acres less than five leagues), still leaving out the
piece embraced in the original survey lying in the southwest corner
No special claim seems to be made to this piece of land by the owners
of La Purisima, and the disposition of it must be determined by the
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same rule that governs the disposition of the large tract lying east of
the west line of Santa Rita as granted to Malo.
The remaining and important question in the case is whether any
lands should be included in the grant in question lying east of such west
line of the Rancho Santa Rita, being the west line as patented, extended
north to the south line of Los Alamos.
Prior to 1873 the owners of La Purisima had not made claim to any
lands lying east of the west line of Rancho Santa Rita. They had con-
tested the southern and western boundaries of their grant, and were
endeavoring to extend the limits in those directions, or repel intrusions
upon what they regarded as their territory by the owners of the grants
lying on those boundaries; but it was not until after the decision of 1873
that any claim was made to lands lying east of the west line of Santa
Rita. The first survey that included lands lying east of that line was
the Norway survey, made in November, 1874, and embraced 34,012.56
acres. The largest amount embraced in any survey before that time
was that constructed by Beale from field notes in June,, 1862, and in-
cluded lands in contest with Lompoc, Vieja de la Purisima, and Jesus
Maria, and embraced 16,455.54 acres. The two large tracts, one lying
upon the Pacific Ocean and the other north of Los Alamos, have never
been included in any survey of La Purisima. Your predecessor was of
the opinion that these two tracts, under the decision of 1873, hereafter
mentioned, were included in La Purisima at the time of the sale to Tem-
ple, and that the claimants would be entitled to them but for the fact
that they were not included in the petition for confirmation. Your
predecessor bases this opinion, and also the opinion that the lands ly-
ing east of the west line of Santa Rita belong to the grant in question,
upon the ground that by the decision of the Secretary of the Interior
of July 21, 1873, " the La Purisima was a sobrante dependent for its
boundaries upon the location of the adjoining ranchos."
I think the effect of that decision upon the question involved in this
case will not bear the construction placed upon it by your office. It
must be remembered that the extent, the quantity of land granted, and
the particular character of La Purisima were not involved in the ques-
tions considered in that decision. The particular question under con-
sideration by the Secretary in the " Lompoc contest," when he desig-
nated La Purisima as a sobrante, was to determine the northern bound-
ary of Lompoc and Mission Vieja, as conflicting with La Purisima;
whether the River Ynez constituted such boundary, or the range of hills
lying north of the river. He finds that Lompoc was granted in 1837,
long before the sale to Temple; that juridical possession was given; and
that La Purisima, being a grant made subsequently to Lompoc, was a
sobrante or grant of what remained, and must necessarily be limited
by the boundaries of Lompoc as granted and settled by juridical posses-
sion. Such I understand to be the purport of that decision in that
respect. Applying the facts and the reasons given in that decision to
256 DECISIONS RELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS.
the boundary line between La Purisima and Santa Rita, the effect of
the decision would be to limit La Purisima to the western boundary of
Santa Rita as granted, and as juridical possession was given.
The decision says that many grants had been made " from the lands of
the La Purisima, among them the Lompoc, Mission Vieja, Santa Rita,
Todos Santos, and Los Alamos. The residue was sold in the manner indi-
cated, and then granted to the purchaser."~ It cannot be claimed that the
Secretary meant by such language to hold that La Purisima could be
extended beyond the interior lines or sides looking toward each other
of the surrounding grants named by him. Whatever may have been said
in that decision in respect to La Purisima being a sobrante, not called
for in consideration of the questions then to be decided, must be regarded
as obiter dictum, and not intended by the Secretary to designate the
extent of La Purisima, and its character as a sobrante in the general
acceptation of that term. It may be observed here that the Secretary
expresses doubt whether, but for the act of confirmation, La Purisima
ever had any valid existence. Referring to the grant to Temple, the
decision says:
This was the only title that Temple or any one under him ever had
from the Mexican government; if under that government it was of
any validity whatever, which is doubtful, it was one of the weakest
titles known to the law.
Taking the decision as a whole, and regarding the questions then
under consideration, to hold that the Secretary intended to characterize
La Purisima as a sobrante in the sense claimed, extending beyond the
limits of the surrounding ranchos named by him, and embracing large
tracts of land, vastly greater than the part lying within the boundaries
of such ranchos, and some of them at great distances therefrom, would
be doing violence to the language used by the Secretary and the mani-
fest purport and intent of the decision, and yet such is the construction
which your predecessor has placed upon it.
La 'urisima was not described in terms as a " sobrante" in the sale
and conveyance to Temple, or the transfer to Malo, nor in the original
or amended petition for confirmation, nor in the decree of confirmation,
except in the use of that term by Thompson in his deposition referred
to in the decree " for a more particular description." It therefore be-
comes of some interest and importance to look into the meaning of the
term as used by Thompson, and especially so since the claim of La
Purisima to all the lands, except about three leagues, depends upon
whether the claim is a sobrante in the broad interpretation of the term.
Thompson, in his deposition, says:
There were some lands then belonging to the mission, and which were
sold with the buildings. These lands were called the sobrante, or lands
then remaining to the mission after deducting the lands which had been
granted. These lands (sobrante) I understood amounted to about two
or three leagues.
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When asked for a more particular location he gives Rancho Lompoc
as situated on the south of Santa Rita, "belonging to Ramon Malo "
on the southeast, and Todos Santos and Los Alamos on the north.
Thompson had been acquainted with La Purisima since 1831, and knew
the surrounding ranchos. Within the limits of the ranchos he names
(supplying Jesus Maria on the west and Mission Vieja on the south)
we find about three leagues of land, the largest amount estimated by
him as belonging to La Purisima, which he terms a sobrante. It is clear
that Thompson by the use of that term did not suppose that it applied
to any lands lying outside of the interior boundaries of the ranchos
named by him, and evidently believed' that there were no such, lands
belonging to La Purisima. It is clear that Thompson used the term in
the same sense as did the Secretary in the decision of July 21,1873. If
he had intended to include in his term "sobrante" the large tracts
lying outside of the ranchos named, he would not have limited the
~amount "to about two or three leagues." There is as much force in
insisting that La Purisima is a " sobrante " in the sense claimed by its
owners, under the Thompson deposition (since it is by the decree made
a part of the description), as there is that it is a " sobrante " by the
decision of 1873. I am aware that it is claimed that, by the decision of
1873, La Purisima is adjudicated to be a sobrante, but, as has already
been intimated, there was not that identity of the subject matter under
consideration which constitutes the first element of " resjudioata."
Again, it is evident that, in any view of the case, the owners of La
Purisima can take no more land than was petitioned for and confirmed
by the Board of Commissioners.
The lands petitioned for are the lands belonging to La Purisima-
Amounting to between two and three square leagues, having for
boundaries the lines of former or previous grants, viz: Mission Vieja de
la Purisima, Rancho Maria, Lompoc, Los Alamos, and Santa Rita.
It is difficult to understand how the plain language of that petition
can be construed to embrace several tracts of land in quantity many
times greater than sufficient to answer the call, and lying outside of the
interior limits of the ranchos named. Is it not clear that the petition
asks for a compact parcel of land lying within the boundaries of the
ranchos named, and embracing two or three leagues It is manifest
from the petition what land Malo believed he owned. If he supposed
that he took by his grant some 90,000 acres of land, or upwards 6f
twenty leagues, would he have limited the quantity to two or three
leagues, or some 13,000 acres e Although permitted to amend his peti-
tion some nineteen months after filing the first, he, in both, claims the
amount to be between two and three leagues. He also states in the
petition that he has been in peaceable possession of the lands asked for
since the transfer to him by Temple in 1850, which could not have been
true as to the large amount of lands now claimed as a sobrante, and
could only have been true as to the two or three leagues.
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The decree of confirmation is for "the lands of the Mission of La
Purisima to the extent of between two and three square leagues," bounded
by the Ranchos Lompoc, Santa Rita, Todos Santos, and Los Alamos.
It will be observed that in the petition the Rancho, Todos Santos is
omitted in giving the boundaries, but it is supplied in the decree, while
in the decree Rancho Maria is omitted, as well as in the deposition of
Thompson; but, taking the petition, the decree, and deposition together,
La Purisima is bounded and inclosed completely by the adjoining
ranchos.
As before suggested, whatever construction may be put upon the
decision of 1873, the grant cannot be extended beyond the decree of
confirmation. The amount of land may exceed three square leagues,
but the quantity is limited by the lines of the surrounding ranchos as
they existed at the time of the decree. In that sense, and in no other,.
can La Purisima be called a sobrante. It was a grant for all the lands
inclosed within those limits; and the amount, as ascertained by actual
survey, nearly corresponds to the amount named in Malo's petition, the
decree of confirmation, and the deposition of Thompson.
The idea that La Purisima was a sobrante in any other sense than
that mentioned above, seems to have originated in the misconstruction
put upon the language used in the decision of 1873; and since then the
claims for La Purisima have attained proportions that could hardly have
been anticipated by the most sanguine claimants at the time of its con-
firination, or before that decision.
As has been already intimated, the boundary of the grant in question
must be limited by the western boundary of Santa Rita, as it was orig-
inally granted to Malo under that grant. Such line extended north to
Los Alamos, andjuridical possession of the grant was given to him on the
31st day of October, 1845, and it is recited in the record of the proceed-
ings giving such possession that "he took the true, real, actual, and
corporal possession "; that " he entered upon and passed over said lands,
pulling up herbage, scattering handfuls of earth, breaking branches of
trees, and making other demonstrations of the possession that he took
of said lands." The amount of land conveyed to him, and of which
he took possession, was three leagues and two hundre varas. The
amount confirmed to him by the district court, southern district of
California, at the December term, 1856, was " three square leagues an d
no more."
Under the approved survey made in March, 1875, the surplus of the
juridical measurement was taken out on the north, leaving a parcel of
land of considerable extent between Santa Rita, as thus surveyed, and
the southern boundary of Los Alamos. This parcel adjoins La Purisima,
as surveyed prior to 1873, and is now claimed by the owners of La Pu-
risima, together with the large tract connected therewith lying east and
northeast of Santa Rita, under their claim of " sobrante."
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It will be remembered that in the deed of La Purisima from Pico to
Temple, juridical possession of the grant was directed and permitted,
but was never given. This was a proceeding correspon ding in its nature
somewhat with livery of seisin under the common law, and was im-
portant, if not absolutely necessary, to complete the title; and failure
to give such possession, taken in connection with the otherwise uncer-
tain character of the grant, but for the decree of confirmation, might
raise a grave question as to its validity.
In Van Reynegan v. Bolton (5.Otto, 33), decided several years after
the decision of the Secretary before referred to, Mr. Justice Field, in
considering the validity of like grants, says:
There was another proceeding to be taken, which was essential to
the complete investiture of the title, and that was a formal delivery of
the possession of the property by a magistrate of the vicinage, called,
in the language of the country, the delivery of juridical possession.
This proceeding involved the establishment of the boundaries of the
tract, when there was any uncertainty respecting them. If these were
designated in the grant, it required their ascertainment and identifica-
tion; if they were not thus designated, it required the measurement of
the quantity granted and its segregation from the public domain. The
regulations prescribed by law for the guidance of the magistrate in
these matters made it his duty to preserve a record of the various steps
taken in the proceeding; to have the same attested by the assisting
witnesses, and to deliver an authentic copy to the grantee.
It was evidently intended that juridical measurement and possession
should follow immediately after the grant. And yet such measurement
and possession of the tracts now claimed as a sobrante would have been
- practically impossible, and could have been contemplated only in rela-
tion to the two or three leagues inclosed within the limits of the adjacent
ranchos. The fact that the two vineyards of Jalama, contained in the
sale and conveyance to Temple, were situated several miles distant from
the principal tract granted, adds no force to the claim for other outlying '
tracts as sobrante. On the contrary, under the well-known rule of con-
struction that where a particular thing is mentioned all others are ex-
cluded, the particular mention of the two vineyards would exclude the
supposition that any other outlying tracts were intended to be included
in the grant.
I am of the opinion that the west line of Rancho Santa Rita as origi-
nally granted, and as fixed by the act of juridical possession (being the
west line of Santa Rita as patented, extended to the south line of Los
Alamos as patented), must limit the grant of La Purisima in that direc-
tion, and such line constitute the eastern boundary thereof.
I am also of the opinion that the triangle lying upon the southwest
corner of Rancho Todos Santos, as patented, must be excluded from the
grant of La Purisima; and that in other respects, and in other direc-
tions, the grant of La Purisma is limited by the surrounding ranchos,
as patented.
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The modified Norway survey of June, 1875, embracing 1 4,735.76 acres,
is therefore the correct survey, and a patent should issue in accordance
therewith. This survey has been duly advertised, as provided by the
act of July 1, 1864. (See opinion of Surveyor-General H. G. Rollins,
April 5, 1877.)
The decision of your predecessor, directing that the Terrell survey be
so amended as to include all the land between the Ranchos To dos San-
tos y San Antonio, Los Alamos, La Laguna, San Carlos, De Jonata,
Santa Rosa, Santa Rita, Lompoc, and Jesus Maria, is hereby overruled.
PRIVATE CAIM-SECON-D PUBLICATO OF SURVEY.
RANCHO ARRiOYO DEL RODEO.
Where publication of the survey of a private land claim in California has been regu-
larly made and certified to under the act of June 14, 1860, all parties are con-
cluded, and patent should issue for the claim as surveyed. A subsequent publica-
tion underthe act of July 1, 1864, is invalid.
Secretary Kirkwood to Commissioner McFarland, March 10, 1882.
I have examined the matter of the survey of the Rancho Arroyo del
Rodeo, situate in Santa Cruz County, San Francisco district, California,
on appeal by the confirmees from your predecessor's decision of April
2, 1881, holding that a patent should issue upon said survey.
The records of your office show that this rancho was granted to one,
Francisco Rodriguez, July 28, 1834, by Gov. Jos6 Figueroa, as being
"bounded by the town of Branciforte and the Rancho Shoquel. On
May 12, 1854, said rancho was sold and conveyed by the grantee to
Messrs. Juan Hames and Juan Danbenber (or Danbenbin), upon whose
petition it was confirmed March 27, 1855, by the Board of Land Com-
missioners appointed pursuant to the provisions of the act of March 3,
1851 (9 Stat., 631), which confirmation was affirmed by the United States
district court for the southern district of California, March 5, 1856.-
To the extent of one league in longitude by one-fourth of a league in
latitude, and no more, within the boundaries called for in the grant and
map to which the grant refers, to wit: One league in length by one-
quarter of a league in width, and bounded on the South by the Sea, on
the west by the Arroyo del Rodeo, and on the east by Arroyo Shoquel:
Provided, That should there be a less quantity than one square league
within the said boundaries, then confirmation is hereby made to such
less quantity.
This decree became final upon the vacation by said court, at its
December term, 1856, of its order allowing an appeal by the United
States to the supreme court of the United States.
In November and December, 1858, a survey of said rancho was made
by John Wallace, United States deputy surveyor, the boundaries of
which, as shown by the official plat thereof, contained 2,353.32 acres,
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but which, as approved by Surveyor-General Mandeville February 5,
1861, contains only an area of 1,473.07 acres. As thus diminished this
rancho has for boundaries: On the south the Bay of Monterey; on the
east the Arroyo Shoquel; on the west the Arroyo del Rodeo; and on
the north, a due east and west line between said Arroyos, distant 210
chains and 68 links from a point on the bay aforesaid, indicated on said
plat as "Post of United States Coast Survey," the same being the
sonl hernmost point of said rancho. The fact is clearly established by
the certificate of Surveyor-General Mandeville, dated May 31, 1861,
that notice of said survey, the approval of the plat thereof, and its re-
tention in his office for four weeks subject to inspection, was published
for that period pursuant to the requirements of the act of June 14, 1860
(12 Stat., 33); and it is also as clearly established by such certificate
that no order for the return of said survey and plat to the United States
district court was ever served upon him. Subsequently, however, upon
the publication of said survey, under the provisions of the act of July
1, 1864 (13 Stats., 332), and within the period prescribed by the same,
the confirmees filed objections thereto, alleging: (1) That it excludes
lands that have been in the continuous possession of the said grantee,
Francisco Rodriguez, and those claiming under him since the date of
the grant of said rancho to him in 1834; (2) that it excludes land with-
in the boundaries of the judicial possession; and (3) that it does not
conform to the description of the land as confirmed.
The primal question to be determined is, did the publication of notice
by Surveyor-General Mandeville of his approval of the Wallace survey,
pursuant to the provisions of the act of June 14, 1860, render such sur-
vey final ? The act of 1860 requires the publication of the survey to be
made by the surveyor-general of California-
Once a week for four weeks in two newspapers, one published in Los
Angeles, and one of which the place of publication is nearest the land,
if the land is situated in the southern district of California; and until
the expiration of such a time the survey and plat shall be retained in
his office, subject to inspection.
In this case, as shown by the surveyor-general's certificate aforesaid,
the requirements of the act in question were literally complied with by
him in every essential particular, and this without intervention by any
party in interest.
After the lapse of the period prescribed for retaining the plat and
survey in the office of the surveyor-general, without intervention by
any party interested (if the other preliminaries have been duly per-
formed), there is no provision for making complaint or for correcting the
result; and in such case,it seems tome, if any injury has been done, the
only appeal left is to Congress.-(Opinion of Solicitor-General Phillips,
March 10, 1873, in the matter of the California private land claim Guad-
alupe.)
This opinion was adopted by this Department March 26, 1873.
In such a case all parties are concluded; for the statute expressly
directs " that the patent for the land as surveyed shall forthwith be is-
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sued therefore and: further declares that " the said plat and survey so
finally determined by publication shall ... . . have the same
effect and validity in law as if a patent for the lands so surveyed had
been issued by the United States."
It has been invariably held that the date of approval should be re-
garded as the date of survey. The survey in this case was approved
February 5, 1861, as aforesaid. It has been determined by the Depart-
ment in the case of Corral de Piedra, June 26, 1867, and the opinion of
Attorney-General Stanbery, under date of September 30, 1867 (12 Opin.,
250), that a survey made after the passage of the act of 1860, and duly
advertised and not taken into the district court, is final.
This opinion was adopted by this Department October 5, 1867. It
was also held by my predecessor, Mr. Secretary Delano, in the case of
SanBernabe, under date of February 10, 1872, " that a survey approved
after the passage of the act of 1860 was such a survey as that act con-
templated."-(Rancho Tajauta, 1 C. L. L., 548.)
Inasmuch as the certificate of the surveyor-general is in the usual
form, and contains a sufficient statement of the facts showing publica-
tion of the notice of said survey in all respects conforming to the re-
quirements of the act of June 14, 1860, and as none of the parties in
interest intervened within the period and in the manner prescribed by
the statute, I concur with you in the opinion that the subsequent publi-
cation of the Wallace survey in question was without authority of law,
and null, and that a patent should issue upon said survey.
Your decision is accordingly affirmed.
PRIVATE CLAIM-SURVEY-JURISDICTION.
RANCHO LAS CRUCES.
The act of June. 19, 1878, gave to the United States district court jurisdiction to hear
and determine as to the title of the claimant, and to the Land Department thefinal location of the claim.
The survey was therefore properly published by the surveyor-general, and objections
thereto filed before him by party in interest as contestant. Motion to dismiss the
objections on the ground that the court had power to and did determine the loca-
tion is untenable and overruled.
Commissioner 3]JcFarland to U. S. surveyor-general, San Francisco, Cali-
fornia, July 13, 1882.
In the matter of the survey of the Rancho Las Cruces, confirmed
to Vicente Cordero and others by decree of the United States district
court for the district of California, under the special act of Congress of
June 19, 1878 (20 Stats., 172), John Mllan, esq., of counsel for con-
firmees, on the 31st of January, 1882, filed in this office a statement
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Teferring to the proceedings in said matter, claiming that said proceed-
ing, as far as relates to determining the location of the confirmed tract,
became final upon the rendition of the decree of the district court in the
case, and that the action of your office therein in the publication of the
survey, etc., was without authority of law and void; and thereupon
moving that your office be called upon for a report as to its action in
the premises, and to transmit copies of the papers in the case to this
office for its "consideration and action," and instructed to suspend fur-
ther proceedings in said matter until otherwise directed.
The motion of Mr. Mullan was granted, of which your office was ad-
vised on the 14th of February, 1882, and under date of March 2, 1882,
transmitted to this office copies of the papers in the case, showing the
proceedings that had been had therein.
These proceedings are now before me for consideration; William
Leviston, esq., as attorney for Ramon de la Cuesta, having, under date
of May 15 last, filed in this office an answer to the statement aforesaid
9f Mr. Mullan, and the latter on the 10th of June ultimo filed a reply
thereto.
The act of June 19, 1878, under which the proceedings herein origi-
nated, by its first section permitted and authorized the claimants of the
Rancho Las Cruces to present their claim to the United States district
court for examination, and if found valid authorized the court to con-
firm it; provided that the quantity should not exceed 8,888 acres; that
no land should be confirmed to which there were valid claims existing
under the pre-emption or homestead laws, and that the confirmation
should not affect any valid adverse rights, nor give to the confirmees
any claim against the United States for compensation on account of
any such pre-emption or homestead claims or adverse rights; and pro-
vided further, that the claimants before filing their claim should execute
releases to all persons in possession under the pre-emption or homestead
laws, which releases the court was required to see executed before con-
firmation.
The second section gave to the claimants the right of appeal to the
supreme court of the United States.
The third section directs that the United States surveyor-general for
'California, upon the filing in his office a certified copy of the decree of
confirmation, shall cause the claim to be surveyed as other claims of like
nature are now surveyed under existing laws; and that upon the ap-
proval of the survey by the Commissioner of the General Land Office, a
patent shall issue to the claimants in the usual form.
It appears by the papers returned that the claim was presented to the
district court by the petition of the claimants, the United States appear-
ing by J. E. Levett, esq., and that upon the hearing thereof the court
found that at the date of said act there were no valid claims to said
lands existing under the pre-emption or homestead laws, nor persons in
possession of any of said land under valid claims under those laws or
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other laws of the United States; that the claim was good and valid, and
thereupon confirmed it to the petitioners by the following description:
The lands of which confirmation is hereby made are known as the
"Las Cruces," situated in Santa Barbara County, and are bounded anddescribed as follows: On the south by that portion of the Nuestra Seioradel. Refugio which is known as the " La Gavida," on the west by theRancho San Julian, on the north by the Rancho Santa Rosa, on the
east by the Rancho Nojoqui and the Cuchilla or ridge of Nojoqui, and
on the southeast by a range of mountains; not to exceed within said
'limits 8,888 acres, reference being had to a survey of said Rancho LasCruces, made by W. H. Norway, and delineated upon a plat filed inthis case, marked Exhibit C, and hereunto annexed and made part ofthis decree.
On the 30th day of June, 1881, upon motion of the petitioners, the
United States being represented, the court by frther order, holding
that by the provisions of the act the right of appeal was only given to
the claimants, and that the proofs in the case would not justify an ap
peal by the United States in case the right of appeal existed by gen-
eral laws, declared its decree of confirmation final, and directed the sur-
veyor-general, upon the filing with him of a certified copy of said decree,
to cause the claim to be surveyed with all convenient disp tch " as
other claims of like nature are now surveyed under existing laws."
Thereupon it appears a survey was made under the direction of your
office by United States Deputy Surveyor W. H. Norway, in August,
1881, and that the same was published, as required by the act of July 1,
1864 (13 Stats., 332), in October and November, 1881.
It further appears that within the time allowed by said act, Ramon
de la Cuesta, appearing by Wm. Leviston, esq., his attorney, filed in
your office objections to said survey, alleging that by himself and his.
grantees he had been in possession for the past twenty-two years of
631.11 acres of the land included therein, lying in the northern-part of
the surveyed tract, which was part of the Rancho Nojoqui, and pur
chased by the objector and his grantees, in good faith and for a valuable
consideration, from the original Mexican grantees; that said survey is
erroneous in that it includes the said land of the objector, which is not
a part of the Rancho Las Cruces; that the northern boundary of Las
Cruces, as shown by the grant, disefio, and decree of confirmation, is
south of the land of the objector; with other grounds of objection not
necessary to be here set forth.
To these objections the claimants interposed a motion, before your
office, asking for their dismissal on the grounds, among others, in sub-
stance that they were not sworn to; that the facts of possession, occu-
pancy, etc., alleged, should have been presented to the district court
when the claim was pending therein; that the decree of the court was
final as to title and boundaries, and the only question that could be
raised was whether or not the survey conformed to the decision of the
court, and that being undisputed, they asked that the objections be
disregarded and the land patented according to the survey.
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This motion on the part of the claimants having been overruled, the
aforesaid motion of Mr. Mullan in their behalf was filed before this
office; the relief sought thereby from the " consideration and action" of
this office being, as understood, the dismissal of the contestant's objec-
tions and the carrying of the survey into patent under the decree of the
court, as being conclusive in regard to the specific location on the ground,
of the tract confirmed, as well as to the descriptive designation of the
boundaries.
This claim on the part of the grant owners can only be maintained on
the assumption that the act of July 19, 1878, empowered the district
court to locate and determine upon the ground the specific limits of the
claim, to the exclusion of the exercise of any control or discretion by
the surveyor-general and by this office touching the location, as well as
to pass upon and confirm the title.
I do not so understand nor construe the provisions of the act. By
it the claimants were permitted to present their claim to the court for
examination; and if, upon the hearing, it should appear that the claim
-was valid under Mexican law, the court was authorized to confirm it to
the extent of quantity specified; valid claims under the pre-emption and
homestead laws, and valid adverse rights being protected by the act.
The duty of locating the land confirmed by survey is, by the act,
imposed upon the surveyor-general; who upon the production of the
final decree of confirmation is directed to cause the claim to be sur-
veyed "as other claims are now surveyed under eisting laws," and filial
approval of the survey by this office is required before patent can issue.
This provision contemplates and requires a survey of the claim by
the surveyor-general after the confirmation; notice thereof by publica-
tion, and opportunity for parties interested to appear and contest the
same before your office, as in like cases under the laws existing at te
date of the passage of the act (see act of March 3, 1851, 9 Stats., 631,
sec. 13, and act of July 1, 1864, 13 Stats., sec., 1 and 7).
The language of the act relating to the survey of the claim is so plain
and direct that it would seem impossible to come to a conclusion differ-
ing from the above. And, besides, the necessity for the provision im-
posing the duty of making the location upon the surveyor-general and
this office in the manner prescribed by the existing laws is as obvious
as the conclusion that the act had that intention is unquestionable.
The act in prescribing the machinery for perfecting the claim in the
confirmees contains no provision, as regards the proceedings in the dis-
trict court, for the notification or summoning of parties having interests
possibly in conflict with the claim. The contestant could have had no
opportunity, and, having regard to the provisions of the act, was warned
of no necessity for becoming a party to said proceedings. He was,
therefore, guilty of no laches in that regard. The first opportunity he
had to be heard in opposition to the location was upon the publication
of the survey, of which he availed himself in due time.
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The act of July 1, 1864, under which the objections are filed, does not
require that they should be sworn to, but only "reduced to writing,
showing distinctly the interest of the objector and signed by him or his
attorney." They are in due form and entitled to be heard in the usual
course of proceeding.
The allegation of the claimants in their motion paper, in allusion to
the proceedings before your office, in substance, that it is not disputed
that the survey conforms to the decree of confirmation is negatived by
the following objections of the contestant, which puts it directly in
issue:
That it (the survey) includes the said land of objector which is not a
part of said Rancho Las Cruces, but was a part of the Rancho Nojoqui.
That the northern boundary of said Rancho Las Cruces, as shown by
the grant, disefio, and decree of confirmation, is south of said land of
objector.
It is not proper to decide or even examine, upon this motion, as to
whether the survey conforms to the decree of confirmation or otherwise.
In the view here taken that can only properly be determined upon the
issue formed between the parties after they shall have had opportunity
to present their proofs and be heard thereon in the usual manner.
The motion of the claimants to dismiss the objections of the contest-
ant is denied, of which you are instructed to notify the parties, and, as
soon as practicable, to complete the proceedings in the case, and make
return of the same, with your report thereon, to this office.
PRIVATE CLAIM-BEQ CEST FOR INSTR UCTIONS.
VIGIL AND ST. VRAIN.
Commissioner McFarland to Secretary Teller, lay 5, 1882.
An application has been made to this office for the delivery of the
plat of survey approved August 6, 1878, by the surveyor-general of
Colorado, being the evidence of title provided by the third section, act
of February 25, 1869, Stats. 15, p. 276, in the case of the claim of Este-
fana Hicklin, one of the derivative claimants within the limits of the
Las Animas grant, Colorado.
The facts in this case, briefly stated, are as follows:
By the first section, act of June 21, 1860, Stats. 12, p. 71, the claim
No. 17, in the name of Cornelia Vigil and Ceran St. Vrain, was con-
firmed, not to exceed 11 square leagues to each of said claimants or 22
square leagues to both, amounting to 97,650.96 acres.
The tract granted embraced within its boundaries a much larger area
than that confirmed, to wit, about 4,000,000 acres.
The second section of said act provided that in surveying this claim
the location shall be made as follows, viz:
The survey shall first be made of all tracts occupied by actual settlers
holding possession under titles or promises to settle which have hereto-
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fore been given by said Vigil and St. Vrain, in the tracts claimed by
them, and after deducting the area of all such tracts from the area em-
braced in 22 square leagues, the remainder shall be located in two equal
tracts, each of square form, in any part of the tract claimed by the
said Vigil and St. Vrain selected by them, and it shall be the duty of
the surveyor-general of New Mexico immediately to proceed to make
the surveys and locations authorized and required by the terms of this
section.
Presumably for the reaso n that the grantees had disposed of the en-
tire grant, and it was not practicable to comply with the above provis-
ions of law as to survey, further legislation was necessary to determine
the validity and extent of the claims of Vigil and St, Vrain, and all of.
the derivative claimants; therefore Congress passed the act of Febru-
ary 25, 1869, in which it was provided that all claimants (the original
grantees and those who had title from them) should "establish their
claims to the satisfaction of the register and receiver of the proper
district."
Under this act 39 claims of different tracts of land were presented to
the register and receiver at Pueblo, Colorado, for adjudication, and on
the 23d of February, 1874, they made awards in 13 claims, amounting
to 97,614.53 acres, as follows:
Acres.
Charles Autobees ....................................................... 686.17
Norton W. Welton ...................................................... 760. 00
Joseph B. Doyle's heirs .................................................. 1,924. 49
Helen N. McCormick ............... 2............... ..... .. 0  . 0  00
-George F. Streeter ...............-.....-....-.. ........... . 160. 00
George W. Schofield ............... - ............ 3,593. 06
Fenry W. Jones ................... ........... 5, 752.40
Estefana Hicklin -------------------------------------------------------- 5,118.72
Wm. W. Bent's heirs -...--.------.-- 2,085.51
B. B. Field and Win. Kronig ------- ...-- ...-- 322.63
John M. Francisco & Henry Daigre ...................................... 1,720.00
Romalda Luna Boggs ................................................... 2,040. 00
William Craig .........-........ ............ 73,251. 55
97,614.53
It will thus be observed that these awards, with the exception of
36.43 acres absorbed the 22 square leagues confirmed.
In some cases in which awards were made as well as those that were
rejected appeals were taken from the action of the register and receiver
to this office. A question, however, was raised as to its jurisdiction to
try these cases upon their merits, it having been claimed that the action
of the register and receiver was final, and on October 14, 18'4, a decis-
ion was rendered here in favor of jurisdiction, which was affirmed by
the Department October 27, 1874, and upon a motion for reconsidera-
tion again decided in the affirmative January 23, 1875.
It appears, however, that this matter was brought to the attention of
the President who referred the question to the Attorney General, and
that officer, May 15, 1876, rendered an opinion to the effect that an ap-
peal did not lie from the action of the register and receiver which was
final under the statute, and on the 2d day of March, 1887 President
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Grant issued the following order in the claim of Col. Wm. Craig, one
of the derivative claimants, viz:
In accordance with the opinion and recommendation of the Attorney
General upon the questions submitted to him the Commissioner of the
General Land Office is directed to instruct the surveyor-general of Col-
orado to deliver to Col. William Craig an approved plat of the land
adjudged to him by the register and receiver of the Pueblo land dis-
trict in that State, dated February 23, 1874.
In accordance with this order plats were prepared, approved, and de-
livered iii the following derivative claims: William Craig, George W.
Schofield, John M. Francisco& Henry Daigre, Charles Autobees.
(In the claims of Craig, Schofield, and Francisco & Daigre, patents
also were issued under sec. 2447, Rev. Stats. U. S.)
In the claims of the heirs of Wm. W. Bent and Estefana Hicklin ap-
proved plats are on file in this office. These plats were prepared, ap-
proved, and transmitted here, in pursuance of instructions from this
office, but were subsequently suspended on account of the decision of
Judge Dillon in United States circuit court, for the district of Colorado,
July term, 1878, in the case of Thomas Leitensdorfer v. Wm. L. Camp-
bell, United States surveyor-general, and William Craig, which was
communicated to this office August 21, 1878.
In the decision referred to, the court held, in substance, that parties
affected thereby had the right to appeal from the awards of the register
and receiver, and consequently that the opinion of the Attorney-General,
upon which the President's order aforesaid was founded, was erroneous,
and if this view of the said act of 1869 should be sustained upon a final
decision in this case, and followed by the Executi ve, it would reopen at
least such cases as had not been finally adjudicated under the order of
the President.
It is contended in this case that as the plat had been prepared and
approved under instructions from this office, and in the manner provided
by the said act of February 25, 1869, which makes the plat of survey in
this class of cases evidence of title, this Department has no further
jurisdiction over the matter, and that the plat should be delivered under
the principles announced in the decision of the Supreme Court of the
United States in the Thomas McBride case, decided at the October
term, 1880.
While this may be true, and the claimant is entitled to the plat referred
to, yet as the case is without precedent, and if decided affirmatively by
this office would not reach the Department, as the question presented is
solely between the United States and claimant, and consequently there
would be no appeal, I deem it proper to ask for instrnctions as to what
course should be pursued in the premises.
The papers transmitted are-
1. Order of the President, March 2, 1877, claim of William Craig.
2. Copy of office instructions dated June 24, 1878, in claim of Este-
fana EIicklin.
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3. Plats of claim of Estefana Hicklin.
4. Copy of decision of Judge Dillon, rendered at July term, 1878, of
United States circuit court, district of Colorado.
IN SAME CASE.
Review of facts reported and direction that evidence of title of the tract awarded to
her be issued to Mrs. Hicklin.
Secretary Teller to Commissioner licFarland, June 12, 1882.
The clainm of Estefana Hicklin, one of the derivative claimants within
the limits of the Las Animas grant, Colorado, for a delivery of the plat
of survey approved August 6, 1878, by the surveyor-general of Colorado,
has been considered by me.
The grant in the name of Cornelio Vigil and Ceran St. Vrain, desig-
nated as No. 17, was for 922 square leagues, about 4,000,000 acres.
June 21, 1860, Congress confirmed the grant to the extent of 22 square
leagues, 97,650.96 acres, to both claimants (12 Stats., 71).
The act (Sec. 2) provided that in surveying and locating the confirmed
grant, all tracts occupied by actual settlers, holding possession under
titles or promises to settle, theretofore given by Vigil and St. Vrain in
the tracts claimed by them, should be first surveyed, and after deduct-
ing the area of all such tracts from the area embraced in the 22 square
leagues, the remainder should be located in two equal tracts in any part
of the tract claimed by Vigil and St. Vrain. And it was made the duty
of the surveyor-general of New Mexico immediately to proceed to make
the surveys and locations authorized.
A further act was passed, February 25, 1869, (15 Stat., 275), which
provided that all claimants should "establish their claims to the satis-
faction of the register and receiver of the proper district"; and that
upon the adjustment of the claims according to the provisions of the act,
the surveyor-general should furnish proper approved plats to claimants,
which should be evidence of title, the same to be done according to in-
structions to be given by the Commissioner of the General Land Office.
You inform me that, under the provisions of the act before stated,
39 claims of different tracts of land were presented to the register and
receiver for adjustment, and that, February 23, 1874, they made awards
in 13 claims, amounting to 97,614.53 acres, thus absorbing the 22 square
leagues except 36.43 acres.
That appeals from the decision of the register and receiver in some
cases in which awards were made and upon some of the rejected claims
were taken to your office.
It was claimed, however, that the determination of the register and
receiver was final under the provision in the act before referred to, and
that no appeal would lie from their decision.
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The Commissioner held otherwise, and upon an appeal being taken
to the Secretary the decision was affirmed October 27, 1874.
And again upon a reconsideration of the question in an opinion of
great length, given January 23, 1875, the Secretary held that this De-
partment had jurisdiction, and would entertain the appeals.
The matter being brought to the attention of the President, it was
referred by him to the Attorney-General, who, May 15, 1876, gave an
opinion that an appeal did not lie from the determination of the register
and receiver to the Commissioner of the land office (15 Opinions, 94) and
recommended that the Commissioner of the General Land Office be in-
structed to direct the surveyor-general to deliver to Craig an approved
plat of the land awarded to him by the register and receiver.
Accordingly, March 2, 1877, the President issued such order, and in
compliance therewith such plat was prepared and delivered to Craig,
and, probably in view of such opinion and action, plats were also pre-
pared and delivered to George W. Scofield, John M. Francisco and
Henry Daigre, and Charles Autobees, whose claims were allowed by
the register and receiver, followed by patents to all of such claimants
except to Autobees.
The patents seem to have been unnecessary, since the act before re-
ferred to made the approved plats " evidence of title."
You inform me that in pursuance of instruction from your office,
plats were prepared, approved, and transmitted in cases of the adjusted
claims of the heirs of Wm. W. Bent and Estefana Hicklin, and are now
on file; that the delivery of these plats was suspended because of the
decision of Judge Dillon, Judge Hlallett concurring, rendered in the
United States circuit court for the district of Colorado, at the June term,
1878, in the case of Thomas Leitensdorfer, complainant, v. William I.
Campbell, United States surveyor general, and William Craig, defend-
ants. A demurrer to the original bill had- been interposed and sus-
tained at the July term, 877, of said court, by Mr. Justice Miller and
Judge Hallett with leave to amend.
Thereupon a supplemental bill was filed, and again demurred to by
the defendants severally. The demurrer was sustained as to the sur-
veyor-general, upon the ground that he was an improper party, but over-
ruled as to defendant Craig. Judge Dillon is of the opinion that'the
complainant had the right to appeal from the decision of the register
and receiver, rejecting his claim, and from the decision establishing
Craig's claim, and that the opinion of the Attorney-General to the con-
trary was erroneous; that the court would relieve derivative claimants
of the Vigil and St. Vrain grant, under the act referred to, from evi-
dences of title procured by fraud; that while the approved plats re-
mained in force it is not within the power of the Commissioner or of
the Secretary to hear and determine the appeals because the delivery
of the plats passed the legal title, and with it all control of the execu-
tive department over the title, (Moore v. Robbins, 9 U. S., 530); that
DECISIONS RELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS. 271
under the acts relating to the Vigil and St. Vrain grants it was con-
templated that the validity and extent of the claims of Vigil and St.
Vrain and of derivative claimants showed he decided by the executive
instead of the judicial department; that the courts could only interfere
in the results of executive action when such results had been procured
by fraud or the denial of plain legal rights; that if the approved plats
were set aside, and the courts could go no further, the executive de-
partment would be free to act and hear and decide the appeals, and per-
haps could be compelled to do so by mandamus; but that by issuing
the plats the executive department had disabled itself from hearing.
the appeals; and that in many of its aspects the case was wholly with-
out a precedent, and grave doubts existed as to what the court ought to
do upon a final determination of the case.
I am advised that in July, 1880, said court, after a hearing upon plead-
ings and proofs, made a decree setting aside the decision and award in
favor of Craig, made by the register and receiver upon the ground that
it was procured by fraud, and declaring the patent and plats issued to
him void and of no effect. The decision is likely to be reviewed on ap-
peal taken to the supreme court, but the effect of the present decision
may be to open the whole question as to the rights, claims, and locations
of the derivative claimants, and to this Department the matter of finally
determining and settling all the claims and equities of the derivative
claimants may yet be referred.
The particular instruction which you ask of me is, whether the ap-
proved plat embracing 5,118.72 acres, in the case of Estefana Hicklin,
shall be delivered to her.
No question has been raised as to the right or equity of the award
made to her. She took an appeal from the decision of the register and
receiver, complaining that the amount awarded to her was too small
(she claims she had improved and occupied 12,000 acres); but an accept-
ance of the plat of the amount awarded would of course be a waiver of
the appeal, and probably a release of any further claim. It does not
appear that complaint as to the award made to her has been made by
any one else. The proofs set forth in the award show that she has been
in occupation, actually residing on the land, since 1859 or 1860. and she
was only awarded the tracts improved, cultivated, and actually built
bn, and such other tracts as were indispensable to the enjoyment of the
portions actually cultivated and built upon.
It does not follow, because the award to Craig was procured by brib-
ery and fraud, that the other awards were necessarily tainted. A pre-
sumption of fraud for that reason alone could not be raised. The claims
were entirely distinct, and not dependent at all upon the same proofs.
Corruption in a judicial officer proved in one instance does not affect his
adjudications in other cases.
If any inference as to other claimants can be drawn from the alleged
corrupt action of the register and receiver in Craig's claim, it is that
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their claims were cut down or thrown out in order to make room for his,
which, as claimed, exceeded the whole amount confirmed by Congress
It may not be of any advantage to Mrs. Hlicklin to receive the plat, in
view of the questions existing in the courts, but an award has been
made to her, under the act of Congress before mentioned, which has notbeen set aside, and I am not informed that any proceedings are pend-ing for such a purpose. An approved plat has been made under in-
structions from your office, and is now ready to be delivered. The act
of Congress provides that upon the adjustment of the claims "it shallbe the duty of the surveyor-general of the district to furnish proper
approved plats to said claimants."




Grants made by the representatives of France, after the cession of the Province toSpain, were void, unless recognized by Spanish authority subsequent to the ces-
sion, and efore the transfer by Spain to the United States.
There is no authority of law empowering the General Land Office to adjudicate af-
- firmatively and declare claims under foreign grants, to be held by conilete title, in
effect to confirm the same. Parties relying upon such grants must assert and defend their claims, if assailed, in the courts.
Commissioner IcFr land to register and receiver, New Orleans, La., JTune
2, 1882.
In the matter of the claim of Bradish Johnson it appears that the
claimant presented his notice and sworn statement to the former regis-
ter and receiver at your office, alleging a complete'French grant byD'Abbadie, director-general, etc., to Frangois Vignette, alias Pantin, of30 arpents front by 40 arpents in depth on the west side of the Missis-
sippi River, in the parish of Plaquemines, 17 arpents front of which were
confirmed by the Board of Commissioners for the eastern district of theTerritory of Orleans to onor6 and Michel Duplessis; and claiming
the remainder of said 30 arpents, embracing sections 14 and 15 in T. 17
S., R. 26 E., southeastern district of Louisiana, as held by him by com-plete title under said grant and under the decision of the Department
in the Malines case, not requiring confirmation; but that-
Since the government has cast a cloud upon his title, by allowing theproperty covered by it to be represented on the official plat of survey
as unconfirmed and liable to be treated as public land, he deems itproper to ask a formal recognition of the above-described grant to Fran-gois Vignette, etc.
The former register and receiver reported the claim as if presented
under the act of June 22, 1860, as No. 7, of class 1, according to the clas-
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sification of claims prescribed by said act, without, however, recommend-
ing it for confirmation, but expressing the opinion-
" That there is no further action of the government required than to
place the same upon the official plats, as other complete grants requir-
ing no confirmation."
Appended to the claimant's notice and statement of claim is a copy
of the grant to Vignette, with a translation of the same; but no abstract
of title nor evidence in support of the same, other than said grant to
Vignette.
Regarding the claim as presented under'the act of 1860 and the ma-
terial defects above referred to appearing in the record, the transcript
was returned to your office on the 13th of August, 1880, with instruc-
tious that the claimant be notified and given opportunity to supply the
deficiencies, by presenting an abstract of his title and evidence to sup-
port the same. It was also suggested that he might avail himself of
the provisions contained in the second section of the act of June 10, 1872
(17 Stats., 378), relating to proof of continuous possession in connection
with proof of title if able to do so.
Under date of November 10, 1881, the transcript of the record was re-
turned from your office with the following additions certified thereto:
A letter of Albert C. Janin, attorney for claimant, accompanied by
three affidavits, in which the affiants severally depose that Bradish
Johnson and his grantor, George W. Johnson, have had continuous pos-
session of the property known as the Woodland Plantation, situated on
the right bank of the river Mississippi, in the parish of Plaquemines,
State of Louisiana (not otherwise identifying said plantation as com-
posed of, or embracing, the land claimed), one since the year 1838, one
since May, 1840, and the other since 1849 and 1S50.
Mr. Janin states in his said letter that no confirmation of the title by
the United States is needed to protect the claimant in his possession;
and that all that he, as counsel for the claimant, asks is that official
notice be taken of the fact that he claims the tract by virtue of a grant
made before the date of the treaty of cession and that he be not inter-
fered with by any attempted exercise by the government of the right
to disposal thereof.
Though the application was reported tinder the act of 1860, it did not,
either originally nor as amended, comply with its requirements; nor is
the action asked for and recommended by the former register and re-
ceiver contemplatedby its provisions. That act required that claim-
ants should file with their notice "the evidence in support of their claims
. . . .together with a brief abstract of the title of the claimant." These
material requirements could only be answered by an abstract showing
title in the claimant, and evidence establishing the same.
The act of June 10, 1872, allows proof of continuous possession by
claimants, and those from whom they derive title, from the date of the
cession of the territory to the United States (April 30, 1803) in substi-
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tution for proof of title; but the affidavits produced only show posses-
sion back to 1838, at furthest.
The forms prescribed by the act under which the claim was ostensi-
bly presented not having been observed, and neither the proof of title
in the claimant required by that act, nor the substituted proof of pos-
session allowed by the act of Jun 10, 1872, produced, the claim could
not be favorably reported by this office to Congress for its action, if
that were desired, even if the original grant could be held to confer com-
plete title on the grantee.
If the action asked for came within the province of this office the
defects in the claimant's proof would prevent it being taken. Suppose
a complete grant to Vignette; the question presented is, what right has
the claimant established under or in connection with it? The answer
must be, none whatever. Though the grant may have been complete
as to Vignette, and invested him with absolute title, it is not shown
that he had, as far as relates to the land herein claimed, succession or
representation; it may therefore have reverted to the government hav-
ing the right of sovereignty; and whether so or not the claimant fails,
indeed makes no attempt,to connect himself, by proof, with the Vignette
title; and the presumption could hardly be justified that, because the
land was granted to Vignette in 1764 without specification or proof of
time or manner, it became the property of the claimant.
The cession of Louisiana by France to Spain took place November
19, 1762. Grants made by the representative of France after the trans-
fer have been held by the Supreme Court of the United States to be
void unless confirmed by the Spanish authority before the cession by
Spain to the United States (United States v. D'Auterive, 10 Howard,
609; United States v. Pelerin et al., 13 Howard, 9). The grant to Vig-
nette comes within these decisions, having been made under French
authority in 1764, and there being no pretense of proof that it was ever
confirmed or recognized by Spain.
The claimant in his statement refers to proceedings before the Board
of Commissioners for the eastern district of the Territory of Orleans,
as showing confirmation of 17 of the 30 arpents to the Duplesses under
the grant to Vignette, on the ground that said grant gave a complete
title. The report of the Commissioners is as follows:
It appears that Francis Vignette, from whom the claimants derive
title, obtained from the French government, on the 19th day of July,
1764, a complete title to 30 arpents front on the river, of which the
present claim is a part. Confirmed.-(Am. State Papers; Gales and
Seaton, Vol. II, p. 322.)
The seventh section of the act of June 22, 1860, provides, in case of
a claim presented for confirmation under the act, which had before then
been presented to any Board of Commissioners under authority of Con-
gress, that "the facts reported as proved by the former Board shall be
taken as true prima facie."
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The section in terms only applies to claims presented for confirmation
under the act which is not the character of the present application;
confirmation in the manner provided for by the act not being sought.
But without having regard to this distinction it is seen that the only
fact reported as found by the Board, which has connection with the
present claim, is that Vignette obtained from the French government
;a complete title. From the particular reference to the date, etc., it is
evident that the proof of title presented to the Board was the Vignette
grant; and it is clear that the primafacie character given to it as proof
by the report of the Board, under the section quoted, is nullified by the
subsequent decisions of the supreme court holding corresponding grants
void.
I am not aware of any provision of law empowering this office to ad-
judicate affirmatively, and in effect to confirm claims of this character
and presented as in this case (however complete the origin of title
claimed may e), which is really the action now asked for. It is pre-
sumed that parties claiming under foreign grants as conferring com-
plete titles not requiring confirmation, must assert and defend their
elaims if assailed in the courts having jurisdiction, as in other cases. t
brought in question by conflicting claims arising under the land laws
,of the United States, the Department charged with the execution of
those laws must necessarily consider and determine the questions aris-
ing, so far as to designate the status of such claims in their relation to
claims under foreign alleged complete unconfirmed grants.
For the reasons herein set forth, the claim of Bradish Johnson in ques-
tion cannot be repognized in the manner requested.
PRIVATE CLAIM-ACT OF FEBRUARY 5,1825.
JAMES AND DENNIS QUINNILTY.
The proviso that no claim confirmed by said act should exceed in quantity one square
league applies to all the laims reported by the register and receiver for confir-
mation, and embraced in the act; and is not limited by their recommendation
that the claim, in class six (in which the claim in question is included), be limited
in quantity to one mile square.
The Quinnilty claim having been surveyed for 5,876.74 acres (125.76 acres less than
the maximum quantity confirmed), and so represented on the township plat,
patent should issue for the quantity surveyed.
Secretary Teller to ommissioner .l3IcFarland, April 4, 1883.
I have considered the matter of the private land claim of James and
Dennis Qinnilty for a certain tract of land alleged to contain a square
league of land, situate on the island Piscadaire, Red River, in T. 11 N.,
of R. 10 W., late southwestern district, Louisiana, on appeal by one of
the parties in interest from your office decision of January 15, 1872,
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holding that the claim was confirmed for one section, or 640 acres of'
land only.
It appears that this claim is designated as No. 323, in class 6, in the
report of the register and receiver at Opelousas, La., dated December
30, 1815, to wit:
James and Dennis Quinuilty, heirs of John Quinnilty, claim a tract
of land one lague square, situated on the island Piscadaire, on Red
River, in the county of Natchitoches, bounded on the north by land,
known by the name of Wallis' Old Place. Tile evidence of Jose de la.
Vega, aged fifty-nine years, taken the 28th December, 1813, states that
John Quinnilty settled on the land upwards of twenty years ago, and
continued to inhabit and cultivate the same for twelve years, since
when it has remained vacant. Deponent knows of no grant for this.
land which lies within the jurisdiction of Nacogdoches, the comman-
dant of which place usually granted lands from one to two leagues
square. This deponent, as collector for the church at Nacogdoches,
recollects having receiving (ed) tithes from said Qaiunilty, the produce-
of said land.-(See American State Papers, Public Lands, Vol. 3, p. 176.).
The register and receiver, in recommending said class of claims for
confirmation by Congress, state that the same ought to be-
Confirmed, pursuant to the first section of the act of Congress of the
21st April, 1806, for the quantity claimed, or within the acknowledged
and ascertained limits of the same, not exceeding one mile square, or
640 acres.
The first six classes of claims, including the one in question, as des-
ignated in said report, were confirmed by the act of February, 5, 1825.
(4 Stat., 81), which provides as follows.:
That all claims to land embraced in the report made by the Commis-
sioners appointed for adjusting the titles and claims to land in the
western district of Louisiana, upon the thirtieth day of December, 1815,
and recommended by them for confirmation, be, and the same are
hereby, confirmed: Provided, That no person or persons shall be en-
titled, by any one claim, to a greater quantity than one league square
under this act.
The decision in question holds in this connection as follows:
From the foregoing it is conclusively shown that the confirmation of
the class of claims to which the one under consideration belongs was
for a quantity not to exceed one mile square, or 640 acres, the proviso
in the confirmatory statute being applicable tolclaims recommended for
confirmation by the Commissioners other than those embraced in class
six.
And that the approved survey of the premises must therefore be re-
duced to an area containing one section, or 640 acres.
The said party in interest (pro se, et al.) urges, however, that some
time, about the year 832 (or shortly after the passage of the act of-
March 3, 1831, (4 Stat., 492), creating the office of surveyor-general of
Louisiana), the claim was regularly surveyed pursuant to the orders of
the surveyor-general of Louisiana, the plat thereof approved, and the
claim designated thereon as section 37, T. 11 N., R. 10 W., containing-
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Z,876.74 acres, or a square league of land; that during the interim of the
passage of the confirmatory act and the date of the decision in question-
nearly fifty years-the United States has expressly and tacitly recog-
nized the claim as valid, segregated from the public domain, and con-
firmed to the full amount claimed, or for one league, and so delineated
upon said plat in your office, the local office, and the surveyor-general's
office. That " as shown by the certificate . . . of the clerk
and recorder of Natchitoches Parish, where the land is situated, it has
been, during the time named, the subject of transactions of every de-
Iscription incident to private ownership, to the amount of near $50,000."
The records of your office show that the claim has been surveyed, and
it is represented on the approved township plat as containing 5,876.74
aCres, or 125.76 acres less than a square league, which contains 7,056
arpents, or 6,002.50 acres.
It should be observed that the report of the register and receiver was
expressly submitted " for the revision of Congress," as will be seen from
the purview thereof, to wit:
" The register of the land office and the receiver of public moneys of
the western district of the late Territory of Orleans, now State of Lou-
isiana, have the honor to report their decisions and opinions, for the re-
;vision of Congress, on the following claims to land within said district."
Such report consists of a concise recital of facts coupled with a recom-
mendation or expression of opinion touchingthe action thatshould behad
thereon, subject, however, to Congressional "revision," i. e., re-examin-
ation or correction. Indeed, one of the duties expressly imposed upon
the several Boards of Commissioners, as created by the fifth section of
the act of March 2, 1805 (2 Stat., 324), was the submission of their de-
cisions or opinions on all claims filed with the register in conformity
with the provisions of the fourth section of said act, to wit, " which de-
oCisions hall be laid before Congress in the manner herein directed, and
lie subject to their determination thereon."
While Congress doubtless accepted the facts as recited, it cannot be
presumed to have adopted such opinion as of course, because it merely
Subserved the purpose of a suggestion, which Congress, in its discre
tion, adopted or corrected as it deemed advisable. Albeit Congress
only confirmed the said six classes that were recommended for confirm-
ation by the report in question, it should be observed, nevertheless, that
while none of them were so recommended for more than 640 acres, Con-
gress (lid not adopt such recommendation, but, on the contrary, ex-
pressly disregarded the restrictive feature of the same by substituting
" one league square" as the maximum area of claims confirmed under
this act, in lieu of the " one mile square or 640 acres" suggested by
said report.
The patent intent of Congress, as expressed by the proviso in ques-
tion, is, that all claims recommended for confirmation are confirmed for
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the quantity claimed, upon the condition precedent that such quantity
shall not exceed " one square league "
In order to sustain the converse of the foregoing proposition, it would
be necessary either to interpolate some such words as " are hereby con-
firmed'as recommended," or to eliminate the proviso; because otherwise
the same would be in direct conflict with the purview of the act, which
would render the former nugatory or inoperative.
It is a fundamental rule that invariably obtains in the construction of
statutes that the legislative intent is to be ascertained from the statute
itself, unless the language be so ambiguous as to render such construe-
tion unreasonable or impracticable.
Every day I see the necessity of not importing into statutes words
'which are not found there. Such a mode of interpretation only gives
occasion to endless difficulties. (Per Patterson, J., in King v. Burrell,
12 A. & E., 468.)
In the case of Newhall v. Sanger (92 U. S., 761), it was strenuously
urged by the learned counsel that the word " lawfully " should be im-
ported into section 6 of the act of March 3, 1853 (10 Stat., 246), by which
lands claimed under Mexican or Spanish grants were reserved from
pre-emption and sale until final decree upon title, but the court in pass-
ing upon this question said:
" It is said that this means lawfully claimed; but there is no authority
to import a word into a statute in order to change its meaning."
This ruleof construction iselementary, and indorsed by all text writers.
(See Potter's Dwarris, 199, et seq.)
Passing from these considerations to another, which necessarily brings
under review the second point of objection to the holding that " the
proviso in the confirmatory statute being applicable to claims recom-
mended forconfirmation by the Commissioners other than those embraced
in class 6," I am constrained to the opinion that there is nothing in the
purview of the statute, either in the enacting clause or in the proviso,,
to justify such presumptive construction.
In United States v. Dickson (15 Peters, 165), the court say:
We are led to the general rule of law which has always prevailed, and
become consecrated almost as a maxim in the interpretation of statutes,
that where the enacting clause is general in its language and objects,
and aproviso is afterwards introduced, that proviso is construed strictly,
and takes no case out of the enacting clause which does not fall fairly
within its terms. In short, a proviso carves special exceptions only out
of the enacting clause; and those who set up any such exceptions must
establish it as being within the words as wellas within thereason thereof.
As matter of fact, it will be observed that while the various claims
embraced in the six classes recommended for confirmation are for mani-
fold quantities, the Quinnilty claim in question is the only one for the
specific quantity of one league square. In view of this fact, and of the
further fact that the report in question recommendled no claim in any of
the classes for a quantity more than about one-half a league square, and
none in class six for more than one mile square-of all whereof Congress
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was presumably cognizant-it would seem to be imputing a vain intent
or an act of supererogation on the part of that body in enacting said pro-
viso if the same were to be a dead letter, negatived by the recommen-
dation in question.
I think, therefore, that the proviso undoubtedly applies generally to
all claims confirmed by said act, and that it is merely an expression of
the sense of Congress that no claim should be confirmed for " a greater
quantity than one league square under this act.
Inasmuch, therefore, as this claim is for a tract of land containing
5,876.74 acres, or 125.76 acres less than the maximum quantity confirmed
by said act, I am of opinion that patent should issue in the name of
James and Dennis Quinnilty for the premises as claimed by them.
Your office decision is accordingly reversed.
DO.YI TION-BESII:ENSC-SETTLEMENT-PA TENT.
JUAN RAFAEL GARCIA.
The object of the donation act (June 22, 1854) was to secure the permanent settle-
ment and occupation of the country as speedily as possible by a substantial resi-
dence upon the tracts selected by it.
Residence and settlement were required to be contemporaneous. Settlement upon
the tract claimed as donation, as well as residence within the territory, must
therefore have commenced within the time limited in the act, i. e., January 1,
1858.
As, in this case, though residence commenced prior to 1853, settlement was not made
until July 1, 1871, the claim cannot be approved for patent.
Secretary Teller to Commissioner McFarland, November 23, 1882.
I have considered the donation claim of Juan Rafael Garcia, certifi-
cate No. 228, for the S. J of the SE. J of Sec. 29, and the N. 3 of the
NE. I of Sec. 32, T. 22 N., R. 33 E., N. M. P. M., submitted for my ap
proval under act of Congress of July 22, 1854 (10 Stat., 308).
Section 2 of said act is as follows, viz:
That, to every white male citizen of the United States, or every white
male above the age of twenty-one years who has declared his intention
to become a citizen, and who was residing in said Territory prior to the
first day of January, eighteen hundred and fifty-three, and who may
be still residing there, there shall be, and hereby is, donated one quar-
ter-section, or one hundred and sixtj acres of laud. And to every
white male citizen of the United States, or every white male above the
age of twenty-one years who has declared his intention to become a cit-
izen, and who shall have removed or shall remove to and settle in said
Territory between the first day of January, eighteen hundred and fifty-
three, and the first day of January, eighteen hundred and fifty-eight,
there shall in like maner be donated one quarter-section, or one hun-
dred and sixty acres, on condition of actual settlement and cultivation
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for not less than four years: Provided, however, That each of said dona-
tions shall include the actual settlement and improvement of the donee,
and shall be selected by legal subdivisions, within three months after
the survey of the land where the settlement was made before the sur-
vey; and where the settlement was made after the survey, then within
three months after the settlement has been made; and all persons fail-
ing to designate the boundaries of their claims within that time shall
forfeit all right to the same.
The proofs submitted show that Garcia resided in New Mexico prior
to the 1st day of January, 1853, and has since continued to reside in
such Territory, and in all respects possessed the necessary qualifications
to become a donee under such act. He entered upon and took posses-
sion of the land in question July 1, 1871, and had resided thereon con-
tinuously from that time to the time of making his proofs, January 8,
1881, and had made the necessary cultivation and improvement upon
the land.
The township plat was filed in the local office October 9, 1880.
The single question presented by the case is, whether the selection
should have been made and the actual settlement and cultivation been
commenced by the 1st day of January, 1858.
I am informed that most of the claims under this act on file in your
office show settlement and cultivation begun and ended within the last
eight or nine years.
The question, therefore, has an importance beyond the single case
under consideration.
Some light to aid us in the construction of this statute may be found
by referring to the condition of New Mexico at the time of the passage
of the donation act.
Courts will take judicial notice of the condition of the country and of
titles to land at the time of the passage of the act. (Lamb v. Daven-
port, 1 Saw, 609.) And the rule is specially applicable in the adminis-
tration of the laws in this Department relating to the public lands.
The treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo was concluded February 2, 1848.
At the time the vast country composing New Mexico was organized
into a Territory, in 1850, it contained about 60,000 white inhabitants,
most of them peacefully engaged in raising stock and cultivating the soil.
For several years before the passage of the donation act the country had
been in an unsettled and suffering condition. The Comanche and
Apache Indians, the two largest tribes in the Territory, " were as actively
hostile to the Americans as they were before the country occupied by
them became a part of the Union." They, especially the Apaches, had
been robbers from the first knowledge of them, as early as 1694.
For several years the average number of sheep stolen by them had
been 100,000 each year, besides large numbers of mules, horses, and
horned cattle. In 1852 and 1853 these depredations, accompanied with
the killing of the inhabitants, were appalling; and "regions once
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inhabited by a peaceful and happy population, and the fertile valleys
they tilled, were reverting to the condition of a wilderness."
To protect this country and parts of Texas ajacent to it, full two-
thirds of the whole Army was required and was maintained there at
great expense. A considerable number of the soldiers, to the neglect
of their proper duty as soldiers, went into quarters and engaged in cul-
tivating corn and in other agricultural pursuits, in order to provide food
for the Army. (Bartlett's United States Explorations in New 3exico,
vol. 2, page 384, et seq.)
It was of te greatest importance, therefore, that this vast country
so thinly settled, and subject to such depredations, should be speedily
land permanently occupied, and its resources, especially those of all
agricnltural character, developed. And the object of the donation
Undoubtedly was to induce the persons then in the Territory to remain
there, and to induce others, within the time specified in the act, to go
there to reside and settle.
If only residence, without selection and settlement of the land within
the time specified, was required by the act, then all those persons resid-
ing there January 1, 1853, and still there at the time of the passage of
the act, and those who became residents by the 1st day of January,
1858, could have left the Territory and returned at any time during the
lifetime of such persons and claimed the donation. And residence once
having been acquired the selection and cultivation, within the allotted
limit of human life, might have, in many instances, been postponed
forty or fifty years. It seems incredible that such could have been the
intention of the act, and yet these claims under consideration must all
be based upon such a construction.
I do not see how by construction the residence can be separated from
the selection and settlement. I think it was contemplated that the fact
of residence and settlement should be contemporaneous. The act,
speaking of the persons not then resident, says, who "shall remove to
and settle in said Territory.
If the land can be claimed so many years after the required residence,
much difficulty must arise in proving the fact that residence was ac-
quired within the time limited, and it would open a door to much mis-
chief and fraud.
The reasons why settlement and cultivation should be commenced
within the time specified in the act, are even stronger than that resi-
dence should be acquired within that time.
The mere fact of residence, often u substantial and indefinite, and
especially so in such a country as New Mexico was at that time, would
not accomplish the intents of the act.
The plain object of the donation was to secure the permanent settle-
ment and occupation of the country as speedily as possible, and that
object could be best attained by a substantial residence upon tracts of
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land selected and defined which would be the homes of the settlers and
of their families, and to which they would be attached and aroused to
defend by the interest of a present property, and which by cultivation
would supply the wants of the country.
Residence separated from settlement and cultivation might be bona
fide, and yet be of short duration; united with settlement a definite pe-
riod of time was secured.
The act says that there shall be donated to the persons then residing,
or removing to the Territory within the time specified, 160 acres, on
condition of actual settlement and cultivation for not less than four
years. Was this contemplated settlement and cultivation to proceed
at once, or could it be made at any period during the life-time of the
donee?
If it could be held in these cases that the grant to all persons, under
this act, possessing the necessary qualifications, and having complied
with the act as to residence, was a grant in presenti, and vested the
title in such persons in fee simple, subject to be defeated only by a
failure to perform the conditions as to settlement and cultivation, then,
perhaps, there being a present estate, settlement and cultivation might
be postponed, and a way found to the approval of these claims.
Lands under the Oregon donation act of September 27,1850, have
been the subject of numerous decisions in the Federal courts.
In Adams v. Burke, 3 Saw., 415; Wythe v. Haskell, ib., 574; Chap-
man v. School District, 1 Deady, 108; Lamb v. Davenport, 1 Saw., 609,
it was held that the Oregon act transferred a present title in fee simple,
subject to be defeated by a failure to perform the conditions as to
settlement and cultivation. But in all those cases settlement was be-
gun within the time required by the act for acquiring residence.
In the case, however, of Hall v. Russell (101 U. S., 503), arising under
the Oregon donation act, it was held that the title to the soil did not
rest in the settler before the conditions had been fully performed; that
although the language of the act was appropriate to express a present
grant yet there could be no present grant without a grantee actually in
existence, and fully qualified at the time of the passage of the act, to
take the grant; and if the "law making the grant indicates a future
grantee, and not a present one, the grant will take effect in the future,,
and not presently."
The paramount question in the construction of these grants is, how-
ever, what was the intent of Congress?
In the case of the Missouri, Kansas and Texas Railway Company v..
Kansas Pacific Railway Company (97 U. S., 491), Justice Field says:
It is always to be borne in mind that in construing a Congressional
grant the act by which it is made is law, as well as a conveyance, and
that such effect must be given to it as will carry out the intent of Con-
gress.
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I think it was the intent of Congress, in the passage of the New Mex-
ico donation act that all selections should be made under the act, and
settlement and cultivation be commenced by the first day of January,
1858, that being the limit of the time within which the necessary resi--
dence could be acquired.
These claims do not seem to be represented by counsel, and no reasons
are presented why they should be approved.
If these settlers have in good faith settled upon and cultivated these
lands under a misapprehension of the meaning of the act, they may be-
entitled to relief, but it is not in the power of this Department to grant
it under the donation act in question. It is quite probable that under
the pre-emption and homestead laws meritorious claimants can obtain
adequate relief.




Claimant having relinquished his right under the donation act and req uested permis-
sion to make entry of the land under the homestead law, his donation claim is.
canceled, and instructions will issue as to the manner of a pplication to enter-
under the homestead or pre-emption laws.
Commissioner McFarland to register and receiver, Santa Be, New Mexico,
March 2, 1883.
I am in receipt of your letter of the 2d ltimo, inclosing duplicate
donation certificate No. 317, issued at your office January 19, 1882, to
Jesus Maria Rael, upon notification No. 437, for the NW. SW.j.
and V. NW. Sec. 9, and SW. SW. , Sec. 4, T. 7 N., R. 28 E., N.
M. P. V-.
Upon said duplicate Mr. Rael has executed a relinquishment of all!
his right and title to the land under the act of July 22, 1854, and he
requests permission to enter the same tracts under the act of May 14,
1880, relating to homesteads, with credit for fees and commissions.
already paid.
The donation claim above described has therefore this day been can
celed upon our files and records, and you will makd proper annotations-
upon your records, advising the claimant of the action taken.
You will receive further instructions as to the manner in which the
claimant may apply to enter said land under the pre-emption or home--
stead laws, etc.
Until further advised, you will permit no person to initiate a claim of
any character to the tract embraced in said canceled donation certifi-
cate.
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DONA TION-SETTLEMENT-CERTIFIC.ATE.
SIST o RAMIREZ.
'Settlement not having commenced until after January 1, 1858, claimant is not entitled
to donation; and having acquired no interest under the donation act, relinquish-
ment is not necessary.
No certificate having been issued the claim cannot be docketed in the General Land
Office, and the land appears on the tract books as vacant.
If, therefore, the claimant possesses the proper qualifications, he may protect his im-
provements by making entry of the tract nder the homestead or pre-emption
laws.
Commissioner McFarland to register and receiver, Santa Be, New Mexico,
April 4, 1883.
I am in receipt of your letter of the 23d ultimo, inclosing a duly ex-
-ecuted relinquishment by Sisto Ramirez, of all " right and title" to the
SE. Sec. 12, T. 5 N., 'R. 23 E., as a donation claim under the act of
July 22, 1854.
It appears that you declined to receive the fee tendered in this case,
and issued no certificate; but forwarded the papers here on September
22, last, for examination.
The party filed his notification, No. 150, in your office, February 21,
1878. He swears-and his witnesses also-that he resided upon and
cultivated the land from February 1, 1876, to August 9, 1882.
In a supplemental affidavit executed September 16, 1878, Mr. Ramirez
sets forth that the date of settlement given in his original affidavit, and
in his proof was a mistake; that the true date is February 21, 1878;
-that he did not take possession of the land described prior to that
time, etc.
You stated in your letter of September 22, 1882, that said supple-
mental affidavit was not satisfactory to your office.
The question as to whether settlement was commenced in 1876 or
1878, has now become immaterial. Under the Department decision of
November 23 last, in the case of Juan Rafael Garcia, settlement and
cultivation must have been commenced on or before January 1, 1858, to
render, the claim valid in its initiation.
There is no necessity, therefore, for the relinquishment of interest
'made by the party. His claim is invalid, and is hereby rejected; and
you will so note upon the papers herewith returned, to be retained upon
your files.
As no certificate has been issued in.the case, this rejected claim cannot
-be docketed upon our record of New Mexico donations; and the proper
-tract-book shows the land described to be vacant and subject to entry,
;so far as the returns from your office have been received and posted.
If, therefore, Mr. Ramirez possesses the legal qualifications of an
entry-man, has not exhausted his rights, and is in actual occupancy of
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the land, he can protect his improvements by applying to enter the
tract in question, in the usual manner, under either the homestead or
pre-emption laws; and you will so notify him.
PRIVATE CLAIM-CORRECTION OF SURVEY.
TOWN OF CHuILILI.
A survey made under instructions given upon an erroneous translation of original
title papers, etc., ordered to be corrected.
Secretary Kirkwood to Commissioner McFarland, July 21, 1831.
I have considered the matters set forth in your letter of July 22 in-
stant, respecting the survey of the Chilili town grant, in the counties of
Bernalillo and Valencia, N. Mex. It appears that on March 8, 1841,
certain persons petitioned the civil and military governor for a grant
of certain described land, and that on March 20, 1841, said governor-
directed a named official to place the petitioners in possession of the
land asked for, in accordance with the boundaries named by them. On
March 29, 1841, this official directed that the petitioners be placed in
possession of said land, that the boundaries be established, and that
each one be given lands according to his means of cultivation, and that
the running springs and heads of streams were to be well cared for as
belonging to them. It does not appear from the original record that
juridical possession was ever given in compliance with these directions.
On December 17, 1856, this claim was presented to the surveyor-gen-
eral of New Mexico for examination and report, in accordance with the
act of July 22, 1854 (10 Stats., 308). It was favorably reported by him
in September, 1857, and was confirmed by the act of Congress of De--
cember 22, 1858 (11 Stats., 374), as the claim of " the town of Chilili; "
and the survey thereof was made by United States Deputy Surveyor
Clements, and approved by Surveyor-General Wilbur November 8,
1860, according to certain lines set forth in your letter. Un February
12, 1875, your office held this survey defective, for reasons named, and
directed a new survey, which order was affirmed by this Department on
September 7 following, with the further direction that, if upon survey
it be found that a straight line would run south of and exclude the town
of Chilili from the grant, the line be so modified as to include the town,.
for, as stated, " it cannot be possible that the Pueblo grant would ex-
clude the town." Surveyor-General Proudfit being in doubt as to the
manner of executing the survey in regard to the town of Chilili, under
said decision, asked instructions from your office, which were given him
specifically on December 9, 1875.
In February, 1877, a new survey was made by United States Deputy
Surveyors Sawyer and McElroy; and, in April following, the attorney
for the grantees advised the surveyor-general that the directions for-
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~said new survey had been given under a misunderstanding arising from
.a mistake in the translation of the original grant, and asked for a new
translation thereof. The surveyor-general, however, approved said
survey, and on July 1.0, 1877, transmitted the same to your office.
No further proceedings appear to have been had in the case until
August 30, 1SO, when the said attorney transmitted to the surveyor-
-general a protest adopted at a public meeting of the inhabitants of said
town, accompanied by sundry affidavits, all of which were transmitted
for the action of your office, on December 21, 1880. The reasons for said
protest and the allegations in said affidavits are fully set forth in your
letter, and were enforced by an argument filed by W. C. Hill, esq., at-
torney for said town, in March last, who, in view of said protest and
allegations, asked that a new survey be directed, in order to obviate
said objections; and on April 2 last your office directed the surveyor-
general to cause an examination to be made touching said matters, after
notice to the town authorities and all parties in interest, and to take
testimony respecting them. This duty was performed by United States
Deputy Surveyor Willison, who made due report. In view thereof, and
-of the testimony submitted, and of the corrected transcript from the
records of Bernalillo County, of the Chilili grant, which varies from the
-copy in possession of the surveyor-general when the claim was adjudi-
*cated, in this, that, in the description of the boundaries, where it reads
in the original copy "' from west to south," in the corrected copy it reads
a north to south," thus causing an error in the former survey; and in
view, also, of the recommendation of said Deputy Surveyor Willison,
approved by the surveyor-general, and of youir suggestions, and as no
objection is made to a further survey, I direct that the survey of Sawyer
and McElroy be set aside, and that the granted tract be located. by a
mnew survey, with the following boundaries, viz: At the northeast, the
brow of the Cibolo, at the point where it faces the surveyed tract, and
where the two lateral lines will unite to form the northeast angle; at
the south, the spring of Los Casos; the spring to be included; and on
the two sides, from the northeast to the southwest points aforesaid, the
sharp edged hills of the cation; the lines to be run along the dividing
ridges on the two sides of the caion; being substantially as shown on
the diagram of Deputy Surveyor Willison, except as to the spring of
Los Casos, which should be included in the survey, it appearing that it
was the intent of the order for juridical possession to give the petitioners
control of the water supply of the cafion, which spring was one of the
principal sources thereof. A survey by these boundaries will, as stated
by you, exclude on the northwest and southeast considerable tracts
included in the first survey; also on the southeast a portion of that
included in the Sawyer and McElroy survey, and will include the
source of the water supply of the caion, the old and new towns of
,Chilili, and the former and present cultivated fields and improvements
of the inhabitants.
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PRIVATE CLAIMS-DELIVERY OF PATENT.
CANON DE SAN DIEGO.
Where the title is in litigation, and opposing parties claim the delivery of the patent,
it will be retained until the ownership of the land is judicially settled; but, if
essential for purposes of the litigation, it may, on stipulation of the parties, be
delivered to a responsible person to be held in trust for, and finally delivered to,
the one legally entitled thereto.
Commissioner MeFarland to U. S. surveyor-general, Santa e, Mexico.
March 20, 1882.
Referring to your letter of January 23 last, relating to the delivery
of the patent for the " Canon de San Diego" grant; also to your let-
ter of February 16, ultimo, on the same subject, I have to say: It is
shown by the record that the patent was issued to Francisco Garcia
and nineteen others named therein, the original grantees, " and those
claiming under or through them"; and that on the 27th of October,
1881, the patent was transmitted to you from this office " for delivery to
the party or parties legally entitled to the delivery thereof."
It now appears from your letters aforesaid that different parties claim
the delivery of the patent, each contesting the right of the other to re-
ceive it; but that both fail to connect themselves by evidence with the
title of the original grantees, and therefore to establish their right of
ownership under or through them. Also, that a suit in partition is
pending in the district court, in which the question of title will be judi-
cially determined.
Though the possession of the patent could give but little advantage
to one not holding the legal title, the uniform practice should be maiu-
tained and delivery only made, as heretofore directed, to the party or
parties legally entitled thereto; and if no one applies who can establish
that claim, you will retain the patent until the ownership of the land
covered by it shall be judicially ascertained and settled.
If, however, delivery appears to be essential for purposes of the pend-
ing litigation, you are authorized, on stipulation placed in your posses-
sion to that effect, by the parties claiming to be interested, to deliver
the patent to a responsible person, to be selected by you, to be held in
trust for and finally delivered to the party or parties who shall be as-
certained to be legally entitled thereto.
PRIVATE CLAJIM-CONFIRIIATIO--GRANT.
ANTON CHICO.
Confirmation not recognized as being to the town of Anton Chico.
Justice would be done by following the terms of the grant or judgment rather than
by having regard to the mere style of the case, and patent should issue to Manuel
Rivera and others, being the thirty-six men, etc. Direction accordingly.
Secretary Teller to Commissioner McFarland, February 19, 1883.
I have considered the matter of the land claim known as Antdn
Chico, Santa F6 district, New Mexico, on appeal alleged to have been
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presented in behalf of the claimants under Manuel Rivera from you.
decision of August 10, 1881, holding that confirmation is to the " town
of Anton Chico," and that patent should so run.
The record shows that the claim was presented to the Jnited States.
surveyor-general of New Mexico in accordance with the provisions of
the eighth section of the act of Congress approved July 22, 1854 (10
Stat., 309), and was finally reported by Dlim to Congress, and thereby
confirmed as No. 29 by the third section of the act of June 21, 1860 (12
Stat., 71).
I am of opinion that substantial justice would be done to all parties
in interest by following the terms of the grant or judgment recorded
rather than by having regard to the mere style of the case or descrip-
tion of the papers therein, and that patent should issue accordingly,
citing the grant as in terms following: To Manuel Rivera and others,.
being the thirty-six men to whom the grant was made by Facunda Nul-
gares, governor, May 2, 1822, their children, heirs, successors, and as
signs, as in said grant provided, and which was confirmed as private-
land claim No. 29 by act of Congress, entitled "An act to confirm cer-
tain private land claims in the Territory of New Mexico," approved
June 21,1860, subject to all the provisions and conditions mentionedl
and set forth in the decree granting said tract of land as aforesaid,.
and the record of juridical possession and other documents accompany-
ing the same, and made part of the report of William Pelham, surveyor-
general of New Mexico, on the 15th of July, 1859, and to the rights of
all persons claiming under said provisions and conditions.
Your decision is accordingly reversed.
PBIVATR CLAIM-CONVFIRMATIONV-BOUND-ABY.
RA MON VIGIL GRANT.
Where "mountains" are made the boundary of a grant, the foot or base (unless oth-
erwise expressed) is intended and must be taken as the limit of the claim.
Commissioner Hilearland to U. S. surveeyor-general, Santa Fe, New Mex-
ico, April 10, 1883.
I have examined the case in the matter of the survey of the Ramon
Vigil grant, being private land claim No. 38, New Mexico, in connection
with the protest of Thomas A. Hayes, claiming to bethe present owner
of the granted tract, against the'survey of the same as approved and
returned by you.
The grant which is the foundation of the claim originated in a peti-
tion by Pedro Sanchez to the governor and captain-general of New
Mexico, soliciting the grant of a piece of vacant land, which he described
as follows:
The boundaries being on the north the lands enjoyed by right by the
Indians of the Pueblo of San Ildefonso; on the south the lands of Capt..
DECISIONS RELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS. 289
Andres Montoya; on the east the Del Norte River; on- the west the
Rocky Mountains.
The grant bears date March 20, 1742, and was made in conformity
with the petition by Don Gaspar Domingo de Mendoza, lieutenant-
colonel, governor, and captain-general, for " the land asked for," with-
out further description, with direction to the senior justice of the juris-
diction to give possession.
On the 28th day of the same month the act of possession, certified by
Juan Joseph Lovato, acting judge, set forth that he gave the royal
possession of the land granted, in doing which he established the south-
ern limits of the pueblo, erecting there "a holy cross" to serve as
the boundary of the said Indians on the south, and of Sanchez, the
*grantee, on the north; but gives no description of the other boundaries.
After the passage of the act of July 22, 1854, Ramon Vigil, claiming
to be the owner of the lands granted to Pedro Sanchez, made applica-
tion to the surveyor-general of New Mexico for proceedings under the
provisions 6f said act, for confirmation to him of the title to the lands
in question; and, though he referred in his petition to the conveyances
by which be claimed to have become the owner, he failed to produce
and prove the same.
On July 15, 1859, Surveyor-General William Pelham reported the
claim for the action of Congress, holding the grant to be genuine and
valid, finding that the parties were, and had been from time immemo-
rial, in quiet and peaceable possession of the land, and approving the
claim in favor of "the legal representatives of Pedro Sanchez."
By the act of June 21, 1860 (12 Stat., 71), the claim was confirmed I"as
recommended for confirmation by the surveyor-general."
The survey of the confirmed claim being that under consideration,
made by United States Deputy Surveyors Sawyer and McElroy, in
April, 1877, and approved by you June 3 in the same year, bounds the
surveyed tract on the east by the Rio Grande; on the south by lands
of Capt. Andres Montoya; on the west by mountains (Sierra Madre),
and on the north by the San Ildefonso grant, and a line extended west
from the southwest corner of that grant to the mountains represented as
the western boundary. The area presents the figure of an irregular
triangle, the north line forming the base, the course of the Rio Grande
the boundary on the east, being from said north line southwesterly, the
boundary of the lands of Montoya, from the point where the Rio Grande
intersects the same, running in a general course northwesterly, and the
mountains representing the western boundary, extending from the
point of intersection of the Montoya line in nearly the same direction
northwesterly, to the point where they are intersected by the north
boundary.
The north boundary, governed by the line of Ildefonso, and the east
boundary, the Rio Grande, cannot be otherwise than correct. The
southern boundary is not questioned; and if the deputy surveyors
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have ascertained and rightly located the boundary of Montoya's land,
as there is no reason to doubt that they have, must also be correct.
The western boundary is described in the petition of Sanchez (the
only descripton found in the original title papers), and in the petition
of Ramon Vigil to the surveyor-general, as the Rocky Mountains. In
the report of the deputy surveyors who made the survey, and in the
protest of Mr. Hayes, the mountain range made tle western b oundary
of the surveyed tract is called the Sierra Madre. No other mountains
are alluded to by either; and fro n the de;criptioa of the northern
boundary line in the field notes, and of the surveyed tract in the deputy
surveyors' report, it appears that this is the first mountain range west
of the Rio Grande answering the descriptive call.
The survey makes the foot or base of the range the boundary on the
west. The protest and objection of Mr. Hayes is limited to this part of
the survey; the ground of complaint being that the line is run at the
foot instead of the summit, or ridge, "thereby," as alleged, "attempting
to materially reduce the quantity of land in fact granted."
The only question, therefore, remaining to be considered is as to
whether the base or the summit of the mountains should constitute the
boundary. The l)rotestant contends that "it always was and is yet the
custom and understanding in Mexico (and consequently in New Mexico)
that a mountain boundary embraced to the summit, unless otherwise
specifically expressed."
I do not so understand the rule. Where an object boundary of extent
is named, it stands to reason that the side of the object nearest the tract
to be bounded, unless some other part be particularly designated, should
be taken as the boundary; and upon this principle it has always been
held in this Department, in locating Mexican grants in California, that
where a mountain has been made the boundary, without more specific
designation, the proximate foot or base is to determine the boundary
line.
The rule was so held by this office December 17, 1873, in the case of
the Rancho Caslamayomi, affirmed by the Department on appeal August
13, 1874. (1 C. L. L., 589.)
The same was held by this office in the case of the Rancho Los Prietos
y Najalayegna, decided September. 18, 1874, where one of the calls was
a mountain represented on a diseilo. (Id., 591.)
In the matter of the survey of the Rancho Agua Caliente, Vallejo
confirmed for part and Leavenworth for another part. The description
in the case of Vallejo was "1 the hills and mountains which intervene
and separate the rancho of George Yont; and in the Leavenworth case
the mountains dividing Sonoma from Napa." This office decided, Feb-
ruary 21, 1878, in the case of Vallejo, that "the boundary must follow
along the foot or base of such hills or mountains," and in that of Leaven-
worth that " the foot of the mountain should constitute the boundary."
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In a subsequent review of the latter case, April 24, 1878, this office,
in reply to an application of Hon. ilenry S. Foote, asking for certain
modifications of the decision, and as to the mountain boundary, claim-
ing that there was a well-defined range of hills or mountains between
Sonoma and Napa, and that the summit or ridge thereof should, be
adopted as the boundary, made the following statement of the rule:
The rule is well settled in regard to cases like this, that where hills,
mountains, or mountain ranges are named as boundaries, the foot or
base is to be taken as the boundary indicated, unless the top ridge or
summit is clearly indicated as such.
Appeal was taken to the Department in the cases both of Vallejo and
Leavenworth, but withdrawn as to that of Leavenworth; but as both
cases were embraced in the same decision, both were before the Depart-
ment; and by its decision of January 9, 1879, the decision of this office
as to the mountain boundary in the case of Vallejo was affirmed, and in
that of Leavenworth, expressly approved.
If I entertained doubt as to the proper location of the boundary under
consideration, as matter of construction having reference to the descrip-
tive call, which I do not, the decisions cited aboye abundantly settle the
question. In accordance with them the boundary must be held to be
properly located, and the survey is hereby approved.
You will give notice of this decision to the protestant, and all parties
who are, within your knowledge, or as shown by the records of the case,




A certificate on a donation claim notified upon by a single man, and issued in his
name, he being deceased, is erroneous, and should have been in favor of his heirs
at law. A new certificate therefore directed to be issued.
Comn missioner McFarland to register and receiver, Roseburg, Oregon, July
19, 1881.
It appears by evidence on file here that the east half of Sec. 3,
T. 17 S., R. 3 W., Oregon, was notified upon December 1, 1853, by Jacob
Spores, as a donation, under the fourth section of the act of September
27,1850 (Stat. 9, p. 496.)
Proof is furnished showing that the land thus claimed was continu-
ously resided upon and cultivated by said Jacob Spores, as a single man,
from the 16th day of August, 1853, to the 10th day of May, 1856, the
day of the donee's death.
The 8th section of said act provides-
That upon the death of any settler before the expiration of the four
years' continued possession required by this act, all the rights of the
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deceased under this act shall descend to the heirs at law of such settler,
including the widow, where one is left, in equal parts; and proof of
compliance with the conditions of this act up to the time of the death
of such settler shall be sufficient to entitle them to the patent.
The certificate No. 2056 issued at your office for the claim in question
is in favor of Jacob Spores, and hence is erroneous.
You are therefore hereby instructed to issue another certificate in
favor of the heirs at law of Jacob Spores, deceased, for the aforesaid
tracts of land and forward it to this office.
DONATION-LIMITED TO ONE CLAIM.
GEARSHUM VANNATER.
The settler, a married man, having notified on a specified tract, under the fifth sec-
tion, act of September 27, 1850, made proof of residence, etc., commencing No-
vember 11, 1854, and received patent to himself and wife March 22, 1866, and
also having notified upon another tract, and made proof of residence, etc., com-
mencing November 1, 1854, could only receive the one donation patented as above.
Commissioner McFarland to register and receiver, Roseburg, Oregon, Au-
gust, 11, 1881.
It appears by the records and files of this office that Gearshum Van-
nater claimed, as a married man, under the fifth section of the act of
September 27, 1850 (Stats., vol. 9, p. 496), and the legislation supple-
mental thereto, Notification No. 5784, lots 1 and 2, and the N. j of N. 
of Sec. 3, and the N. j of NE. i of Sec. 4, T. 15 S., B. 3 W., Oregon, con-
taining 250.38 acres, and made proof of residence and cultivation thereon
from November 11, 1854, to January, 1859. This claim was patented to
the donee and his wife March 22, 1866.
It also appears that the said Gearshum Van nater claimed under said.
act the NW. 4, the W. i of NE. , and the W. I of SE. i, See. 8, in same
township and range, Notification No. 4724, and made proof of residence
and cultivation thereon from November 1,1854, to the 7th of December,
1858. This latter claim and proof was retained in your office and was.
not known to exist by this office until long after the issue of said patent
to Vannater and wife in 1866.
The first proviso in section 5 of said act of 1850 provides-
" That no person shall ever receive a patent for more than one dona-
tion of land in said Territory in his or her own right."
These two claims under said act being for two separate and distinct
donations of land in Oregon, one o which has been patented to the
claimant, Vannater, his rights thereunder as a donee are exhausted,
and for that reason his claim under said act to the tracts of land in said
section 8 is held for cancellation, and you will so notify the interested
parties.
In case of an appeal you will be governed by the rules of practice
now in force.
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DOYATION-PARTITION-SURVEY.
ELIJAH ELLIOTT.
The act of September 27, 1850, confers no authority upon any officer connected with
the adjudication of the claim to make any division of the land among the donees.
Commissioner MaFarland to register a'ind receiver, Roseburg, Oregon, Marcis
17, 1882.
I return herewith donation certificate No. 2083, for the claim of the
widow and heirs at law of Elijah Elliott, deceased, that the initial point
15.29 chains W., and 8.90 chains N., of the northeast corner Sec. 35, T.
iS S., R. 2 W., Oregon, and the direction of the third line east 29.96
chains, may be corrected by you to agree with the official survey, which
shows the initial point to be 15.29 chains W. and 8.96 chains N. of the
northeast corner of said Sec. 35, and the third course to run N. 89aO E.
29.96 chains. You will strike out all of the printed line eleven in said
certificate, except the word cultivation, and insert the following: " Until
the date of the death of said settler, as provided by the eighth section
of said act."
It is also noticed that you have divided the donation into two equal
parts, and assigned one-half to the widow and the other to the heirs at
law of said Elijah Elliott, deceased.
The supreme court, in the case of Hall v. Russell, 11 Otto, p. 503, held
if a settler died before the expiration of the required four years' con-
tinued possession, that the eighth section of the act of September 27,
1850 (Stats. 9, p. 496), made a new grant of the land claimed by him to his
heirs at law, including his widow, if he left one, and proof of compliance
with the conditions of the act up to the time of his death should be
sufficient to entitle them to the patent. According to this construction
of said eighth section, the land claimed by Mr. Elliott during his life-
time was, after his death, donated to his heirs at law, including his
widow, they having furnished the required proof. Said section confers
no authority upon any officer connected with the adjudication of said
claim to make any division of the land donated among the donees, and
consequently your action in dividing the land donated to the present
claimants is disapproved, and you are hereby instructed to cancel upon
said certificate the division made by you between said widow and the
heirs at law of Elijah Elliott, deceased.
Inasmuch as you have upon the application of the widow, one of the
donees in this case, made a division of the land in question, you will,
before canceling the aforesaid division, as herein directed, notify the
parties in interest of this ruling and allow them the usual time for
appeal therefrom to the honorable Secretary of the Interior. In case
of an appeal you will correct the certificate as herein indicated, except
the cancellation of the division of the land, and return it here with the
appeal papers; but if no appeal is taken within the time allowed by you,
you will, before returning said certificates, make all the corrections
indicated by these instructions.
294 DECISIONS RELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS.
DONATIOY-NOTIFICATION-A EEMENT OF ARTIES.
ATTWELL V. OREGON RY. & NAV. Co.
The husband of claimant having, as a married man, filed notification, before and after
survey, describing his claim by metes and bounds, the land notified for, as de-
scribed, is that which constitutes the Attwell claim.
The claim of the company above is made under Chipman, who notified after Attwell
on an adjoining tract, and by color of an alleged agreement with Mr. Attwell
(denied by her), by which a portion of the Attwell claim was to be included in
that of Chipman.
There is no authority of law for patenting any part of the donation of Attwell to
Chipman, or his assignees, or vice ver8a.
Commissioner McFarland to register and receiver, Oregon City, Oregon,
May 25, 1882.
I have had under consideration the contest of Mrs. Mary J. Attwell,
wife of Roger G. Attwell, against the Oregon Railway and Navigation
Company, involving the title to a portion of the NE. of Sec. 12, T. 2
N., R. 7 E., Oregon, transmitted here on appeal from your decision of
January 16, 1881.
The tract in question, as appears by the donation certificate in the
case, is included in the claim of John Chipman and wife, now owned by
the Oregon Railway and Navigation Company, but it is contended that
said tract is a portion of the donation claim of Roger G. Attwell and
wife.
These claims had their inception under the fifth section of the act of
September 27,1850, commonly known as the Oregon donation act (Stats.
9, 496), and supplemental legislation, and upon examination of the
proofs furnished, it is clear that each claimant is entitled, as a married
man, to a donation of 320 acres.
The sixth section of the said act of September 27, 1850, and the sixth
section of the act of February 14, 1853, as amended by the third section
of the act of July 17, 1854, require donees to notify upon the lands
claimed by them respectively.
The public surveys were extended over the townships in which these
claims are located, April 9, 1860.
Attwell filed- his notification before and after survey, prior to Chip-
man.
It has been held in the case of Ramsey v. Loomis et al., Oregon Re-
ports, vol. 6, p. 367, and that of Fitzpatrick v. Du Bois et al. (2 Sawyer,
p. 434), that land claimed under the " donation act" is segregated when
the notification is filed. Applying this rule to the claims under discus-
sion the question arises what lands were segregated by the notices of
Attwell and Chipman respectively.
Attwell described his claim as extending from a balm of gilead tree,
standing at the mouth of a small creek which empties into the Colum-
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bia River, up the river about one mile to a fir tree standing on a large
pile of stones, " thence back."
Chipman described his claim as extending down the river from this
tree a little more than one mile.
It will thus be observed that the claimants had a common initial
point, viz: a balm of gilead tree, and from this tree the lines run in
opposite directions.
Two witnesses, Russell and McMillan, civil engineers, produced at
the hearing before you, locate this balm of gilead tree 113 feet south of
the south boundary of lot 2 in said section 12, and as this loeation is
not disputed would throw said lot 2 and 113 feet off that portion of the
north side of lot 3 adjoining said lot 2; also 113 feet off the north side
of the SW. I of NE. in said section 12, being the land in controversy
within the limits of the Attwell claim.
Notwithstanding the public surveys of these townships Attwell con-
tinued to claim his donation by metes and bounds, and hence no official
survey of it has yet been made. It would seem, however, that if the
line extending west to the river from the line between ranges 7 and 8
east described in his first notification after the public survey of these
townships is located in connection therewith it would fall about 217 feet
south of said tree, and in the second about 85 feet.
The theory upon which the representatives of the Chipman interest
are attempting to include the land in controversy is that Mrs. AttweU
had agreed or consented to the establishing of the line dividing these
two donations as they appear in said certificates, but Mrs. Attwell denies
making this agreement or giving her consent to such dividing line. She
admits that she was negotiating with the agent of the Oregon Steam
Navigation Company, J. W. Brazee, for the sale of the said strip of land,
but the sale was never perfected.
It will thus be observed that this contest is not to settle a disputed line
between the two donations, but is a proceeding based upon an alleged
agreement to secure by patent as a part of the Chipman donation lands
belonging to the Attwell donation, or, in other words, to patent to Chip-
man lands not claimed or occupied by him.
I find no authority of law for this office to patent any part of the
donation of Attwell to Chipman or his assignees, or vice versa. Each
of these two donations must be adjudicated by the provisions of the
donation acts, and as of the date when the claimants perfected title
thereto, and issue patents for the title so perfected, giving each claimant
the land settled upon and selected by him pursuant to the provisions
of said acts, and leave those who claim the whole or any portion of
said donations as purchasers to follow the title granted to these donees.
In view of the foregoing I am of the opinion and so decide that lot
2 and a strip 113 feet wide off that portion of the north side of lot 3,
contiguous to said lot 2, also a strip 113 feet wide off the north side of
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the SW. I of the NE. i in said section 12, should be included in the
Attwell claim.
This disposes of the conflict between the two claims, but it is ob-
served from an examination of the Chipman claim that after excluding
therefrom the land in controversy which is awarded to Attwell by this
decision, it will still have a continuous river front from the balm of gilead
tree according to the meanders of the river of about 1 miles.
The distance from this tree along the river, according to Mr. Chip-
man's notification was a little more than 1 mile, and, in my opinion, if
the lines were to terminate at the SW. corner of lot 1, in Sec. 13, T.
2 N., R. 7 E., it would cover substantially all that was claimed, giving
him a river front of about 1 miles. This would reduce the area of the
claim according to the certificate to about 273 acres.
The certificate, however, is found to exclude the SE. 1 of the NE.
4 of Sec. 12, T. 2 N., R. 7 E., originally claimed by Chipman, and which
does not appear to be claimed by Attwell, with the exception of a small
strip 113 feet wide across the north side. The remainder of this tract,
therefore, may be included in the Chipman claim, and will increase the
area to about 310 acres, or approximately what he was entitled to under
the law.
You will notify all parties in interest of the purport of this decision,
and be governed by the rules of practice in case of an appeal.
DONA TI ON-RESIDENCE-SETTLEMENT.
ELVIRA BREWER.
Where the husband could not have become a resident of Oregon before December 1,
1850, or at any time tereafter, his widow could gain no right by settlement un-
der the act of September 27, 1850, nor acts amendatory thereof.
Secretary Teller to Commissioner MlfcFarland, June 29, 1882.
I have considered the matter of Elvira Brewer's donation claim, in-
volving the NW. 4 of Sec. 11, T. 17 S., R. 5 W., Roseburg district, Ore-
gon, on appeal by her son, Reese A. Brewer, from your office decision
of June 18, 1881, rejecting his mother's claim.
The record shows that said claim was preferred by her as the relict of
John Brewer, under the provisions of the eighth section of the act of
February 14, 1853 (10 Stat., 158); that her husband died in Pike County,
Arkansas, on the 9th day of April, 1845; and that she subsequently
emigrated to Oregon, where she arrived in October, 1853, and settled
upon and commenced to cultivate the tract in question February 10,1854,
which she continued to do until the day of her death, November 15,1857.
As it thus appears that it was impossible for her husband to bring
himself within the purview of the act of September 27, 1850 (9 Stat.,
496), by becoming a resident of Oregon on or before December 1, 1850,
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or at any time thereafter, it follows, therefore, that she can derive no
benefit from the act cited or from any of those amendatory thereof, and
her claim must fail for want of the requisite basis.
Your decision is accordingly affirmed.
DONATION CLAII-BESIDENCE-CULTIVAT1ON.
WILLIAM T. BINGHAM.
Where a donation claim was initiated in the fall of 1855; a little garden made in the
spring of 1856; a small house on the place; no land cultivated but one season,
and then only the small garden; the claimant in the fall of 1856 going to the
mines and residing there the fall and winter of 1856 and most of the year 1857,
dying about 1858, the residence and eltivation were not such as required by
the donation act, and the claim should be canceled.
Commissioner McFarland to register and receiver, Roseburg, Oregon, July
25, 1882.
I have considered the matter of the donation claim of William T.
Biugham certificate No. 1142, made under the provisions of the fifth
section of the act of September 27, 1850 (Stats. 9, p. 496).
From the papers in the case it appears that Mr. Bingham settled
upon a tract of 160 acres of unsurveyed land on the 28th of October,
1855, and on the 8th of November following made preliminary proof of
residence and cultivation and his notification, in which he described
the particular tract claimed by him as well as was possible in the
absence of a survey of the land.
On the 15th of April, 1863, Thomas Johnson appeared before the
register and made affidavit that Bingham had resided upon and culti-
vated his claim from October, 1855, until his death in May, 1858, " except
during the Indian troubles."
On the 9th of May, 1863, Edward Burroughs made affidavit that
Bingham resided upon and cultivated his claim from November, 1855, to
May lO, 1858, the date of his death, and further testified that the land
claimed by Bingham-
Was embraced in the following metes and bounds: commencing at a
stake marked R. 15 W., T. 31 S., 9 & 10; thence running south one-half
uile; thence east one-half mile; thence north one-half mile; thence
west to the place of beginning.
On the 31st of December, 1866 the register and receiver issued their
certificate for the claim in favor of the heirs-at-law of William T. Bing-
ham, deceased, and located it on the E. i of SE. I of sec. 9 and W. i of
SW. 1 of sec. 10, T. 31 S.B R. 15 W.
On the 20th of June, 1876, the Hon. L. F. Lane filed in this office the
affidavits of W. H. Cooper, Frederick Unicorn, and James S. Langlois,
that Bingham had never claimed the tract described in the certificate,
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but that his claim was located on what would be the NW. i of Sec. 15,
if the public surveys were extended over it.
In view of these sworn statements you were instructed on the 23d of
November, 1876, to take the necessary steps to determine the correct
location of the claim in connection with the public surveys, obtain fur-
ther proof showing specifically the character of Bingham's residence and
cultivation, and if he had been absent from his claim on account of In-
dian troubles, to ascertain the duration of such absence.
In accordance with these instructions, as appears from your report of
the 26th of March, 1877, on the 3d of January, 1877, you published for
four weeks a notice to all parties interested in the claim of Bingham to
appear at your office on the 26th of February, 1877, for the purpose of
furnishing proof as to the correct location of the claim, etc., and in addi-
tion to the published notice, you notified, by letter, Isaac Bingham, a
brother of the deceased claimant, who, as administrator of his brother's
estate, procured the proofs of residence and cultivation on which the
certificate was based.
On the day set for the hearing the only parties appearing before you
were W. H. Cooper, who had previously applied to enter the tracts cov-
ered by the donation certificate as a homestead, and S. H. Crouch. The
latter testified that he was acquainted with Bingham in his lifetime and
knew that he located a donation claim in the fall of 1855, on the NW.1
of Sec. 15; that he resided on the place and in the vicinity until about
the year 1858, when he died; that there was a small house on the tract
and "a little garden put in in the spring of 1856;" that in the fall of
1856 Bingham, in company with deponent, went "prospecting" and
found mines, where Bingham resided during the fall and winter of 1856,
and that he also resided in the mines most of the year 1857, and also
that Bingham did not claim the tracts described in the certificate issued
by the reg ster and receiver.
In regard to Bingham's cultivation Crouch further testified that he
"did not cultivate any land but one summer, and then only a small
garden."
The deposition of S. H. Crouch and a diagram of Sees. 9, 10, and 16,
of T. 31 S., R. 15 W., certified by F. W. Colebrook, county surveyor for
Curry County, Oreg., filed by W. HI. Cooper, is the only evidence pro-
duced at the trial.
In certifying to the diagram Mr. Colebrook stated that he had exam-
ined the public surveys of the sections covered by the diagram, and
found that Bingham's improvements were on the NW. of Sec. 15.
Upon a careful consideration of the record in the case, and particu-
larly the deposition of Crouch, who it appears was the friend and asso-
ciate of Bingham, and cognizant of his acts and whereabouts during
the period referred to, it appears that his residence and cultivation were
not of such a character as was contemplated by the provisions of the
donation act.
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I am, therefore, of the opinion, and so decide, that the claim of Will-
iam T. Bingham is not a bonafide one, and should be canceled.
It appears by the evidence that the original settlement of Bingham
was upon the NW. i of Sec. 15, Township 31 S., R. 15 W., Oregon, but
as my decision disposes of his claim upon the ground that it had no
validity under the donation act, the necessity of rendering a decision
upon that question is thereby obviated.
PRACTICE-NOTICE BY PUBLICATION.
MILLER ET AL. V. TERRY ET AL.
Service by publication is not authorized without due showing that personal service
cannot be made.
Commissioner McFarland to register and receiver, Oregon City, Oregon,
December 30, 1882.
On the 15th of July, 1880, the register forwarded here the affidavits
of J. L. Miller, Andrew J. Miller, and James A. Crabtree, and recom-
mended, upon the allegations contained in said affidavits, that a hear-
ing be allowed at his office for the purpose of showing the falsity of the
final proof accompanying the papers in the donation case of Hugh
Terry, deceased, certificate No. 521-6, involving the title to the S. i of
NE. 1 of Sec. 25, T. 10 S., R. 3 W., Oregon.
Pursuant to this recommendation. on the 17th of May last, a hearing
was allowed upon the conditions that those desiring to contest said
claim should deposit with you a sufficient sum of money to defray the
expense incident thereto, and that due notice to all interested parties
should be given.
On the 11th instant the register transmitted here in the cause entitled
"J. L. Miller, James Williams, and James A. Crabtree v. the heirs-at-
law of Hugh Terry et al., an affidavit of publication of notice of hear-
ing to be had at the United States land office at Oregon City, Oreg.,'on
Wednesday, October 18, 1882, at 10 o'clock a. in.; affidavit of the post-
ing of a copy of the notice of said hearing ora said claim ; affidavit of
Daniel Morris amending his former affidavit, and the testimony taken
pursuant to said published notice on the day mentioned therein.
This published notice is directed to Lucinda McCool, Polly Ann Mor-
ris, Sarah Bilyer, Nancy Miller, Martha F. Miller, Hugh Terry, Orsena
Bilyer, and Evelina Powell, heirs-at-law of Hugh Terry, deceased, and
to all parties in interest.
The record in this case does not show that any person made affidavit
that personal service of said notice could not be made upon any of the
parties named therein, and consequently the publication of the notice
of hearing in this case was unauthorized and gave you no jurisdiction
either to proceed with the examination of witnesses or to continue the
controversy. (See Rule 12, rules of practice, relating to service of
notice.)
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It also appears that you have entirely failed to observe rule 50 of
said rules of practice. And it further appears that said hearing was
conducted on the day mentioned in said published notice by the regis-
ter alone, without any evidence being produced to show that any of said
parties were non-residents, or that their residence was unknown, and
without legal notice having been served, personally or by mail, upon
any of the parties mentioned in said published notice, and without ap-
pearance by any of them in any manner, and consequently I have this
day set aside all proceedings had in the matter of said hearing.
You will notify the parties contesting this claim of this ruling, and at
the same time give them notice that they can hereafter be heard before
you, at the office of the United States register, at Oregon City, Oreg.,
upon their complying with the rules of practice now in force, and depos-
iting within thirty days from the date of the service of such notice a
sufficient sum of money to defray the expense incident thereto.
SCIP-MISNO1ER OF ASSIGNEE.
PIERPRE BONTAIN.
Affidavit required showing the true spelling of the name, and proving the identity of
the assignee.
Commissioner McFarland to register and receiver, Crookston, Minnesota,
July 17, 1882.
Upon an examination of the papers in pre-emption entry at your
office for the NE. Sec. 28, T. 152 N., R. 46 W., and paid for with su-
preme court scrip Nos. B471 and B472 I find that the name of the party
who made said entry is Pierre Bontain; but the scrip appears to have
been assigned to Pierre Bontine.
The case is, therefore, held suspended, and you will please call upon
the party to furnish an affidavit showing the true orthography of his
name, and that the party who made said entry is the identical person
to whom said scrip was assigned, and upon the receipt of the same you
will transmit it to this office.
SCRIP-MISNOMER OF ASSIGNEE.
PEDER P. LxEm.
Entry by Pedre P. Lomem, on assignment of scrip to Peter P. Lomem. Affidavit
required showing true name and identity of party.
Commissioner McFarland to register and receiver, Fargo, Dakota, July
19, 1882.
Upon an examination of the papers in pre-emption entry, at your
office, for SE. Sec. 30, T. 147, R. 51, and paid for with supreme court
scrip Nos. B260 and B261, I find that the name of the party who made
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said entry is Peder P. Lomem, but the scrip appears to be assigned to
Peter P. Lomem.
The case is therefore held suspended, and you will please call upon
the party to furnish an affidavit showing the true orthography of his
name, and that the party who made said entry is the identical person
to whom said scrip was assigned, and upon the receipt of the same you
will transmit it to this office.
SCRIP-ASSIGNEE-ERAS URE.
JOHN HERRING.
Assignee required to show by affidavit how he became possessed of the scrip, and to
account for the erasure, etc.
Commissioner 1M1cFarland to register and receiver, Crookston, Minnesota,
July 19, 1882.
Upon an examination of the assignment of certificate of location No.
R709, and applied in payment of pre-emption entry for N. i of NE. 
Sec. 30, T. 140 N., R. 45 W., from Albert C. Janin, attorney-in-fact of
Charles Bouligny et al., heirs and legal representatives of Jean An-
toine Bernard Dauterive, deceased, it is found that the scrip was orig-
inally assigned to some person unknown, and that the name was erased
and that John Herring was substituted.
You will require Mr. Herring to show by affidavit how he came in
possession of said scrip and to account for the erasure in the body of




Certificate returned and blank assignment required to be perfected.
Commissioner McFarland to register and receiver, Fargo, Dakota, July 25,
1882.
Certificate of location No. M552, issued by this office April 14, 1875,
in part satisfaction of the private land claim of the cities of Baltimore
and New Orleans, under act of June 22, 1860, and supplemental legis-
lation, applied in payment of pre-emption entry by Michael Callaghan
for SE. i of SW. and NW. : of SE. i Sec. 19, T. 152 N., B. 50 W., is
held suspended upon the records of this office for the reason that the
said certificate has never been assigned to the party in whose name
said entry is made.
It appears by reference to the instruments indorsed upon the back of
said certificate that the same has been regularly assigned by the cities
of Baltimore and New Orleans to Samuel E. Tayart, and that on the
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13th day of May, 1879, Mr. Tayart executed an assignment in blank, and
the said certificate is herewith returned in order that the paity in inter.
est may have an opportunity to perfect said assignment, after which
you will please return it to this office.
SCRIP-ASSIGNMENT-CONFIRMEE.
JACOB S. TAYLOR.
Assignment required from the legal representative of the confirmee of the claim for
which the scrip was issued.
Commissioner McFarland to register and receiver, Pueblo, Colorado, Sep-
tember 27, 1882.
Certificates of location Nos. 221E, 221F, 221G, and 221H, issued June
29, 1872, by the surveyor-general of Louisiana, in part satisfaction of the
private land claim of Jesse Kesspy, entered as No. 82 in the report dated
December 24, 1819, of Cosby and Skipwith, located at your office by
Jacob S. Taylor on W. I of SW. i Sec. 5, W. jof SW. X Sec. 9, and E. A
of NW. i Sec. 32, T. 11 S., R. 65 W., and SE. i of NW. j and SW. of
NE. Sec. 13, T. 11 S., R. 66 W., are held suspended upon the records
of this office, for the reason that the said certificates have never been
assigned to the party in whose name said locations are made.
It appears by reference to an instrument indorsed upon the backs of
said certificates that W. T. Dugan is the legal representative of said
confirmee, and as such is entitled to assign the same. You will there-
fore require Mr. Taylor to furnish a properly executed assignment for
each piece of scrip, upon the receipt of which you will please transmit
them to this office.
SCIP-ASSIGNMEXT-A UTHORITY.
JAMES L. BRADFORD
Assignment having been made by attorney in fact of legal representatives of confirmee,
without accompanying evidence of his authority, the same is required to be fur-
nished.
Commissioner McFarland to U. S. surveyor-general, New Orleans, La.,
September 27, 1882.
It appears by reference to the instruments indorsed upon the backs
of certificates of locations Nos. 56A, 56B, and 56C, issued July 21, 1880,
by your office in satisfaction of the private laud claim of Philip Green,
entered as No. 1274, in the report dated December 30, 1815, of the reg-
ister and receiver of western district Louisiana, under act of June 2,
1858, that David Taliaferro, as attorney in fact of the legal representa-
tives of said Green, executed assignments of said certificates to James
L. Bradford.
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As there is nothing on file here to show that Mr. Taliaferro is the at-
torney in fact of said confirmee you will please request him to furnish a
power of attorney authorizing him to assign said certificates upon the
receipt of which you' will please transmit it to this office.
SCRIP-REISS UE -INSTB UCTIOiNS.
JOHN MARRIS PIERRO.
Two certificates of location for one hundred and sixty acres each authorized to be
issued, in lieu of one of three hundred and twenty acres, on application of the
holders of the latter certificate.
Commissioner McFarland to U. S. surveyor-general, New Orleans, La.,
January 5, 1883.
Messrs. Curtis and Burdett of this city filed here, with their letter of
28th ultimo, one certificate of location numbered 380A, for 320 acres
issued by you September 18, 1877, in part satisfaction of the private
land claim of John Marris Pierro, entered as No. 259, fifth class, in the
report dated December 30, 1815, of the register and receiver, western
district of Louisiana, confirmed by act of Congress of February 5, 1825,
with the request that the same be canceled and two pieces of one hun-
dred and sixty acres each be issued in lieu thereof.
As there is no reason known to this office why the request should not
lie complied with, I transmit herewith said certificate in order that the
same may be canceled, and scrip of the denomination of 160 acres be
issued as requested.
Your attention is respectfully invited to office letter to you of April
18, 1879, in the matter of the private land claims of Joshua Garret and
George Miller, wherein instructions for subdividing this class of scrip,
will be found.
After preparing the new scrip you will cancel the original in red ink,
across its face, over your signature, referring to this letter by its ini-
tial and date, and transmit all the certificates to this office for further
action.
On the back of each new piece of scrip you should place your usual
certificate, showing who is the legal representative of the cbnfirmee in
the 
-3 vdION-NOT!FI CA TION-SEGREGATION.
I> kt sfJoaN J. ELLIOTT.
Filing an original notification is an ipso facto segregation of the land described from
the contiguous lands, and after completing the term of residence required, the
donee cannot amend it so as to include other lands.
Secretary Kirlewood to Commissioner McFarland, ilarch 6, 1882.
I have considered the matter of the survey and proper locatior of
John J. Elliott's donation claim to certain lands in Sec. 29, T. 9 N.,
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R. 5 W., Willamette meridian, Vancouver district, Washington Terri-
tory, on appeal from your decision of April 27, 1881, suspending the
issuance of a certificate for said claim.
It appears from the record that Elliott settled upon a certain tract
containing 160 acres of unsurveyed land situate in Wahkiakum County,
W. T., and specifically described by metes and bounds and courses and
distances in his original notification No. 1430, filed in the local office
April 10, 1856, whereby he claims title nuder the donation act of Sep-
tember 27, 1850 (9 Stat., 496), and the act amendatory thereof.
Elliott subsequently filed two more notifications numbered 1430, one
dated April 17, 1871, and the other March 22, 1872, which cover sub-
stantially the same tract, but embrace only a portion of the land cov-
ered by the original notification.
It appears that the official survey was based upon the description of
his claim as contained in the second notification, and that such survey
locates the same in section 29, as aforesaid.
The filing of the original notification was an ipso facto segregation of
the tract therein described from the lands contiguous thereto; and as
Elliott has resided upon and cultivated the tract so described for more
than the full period of four years prescribed by the statute, he cannot
be allowed to change or amend such notification so as to embrace land
not included in his original selection.
I therefore concur with you in the opinion that the survey in question
does not correctly locate Elliott's claim as he described the same in his
original notification; that such survey should be set aside; and that
the issuance of certificate to Elliott should be held in abeyance until he
shall procure an official survey of his claim in accordance with the orig-
inal description thereof. Your decision is accordingly affirmed.
DONATION-DEATH 0F CLAIMANT-DESCENT.
JOSEPH H. CNNER.
By the eighth section of the act of September 27, 1850, on the death of the donation
claimant before completing the term of residence and cultivation, the land de-
scended as a donation to his heirs at law, including his widow, if one is left,
Certificate should issue accordingly, and its issue in the name of the deceased
donation claimant and his widow is erroneous.
Commissioner MeFarland to register and receiver, Olympia, Washington
Territory, May 5, 1882.
The proofs accompanying certificate No. 689, for lands in T. 18 N., R.
1 W., V. T., claimed by Joseph H. Conner as a donation under the fifth
section of the act of September 27, 1850 (9 Stats., 496), and supple-
mental legislation, show that the claimant, as a married man, settled
upon a part of sections 25 and 26, in said township, on the 18th day of
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December, 1852, and continued his residence thereon, as required by
law, until the 26th day of March, 1856, the day of his death.
The eighth section of said act of September 27, 1850, provides:
That upon the death of any settler before the expiration of the four
years' continued possession required by this act, all the rights of the
deceased under this act shall descend to the heirs at law of such settler,
including the widow, where one is left, in equal parts; and proof of com-
pliance with the conditions of this act up to the time of the death of
such settler shall be sufficient to entitle them to the patent.
Mr. Conner having died before completing his title to the land in
question by a continuous residence thereon of four years, and proof
having been furnished of his compliance with the conditions of said act
up to the time of his death, the land upon which he had settled was
donated by said eighth section to his heirs at law, including his widow.
The present certificate being in favor of "Joseph H. Conner, now
deceased, and Phebe M. Campbell, late widow of the said Joseph Con-
ner," is erroneous.
You are therefore instructed to issue a corrected certificate for the
claim in question in favor of Phebe M. Conner, widow, and the heirs at
law of Joseph H. Conner, deceased.
The law does not authorize you to make a division between the donees
of the land granted by said eighth section, and consequently in the
issue of the corrected certificate you will not divide the claim.
DOYATION-VOTIFICATIO.-RAI1LROAD CLAIM.
BAPTISTE PEONE.
Where the claimant settled as far back as 1853, rfarther, and complied with allthe
requirements of law, except filing notice of his claim within the time fixed by
statute, the act of Jnne 25, 1874, exempted him from forfeiture; and having
within twelve months after survey made proof showing the bonafides of hissettle-
ment, etc., as required by the seventh section of the act of September 27, 1853, he
established a claim superior to that of the railroad company, accruing by with-
drawal and definite location (including the land in question) in the mean time.
Commissioner leFarland to register and receiver, Colfax, Washington
Territory, June 6, 1882.
I a in receipt of your letter of the 12th of September last, inclos-
ing, for the views of this office, the proofs in the matter of the donation
claim of Baptiste Peone, accompanied by the protest of the Northern
Pacific Railroad Company against the allowance of said claim.
The question presented for adjudication involves the title to Sec. 13,
T. 26 N., R. 43 E., W. T.
Peone claims said section as a married half-breed Indian, under the
fourth section of the act of September 27, 1850 (9 Stats., 496), and sup-
plemental legislation.
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The railroad company, byvirtue of their compliance with the provis-
ions of the act of July 2, 1864 (13 Stats., 365), and supplemental legis-
lation, claims said section as a portion of the land granted them to aid
in the construction of their road, and allege that Peone has forfeited
his right to claim this tract of land by reason of his failure to give notice
of his claim thereto within the time required by law.
The public surveys of the township embracing the tract in question
were approved August 12, 1880, and were filed in the local land office
on the 7th of the following October.
* The withdrawal for the Northern Pacific Railroad Company on its
general route was made February 21, 1872, and the definite location of
its line was made October 4, 1880. This section 13 falls within the limits
of said withdrawal, and also within the limits of said definite location.
The first notice Peone gave of his claim to this land was on the 16th
day of March, 1881, upwards of five months after the public surveys
had been extended over it.
The proof furnished by Peone shows that he possessed all the neces-
sary qualifications as a married half-breed American Indian to claim
640 acres of land under the fourth section of said act of September 27,
1850. The donee's settlement upon the land in question is variously
stated. One witness makes this settlenient date from April, 1853, to
December, 1880. Another witness makes it extend back from Septem-
ber 29, 1880, "for more than thirty years." The affidavit of the settler
dates this settlement as early as 1848, and the occupancy thereafter to
have continued until the day preceding the date of his affidavit, March
14, 1881.
It is not claimed by the donee that he complied or attempted to com-
ply with the requirements of the 6th section of the act of Congress of
February 14, 1853 (10 Stats., 158), as amended by the third section of
the act of July 17, 1854 (10 Stats., 305), hence from December 1, 1855,
to June 25, 1864, Mr. Peone was debarred from receiving any of the
benefits conferred by the fourth section of said donation act. Congress
at this latter date provided as follows:
That in all cases under the act of Congress approved September 27,
1850, entitled " An act to create the office of surveyor-general of the
public lands in Oregon, and to provide for the survey, and to make do-
nations to settlers of the said public lands,;and the several acts amend-
atory and supplemental thereto, in which the actual settlement may
be shown to be bona fide and the claim in all respects to be fully within
the requirements of existing laws, except as to the failure of the party
to file notice within the time fixed by statute, such failure shall not
work forfeiture when no adverse rights intervene before the filing of the
required notification by the claimant."
The seventh section of said act of September 27, 1853, gave Mr. Peone
a period of twelve months after survey within which to show his bona
fides by proving the commencement of his residence and cultivation on
the land claimed by him as a donation. He has furnished proof within
DECISIONS RELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS. 307
six months after such survey, and it shows that his residence and cul-
tivation on said tract commenced as early as April, 1853, and was con-
tinued thereafter far beyond the time required by law.
This, in my judgment, establishes a claim to the land in question at
the date said railroad company, October 4, 1880, definitely and legally
fixed the line of their road, which claim had its inception as early as
1853, and consequently it formed no part of the grant to said company,
as the act under which said company is claiming only conveys to them
upon their compliance with its provisions land to which the United
States have full title' not reserved, sold, granted, or otherwise appro-
priated, and free from pre-emption or other claims or rights at the time
the line of said road is definitely fixed, and a plat thereof filed in the
office of the Commissioner of the General Land Office.
DO.NA TIOV-NOTIFICAX T.O.-P UBLIC RESERV V TIONT.
DO1mrNicK CORCORAN.
The claimant made settlement and notification and occupied the land for over a year,
when his further occupation was prevented by Idian hostilities; the land being
afterwards taken possession of by government officers and occupied as a military
post and for Indian purposes, the return of the claimant to the same, though
attempted, was thereby prevented; the claimant having made proof of residence,
etc., and received donation certificate as the basis for patent, and the land being
still required for public purposes, compensation therefor is recommended.
Commissioner jllcarland to Secretary Teller, June 9, 1882.
In compliance with the direction for report contained in your ref-
erence on 1st instant, of the papers submitted on the 26th ultimo to
the Department by the Acting Commissioner of Indian Affairs relative
to the claim of Dominick Corcoran to parts of sections 1 and 2 in town-
ship 20, north, of range 5 east, Washington Territory, containing 160
acres of land taken by the government for Indian purposes and known
as the " Mucileshoot Prairie " Indian reservation, I have the honor to
state that the record in this case shows that Dominick Corcoran filed
a notification on the 21st day of April, 1855, numbered 1028, upon unsur-
veyed land, claiming as a single man 160 acres of land, under fifth sec-
tion of the act of Congress of September 27, 1850 (9 Stats. 496), and
supplemental legislation and made proof, by two disinterested witnesses,
that his settlement upon the land claimed by him commenced, on the
1st day of July, 1854, and continued until April, 1855. Subsequently
additional proof was furnished showing that the settler occupied and
improved his claim until October, 1855, when he was prevented by
Indian hostilities from continuing in the occupation of the same. The
land was subsequently taken possession of by the officers of the United
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States Army as a military post, and since then has been occupied by the
government for military and Indian purposes.
It appears that Mr. Corcoran has made repeated demands of those
having charge of the reservation to be reinstated in his possessory
rights to the land claimed by him as a donation, bt as the said land
vas required by the government for military and Indian purposes his
demands have not been complied with.
In 1858 Mr. Corcoran made proof alleging the completion of his resi-
dence and cultivation upon the land claimed for the full period of four
years as required by law, stating that from October, 1855, he believed
it to be unsafe for him to reside upon his claim on account of said Indian.
hostilities.
The township embracing the claim of Corcoran was officially sur-
veyed in 1872, and in 1873 he procured a survey of his claim as follows .
Beginning at a point 6.40 chains south of the northwest corner of see-
tiou in T. 20 N., R. 5 E., W. T., and running thence west 3.75 chains;
thence south 40.00 chains; thence east 40.00 chains; thence north 40.00'
chains, and thence west 36.25 chains to the place of beginning.
The register and receiver on the 9th of April, 1873, issued (lonatiolb
certificate No. 588, describing the claim by metes and bounds, as above
set forth, as the basis of a patent, but no patent has yet been issued for
the reasons before stated.
In my opinion this claim in its inception was in all respects proper
and legal, and I have no doubt would have been perfected according to
law and patente(l but for the action of the government in taking pos-
session of it for military and Indian purposes.
It would seem, therefore, that as a matter of comnrmo jstice Mr..
Corcoran should be paid a sufficient sum of money to cover the daniages
he has suffered by reason of such action, ad without fault pon his
part, an(I I fully concur with the Acting Commiissioner of Indian Affairs
that he be paid the sum of $320.
SURVEY-DEPOSIT SYSTEM-RAIL ROADS.
ATLANTIC & PAC. R. E. Co.
Under Revised Statutes 2401, 2402, and 2403, and act of March 3, 1879, corporation&
cannot be considered as "residing" or bcing " settlers" in a township, and are
not entitled to the benefits conferred by said laws. The railroad applying can-
not be allowed to make deposit in payment for surveys along its line.
Commissioner Mc1eFarland to Messrs. Britton and Gray, Washington, D.
C. Noember 28, 1882.
I have considered your application for a reconsideration of my decis-
ion of August 19, 1881, denying the application of the Atlanticnud Pa-
cific Railroad Company to beallowed to make deposit for surveying pub-
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lic lands, under the provisions of sections 2401, 2402, 2403, Revised
Statutes, and the act of March 3, 1879 (20 Stat., 352), and also the argu-
ment of Messrs. Britton and Gray, filed in support of said application.
The privileges granted by said provisions are limited by section 2401
to " settlers in aly township" who desire to have the same surveyed. If
it be true that any person or corporation that causes a township to be
settled is a settler of such township, as is argued, yet, unless such set-
tler is residing or located within the township, he is not a settler in the
township.
Section 2403 provides:
When settlers make deposits, in accordance with the provisions of sec-
tion 2401, the amount so deposited shall go in part payment of teir lands
situated in the townships, the surveying of which is paid for out of such
deposits.
When these provisions became law, Mtarch 3,1871, the only settlers
that could acquire any interests in public lands required to be paid for
-were settlers actually resident in the township, and who resided upon
and improved the lands, and who possessed certain personal qualifica-
tions that pertain to individuals and that cannot be predicated of cor-
p)orations.
Though I were satisfied that the term settler as used in the public
land laws does not always mean a resident, yet it seems to me obvious
that the term as used in the statutes under consideration means those
residingin the township.
Words should be construed in connection with the context in which
they are found, for a word standing alone may have several significa-
tions, which, when considered in relation to accompanying words and
phrases, is clearly limited to one meaning; and sometimes the text
,clearly shows that a word has not been used in a sense which might
'otherwise belong to it. But it is always to be understood in the sense
in which it is obviously employed in the statute or instrument to be
construed. In this case it has been used in the sense of a resident,
which is a proper and the most common meaning of the word, and the
sense in which it is more frequently, if not invariably, used in the pub-
lic land laws, and in the correspondence and decisions of this office.
The act of March 3,1879, amending section 2403 Rev. Stat., provides
as follows:
When settlers make deposits in accordance with provisions of section
2401, the amount so deposited shall go in part payment for their land
situated in the townships, the surveying of which is paid for out of such
deposits; or the certificates issued for such deposits may be assigned
by indorsement and be received in payment for any public lands of
the United States entered by settlers under the pre-emption and home-
stead laws of the United States, and not otherwise.
This amendment does not enlarge the right to make deposits or ex-
tend te privilege to any parties not previously authorized to make
deposits. The certificates are authorized to be assigned, but they can
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only be used'in payment of lands entered by settlers under the pre-
emption and homestead laws. Lands are entered under these laws by
those settlers only who possess certain personal qualifications as to age
or citizenship and who have complied with certain requirements as to
residence, improvement, etc.
Whether I consider these provisions separately or collectively, it ap-
pears to me that the term settler, as used in the statutes in question,.
means actual persons who are residents of the township, and cannot be
applied to corporations that are not actual persons and cannot be con-
sidered as residing or as being settlers in a township.
Whether the law is considered as to its terms, its general meaning or
the intention of its framers, I am clearly of the opinio n that the Atlantic
and Pacific Railroad Company is excluded from its provisions, and there.
fore adhere to my former decision.
SAmE, ON APPEAL.
Secretary Teller to Commissioner McFarland, July 8, 1882.
I have considered the appeal of the Atlantic an( Pacific Railway
Company from your decision of August 19, November 28, and Decem-
ber 6, 1881, declining to authorize the deposit of money for surveys
along the line of its road.
1st. As a "settler" under sections 2401, 2402, 2403, Revised Statutes;
and-
2d. As advance payment of "cost of surveys" under act of July 31,
1876 (19 Stat., 121), which provides that before any lands granted shall
be conveyed " there shall first be paid into the Treasury of the United
States the cost of surveying, selecting, an(l conveying the same."
The reasons given for your conclusions appear to rest upon sound con-
struction, and your action is accordingly affirmed.
SUBVEY-OVERFLOWVED LAND.
DENNIS -COOK.
Request for survey of a tract lying between and excluded from two private claims,
not classed on the township plat as public land, but designated thereon as
" overflowed," and on the plat of the county surveys as "sand, salt marsh, and
willows," was properly refused by the surveyor-general.
Commissioner McFarland to U. S. surveyor-general, San Francisco, Cali-
fornia, November 19, 1881.
I am in receipt of your letter of November 2, 1881, transmitting the
notice of appeal of J. W. Harding, esq., attorney for Dennis Cook, esq.,
from your decision rejecting his application for the survey of a tract of'
land containing, as per private survey made by Thomas W. Wright,
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county surveyor of Santa Cruz County, in which the land is situated,
38.025 acres, together with copies of the correspondence between your-
self and the said J. W. Harding, the attorney for the applicant.
From a careful examination of the papers, and particularly the de-
cision of the honorable the Secretary of the Interior, dated December
10, 1880, reviewing the survey of Deputy Surveyor Freeinai in the case
of the rancho Arroya de la Laguna, to which special attention was in-
vited by Mr. Harding, I am of the opinion that the rejection of the ap-
plication of Dennis Cook, by Attorney Harding, should be sustained.
The entire question turns upon the matter of survey by Deputy Sur-
veyors Freeman and Craven and the decision of the honorable the Sec-
retary of the Interior, above referred to. he skeleton plat of T. I1 S.,
R. 3 W., M. D. M., as filed with the letter of Surveyor-General Stratton,
under date of July 23, 1874, shows the tract in question to have been
excluded from the survey of either the Rancho de la Laguna and Rancho
Refugio and from the township named. The decision of the honorable
the Secretary of the Interior, while affirming the exclusion of the Cook
tract, the survey of which is now applied for from both of the surveys
of the ranchos named and from the township, does not class it as public
land. The skeleton plat above referred to would make it appear that
the locality of the Cook tract is not alone outside of the rancho, but is
also omitted from the official survey of T. 11 S., R. 3 W., M. D. 3I., and
is shown as overflowed. The plat of survey as made by County Sur-
veyor Wright designates the tract in question (38.025 acres) to be sand,
salt marsh, and willows.
The decision of the honorable the Secretary of the Interior above re-
ferred to shows that the Cook tract was excluded from the survey of
the Rancho Refugio, by direction of its owner, as being worthless; that
subsequently one Butler filed a claim for the tract under the laws of the
State of California; and further, that in course of time Cook became
possessed of the entire claim, he having been at one time interested
only to the extent of one half.
The claim having been made under the laws of the State of Califor-
nia, the tract in question being shown by the survey of United States
deputy surveyor to be overflowed, and designated as sand, salt marsh,
and willows by the survey of County Surveyor Wright, and probably
subject to overflow; the tract not being included within the patented
limits of either of the ranchos bordering on the same, nor specifically
classed as public lands of the United States in the decision of the hon-
orable the Secretary of the Interior, your declining to entertain the ap-
plication for the survey in question is sustained and hereby approved.
You will therefore so inform J. W. Harding, esq., the attorney for Den-
nis Cook, applicant.
At your early convenience you will cause an authenticated copy of
the plat and field notes of T. 11 S., R. 3 W., M. D. M., showing the sub-
divisional surveys of Deputy H. S. Cravens, executed in 1873 and 1874,
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to be furnished for the files of this office. Surveyor-General Stratton,
under date of July 23, 1874, in transmitting the skeleton plat of the
township named, prOl)osed forwarding official plats of survey to the
local land office and to this office. No copy has been received here, and
it is doubtful whether the same has been furnished to the local land
office. You will cause inquiry to be m.tde in this respect, an I forward
a copy to that office, if found necessary, with proper annotations thereon).
SANmE, ON APPEAL.
Secretary Teller to Cncissioaer McForlaa 1, Otoper 5, 182.
I have considered the appeal of Dennis Cook from our decision of
November 19, 1881, rejecting his application for a survey of a tract of
land alleged to be situated in the county of Stnta Cruz, California, an(l
to contain thirty-eight and twenty-five one hundredth acres.
The alleged tract is upon a -bay or inlet of the ocean, between the
Ranchlo Arroyo (le la Inlguna and the Rancho Refauio, oth of which
lave been surveyed and from the patented limits of both of which it
was excluded. It was also excluded from the official survey of T. 11 S.,
R. 3 W., M. D. M., within which it is alleged to be located, as not being
Ioublic land. The plat of survey of said township shows the tract to be
overflowed land, and the private survey by County Surveyor Wright,
filed by the applicant, shows it to be sanl, salt-marsh, anl willows, with
but a very small portion of cultivable land, if any.
Your decision holds that as the tract has not been heretofore claimed
nor classed as public land of the United States, but has been claimed
by Cook and those associated with him from the State of California;
and also in view of its exclusion from said ranches and township, and
of the character of the tract as represented by said surveys, and its sub-
jection to tidal overflow, said application should be rejected.
Your decision is affirmed.
SURVEY-SWAMP LAND.
STATE OF CALIFORNIA.
The act of September 28, 1850, was a grant of the swamp land to the State i presenti,
i. e., of the land then being swamp.
The R. S. 2488 has relation to lands ia California that were swamp at the date of the
granting act, September 28, 1850.
A survey made in California in February, 1880, as of all swamp and, when part had
become dry from natural causes, it appearing that it was all swamp in 1850, was
properly so designated by the survey.
Commissioner ilfcFarland to U. S. surveyor general, San Francisco, Cali-
fornia, February 14, 1882.
I have duly considered the survey of T. 21 S., R. 19, 20, 21, 22, and
23, E.; T. 22 S., R. 18, 19, 22, and 23 E.; T. 23 S., R. 19, 20, 23, and
24 E., and T. 24 S., R. 20, 21, 22, 23, and 24 E., M. D. M., made by
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Thomas Creighton, United States deputy surveyor, in January and
February, 1880, under contract dated September 12, 1879, and the
questions raised by protest against the same. Said survey represents
all of said lands as swamp and is approved by you.
Protest was filed against my approving said survey by the attorneys
of the Southern Pacific Railroad Company on the grounds-
1st. That the survey had not been made as required by law.
2d. That the classification of the lands as swamp was clearly wrong,
a fraud upon the government and the rights of its citizens; that by far
the greater part of the lands were dry and subject to sale by the gov-
ernment; and-
3d. That the facts are admitted to be such that the State of California
can have no title under the swamp land grant.
Under said first objection it is urged that Creighton has not shown a
stream of water entering into the lake, and has not noted the crossing
of streams by the subdivisional surveys and the point of intersection
and width of streatms; that the streams represented in the survey of
1853 and 1854 disappear in the Creighton survey as soon as they enter
its lines, and that certain improvements (affidavits of the existence of
which are filed) are not noted by him.
Under the second objection it is insisted that the representation of
the land as all swamp is wrong and bears marks of fraud; that Creigh-
ton reports no land as iret, although all is unfit for cultivatioir without
protection by levees, and insists that if all the land is swamp it should
not have been subdivided.
It is urged that liability to overflow in seasons of unusual rainfall
does not make the land swamp.
It is further pointed out that Creighton, while returning the land as
swamp, rates and reports it as first, secon(l, and third rate.
In supaport of said protest certain affirlavits were filed, the gist of
which is as follows:
Stephen Barton swears that in 1868 the amount of water from the
Sierra Nevada Mountains was ten times as great as the channels of the
streams would carry through the valley; that Tulare Lake was raised
17 feet above ordinary level; 300,000 acres submerged for several
months; water commenced to recede during dry weather of 186S, and
in 1871 about half the submerged lands was laid dry and required irri-
gation to secure production of cereals in an ordinarily dry year. His
inquiries of the oldest white settlers and old Indians fixed the convic-
tion that only two overflows of equal extent have occurred in a century.
Not more than one third the amount of water of 1868 has since been
equaled by the highest waters, and that from 100,000 to 200,000 acres
embraced in Tulare Lake in 1852, as shown by the plats on file in Visa-
lia laud office, have since become dry lands from the result of the natu-
ral and gradual receding of the waters of the lake.
The affidavit of P. Y. Bakir, a surveyor, sets forth that he has been
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a resident of Tulare County since 1875; that said lands have not been
subject to periodical overflow since 1875, and are now dry; that nu-
merous canals and ditches have been constructed, diverting most of the
waters from the streams that empty into the lake; that large tracts of
the land embraced in the Creighton survey have- been cultivated suc-
cessfully, and crops produced for years past; that the lands were not
reclaimed by reclamation works, anl are so dry that there has been
serious talk of boring artesian wells for water to irrigate them; that he
is informed, believes, and alleges, that the winter of 1849 was an un-
usually wet one, and that in the months of August and September, 1850,
the waters of said lake were fully up to the meander line of said lake
as established in 1853 and 1854, and remained at that height, or near
that height, for several succeeding years; that the said lands were not
from the fall of 1850 up to 1875, subject to periodical overflows, but
sometimes remained dry for several successive years.
Samuel Jennings makes affidavit that he has been a resident of Cali-
fornia since the fall of 1849, and of Tulare County since the fall of 1852;
is acquainted with the character of Tulare Lake and surrounding lands
lying between the meander line established by government survey of
1853 and 1854, and the present margin of the lake; that since about
1876 the lands have been dry and fit for cultivation, and have produced
abundant crops of cereals; that said lands have became dry by reason
of frequent droughts in the valley and the diversion of the waters, for-
merly flowing into the lake, for irrigation purposes by persons remote
from said lands; that about 1868 the major part of King's River, the
largest tributary of the lake, diverted from the lake and formed a new
channel, running through Cole Slough and discharging into Fresno
Slough, and thence through San Joaquin River into San Francisco
Bay; that within the last six or eight years the turf or peat, together
with the tules or flags theretofore obstructing outlet of the lake, has
burned out, some places burning down 7 or 8 feet below the surface,
thereby lowering the outlet of the lake from 2 to 8 feet, so that the waters
are afforded an outlet and can never overflow said lands from which
the water has permanently receded; that the lands are not swamp or
subject to periodical overflow, but are of desert character, and have
been of that character since about the year 1876, and at present, in an
ordinarily dry season, require irrigation for the successful raising of
crops; that the dry condition of said lands is not due to reclamation
works, and that from his knowledge of the winter of 1849, the waters
of the lake were as high during August and September, 1850, as in the
fall of 1853 and 1854; the winter of 1849, in the valley, was unusually
wet, and none of the waters were diverted then; and that said lands
are not now, nor for the last twenty-eight years have been, subject to
regular or periodical overflows.
The affidavit of John T. Burch states that he is a surveyor and was,
employed in 1880, by Thomas Creighton as one of the sworn assistants
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under the contract of September 12, 1876, and acted as compassman;
is personally familiar with nearly every line of said survey, and all lands
embraced therein and their character; that early in 1880, and before the
time of said survey, these lands were dry and capable of cultivation, and
large portions of them, about 3,000 acres in T. 21 S., 22 E., 22 S., 23 E.,
and 23 S., 23 E., had been cultivated in 1879, and as he was informed
in 1880, in wheat, barley, sorghum, etc., without artificial means save
as stated; that the lines of said survey in many places run for long dis-
tances, comparatively, on land on which there was stubble of wheat and
barley, and the only reclamation was in T. 23 S., 23 W., where Edwin
R. Thomason made a farm in 1876, and, being fearful of a rise in the
water, built a levee for protection in such contingency at a cost of about
$10,000; that it was found unnecessary as the waters at date of survey
were about 2 miles distant from it, and the crops within the levee werer
so dry they were in danger of drought, and Thomason dug a ditch from
the lake back to the levee to conduct water, and bought a steam-pump,
to raise water to irrigate the land; affiant believes that in 1850 these
lands formed a part of the permanent bed of Tulare Lake, and were for-
a long time subsequent continually under water, and were not swamp
in 1850.
James A. Wheeler swears that in April. 1879, he erected a dwelling
house on fractional section 17-22 S., 19 E., and has since continuously
resided there with his family, and knows lands within the Creighton
survey to be dry and fit for agricultural purposes and not subject to
any periodical or other overflow, the lake having receded on account of
natural causes and not from works of reclamation. Affiant settled to
acquire titleunder homestead and pre-emption laws of theUnited States.
The foregoing affidavits are quoted as fairly showing the character of
evidence submitted to show that said lands are not swamp.
The attorneys for the State have submitted affidavits, Exhibits A to
., inclusive. I will quote from the following only:
Chas. D. Gibbs swears that he is a surveyor and civil engineer, and,
in 1852 and 1854, he surveyed and meandered Tulare Lake in T. 21, 22,
23, and 24 S., R. 23 and 24 .E., M. D. M. for the United States govern-
ment; that said meander line was on the east side of the lake, and was,
ma-de by him on the edge of the water as it then stood; that the waters
seemed to be at its highest, and from his meander line towards the lake,
seemed to be very shallow for a long distance, and was so muddy that
he had to go in one-half mile or more daily for drinking water, and the
water for that distance was not more than knee deep, and this was the
character of the overflow in said townships.
J. S. Meckley swears he arrived in Tulare County in 1852, and has
been there ever since; visited T. 21 and 22 S., 23 E., that year; in 185£P
assisted Robert Whiting in the subdivisional survey, and it was then
entirely practicable to have designated these lands as swamp, but it
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-was not then customary; that he has never seen these lands dry during
;the spring freshets.
J. M. Lewis saw Tulare Lake in 1854, camped two days on the lake;
waters extended to about the meander line surveyed in 1853 and 1854;
isaw the lake in 1866, and has since been well acquainted with the sur-
rounding landsand those embraced in Creighton's survey in T. 19 ,2021,
22, 23, and 24 S., R. 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, and 24 E.; in fall of 166 started
from Sec. 27, 24 S., 22 E., and waded about three miles into the lake to
Atwell Island, and camped there all night, water ot being more than
4 feet deep; saw lands in spring, summer, and fall in 1867, and found
waters lower; a great portion of Creighton survey was then covered
with water. Saw lake again in 1868, and waters were higher than in
1854, and all the land in Creighton survey was covered with water; saw
the lake often during each year, and was working on the lake from 1868
to 1875, and all that time was familiar with the water and surrounding
lands embraced in said survey, and in said years the waters rose in the
spring and receded during the summer and fall, alternately, covering
and Uncovering most of the land in the Creighton survey, and in each
of said years was covered with tales, swamp and wire grass; that from
1875 to the present time the waters have continued to recede, and it has,
in opinion of witness, reached the natural and permanent banks; that
in T. 23 S., 20 E., is Skull Island, where the Indians evidently buried
their dead; the flood waters had washed out and exposed their skulls,
-and they were scattered bout on the sand, and the waters have now
receded so as to leave said place above them. Since 1875 the country
has been unusually dry, but is of the opinion, from his knowledge of the
country, that the lands in Creighton survey will be subject to frequent
overflows unless strong and high levees are raised and canals cut to
keep off the waters of the lake and its tributaries.
C. V. Clarke has seen the waters of Tulare Lake cover most of the
Creighton survey a portion of the year, and then recede the same year,
leaving said lands partially dry at least nine times since 1865.
Frederick Cox moved his cattle in 1864 to the swamp lands around
Tulare Lake; the waters receded all of that year, and his cattle lived
on wire grass, salt grass, and tles in the Creighton survey, and had it
-not been for the swamp feed that year his cattle and the cattle of many
others would have perished.
A. J. Atwell intimately acquainted with lands in Creighton survey
over twenty-one years; for large number of years owned and navigated
a steamboat on said lake, and prior to 1875 the said lands were covered
-with a dense growth of tules and swamp grass, an(l were overflowed
,during the spring and winter of each year so as to render them unfit for
cultivation.
Duncan Beaumont, civil engineer, in 1854 had contract with Jack
Hayes, United States surveyor-general, for sectionizng T. 20 S.. R. 20,
21, 22, and 23 E.; had special instructions not to extend any section
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line into the swamp and overflowed lands, but to establish a meander-
post on the margin thereof; the meander line then established was the
correct margin of the swamp and overflowed land in those townships
at that time; at meander post, south boundary of Sec. 36, 20 S., 22 E.,
looking southwest, west, and northwest as far as eye could reach, the
land was covered with tles, etc.
Several other affidavits are filed to the same general intent, but suffi-
cient' has been quoted from the evidence submitted, both by said rail-
road company and the State, to show on what facts each relies.
There is a third source from which evidence has been sought in this.
case.. After the protest by said railroad company, my predecessor ap-
pointed J. R. Hardenbergh a special agent of this office to make a per-
sonal examination, of said lands, and to report upon the Creighton
burvey.
Omitting the detail of examination, I notice that Mr. Hardenbergh
describes Tulare Lake as-
Situated in the lowest depression of the upper portion of the San Joa--
quin Valley, which may be briefly described as a great basin, very flat,,
rising from the lake from 1 to 3 teet per mile, and receiving the natural
waters of all that country. On the east to the summit of the Sierra.
Nevada Mountains, distant about 70 miles, and on the south for about
the same distance, on the north and wvest about 18 miles.
Mr. Hardenbergh concludes that the Creighton survey is technically
correct,but that hisclassification of lands is entirely erroneous, and finds
no indication that any of said lands are swamp and overflowed within
the meaning of the act of September 28, 1850.
Referring to the protest of said railroad company, I find that their
first exception, to wit, that the survey had not been made as required
by law, is not well taken. Mr. llardenbergh's experience as a surveyor
justifies me in regarding his report touching the execution c? the woik
as correct; and while there may be some improvements which were not
noted, it cannot be concluded that the omission invalidates the survey..
In respect to the second exception of said protest, to wit, that the
classification of lands as swamp was clearly wrong and a fraud upon
the government and the rights of its citizens, by far the greater part of'
said lands being dry and subject to sale by the government, careful con-
sideration of the testimony submitted is necessary.
I will first refer to the affidavit submitted by said railroad company,,
hereinbefore recited:
Stephen Barton swears that in 1S68 Tulare Lake rose 17 feet above-
ordinary level; that 300,000 acres were submerged for several months;.
that the water began to recede in the dry weather of 1868, and in 1871
about half the submerged lands were laid dry, and require-l irrigation
to insure production of cereals in an ordinarily dry year. If Mr. Bar-
ton swears truly there was nearly three times the area submerged in
1868 than is embraced in Creighton's survey; and three years later
there were about 35,000 acres, more than are embraced in Creighton's.
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survey, still under water from that overflow. Moreover, this was an
overflow and above the " ordinary level " of the lake, and the date is not
given when the waters receded from the lands now involved.
Mr. Barton further swears that from 100,000 to 200,000 acres em-
braced in the lake in 1852, as shown by plats in the Visalia land office,
have since become dry lands, and that not more than one-third the
amount of water of 1868 has since been equaled by the highest water,
thus impliedly conceding the overflow since 1868 of about 100,000 acres.
Mr. P. Y. Baker, another witness in behalf of the protestants, swears,
-npon information and belief, that the winter of 1849 was unusually wet,
and that in August and September, 1850, the waters of the lake were
fully up to the meander line as established in 1853 and 1851, and re-
mained at that height for several years. Substantially the evidence of
Mr. Baker is confirmed by several others, and indeed it nowhere appears
to the contrary. It thus seems to be established by protestant's own
witnesses that at date of the-swamp grant of September 28, 1850, the
lands now in question were overflowed, and that the waters did not re-
cede for several years, the laud being manifestly rendered unfit for cul-
tivation, and the evidence establishing this fact precludes the conclusion
that these lands were the bed of the lake.
Another witness for protestants, Samuel Jennings, who has been a
-resident of California since 1849, and of Tulare County since 1852, and
who is well acquainted with these lands, swears that since 1876 the
lands have been dry and fit for cultivation.
In short, the testimony of all the witnesses of protestants is to the
effect that the lands are now dry, and have been so since 1875 or 1876;
that their condition is not due to reclamation works, but to natural
causes, and that the streams formerly discharging into the lake have
within the last few years been diverted in other directions.
Relying solely upon protestant's evidence, I should be compelled to
conclude that these lands were overflowed and unfit for cultivation at
date of the swamp grant; that four years later the waters had receded
only to the meander line within which the lands now claimed as swamp
are situated; that while reclamation works in the shape of levees may
not have been constructed to any considerable extent, yet the waters
of several streams were diverted from their course to the lake and turned
in other directions for irrigation purposes, and thus reduced the volume
of water emptying into the lake which caused the overflow, and that
such diversion of said streams was simply one mode of drainage; and
that from 1850 to 1875 the lands in question were probably covered by
the overflow named, or in such condition for more than half the time
as to be unfit for cultivation. These overflows are obviously not such
as protestants refer to as a rise in the water of a stream because of an
* unusual rainfall. As these mountains surrounding this vast plain,
which is almost level with the waters of the lake, were annually covered
with snow, and the snow annually melted and flowed to this lake, which
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had no outlet, the explanation of said overflows and the cause of their
duration is very clear.
The great weight of evidence shows that no cultivation of these lands
was attempted until within the last few years, although the lands were
utilized in seasons of extreme drought for the pasturage of cattle which
fed upon the swamp grass while there was no feed on the dry lands.
And it further appears that cultivation was not attempted until after
the water in the streams which flowed into the lake was diverted to
other directions.
Moreover, there is much testimony from those who navigated the lake
or were otherwise familiar with it for many years prior to 1875, to the
effect that the annual rise and fall of the lake precluded the possibility
of successful cultivation of the land now in question.
The swamp grant of 1850, under which the State claims, was of "the
whole of those swamp and overflowed lands made unfit thereby for cul-
tivation." The proceeds of such lands were to " be applied exclusively,
as far as necessary, to the purpose of reclaiming said lands by means of
the levees and drains aforesaid."
It was held by this Department as early as 1850 that said grant was
in prwsenti, and this ruling has uniformly obtained and been sustained
by the highest courts. Hence lands which were of said specified char-
acter at date of the grant passed to the State, and the evidence submit-
ted in this case seems conclusive of the material fact that, in 1850, and
for many years subsequent thereto, these lands were swamp or over-
flowed within the clear meaning and intent of said act. There is no
evidence submitted, and probably none available, to show the condition
of said lands prior to 1850; but as prior to that date there was no out-
let to the lake, no irrigation ditches or other known means of diverting
the waters of the streams which discharged into the lake, and no known
or probable condition of the physical features of the country different
from that existing in 1850 and since, the conclusion is unavoidable that
like causes produced like effects before as well as after 1850, and that
the land was subject to like overflows.
The question arises whether, as much of said land was dry at date of
Creighton's survey, it was not his duty to return it as such, and thus re-
mit the State to a subsequent claim to be determined by evidence to be
submitted before the surveyor-general. This view is insisted upon by
protestants.
I find that the fourth paragraph of section 2488, United States R
vised Statutes, which relates to swamp lands in California, is as follows:
In case State surveys are found not to be in accordance with the sys-
tem of United States surveys, and in such other townships as no sur-
vey has been made by the United States, the Commission shall direct
the surveyor-general to make segregation surveys upon application to
the surveyor-general by the governor of said State within one year of
such application, of all the swamp and overflowed land in such town-
ships, and to report the same to the General Land Office, representing
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and describing what land was swamp and overflowed, under the grant,.
according to the best evidence he can obtain.
It is only after this has been done that the further provision is made
for the adjustment of any claim which the State may then present' for
lands not represented on the map or in the returns of the surveyors as
swamp.
Under the law as above quoted it would appear to be the plain duty
of the surveyor-general to represent and return what land he finds to,
be swamp and overflowed "under the grant according to the best evi-
dence he can obtain." This clearly means the land which was swamp
in 1850, as that oxily is swamp under the grant; and I am of the opin-
ion that the action of the surveyor-general was therefore lawful and
necessary in the case in returning the land as it was shown to be in
1850, and-not as it appeared in 1880.
Several points are raised in this case, both by protestants and the-
State, other than those herein considered, but as I am convinced that,
said lands were of the character granted to the State by the swamp act
of September 28,1850, I deem it unnecessary to discuss any propositions.
not essential to said conclusion.
I decide to approve the said Creighton survey. You will give notice
hereof to all parties in interest. Time for appeal from this decision will
be allowed under the rules of practice.
SAME, O N APPEAL.
Secretary Teller to Commissioner JlR.Farland, March 9, 1883.
I have considered the question of survey of T. 21 S., RI. 1, 20, 21,,
22, and 23 E.; T. 22 S., R. 18, 19, 22, and 3 E.; T. 23 S., R. 19, 22,
23, and 24 E.; and T. 24 S., R.20, 1,22, 23,and 24 E., M.D.Al.,Cal-
ifornia, made by Thomas Creighton, United States deputy surveyor,
in January and February, 1880, and approved by Theodore Wagner,.
United States surveyor-general.
The question involves a tract of laud lying upon the borders of Lake
Tulare, containing upward of 100,000 acres.
By your decision of February 14, 1882, you approve of the said Creigh-
ton survey, which represents the whole of said tract as swamp lands..
The Southern Pacific Railroad Company brought an appeal in the
interest of its land grant, and certain settlers, represented by counsel,.
but not having a standing in the case, requested the Attorney-GeneraL
to direct an appeal in behalf of the settlers and of the United States..
Such appeal was accordingly taken.
The State of California claims the entire tract, under the swamp-land.
grant act of September 28, 1850 (9 Stat., 519).
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The Creighton survey was made at the request of the governor of
California, by letter of July 31, 1879, addressed to the surveyor-general
of that State, and was duly authorized by your office.
The first township surveys of land adjoining the lake were made in
1853 and 1854. The tract in controversy lies between the meander line
of the lake, as shown by those surveys, and the waters of the lake, or
new meander line, as shown by the Creighton survey of 1880. By the
first surveys this tract was returned as lake, and was at that time, in
fact, covered, or neaily so, by water.
The swamp-land grant is a grant inpresenti, except as to States ad-
mitted into the Union after the passage of the act (French v. Fyan, 93
U. . 169). California was admitted September 9, 1850.
If, then, the tract in question at the time the swamp-land grant passed
was covered with water, apparently of a permanent character, up to
or near the old meander line, it would not pass to the State under that
grant, although subsequently, by a recession of the waters, land of a
dry or swampy character should come into existence (Wolf Lake, Illi-
nois, 5 C. L. ., 19; Beaver Lake, Commissioner's decision, June 17,
1871; County of St. Clair v. Lovingston, 23 Wall., 46).
It becomes, therefore, of the first importance to inquire whether the
tract became a reliction after the 28th day of September, 1850, or
whether in fact at that time it existed as land and was swamp or over-
flowed, so as to bring it within the meaning of the act of that date.
The question thus presented is one purely of fact.
There is no common-law proof in the record upon the subject, and
keeping out of view for the present the Creighton survey, which is a
subject of much controversy, the testimony in the record is made up en-'
tirely of affidavits taken ex parte. These affidavits are numerous, are
taken and put into the case by both sides without objection, and are
referred to and quoted from by counsel for the respective parties.
In order to understand the proofs fully, it is necessary to state briefly
the conformation of that part of the earth's surface to which they relate.
Lake Tiflare is an inland navigable body of water, some 25 miles in
extent across its center, from north to south and from east to west. It
occupies the lowest depression of a large valley, the watershed being
quite extensive, comprising on the east all the country between the lake
and the Sierra Nevada range, distant some 70 miles, and, on the south
and west, that between the lake and the coast range, distant from 20 to
70 miles. The slope upon the north, east, and south, is very gradual,
but on the west is less so; consequently nearly all of the tract in con-
troversy lies upon the eastern and southern shores of the lake.
Tule River, Cross Creek, Deer Creek, King's River, Flat Creek, Elk
Bayou, and numerous streams and water-courses, flow into the lake from
the direction of the mountains. From the old meander line across the
tract in question, these streams have no defined channels.
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At the time of the surveys of 1853 and 1854, there was no outlet of
the lake, natural or otherwise, except that after attaining at or about the
height marked by the old meander line, the waters overflowing through
the slough extending northward from the lake toward the San Joaquin
River, found an outlet by way of that river.
There is no certainty that the waters will remain at or near the level 
represented by the new meander line unless an artificial outlet is pro-
vided; and there is some question whether an adequate outlet could be
thus constructed, although some efforts to that end have been made.
Such are the topographical features of the country and its general
situation as affecting the tract in question.
The proofs found in the affidavits introduced by both parties show
that the water in the lake was as high at the time of the surveys of
1853 and 1854 as it has ever been; that it was about the same height
in 1868; that from the first surveys to the year 1876 the lake was
subject to great fluctuations, inundating from 100,000 to 300,000 acres
of land which were exposed at its lowest level; that the tract in ques-
tion was often submerged; that since the year 1876 seasons have been
generally dry, and the tract in question has suffered but little from in-
undation; that the beds of all or nearly all the streams running into
the lake are dry at certain seasons of the year, and others are swollen
by rains and melting snows, and after passing the old meander line,
spread out and overflow considerable portions of the tract in question;
that in order to protect the lands channel excavations must be made,
whereby to conduct the waters of the streams from points in the old
meander line through the tract to the lake, and extensive levees built
along the lake and the streams.
There is but little conflict in the affidavits as to what was the condition
of the tract as to its being subject to overflow prior to 1875 and 1876,
the main conflict being as to its condition since that time, and the lia-
bility of its being inundated in the future.
There is some proof that some of the streams formerly emptying into
the lake have in whole or part been diverted for purposes of irrigation.
I think, however, that it is clear there is no adequate protection of
the tract, either by outlet or otherwise, against a wet season or such
rises of water as occured frequently prior to 1876, and are quite likely
to occur again. The affidavits prove that large portions of the tract
were dry at the time of the Creighton survey. Other portions were
covered by a luxuriant growth of tule, , salt-grass, and other vegetation,
the products of a wet soil, and affording pasture for stock in seasons of
drought.
It must be borne in mind, however, that our inquiry must be kept to
the condition of the tract in 1850, and that evidence of its subsequent
condition is material only in aiding us to ascertain its real condition at.
the time the swamp grant act was passed. There is proof, in the affida-
vits of deputy surveyors and others, that at the time of the surveys of
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1853 and 1854, there was a belt of swamp land on the lake side of the
meander line then established, and that at that time there existed in-
structions " issued by the United States surveyor-general, not to extend
any section lines into swamp and overflowed lands, but to establish a
meander post on the margin of the same."
The deputy surveyor who made the survey and established the old
meander line, says that the water then seemed at its highest; that from
the meander line the water was very shallow for a long distance into
the lake, and so muddy that he had to go nearly half a mile into the
lake daily for drinking water; and that such was the general character
of the overflow in the townships in which this tract is located.
In 1849 there was a great rise of water in the lake, which seems to
have remained up to and after the time of the surveys of 1853 and 1854.
Such is substantially the case as made by the proofs and the record,
aside from the Creighton survey.
In relation to this survey and the recitations found in it there is much
controversy.
The survey is important, since if it cannot be sustained the lands
cannot be certified to the State in the present proceeding, even if it
should clearly appear that they were swamp and overflowed lands in
1850. They were not, as we have seen, represented as such lands upon
the surveys and plats of 1853 and 185t. Therefore it became necessary,
under the act of July 23, 1866, to quiet land titles i California (14
Stat., 218), that the governor should make application to the surveyor-
general, and that by your direction segregation surveys should be made
"of all the swamp and overflowed lands in such townships, and to
report the same to the General Land Office, representing and describing
what land was swamp and overflowed under the grant, according to the
best evidence he could obtain." If the State made claim, under the act
of 1850, to lands as swamp and overflowed which were not represented
as such by the returns of any surveys, the claim was to be determined
by testimony to be taken before the surveyor-general.
The Creighton survey was duly authorized, and was made in the field
in January anm February, 1880. The field notes were returned to the
surveyor-general, and approved by him. By such survey the tract in
question was returned and classified as swamp and overflowed land.
A protest, with various allegations, was made against the survey by
said railroad company, which resulted in the appointment of a special
agent by your office to make personal examination of the lands and
report upon the Creighton survey. This agent, after an extended exam-
ination, reported that the survey was technically correct, but was erro-
neous in the classification of the lands as swamp and overflowed within
the meaning of the act of 1850.
Undoubtedly at the time of the Creighton survey the actual condition
of lands was generally dry, and that they were in that condition also at
the time of the examination by the special agent in 1881.
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Upon an examination of the lengthy report of the special agent, I
think it will clearly appear that he had in mind the condition of the
lands as be found them in 1881, and as they had been for some years
prior to that time, but that he did not consider nor report upon their
condition in 1850, nor seek, to any considerable extent, for evidence to
establish their actual condition at that time, nor do I think his instruc-
tions require him to do so. And when he reports Creighton's elassifica-
tion of the lands to be erroneous, he evidently refers mainly to the
condition he then found them in, and the condition they actually were
in at the time of the Creighton survey. In proof of this I quote briefly
from his report. He says:
I have no hesitation in reporting that the land returned by the Creigh-
ton survey as swamp and overflowed land is not correct, and that the
land returned as swamp and overflowed is not of that character; that
no water stands upon the land except that which I have mentioned, and
no reclamation is required to raise a crop on the same.
After referring to the fact that formerly the lake had no outlet, he
says:
But its condition has changed materially; it has lost its chief water
supply by canals and ditches, and it never can, while those canals and
ditches keep up their flow, receive any great amount of water.
And the purport of the great share of his report is to the same effect.
On the other hand, the general description of the physical formation
of the region about the lake, as given by the agent, affords very strong
proof that the lands were subject to overflow, and unfit for cultivation,
in 1850. He describes the lake as having Ro outlet at the time of the
great floods of 1861-'62, 1867-'68, and that it then took the waters a
long time to recede by evaporation and percolation; that the lake was.
situated in the lowest depression of the San Joaquin Valley, a great
basin and receiving the natural waters of all that country, being " a
vast area of over 7,000 square miles."
It became Creighton's duty under the act aforesaid, being section
2488, United States Revised Statutes, to represent and describe what
land was swamp and overflowed under the act of 1850, " according to
the best evidence he could obtain." I think an examination of his sur-
vey and report leads inevitably to the conclusion that his classification
of the lands as swamp and overflowed referred to their condition in
1850. As I read the reports of Creighton and of the special agent, the
supposed conflict does not exist.
The Creighton survey is severely assailed by the protest on the part
of the railroad company as fraudulent and illegal. The principal ground
of the charge is as follows:
The surveyor-general, before his appointment as such, acted as attor-
ney for the State in reference to the lands now in question, although
not inrelationto the present controversy. After the survey in the field,
the books of survey were transmitted to him by Creighton, and were
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returned by the surveyor-general, accompanied by the letter of May 8,
1880, for correction, which letter indicated that the notes of survey
should show more definitely the condition of the lands September 28,
1850, if he(Creighton) should be ofthatopinion. Creighton then added
to his notes, after nearly every subdivision, as follows: " Subject to
overflow and unfit for cultivation within the meaning of the act of Sep-
tember 28, 1850," giving in many instances the name of the stream from
which the overflow was liable to come. After these additions were
made the survey was approved.
It is undoubtedly within the duty of the surveyor-general to super-
vise and direct corrections to be made of the field notes of subordinate
surveyors, and it is a duty often exercised. But for the fact of the sur-
veyor-general's former relation to these lands as attorney, the question
of his interference with the notes and surveys would not probably be
raised. Such relation ought, it would seem, to disqualify a surveyor-
general from action; but probably it does not--at least, not by positive
law.
I think, however, that such additions do not vitiate the surveys, nor
for that reason require that they should be rejected and canceled. Such
additions are i effect but the statement of a conclusion of law, and may
very properly be disregarded. I think the addition was uncalled for
and unnecessary. It occurs, the same in substance, more than four
hundred times. The surveyor (Creighton) has already, without any sug-
gestion, incorporated into his notes, at the end of the surveys of the
townships, a complete and much more satisfactory statement as to all
the lands within the townships embraced in the surveys. As an in-
stance, I cite the statement at the end of the survey of township 24,
range 20 E., which is as follows, viz:
The quality of land in Fr. T. 24 S., R. 20 E., is generally good. The
land is swamp and. overflowed in nature, being made so by the waters
of Kern River, [which] coining down through the Buena Vista, and hav-
ing no definite channel, overflow the whole country at time of high
water. It is also liable to overflow from the rising of Tlare Lake,
having been under water for these causes since 1860, the water gradu-
ally receding for the last six or eight years, being seasons of drought
in this country. The land is liable to be again inundated from these
causes (unless thoroughly protected by levees) at any season of any-
thing more than an average rainfall.
I shall refer to but one other criticism of the Creighton survey. It is
claimed that, under section 2395 of the Revised Statutes, all water-
courses must be noted in the field book, and that in fact no water-courses
are noted upon the plats in question, but all the numerous streams dis-
appear upon reaching the old meander line, so that no streams appear
as passing across the tract in question to the water of the lake. This
is explained by evidence which shows that in fact there are no channels
across the tract, but that, the ground being nearly level, the waters
spread out over the tract after reaching the old meander line.
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A large map of Tulare county, which I find in the record, approved
by the supervisors as the official map of the county, and apparently
having no connection with the case, has clearly marked upon it the
tract in question, and shows all streams as ending at the old meander
line. The examination and report made by special agent Hardenbergh,
conceded to be a very competent surveyor, states that the Creighton
survey is technically correct.
Leaving out of view the additions before referred to, I think the
Creighton survey is fall and intelligent, and all its recitations bear the
evidence of being fair and truthful. I find no ground for impeaching it.
The evidence shows that there are but few settlers upon the tract
except those who are there under a claim of right from the State. It
isdoubtful whether there are any other actual or bona-fide settlers. Of
the eighteen persons who signed the request (Exhibit No. 6) for appeal
to this Department, it is proven that not any of them reside upon lands
within the Creighton survey, but are residents of adjoining towns.
Undoubtedly some of these persons have made claim to some of the
lands within the Creighton survey, and have made some improvements
thereon. In a very few instances quite a large amount of money has
been expended in the construction of levees, but I understand from the
evidence that such expenditure has been made by persons claiming un-
der the State.
The Creighton survey and notes (disregarding the additions before
named) afford much satisfactory evidence as to the condition and sitt-
ation of the lands and their liability to overflow, and the hazards of
cultivation without a large expenditure for protection. This evidence,
taken in connection with the physical conformation of the country, and
the fact that there is no adequate outlet for the waters liable at any
unusual rise to be precipitated into the lake, show that these lands are
at present in a condition unfit for safe and continued cultivation. Most
of the tract is so nearly on a level with the water in the lake at its
present stage, that a small rise therein, without protection, would inun-
date the entire tract.
When these well-established facts are considered, with the proof fur-
nished by the surveys of 1853 and 1854, and the evidence Connected
therewith that the tract was that mainly covered with water, and had
been since 1849, and that at different times, for long periods down to
1876, it had been so covered and overflowed, the conclusion is manifest
that the tract in question, at the time of the passage of the act of Sep-
tember 28, 1850, was " swamp and overflowed lands, made unfit thereby
for cultivation."
After a somewhat extended examination of the several matters
involved, I am satisfied that the lands properly belong to the State, and
have therefore concluded to affirm your decision approving the Creigh-
ton survey, and to direct the necessary steps to be taken to give the
State the legal title to the lands covered thereby.
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PRICE OF LANVD-ACT OF JUNSE 22, 1874.
CHARLES MOEWEN.
A tract of land within the limits of the grant to the Hastings and Dakota Railroad,
to which the railroad has the superior right, which it relinquishes under the act
of June 22, 1874, held to be subject to entry at the minimum price, it not being
" land remaining to the United States."
Commissioner McFarland to register and receiver, Benson, Minnesota,
October 31, 1881.
I am in receipt of a letter from Messrs. Curtis, Earle and Burdette,
attorneys, dated 26th August, 1881, relative to cash entry 4571 of
Charles McEwen for lots 1, 2, 7, and 8 of Sec. 31, 116, 31, Benson dis-
trict, Minnesota, in which case you were instructed by my letter of
April 16, 1880, to call upon McEwen for an additional payment of $1.25
per acre ($1.25 per acre being paid at date of entry), because the land
was within the ten-mile "granted" limits f the Hastings and Dakota
Railroad Company, which relinquished said land in favor of McEwen
under act of June 22,1874. Said attorneys claim in behalf of Mc-
Ewen that the land was not-being in an odd-numbered section-re-
served to the United States; that there is no law authorizing the in-
crease of price to be applied to the odd-numbered sections; that the
land is not land the title to which " remained in the United States; "
also that said decision or requirement of April 16, 1880, is contrary to
the raling of the Department in similar cases, in proof of which they
refer to the case of Jane Soule, who made cash entry (pre) 3998 for the
SW. of Sec. 5, 117, 40, in your district.
The act of July 4, 1866, under the provisions of which the Hastings
and Dakota Railroad was constructed, provides-
That the sections and parts of sections of land which by such grant
shall remain to the United States within 10 miles on each side of said
road shall not be sold for less than double the minimum price of public
lands when sold. . . . . . Provided. That actual bonafide settlers
under the pre-emption laws of the United States may, after due proof
of settlement, improvement and occupation, as now provided by law,
purchase the same at the increased minimum price.
It has been held by this office in cases arising under similar grants,
notably that of Hartley v. Saint Joseph and Denver City Railroad Com-
pany, decided October 20, 1876, that where lands in odd sections within
the granted limits, were in the possession of actual bon fde settlers
under the pre emption laws, at the time the right of a road attached,
and where such lands subsequently reverted to the United States by
abandonment or otherwise, they could not be sold to pre-emptors at
less than $2.50 per acre. A tract, therefore, excepted from a grant by
reason of the existence of a valid claim, which subsequently ceased,
would "remain to the United States," and become subject to the pro-
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vision of law under consideration. In the present case the land was
granted to the road, and the superior right of the road admitted and
affirmed by letters from this office, of July 16, 1873, and October 19,
1874. The fact that the road or company subsequently relinquished
the land did not bring the land into the condition described by the act
as "land remaining to the United States," because the United States
in such cases is, if I may so term it, merely a trustee for a transfer of
the land from the company to the settler.
The act of June 22, 1874, specifically states that the lands relinquished
under its terms must be lands granted to the road, and when such lands
are relinquished by the company, they are relinquished in order that
"the entries or filings may be perfected into complete title as if such
lands had not been granted." I am therefore constrained to decide
that the decision of my predecessor in this case was erroneous, and that
the entry of McEwen should have been approved without requiring
further payment. I have therefore this day approved said entry.
There was no formal decision in the Soule case referred to by the attor-
neys named, the entry evidently having been approved without raising
any question as to the price of the land involved.
BAILROAD GRANT-FORFEITURE-AUTHORITY OF DEPARTMENT.
MCGRATH . ATLANTIC & PAC. R. B. CO.
Although the company has failed to comply with the terms of its grant it is not com-
petent for the Department to enforce a forfeiture or restore the lands granted by
the act of 1qt66.
Secretary Kirk wood to Commissioner McFarland, November 21, 1881.
I have considered the case of Edward McGrath v. The Atlantic and
Pacific Railroad Company, involving the S. 1 SE. , NW. i NE. SE.
i, and SE. i SW. 1 of Sec. 9, T. 31 S., R. 15 E., M. D. M., San Francisco
district, California, on appeal by McGrath from your decision of January
27, 1881, rejecting his application to purchase said tract.
It appears from the record that the tract is within the 20 miles
(granted) limits of the grant by act of July 27, 1866 (14 Stat., 292), to
the said company, and was withdrawn therefor on December 9, 1874,
upon definite location.
The township plat was approved by the surveyor-general July 26,
1880.
On August 27, 1880, McGrath applied at the local office to purchase
the land in question under the act of June 3, 1878 (20 Stat., 89), but
the register and receiver rejected his application, for the reason that
the land was reserved for the said company. From this action McGrath
appealed, urgint as a ground therefor that the eighth section of the act
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Of 1866, aforesaid, required said company to "construct, equip, furnish,
and complete the main line of the whole road by the fourth day of July,
anno Domini eighteen hundred and seventy-eight," and that by reason
of failure to comply with such requirement the company has forfeited
its rights to all the lands granted thereto.
The ninth section of the act in question provides that in the event
of any breach of the conditions cited the United States may, at any
time after the expiration of one year from the making of such breach,
do any and all acts which may be requisite to insure a speedy comple-
tion of the said road. This section does not create a forfeiture, but is
merely in the nature of a condition subsequent.
I In the case of Schulenberg v. Harriman (21 Wallace, 44) it was held
by the United States supreme court that the provision in the act of
June 3, 1856, to the effect that all lands remaining unsold after ten
years shall revert to the United States, if the road be not ten com-
pleted, is a condition subsequent, being in effect a provision that the
grant, to the extent of, the lands unsold, shall be void if the work des-
ignated be not done within that period; that no one can take advantage
of the non-performance of such a condition annexed to an estate in fee
but the grantor or his heirs or successors, and if they do not see fit to
assert their right to enforce a forfeiture on that ground, the title remains
unimpaired in the grantee. The same doctrine obtains where the grant
upon such condition proceeds from the government (as in the case under
consideration); "no individual can assail the title it has conveyed on
the ground that the grantee has failed to perform the conditions an-
nexed." This construction is based upon Sheppard's Touchstone, p.
125, wherein it is said:
If the words in the close or conclusion of a condition be thus, that the
land shall return to the enfeoffor, or that he shall take it again and
turn it to his own profit, or that the land shall revert, or that the feoffor'
shall recipere the land; these are, either of them, good words in a con-
dition to give a re-entry-as good as the word " re-enter"-and by these
words the estate will be made conditional.
Although, as you state, the Atlantic and Pacific Railroad Company
has failed to comply with the terms of its grant, it is not competent for
this Department to enforce a forfeiture or restore the lands granted by
the act of 1866, as no action to that end has been taken either by legis-
lative or judicial proceedings.
Therefore the title remains in the company as completely as it existed
on the day when the title by location of the route of the railroad acquired
precision and became attached to the adjoining alternate sections.
The foregoing construction of the act of 1866 is in harmony with that
of the Attorney-General of the United States, as expressed in his opinion
under date of October 26, 1880, which opinion has been adopted by this
Department as the law of the case.
Your decision is accordingly affirmed.
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RAILROAD GRANT-IXDEMNITY SELECTION.
CALIFORNIA & OREGON R. R. Co.
Instructions will not issue to receive this conipany's selections of lauds subsequent to
the expiration of its grant (July 1, 1880), as the granting act provides that if
the said company shall fail to complete its road within that time the act shall be
null and void, and all the lauds not conveyed by patent to said company at the
date of such failure shall revert to the United States.
Commissioner McFarland to Henry Beard, Washington, D. ., December
15, 1881.
I am in receipt of your letter of the 10th of October last, stating that
in June, 1880, the Central Pacific Railroad Company, successor to the
California and OregonRailroad Company. applied to select sundry tracts
of land at Marysville, Cal., as per list No. 11; that among the lands
thus applied for was a very considerable quantity, the surveys of which
were not then completed, and the selections were refused by the regis-
ter and receiver for that reason; and you now request that this office
direct the said officers to accept the -fees and certify the said list for the
following tracts in T. 16 N., R. 1 E. (the survey of which township has
been completed and returned), with a view of patenting the same to the
said company, so far as not in conflict with pre-emption, homestead, or
other lawful claims, to wit: S. of Sec. 11, T. 16 K., R. 1 E.; all of Sec.
13, T. 1 K., R. 1 E.; E. of Sec. 1, T. 16 ., R. 1 E.; all of Sec. 23,
T.16K.,R. IE.; N. andSW. I of Sec. 25, T. 16 N., R.j E.; E. of
Sec. 27, T. 16 N. R. 1 E.
In answer, I have to advise you that the lands in question are within
the 20-mile limits of the grant of July 25, 1866, to the California and
Cregon Railroad Company. This company was required, under section
6, of the said act, to complete the whole of its road on or before July 1,
1875. This section was amended byact of June 25,1868(15 Stats., 80),
which extended the time for the completion of said road to July 1, 1880.
The line of said road has been completed north toward the Oregon
State line, to a point in Sec. 35, T. 32 N., R. 5 W., M. D. M.
The eighth section of the granting act of July 25, 1860(14 Stats., 241),
provides:
That in case the said companies shall fail to comply with the terms
and conditions required, namely, by not filing their assent thereto as
provided in section 6 of this act, or by not completing the same as pro-
vided in said section, this act shall be null and void, and all the lands
not conveyed by patent to said company, or companies, as the case may
be, at the date of any such failure shall revert to the United States.
In view of this provision of the law, which is plain and not to be mis-
understood, I must decline to instruct the local officers at Marysville,
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Cal., to accept the fees and certify the list of lands referred to, as they
cannot now be patented to the Central Pacific Railroad Company, suc-
cessor to the California and Oregon Railroad Company, by reason of
its failure to complete its road within the time specified in the granting
act.
RAILROAD GRANVT-TITHDRAWAL-SETTLEMENT.
S'T. PAUL M1. & M. Ry. Co. v. GJUVE.
A grant is to be taken most strongly against the grantee, and, therefore, in a case
where a pre-emptor settled on the same day that the railroad right attached, the
land, in the absence of proof as to the actual facts, should be awarded to the
settler.
Secretary Teller to C'ommissioner McFarland, July 24, 1882.
I have considered the case of the Saint Paul, Minneapolis and Mani-
toba Railway Company v. Bjorn Christopherson Gjnve, involving the
cash entry of the latter, made February 10, 1877, upon lot 4 of Sec.
33, T. 136, R. 44, Fergus Falls, Minn., on appeal by the company from
your decision of August 11, 1880, holding Gjuve's entry for approval
for patent.
The tract is within the 10-mile limits of the grant to Saint Vincent
Extension, Saint Paul and Pacific Railroad Company, the right of which
attached September 20, 1871. Gjuve made his settlement on the same
day; and upon the day of his entry submitted proof showing continu-
ous residence and cultivation of the tract, with valuable improvements
thereon.
There is no proof showing or tending to show which of the parties
became first entitled to the tract; whether Gjuve by his settlement, or
the company by the definite location of its road, on the same day. The
argument of the company that, as there are no fractions of a day recog-
nized in law, it must be conceded that the right of the company com-
menced with the beginning of that day and hence has priority, applies
with no greater force to it than to Gjuve, who, under the same rule,
might be held to have commenced his settlement with the beginning of
the day. In the absence of proof as to the actual facts, I find no other
rule for the determination of the question than the equities of the case
and the general proposition that a grant is to be taken most strongly
against the grantee.
Your decision is affirmed.
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RAILROAD GRANT-OVERLAPPING LIMITS.
MISSOURI, KANSAS & TExAS RY. Co.
A tract of land is within the 10-mile (granted) limits of the Leavenworth, Lawrence
and Galveston Railroad, and the 20-mile (indemnity) limits of the Missouri,
Kansas and Texas Railway. Held: 1st. That as at the date of the withdrawal for
the latter company the tract in question was reserved for the Leavenworth, Law-
rence and Galveston Railroad, it was excepted from the grant to the Missouri,
Kansas and Texas Railway; and 2d. As the tract in question could not be with-
drawn for the Missouri, Kansas and Texas Railway before the act of July 24, 1876,
declaring the lands of the Leavenworth, Lawrence and Galveston Railroad for-
feited to the United States, and as it has not since been selected by, nor with-
drawn for, the Missouri, Kansas and Texas Railway, it is subject to entry under
the homestead law by the first legal applicant.
Acting Commissioner Harrison to register and receiver, Independence,
Kansas, September 2, 1889.
I am in receipt of the register's letter, dated the 4th instant, asking
why the location of warrant No. 80463, act of 1847, by John Wiggins,
for the NE. Sec. 13, T. 23 S., R. 18 E., was canceled, and what dispo-
sition is to be made of the land.
In reply, I have to state that the records of this office show that
Wiggins was actually residing on the NE. Sec. 13, T. 23 S., R. 17 E.,
and (lid not therefore have a pre-emption right for the first described
tract, and the location was canceled.
The tract is situate within the 10-mile limits of the grant to the Leav-
enworth, Lawrence and Galveston Railroad Company and the 20-mile
limits of the grant to the Missouri, Kansas and Texas Railway Com-
pany. The grant to the former company was created by the act of
Congress approved March 3, 1863, and the lands were withdrawn for
its benefit May 5, 1863.
The grant to the latter was created by the act approved July 26, 1866,
the withdrawal for which became effective April 3 1867.
Section 4 of the act of March 3, 1863, provided that if any part of the
roads and branches was not completed within ten years from the pas-
sage of that act, no further sale should be made and the lands unsold
should revert to the United States. A portion of the Leavenworth,
Lawrence and Galveston Railroad was not completed, and the act of
July 24, 1876, provided that all lands granted to the company which
had not been patented to it under said act, or earned by the completion
of its road, or to which it was not lawfully entitled, were thereby de-
clared forfeited to the United States, and should thereafter be subject
to entry only under the provisions of the homestead laws. I therefore
hold that the company's right to select the tract in question ceased
from that date, and the land became a part of the public domain.
The Missouri, Kansas and Texas Railway Company claims lands
under the act of March 3, 1863, by virtue of an assignment by the
Atchison, Topeka and Santa F Railroad Company of its rights for the
branch from Emporia to where the Leavenworth, Lawrence and Gal-
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veston Railroad enters the valley of the Neosho, but it cannot be claimed
that under that act it would be entitled to indemnity within the 10-mile
limits of the grant to the Leavenworth, Lawrence and Galveston Rail-
road Company.
Therefore it must assert its claim to the tract, if at all, under the act
of July 26, 1866, and at the date of this act, as well as at the time of
the withdrawal for its benefit, the land had clearly been reserved to the
State of Kansas for the benefit of the Leavenworth, Lawrence and Gal-
veston Railroad Company, and consequently was excepted from the
operation of the grant to the Missouri, Kansas and Texas Railway Com-
pany.
The former theory of this Department that railroad rights attached
to lands within indemnity limits was abrogated by the decision of the
supreme court of the United States, in the case of Michael Ryan v. the
Central Pacific Railroad Company (100 U. S., 382), wherein it was held
that the grant of indemnity lands was only a float which attached to
no particular tracts until a selection was actually made.
The Missouri, Kansas and Texas Railway Company has not selected
the tract in question. It has not been withdrawn for its benefit since
the act of July 24,1876, declaring the Leavenworth, Lawrence and Gal-
veston lands forfeited to the United States, and it could not be with-
drawn before on account of the then existing grant to the Leavenworth,
Lawrence and Galveston Railroad Company.
It is my opinion that the tract is subject to entry under the provis-
ions of the homestead law, and you will allow the first legal applicant
to so enter it, and note upon the papers a reference to this letter by its
initial and date.
,7-0 J t
'. f RAILBOAD GRANT-ACT.OF APRIL 21, 1876.
WENZEL V. ST. PAUL, M. & M. Ry. Co.
A settlement and filing constitute an entry within the meaning of the act of April21,
1876, as well as under the general practice of the Land Department.
A filing duly made with the local officer, whose act ion was approved by the General
Land Office, is an entry " made by permission of the Land Department," within
the meaning of the act of 1876.
In using the language " at a time subsequent to the expiration of such grant D Con-
gress has reference to the dates named in the various granting acts to railroads,
as the dates at which the roads should be completed, and not to a time when by
legislative or judicial action a forfeiture might be declared.
A settlement and filing made under the pre-emption laws on lands within the limits
of a railroad land grant, at a time subsequent to the expiration of such grant,
is an entry which is confirmed by the third section of the act of April 21, 1876.
Secretary Teller to Commissioner McFarland, October 20, 1880.
I have examined the application of W. K. Mendenhall, esq., of coun-
sel, for a reconsideration of my decision of the 13th of July last in the
case of John P. Pillard and others (including Charles Wenzel) v. The
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Saint Paul, Minneapolis and Manitoba Railway (formerly the Saint Vin-
cent Extension, Saint Paul and Pacific Railroad) Company, so far as said
decision relates to Charles Wenzel. Tile laims involved in that de-
cision were adjudicated under the provisions of the act of April 21,
1876, entitled "An act to confirm pre-emption and homestead entries of
public lands within the limit of railroad grants in cases where such en -
tries have been made under the regulations of the Land Department."
(19 Stat., 35.)
Wenzel made settlement June 2, 1874, and filed declaratory state-
ment September 2, 1874, as a pre-emptor on the NW. of Sec. 1, T.
154, Pi. 48, Crookston, Minn. This tract is within the 10 mile limit of
the grant to the railroad, and Wenzel's filing was by you held for can-
cellation as not confirmed by the act of April 21, 1876, for the reasons
that he did not make settlement until after the withdrawal of the land
for the benefit of the road. This action, based upon section 1 of the
act, was affirmed by the Department July 13, as above stated.
In the application for review it is contended that Wenzel's cai.
comes within the provisions of section 3 of the act cited. That sectioi
provides:
That all such pre-emption and homestead entries which may havebeen made by permission of the Land Department, or in pursuance of
the rules and instructions thereof, within the limits of any land grant
at a time subsequent to the expiration of such grant, shall be deemed
valid, and a compliance with the laws and the making of the proof re-quired shall entitle the holder of such claim to a patent therefor.
Applying the law just quoted to the facts as they appear in Wenzel's
ease, the following inquiry is suggested: Did he make a pre-emption
entry by permission of the Land Department, or under the rules and in-
structions thereof, at a time subsequent to the expiration of the grant
to the railroad?
That his settlement and filing constituted an entry within the mean-
ing of the act of 1876, as well as under the general practice of the Land
Department, seems to me obvious. I am equally well convinced that
the entry was made by permission and under authority of the Land De-
partment. The filing was duly made with the local officer, whose ac-
tion, in addition to being rima facie authoritative, was explicitly ap-
proved and ratified by your office in letter bearing date September 23,
1874, directing that "settlers upon the land of the Saint Vincent Ex-
tension . . . . . who were actual settlers at the date of the act of
June 22, 1874, and applied to file within the legal period, are protected
by the statute, and their filings may be received," etc. Wenzel's settle-
ment was on June 2, 1874. It is true the act of June 22,1874, was sub.
sequently declared by one of my predecessors inoperative. ide case
of Kemper v. Saint Paul and Pacific Railroad Company (3 C. L. ., 170).
Until that was done, however, all rules and regulations of your office
relating to said act of 1874 were properly in force, and all acts of settle-
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ment in good fait in accordance therewith are entitled to recognition.
The policy of the general law is to protect such settlers in their rights.
Especially must such a policy prevail when a remedial statute is i'n-
voked, as in this case.
There remains to be considered then, only the third point in the in-
quiry, viz, was the entry made at a time subsequent to the expiration
of the grant to the railroad. After a careful consideration of the act
of 1876 in all its bearings, and especially of section 3 as applicable to
this case, I am of the opinion that in using the language "at a time sub-
sequent to the expiration of such grant" Congress had reference to the
dates named in the various granting acts to railroads as the dates at
which the road should be completed, and not to a time when by legisla-
tive or judicial action a forfeiture might be declared.
If such was not the intention of Congress, then the section is mean-
ingless, for after declaration of forfeiture by legislative action or jdi-
cial decision the lands would be open to entry under the general pre-
emption and homestead laws, and without the intervention of a reme-
dial statute.
The original grant, under which the construction of the Saint Paul
and Pacific Railroad was authorized, was by act of Congress approved
March 3, 1857.
By act of March 3,1865, the grant was increased to 10 sections per
mile, the indemnity limits to 20 miles from the line of the roads or
branches, and the time for the completion of said roads was extended
eight years from the passage of said act.
By act of March 3, 1873, the time for the completion of the roads
from Saint Anthony to Brainerd and from Saint Cloud to Saint Vincent
was extended nine months from the time limited by prior acts. The
limitations named in these several acts as to time of completion had all
expired prior to the date of Wenzel's settlement.
It therefore seems conclusive that the remedy offered by section 3 of
the act of April 21, 1876, was intended to, and does, include entries of
the character of that made by Mr. Wenzel, and it is not even necessary
to apply the well-established principle of law that " remedial statutes
must be construed liberally, and where the meaning is doubtful they
must be construed to extend the remedy."
My decision of July 13 is accordingly modified so as to allow the entry
of Wenzel, he having made settlement and filing in accordance with the
pre-emption laws. It is no part of my duty to here discuss the consti-
tutionality of the act of 1876, nor the questions which may arise as to
conflict of title by reason of its having a place on the statute books.
Those are questions for the courts. My plain duty is to execute the
laws under which I am called to act, in accordance with their letter and
spirit as I find them.
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RAILROAD GRANT-CONLFLICTNG CLAIMS.
PERKINS V. CENTRAL PAC. R. R. Co.
These grants to railroads are present grants; when they take effect they operate eo
instante upon the lands within the granted limits. The grant is not held in abey-
ance to await the default of settlers, but the title vests or does not vest at once;
and so far as regards the land in which the title does not vest at once, the claim
of the company is at an end. If the grant is a present one, and te title does not
vest when the grant takes effect, it cannot vest afterward.
It was the intention of Congress that only such unoccupied lands as were not held
under any claim recognized by the government, should pass under the grant.
The lands, therefore, in those sections to which pre-emption and homestead claims
bad attached at the time the line of the road was fixed, were not granted at all.
It was not a grant of the entire odd sections, subject to pre-emption and home-
stead claims thereon; but the grant did not touch the lands to which these claims
had attached.
Secretary Teller to Commissioner llfc~arland, December 12, 1882.
I have considered the case. of James F. Perkins v. the Central Pacific
Railroad Company, involving the SE. 1 of Sec. 21, T. 14 N., R. 9 E.,
M. D. M., Sacramento, Cal., on appeal from your decision affirming the
decision of the local office and permitting Perkins to make pre-emption
filing for said tract.
The land in question is within the granted limits of the grant of July
1, 1862, to the Central Pacific Railroad Company, the right of which
attached September 14, 1866.
Lands in the odd-numbered sections were withdrawn October 3, 1864,
and the township plat filed in the local office April 16, 1866.
February 2, 1878, Perkins applied to make pre-emption filing for the
tract, and at his request citation issued to the said company to appear
March 14, 1878, at the local office, there to produce evidence to contest
Perkin's claim.
At the time and place named, both parties appeared, and testimony
was taken.
By the testimony so taken, and the evidence, the following facts are
fairly established, viz:
That one Murphy settled upon the land in 1854, and lived there until
1857 or 1858, and then sold his possessory right and claim to Lorenzo
D. Brown and one Dow.
Brown went into possession, and lived there until 1871. He con-
tinued to make improvements, so that in 1871 he had a good fence of
cedar rails around the whole tract; a good house, barn, and orchard
thereon, and all of the value of $1,800. Brown sold the improvements
and possessory claim for $600 to one George Geisendorfer, who sold
the same to said James F. Perkins for $500. Perkins took possession
in 1877, and has since then lived on the land, cultivating and improv-
ing it.
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It is insisted that it is not proven that Brown was a qualified pre-
emptor.
Piown filed declaratory statement No. 3481 for said tract July 13,
1W, alleging settlement June 1, 1858. The testimony taken upon such
hearing, considered in connection with the record evidence, establishes
primafacie that said Brown was a qualified pre-emptor, and there was
no adverse testimony.
It is also claimed that the testimony proved that Dow was an equal
owner with Brown, and that " a joint purchase does not give one of the
parties a right to acquire the title under the pre-emption law." It is
not shown what became of Dow's interest. It does not appear that he
was ever in possession, of joined at all in the settlement with Brown.
Brown was in possession many years; Geisendorfer, his vendee, was
also in possession, and Perkins has now been in sole possession several
years, living upon, cultivating, and improving the land.
Dow's right, however, was only a possessory right, and not having
been asserted for so many years may well be regarded as extinguished.
At the time, therefore, that the grant of the company attached to the
land within its grant, there was a valid pre-emption claim to the tract
in question, capable of being perfected.
Upon this state of facts the legal question in the case arises, viz:
did the pre-emption claim existing at the time the grant to the company
took effect absolutely exclude the land from the grant ?
If such was the effect of the pre-emption claim, then " it is immaterial
whether the lands subsequently became a part of the public lands of
the country." (2 Otto, 33.)
That would be a question which would not concern- the company;
and upon abandonment or failure of the pre-emption claim for any rea-
son, the tract would become public land, and questions relating to it
would be solely between the government and the claimants other than
the company.
I agree with the counsel for the company that this case does not
come within the ruling of Trepp v. Northern Pacific Railroad Company
(8 C. L. O., 181). In that case the tract had not been abandoned; and
it was held that where the pre-emption claimant asserted his right, the
failure to file in time (the land being unoffered) did not defeat the
claim, except where another settler on the same tract had filed and
complied with the law.
In considering the case at bar it will be assumed that the sale by
Brown of his improvements and possessory right was in legal effect an
abandonment, and that Perkins acquired no right of inchoate title until
he applied for leave to file his declartory statement of February 2, 1878.
The case of Gates v. Califorpia and Oregon Railroad Company, cited
and relied upon by counsel for the defendant in this case, was decided
by this Department December 18, 1878 (5 C. L. 0., 150).
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This case held that where a preenmption claim, capable of being per-
fected, existed at the time the grant to the company took effect, but
was afterwards abandoned, the fact of such claim having so existed
did not exempt the tract from the grant.
The granting words of the act granting lands to that company are
different from those in the act granting lands to the Central Pacific;
but if the legal effect is the same (a question which will be considered
hereafter), then the case under consideration is ruled by the Gates de-
cision, and if that decision is to be followed the tract in question, upon
the abandonment by Brown, inured to the company, and the plaintiff's
request to file must be denied.
Before the decision in the Gates case a different rule, as to the opera-
tion of railroad grants generally, had prevailed for many years in this
Department and in your office. That decision was made solely upon the
authority of Sherman v. Buick (3 Otto, 209) and Water & Mining Com-
pany v. Bugbey (6 lb., 165).
Some two years after the decision in the Gates case the case of Min-
ing Company v. Consolidated Mining Company (102 U. S., 167) was de-
cided. This latter case involved substantially the same questions ex-
amined in the two former cases, and in the last case the two former
ones were considered and explained.
'Upon a careful examination of these cases, especially as considered
and explained by the later case, it will be found that they will not bear
the construction put upon them i the Gates case.
These cases all arose under the act granting to the State of California
sections 16 and 36 for school purposes. Section 7 of the act provided:
That when any settlement, by the erection of a dwelling, or the culti-
vation of any portion of the land, shall be made upon the 16th and 36th
sections before the same shall be surveyed . . . . . other land
shall be selected by the proper authorities of the State in lieu thereof.
In Sherman v. Buick, in commenting upon the effect of the erection
of a dwelling house, or of cultivation, found on those sections, Mr.
Justice Miller, who delivered the opinion, says:
These things being found to exist when the survey ascertained their
location on a school section, the claim of the State was at an end; and,
being shown in the proper mode to the proper officer of the United States,
the right of the State to that land was gone, and in lieu of it she had
acquired the right to select other lands.
This is very clear and explicit, and it would seem that the settlement,
being found to exist at-the time the grant to the State took effect, was
such an appropriation of the land as prevented its passing, then or af-
terward, whatever its condition, to the State under said act.
Some expressions, however, found in the later case of Water & Min-
ing Company v. Bugbey, and quoted in the Gates case, are supposed to
convey a different meaning. But upon examination of the facts it will
be found that such is not the case. Bugbey had settled upon one of
such school sections, and undoubtedly had the necessary buildings and
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cultivation to have excluded the land from the grant to the State; but
he did not assert his claim, and took a patent from the State. The min-
iug company did not in any manner connect itself with Bugbey's title,
but by means of it sought to defeat that of the State. The language
quoted in the Gates case, and supposed to be decisive of the question
now under consideration, is as follows:
As against all the world, except the pre-emption settler, the title of
the United States passed to the State upon completion of the surveys,
and if the settler failed to assert his claim, or to make it good, the right
of the State became absolute.
But in the same connection, and immediately after, the court quotes
with approval, from the case of Sherman v. Buick, the language already
cited, to the effect that when the settlement and improvement were
found, the title of the State was at an end. This seeming contradiction
is reconcilable by a reference to the fact that Bugbey did not claim ad-
versely to the State, but took title from the State; and the court said
truly that he " was under no obligation to assert his claim."
In the case of Mining Company v. Consolidated Mining Company
(supra), where, as before stated, the two former cases were commented
upon and explained, this question is put to rest. It was there decided
that-
Whenever, at the time these sections (16 and 36) are ascertained by
the government survey, there is either a dwelling-house, or the clti-
vation of any portion of the land on which some one is residing, and is
asserting claim, it (the title of the State) does not vest, but the alterna-
tive right to other land as indemnity does.
The principle settled in the case-that the erection ot a dwelling-
house, or the cultivation ot any portion of the land, found at the time
the grant took effect, and connected with assertion of claim, excluded
the land from the grant-is valuable in considering the effect of an ex-
isting pre-emption claim held adversely to the company at the time a
-rant to a railroad company takes effect.
We may now proceed to examine more closely the question under con-
sidleration.
In Wilcox v. Jackson (13 Peters, 498) it was held that-'
Whensoever a tract ot land shall have once been legally appropriated
to any purpose, from that moment the land thus appropriated becomes
severed fom the mass of public lands; and that no subsequent law, or
proclamation, or sale, would be construed to embrace it, or to operate
upon it, although no reservation were made of it.
This case was cited and approved in Leavenworth, Lawrence & Gal-
veston Railroad Company v. United States (92 U. S., 733). And in the
latter case it was held that a grant, in general terms, to a State of odd
sections to aid in the construction of a railroad, could not be construed
to embrace Indian lan(ls., to which the right of the Indians to occupy was
assured by treaty; that such lands would not pass, neither absolutely
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nor subject to the ncumbrance of the Indian right of occupancy. In
that case the grant was in the words of a present absolute donation,
and there was no exception of the Indian right; and it was held that
"1a special exception was not necessary, but that these grants (to rail-
roads) have always been recognized as attaching only to so much of the
public domain as was subject to sale or other disposal "; and that such
grants were "applicable only to public land owned absolutely by the
United States."
In Newhall v. Sanger (92 U. S., 761), decided subsequently, but at
the same term, the principle established in the above case was carried
to the extent of holding that lands claimed under an allegediMexicaii
grant, and which were sub judice at the time the grant to the railroad
took effect, did not pass under the grant to the company, although it
subsequently appeared that the pretended Mexican grant was forged
and fraudulent. In Ryan v. Railroad Company (99 U. S., 382), this case
(Newhall v. Sanger) was cited and distinguished, and the doctrine that
the land was not public land at the time the grant took effect, and there-
fore a patent to the company therefor was void, was reaffirmed. It was,
however, further held that when the Mexican claim was adjudged to be
false the land was restored to the public domain, and being within the
indemnity limits the company had the right to make selection of lands
within the boundaries of the former Mexican grant.
The court says:
At the time of the selection the premises were public land. The
Mexican claim had been rejected by this court more than a ear and a
half before, and the land was not within any exception expressed or
implied in the act.
That " with respect to the 'lieu lands,' as they are called, the right
was only a float, and attached to no specific land until the selection was
actually made." That in effect as to those lands which had been sub
judice, the company was put upon the same footing as were pre-emption
and homestead claimants, and having made a selection and received a
patent long before the homestead claimant made entry for the same land,
the title of the company was sustained. At the time the line of the road
was fixed Brown was in the lawful possession of the land under the set-
tlement laws; such possession was the legal appropriation of the tract,
and by virtue of such appropriation for the time being it was severed
from the mass of public lands. See Wilcox v. Jackson, 13 Peters, 498;
Leavenworth et al. v. Railroad Company, 92 U. S., 745.
It may have been within the power of Congress to have disregarded
such inchoate right, and to have granted to the company the land so
occupied by Brown. It did not do that, but, on the contrary, declared
that Brown's rights should be respected, and thatall lands soheld should
not pass bythe grant to the railroad company. The United States had
undertaken to convey to Brown a fee-simple title when he should fully
DECISIONS RELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS. 341
comply with its terms, and to enable the government to do this it
retained its full and complete title to the land. But it is now said that
if Brown did not choose to avail himself of the privilege given him by
the United States, and abandoned the land, the United States lost its
title, and the railroad company took what the United States lost. I do
not think this view of the case can be maintained, either on principle or
precedent. The title was in the United States, the possession in Brown,
and when he abandoned his possession the title and possession were
both in the United States, and not the railroad company. How can it
be said that Brown's action could create a title in the railroad company
when the provisions of the act expressly exclude from the grant lands
so held, without reference to the subsequent conduct of the lawful occu-
pant thereof e
These grants were not in consideration of any debt or obligation on
the part of the United States to the grantee. They were bounties be-
stowed on the railroad company by the United States to encourage the
building of the road, and in consideration thereof the company under-
took to build. In this case the company accepted whatever it could find
within its limit "not sold, reserved, or otherwise disposed of by the
United States, and to which a pre-emption or homestead claim may not
have attached at the time the line of the said road is definitely fixed.7
It the United States had not sold, reserved, or otherwise disposed of
any ot said lands, and no pre-emption or homestead claims had attached,
the company got its full complement of land. But if any embarrass-
ment of the kind before stated existed, then the company took the
measure of its grant less the land embarrassed by such claim, or that
had been reserved, sold, or otherwise disposed of. The company now
claim to take more than was under the absolute control of the United
States at the time the line of the road was definitely fixed.
These grants to railroads are present grants; when they take effect
they operate o instants upon the lands within the granted limits. The
grant is not held in abeyance to await the default of the settlers, but
the title vests or does not vest at once; and so far as regards the land ia
which the title does not vest at once, the claim of the company is at an
end. The same rule must be applied as was applied in Mining Company
v. Consolidated Mining Company (supra), where it was held, as before
stated, that, where there is "either a dwelling-house or the cultivation
of any portion of the land on which some one is residing and asserting
claim, the title does not vest." If the grant is a present one, and the
title does not vest when the grant takes effect, it cannot vest after-
wards.
It was, I think, the intention of Congress that only such unoccupied
lands as were not held under any claim recognized by the government
should pass under the grant. Grants to railroad companies must be
strictly construed against the grantee (92 U. S., 733).
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The language of the grant to the Central Pacific Company, which is
more particularly in question, is as follows, viz:
That there be, and is hereby, granted to said company
every alternate section of public land designated by odd numbers
.. . . . not sold, reserved, or otherwise disposed of by the United
States, and to which a pre-emption or homestead claim may not have
attached at the time the line of said road is definitely fixed. (12 Stat.,
489.) See section 3, p. 492.
The lands, therefore, in those sections to which the pre-emption and
homestead claim had attached at the time the line of the road was fixed
were not granted at all. The act did not undertake to grant them. It
is not a grant with an exception, but a grant of those sections or parts
of sections to which such claims had not attached. It was not a grant
of the entire odd sections, subject to pre-emption and homestead claims
thereon; but the grant did not touch the lands to which these claims
had attached.
The grant under consideration, in Gates v. California and Oregon
Railroad (14 Stat., 239), granted alternate sections, and then provided
that, "when any of said alternate sections or parts of sections shall
be found to have been granted, sold, reserved, occupied by homestead
settlers, pre-empted, or otherwise disposed of, other lands" shall be
selected in lieu thereof.
In te one case (the Central Pacific) the pre-emption and homestead
claims are not granted at all; in the other, the sections are granted in
terms, and then the sections and parts of sections " occupied by home-
stead settlers, pre-empted, or otherwise disposed of;" are designated
and reserved. I am of the opinion, however, upon authority, and for
the reasons before stated at length, that the legal effect in both cases is
substantially the same, and that lands to which pre emption and home-
stead claims, existing and capable of being perfected, had attached at
the time the grant took effect, did not pass to said California and Ore-
gon Railroad Company.
The decision in the case of Gates v. California and regon Railroad
Company, wherein it holds that a pre-emption claim capable of being
perfected, existing at the time the grant to the company took effect,
passed to the company upon abandonment, is therefore overruled.
Perkins should be permitted to make pre-emption filing for the land
in question in accordance with his application.
Cases already adjudicated, under views different from those herein
announced, are not to be reopened-the rule established hereby is for
future guidance only.
Your decision in that it permits Perkins to make pre-emption filing
is affirmed.
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RAILROAD GRANT-FORFEITURE-STATM.
ALABAMA & CHATTANOOGA R. R. Co.
It was the intention of Congress to extend the grant of 1856 to the roads named, as
the cestuis que trust under the title vested in the State, limited by the require-
ment of the second proviso, to the effect " that the lands hereby granted for and
on account of said road, severally, shall be exclusively applied in the constrne-
tion of that road for and on account of which such lands are hereby granted, and
shall be disposed of only as the work progresses, and the same shall be applied
to no other purpose whatsoever."
Secretary Teller to Commissioner fcFariand, December 21, 1882.
I have considered the application of the Alabama and Chattanooga
Railroad Company, in connection with your reports of 21st of February
and 24th of April last, respecting the listing of lands to the State of
Alabama along the completed line of said road and within the common
limits of that road and the intersecting but incompleted Coosa and Ten-
nessee Railroad.
The grant was by act of June 3, 1850 (11 Stat., 17), revived as to the
Alabama and Chattanooga by act of April 10, 1869 (16 Stat., 45), the
present management being formed by consolidation of the lines named
in the granting acts from Gadsden to the Mobile and Ohio and from
Gadsden to the Georgia and Tennessee line of railroads.
The road was constructed within the time limited by the latter statute.
It was the former practice of this Department to certify lands to the
State upon construction of any portions or sections of road for the beu-
efit of the particular road; and in the case of overlapping limits, caused
either by intersecting or closely parallel lines, to certify by moieties for
the respective benefit of each.
Latterly, following the decision of the Secretary in the case of the
Alabama and Chattanooga v. the South and North Railroad, the prac-
tice has been in some cases modified, and certification has been made
to the State, without specification of the particular road for whose ben-
efit each portion was certified, leaving the matter to the exclusive juris.
diction of the State authorities. This rule was adopted in the partic-
ular case to avoid the necessity of an award, there being no question
of the construct on of both roads, but a conflict of opinion on the con-
struction of the law touching their respective rights under the reviving
act.
And it may be noticed in this connection that the opinion of the At-
torney-General (14 Op., 617) was to the effect that the grant being in
fee to the State, no certification was necessary; that the act of 1869
gave a priority of right to all the lands, being anew declaration of grant
after a liability to forfeiture, and an accrued right of re-entry; that a
later reviving act in favor of the other road gave nothing to that road
within the conflicting limits on account of the vested right of the Ala-
bama and Chattanooga road to .the whole under the reviving statute;
and that in view of former settled practice, if a certification was made
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by the Department, it should properly specify the particular oad in
whose favor the same was intended to run.
By some evident misapprehension in the mind of the then head of this
Department, the direction given to your office, on the 28th of August,
1874, while stating in terms that it was made "in accordance with the
opinion of the Hon. Attorney-General, and out of deference to the same,7
was expressly opposed to the doctrine laid down by that official,' and re-
quired your office, as before stated, " to certify the lands in controversy
to the State of Alabama, without any expression of opinion as to what
company is entitled to them or any part thereof," and they were certified
accordingly.
The question afterward arose in the matter of the indemnity lands in
the common limits of the Alabama and Chattanooga and the Coosa and
Chattooga River Railroads, the lItter road never having been con-
structed; and my predecessor held, on the 20th of July, 1881, that, as to
such limits, proper selections made bya duly authorized agent of the State
might be approved for the benefit of any road entitled thereto under
her laws, without the intervention of this Department upon the ques-
tion of partition between the respective companies.
This decision, Mr. Brainard, as attorney for the Alabama and Chatta-
nooga Company, now seeks to have modified or ignored as to the lands
granted in place within the intersecting limits of his road and the Coosa
and Tennessee; and that all such lands may, in default of construction
of the latter road, be certified for the Alabama and Chattanooga.
Notwithstanding the able arguments, printed and oral, which have
been presented in support of the application, and with due respect to
the opinion of the Attorney-General already cited, I am constrained to
hold that it was the intention of Congress to extend the grant of 1856
to all the specific roads named, as the cestuis que trust under the title
vested in the State, governed and limited by the requirement of the sec-
ond proviso, to the effect * that the lands hereby granted for and on ac-
count of said road, severally, shall be exclusively applied in the con-
struction of that road for and on account of which such lands are hereby
granted, and shall De disposed of only as the work progresses, and the
same shall be applied to no other purpose whatsoever."
I agree with counsel that this is no limitation upon the whole fee; but
I regard it as a marking out by Congress of the particular definite por-
tions applicable to each, "severally," as declared, and a prohibition of
any recognition of the right of one to take what was by intendment
appropriated to another.
By intersection or close parallel, the routes might include common
limits; and this must have been in the mind of Congress, for the direc-
tion of the routes and the connections required to be made show that
the system provided for just such results. How, then, could Congress
more clearly regulate the grants to each, and by a several provision
applicable to each, the enforcement of which would be impossible if the
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whole fee might be given to one road, and another having equal right
in the scheme be denied its equal share e
Now if this limitation operated at once upon definite location of the
roads named, its operation continues with the life of the grant, which
is until Congress resumes it for breach of condition subsequent, and
declares a forfeiture.
This has not been done. In the case of the Alabarnaand Chattanooga,
the grant of so much as was granted to assist it by the original act was
revived by the act of April 10, 1869. But no more than that was done,
and no declaration of forfeiture as to other grants was made. There
has been a default and breach but no re-entry or " office found." Con-
sequently there has been no release of appropriation for the purpose of
including the lands in the revivor to another grantee.
This disposes of the question. It is not material to inquire what may
ultimately be done with the moiety necessarily withheld from certifi-
cation for the benefit of the incompleted road. Of course it would be
impolitic to certify it while there exists a moral if not an absolute cer-
tainty that the road will never be completed. And it is equally impolitic
to certify an undivided moiety for the benefit of the completed road, as
that would create for an indefinite period a species of common tenancyin
the government and its grantee, which might embarrass its reversion-
ary right or interest. If the State will make proper partition of the
lands, indicating by legal description the moiety belonging under her
laws to the railroad company, I see no objection to passing the selec-
tions by the usual certification.
You will so advise the parties in interest.
RAILROAD GRANT-SETTLEMENT RIGHTS.7
COOPER ET AL. V. SIOUX CITY & PAC. R. R. Co.
The Sioux City and Pacific Railroad Company completed its road in 1869, and in 1875
sold to the Missouri Valley Land Company certain lauds granted to it by the acts
of July 1, 1862, and July 2, 1864, whichlands have been settled upon and claimed
by certain settlers under the last clause of the third section of the former act,
which provides that all lands not disposed of within three years after the entire
road shall have been completed shall be subject to settlement and pre-emption as
other lands. at a price not exceeding one dollar and twenty-five cents per acre, to
be paid to the company.
This proviso was a condition subsequent, the failure to perform which does not dero-
gate from the grant, nor can it operate to defeat the same, or cause its lands to
revert to the United States.
The aforesaid sale must be regarded as an hypothecation of the fee for the benefit of
the stockholders, or such disposal of the lands as the statute contemplated.
Even if intended to be disposed of as public lands,'no machinery is provided by the
statute for such disposal by the executive department of the government, in
view of the provision for payment to be made to the company.
Secretary Teller to Commissioner McFarland, February 7, 1883.
I have considered the case ot S. M. Cooper et al. v. Sioux City and
Pacific Railroad Company, involving the right of certain settlers to
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pre-empt certain described tracts of land situate in the Norfolk district,
Nebraska, on appeal by the company from your adverse decision of
February 9, 1S82.
The tracts in question are parts of odd-numbered sections within the
limits of the grant made by act of July 1, 1862 (12 Stat., 489), and of
July 2, 1864 (13 Id., 356), amendatory thereof, under and by virtue
whereof the company claims the premises, while the seven settlers claim
the same by virtue of the last clause of the third section of the former
act. This clause provides as follows, to wit:
And all such lands so granted by this section, which shall not be
sold or disposed of by said company within three years after the entire
road shall have been completed, shall be subject to settlement and pre-
emption, like other lands, at a price not exceeding one dollar and twenty-
five cents per acre, to be paid to said company.
The company's right attached November 9, 1866, and as at such date
no valid adverse claim for any of said tracts existed, the same inured
to its grant.
It appears that the companycompleted its entire road in March, 1869;
that in January and February, 1881, the said settlers offered to file
declaratory statements for the tracts settled upon by them, respectively,
and tendered the purchase-money therefor to the receiver of the local
office; that the lands being within the limits of the railroad grant their
filings were disallowed, anda hearingwasordered (pursuant to youroffice
circulars of August 10, 1878, and of May 23,1879, modifying the former),
whereto the company was duly cited, in order to determine whether or
not the lands thus applied for had been sold or disposed of thereby, as
contemplated by the third section in question.
While the evidence in support of the main facts is in many instances
questionable, yet as the same stands uncontroverted, they must be re-
garded as admitted.
The facts as they thus appear are, that the company completed its
road as aforesaid; that at a meeting of the board of directors of the
company, held December 30, 1874, certain resolutions were adopted,
from which it appears that it was necessary to raise the sum of $200,000
for the purpose of liquidating the interest due and maturing upon the
company's floating bonded debt, taxes, etc.; that after discussing the
question as to the most feasible method of accomplishing such object,
the Board concluded to sell for the sum of $200,000 cash, the residue of
the company's assets, consisting of lands, town lots, bills receivable for
lands sold, etc., to a corporation thereafter to be formed, the capital
stock thereof to be offered to the stockholders of the railroad company
of record at the close of business January 6, 1875, pro rata, to the
amount of their stock, both preferred and common; that to this end,
such a stock company was organized in April ensuing, under the style of
the Missouri Valley Land Company, and a parol agreement, based upon
said resolutions, was entered into between said companies during the
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spring of that year, pursuant to which the land company paid the rail-
road company the sum of $200,000, "which payment was madein cash,
and the coupons of the first mortgage bonds of the Sioux City and
Pacific Railroad. Company," in May, June, and July, 1875, in considera-
tion of the latter company's assignment to the former, of said bills
receivable, the face value of which at the date of such transfer was
$81,146; and in the further consideration of the conveyance of title to
certain of said lands, aggregating, as it is alleged, 56,000 acres, to which
the railroad company had complete title, it being understood that it
would convey the remaining lands when it should receive patents there-
for, without further consideration. This method was adopted as an
alternative to the hypothecation of said assets as security to a second
mortgage loan.
It further appears that none of the tracts in question have been
patented to the railroad company, nor even selected thereby, nor deeded
by the same to the land company; that the records of the county
wherein the tracts are situate fail to discover any such conveyance, nor
do they evidence any transaction whatever between the companies,
touching said tracts.
Upon the foregoing state of facts the register and receiver found that
the company had disposed of and could further so dispose of its lands,
but that as the laws of Nebraska require that " deeds and other instru-
ments relating to real estate . . . . . shall be recorded in the
county in which such real estate or any part thereof is situated," and that
they shall obtain " from and after the time of delivering the same to the
clerk for record, and not before, as to all creditors, and subsequent
purchasers in good faith without notice," and shall be adjudged void as
to such creditors and purchasers without notice, whose deeds shall befirst
recorded; and that as the applications in question were made in good
faith, the applicants fall within the category of " subsequent purchasers
in good faith without notice," and that therefore the agreement between
the companies was void as to them, and they are entitled to file their
declaratory statements. From this action the company appealed upon the
following grounds, to wit: That the tracts applied for were granted to
it by the said acts of Congress; that the lands thus granted do not fall
under the third section of the senior act, requiring the company to sell
or dispose of such lands within three years from the date of the comple-
tion of the road; that even if they did so fall the United States would
be estopped from setting up a failure on the part of the company to sell
said lands within such period, and this by reason of its having failed
and refused to convey the same to the company; and that the same has
sold the land to the land company.
In this connection, you hold:
If the applicants are entitled to have their declaratory statements
received, it is not because they are urchasers in good faith, wit/hout
notice. They are not only not purchasers as yet, and have no instru-
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ment of conveyance recorded in the county records, but from the very
nature of the case and the requirements of the office instructions in
such cases are compelled to take notice of the status of the land before
they can become such.
The State statute cannot be employed to furnish a ondition under
which said clause of said act of Congress became operative. The incon-
sistency and impropriety of a different view must at once appear. If the
applications aforesaid should be received, it is because the railroad com-pany has not sold or disposed of the land at all, or because it did not
sell or dispose thereof within the prescribed limit of three years from
the completion of its entire road. There is no question but that thegrant to said company was made subject to the provision in said clause.That the Department so considered it may be seen by the circular ofAugust 10, 1878, aforesaid, in which said company is specifically des-
ignated as one whose grant is clearly subject to the terms of said clause.No further authority for this view would seem to be required than theprovisions in section 14 of the granting act, athorizingthe company
to construct a railroad, etc., on the same terms and conditions as provided
in this act for the construction of the Union Pacific Railroad Company;
and it will not be denied that the clause in section 3 furnished one of
the terms and conditions of the grant to said Union Pacific RailroadCompany. The third ground for appeal, whereby the company claims
that it should be relieved from the strict construction of said clause, is
not supported by facts.
The government could not in any way refuse to patent specific lands
until the list of selections hd been madeand tralsmitted to this officefor consideration; and it appears that these lands have not been selecte(dby said company. Besides, it is well known that granted laids are
often and can be transferred, sold or disposed of prior to the issuance ofpatent therefor. None of the objections raised by the company aretenable, unless it be held that it has sold or disposed of the land to saidMissouri Valley Land Company, and that subsequent to the date of such
sale or disposal the land was not subject to settlement and pre-emption
as provided in the clause under consideration.
But it is unnecessary to consider whether there was such a sale or dis-posal, if the clause referred to must be so construed that to have de-feated the right of pre-emption authorized thereby, the company must
have sold or disposed of the lands within the stated period of threeyears after the entire road was completed, and not after the expiration
of that time, though prior to any application to pre-empt the laud.
Upon the foregoing statement of facts the primal question to be de-
termined is: Is it competent for the Land Departmeut to permit such
settlers to acquire title to the tracts in question under the general land
laws of the United States?
It is strenuously urged by the settler's attorneys that the railroad
grant is coupled with a condition, which is unquestionably a reserva-
tion of sale in the government, by virtue whereof, proprio viyore, upon
the company's failure to sell or dispose of all the lands granted by the
section in question within the prescribed three years, all such lands,
eo instanti, became subject to settlement and pre-emption like other
lands."
The senior act in question was a grant, in prcesenti, to the Union
Pacific Railroad Company and its branches, of public lands ithin cer-
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tain specified lateral limits, which were not, however, identified with
precision until the map of definite location was filed, when the grant
attached by relation as of the date thereof. (Missouri, Kansas and
Texas Railway Company v. Kansas Pacific Railway Company, 97 U.
S., 491.)
The express requirement prescribed by the third section of the act in
question, that the company should sell or dispose of all its lands within
three years from the date of the completion of its entire road, and that
otherwise they should be subject to settlement and pre-emption like
other lands, if intended as a reservation of power in the government
to resume and sell the lands, is manifestly a condition subsequently an-
nexed to the freehold, a failure to perform which does not derogate
from such grant or in any manner impair the company's title thereunder,
unless the grantor, the United States, deem it advisable to take ad van-
tage of such failure by enforcing the condition. Hence, 'in the absence
of such procedure, it is neither competent for the land department nor
for third parties to so construe the said section as to assume that such
formal procedure is not necessary. Such condition predicated upon
such failure, cannot, therefore, operate to defeat the company's grant,
or cause its lands to revert to the United States ex vi termini.
But, in another view, in the year 1881, when Cooper and the other
settlers applied to file their declaratory statements for the tracts in
question, respectively, the title conveyed by the grant reposed in the
railroad company, wanting only the issue of patent to render it com-
plete; so that, the United States having no right to refuse such patent
when demanded, according to the terms of the granting act, it is not
competent for the Land Department to create an adverse title by patent
or otherwise in these applicants. The statute expressly prescribes that
the minimum price ($1.25) per acre of all such lands, so settled upon
and pre-empted, shall be paid to the company. No authority is dele-t
gated to the register and receiver to receive such purchase-money, or
to issue certificates therefor; no machinery is provided by the statute. 
If such delegation were attempted by this department, it would be man-
ifestly without sanction of law. The lands having been granted a8
aforesaid to the company, belong to the same; and hence, all tenders
of purchase-money should be made directly to it; and, would-be pre-
emptors of such lands must look to the company and not to the gov-
ernment for title. And, if this be so, it may be assumed that, in case
the lands be not otherwise disposed of, a party having settled and im-
proved the land in such manner as would support a pre-emption right
to lands of the United States, iiay tender his purchase-money to the
company and demand his deed; and if the same be refused, that he
may maintain an action in equity to compel its execution. But in all
this there is no room for further intervention by the Land Department.
I am aware that in the case of Nelson Dudymott v. Kansas Pacific
Railway Company ( Copp, 69), my immediate predecessor, Mr. Secre-
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tary Schurz, construed the section in question differently, and that he
therein prescribed a method for the sale of such lands and directed your
office to instruct the local officers to keep a separate ac count of all moneys
received from such sales, in order that the same might be credited to the
company. But such decision was modified, and the instructions afore-
said of August 10, 1878, issued pursuant thereto, were recalled, under
date of May 7, 1879 ( Id., 60), upon application of the company's at-
torney, based upon the decision of the United States supreme court,
in the case of Platt v. Union Pacific Railroad Company (99 U. S., 48).
The question considered by the court was whether a mortgage executed
by the company within the period designated by the section in ques-
tion was such a sale or disposal of the company's lands as the statute
contemplated, and it was held that the provisions both of the original
and of the amendatory act should be so construed as to effect their
primary object, which was to aid in the construction of the road;
that that could not he subordinated to the secondary purpose of open-
ing to settlement and pre-emption such of the lands as had not been
sold or disposed of within the designated period; that the words
"or disposed of" are not redundant, nor are they synonymous with
" sold ;" that a mortgage of said lands is such a disposal-an hypothc-
cation of the fee, and not merely of an estate determinable at the
expiration of three years from the completion of the road; that the
debt which it was given to secure not having matured, the lands are not
subject to pre-emption; ed quocere, whether the remnants that may be
unsold when the mortgage debt shall be paid will not then be subject
to pre-emption, and that in construing a statute aid may be derived
from a consideration of the condition of affairs as they existed and ap-
peared to the legislative mind when the statute was enacted.
As the construction is to be made upon the entire instrument, whole
will, or complete statute, and not upon disjointed parts of it, conse-quently all its parts are to be compared, considered, an(l construed
with reference to each other. . . . It is an established rule in the
exposition of statutes, that the intention of the law-giver is to be de-duced from a view of the whole and every part of a statute, taken and
compared together. When the words of the statute are not explicit, theintention is to be collected from the context-from the occasion and
necessity of the law from the mischief felt-and the object an(l remedyin view; and the intention is to be taken or presumed, according to
what is consonant to reason and good discretion. This was the rule
laid down by Plowden, pp. 10, 57, 205, 363, and by which ChancellorKent says: The sages of the laws have ever been guided in seeking for
the intention of the legislature; and which he approves, as maxims of
sound interpretations, which have been accumulated by the experience
and ratified by the approbation of sages.-1 ent. Com., 462. (Potter's
Dwarris, 194, note 13.)
With respect to the alleged sale or disposal of the tracts in question,
independently of the foregoing considerations, and upon the facts as
found and recited, I am of the opinion that the transfer of the lands by
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the railroad company must be regarded as an hypothecation of the fee
for the benefit of the stockholders, or such a disposal of its lands as the
statute contemplated. Such view brings the case within the ruling in
the Platt case (supra), which must, therefore, be regarded as a prece-
dent for the determination of the question involved in the premises.
In this connection, I deem it advisable to state that under date of
September 3, 1878, my said predecessor denied at length the applica-
tion of the railroad company for a suspension and reconsideration of his
decision of July 23 precediug, in the aforesaid case of Dudymott. In
so far as his opinion expressed in such denial, touching mortgages and
deeds of trust, asserts a different doctrine from that enunciated by the
supreme court in the Platt case, the same is hereby overruled.
Your decision is accordingly reversed.
RAILROAD GRANT-ACT OF JULY 4, 1866-PATENT.
KUFNER v. THE SOUTHERN MINNESOTA Ry. EXT. CO.*
The title to the lands granted to the State of Minnesota, for the benefit of the South-
ern Minnesota Railway Extension Company, by the act of July 4, 1866, must
under the terms of the act be conveyed by patent.
Hence the title to a tract of land which was erroneously certified to the State for
said company is still in the United States, and the land is under the control of
the Department.
Commissioner McFarland to register and receiver, Worthington, Minne-
sota, llarch 31, 1883.
I am in receipt, by reference from the Secretary of the Interior, of a
letter addressed to him by F. B. Robbins, of Wells, Minn., under date
of February 20, 18S3, and askingc' for action in the case of Augustine
Kufner, who claims the NW. . of Sec. 17, 101, 24. The land described
is within the 10 mile or primary limits of the grant by act of July 4,
1866, for the Southern Minnesota Railway extension. Said grant was
accepted by the legislature of Minnesota February 25, 1867, on which
date it became effective. On May 24, 1864, J. A. Hovey made home-
stead entry 1773 of the landin question, and said entry remained intact
until March 27, 1872, when it was canceled. On March 6, 1876, the land
was certified to the State of Minnesota for the road above named. Said
certification was, however, erroneous, as the entry of Hovey excepted
the land from the operation of the grant.
The title to land granted by the act of July 4, 1866, must, under the
terms of the act, be conveyed by patent.
The NW. J of Sec. 17, 104, 24, is therefore still under the control of
this Department. It appears from testimony on file in this case, that
*See 2 L. D., 492.
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Xufaer settled upon said tract in October, 1867; that he has resided
upon and cultivated the landever since; that his improvements thereon
are valued at $700; that in the month of June, 1872, he applied " at
the local office at Jackson, Minn.," to enter the land as a homestead,
paying at the same time $18 as fee and commissions, and that the local
officers told him that as soon as Iovey's entry was canceled they would
send him his receipt. Subsequently said officers informed Kufner that
the land had been awarded to the railroad company by this office.
Kufner has shown entire good faith in the matter, and is clearly entitled
to enter the land. You will therefore permit him to make a homestead
entry for the same, and as he has completed the term of residence re-
quired by law, be may be allowed to make final proof as provided by
the acts of March 3, 1879, and May 14, 1880. The Southern Minnesota
Railway Extension Company will be allowed the usual right of appeal
from the foregoing decision.
RAILROAD GRANT-WITffDRAWAL-HOMESTEAD.
BAUGHM AN V. OEGON CENTRAL WAGON ROAD CO.
A homestead entry of record within the " granted " limits of the railroad and the
" indemnity " limits of the wagon road at the date of the withdrawals, excepts
the tract covered thereby from the operation of either of the grants.
Secretary Kirk-wood to Commissioner McFarland, November 12, 1881.
I have considered the appeal of the Oregon Central Wagon Road
Company from your decision of June 1, 880, permitting to stand
intact homestead entry No. 3180, made by Peter J. Baughman, Febru-
ary 24, 1879, of the W. i SW. I Sec. 27, T. 19 S., R. 2 W., Roseburg dis-
trict, Oregon.
It appears from the record that the tract is within the 20 miles granted
limits of the grant by act of July 25, 1866 (14 Stat., 239), to the Califor-
nia and Oregon Railroad Company, the right of which attached March
26, 1870; and it is also within the 6 miles indemnity limits of the grant
to said wagon-road company by act of December 26, 1866 (14 Stat., 374),
the withdrawal for the benefit of which became effective May 19, 1871.
On January 31, 1870, one A. J. Wimer made homestead entry No.
1193 of said tract, and the same was canceled on May 10, 1873, for vol-
untary relinquishment.
Thus it appears that at the date of the withdrawals aforesaid the
tract in question was covered by a valid, subsisting homestead claim,
which excepted the same from the operation of either of the said grants,
and it was subject to Baughman's entry. Your decision is therefore
affirmed.
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BAILROAD GRANT-RESTORATION OF LAND TO MARKET.
JENNESS V. CEDAR RAPIDS & M. R. R. Co.
A homestead entry for a tract of land within the limits of the railroad withdrawal,
which tract was covered, at the date of the order for the restoration to market
of the vacant lands within such limits, by a former homestead entry, and was not
therefore included in the list of lands actually restored, held to be confirmed by
the act of April 21, 1876, the land being treated by the Department as in fact re-
stored and properly subject to homestead entry.
Secretary Teller to Commissioner McFarland, May 19, 1882.
I have considered the case of the Cedar Rapids and Missouri River
Railroad Company v. M. J. P. Jenness, involving the W. J of SE. J,
and the NE. J of SW. 4, Sec. 6, T. 85 N., B. 43 W., Des Moines, Iowa,
on appeal from your decision of July 9, 1880, in part adverse to the
company. The lands in question were withdrawn from market June
16, 1864, but were restored to homestead and pre-emption entry August
25, 1864.
Homestead entry was made May 31, 1865, by one Anthony McCainey,
for NW. J of SE. , and SW. of NE. J, of the section above named,
which entry stood unimpeached until July 3, 1868, when it was can-
celed for abandonment. The lands were again withdrawn from loca-
tion or entry June 7, 1865, and were again restored November 1, 1867,
but the NW. . of SE. was not included in the restoration. The
entry of Jenness was made February 4, 1873, and on the state of facts
above recited, your office declined to hold for confirmation, under the
act of April 21, 1876, so much of said entry as refers to the 40 acres
last described. The effect of this would be to annul his entry as to the
one or the other of the 40-acre tracts included in the entry, for want of
contiguity, thus leaving for confirmation only 40 acres out of the origi-
nal entry of 120 acres.
In this conclusion I do not concur. The entry of McCainey (which
covered the NW. of SE. , now included in the entry of Jenness),
was made at a time when the lands in question were open to entry
by order of your office restoring them to market. This entry hav-
ing been canceled in 1868 for abandonment, homestead entry, includ-
ing the same NW. of SE. , was, on August 1, 1870, made by Edward
W. Mackey, which was canceled January 23, 1873, for relinquishment.
The fact that neither of these entries was canceled on account of any
right of the railroad company to the lands, and the additional fact
that the NW. of SE. was not included in the restoration of No-
vember 1, 1867, show that the entry of Mc(ainey was treated by the
Department as upon land in fact restored and properly open to his
entry at the date thereof.
The entry of Jenness, therefore, comes within the reason of my de-
cision of the 9th instant in the case of Azrow W. Copeland v. The Cedar
20309-VOL 1--23
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Rapids and Missouri River Railroad Company, and clearly falls within
the spirit if not the very letter of the statute.
It appears from the proof that Jenness fully complied with the home-
stead law, showing good faith throughout, and I am of opinion that his
entry should be held intact in its entirety.
Your decision is modified accordingly.
RAILROAD GRANT-RESTORATION OF LANDS.
LEGGETT V. CEDAR RAPIDS & M. R. R. Co.
Land situate within the limits of a railroad wiithdrawal is subject to homestead entry
in the interint of its restoration to market and the suspension of the same. A
subsequent entry of such tract is confirmed by the act of April 21, 1876.
Secretary Teller to Commissioner 1l1cEarland, May 31, 1882.
I have considered the case of Reman C. Leggett v. Cedar Rapids and
Missouri River Railroad Company, involving the W. 4 of SW. 1 of Sec.
22, T. 86, R. 44, Des Moines (formerly Sioux City) district, Iowa, on ap-
peal by Leggett from your predecessor's decision of April 19, 1880, per-
mitting his entry to stand subject to the final adjustment of the railroad
grant.
The record shows said tract to be within the 15 miles (indemnity}
limits of the original line of the Iowa Central Air Line (now Cedar
Rapids and Missouri River) Railroad, as located under the act of May
15,1856 (1i Stat., 9).
The tract in question was withdrawn for the benefit of the company,
pursuant to your office letter of June 16, 1864, but such withdrawal was
so modified, August 25, 1864, as to allow pre-emption and homestead
entries. Such modification was rescinded June 7, 1865, and the register
and receiver were directed to allow neither entries nor locations of any
kind within the limits of the withdrawal. On July 5, 1866, when the
railroad grant was supposed to have been adjusted, all the vacant or
unsettled lands within said limits were restored to market. A copy
of such order with descriptive lists of the lands to be restored in the
Sioux City district was transmitted to that office, and the tract in ques-
tion, as shown by said lists, appeared to be clear and unincumbered.
This order of restoration was subsequently suspended for one year from
its date, but on August 5, 1867, such suspension was rescinded and the
lands then vacant were actually restored to private entry September 23
ensuing.
It further appears that one Philander M. East made homestead entry
No. 360 (Sioux City series) of the tract, August 30, 1866, which was
canceled March 20, 1869, for abandonment. Under date of August 1
ensuing, Leggett made homestead entry No. 2346, of the tract in ques-
tion, and on January 5, 1875, he submitted proof, upon which final cer-
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tificate No. 1664 was issued, but the entry was suspended by reason of
conflict with the railroad grant; the Department having held subse-
quently to the restoration of 1867, aforesaid, that the same was errone-
ous. The tract was included in a list of selections made by the company
April 18, 1876, but such list was disapproved by the register and receiver
for conflict with Leggett's entry.
Upon the foregoing statement of facts your office held his entry to be
illegal, and as not confirmed by the act of April 21, 1876 (19 Stats., 35),
for the reason that at the date of the final restoration East's entry was
extant upon the records and defeated such restoration as to the tract
covered thereby. In this view of the case I do not concur. East's
entry was made in the interim of the restoration of July 5, 1866, and
the suspension thereof, during which interval the tract was subject to
such entry It was for this reason that his entry was allowed to stand
upon the record until March 20, 1869, when it was canceled for aban-
donment, and not for conflict with the railroad grant. .
As regards Leggett's entry, I am of the opinion that the fact that the
tract was not included in the final restoration shows that his entry was
treated by the Department as upon land already restored to market so
far as respects homestead and pre-emption entry, and properly subject
to the same at the date thereof.
The first section of the said act provides that where bona fide entries
have been made in compliance with any law of the United States by
actual settlers on the public lands within the limits of any land grant
" after their restoration to market by order of the General Land Office,>"
and proper proofs of compliance with legal requirements have been
made, such entries shall be confirmed and patents for the tracts covered
thereby shall be issued to the parties entitled thereto.
As it appears that Leggett has made final proof showing bona fide
compliance with the requirements of the homestead law, I am of the
opinion that his entry falls clearly within the intendment of the statute
and is confirmed thereby.
Your decision is modified accordingly.
nOMIESTEAD-PRE-EfPTION-SETTLEMENP.
CENTRAL PAC. R. R. Co. v. BAKER.
Any person who has made a settlement on the public lands under the pre-emption
laws and has subsequently changed his filing, in pursuance of law, to a home-
stead entry upon the same tract of land, shall be entitled to have the time re-
quired to perfect his title under the homestead laws computed from the date of his
original settlement.
Secretary Teller to Commissioner McFarland, June 20, 1882.
I have considered the case of the Central Pacific Railroad Company
v. Amenzo W. Baker, involving the E. of SW. of Sec. 5, T. 11 N.,
E. 1 W., Salt Lake City district, Utah Territory, on appeal by the com-
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pany from your predecessor's decision of September 25, 1880, allowing
Baker's entry to remain intact subject to final proof.
The tract is within the limits of the grant by act of July 2, 1864 (13
Stat., 356), to the company, the right of which attached July 18, 1868,
and the withdrawal for which became effective May 24, 1869.
The township plat was filed in the local office January 18, 1869.
It appears from the record that Baker filed his declaratory statement,
No. 882, for the SW. I of the said section, June 1, 1869, alleging settle-
ment April 10, 1867. Under date of April 19, 1878, he transmuted his
filing to homestead entry No. 3631, of the F. I of SW. J aforesaid. His
entry appears to be regular, and the accompanying proof shows that
Baker is a citizen of the United States; that he erected a house upon
the land in the year 1867, since which date he has continuously resided
upon, cultivated, and improved the same. It is, however, urged by the+ company's attorney that the act of July 14, 1870 (16 Stat., 279), as
amended by the joint resolution of March 3, 1871 (ibid., 601), operated
as a statute of limitation, whereby Baker was required to make proof
and payment on or before July 14, 1872, and having failed to comply
with such requirements he was guilty of laches by reason of which his
pre-emption right expired by limitation, and the land department is
therefore precluded from recognizing a right which he might otherwise
have exercised by virtue of his filing. Such position would doubtless
be tenable if the act of May 27, 1878 (20 Stat., 63), had not come to his
relief. This act provides "that any person who has made a settlement
on the public lands under the pre-emption laws, and has subsequent [ly]
to such settlement changed his filing, in pursuance of law, to that for a
homestead entry upon the same tract of land, shall be entitled to have
the time required to perfect his title under the homestead laws com-
puted from the date of his original settlement heretofore made, or here-
after to be made, under the pre-emption laws, subject to all the pro-
visions of the law relating to homesteads."
Again, section 2281, Revised Statutes, provides that-
All settlers on public lands which have been or may be withdrawn
from market in consequence of proposed railroads, and and who had set-
tled thereon prior to such withdrawal, shall be entitled to pre-emption at
the ordinary minimum to the lands settled on and cultivated by them;
but they shall file the proper notices of their claims, and make proof
and payment as in other cases.
This section was derived from the act of March 27, 1854 (10 Stat., 269),
as amended by the second section of the act of July 14, 1870, aforesaid.
That these acts obtained at the date of the railroad grant abd of the
withdrawal thereunder, there can be no doubt. Baker is undoubtedly
entitled to the benefit of their provisions, and to those of section 2281
as well. That section only requires of the settler that he shall file and
make proof and payment as in other cases. Hence, if a failure to so
comply within the prescribed period work no forfeiture of a claim in the
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absence of another settler on the same tract in other cases, there can be
no such forfeiture within the purview of the statutes cited, which were
unquestionably enacted for the protection, and not for the destruction,
of settlers' claims.
Furthermore, this case comes clearly within the reason of the rule laid
down by the Department in the case of Trepp v. Northern Pacific Rail-
road Company (8 C. L. O., 180), wherein my immediate predecessor held
that a pre-emption claim ("not since abandoned") attaching to a tract
in an odd-numbered section within the granted limits of a railroad at
the date of the definite location of the road, excepts such tract from the
operation of the grant, and the claimant's failure to file within the pre-
scribed statutory period, if he afterward assert his claim, does not defeat
the same unless another settler on the same tract has filed and other-
wise complied with legal requirements.
As it is proved that Baker was the sole settler upon the tract in
question at the date of the definite location of the railroad, and that he
has not abandoned his claim, but has in good faith made satisfactory
compliance with legal requirements in point of inhabitancy, cultivation,
and improvement, his entry should be allowed to remain intact subject
to final proof, which he should be required to make forthwith.
Your decision is accordingly affirmed.
RAILROAD GRANT-ACT OF APRIL 21,1876.
LUNDE V. ST. PAUL M. & M. RY. CO.
A homestead entry, allowed under instructions from the General Land Office, although
based upon a former homestead entry, which is now held to be illegal, is con-
firmed by the act of April 21, 1876.
Secretary Teller to Commissioner McFarland, June 28, 1882.
I have considered the case of Asle N. Lunde v. The Saint Paul, Min-
neapolis and Manitoba Railway Company (successor to the Saint Paul
and Pacific Railroad Company, Saint Vincent Extension), involving the
W. J of the SE. I, NE. 1 of SE. t, and lot No. 1, See. 11, T. 132, R. 43,
Fergus Falls (formerly Litchfield) district, Minnesota, on appeal by the
company from your decision of June 29, 1880, holding Lunde's home-
stead entry No. 2588 of the said tract for approval.
It appears from the records that the tract is within the 10 miles
(granted) limits of the grant by act of March 3, 1871 (16 Stat., 588), to
the said Saint Vincent Extension, the right of which attached in Sep-
tember, 1871.
It appears, from the records of your office, that the first notice of
withdrawal was received at the Litchfield local office February 15,1872,
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which order was revoked on June 25 ensuing, and the lands restored to
market; and that the lands were again withdrawn by letter of your
office received at the local office September 3, 1872.
At the date on which the right of the railroad attached the tract was
covered by homestead entry No. 5322, made by Robert Cavanaugh,
July 21,1868, which entry was canceled December 14, 1871, for abandon-
ment. This entry was made under the provisions of the act of March
21, 1864 (section 2293, Rev. Stat.), amendatory of the original act of
May 20, 1862 (section 2290, Rev. Stat.). It appears that at the date of
the entry in question, Cavanaugh was a single man engaged in the
United States service, and not the head of a family. This entry was
made by one F. A. Conwell, as the agent of Cavanaugh, who never
settled upon or cultivated the land.
It further appears that Lunde settled upon the land and contested
Cavanaugh's entry of the same. On December 14, 1871, he procured
its cancellation as aforesaid, and on the same day offered to file declara-
tory statement for the tract, but the register and receiver refused to
accept the same because the tract was within the limits of the railroad
grant. From this action Lunde appealed, and your office, under date
of April 29, 1872, advised the local office that as the tract was covered
by a valid homestead entry at thedate when the railroad right attached,
it reverted to the United States upon the cancellation of such entry,
and became public land subject to the first legal applicant.
Under these instructions Lunde was permitted to file his declaratory
statement, No. 477, for the tract May 10, 1872, alleging settlement April
10, preceding. On August 23 ensuing he transmuted his filing to home-
stead entry No. 2323, and made proof of his compliance with the pre-
emption laws. This proof shows that Lunde settled upon and culti-
vated the land from April 12, 1871, to date of his entry. On November
23, 1878, he submitted final proof, showing settlement and residence
upon the land from August 6, 1872, to date of submitting such proof.
I am of the opinion that as Lunde filed his declaratory statement pur-
suant to the instructions of your office, and as he has made proper proof
showing bonafide compliance with the requirements of the pre-emption-
and homestead laws, his entry should be deemed valid within the mean.
ing of the act of April 21, 1876 (19 Stat., 35), and is thereby confirmed,
(Streeter V. Missouri, Kansas and Texas Railroad Company, 4 C. L. 0-
180.)
Your decision is therefore affirmed.
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BALEROAD GRANT-INDEMNTITY-ACT OF JUNE 22, 1874.
MARTIN v. ATLANTIC, GULF AND WEST INDIA TRANSIT CO.*
A settler having initiated an entry under the homestead law prior to the railroad
withdrawal of March 26, 1881, his cash entry for the same land under act of June
15, 1880, made after that date, was properly allowed, and the railroad is not enti-
tled to indemnity under the act of June 22, 1874, although it has relinquished in
his favor, the effect of the decision of the Secretary of the Interior of April 29,
1876, having been to throw open to homestead settlement and entry all of the
public lands within the six and fifteen mile limits of the Tampa Bay portion of
the road.
Commissioner l11cFarland to register and receiver, Gainesville, Florida,
JTuly 12, 1882.
I have this day examined cash entry No. 2267, of the SE. NW. i
Sec. 29, 10 S., 23 E., made by Charles Martin, December 30, 1881, under
act of June 15, 1880, being the land embraced in his homestead No.
(6671, entered by him June 12, 1878, and the same is held for approval
subject to appeal by the Atlantic, Gulf and West India Transit Com-
pany.
The said tract lies with the 6-mile limits of the Atlantic, Gulf and
West India Transit Company Railroad betweenWaldo and Tampa Bay.
On December 14, 1860, the engineer of said comp any filed a map of
the route of said road between Waldo and Tampa Bay. This map was,
however, not accepted, as it was not certified to by the governor of
Florida, and was returned for the governor's certificate. Afterwards it
was lost, mislaid, or destroyed.
On December 13, 1875, the president of the company filed an alleged
duplicate thereof, which was officially approved by M. L. Stearns, gov-
ernor of the State at the date of its presentation.
On April 29, 1876, the Hon. Secretary of the Interior (Hon. Z. Chand-
ler) decided that said duplicate map could not be accepted as a map of
the definite location of the Tampa Bay portion of the road. He held
that no map showing the definite location of the road to Tampa Bay
had ever been filed in this Department. That "the completion and
operation of the road from Fernandina to Cedar Key as a single line,
coupled with the failure for fifteen years thereafter to designate the
line or perform any other act indicating an intention to build the road
to Tampa Bay, would naturally be accepted as such an abandonment
*of the latter portion of the line as would render a formal forfeiture un-
necessary." . . . . . Thatthe "important actofdefinitelylocating
the road can only be performed by or under the authority of the State,
and it should be done within a reasonable time after the date of the
grant, and in all cases before the expiration of the time fixed for com-
pleting the road. Failure to discharge this duty should be taken as
'See 2 L. D., 535
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conclusive evidence of abandonment of the grant."7 That he did not
conceive it to be his duty "to aid in reviving a grant which had so long
remained dormant," and therefore declined to receive or approve the
map above mentioned, and directed " that it be returned to Mr. Yulee,
with the information that this Department cannot permit the company,
after so great a delay, to file a map designating the route of its road."'
Afterwards the company applied for a review of the above decision
upon the ground of newly-discovered matter not within the reach of the
company at the date of the original application, and upon the ground
that material facts which go to show the authority of the company to
locate the line and file the map were not before the honorable Secretary.
This application for review and accompanying papers were submitted
to the honorable Secretary (C. Schurz) by this office November 10,
1879, and on January 28, 1881, the honorable Secretary, having exam-
ined the various documents presented, upon due consideration was of
the opinion that sufficient ground for review was established, and held
that " the exact correspondence with the map of 1860 of the duplicate
plat now filed appears to have been sufficiently shown, and there re-
mains no doubt that the line exhibited was surveyed and marked as
the definite location of the road; that it was recognized as such by the
officers of the company and the State authorities, and that the map was
filed in the same manner as the surveys of previous portions of the line
had been filed in the office of the secretary of state of Florida." That
the map before him was " officially approved by M. L. Stearns, governor
of the State at the date of its presentation," and that the only question
relating to its acceptance that can " be considered is, whether or not the
lands can be legally certified to the State in view of the limitation of time
contained in the provision of the granting act, that if the road is not
completed within ten years, no further sales shall be made, and the
lands unsold shall revert to the United States. Upon this point the
authorities are clear and express to the effect that the proviso in ques.
tion is a condition subsequent, of which no one but the grantor can take
advantage; and that until some proceeding in the nature of ' office found'
be instituted, the grantee may enjoy the estate upon the original fee,
and no reversion can take place by mere operation of law."
He returned the map and accompanying papers for the files of this
office, and directed " the necessary withdrawal of lands to protect the
rights of the company, and secure the proper adjustment of the grant
upon the line designated."
In connection with this decision the attention of this office was " also
particularly invited to the formal waiver of the company in favor of
actual settlers prior to December 13, 1875," and was " instructed to
make respectful request for a like waiver covering the time since that
date, and up to the time when formal notice of the withdrawal can be
communicated to the district land office."
In pursuance of these instructions, on March 16, 1881, the necessary
withdrawal was ordered to be made, and Mr. Yulee, the vice-president.
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and acting president of the company, was requested that the company
"s waive its right in favor of actual settlers prior to the time when the
normai notice of withdrawal is received at the district office." The order
for the said withdrawal was received at the local office March 16, fol-
Lowing, when the same accordingly became effective.
On June 25, 1881, the company filed a formal waiver in favor of actual
settlers, as follows, to wit:
It rests in the volition of the company, as is recognized in the gen-
eral instructions from your office, whether or not it will assert its title
to lands occupied under homestead and other entries after the survey
of the line, which in this case wag in 1858-'59. . . . . . In due
consideration of all the circumstances, the company has decided to ex-
tend the relinquishment or waiver heretofore made to actual bona lde
settlers who made improvements prior to the sixteenth day of March,
1881, upon which day your instructions were issued to the local land
officers. The Department can accordingly apply this waiver or relin-
quishment in its action upon the cases of all such actual settlers who
shall have entitled themselves to patents. In making this relinquish-
ment the company reserves the right to select, under the act of June
22, 1874, equal quantities of other land in lieu of tracts embraced in
such entries as may be relieved hereby.
The effect of Secretary Chandler's decision was to throw open all of
the public lands within the six and fifteen mile limits of the Tampa Bay
portion of the road to settlement and entry under the homestead laws.
This became a privilege and a right of which many persons availed
themselves, and established homes thereon, and in many cases many
have invested their all in improvements on the land.
Mr. Martin's entry having been initiated under the provisions of the
homestead laws prior to March 26, 1881, his said cash entry under act
of June 15, 1880, made after that time, -was properly allowed, and the
company will not be entitled fo indemnity under the act of June 22,
1874.
You will notify Mr. Martin and the proper officer of said railroad
company of this decision. Allow the compapy sixty days in which to
appeal therefrom and make prompt report.
RAILROAD GRANT-SELECTION-RES JUDICATA.
GONZALES V. ATLANTIC & PAC. R. R. Co.
The land in question is within the indemnity limits of the grant, but has not been
selected by the cOmpaDy, and was not subject to selection on account of the
prior claim of Gonzales.
Gonzales having made final proof, after due notice by publication as required by law,
the question of the validity of his claim is res judicata so far as the railroad com-
pany is concerned.
Commissioner McFarland to register and receiver, January 15, 1883.
I have considered the case of Bivian Gonzales, who made homestead
entry No. 1018, on March 6, 1882, of the E. 0 NE. I Sec. 10, and NW. 4
of NW. 4 See. 11, and SE. 4 of SE. i Sec. 3, 20 N., 28 E., Santa F6, N.
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MVex., alleging settlement February, 1871. His final proof, which was
made September 30, 1882, shows that he is a citizen of the United
States; that he settled on the land in February, 1871, and has resided
thereon with his family continuously since that date.
The land in question is within the indemnity limits of the grant to
the Atlantic and Pacific Railway Company, but has not been selected
by said company, and was not subject to such selection owing to the
prior claim of Gonzales. (See Perkins v. Central Pacific Railroad Com-
pany. The Reporter, vol. 2, p. 161, December number, 1882.) Gon-
zales having made final proof, after due notice by publication as re-
quired by law, the question of the validity of his claim is resjudicata
so far as the railroad company is concerned. (See Atlantic and Pacific
Railroad Company v. Forrester. The Reporter. Supra, p. 163.)
His proof being satisfactory, you will, upon payment of the legal
fees, issue final certificate, noting thereon a reference to this letter.
RAILROAD GRA-NT-ENTRY OF BECORD.
GRAHIAM V. HASTINGS AND DAKOTA Ry. Co.
'Under Section 2308 Rev. Stats., a soldier's services in the United States army are
equivalent to residence under a homestead entry.
A homestead entry, which on its face is valid, subsisting at the date a present grant
to a railroad company took effect, excepts the land embraced thereby from such
railroad grant.
An entry of record, which on its face is valid, reserves the land covered thereby from
the operation of any subsequent law, grant, or sale, until a forfeiture is declared
and the land is restored to the public domain in the manner prescribed by law.
Secretary Teller to Commissioner McFarland, Februttry 12, 1883.
I have considered the case of Julia D. Graham v. The Hastings and
Dakota Railroad Company, involving the S. of the SW. of Sec. 35,
T. 116, R. 32, Benson district, Minnesota, on appeal by the company
from your decision of November 4, 1881 (reversing your predecessor's
,decision of November 29, 1880, in favor of the company, and) permitting
Graham's entry to remain intact.
The tract is within the 10 miles granted limits of the grant by act of
July 4, 1866 (14 Stat., 87), to the State of Minnesota, for the purpose Of
aiding in the construction of said railroad (inter aia), the right of which
attached March 7, 1867, the date of the act of the State legislature con.
ferring the grant upon the company.
It appears that the tract was formerly covered by soldier's homestead
entry No. 1842 (Minneapolis series), made May 3, 1865, in the name of
Bentley S. Turner, and canceled September 30, 1872. The entry was
made through F. A. Conwell, as Turner's attorney in fact, pursuant to
the provisions of the act of March 21, 1864 (13 Stat., 35), as embodied in
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section 2293 of the Rev. Stat., which act is amendatory of the original
act of May 20, 1862 (12 id., 392) as embodied in section 2290 of the Rev.
Stat.
Turner alleged in his affidavi (which was made before his command-
ing officer while engaged in the military service of the United States in
the State of Virginia) that he was the head of a family, a citizen of the
United States, and a resident of Franklin County, New York.
Under date of May 7, 1877, Graham made homestead entry, No. 7560,
of the tract in question. Inasmuch as the record failed to discover
whether Turner's family, or any member thereof, had ever resided upon
the land, your office, under date of September 1, 1880, directed the reg-
ister and receiver to order a hearing for the purpose of ascertaining that
fact. In their letter of October 30 ensuing, said officers reported that
pursuant to your instructions they had duly advised the parties in in-
terest, September 11, 1880, that such hearing would be had October 29
ensuing, but that neither the company nor the claimant appeared.
Whereupon, November 29, 1880, your predecessor, Commissioner Will-
iamson, held Graham's entry for cancellation, subject to the usual ap-
peal, for conflict with the railroad grant
Under date of February 18, 1881, the register and receiver transmit-
ted a letter from Miss Graham, wherein she stated that she was unable
to appear at the local office by reason of sickness and the state of the
Toads at the date of the hearing, andL she therefore asked for a new trial.
This petition was treated as an appeal, which, being considered defect-
ive, your office instructed the register and receiver, April 13, 1881, to
allow her fifteen days to amend by filing a specification of errors.
Under date of June 20 ensuing, they reported to your office that Miss
Graham had been duly advised of such extension, but had failed to re-
spond.
Ltnder date of November 4 ensuing, you finally decided upon exam-
ining Graham's letter that she asked for a new trial, and probably did
not intend to make a technical appeal; that her application for a new
trial was as informal as her presumed appeal was held to have been;
that a consideration ot the case shows you that no new trial is neces-
sary, and that the decision of your predecessor "of November 29,1880,
was inadvertently made, through some misapprehension of the law or
the facts.'
From such decision the railroad company appeals, alleging, inter alia,
error on your part in reversing your predecessor's decision; in ruling
that you had jurisdiction to vacate such decision; and in holding that
the homestead entryof Turner was in anysense such a valid subsisting
claim as to defeat the company's grant.
It will be observed that your predecessor virtually reopened the case
himself, and, as you found it in that conditionit was competent for you
to consider and decide the same. Furthermore, the irregularity of pro-
cedure in the premises is such as to bring this case within the category
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of exceptions to the general rule laid down by this Department in the
case of Owen v. Russell (9 C. L. O., p. 111).
Upon the foregoing state of facts the question arises: Did Turner's
entry except the land from the operation of the railroad grants
In the case of Kniskern v. Hastings and Dakota Railroad Company
(6 C. L. O., 50), it was held by my predecessor, Secretary Schurz, that
an entry under the statutes hereinbefore cited, made by a single man
not the head of a family, in the military or naval service of the United
States, who had not made a bona fide settlement upon and improvement
of the land as required by the statute, is void ab initio, and cannot ex-
cept the land covered thereby from the operation of a railroad grant.
On the other hand, it has always been the invariable custom of the
Department to regard land appropriated under the homestead law as
removed from pre-emption settlement and homestead entry, and not
again subject to either until the homestead entry is canceled, where-
upon the land reverts to the government, and as a part of the public
domain becomes subject to either.
Until after the expiration of the period in which the settlement and
improvement can be proven, the government presumes that the home-
stead claimant is acting-in good faith, unless the contrary be shown in
the manner prescribed by the statute; but until such showing a forfeit-
ure cannot be declared.
When an entry thereof is made under those laws (whether pre-emp-
tion, homestead, or other), the particular land entered thus becomes
segregated from the mass of public lands, and takes the character of
private property. "In no just sense," observe the supreme court in
Witherspoon v. Duncan (4 Wall., 218), " can lands be said to be public
lands after they have been entered at the land office and a certificate
of entry obtained. If public lands before entry, after it they are private
property." (Opinion of the Attorney-General, 8 C. L. O., 72.)
In the light of the judicial interpretation of the term "entry," as it
is used in the public land laws, I am constrained to the opinion that an
entry of record, which on its face is valid, is such an appropriation of
the land covered thereby as to reserve the same from the operation of
any subsequent law, grant, or sale, until a forfeiture is declared and the
land is restored to the public domain in the manner prescribed by law.
Section 2271 (chap. 4, Pre-emptions) Rev. Stat. provides as follows:
The provisions of this chapter shall be so construed as not to confer
on any one a right of pre-emption, by reason of a settlement made on
a tract theretofore disposed of, when such disposal has not been con-
firmed by the General Land Office, on account of any alleged defect
therein.
It will be observed in this connection that railroad grants invariably
provide in express terms that all lands to which the right of pre-emp-
tion or homestead has attached, or that are found at the date the grant
became effective to have been theretofore reserved, or in any wise dis-
posed of by the United States, shall be excepted from the operation of
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the grant. In other words, railroad grants are made subject to re-
emption and homestead rights.
if, therefore, the right of pre-emption to a tract of land theretofore
disposed of is barred, although such disposal has not been confirmed by
your office a fortiori, is a railroad company precluded from acquiring
title to a tract of land that is expressly excepted from the operation of
its grant?
The manifest intent of Congress in these provisions was to protect
actual bona fide settlers in their rights at the date of the definite loca-
tion of the road, and to give the company other lands in lieu of the
lands thus or in any wise appropriated at such date. By the express
terms of the granting act, lands to which the right of pre-emption or
homestead settlement had attached when the line or route of said road
was definitely located were excepted from the operation of the grant.
It provides in the first section thereof as follows:
That there be, and is hereby, granted to the State of Minnesota, for
the purpose of aiding in the construction of a railroad from Houston,
.. . . and also for a railroad from Hastings .... . to
such point on the western boundary of the State as the legislature of
the State may determine, every alternate section of land designated by
odd numbers, to the amount of five alternate sections per mile on-each
side of said road; but in case it shall appear that the United States
have, when the lines or route of said roads are definitely located, sold
any section or part thereof, granted as aforesaid, or that the right of
pre-emption or homestead settlement has attached to the same, or that
the same has been reserved by the United States for any purpose what-
ever. (14 Stat., 87.)
These grants to railroads are present grants; when they take effect
they operate eo instanti upon the lands within the granted limits. The
grant is not held in abeyance to await the default of the settlers, but
the title vests or does not vest at once; and so far as regards the land
in which title does not vest at once, the claim of the company is at an
end. . . . . . If the grant is a present one, and the title does not
vest when the grant takes effect, it cannot vest afterwards.
It was, I think, the intention of Congress that only such unoccupied
lands as were not held under any claim recognized by the government
should pass under the grant. Grants to railroad companies must be
strictly construed against the grantee (92 U. S., 733). See case of James
F. Perkins v. The Central Pacific Railroad Company, decided by the De-
partment under date of 12th of December, 1882. (The Reporter, vol. 2,
p. 161.)
Thus it will be seen that the company's title to the lands embraced in
the grant attached to the road from the date of its definite location,
March 7, 1867; but, as before stated, Turner's entry was at such date
intact upon the record, and remained so until September 30, 1872, when
it was canceled for failure to make final proof; and the tract being thus
released from reservation, reverted eo instanti to the public domain, and
became subject to entry by the first settler.
The rule laid down by the Department in the case of Chalkley Thomas
v. The Saint Joseph and Denver City Railroad Company (3 C. L. O.,
197), and which still invariably obtains, is that in cases where a forfeit-
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ure has been declared for abandonment, and the land has been disposed
of under the ruling of your office, it is not competent for a claimant to
show that the canceled entry was void, as such cases. are treated as re&judicata.
Now, this is exactly the tatus of the case at bar, as will be seen from
the recital in the premises, Turner's entry having been canceled for con-
structive or virtual abandonment, and Graham's entry having been
allowed pursuant to the rules and regulations of your office, which ob-
tained until the rendition of the Kniskern decision, and the promulga-
tion of instructions thereunder. Such regulations will be found in their
entirety in 2d Lester, , 253, et sequential under the style and date re-
spectively of No. "243 B," April 18, 1864 (explanatory of the act of
March 21, 1864), and " No. 244 B," March 1, 1865 (supplemental to the
former).
Thus it appears in the light of the foregoing rules and regulations
that Turner's entry was regular in all respects, and hence primiafacie
valid. And as it was extant upon the record, both at the date of the
grant and when the company's right thereunder attached, I am clearly
of the opinion that the land in question was excepted from the opera-
tion of the grant, or, rather, that the same was not granted thereby.
Hence any laches on Graham's part was a matter to be considered
solely between her and the government, of which it was not competent
for the company to take advantage; because any defect that may have
existed in Turner's status could be questioned only by the government,
and subsequently it was. cured by the remedial act of June 8, 1872 (17
Stat., 333), as embodied in section 2308 Rev. Stat., which declares that
the soldier's services in the Army of the United States " shall, in the
administration of such homestead laws, be construed to be equivalent,
to all intents and purposes, to a residence for the same length of time
upon the tract so entered." This section ratified the original entry, and
rendered it complete.
Your decision is accordingly affirmed.
RAILROAD GRBAT-CEBTIFICATIOV-PITE XT.
JOHNSON . ST. PAUL & SIOUX CITY R. R. Co.*
A certification to the State of Minnesota for the benefit of the Saint aul and Sioux
City Railroad Company does not convey title to land, as, under the act of March
3, 1865, title can only be conveyed by patent.
The party in interest having received no notice of the decision canceling his entry,
and, therefore, having no opportunity for appeal, the decision cannot be treated
as final.
Commissioner .31cFarland to register and receiver, Worthington, Mlinne-
sota, arch 23, 1883.
I am in receipt of a letter from C. F. Kellogg, esq., of Sterling Centre,
Minn., asking that patent may issue on homestead entry 1238 (F. C.,
I See 2 L. D., 498.
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437) of George W. Johnson for NE. i of Sec. 5, 105, 27, The records
of this office show that said entry was made December 8, 1863; that on
March 22, 1866, it was canceled upon the records of this office, because
at date of entry the land was withdrawn and reserved for the benefit
of the Saint Paul and Sioux City Railroad, which was definitely located
opposite said tract in June, 1857. Johnson enlisted in the Army after
making the entry. His family, consisting of a wife and three children,
remained upon the land. Johnson died in March, 1865, in the Army.
In March, 1869, his widow was allowed by the local officers to make
final proof on the entry, there being no record on the local office tract-
biooks of the cancellation of the entry by this office, March 22, 1866,
although the register and receiver (successors of the officers who allowed
final proof) Teport, May 2, 1870, that the letter of this office dated March
22, 1866, is on file in the local office and bears this indorsement: " John-
son notified at Mapleton, May 12." The land is within the 15-mile in-
demnity limits by act of March 3, 1857, of the Saint Paul and Sioux
City Railroad, and was certified to the State for the benefit of said road
on March 7, 1872, having been previously selected August 1, 1871. The
certification of the land to the State did not convey title to the land, as
under the act of March 3, 1865, title can only be conveyed by patent
(See Secretary's decision of September 29, 1874, and December 2, 1875,
in case of Saint Paul and Pacific Railroad, C. L. O., vol.2, p. 134.) The
certificate states that the land is listed in accordance with the require-
ments of the acts of May 12,1864, and July 13,1866, no reference being
made to the act of March 3,1865. The Saint Paul and Sioux City Rail-
road was definitely located opposite the land on June 18, 1857. On
July 6, 1857, Solon B. Rumvill filed Pre. D. S. 7759 for the land in ques-
tion, alleging settlement June 1, 1857. The land was withdrawn from
entry March 14, 1857, but by letter of April 9, 1857, the register and
receiver were directed to permit pre-emption settlements up to date of
definite location.
Rumvill's settlement, therefore, annulled the withdrawal of the land,
and it was subject to entry at the date of Johnson's application. The
attempted cancellation of the entry not having been consummated by
noting the same on the records of the local office, and the party in in-
terest (Mrs. Johnson) evidently not having received notice of the action
of this office, and, therefore, having no opportunity for appeal, the de-
cision of March 22, 1866, cannot be treated as final. Said irregularities
are sufficient to bring the case within the exceptions to the general rule
relative to reopening decided cases. (See Graham v. Hastings and
Dakota Railroad Company, Reporter, vol. 2, p. 178.)
The entry of Johnson will, therefore, be reinstated (for the purpose of
issuing patent on same), subject to appeal by the Saint Paul and Sioux
City Railroad Company, the resident attorney of which will be notified
hereof by this office.
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Ai I
RAILROAD GRANT-IYDIAN RESERVATIO.
PHELPS V. NORTHERN PAC. R. R. Co.
The grant (July 2, 1864) was a present one, and conveyed lands within the granted
limits to which the United States had " fall title, not reserved or otherwise ap-
propriated, at the time the line of road is definitely fixed."
Theactloesnotpasstbelands "reserved" or "otherwise appropriated."1 At thetime
the grant to the company was made these lands were occupied by the Flatheads.
They would not, therefore, pass by the grant.
Every tract set apart for special uses is reserved to the government, to enable it to
enforce them. And that was the character of the reserve of the Bitter Root Val-
ley. The stipulation to extinguish the Indian title did not apply to those lands.
Secretary Teller to Commissioner McFarland, January 22, 1883.
I have considered the case of James Phelps v. Northern Pacific Rail-
road Company, involving homestead entry No. 918, for the E of the
NE. , See. 32, and the W. of the NW. , Sec. 33, T. 9 N., R. 19 W.,
Helena, Mont., on appeal from the decision of your office holding said
entry for cancellation as to the odd section and for approval as to the
even. The case is a test one,-and a large number of others await the
decision in this.
The first error assigned by counsel for Phelps (who appears also for
the settlers generally in the Bitter Root Valley) is that your office erred
in holding that said odd-numbered Section 33, 9, 19, constituted any
portion of the land granted to the said railroad company. All the other
assignments of error are involved in the first, and it will be necessary
to consider only the first.
Said sections are a part of the land situate in the Bitter Root Valley,
mentioned in the treaty made with the Flathead nation of Indians July
16, 1855, ratified by the Senate March 8, 1859 (12 Stat., 975).
Article XI of the treaty provided that the Bitter Root Valley above
the Lo-Lo Fork should be carefully surveyed and examined, and if it
should prove, in the judgment of the President, to be better adapted to
the wants of the Flathead tribe than the general reservation provided
for in such treaty, then such portions of it as might be necessary should
be set apart as a separate reservation for said tribe.
November 14, 1871, the President issued an order which recited that
the Bitter Root Valley above Lo-Lo Fork had " been carefully surveyed
and examined in accordance with the eleventh article of the treaty"
above mentioned, and in the judgment of the President had proved
"not to be better adapted to the wants of the Flathead tribe than the
general reservation provided for in said treaty,"7 and he "therefore
ordered and directed that all Indians residing in said Bitter Root Val-
ley be removed, as soon as practicable, to the reservation provided for
in the second article of said treaty."
June 5, 1872, Congress passed an act (17 Stat., 226) providing for the
removal of said Indians from the Bitter Root Valley to the Jocko reser-
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vation mentioned in said treaty. Section 2 of the act de cre*4at the,
lands in the Bitter Root Valley lying above the Lo-Lo Fork should be
surveyed as soon as practicable, " as other public lands of the United;
-States are surveyed;" and that "said lands shall be open to settlement
and shall be sold in legal subdivisions to actual settlers only .....
in quantities not exceeding 160 acres to each settler, at the price of
$1.25 per acre." It provided for the. reservation of the sixteenth and
thirty-sixth sections for school purposes, and of lands for town sites.
None of the lands were to be opened to settlement under the homestead
and pre-emption laws. Ot of the first moneys arising from the sales
$50,000 was to be set apart for the use of the Flatheads. No more than
fifteen townships of the lands so to be surveyed were subject to the
provisions of the act.
Section 3 provided that any of said Indians, being the head of a family
or twenty-one years of age, residing upon and cultivating any portion
of said lands, should be permitted to remain in said valley and pre-empt
without cost the land so occupied, not exceeding 160 acres to each In-
dian, for which patent should issue, without power of alienation, upon
condition that the Indian should give notice of his intention to abandon
his tribal relations and remain in the valley.
The act of February 11, 1874 (18 Stat., 15), extended the benefit of
the homestead act to settlers in the Bitter Root Valley.
In 1872 the Hon. James A. Garfield, at the request of the Secretary
of the Interior, went to the Bitter Root Valley for the purpose of making
arrangements to remove the Flathedd Indians to the Jocko reservation.
He made an agreement in writing, August 27,1872, containing numerous
provisions as to such removal. The agreement was executed by him-
self as special commissioner, and by the second and third chiefs on the
part of the Indians; but Charlot, the first chief, declined to sign the
agreement.
In reply to a special inquiry recently made by this Department to
the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, as to the removal of said Indians
from the Bitter Root Valley, it appears that the Garfield agreement has
been only partially performed, either on the part of the government or
of the Indians, and the latest information in possession of the Indian
Office, contained in a report made by Inspector Pollock, October 12,
1880, was to the effect that between 300 and 400 Flathead Indians were
then residing in the Bitter Root Valley, under Chief Charlot, and that
104, under Chief Arlee, had removed, under the Garfield agreement, to
the Jocko reservation, joining other Flathead Indians already there
under the treaty.
Quite a large number of patents have been issued to individual In-
dians for lands in the Bitter Root Valley, but have not been delivered,
because the Indians declined to receive them, alleging as a reason that
acceptance would dissolve their tribal relations.
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February 21, 1872, the Northern Pacific Railroad Company filed in
your office a map of general route in Montana, and lands were with-
drawn for the benefit of the grant. (A map of general route had also
been filed August 13,1870.)
The grant (July 2, 1864, 13 Stat., 365) was a present one, and conveyed
land within the granted limits to which the United States had "full
title, not reserved, sold, granted, or otherwise appropriated, and free
from pre-emption, or other claims or rights at the time the line of said
road is definitely fixed."
It is claimed by counsel for the company that if the lands became
public lands prior to February 21, 1872, they passed by the grant. It
is not necessary to controvert such claim.
It is only necessary to refer to the citations already made to show that
the lands in the Bitter Root Valley were not public lands free from
" other claims or rights " at the time of filing such map, but had been
otherwise appropriated.
The Flatheads might have continued to occupy the valley for all time
if after a careful survey and examination thereof above the Lo-Lo Fork
it proved, in thejudgment of the President, to be better adapted to their
wants than the general reservation provided for in the treaty. If that
should be the judgment of the President, then such portions of the valley
as should be found necessary were to be "set apart as a separate reser-
vation for the said tribe." And no portion of said valley above said fork
was to be open to settlement until after such examination had and " the
decision of the President made known." The act does not pass the lands
"reserved" or "otherwise appropriated." At thetimethegranttothe
company was made these lands were occupied by the Flatheads. All
or portions of them were quite likely to become a permanent Indian
reservation. By the treaty they were expressly reserved for that pur-
pose, or until the question should be determined; and settlement upon
them was prohibited. They would not, therefore, pass by the grant
(Leavenworth, L. & G. Railroad, Company v. United States, 92 U. S., 733.)
The executive order, made before the filing of the map of route, found
the lands in the reserved condition before stated, occupied by the In-
dians, and ordered their removal as soon as practicable. It directed
an appraisal of substantial improvements made by Indians, such as
fields inclosed and cultivated, and houses erected. It further ordered
that after such removal the Bitter Root Valley aforesaid should be
opened to settlement; and that any Indians residing in the valley who
desired to become citizens and to reside on the lands then occupied by
them, not exceeding in quantity the amount allowed under the home.
stead and pre-emption laws, should be permitted to do so, provided
such intention was declared by the 1st day of January, 1873.
The effect of the order was not to extinguish the Indian title. It re-
served to the Indians a preference right to the lands, upon conditions,
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not to be determined until after the time the company filed its map of
route. The condition of the Bitter Root Valley was substantially un-
changed when Congress at a tihe subsequent to the filing of the map
of route, obviously regarding all the lands in that valley and the rights
of the Indian thereto as a proper subject of legislation, as a subject
pending and not settled, proceeded to make ample provision for the
rights of the Indians therein, and for the removal therefrom of such as
were not disposed to remain, and for a disposition of all of the lands
without recognition or reservation of odd sections or of the grant to the
Northern Pacific Company in any manner whatever.
The only further question necessary to be considered is as to the
effect of the stipulation in the granting act relating to the extinguish-
ment of Indian titles.
The acts of Congress of June 5, 1872, and of February 11, 1874, be-
fore cited, were passed after the filing of map of general route in Mon-
tana. These acts, as before stated, provide for a disposition of all the
lands in the valley, and for the raising of a trust fund therefrom for
the benefit of said Indians. The right of the company to the lands or
any part thereof is nowhere expressly recognized.
I do not mean to be understood as asserting that it is always neces-
sary to make express mention of lands in order to prevent them from
passing by a granting act which apparently covers them. The question
of reservation is, however, one of intention. The price of the lands to
be sold is fixed at the single minimum; and other provisions are incon-
sistent with an intention on the part of Congress to extinguish the In-
dian title for the benefit of the railroad grant.
Your office has given this construction to the acts. In a letter ad-
dressed, April 30, 1874, to L. B. Lyman, esq., the Acting Commissioner
says:
Under the act of June 5 1872, the lands . . . . . are not sub-ject to the withdrawal for the Northern Pacific Railroad Company, and
can only be disposed of in the manner prescribed in that act to actual
settlers at $1.25 per acre.
In a letter addressed to the register and receiver at Helena, Mont.,
July 18, 1874, the Commissioner saps:
All sections, odd and even, opened for settlement by act approved
June 5, 1872 . . . . . are subject to pre-emption and homestead
entry. Settlers may file on odd in the same manner as on even sec-
tions.
Your office seems to have acted upon such construction for several
years, and until the decision of the late Commissioner Williamson in
the case of Martin, decided July 24, 1880, and in a few months after-
wards in the case of Phelps, now under consideration.
The decision in Martin's case (which was followed by the Commis-
sioner in the present case) was made upon the authority of Hogland -
372 DECISIONS RELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS.
the Northern Pacific Railroad Company (5 C L. O., 107). The situa-
tion of the lands under consideration in that case as to the Indian claim
or right is clearly distinguished from that of the lands now under con-
sideration; nor had such lands been the subject of legislative enact-
ments by the aid of which we are the better enabled to arrive at the
legislative intention. The right of the Indians to the lands under con-
sideration in IHogland's case was that of occupancy under the aboriginal
title, and it was held that the extinguishment of that right was but giv-
ing effect to the stipulation in the last clause of section second of the
granting act, to the effect that the United States should, as rapidly as
was consistent with public policy and the welfare of the Indians, extin-
r guish the Indian titles to the lands donated. This stipulation cannot
be held to apply to permanent Indian reservations, nor to lands which
had been reserved before the grant was made, as we have seen these
lands were. It applied only to the lands clearly granted.
In construing a public grant, as we have seen, the intention of the
grantor, gathered from the whole and every part of it, must prevail. If
on examination there are doubts about that intention, or the extent of the
grant, the government is to receive the benefit of them.-Leavenworth
Railroad Company v. United States (supra), 746.
In the case last cited the Inlian title to the landsthere in question was
extinguished between the timue of the passage of the act making a pres-
ent grant and the filing of the map of definite location, and it was held
that the lands did not pass by the grant. In that case, however, the
provision for the extinguishment of the Indian title was in an act other
than the one making the grant, and the acts had no necessary connec-
tion, although passed on the same day. I think. however, that the
principle is applicable to the case under consideration. After referring
to the stipulation on the part of the government to extinguish the In-
dian title in the case of the grant to the Union Pacific and roads there-
with connected, the court said: "This was necessary, although their
roads ran through territory occupied by wild tribes; but this (the Leav-
enworth) passed through a reservation secured by treaty and occupied
by Indians (the Osages) at least partially civilized."
If the lands in the Bitter Root Valley had passed by the grant, the
government could not have fulfilled its agreement with the Flatheads
in case the President found that those lands were better adapted to their
uses than the Jocko reservation.
Referring again to the case last cited, the court uses this language:
"i Every tract set apart for special uses is reserved to the government,
to enable it to enforce them." And that was the character of the re-
serve of the Bitter Root Valley. The stipulation to extinguish the
Indian title did not apply to those lands.
I am of the opinion that the lands in question did not pass to the
Northern Pacific Railroad Company under its grant, nor subsequently
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upon extinguishment of the Indian title, and therefore reverse the de-
cision of your office wherein it holds that the land in the odd-numbered
section is not subject to entry.
The facts recited show that some obstacles present themselves in the
way of awarding lands to settlers in the Bitter Root Valley. Fifty-one
patents to Indians are now outstanding, but not delivered, for the rea-
son before stated. A large number of the Flatheads are still residing
in the valley, and may have initiated claims by giving notice required
by section 3 of the act cited and by residing upon and cultivating lands
for which patents have not yet been issued to them.
Great care should be exercised that there may be no interference in
respect to the patents already issued, and that all rights which the In-
dians may have to lands actually occupied by them may be properly
regarded.
In the case of James Phelps, under consideration, there seems to be
no adverse claim except that of the railroad company herein considered;
his entry should therefore be allowed.
RAILROAD GRANT-LANDS EARNED BY CONSTRUCTION.
WISCONSIN CENTRAL R. P. CO.
There is no question that the road was entitled to alternate sections so soon as pro-
gressive sections of the road are completed. The company is entitled to the lands
earned by the construction of its road prior to the expiration of its grant.
Secretary Teller to Commissioner McFarland, October 2, 1882.
I herewith inclose letters from W. K. Mendenhall, esq., dated re-
spectively February 20, and September 18, 1882, on behalf of the Wis-
consin Central Railroad Company, in which a request is made for the
patenting of lands earned by the construction of that railroad prior to,
the expiration of the grant.
By your letter of the 30th of March ltimo, it appears that the road
has received 575,844.56 acres; and that the lists ready for submission
for approval contain 23,578.08 acres; and that these two amounts will
fall short, of the number of acres earned by the construction of 231
miles of road completed prior to December 31, 1876.
In the matter of the grant to the Wisconsin Central Railroad, there
is no question that the road was entitled to alternate sections so soon
as progressive sections of the road should be completed. That being
the case, I see no reason why the list mentioned in your letter should
not be submitted to me for approval, and you are directed accordingly.
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RAILROAD RAINT-OFERLAPPING LlIfITS.
&LABAMA & CHATTANOOGA R. R. CO. ET AL.
The lands within the overlapping or conflicting 15 miles or indemnity limits of the
two lines of road authorized by the same act, one of which has never been con-
structed, should be approved and certified to the governor of the State of Ala-
bama for disposal by the legislature of the State in accordance with the condi-
tions of the trust as expressed in the granting act.
It is for the State to determine what lands or proceeds of lauds the Alabama and
Chattanooga Railroad Company shall receive under the grant.
The Department has not the authority to direct the State in this matter; for all the
directions and conditions that Congress saw fit to give to and impose upon the
State are expressed in the act.
Secretary Kirlkiood to Commissioner McFarland, July 20, 1881.
I have examined your report of the 1th instant, accompanying a
list of lands selected by F. Y. Anderson, as agent of the State of Ala-
bama, within the indemnity limits of the Alabama and Chattanooga
railroad, and claimed as inuring to the Alabama and Chattanooga Rail.
road Company under the acts of Congress approved respectively June
3,1856 (11 Stats., 17), and April 10, 1869 (16 Stats., 45).
The list was rejected by the register of the United States Land
Office at Huntsville, Ala., March 8, 1881, without stating any reasons
therefor; whereupon the said Anderson, as agent of the State and Com-
pany appealed to your office.
You report as follows:
1st. That the lands were withdrawa from disposal by telegrams of
June 19 and letters of June 20,1856, addressed to registers and receivers
in said State.
2d. That a map of definite location of the Coosa and Chattooga
River railroad, from Gadsden, Ala., to the Georgia State line, through
the Chattooga Valley, a distance of about 40 miles, was filed in your
office September 20, 1858.
3d. That no portion of the projected road thus located was ever con-
structed; that no existing corporation having any relation to this line
is known to your office; and that there has been no declaration of for-
feiture of the grant of 1856 or 1869 to aid in the construction of this
projected or contemplated road..
4th. That a map of definite location of the northeast and southwest
Alabama and Wills Valley railroads, in connection (now by consolida-
tion under State law the Alabama and Chattanooga Railroad) from the
Mississippi State line to the Georgia State line, through the Wills and
Lookout Valleys, was filed in your office November 29, 1858.
5th. That the last-named road has been completed, and that no for-
feiture of the grant to aid in its construction has ever, in any manner,
been declared.
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6tl. That a portion of the lands selected as aforesaid, lie within the
overlapping or conflicting 15 miles or indemnity limits of the two lines.
of roads located as above set forth.
Under this state of facts you submit, for my opinion, the question
whether the indemnity selections should be certified to the Alabama,
and Chattanooga Railroad Company.
The act of April 10, 1869, revived and renewed the grant of 1856 to
the State of Alabama to aid in the construction of the two roads defi-
nitely located as aforesaid. The first section of the act of 1856 pro-
vided that the lands thereby granted should be exclusively applied in
the construction of that road for and on account of which the same
were granted, and that they should be disposed of only as the road
progressed.
The third section provided that the lands granted by the act to the
State should be subject to the disposal of the legislature thereof, for
the purposes aforesaid, and for no other.
The fourth section provided the manner in which the State should
dispose of the lands; that is to say:
That a quantity of land, not exceeding one hundred and twenty sec-
tions for each of said roads, and included within a continuous length
of twenty miles of each of said roads, may be sold, and when the gov-
ernor of said State shall certify to the ecretary of the Interior that
any twenty continuous miles of any of said roads is completed, then
another quantity of land hereby granted, not to exceed one hundred
and twenty sections for each of said roads having twenty continuous
miles completed as aforesaid -. . . . . may be sold, and so on,
from time to time, until said roads are completed.
Thus it is seen that the grant is to the State to aid in the construc-
tion of said roads; that the State is, therefore, simply the trustee to
dispose of the lands, for the benefit of the several roads, in the manner
prescribed by Congress.
It is also clear, from your report, that the precedent conditions to the
right or authority of the State to dispose of the lands granted in aid
of the Alabama and Chattanooga Railroad have been performed.
The first section of the act of 1856 further provided that it should be
lawful for any agent or agents to be appointed by the governor of the
State to select the indemnity lands, subject to the approval of the Sec-
retary of the Interior, and that the lands so selected should be held by
*the State of Alabama for the use and purpose of the grant as aforesaid.
It follows, therefore, that any proper selections of indemnity should
be approved and certified to the governor of the State of Alabama for
disposal by the legislature of the State, in accordance with the condi-
tions of the trust as expressed in the granting act.
It seems to me that it is for the State to determine what lands or pro-
ceeds of lands the Alabama and Chattanooga Railroad Company shall
receive under the grant, and that this Department has not the authority
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to direct the State in this matter, for all the directions and conditions
that Congress saw fit to give to and impose upon the State are expressed
in the act.
I therefore hold that indemnity selections made by lawful authority
of lands inuring to the State under the grant of 1856, as revived and
renewed by the act of 1869, should be properly listed and forwarded to
this Department for approval and certification to the governor of the
State of Alabama.
RAILROAD G-INT-PARTITION BY THE STATE.
ALABAMA & CHATTANOOGA R. R. Co.
Where several roads intersect at a common point, their entire respective interests
must enter into consideration in making partition.
This partition is the duty of the State, and the General Land Office is not called upon
to act in the absence of a proper request for certification, nor to lay down rules
for such partition, further than to say that any adjustment by the State authori-
ties which shall give to each only what is legally due will be recognized and car-
ried into certification when presented.
Secretary Teller to Commissioner McFarland, December 29, 1882.
I inclose for your information, and such consideration as may be re-
quired, a letter of 27th instant from M. D. Brainard, esq., submitting
various questions and asking definite instructions in the matter of the
right of the Alabama and Chattanooga Railroad Company under the
ruling made 21st instant touching the overlapping or common limits of
certain roads in Alabama.
Deeming the decision referred to sufficiently explicit, and in the ab-
sence of any suggestion of doubt from you as to its practical execution,
I forbear to add at this time any instructions further than to remark
that the term moiety was intended in its true sense to indicate equal
division as between any two roads having equal right and common
limits. Where several roads intersect at a common point, their entire
respective interests must enter into consideration in making partition.
This partition is, however, the duty of the State, and you are not called
upon to act in the absence of a proper request for certification, nor to
lay down rules for such partition, further than to say that any adjust-
ment by the State authorities which shall give to each only what is
legally due will be recognized and carried into certification when pre-
sented.
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BAILROAD GRANT-PRIVATE CLAIM-CONELICT.
SOUTHERN PAC. R. R. CO.
The lands in question were at the date of the grant within a survey of the Tajaata
Rancho, and were patented to the railroad company in 1876 under the rulings
then in force.
As the company has sold the land. neither justice nor good policy require the inter-
vention of the government to disturb the title conveyed, although under subse-
quent decisions the lands are held to be excluded from the grant.
Secretary Teller to Commissioner McFarland, December 8, 1882.
I have considered your communication of 7th August last recommend-
ing the institution of suits to vacate patent issued in favor of the South-
ern Pacific Railroad Company, March 29, 1876, to the following described
lands, in Los Angeles district, California: Lots 1 and 2 of Sec. 33, 2 S.,
13 W.; SE. - of SE. J Sec. 5, 3 S., 13 W.; Lots 1, 2,3, and 4 Sec. 9, 3 S.,
13 W.; NE. of SE. I and lot 3, Sec. 17, 3 S., 13 W., San Bernardino
meridian.
These tracts were in 1871 within a survey made in 1868 of the claimed
Tajauta Rancho, and it is claimed that-they are therefore excluded
from the railroad grant under the Newhall-Sanger decision (2Otto,
761).
It was held, however, by Mr. Secretary Delano, February 21, 1872
(1 C. L. L., 548), that the survey was unauthorized, end he had no juris-
diction to approve it, on account of a previous survey of 1858, which had
become final by proper publication without objection under the act of
June 14, 1860 (12 Stat., 33). This final survey did not embrace these
lands, and the same were regarded as public lands properly inuring to
the grant at the date of patent. The issue of such patent was not, there-
fore, inadvertent, although my 'predecessor, Mr. Secretary Schurz, in
the subsequent case of Eenry J. Dull (2 C. L. L., 944), held that the
pendency in this Department of proceedings on the latter survey oper-
ated to exclude the lands within its limits from the railroad grant.
It is shown that the patents were issued advisedly under rulings in
force, and it is further shown that the company has sold the lands.
Under these conditions, even were it reasonably certain that the de-
cision made subsequently to such issue was grounded upon a better
construction of law (a point not necessary to decide), I am of the opin-
ion that neither justice nor good policy requires the intervention of the
government to disturb the title conveyed.
378 DECISIONS RELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS.
RAILROAD GRANT-CONSTRUCTION OF ROAD.
ST. PAUL M. & M. RY. CO.
Although the greater portion of the lands in question lie opposite portions of the
road which were not completed within the time required by the granting act,
the Department is estopped by the decision of the United States supreme court
in the case of Schulenberg v. Harriman from refusing to permit the list of lands
to go to patent merely on account of the failure of the company to complete the
sections of road within the time prescribed.
Secretary Teller to Comnisioner McFarland, April 3, 1883.
On December 30, 1882, the Department referred to you a letter of
Messrs. Curtis & Burdett in relation to a certain list of selections of
land on account of the grant to the Saint Paul and Pacific, Saint Vin-
cent extension, now the Saint Paul, Minneapolis and Manitoba Railway
Company, which had received the approval of my predecessor, Mr.
Kirkwood, with directions that you submit to the Department the pro-
posed amended list for approval, with all other papers on file in your
office pertaining to the case, as requested by the letter of the attorneys
of the road.
On the 15th of January last, in accordance with this direction, you
inclosed the said list of 6,273.68 acres and papers, stating th at you "had
not been officially advised of Secretary Kirkwood's decision of any of
the questions raised before him as to the issuance of patent in this case,"
and that "the major portion of the lands described in said list desired
to be patented lie opposite to portions of said railroad which were not
completed within the term required by the granting act."
I have been informed that Secretary Kirkwood, after informally or-
dering suspension of action on the list approved by him, disposed of all
the objections raised by Mr. G. B. Edmonds's letter of September 9, 1881
(concerning the lands which he states were about to be patented to the
Saint Paul, Minneapolis and Manitoba Railway Company), excepting
the one relating to indemnity selected for lands lost within the granted
limits of the railroad through the operation of the swamp-land grant to
the State of Minnesota, and upon which he did not reach a conclusion.
As to the information which you deem proper to give with regard to
the major portion of the lands described in said list, that "they lie op-
posite portions of said railroad which were not completed within the
term required by the granting act," I have to say that I am estopped
by the decision of the United States supreme court in the ease of Schu-
lenberg v. Harriman (21 Wall., 44) from refusing to permit such list to
go to patent merely on account of the failure of the company to com-
plete the sections of road affected within the time rescribed. Besides,
I question whether I am empowered, under the well-settled practice of
this Department, to set aside, by my own volition, without sufficient
and controlling reasons, a list of selections formally approved by a for-
mer Secretary.
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Under date of the 28th ultimo, Messrs. Curtis & Burdett request that
the list of 6,273.68 acres be returned to them, and that the list of selec-
tions for indemnity approved by Secretary Kirkwood be patented, omit-
ting the tracts selected in lieu of lands lost to the road by reason of the
swamp grant. They also state that they do not by this intend to sur-
render any rights the company may have acquired by reason of the ap-
proval of the list by Secretary Kirkwood of the lands withdrawn from
consideration at the present time by the Department.
You are directed to patent the lands certified by Secretary Kirkwood,
omitting from the list, however, the 6,273.68 acres which were selected
in lieu of lands lost by reason of the swamp grant.
RAILROAD GRANT-CONFLICTING PRE-EMPTION CLAIM.
HAZEL . ST. PAUL & SIOUX CITY R. R. CO. ET AL.
Although it is held that the burden of proof is upon him who alleges that a tract
within the granted limits is excepted from a railroad grant, yet, as a pre-emption
filing isprintafacie evidence of a valid right, it follows that a pre-emption filing
makes a prima facie case in favor of the pre-emption claimant, and shifts the bur-
den of proof from him, and in the absence of evidence to rebut the presumption
raised by his pre-emption filing the validity of his pre-emption claim nust be
deemed to be established and his entry must be approved.
Commissioner MlfcFarland to register and receiver, Worthington, Afinne-
sota, October 10, 1881.
Referring to final homestead entry No. 4942, dated January 16, 1878
(original 8602, January 3, 1873), in the name of Hugh C. Hazel, cover-
ing the NE. I Sec. 21, T. 105, R. 27, I have to state that the tract is
unoffered land and is within the 20 mile indemnity limits of the addi-
tional grant by the act of May 12, 1864, for the Saint Paul and Sioux
City Railroad Company, the withdrawal for which became effective
July 20, 1864. It is also within the 10-mile limits of the grant by the
act of July 4, 1866, for the Southern Minnesota Railroad Company, the
right of which attached November 29, 1866.
Hugh C. Hazel filed D. S. No. 12091 for the tract May 9, alleging set-
tlement March 1, 1862. January 3, 1873, he made homestead No. 8602,
and on January 3, 1878, he submitted final homestead proof, showing
settlement on the land at the date of his entry, and continuous resi-
dence and cultivation from that time to the date of his proof. There is
no pre-emption proof in the case, and as the land was withdrawn for
railroad purposes at lkhe date of his entry, he is not entitled to the
same, unless he has a prior claim based on his pre-emption filing.
Prior to the act of July 14, 1870 (16 Stat., 279), pre-emptors on un-
offered land were not required to make proof and payment until the
lands were offered. Said act required such pre-emptors to make their
proof within eighteen months after the date prescribed for filing their
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declaratory notices had expired, and where said date had elapsed before
the passage of the act, they were to have one year after the passage
thereof to make such proof. The resolution of March 3, 1871 (16 Stat.,
6O1), allowed said parties twelve months' additional time to make their
proof and payment. . The act of May 9, 1872 (17 Stat., 88), allowed
persons who had pre-emptions on the public lands in Minnesota one
-ear in addition to the time then prescribed by law within which to
make their proof and payment. The party, therefore, appears not to
have been in default as to proof and payment at the time he made his
entry, and he, therefore, had the right to transmute his filing to a
homestead entry, if he had complied up to that time with the pre-emp-
tion law.
If Mr. Hazel had a valid pre-emption claim to the land from the time
of filing his declaratory statement down to the time of making his
homestead entry, the land was clearly excepted out of the grant.
It is held that the burden of proof is upon him who alleges that a
tract within the granted limits is excepted from a railroad grant. It
was also decided by Secretary Schurz, in Vincent v. Saint Joseph and
Denver City Railroad Company (4 C. L. O., 44), that a pre-emption
filing is prima facie evidence of a valid right. It consequently follows
that the pre-emption filing of Mr. Hazel made a primafacie case in his
favor and shifted the burden of proof from him, and in the absence of
evidence to rebut the presumption raised by his pre-emption filing the
validity of his pre-emption claim must be deemed to be established, and
his final entry must be, and hereby is, held for approval for patent.
You will so advise him and the proper representative of the Saint Paul
and Sioux City Railroad Company. , The Southern Minnesota Railroad
Company will be advised from this office.
RAILROAD GRANT-WIT'HDRAIVAL-PRE-EMPTION CLAIM.
TREPP . NORTHERN PAC. R. . Co.
A pre-emption claim (not since abandoned), attaching to a tract in an odd-numbered
sectioninthe "granted" limits at the date of the withdrawal made upon the
filing of a map showing the general route of the road, excludes said tract from
the withdrawal and from the grant.
'The failure of a pre-emption claimant to file " in time" on such a tract, but who
afterwards asserts his claim, it, being for " unoffered " land, does not defeat his
claim, except where another settler on the same tract has filed and complied with
the law.
Tracts to which valid pre-emption claims attached when lands were withdrawn for
the road, or at its definite location, cannot pass under the grant if the pre-emption
claimant asserts his right.
The Department decision in Serrano v. Southern Pacific Railroad Company was erro-
neous.
Secretary Kirkwood to Commissioner McFarland, December 17, 1881.
On the 25th ultimo I instructed you verbally to sspend the execu-
tion of my decision of the d of October, 1881, in the case of Martin
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Trepp v. The Northern Pacific Railroad Company, in order that I might
give the case further examination upon the questions of law involved
therein.
The decision of October 3, 1881, was simply an affirmance of the de-
cision of your office following the precedent of the Department in the
case of Serrano v. Southern Pacific Railroad Company, decided July 2,
1879 (6 C. L. O., v. 93), and under the circumstances the main ques-
tions of law involved did not receive the critical examination and care-
ful consideration that they otherwise would; for to reverse the decision
of your office involved the reversal of a rule adopted by my preleces-
sor. Upon a careful re-examination of the case, however, I am con-
vinced that the rule in the Serrano case was erroneous, and hence that
it was an error to hold that the failure of Trepp to file his declaratory
statement for the land in contest within the statutory period, and the
intervention of the withdrawal for said Northern Pacific Railroad Com-
pany after the expiration of said period and before Trepp filed, worked
a forfeiture of the latter's claim.
The material facts are that plat of township embracing tract in ques-
tion was filed in local office at Helena, Mont., September 18, 1869; that
Trepp settled as pre-emptor September 15, 1871; that he was a quali.
fied settler; that he filed declaratory statement for said tract July 3,
1878, more than three months after settlement (Sec. 2265 Rev. Stat.)-;
that he proved up his claim and entered the land August 10, 1878; that
it is found, and, as I understand, it is not questioned, that Trepp per-
formed all the requirements of the pre-emption law except as to filing
in time, and that with this exception his claim is valid in all respects;
that the tract is within the limits of a withdrawal made under authority
of said act of 1864 (13 Stats., 365) for the benefit of said company, by
letter of the Commissioner of the General Land Office, by direction of
the Secretary, under date of April 22, 1872, received at local office
May 6, 1872, upon map of general route filed with the Secretary and
approved by him February 21, 1872; that this letter 'withdrew the odd
sections within the forty-mile limits on each side of the line of general
route; that the tract is within the forty-mile or granted limits as shown
by said map of general route on file in the General Land Office, upon
which the withdrawal was made, and that the road opposite the land
has not been definitely located.
Of course it will be admitted that the title to land within this with-
drawal has not absolutely vested in the company beyond revocation by
Congress wherever the line of the road has not been definitely located
and constructed (see sections 3, 6, and 20, act of July 2, 1864, 13 Stats.,
365), and it is not certain that the road will ever be definitely located or
built over the line of the general route; but it is a fact that no change
of route has been made, and that the withdrawal of 1872 remains intact
and in full force; hence it must be assumed that the company claims
all rights to which it is entitled by virtue of the filing of the map of
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general route and the withdrawal in accordance therewith. The case
should, therefore, be treated as if the company had a valid claim to such
odd sections within the granted limits as are not excepted from the
.grant; in other words, that all rights intended by the act of 1864 tobe secured to the company upon the filing of a map of general route,
remain unimpaired.
The sixth section of the granting act of 186: (13 Stats., 369) provides
as follows:
That the President of the United States shall cause the land to besurveyed for forty miles in width on both sides of the entire line of saidroad, after the general route shall be fixed . . . . . and the oddsections of land hereby granted shall not be liable to sale, or entry, orpre-emption before or after they are surveyed, except by said companyas provided in this act, but the provisions qf the act of September, eighteenHundred and forty-one, granting pre-emption rights, and the acts amend-atory thereof . . . . . shall be, and the same are hereby, ex-tended to all other lands on the line of said road, when surveyed, ex-cepting those hereby granted to said company.
I have underscored words above which seem to me to have significant
bearing upon the question in the case.
The first observation upon this section is, that while it does not interms direct the Secretary of the Interior to withdraw lands for the bene-fEt of the company, the duty and authority to do so are clearly implied.The map of general route being filed, the lateral limits of the grantthereby appear. The odd sections granted by the act are not thereafterliable to sale, entry, or pre emption. There is no way, therefore, to pre-
vent disposal or entries of the granted land except by giving notice of thelimits of the grant and directing the local officers to make no disposi-tion of the granted lands within those limits. It has been held by theDepartment that upon acceptance of map of general route by the Sec.
retary, a withdrawal of the odd sections took place eo instanti, by force
of the sixth section of the statute itself (1 C. L. L., 377); nevertheless,
orders of withdrawal were deemed necessary to avoid confusion and toprotect both settlers and the company, and there can be no question of
the authority to make such withdrawal.
If, however, any question that executive authority existed to makethe withdrawal of April 22, 1872, arises in the mind of any one, refer-
ence to section 2281 Rev. Stat., and to the decision of the supreme
court in Wolcott v. Des Moines Co., 5 Wall., 681, will settle it affirma-tively. This certainly puts the case on its firmest grounds in favor ofthe company, and in my opinion on the correct basis.
Now let us see whether the company has any just claim of right toTrepp's land, or whether Trepp's entry ought to be canceled by reason
of anything in said act of 1864, or the recited proceedings thereunder.In the first place the legislative withdrawal which occurred upon the
acceptance of the map of general route February 21, 1872, or the exec-
utive withdrawal of April 22, 1972, embraced and attached only to the
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odd sections " granted " by act of 1864. The withdrawal was limited
to such by the express language of the sixth section: " And the odd
sections of land hereby granted shall not be liable to sale," etc., and the
provisions of the pre-emption law "shall be and the same are hereby
extended to all other lands on the line of said road, when surveyed, ex-
eepting those hereby granted to said company," is the language of the act.
There was no legislative withdrawal and no authority for executive
withdrawal, therefore of other lands than those granted by the act. It
follows that the right of pre-emption could not be denied to any "other
lands on the line of said road, when surveyed." Now it is obvious that
the withdrawal was to protect the company, and to preserve to it all
lands to which its right might attach and vest upon definite location
(1 C. L. L. No. 400, page 377). What those lands are, the third section of
the act specifies. They are "every alternate section of public land, not
mineral, designated by odd numbers, to the amount of twenty alternate
sections per mile, on each side of said railroad line, as said company
may adopt through the Territories of the United States.
whenev-er on the line thereof the United States have full title, not re-
served, sold, granted, or otherwise appropriated, and free fromt pre-
emnption or other claims or rights at the time the line of said road is
definitely fixed, and a plat thereof filed in the office of the Commissioner
of the General Land Office."
Clearly, the object of Congress, as expressed in the act, was to with-
draw the lands intended to be granted upon the filing of the map of
general route, so that they should maintain their existing status from the
time of withdrawal to the time of filing map of definite location. Hence
the condition of the land at date of withdrawal will determine whether
it was granted or intended to be granted or not, and the withdrawal
would attach to such lands only as maintaining the same status to time
of definite location would pass to the company under t lie grant. Now,
if there was a pre-emption claim (not since abandoned) attaching to
the land in question at the date of the withdrawal, it excluded the land
from the withdrawal and from the grant as effectually as if the map of
definite location had been filed and accepted at the same time as and
instead of the map of general route.
Trepp's was such a claim, unless his failure to file in time defeated it.
That such failure on unoffered land does not defeat nor forfeit a pre-
emption claim, except in case wherein another settler on the same tract
has filed and otherwise complied with the conditions of the law, seems
to me to be firmly settled by the supreme court and this Department,
as it is possible to settle anything, as will presently be shown. But if
it were an original proposition such would necessarily be the conclusion.
Section 2265 Rev. Stat. provides that every claimant under the pre-
emption law for unoffered land shall make known his claim in writing
to the register of the proper land office within three mon ths from set-
tlement, etc., otherwise his claim shall be forfeited and the tract
384 DECISIONS RELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS.
awarded to the next settler, in the order of time, on the same tract of
land, who has given such notice and otherwise complied with the con-
ditions of the law." Section 22$2 Rev. Stat. provides that nothing con-
tained in the chapter relative to pre-emptions shall delay the sale of
any of the public lands beyond the time appointed by the proclamation
of the President.
Now, when it is considered that unoffered land cannot be entered at
private entry or sale, and that settlement without filing within the time
mentioned in section 2265 will not debar another settler from appro-
priating the land, nor the government from selling it at public sale,
there can be no possible reason for forfeiting a pre-emption claim be-
cause of failure to file in time, nor for giving to section 2265 any other
construction or meaning than its language clearly imports-that is, that
the claim of a pre-emptor who " fails to file the notice of his claim in
time shall be forfeited, and the tract awarded to the next settler," etc.
By limitation of the language itself the forfeiture and award is to the
"next settler."
It is a well-known principle that the law does not favor forfeitures.
To give any other construction to section 2265 than its language im-
ports, would be in open violation of this wise rule and principle of law.
It might be urged that this limitation would restrict the forfeiture and
award to a pre-emption settler; but such does not appear to be the law.
For, in the first place, the section does not so express it; and, in the
next place, section 2289 Rev. Stat., relative to homesteads, makes all
lands that are subject to pre-emption subject to homestead entry. But
whether the law limits the forfeiture to pre-emption settlers or not is of
no consequence in determining this case. If the law is, that in case of
failure to file declaratory statement in time the claim is forfeitable, and
the tract subject to award only to a pre-emptor, let it be so adminis-
tered. The executive duty is to execute the law. The responsibility
for the law is with the law-making power.
Again section 2281 Rev. Stat. provides that-
All settlers o public lands which have been or may be withdrawn
from market in consequence of proposed railroads, and uwho had settled
thereon prior to such withdrawal, shall be entitled to pre-emption at the
ordinary minimum to the lands settled on and cultivated by them; but
they shall file the proper notices of their claims, and make proof and
payment as in other cases.
This section was taken from the act of 27th March, 1854 (10 Stats.,
269), as amended by the second section of the act of July 14, 1870 (16
Stats., 279). All I desire to remark upon the acts of 1854 and 1870 is
that they were in force at the time of the grant to the company and
when the land was withdrawn; that Trepp is undoubtedly entitled to
their provisions as well as to the provisions of section 2281 Rev. Stat.,
and that all that that section requires is that the settler shall file and
make proof and payment as in other cases.
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It follows, therefore, that if a failure to file or make proof and pay-
ment in time works no forfeiture of a claim in the absence of another
subsequent settler on the same tract in other cases, it cannot under the
act of 1854, as amended, and section 2281, which were unquestionably
enacted for the protection of settler's claims, and not for their destruc-
tion. But this question was clearly and positively settled by the su-
preme court in the case of Johnson v. Towsley (13 Wall., 72). That case
has been so often referred to, quoted from, and applied in decisions of
this Department, that it would seem supererogation to do more than
refer to it; but I feel constrained to call attention to certain facts
therein.
Towsley settled June 15, 1858, and filed declaratory statement Feb-
ruary 4, 1859. Johnson filed declaratory statement October 5, 1860, for
same land. On September 20,1862, the local officers allowed Towsley's
entry, and issued patent certificated. Finally, upon appeal to the Secra-
tary of the Interior, a decision was rendered July 11, 1863, in favor of
Johnson. Afterwards Johnson entered the land and received-a patent
therefor. Upon these facts the court upheld Towsley's title, and de-
creed that Johnson, who was held to be the trustee of Towsley, should
convey the title, which passed by patent to Towsley. I need not refer
specially to the opinion of the court upon the question of the failure of
Towsley to file in time. They held that it did not defeat his claim,
because no other person, settler on the same tract, had given the notice,
etc., before Towsley filed. But I desire to draw attention specially to
the fact that the court held that Towsley's claim was a valid pre-emp-
tion claim, notwithstanding his failure to file in time, which point was
fully considered; and being a valid claim, which means that Towsley
had made compliance with the law as the court construed it, the court
decreed the title in him.
Now, let me ask, what is it that is excepted from the grant of the
Northern Pacific Railroad Company What is carved out of the grant
by express language ? What condition is land in which cannot pass
under the grant ? What, by every intendment of the act, should not
pass by the grant 
The answer comes from the very language of the third section of the
act itself. Land, odd sections, to which a pre-emption claim attaches
when the same is withdrawn for the benefit of the road, or at definite
location, as above shown, cannot pass under the grant if the claim is
not abandoned. The land, in other words, nust be "free from pre-emp-
tion or other claims or rights." According to Johnson v. Towsley,
Trepp had a pre-emption claim at the time of withdrawal.
It is not a question whether or not the company is an adverse claim-
ant, and whether the intervention of its claim works a defeat or for.
feiture of Trepp's pre-emption, as in the case of the subsequent settler
who has given notice, etc. The real question is whether the claim of
Trepp does not bring the tract within the exception to the grant; and
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under the doctrine of Johnson v. Towsley it clearly does; and the same
doctrine was maintained in Lansdale v. Daniels (10 Otto, 117).
Another view is that, as between the United States and the company,
the grant is construed more favorably to the government and strictly
as to the company. (Leavenworth Railroad Company v. The United
States, 2 Otto, 733.) Hence, instead of attempting by strained inter-
pretation of the c.pinions in Johnson v. Towsley and Lansdale v. Daniels
to avoid applying the rule that failure to file for more than three months
will not of itself render a claim invalid, the doctrine of those cases
should be applied in the sense in which it plainly appears in said opin-
ions. Yet even in this view of the case the only hardship upon the
company will be the selection of other land in lieu of that claimed by
Trepp; the grant is not necessarily diminished.
The Department at an early day adopted the doctrine of Johnson v.
Towsley, and applied it in cases similar to the one under consideration.
There is an unbroken line until we reach the case of Serrano v. The
Southern Pacific Railroad Company. (6 C. L. O., 93.) In that case it
will be observed that the Secretary found, leaving out of view the ques-
tion of laches in filing, that Mrs. Serrano had no pre-emption claim when
the right of the company attached. That was sufficient to defeat her
case, and to award the land to the company. The reasoning, after re-
jecting the claim upon the facts, does not seem to me, after careful con-
sideration thereof, to overcome that of the court in the cases cited, nor
the evident intent of sections 2265, 2281, and 22S2 of the Revised Stat-
utes, nor to my mind does it afford sufficient ground for setting aside a
rule that had prevailed in the Department since January 10, 1872, at
least. (Walker and Walker, 1 C. L. L., 293.)
The Department, prior to the Serrano case, had not only held that a
failure to file in the absence of an adverse settler's claim did not defeat
a pre-emption claim, but it had also held, by analogy of reasoning, that
a failure to prove up within the time required would not defeat a claim.
I here refer to some of the decisions in which the Department has
applied the Johnson-Towsley doctrine, either directly or analogously;
and an examination of them will show how firmly that doctrine was
adopted as a rule of law for the guidance of the Laud Department.
Walker and Walker, above cited; Erastus Kimball (1 C. L. L., 295);
Schwerin v. Western Pacific Railroad Company (1 C. L. L., 409)-this
case was decided February 9, 1872; Fitzgerald v. Western Pacific Rail-
road (2 C. L. 0., 51, exactly in point); Daffy v. Northern Pacific Rail-
road Company (2 C. L. O., 51, exactly in point); Whitaker v. Southern
Pacific Railroad Company (id., 119, exactly in point); Watson v. Mis-
sonri River, Fort Scott and Gulf Railroad Company (3 id., 7); Barnes
v. Saint Joseph and Denver City Railroad Company id., 132); Southern
Pacific Railroad Company v. Wiggins et al. (4 id., 123); Cox v. Southern
Pacific Railroad Company (6 id., 35).
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Now, Trepp's claim being valid at date of withdrawal, there is no in-
hibition in the act of 1864 against allowing his entry after the with-
drawal; because (1) it is not one of the tracts withdrawn, and (2) the
sixth section of the act of 1864 specifically provides that the provisions
of the pre-emption law shall extend to all lands along the line of road
except those granted to the company, and (3) section 2281 also provides
for the allowance of the entry.
The decision of this Department of October, 3,1881, is hereby recalled
and set aside, and that of your office of January 22, 1881, reversed, and
the entry of Trepp held for patent, and not for cancellation.
RAILROAD GRANT-PRE-~rMPTION-ACT 01 APRIL 21, 1876.
WARD V. SOUTHERN MINN. y. EXT. CO.
A pre-emption entry which was canceled for conflict with the railroad grant held as.
confirmed by, and for re-instatement under, the act of April 21, 1876, notwith-
standing the fact that the pre-emptor had, upon the cancellation of his entry,
applied for the return of the purchase-money, it not appearing from the office
records that the money had been refunded.
Secretary Teller to Commissioner McFarland, June 5, 1882.
I have considered the case of the Southern Minnesota Railway Ex-
tension Company v. Albert L. Ward, involving the NW. of the SW.
4 and the SW. of the NW. of Sec. 9, T. 102, R. 30, Worthington
(formerly Jackson) district, Minnesota, on appeal by the company from
your predecessor's decision of May 4, 1881, holding Ward's entry, No.
7756, made July 17, 1872, for re-instatement.
The tract is within the 10 miles (granted) limits of the grant by the
act of July 4, 1866 (14 Stat., 87), to the company, the right of which
attached November 29, 1866, and was formerly embraced in Thomas G.
Eggleston's homestead entry, No. 1136, dated November 12,1863, which
was canceled January 15, 1867, for abandonment. Ward filed declar-
atory statement, No. 15695, for the.tract December 1, alleging settle-
ment September 11, 1871., and made entry as above stated.
By letter of September 15, 1873, the register and receiver transmitted
to your office au application of Ward for repayment of the purchase-
money upon his entry. On December 11 ensuing the entry was accord-
ingly canceled. This action was based upon the testimony adduced at
a hearing had at the Jackson office (pursuant to your office instruction
of January 23, preceding) to ascertain the status of the land November
29, 1866, the date of the definite location of the road. As such testi-
mony showed that Eggleston had abandoned the land long prior to said
date, your office held that such entry (lid not except the tract from the
operation of the grant, and allowed the company to select the same upon
its paying the requisite fees. The company accordingly selected the
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tract March 4, 1880. This action of your office was in accordance with
the rulings that then obtained, but which have since been changed.
My predecessor, Mr. Secretary Chandler, in the case of Chalkley
Thomas v. Saint Joseph and Denver City Railroad Company (3 C. L. O.,
197), held that land situate within the limits of a railroad grant covered
by homestead entries at the date of such granting act, which entries
were subsequently canceled, are excepted from the operation of the
grant. In this view of the case the entry was improperly conceled.
Stress is laid upon Ward's assertion that he never applied for the repay-
nent of his purchase-money, notwithstanding the fact that the records
of your office contain presumptive proof that such application was filed.
While your records undoubtedly show such fact, they also show that
the application has lain in your office for several years, but they fail to
discover that the money has been refunded.
In view of such record showing, and as Ward's proof stands unim-
peached by the company, I deem it competent for tne Department,
under the ruling cited, to entertain his application for the re-instatement
of his cash entry and for the issuance of patent thereon.
Inasmuch as it appears that at the date of the definite location afore-
said Eggleston's homestead entry was intact upon the records, and as
Ward has made final proof showing bona fide compliance with the re-
quirements of the pre-emption law, I am of the opinion that his entry
falls clearly within the intendment of the second section of the act of
April 21, 1876 (19 Stat., 35), and that the same is thereby confirmed.
Your predecessor's decision is modified accordingly.
RAILROAD GRANT- WITHDRA WAL-PRE-EMPTION CLAIM.
MCCAIN v. TEXAS & PACIFIC Ry. Co.
McCain's pre-emption claim is allowed, as the land was claimed as a pre-emption by
a qualified party at date of withdrawal for the railroad.
Acting Commissioner Harrison to register and receiver, Los Angeles, Cali-
fornia, January 5, 1883.
I have considered the case of Lawrence Mc(ain v. The Texas and
Pacific Railway Company, involving the NW. I NE. 1, NE. NW.; of
Sec. 9, and the E. j SW. 41 of Sec. 4, 18 S., 5 E., S. B. M., California.
The land is within the limits of the grant of March 3, 1871, to the
said railroad company. The line of road is not yet definitely located.
The lands in the odd-numbered sections were withdrawn upon a pre-
liminary line October 15, 1871.
The records of this office show that one Silas Yarrell hade pre-emp-
tion filing No. 137 for the tract in the odd-numbered section April 11,
1870, alleging that he made settlement thereon October 18, 1868.
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On the 29th of May, 1882, the present claimant, Lawrence Mcain,
made application at the local office to make pre-emption filing for the
land, alleging that he made settlement thereon November 15,1881. His
application was rejected by the register and receiver, on the ground
that the tract in the odd-numbered section was within the limits of the
withdrawal for the Texas and Pacific Railway Company. Mr. McCain
appealed to this office, alleging that the land embraced in the said ap-
plication was covered by a valid pre-emption claim at the date of the
withdrawal for the Texas and Pacific Railway Company, and as such
was excepted from the said withdrawal.
Mc~ain filed with his application the ex parte affidavits of one John
H. Gray and L. H. Gaskill, showing that one Silas Yarrell, a citizen of
the United States, and a qualified pre-emptor, was residing on the land,
with his family, in 1869, and claiming it as a pre-emption right; that
he continued to reside on the land until 1873; that he had improvements
thereon, consisting of a dwelling-house, milk-house, and corral, and
about five acres fenced and under cultivation-the whole valued at about
five hundred dollars.
The grant to the company was of every alternate section of public
land, not mineral, designated by odd numbers, to the amount of twenty
alternate sections per mile, on each side of said railroad line through
the territories of the United States, and ten alternate sections per mile
on each side of said railroad in California, where the same should not
have been sold, reserved, or otherwise disposed of by the United States,
and to which a pre-emption or homestead claiin should not have attached
at the time the line of said road should be definitely fixed.
The line of road has not been definitely fixed, and the right of the
company has not attached to any of the lands within its grant. A with-
drawal of lands for its benefit was made October 15, 1871, upon the
filing of the map of general route in this office. At that date the records
show that Silas Yarrell had a pre-emption filing upon the tract in ques-
tion. You will, accordingly, permit McCain to make pre-emption filing
for the land; and after the usual notice by publication, will permit him
to make proof and entry for the same.
WAGON-ROA4D 'GRAXT-PBE-EAIPTION FILING.
OVERHOLT V. DALLES MILITARY W"AGON-ROAD CO.
An application to file a pre-emption declaratory statement for a tract within the
indemnity limits of the grant should be allowed subject to the company's right to
select the tract.
Secretary Teller to Commissioner McFarland, July 11, 1882.
I have considered the appeal of -D. G. Overholt from your decision of
April 12, 1881, rejecting his application to file a pre-emption declaratory
statement upon the SE. 1 of Sec. 33, T. 13 S., R. 33 E., Lc, Grand, Ore-
gon.
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The tract is within the ten-mile or indemnity limits of the withdrawal
for the benefit of the Dalles Military Wagon-Road Company, under the
act of February 25, 1867 (14 Stat., 409), which grants (Sec. 1) "alter-
nate sections of public lands, designated by odd numbers to the extent
of three sections in width on each side of said road."
The fourth section authorizes the location and use in the construction
of the road, of an additional amount of public lands, not exceeding 10
miles in distance from it, equal to the amount reserved from the opera-
tion of the first section of the act (i. e., of lands reserved or otherwise
appropriated).
In the case of Ryan v. Railroad Company 9 Otto, 382), the court, in
construing an act containing substantially similar provisions, said:
With respect to the " lieu lands," as they are called, the right was
only a float and attached to no specific tracts until the selection was
actually made in the manner prescribed. . . . . It was within the
secondary or indemnity territory where that deficiency was to be sup-
plied. The railroad company had not and could not have any claim to
it until specially selected.
Following this decision, it was held by the Department, in the case
of Blodgett v. California and Oregon Railroad Company (6'C. L. O., 37,
1879), that a pre-emption claim for a tract of land falling within the in-
demnity limits of a railroad grant, although made subsequent to the
date of withdrawal, is capable of being perfected should the company
fail to select said tract as lieu land upon the adjustment of its grant,
but is incapable of perfection so long as the grant remains unadj usted.
(See also Stroud v. Grand Rapids and Indiana Railroad Company, 6 C.
L. O., 112.)
The present case is within the same rule, and, it not appearing that
the company has selected the tract in question, the application of Over-
holt should be allowed, subject to the right of the Wagon-Road Com-
pany, under said fourth section. Your decision is reversed.
RAILROAD GRANT- WITHDRA W. IC-PRE-EMPTION.
EMERSON V. SOUTHERN PAC. R. R. Co.
A pre-emption filing shown to be fraudulent does not except the land covered thereby
from the grant to the railroad company, it being held that the cancellation of
such a filing took effect by relation as of the date of settlement, so that it may be
said that the filing never existed.
Secretary Teller to Commissioner McFarlarnd, February 16, 1883.
I have considered the case of Leonard H. Emerson v. The Southern
Pacific Railroad Company, Branch Line, involving the W. t of NE. i,
SE. J of NW. 1, and NE. 1 of SW. i of See. 15, T. 1 N., R. 11W ., S. B.
M., Los Angeles district, California, on appeal by Emerson from your
decision of May 19, 1882, in favor of the company.
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The tract is within the 20 miles (granted) limits of the grant to the
company by act of March 3, 1871 (16 Stat., 579), the right of which
attached April 3, 1871, and the withdrawal for which was made May
10 ensuing.
It appears that one Fabricio (le la Ossa filed declaratory statement
No. 581, for the tract, October 27, 187:3, alleging settlement thereon
November 30, 1869, and under date of February 16, 1874, he made pre-
emption proof and payment for the land, whereupon cash entry No. 209
issued therefor. May 11 ensuing, however, the company filed affidavits
in your office alleging that Ossa had neither resided upon nor culti-
vated the tract in question, and that he had sold his claim prior to his
entry thereof, upon the date whereof he executed a deed conveying the
same.
Whereupon a hearing was ordered pursuant to departmental direction
of September 27,1879, whereat Ossa failed to appear, although duly cited.
The testimony adduced thereat fully sustained the company's allegations,
establishing the fact that Ossa was not a bona fide pre-emptor, but that
he had done nothing upon the land save to procure wood therefrom for
market. Your office thereupon decided that his claim was invalid, and
accordingly canceled his entry September 4, 1880.
April 13, 1882, Emerson applied at the local office to file for the said
tract, alleging settlement thereon November 28, 1881, bt the register
and receiver rejected such application on the ground that the laud was
within the aforesaid withdrawal limits. He appealed from this action,
alleging that the land had not been patented to the company, and that
it was subject to his filing by reason of Ossa's claim. By your decision
in question, however, you approved such action, and held that, in the
light of said showing touching Ossa's claim, the tract was not thereby
excepted from the operation of the railroad grant.
Inasmuch as it has been established that Ossa never settled as alleged
in his declaratory statement, and that he neither resided upon nor
improved the land as alleged in his final proof-viz, between 1869 and
1874, nor at any other time, I am of the opinion that at no time had he
acquired any right to the tract; and it was therefore competent for the
company to prove that he had perpetrated a fraud against the govern-
ment and its own rights in entering and attempting to convey the land
as alleged. Upon the establishment of the fact that the entry was
fraudulent your office very properly canceled it, pursuant to the provis-
ions of section 2262 of the Revised Statutes.
As his bad faith has been established, I am of opinion that his claim
was invalid-being vitiated by fraud-and did not except the land from
the operation of the company's grant; for upon this hypothesis the can-
cellation took effect by relation as of the date of his settlement, so that
it may be said his filing never existed. The land having thus enured
to the railroad grant prior to Emerson's filing therefor, the company's
right ante-dated, and must therefore be regarded as paramount to his.
Your decision is accordingly affirmed.
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RAILROAD GRANT-CONFLICTING PRIVATE CLAIM.
ATLANTIC AND PAC. R. R. Co. v. FISHER.
Land within the limits of a Spanish or Mexican grant cannot be selected by a rail-
road company as a part of their grant, although the Spanish or Mexican grant had
not been confirmed by the United States.
Lands within the boundaries of any grant awaiting a judicial decision or adjustment
cannot be considered as public lands.
Secretary Teller to Commissioner MeFarland, June 8, 1882.
I have considered the case of the Atlantic and Pacific Railroad Com-
pany v. William Fisher, involving the W. of SW. -of Sec. 11, lot 1
of Sec. 14, lot 1 of Sec. 15, and lot 4 of Sec. 20, T. 4 N., R. 26 W., S. B.
M., Los Angeles district, California., on appeal by the company from
your decision of July 22, 1881, holding Fisher's entry for approval for
patent.
The said tracts are within the 20 miles (granted) limits of the grant
by the act of July 27, 1866 (14 Stats., 292), to the company, which be-
came effective August 15, 1872, the withdrawal for which was made
December i, 1874.
The township plat was filed in the local office May 21, 1875.
The odd-numbered sections of land were also within the claimed limits
of the Rancho Los Prietos y Najalayegua, which was confirmed by the
private act of June 12, 1866 (14 Stats., 589), and patented February 19,
1875.
The records of your office show that in the year 1867 a survey of said
rancho was made by United States Deputy Surveyor Thompson, at the
instance of the grant claimants, but the surveyor-general of California
forwarded the same without his approval, stating in his letter of trans-
mittal that such survey was not " in accordance with the original title
papers on file in his office," as prescribed by the confirmatory grant.
Your office rejected this survey April 23, 1870, under which date it
directed the surveyor-general to make such new survey of the rancho
as he could approve, in accordance with the requirements of the act of
July , 1864 (13 Stats., 332). These instructions were not carried out,
however, and your office, under date of July 21, 1873, further instructed
the surveyor-general to make a segregation survey of the rancho by
extending the lines of the public surveys thereover, pursuant to the
requirements of the eighth section of the act of July 23, 1866 (14 Stat.,
218). Such survey was accordingly made by United States Deputy
Surveyor Norway, which was approved by the surveyor-general June
24, 1874. and forwarded to your office. This survey did not include the
tracts in question. Under date of September 18 ensuing your office
rejected the same, holding the true boundaries of the rancho, as shown
by the title papers aforesaid, to be upon certain specified lines accord-
ing to which a new survey was directed to be made. The surveyor-
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general made such survey, which excluded said tracts and was substan-
tially in accordance with the Norway survey.
In January, 1875, pending appeal from the said decision of your office
the case was finally compromised by all the parties in interest, and the
appeal withdrawn pursuant to a stipulation filed. The case having been
thus settled, patent issued February 19, 1875, for the rancho as em-
braced within the boundaries designated by said decision.
The records of your office further show that Fisher filed declaratory
statement No. 915, for the tracts in question, June 18, 1875, alleging
settlement thereon February 14, 1874, and that he made final proof
August 1, 1877, whereon final certificate No. 616 was issued under same
date. Upon the foregoing statement of facts the question arises, were
these tracts subject to pre-emption entry when Fisher filed his declara-
tory statement therefor, or had they passed to the railroad company by
,virtue of its grant ? There can be no doubt that, by the withdrawal,
the grant took effect upon such odd-numbered sections of public lands
within the specified limits as were not excluded from its operation; and
the question arises, whether lands within the boundaries of an alleged
Mexican or Spanish grant which was then sub jdice are public within
the meaning of the act of Congress by virtue of which the railroad
company asserts title in the premises. The words ' public lands' are
habitually used in our legislation to describe such as are subject to sale
or other disposal under general laws. That they were so employed in
this instance is evident from the fact that to them alone could the order
withdrawing lands from pre-emption, private entry, and sale apply"
(Newhall v. Sanger, 92 U. S., 761). By the third section of the act of
July 27, 1866, aforesaid, Congress granted " every alternate section of
public lands, not mineral, designated by odd numbers
not reserved, sold, granted, or otherwise appropriated, and free from
pre-emption or other claims or rights at the time the line of said road is
designated by a plat thereof, filed in the office of the Commissioner of
the General Land Office."7
The confirmatory act antedated the one just cited, and pending the
exercise of the jurisdiction expressly conferred by the former, Congress
cannot be presumed to have granted the land to the company. A tract
of land legally appropriated to any purpose becomes eo instanti severed
from the mass of public lands, and no subsequent law, proclamation, or
sale will be construed to embrace or operate upon it, although no reser-
vation were made of it. This doctrine was enunciated by the United
States supreme court in the case of Wilcox v. Jackson (13 Peters, 498),
and reiterated in the case of L. L. & G. R. R. Co. v. United States (93
U. S., 733). Thus it appears that from the date of the confirmatory act
down to January, 1875, the tracts in question were within the claimed
limits of the rancho grant, so that they were in a state of reservation
during the whole period covering the date of the railroad grant, the
date when the same became effective, and the date of the withdrawal.
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But it is strenuously urged by the company's attorneys that the doc-
trine enunciated in the case first hereinbefore cited is not applicable to
this case (1), because the facts therein are dissimilar, and (2), because
the confirmation of the grant claim was by boundaries which were sub-
sequently so located as to exclude the land in contest, which land was
not, therefore, within the limits of the claim at the date of the definite
location of the road. A mere variance in unimportant or collateral facts
is immaterial. The substantial fact in the case cited was that at the
late when the railroad right became effective the land was claimed, in
the proper tribunal, to be part of a Mexican grant, and that that claim
was sub judice pending the adjustment of the same. Now if this be so,
in such a case where the claim was found to be a forgery and absolutely
rejected by reason of having no grant as a basis therefor, then, a for-
tiori, does the doctrine therein enunciated obtain in this case, where
the grant is unquestionably valid, the same having been confirmed by
Congress by express reference to certain original title papers of record
in the office of the surveyor-general of California, upon whom the duty
of surveying the raucho in accordance with such papers was imposed,
the issuance of patent for the lands thus surveyed being conditioned
upon the approval of such survey by the Commissioner of the General
Land Office.
By the confirmatory act all questions of title were finally determined
and the sole duty imposed upon the Land Department was the ascer-
tainment of the extent and locus of the grant as shown by the original
title papers aforesaid. But until the extent and exact locus of the grant
were ascertained au(l approved in the manner expressly described by
the statute, the raucho remained an unknown quantity, so that no one
could say to what lands the confirmnees were certainly entitled. I am,
therefore, of the opinion that the tracts in question were reserved from
the operation of the railroad grant, and that the same were public lands
subject to pre-emption when Fisher filed his declaratory statement
therefor, and as his proof shows him to be a qualified pre-emptor, and
that he has complied in good faith with legal requirements in point of
inhabitancy and improvement, he is clearly entitled to a patent for the
land.
Your decision is therefore affirmed.
RAILROAD GANT-SELECTIO-N-TERMINAL LIMITS.
FLINT & PERE MARQUETTE R. . Co.
The railroad is not entitled to select (in either its granted or indemnity limits) lands
lying west of its western terminus, it being the settled practice to allow no selec-
tions beyond the terminal limits of a railroad defined by a line drawn at right
angles with the general route of the road at such terminus.
Secretary Kirkuood to Commissioner MceFarland, September 1, 1881.
I have considered the appeal of the land agent of the Flint and Pere
Marquette Railroad Company from your decision of January 26, 1881,
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rejecting his application to select certain lands enumerated in the two
lists tiled by him. These lands in question are situate in the W. i of
townships S. 19 and 20 N., range iS W., Reed City (formerly Ionia) dis-
trict, Michigan, and are claimed by the State under and by virtue of
the act of June 3, 1856 (11 Stat., 21).
By this act there were granted to the State to aid i the construc-
tion of certain railroads therein named, of which the road aforesaid is
one-
Every alternate section of land designated by odd numbers, for six
sections in width on each side of each of said roads; but in case it shall
appear that the United States have, when the lines or routes of sil
roads are definitely fixed, sold any section or any part thereof as afore-
said, or that the right of pre-emption has attached to the same, then it
J shall be lawful for any agent or agents, to be appointed by the gov-
ernor of said State, to select, subject to the approval of the Secretary
of the Interior, from the lands of the United States nearest to the tiers
of sections above specified," etc.
It appears from the record that the withdrawal for the railroad afore-
sa-d became effective August 16, 1858, but that the lands in question
were not enbraced within the limits thereof, the same lying west of Lud-
ington, which is the western terminus of said road and situate in Sec.
15, T. 18 N.7 R. 18 W.
Your predecessor held, in the decision aforesaid, that it is the settled
practice of your office not to allow selections beyond the terminal limits
of a railroad defined by a line drawn at right angles with the general
route of the road at such terminus.
The act aforesaid is a grant in place, and it is conceded by said agent
that the granted or six miles limit must be coterminous, but he urges that
the same rule should not obtain in regard to the indemnity or fifteen
miles limit. The first proviso to the second section of the act of March
3, 1871 (16 Stat., 582), amendatory of the act aforesaid, provides " that
said lands authorized to be sold as aforesaid shall include only lands
situated opposite to and cotermi nous with te completed sections."
It appears that this and kindred questions relative to the determina-
tion of the termini of railroad grants were raised before this Depart-
ment in the matter of the Iowa railroad grants, and it was decided by
my predecessor, Mr. Secretary Thompson, February 23, 1858, that the
limits should terminate within lines perpendicular to the general course
of the road at its terminal points ( Lester, 527). The supreme court
in United States v. Burlington and Missouri River Railroad Company,
appears to sanction this construction when it declares that " the land was
taken along such line in the sense of the statute, when taken along the
general direction or course of the road within lines perpendicular to it
at each end." (8 Otto, 334.)
Your decision is accordingly affirmed.
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RAILBOAD GRANT-BIGHT OF WAY-PRIORITY.
UTAH & WYOMING R. R. CO. V. OREGON SHORT LINE RY. CO.
The question of priority between two roads claiming right of way under act of March
3, 187 5, is a question of fact to be determined by the courts. The Department
cannot take official cognizance of such question.
Secretary Kirkwood to Commissiomer cFarland, April 10, 1882.
I return for your files two maps of the Oregon Short Line Railway
Company submitted for my approval by your letter of 6th instant, and
showing the line of location under act of March 3, 1875, of two sections
of 20 miles each, viz:
From a point on Ham's Fork 40 miles west of Grander, in the Terri-
tory of Wyoming, to a point on Twin Creek, in Sec. 3, 21 N., 119 W.,
and-
From the point last named to a point in Sec. 29, 24 N., 119 W.
You report that the line represented on the first map, and also about
4 miles of that represented on the second, passes through the same
quarter sections of land as the located line of the Utah and Wyoming
Railroad Company, heretofore approved.
In this connection I have to state that upon protest and petition of
the last-named company, filed in this Department on the 21 of January
last, based upon allegations of former company of the previously
located line of the latter, I have allowed the parties to file affidavits and
to present before me full argument upon the subject of my right to ap-
prove the maps now presented.
The affidavits present entirely conflicting statements of fact respect-
ing such appropriation.
Not deeming it proper, upon the showing made, for me to take official
cognizance of the issues of fact presented, and being of the opinion that
the judicial tribunals alone can authoritatively determine the respective
rights of the parties, I have decided to approve the location, subject to
the rights of the Union Pacific Railway Company, across whose lands
I understand the line passes, and also subject to the rights of the Utah
and Wyoming Railroad Company, upon whose previously located and
approved right of way it is alleged the right of way of the Oregon
Short Line Company now submitted for approval is located, or any
other private right, and subject to any legal objection by reason of the
date of the organization of said Oregon Short Line Railway Company
and of the filing of the due proofs of the same and the approval thereof
by this Department-and have indorsed my approval accordingly.
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RIGHT OF WAY-SURVEY.
UTAH & WYOMING R. E. CO.
The act of March 3, 1875, provides specifically for approval of maps upon surveyed
lands, but requires no filing or approval of such maps prior to survey.
Secretary Teller to Commissioner McFarland, February 12, 1883.
I approve and return herewith the two maps of the Utah & Wyom-
ing Railroad, submitted by your report of 9th instant, the first covering
a distance of 4,62S.4 feet from a point on the boundary between Utah
and Wyoming, in Sec. 9, 21 N., 120 W., to a point in Sec. 10, same town-
ship; and the second, a distance of 41.12 miles from the west line of
Sec. 7, 21 N., 118 W., to the south line of Sec. 32, 21 N., 112 W.
The act of March 3, 1875 (18 Stat., 482), provides specifically for ap-
proval of maps upon surveyed lands, but requires no filing or approval
of such maps prior to survey.
Any regulation of this Department requiring or providing for the
filing of maps over the unsurveyed lands must be held to operate for
purposes of information merely, and such filing and approval cannot
take the place of nor supersede the approval required by the express
language of the law.
RAILROAD GBANT-WITHDRA WAD-SETTLEMENT.
PRESSEY v. NORTHERN PAC. R. R. Co.*
In 1873 a withdrawal was made for the railroad company's branch line in Wyoming
Territory on a map of general route; in 1879 a second withdrawal was made upon
a map showing the amended line of said branch.
The railroad has no right or title to the lands within the limits of both withdrawals,
as against a person who settled subsequent to the withdrawal of 1873, but prior
to that of 1879. In other words, the company's right to the lands included in both
withdrawals does not relate back beyond the withdrawal of 1879.
Commissioner McFarland to register and receiver, Yakima, W. T., June 13
1882.
Register's letter of February 7, last, transmitting appeal of George
W. Pressey from your decision rejecting his application to make home-
stead entry of the S. 4 SE. 4 Sec. 14, SW. 4 SW. 4 Sec. 13, and NW. 4
NW. 4 Sce. 24, T. 16 N., R. 16 E., was duly received.
An early consideration of the case was requested for the reason that
a number of settlers who are desirous of filing similar applications were
anxiously awaiting the decision. The limited force of this office, together
with the great press of business, has prevented earlier action in the
case.
Pressey's application was received by you January 31, 1882. You
rejected the application for the reason that the tract in Section 13 " falls
'Reversed, 2 L. D., 551.
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within the limits of the withdrawal for the Northern Pacific Railroad
Company, made August 15, 1873."
The corroborated affidavit of Pressey, filed in support of his appeal,
shows that he settled upon the land May 21, 1878; has resided upon,
cultivated, and improved the same from that date; that his improve-
ments are worth $500; that he was the first settler in the township, and
that he deposited the money and secured the survey of said land. It
also appears that if he is not permitted to acquire title to the tract
in Section 13, his entry will not form a compact body, and that there is
now no vacant land contiguous to the remaining tracts embraced in his
entry.
The question for this office to decide, however, irrespective of any
equities in the case, is the legal status of the land as respects the rights
of said company.
The tract in said Section 13 has been continuously withdrawn since
August 15, 1873. At this date it was withdrawn for the benefit of the
Northern Pacific Railroad Company. Subsequently the company aban-
doned this line and changed the route of its road to a distance of from
25 to 50 miles south of its original line. This was, in fact, a new loca-
tion. The withdrawal for this "amended line" took effect July 18,1879,
and embraced the tract in question. The lands embraced in the former
withdrawal and not embraced in the new withdrawal were restored
September 1, 1879. This tract, of course, was not restored; but Pressey's
settlement was made prior to this last withdrawal, and he still resides
upon the land.
It now becomes necessary, in order to determine the status of this
tract, to give a history of this change of route.
The map of general route of the original branch line filed in 1873, was
accepted by the Department as authorized under the sixth section of
the act of July 2, 1861 (13 Stats., 365), as amended by resolution of May
13, 1870 (16 Stat., 378).
On November 18, 1876, the company applied to amend said branch
line, and filed in the Secretary's office a map greatly shortening the orig-
inal line.
November 24, 1876, the Secretary (Chandler) approved this map and
directed this office to withdraw the lands along the new line and restore
those along the old.
Pending the preparation of the maps of withdrawal, Hon. Orange
Jacobs filed in the Department a motion to reconsider the action of the
Secretary, which was referred to Commissioner Williamson for report.
Report was made January 17, 1877.
October 15 following, Secretary Schurz reviewed the whole subject
and declined to disturb the action of his predecessor, Secretary Chand-
ler, and directed the Commissioner to execute the original instructions.
Before the instructions received the signature of the Commissioner
(Williamson) he was directed by the United States Assistant Attorney-
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General to suspend action in the premises until further ordered. The
matter was held in abeyance.
In 1879 the companyfiled a new map,andrenewed its request of 1876.
This map showed a very different route from that represented upon the
map filed in 1876, and was, as stated by Commissioner Williamson in
his letter to Secretary Schurz of May 21, 1879, " with the exception of
a few miles, a new location." The Commissioner, however, recom-
mended the approval of the map, as the amount of lands that would
inure to the grant under the new location would be much less than
under the old; but calls the Secretary's attention to the question as to
'whether or not the grant had lapsed.
Under date of June 11, 1879, the Secretary (Schurz) reviewed the
whole question, declaring the grant to be in full force and effect, and
returned the map approved, and directed the withdrawal of the lands
along the new line of road and the restoration of those withdrawn.
August 15, 1873, he added as follows:
The rights of settlers upon the lands included within the limits of
the withdrawal to be made under the amended route must be protected,
if settlements and entries be made before the receipt of notice of with-
drawal at the local office.
" Prior to the approval of this map of new location, George Gray, esq.,
attorney for said company, under date of June 9, 1879, by letter to Sec-
retary Schurz, relinquished, on behalf of said company, " all claim and
interest'7ot said company " to any and all lands heretofore withdrawn
for its branch line in the Territories of Idaho and Washington, except
so far as the same may be within the limits prescribed by the charter
and amendments applicable to the amended line of general route of the
branch in Washington Territory, according to the map thereof presented
on the 13th ultimo."
The question to be determined is as to whether said company has any
right or legal claim to any of the lands withdrawn August 15, 1873,
whether included in the new withdrawal or-not, by virtue of said with-
drawal of August 15, 1873. In other words, does the company's right
to the lands included in both withdrawals relate back beyond July 18,
1879 e I think not.
Conceding that both of said locations of the general route of the com-
pany's road, and the withdrawals made in pursuance thereof, were au-
thorized by law, still, as the route of 1873 was entirely abandoned, the
company is entitled to no rights thereunder. The fact that the com-
pany in relinquishing its claim to the lands embraced in the first with-
drawal reserved its right to such lands embraced therein as should fall
within the limits of the second withdrawal, is of no importance, as a
question of right is one of law and not of election. It was not the inten-
tion of the act granting lands to this company that such a large amount
of the public domain, comprising nearly one-fourth of the Territory of
Washington, should be withheld from disposal for six years to allow
the company to designate the general route of its road.
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It is not necessary to refer to any part of the act of July 2, 1.864, in
support of this conclusion. There is nothing in the act authorizing or
contemplating any such construction. Nor can the company claim that
Pressey's settlement, being upon withdrawn lands, was unauthorized,
for the reason that it can gain nothing thereby, this question being one
entirely between the government and the settler; and if the government
should extend to Pressey any equities to which he may be entitled in
the manner provided by law, the company can interpose no objections.
Pressey was a resident on the land at the date of the withdrawal of
July 18, 1879, and his claim excepted the land from the operation of the
grant to said company, under the third section of said act of July 2,1864.
It may be further stated that the Secretary's order to withdraw the
lands along the new line and to restore those withdrawn August 15,
1873, was dated January 11, 1879. There was nothing said about not
including in the restoration the lands to be withdrawn on the new line.
But as a matter of fact the restoration did not take effect until Septem-
ber 1, 1879, as thirty days' notice was required before the restoration
could be made.
It is a question whether this office would not have acted within the
scope of its authority had it restored all the land withdrawn August
15,1873, and afterwards withdrawn the lands along the new line.
To allow the company the superior right to this land would be to
give it the benefit of two withdrawals on two distinct lines of route.
Sixty days from receipt of notice hereof are allowed the company in
which to appeal herefrom should it so desire. At the end of that time
you will promptly advise this office what action, if any, has been taken
in the premises. The company will be advised hereof by this office.
Should this decision become final, Pressey's homestead application
will be transmitted to you to be perfected, and thereafter you will allow
applications to file for or enter lands of this class, to which claims have
been initiated prior to July 18, 1879.
R.AILROAD GRANT-WITHDRAWAL-SETTLEMENT.
SOUTHERN PAC. R. R. CO. . ROSENBERG.
At date of indemnity withdrawal for this company, the land was occupied by a pre-
emption settler who asserted his claim within three months after filing of plat in
the local office. He did not make his pre-emption proof within the legal period,
but subsequently transmuted his filing to a homestead entry.
The right of the pre-emptor under his settlement antedated that of the company,
which was simply the right to select lieu lands in the indemnity limits, and any
laches on the part of the pre-emptor was a matter solely between himself and the
government.
Acting Secretary oslyn to Commissioner McFarland, August 18, 1882.
I have considered the case of the Southern Pacific Railroad Com-
pany, branch line, v. Jeremiah W. Rosenberg, involving lot 6 of Sec. 6,
lots 3, 4, and 5, and the SE. of NW. 1 of Sec. 7, T. 3 N., R. 20 W., S. B.
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M., Los Angeles district, California, on appeal-by the company from
Tour decision of July 9, 1881, holding Rosenberg's homestead entry of
the tract for approval for patent.
The tract is within the thirty miles or indemnity limits of the grant
by act of March 3, 1871 (16 Stat., 579), to the company, the withdrawal
for which was made May 10, 1871.
The township plat was filed in the local office December 18, 1874.
It appears that Rosenberg filed declaratory statement No. 771, for
the tract, March 9, 1875, alleging settlement September 10, 1870; that
he transmuted his filing to homestead entry, No. 445, February 18, 1879,
when he also made final proof pursuant to the provisions of the acts of
March 3, 1877 (19 Stat. 404), and May 27, 1878 (20 id. 63), whereupon
final certificate No. 136 was issued.
His proof shows him to be a native-born citizen of the United States,
'and a qualified pre-emption and homestead claimant; that he settled on
the land September 10, 1870, where he has resided continuously with
his family ever since, cultivating and improving the same; and that he
has a house, fencing, and about 40 acres under cultivation, his improve-
ments aggregating about $O00 in value.
It is urged by the company's attorney that Rosenberg's homestead
,entry cannot be regarded as atransmutation of his pre-emption, the same
having expired by limitation of law by reason of his failure to make
final proof within the statutory period prescribed therefor.
Inasmuch as his re-emption claim was valid and subsisting at the
,date upon which the company's right attached, I am of the opinion that
his right antedated and was paramount to the company's, which was
simply the right to select lieu lands within the indemnity limits when-
ever, prior to the time said road was designated by a plat thereof filed
in your office, and of the designated sections within the granted limits
were found to "have been granted, sold, reserved, .... pre-empted,
or otherwise disposed of," and that any laches on Rosenberg's part was
a matter to be considered solely between himself and the government,
of which it was not competent for the company to take advantage.
Your decision is accordingly itffirmed, for the reason stated in the
-case of the Central Pacific Railroad Company v. Amenzo Baker. (The
Reporter, vol. 2, p. 113.)
PR3E-:EYVPION-HUSBAND ArD IFE.
LARSEN V. PECHIERER ET AL.
Abandonment of a claim by a husband during coverture is abandonment by the wife.
A divorced wife cannot claim the benefit of acts performed by her husband during
coverture. She can only procure title under the pre-emption law by virtue of
specific acts performed by herself when a fesze sole and the head of a family.
Secretary Kirkwood to Commissioner McFarland, February 21, 1882.
I have considered the case of Mary Larsen v. Henry Pechierer and
Elias Davis, involving the S. of NE. of Sec. 36, T. 2 S., R. 14 W., S.
20309-VOL 1-26
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B. M., Los Angeles district, California, on appeal from your decision of
May 27, 1881, adverse to the defendants.
It appears from the records of your office that the subdivisional sur-
vey was completed February 7, 1868, approved March 31, and that the
township plat embracing said tract was filed in the local office April 22
ensuing. Peter Larsen filed declaratory statement No. 402 (in the San
Francisco office) January 5, 1872, for the S. i of NE. i and the E. j of
SE. I of Sec. 36, alleging settlement March 5, 1868. These tracts being
part of a school section, a contest therefor seems to have arisen between
Larsen and the State of California, wherein they were awarded to the
former by decision of your office rendered under date of May 24, 1877.
The State did not appeal from this action, having already selected, per
lists Nos. 9 and 14, 610 acres of lieu lands in full satisfaction of her claim
to the entire thirty-sixth section, under the grant by virtue of the act
of March 3, 1853 (10 Stat., 244), for lands lost in place, and the selec-
tions thus made were approved July 14, 1869, and July 1, 1870, respect-
ively.
Your office having been advised that Larsen had abandoned the E. i
of SE. i of his claim, canceled that portion September 24, 1877, and upon
satisfactory proof that he had deserted his wife (Mary Larsen) she was
permitted to file declaratory statement No. 1583 September 27, 1878, for
the tract in question, alleging settlement March 5, 1868.
Elias Davis (or Davies) filed declaratory statement No. 1603, June 23,.
1878, for the same tract, alleging settlement March 25, 1878.
Henry Pechierer filed declaratory statement No. 1647 September 27,
1878, for the S. 4 of NE. 4 and the NW. I of NE. I of Sec. 36, alleging
settlement September 19, 1878.
Although it does not appear by whom the contest in this case was
initiated, the record shows that a hearing was had at the local office
December 9, 1878, at which all the parties in interest appeared in per-
son and by attorney except Peter Larsen, who failed to answer the
citation.
The testimony shows that the tract in question was occupied for sev-
eral years by Peter Larsen and Mary, his wife; that he erected a dwell-
ing-house, barn, wind-mill, etc., thereon, and cultivated a small portion
of the same; that about six years from the date of settlement he aban-
doned the land and deserted his wife. She testifies that he never con-
tributed to her support, so that she was compelled to leave the premises
daily in quest of work in order to support herself and children; and
that she obtained a divorce from her husband some time in the year
1876.
It further appears that Elias Davis occupied the land for about sixteen
months, from August 13, 1874, by a virtue of a lease of the same from
Peter Larsen; and that during Mrs. Larsen's absence from the land,
and at the expiration of the lease term, Davis preferred a pre-emption
claim to the land by filing as aforesaid.
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As regards Mrs. Larsen's claim to the tract in question, it should be
observed that in her declaratory statement she alleges settlement as of
March 5, 1868, the date of her husband's alleged settlement; thereby
basing her claim upon an act alleged to have been performed by her-
self dring coverture. Whereas she could only acquire title to the'
land under the pre-emption law, by virtue of certaih specific acts per-
formed by herself when afene sole and the head of a family, in compli-
ance with the statutory requirements, because during the period of
coverture her being was merged, in contemplation of law, into that of
her husband, none of whose acts could inure to the benefit of her claim,
preferred, as it was, subsequently to the date of her divorce. Hence it
follows that his abandonment of the land was her abandonment, so that
she could only acquire title, in any event, de noro, as stated.
Mrs. Larsen having failed to show such compliance, has therefore no
rights or standing in the premises that the Department can recognize.
It is true she interposes a plea of duress (per minas) by reason of which
she claims to have been prevented from performing any act evidencing
her bona fide intention to comply with the legal requirements; but as
such plea is not corroborated, and as Davis denies having threatened
her with personal violence should she attempt to settle upon the land,
said plea can avail nothing and her filing must be canceled.
But aside from the foregoing state of facts and conclusions therefrom,
it will be observed that Peter Larsen lhavingfailed to perfect his claim
in the premises, the title to the land embraced in his declaratory state-
ment vested in the State, by relation, as of the date of the completion
of the survey as aforesaid, by virtue of the seventh section of the said
act of 1853; because, as shown above, he failed to bring himself within
the conditions, precedent by virtue whereof he might have interposed a
plea in bar to such vesting; for only an actual settler before survey who
perfects his claim to a patent can preclude such vesting (Natoma Water
and Mining Company v. Bugbey, 6 Otto, 165; Sherman v. Buick, 3 bid.,
209).
Now, as to the claims of Davis and Pechierer, neither of them can,
stand; because neither of these claimants were, nor-could they be,
privies in estate with Peter Larsen, even if he had not abandoned his
claim, for his estate cannot be regarded as a particular estate upon which
either of these claimants could base theirs.
Under the second section of the act of March 1, 1877 (19 Stats., 267),
relating to indemnity school selections in the State of California, the
title is not confirmed, if such selections shall fail, because the sixteenth
or thirty-sixth section, named as a basis for indemnity, was not actuallyincluded within the final survey of a Mexican grant, or are otherwise
defective or invalid, but was found already surveyed in place, and sub-ject to appropriation by the State under the school grant.
Thus the certifications to the State being found defective and invalid,
and not confirmed by the statute, the same must be revoked, and the
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statutory provisions for complete disposal of the land in question carried
into effect, pursuant to the method prescribed in the case of Watson v.
State of California (6 C. L. O., vol. 193).
Your decision is therefore reversed.
PRIORITY-CONDITIONAL PRE-EJ•PTION-ABANDOMT-ENT.
TITUS v. BULL ET AL.
"The first in time in the commencement of proceedings for the acquisition of title is
deemed to be the first in right," when the proceedings are regularly followed up.
A conditional pre-emption claim is unknown to the law. An abandonment of the
land (with a preservation of rights) until the determination of a controversy can-
not be recognized.
Secretary Teller to Commissioner McFarland, July 13, 18S2.
I have considered the case of Clark A. Titus v. Carpenter Bull, Alex-
ander Gillmore, and William Stewart, involving the NW. 1 See. 10, T
4 N., R. 68 W., Denver, Col., on appeal by Stewart from your decision
of August 12, 18S1, holding his homestead entry subject to Titus show-
ing his good faith when he applies to make final proof and payment.
The record shows that Titus filed declaratory statement May 6, alleg-
ing settlement May 5, 1879, and that Stewart made homestead entry
September 24, 1879.
Bull and Gillmore having failed to appear at the hearing, default was
entered against them, and it is not, therefore, necessary to consider
their claims.
The testimony shows that Titus laid the foundation of a house (the
character of which foundation does not appear) on May 5, 1879. He
then returned to his rented ranch-I 2 miles distance-from which he did
not return to the land in dispute until the 18th, from which date until
the 21st he was engaged in excavating ground. He was again absent
until June 5, when he brought a load of lumber and erected the frame
for a house over the eceavated ground, remaining three days. He again
returned to the land on July 10, with more lumber-remaining two
days-when he partially roofed and inclosed the frame; but it was never
completed, having neither door, window, floor, nor chimney, nor did it
ever have a stove, furniture, or cooking utensils. He states that, in his
travels to and from his ranch, he carried his bed with him, sleeping
usually wherever night overtook him, and never slept in the house more
than six or seven times-the last of which was on June 7, 1879-but
that he had cooked and eaten there. From Jnly 10 lhe was absent with
a sick brother, out of the State, and did not return to the land until
October 3, when he found Stewart living on the land, with his family,
in a house he (Stewart) had erected. He did not remain, for the alleged
reason that he did not wish to expend more labor and money on the
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land until their respective rights had been determined by a contest,
which he commenced on January 8, 1880. He made no further effort to
prosecute his claim, or to do any act of settlement, although he was not
prevented nor forbidden by Stewart from so doing. He values his im-
provements at from $50 to $.75.
Stewart commenced the erection of a house September 26, and moved
into it, as above stated, and has since continuously resided there. He
has a stable, corral, granary, and has dug 120 post-holes for a fence one
mile long. His improvements are valued at $600.
On these facts the local officers recommended cancellation of Titus's
filing. You found otherwise, and sustained it.
In Shepley v. Cowan (I Otto, 330) the court, in discussing pre-emp-
tion rights, said:
" In all such cases, the first in time in the commencement of proceed-
ings for the acquisition of title, when the same are regularly followed up,
is deemed to be the first in right."
Titus made the first claim to the tract; but it is not necessary to con-
sider whether or not his acts established'a valid settlement, because
however excusable his absence may have been from July 10 to October
3-a period of nearly three months-his failure to reside on the land or
to cultivate or improve it from the latter date has no legal justification.
Indeed, from July 10, 1879, to the date of hearing, February 11, 1880-
a period of seven months-he wholly and voluntarily abandoned it, ex-
cept when temporarily on it October 3, when he performed no act of
settlement. An abandonment of land until determination of a contest
which may be prolonged a year or more, with a preservation of rights
during the interim, cannot be recognized. This would be a conditional
claim only, which is unknown to the law, and not the present and abso-
lute one which a party must maintain. A pre-emptor who relinquishes
his rights by failure of constant assertion thereof on the land (unless
prevented by violence or threats or other excusable reasons) cannot:
resume them at his pleasure in the presence of an adverse claim. He
must, on the contrary, as the court says, regularly follow them up. As
Titus neglected to do this, his claim must yield to that of Stewart, which
appears in all respects regular.
Your decision is reversed.
PRE-EHPTION-ADJOINING CANT TRACT.
OSBORNE V. HAVENS AND HAWS.
A pre-emptor who first claimed less than one hundred and sixty acres may file for
that quantity by embracing an additional vacant tract or tracts adjoining the
land first claimed, and his right will commence from date of filing.
Secretary Kirkwvood to Commissioner McFarland, January 16, 1882.
I have considered the case of John D. Osborne v. Cyrus D. Havens
and F. . Haws, involving the W. of the NE. of Sec. 32, T. 1 N.,
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R. 3 W., S. B. M., Los Angeles, Cal., on appeal by Havens from your
decision of April 9, 1881, holding his filing on said tract for cancellation.
The record shows that Havens filed declaratory statement for the
NE. I of said section November 1 1878, alleging settlement June 6,
1875; that Haws filed declaratory statement for W. I of said quarter
section September 17, 1878, alleging settlement November 20, 1873, and
that on December 11, 1878, application to locate the additional home-
stead claim of Osborne upon said W. i was rejected by the local officers
by reason of the pre-emption filings. The township plat was filed Sep-
tember 2, 1878.
It appears that Haws removed from land of his own to settle on this
land, and his filing is admitted to be invalid under section 2260 Rev.
Stat. It also appears that the application to locate the additional home-
stead claim, in the name of Osborne, was made in the interest of Haws
for the purpose thereby of securing his right to the tract, otherwise
defective. Haws erected a house on the tract in dispute in 1873, and
certain fences. His improvements are valued at from $300 to $400.
His actual residence appears to have been on his other land, elsewhere,
until about three months preceding the hearing in February, 1879. He
states that prior to October 30, 1878, he resided on the land in dispute,
"according to circumstances-when business required me." Another
witness testifies that prior to that date he did not reside on the tract,
but used it only for raising grain. It is, therefore, doubtful whether he
ever had an actual residence on the tract prior to October 30, 1878.
Your decision, however, rests upon another ground, viz: that Havens
had never settled upon nor made any claim to the west half of said
quarter section prior to the date of his filing, but had confined his occu-
pation and improvements to the east half of the quarter section, and
had recognized and respected the boundary between these two tracts,
as established by a fence erected by Haws two years prior to his
(Havens's) entry on said east half, and hence that he could acquire no
right to the whole quarter-section by his filing. I think that this was
erroneous. It was held by this Department as early as 1859, in the
case of Bryan v. Whittles (I Lester, 391), that a preemption claimant
who first claimed less than 160 acres might file for that quantity and
embrace it in his claim if no adverse right had attached to the addi-
tional tract, and that his right would commence from the date of such
notice. It is clear, under the testimony, that prior to the date of his
filing Havens had not settled upon nor made any claim to the west half
of said quarter section. But his filing thereon was public notice to all
that he then claimed it. Haws's claim was, at that date, invalid and of
no legal force. The tract was, therefore, vacant public land, subject to
the claims of Havens or whoever else might appropriate it. His filing
embraced the whole northeast quarter of the section, and a residence
upon a part was a residence upon the whole; and as he had a pre-emp-
tion right to one hundred and sixty acres, I see no reason why he might
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-not legally attach his claim at the date of his filing to the unoccupied
eighty acres, and thus embrace the quantity the law allowed him. He
was not required to consider Haws's claim, the same being illegal. The
tract was to him as if Haws had never claimed it, and there was no
other claim. His right to the east half of the quarter section is unques-
tioned, and his claim to the west half can be defeated only by a prior
and better right; and none appears. His filing is within the time re-
quired by law, and was admissible under section 2259 Rev. Stat.
The application to locate the Osborne additional homestead claim was
made nearly four weeks after Havens's filing, and after he (Havens) had
performed or attempted to perform acts of settlement on said west half,
in which he was threatened and forbidden by Haws. This claim can,
therefore, only be allowed subject to the filing of Havens.
Your decision is reversed, and the filing of Havens is permitted to
stand.
PPE-EMPTION-ALr ENA TION-CONTRA CT.
STATE OF CALIFORNIA . ALARI.#
A quitclaim deed executed by an occupant of public land will not operate to estop
the grantor from asserting his own subsequently acquired title.
The converse of this proposition is true in respect of a warranty deed.
While the existence of a contract by which the title the pre-emptor might acquire
from the government would inure to the benefit of another is a bar to entry; it
does not defeat entirely the pre-emption right.
Commissioner McFarland to register and receiver, Los Angeles, Califor-
nia, October 13, 1881.
I have examined on appeal the case of the State of California v. Juan
de Jesus Alarl, involving the E., SE. , and lots 1, 2, and 3 Sec. 34, T.
1 S., R. 9 W., S. B. M.
The records of this office show that Alari filed D. S. 1546 for said
tracts December 17, 1877, alleging settleient December 16, 1857; and
that the State of California filed indemnity selection therefor, and for
SW. SE. said section R. and R. 645, November 8, 1877.
Plat of township filed September 28, 1877.
Your decision was adverse to defendant upon the ground that he had
made conveyances by which the title be might acquire from the United
States would inure in part to the benefit of persons other than himself.
The appeal is taken upon the grounds that the conveyances referred
-to were made prior to the initiation of his pre-emption claim and could
not affect his good faith or the validity of his claim; that the deed from
Alari to Vejar (Ex. A.) was merely a quitclaim and could not operate
to convey a subsequently acquired title, and that if the deeds could be
held to be contracts to convey his after acquired title they could not
i See Secretary's decision, I L. D., 453.
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be held to be valid or effective in view of the fact that such contract
under the pre-emption law would be unlawful.
The deeds referred to are filed as evidence in the case.
The deed from Alari to Vejar (Ex. A.), dated September 14,1865,
bargains, sells, and quitclaims all of his right, title, and interest in and
to a certain tract, containing about one acre, located by the evidence in
lots 1 and 2. There are no covenants of warranty. This instrument
cannot be considered as being more than a quitclaim deed. It could
not operate to estop Alari from setting up any title he might subse-
quently acquire against those claiming under it.
But the deed from Alari to Santiago Lobo, dated November, 1S69
(Ex. B), is in all respects a warranty deed, conveying or attempting to
convey in fee simple a certain lot or parcel of land containing 3.72
acres. The tract described therein is shown by the uncontradicted tes-
timony of Wilson Beach to be situate in lot 3, sec. 34.
It is such a deed as would in accordance with all legal principles
estop Alari and those in privity with him from disputing the title of his
grantee or those in privity with him, and under which any title he might
subsequently acquire to the tract conveyed would inure to the benefit
of his grantor, his heirs or assigns.
The pre-emption law does not prohibit the making of such a deed, but
requires that the pre-emptor, before being allowed to make entry, shall
swear that he has not made any contract by which the title he might
acquire from the United States would inure to the benefit of any other
person, and imposes a penalty for false swearing in that respect. It
does not say that such a contract shall not be made, but that the settler
who attempts-in such manner to transfer the public lands shall forfeit
his right of entry.
It does not in any way affect the legal operation of a warranty deed
to convey subsequently acquired title and permit the grantor to secure
the advantage of his own wrong, although title acquired by false swear-
ing would be vitiated by fraud no matter in what hands it might be
found.
To adopt the reasoning of the appellant in this regard would be to
hold that as no valid contract could be made by which the title that the
pre-emptor might acquire would inure to the benefit of any other person,
such attempted contract could not defeat the right of entry, and hence
the law-making power had done a vain and useless thing in providing
for a forfeiture of that right under the conditions stated.
It is clear to my mind that the outstanding deed from Alari to Lobo
is such a contract or agreement by which the title he might acquire from
the United States would inure in part to the benefit of another than
himself, and hence that upon application to make entry he could not
lawfully make the affidavit required by Sec. 2262 Rev. Stats.
As this conveyance, however, is only a bar to entry, and does not
vitiate his pre-emption right, he may when he applies to prove up do
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so if he can then show in proper manner a reconveyance or release of
claim by his grantee, or those holding under him, of the premises de-
scribed in said conveyance, or by eliminating from his application to
enter the lot embracing same.
Inasmuch as the time within which Alai would, but for the pendency
of this contest, have been required to mIke proof and payment has
expired, he can only be allowed a reasonable time after notice of final
decision in his case within which to tender proof and payment.
The State selection is held subject to the ability of Alari to make
entry.
Advise the parties of this decision and of their right of appeal.
PRE-EMPTION-ALIEV[ATION-MORTGAGE.
LARSON V. WEISBECKER.
A mortgage given by a pre-emptor as security for money loaned him with which to,
paythe government price for the land filed upon is not an alienation of the land,
nor is it such an agreement as is prohibited by 2262 Rev. Stat.
Secretary Teller to Commissioner M'ceFarland, April 24, 1882.
Section 2262 Revised Statutes provides that-
Before any person claiming the benefit of this (pre-emption) chapter
is allowed to enter lands, he shall make oath . . . . . that he has
not, directly or indirectly, made any agreement or contract, in any way
or manner, with any person whatsoever, by which the title which be
might acquire from the government of the United States should inure
in whole or in part to the benefit of any person except himself.
I am aware that the former rulings of your office and of this Depart-
ment-following the precedent of an early decision-have held that an
outstanding mortgage given by a pre-emptor upon the lands embraced
in his filing defeats his right of entry upon the ground that such mort-
gage is a contract or agreement by which title to the lands might inure
to some other person than himself. A careful consideration of this sec-
tion leads me to a different conclusion, and to the opinion that unless it
shall appear under the rules of law applicable to the construction of
contracts or otherwise that the title shall inure to another person, it
does not debar the right of entry; and that the mere possibility that the
title may so result-as in the case of an ordinary mortgage-is not suf-
ficient to forfeit the claim.
The term contract comprises in its fall and more liberal signification
any description of agreement, obligation, or legal tie whereby a party
binds himself or becomes bound, expressly or impliedly, to another to
pay a sum of money, or to do or omit to do a certain act; but in its more
familiar sense it is frequently applied to agreements not under seal.
The term agreement, on the contrary, is rarely used amongst us, except
in relation to contracts not under seal, and this is evidently its proper
410 DECISIONS RELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS.
use (1 Chitty on Contracts, 2). 4 Contract is an agreement, upon suffi-
cient consideration, to do or not to do a particular thing; from whichdefinition there arise three points to be considered: First, the agree-
ment; second, the consideration; and third, the thing to be done or
omitted.7'-(2 Black.Com., 441.).
As defined byAmerican authorities, a contract is an agreement be-
tween two or more parties to do or not to do a particular thing (Taney,
Ch. J., 11 Pet., 420, 572); an agreement in which a party undertakes to
do or not to do a particular thing (Marshall, Ch. J., 4 Wheat., 197); an
agreement between two or more parties for the doing or not doing of
some specified thing (1 Parsons on Cont., 5); an agreement of two or
more persons, upon sufficient consideration, to do or not to do a particu-
lar thing (2 Kent., 450). nder these definitions there seems no essen-
tial difference between a contract and an agreement, and the use of
either word alone would in my opinion have expressed the intention of
Congress in the enactment of this statute as fully as do the two.
It is also a familiar rule in the construction and interpretation of con-
tracts that the intention of te parties, if consistent with the rules of law,
must prevail; and where this is sufficiently apparent, effect must be
given thereto even though some violence be thereby done to the words
of the contract (1 Chitty, 105, and authorities cited). The object of the
maxims which govern the exposition of contracts is "to discover and
give effect to the intention of the parties, so that performance of the con-
tract may be enforced according to the sense in which they mutually
understood it at the time it was made" (Bell v. Buen, 1 Howard, 169;
Lawrence v. McCalmont, 2 Howard, 426; Pick., 278).
The case shows that Weisbecker executed a mortgage upon the land
covered by his filing as security for money loaned him with which to
pay the government price for it. That he did not intend thereby that
.the title should inure to some one other than himself appears from the
facts that he made a conditional alienation of the land only, when, had his
purpose been different, he might have made an absolute conveyance;
that he used the money in payment of the land, title to which, neces-
sarily under the law, vested in himself and not in the mortgagee; that
he subsequently repaid the loan and the mortgage was discharged, thus
leaving no right whatever in the mortgagee; and that there is no evi-
dence tending even to show that he executed the mortgage for any
other purpose than as security for the money loaned. Besides, it was a
contract which could not be enforced against Weisbecker to the loss of
his title, because by payment of the loan he could defeat such loss, and
thus no title could inure to the mortgagee. "A mortgage is the con-
veyance of an estate by way of pledge for the security of debt, and to
become void on payment of it " (4 Kent, 135).
The statute uder consideration requires from a pre-emptor, in my
opinion, in order to the defeat of his right of entry, a contract by force
tof which title to the land must vest in some other person than himself;
and it must appear that such was his intention at the time of making it.
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If, on the contrary, the mortgage was a mere security for money loaned,
and the contract does not necessarily divert the title from him, it was
not a contract or agreement within the meaning of section 2262. In
construing this section the U. S. supreme court says (Myers v. Croft, 13
Wall., 291):
It had been the well-defined policy of Congress, in passing these (pre-
emption) laws, not to allow their benefit to inure to the profit of land
speculators, but this wise policy was often defeated. Experience had
proved that designing persons, being unable to purchase valuable lands
on account of their withdrawal from sale, would procure middle-men to
occupy them temporarily, with indifferent improvements, under an agree-
ment to convey them as soon as they were entered by virtue of their
pre-emption rights; when this was. done and the speculation accom-
plished, the lands were abandoned. This was felt to be a serious evil,
and Congress undertook in the law under consideration to remedy it by
requiring of the applicant for pre-emption, before he was allowed to
enter the land on which he had settled, to swear that he had not con-
tracted it away, nor settled upon it to sell it on speculation, but in good
faith to appropriate it to his own use.
It is clear, I think, under the facts, that Weisbecker did not make
such a contract or agreement as is contemplated by the statute, and
hence that he did not lose his right of entry. This law was intended to
prevent speculative entries; but if a pioneer settler, struggling for a
home for himself and family, is compelled by his necessities temporarily
to mortgage his land, that he may pay for it and secure it to himself,,
and his good faith is manifest, and, in the absence of all fraudulent or
illegal purposes, I discover no reason why the government can reason-
ably object thereto, or that it is within any prohibition of the law.
Weisbecker appears to be one of that numerous class of poor but worthy
citizens for whom Congress legislated in the pre-emption laws. He
mortgaged his land for no speculative nor improper purpose, but that
by means thereof the title might vest in himself and not in another. I
am, therefore, of the opinion that his entry should not be forfeited by
reason thereof. . . . Your decision canceling his entry is reversed,
but cases adjudicated under a different view of section 2262 will not be
reopened. The principle here announced in respect to said section will
Obe applied to future cases only.
BOARD OF EQUITABLE ADJUDICATION-A UTHORITY.
CONLIN V. YARWOOD.
The Board of Equitable Adjudication has exclusive jurisdiction withiji the sphere of
the powers conferred upon it by the statute.
No appeal lies from its decisions, nor are they subject to review by any other tribunal.
The Board may, upon allegations of fraud in an entry, revoke its confirmation thereof.
Secretary Teller to Commissioner McFarland, December 8, 1882.
I have considered the papers transmitted with your letter of March
3, 1882, in the matter of the cash entry of Martin Conlin for the E. i of
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the NW. and the SW. of the NW. t of Sec. 10, T. 28, R. 18, Men-
esha, Wis.
It appears that Conlin filed pre-emption declaratory statement for the
tracts June 18, alleging settlemeniiJune 5, 1875, and made cash entry
therefor July 20, 1S75, and that Hugh Yarwood made homestead entry
for the same tracts March 14,1876.
On September 6, 1876, your office held Conlin's entry for cancellation
for failure to reside on the land for a period of six months prior to his
entry, and also held Yarwood's entry for cancellation because made
upon a tract already appropriated.
Yarwood did not appeal from your decision, and hence it became final
as to him. On Conlin's appeal this Department held,February 28, 1879,
that he had shown good faith and compliance with the law, but, in view
of the facts, directed submission of the case to the Board of Equitable
Adjudication.
Your records show that on March 6, 1879, your predecessor presented
to the Secretary of the Interior and the Attorney-General for their
consideration and action his confirmation of Conlin's entry; that they
approved the same April 7; that it was approved for patent by your
office April 14; and that, on December 4 following, an abstract of said
case, with others which had been confirmed, was transmitted to this De-
partment for transmission to Congress.
On March 29, 1879, Yar wood applied for reconsideration of my prede-
cessor's decision of February 18, which was refused April 2 following,
for want of error therein, unless he should present testimony showing
that Conlin's entry was fraudulent. This action, it will be noted, was
during the pendency of said entry before the Board, and prior to con-
flrmation thereof. After the confirmation, and while the entry awaited
patent, affidavits were filed alleging fraud therein, and your office or-
dered an investigation thereof. On review of the testimony you sus-
tained the allegations and recommended that proper steps be taken to
vacate the confirmation of the Board and for cancellation of the entry.
Your decision therefore presents the question of the finality of adjudica-
tions of the Board.
The Board of Equitable Adjudication is established and its powers,
defined by sections 2450 to 257, Revised Statutes, amended by the act
of February 27, 1877, to consist of the Secretary of the Interior, the At-
torney-General, and the Commissioner of the General Land Office, and
is authorized " to decide upon principles of equity and justice" " all cases
of suspended entries of public lands and of suspended pre-emption land
claims, and to adjudge in what cases patents shall issue upon the same."
" Every such adjudication . . . . . shall operate only to divest the
United States of the title of the lands embraced thereby, without preju-
dice to the rights of conflicting claimants" (i. e., it shall divest the title
of the United States and vest it in the one whose entry the Board con-
firms, in the absence of a conflicting adverse claim). The Commissioner
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is directed to report to Congress at the first session after any such ad-
judications had been made, a list of the same, under the classes pre-
scribed by law, with a statement of the principles upon which each class
was determined, arranging his decisions into two classes: the first to
embrace all such cases of equity as may be finally confirmed by the
Board, and the second such cases as the Board rejects and decides to
be invalid.
';For all lands covered by claims which are placed in the first class,
patents shall issue to the claimants; and all lands embraced by claims
placed in the second class shall ipsofacto revert to, and become part of,
the public domain." Section 2457 provides that the preceding sections,
from 2450 inclusive, shall be applicable to all cases of suspended entries
and locations which have arisen in the General Land Office since June
26, 1856, as well as to all cases which may thereafter occur, embracing
as well locations under bounty-land warrants as ordinary entries and
sales, including homestead entries and pre-emption locations or cases;
when the law has been substantially complied with, and the error or
informality arose from ignorance, accident, or mistake, which is satis-
factorily explained, and where the rights of no other claimant or pre-
emptor are prejudiced, or where there is Do adverse claim.
There is no adverse claimant in this case; the question is one solely
between Conlin and the government, and the successive steps in the
progress of the case to, and through the Board, seem all to have been
in pursuance of the law.
Whether or not my predecessor should have sustained Conlin's entry,
upon his finding that Conlin had acted in good faith, and in compliance
with the law (as I think he should have done), or whether he properly
referred the case to the Board notwithstanding such finding, are not
questions material to the present issue, but whether only he did so refer
it-as he had the undoubted right-whether the Board acted thereon,
and the effect of its-adjudication. This Board is a tribunal of special
and limited jurisdiction. Its powers are conferred and defined by
statute. Outside of these it has no authority, but within the sphere
thereof they are exclusive, and no other person, officer, or tribunal may
control its doings. Your office, this Department, and the Board derive
their powers from a common source-the statute-and neither can
travel beyond the line of its peculiar jurisdiction, nor take what is not
conferred. Hence no appeal lies from the decisions of this Board, nor
are they subject to review in any other tribunal, because the statute is
silent in respect to these matters. When, therefore, a case is referred
to the Board, and it becomes invested with its statutory rights, it ac-
quires exclusive jurisdiction thereof, and your office and this Depart-
ment lose all control over it.
The case of Conlin having been rightfully referred to this Board, its
confirmation of his entry was within its powers and judgment, and its
adjudication must be held final and conclusive; and patent would ordi.
414 DECISIONS RELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS.
narily issue as prescribed by sections 2453 and 2454 Revised Statutes.
(Foley v. Harrison et al., 15 How., 433.)
Although the Board may be authorized, upon allegations of fraud in
the entry, to revoke its confirmation thereof and further hear the case,
I. do not find from an examination of the testimony such evidence of
fraud as to require me to recommend such action.
The entry will therefore stand for patent.
PRE-EXP TI.- UVSUR FEYED LANDS-SETTLEMENT.
When prior settler has distinctly marked his boundaries, his claim by those bounda-
ries will be regarded, though subsequent settler has made improvements within
them.
But where prior settler does not mark his boundaries, priority of settlement does not.
control.
Conmissioner ilIcFarland to register and receiver, Grand Forks, Dakota,
Februiary 3, 1883.
I am in receipt of register's letter of 18th ultimo, requesting, in view of
the numerous settlements that are being made upon the unsurveyed lands
in your district, and the differences of opinion existing among attorneys
and others as to the rights of conflicting settlers upon uch lands, s
statement of the views and rlings of this office upon the subject for
your own instruction, and which you also propose to publish for the
benefit of those now settled, and who may hereafter settle, upon unsur-
veyed lands.
Prefacing with the remark that the determination of every case must
largely depend upon its individual features, and that no general propo-
sitions or rules can therefore be laid down that will meet and control
all cases, I will endeavor to set forth, as requested, the leading principles
that will govern the adjudication of conflicting claims which had their
inception prior to survey, as heretofore understood and enforced in the
practice of this office.
Section 2274 of the Revised Statutes, providing for joint entries in
cases where the extension of the lines of survey finds two or more set-
tiers with improvements upon the same smallest legal subdivision, was
remedial in its nature, and designed to meet a class of cases which, prior
to the date of the act (March 3, 1873) from which it is taken, had been
found extremely difficult to equitably adjust. Owing to ignorance of
where the lines of survey would fall, settlers would be found in posses-
sion of, and with improvements upon, the same smallest legal subdi-
vision; and although there was no conflict between them as to their
actual possession, there would necessarily be a conflict in their claims
as placed upon record. In such cases the provisions of section 2273,
that the right of pre-emption should be in him who made the first set-
DECISIONS RELATING TO THE PUBLIC ANDS. 415
tlement, was extremely inequitable and unjust, and this injustice was
met and overcome by the act of March 3, 1873 (Sec. 2274).
This section, it is obvious, is designed to meet only cases where the
conflict arises from ignorance upon the part of the settlers as to the
extent of the other's claim; hence, in the case stated by you, the prior
settler A, having distinctly marked the boundaries of his claim, so that
no one could mistake its extent, was entitled to the whole thereof, and
the subsequent settler B could acquire no right by asserting a claim in
conflict with that location, or by making improvements within the
boundaries of A.
If, however, A's location, instead of being in exact conformity with
the lines of survey, had excluded a portion of any legal subdivision, and
B had settled and made improvements upon that portion of the subdi-
visidn outside of A's line, he is, under the provisions of section 2274,
entitled to a joint entry of such tract for an adjustment of coterminous
boundaries.
The case stated is controlled by the fact that the prior settler had dis-
tinctly marked his boundaries, and it can make no difference that he
had not and that the subsequent settler had made improvements upon
any particular subdivision within those boundaries.
In the case of Caulfield v. Bosworth, decided by the honorable act-
ing Secretary of the Interior, August 10, 1882, it was held that when a
claim is located upon the ground before survey, either with Valentine
scrip or under the pre-emption laws, and other claims are afterwards
made and located with reference thereto, the party first locating and
making known the extent of his claim will not be permitted to enlarge
the same to the injury of subsequent locators whose claims have been
made to conform to such first location. It would seem to follow that
the first locator, being bound by his established lines, subsequent locat-
ors are also bound by, and cannot acquire rights within, them. The
right of joint entry can only accrue, therefore, where the boundary of
the prior location excludes a portion of a legal subdivision.,
In a case, however, where the prior settler does not mark the bound-
aries of his claim, priority of settlement does not control. In such a
case the subsequent settler who has, prior to survey, made improve-
ments upon a subdivision upon which the prior settler also has improve-
ments, is entitled to the benefits of section 2274, Rev. Stats., and if he
has improvements upon a subdivision embraced in the claim of a prior
settler who, however, has no improvements thereon, and who has had
possession of no portion thereof, he is entitled to the whole tract.
It would seem from the following language contained in your letter,
viz: A goes upon unsurveyed land with the intention of taking 160 acres
under the pre-emption or homestead law, that you consider homestead
settlers upon unsurveyed land as in exactly the same position as pre-
emption settlers. This view, of course, is based upon the provisions of
the third section, act of May 14, 180.
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I do not, however, think that such is the effect of that section. It
protects homestead settlements upon surveyed or unsurveyed lands by
providing that the settler may make his entry within the same time
after settlement, or after the filing of the township plat, as is allowed
pre-emptors to place their claims of record, and that his right shall re-
late back to the date of his settlement. In other words, it makes the
provisions of sections 2265 and 2266, Rev. Stats., as regards the time
allowed for perfecting entry in the district land office, applicable to set-
tlements under the homestead law, as well as to those under the pre-
emption law. It makes no provision for that class of cases where the
survey finds two or more settlers with improvements upon the same sub-
division, one or all of whom claim under the homestead law, and such
settlers are in the same position as were pre-emption settlers prior to
the act of March 3, 1873 (section 2274). The provisions of this section
cannot be applied to cases of settlement under the homestead law, for
the reason that in addition to the fact that there is nothing in said act
of May 14, 1880, that would justify it, the mode of procedure provided
by it is one that cannot be applied in homestead cases. This is true in
cases of conflict between pre-emption and homestead settlements par-
ticularly, owing to the great difference in the nature of the two claims.
The pre-emptor must pay for the land, the homesteader pays nothing;
the pre-emptor must make his proof and payment within thirty-three
months from the filing of the plat, the homesteader, after five years'
residence. There are no features in the character of the respective en-
tries by which they can be united.
It follows, therefore, that in cases of homestead settlement prior to
survey the adjudication of conflicts will depend upon the facts in each
case. If the homestead settler, prior to survey, can ascertain the lines
of his claim, and so mark his boundaries that they will conform to the
lines of public survey when extended, then his entire claim could be
protected by compliance with the law. In cases where no boundaries
are marked, or if marked do not conform to the surveys, the rights of
coflicting claimants to any particular subdivision must be determined
by their priorities, possessions, improvements, etc.; that is, by appar-
ent equities.
PRE-EX PTION-INHABI T24CY; PA CTICE-REVIEW .
MCBRIDE V. LEBCIIER.
The rule of construction in force at any stage of a case is the one that must be ap-plied, and therefore a case will not be reopened upon a motion for review in order
that later rulings may be applied to the same state of facts.
Commissioner McFarland to register and receiver, Miles City, Montana,
June 30, 1882.
I have considered the motion of C. B. Lebeher for a review of my de-
cision of December 3, 1881, closing the case of John McBride v. said
Leher, filed in your office April 2 1882.
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Your findings of fact and opinion were adverse to Lebeher, but he did
not appeal therefrom. Your findings, therefore, became final, and my
said letter simply held that yourconclusions based thereon, were correct,
and, in accordance with the rles of practice, closed the case.
The motion is not based upon newly discovered evidence, but upon
the ground that subsequent to the decisions the course of rulings by
this office upon similiar facts has changed, and that under them Lebeher
would be entitled to an award. There are several reasons why this
motion cannot be granted.
It was not filed within thirty days from the decision, as required by
rule 77, which is specific upon this point. Again, if it were true that
under latter rulings the decision in this case upon the same state of fact
would be different, the case could not be reopened in order to apply such
rulings. See Secretary's decision of July 17, 1873, in the case of the
Missouri, Kansas and Texas Railroad Company v. Buck, where it was
held that the rule of construction in force at any stage of a case is the
one which must be applied.
Finally, although your decision did not state specifically that Lebeher
was acting in bad faith your findings of fact supported that conclusion,
which was in itself te vT l principle of the decision.
The cases referred to by Lebeher, wherein a failure to actually inhabit
the land after settlement were cases wherein such diligence was shown
as circumstances permitted, and wherein the settler's good faith was
clearly shown; hence these are not applicable to the case. You will
advise the parties of the denial of this motion.
McBride submitted final proof of compliance with law, after due pub-
lication of nptice, April 22, 1882, and at the same time submitted his
application to purchase, which you declined to allow during the pend-
ency of this motion. The motion being finally disposed of; you will allow
said application as of its date, if no objection other than that stated
appears.
PRE-EMPTION-ACT OF JULY 23, 1866.
NVARD v. WILLIAMS ET AL.
Section 7 of this act was not repealed by the Revised Statutes, as it is local and tem-
porary in character. If repealed, previously acquired rightscould not be affected
thereby.
Secretary Teller to Commissioner M]cFarland, June 8, 1882.
I have considered the case of Sarah Ward, applicant to purchase the
lands involved, situate in sections 10, 11, 12, 14, ani 24, in T. 4 N., R.
9 W., M. D. M., San Francisco, Cal., under the seventh section of the
act of July 23, 186 (14 Stat., 218), v. Frank Williams et al., pre-emption
and homestead claimants, on appeal from your decision of March 24,
1881, holding, among other things, that said seventh section is not re-
2 0 3 09-VOL 1-27
418 DECISIONS RELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS.
pealed by the Revised Statutes (as is otherwise claimel by Williams
et al.), but is still in force.
The act of March 3, 1851 (9 Stat., 631), entitled " An act to ascertain
and settle private land claims in the State of California," confirmed
only valid claims derived from the Spanish or Mexican governments;
and invalid ones, upon rejection of the grant, were held a part of the
public domain. To relieve persons who had purchased lands under
such grants, title to which they supposed good, but which proved other-
wise, Congress passed the remedial act of 1866, the seventh section of
which provides-
That where persons in good faith and for a valuable consideration
have purchased lands of Mexican grantees or assigns, which grants
have been subsequently rejected, or where the lands have been excluded
from the final survey of any Mexican grant, and have used, improved,
and continued in the actual possession of the same as according to the
lines of their original purchase, and where no valid adverse right or
title (except of the United States) exists, such purchasers may purchase
the same, etc.
This act continued in unquestioned force to the date of the adoption
of the Revised Statutes in 1874. It has never been repealed in terms,
and is still in force, unless its repeal results from sections 5595 and 5596,
R. S.
Section 5595 provides that " the foregoing seventy-three titles em-
brace the statutes of the IUnited States, general and permanent in their
nature, in force on the 1st day of December, 1873," . . . . . and
section 5596, that " all acts of Congress passed prior to said 1st day of
December, 1873, any portion of which is embraced in any section of
said revision, are hereby repealed and the section applicable thereto
shall be in force in lieu thereof; all parts of such acts not contained in
such revision having been repealed or superseded by subsequent acts,
orb not being general or permanent in their nature, provided that the in-
corporation into said revision of any general and permanent provision,
taken from an act making appropriations, or from an act containing
other provisions of a private, local, or temporary character, slall not
repeal, or in any way affect, any appropriation, or any provision of a
private, local, or temporary character, contained in any of said acts,
but the same shall remain in force; and all acts of Congress passed
prior to said last-named day, no part of which are embraced in said re-
vision, shall not be affected or changed by its enactment."
The act of 1866 is partly of a general and permanent, and partly of
a private, local, or temporary character. The first, second, and third
sections, relating to and confirming selections of public lands by the
State of California, in part satisfaction of its grants, and the fourth and
fifth sections, relating to its swamp lands, being of a general character,
are included in the revision. The other four sections relating toperivate
grants from the Spanish or Mexican governments, prior to the treaty of
Guadalupe Hidalgo, in 1848, and enacted for the benefit of claimants
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thereunder, being of a private, local, or temporary character, are omitted
therefrom.
These sections are not wholly free from ambiguity, but their pro-
visions lead me to the opinion that the revision was intended as a sub-
stitute for all general and permanent acts in force prior to December 1,
1873, and that acts and parts of acts containing provisions of a private,
local, or temporary character, were also left in force. I discover no
change in the Congressional policy respecting said private grants at the
date of the adoption of the revision, nor any reason therefor. They
embraced large and important interests. Many of them had not then
been submitted for adjudication, and many others were in process of
adjudication. Had they been considered of a general and permanent
character, the acts affecting them would have found place in the revision;
but not being of such character they are subject to the proviso of sec-
tion 5596, and are not repealed.
Statutes are repealed by express provisions of a subsequent law, or
by necessary implication, and in the latter case there must be such a
positive repugnancy between the provisions of the old and new law that
they cannot stand together, or he consistently reconciled. Repeals by
implication are not favored in law, ad are never allowed but in cases
where inconsistency and repugnancy are plain and unavoidable; and it
is a question of construction whether or not an act proflessing to repeal
or interfere with the provisions of a former law operates as a total or
partial or temporary repeal; and if there are two acts seemingly repug-
nant, if there be no clause of repeal in the latter, they shall, if possible,
have such construction, that the latter may not be a repeal of the
former by implication (Potter's Dwarris, 151, and citations).
In view of the fact that section 7 of the act of 1866 has not been di-
rectly repealed, nor impliedly so, under my construction of sections
5595-6, Revised Statutes, and that many cases have been adjudicated'
under its provisions since the adoption of the Revised Statutes, thereby
holding it in force, I am unwilling to give it a different construction
until it has been otherwise judicially interpreted. I therefore affirm
your decision in this respect.
But whether or not said section is repealed cannot affect the present
case, because section 5597, Revised Statutes, provides that-
The repeal of the several acts embraced in said revision shall not
affect any act done, or any right accruing or accrued . . . . . be.
fore the said repeal, but all rights and liabilities under said acts shall
continue and may be enforced in the same manner as if said repeal had
not been made.
As Mrs. Ward acquired her rights, if any, under purchase of a por.
tion of a Mexican grant of the Soulajule rancho by her deceased hus-
band, in 1861, after whose decease the lands in question were set off' to
her as part of his estate, by the proper courts, her rights will be deter-
mined as his would have been under that provision of section 7, which
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provides that persons who have purchased lands of Mexican grantees or
assigns, and otherwise complied with the requirements of the section,
may purchase the same.
What rights had he ?
It appears that in March, 1844, the Mexican government granted to,
one Mesa the tract of land known as Soulajule. This tract was never
presented totbe United States authoritiesfor confirmation as an entirety,
and hence its location has never been determined by established bound.
aries. Mesa, however, transferred portions of it to different persons,
one of which he conveyed to Pedro J. Vasques by deed dated March
28,1850, and the same was confirmed to him by final decree of the
United States district court for the district of California, in August,,
1857. The surveys of the different claims were duly approved, except
that my predecessor, Hon. C. Schurz, April 15, 1878, directed certain
changes in that of Vasques, which were miiade, and the plat thereof was
approved by your office January 18, 1879, and patent issued to Vasques
on the same day in accordance therewith.
The tracts applied for by Mrs. Ward appear not to have been.vithin
the deed from Mesa to Vasques, nor within the latter's confirmation nor
patent, but little thereto remained in Mesa. Hence any conveyane by
Vasques of land outside of his confirmed and patented limits, to which
he had no title, would be ineffectual in law to convey any interest to his
grantee, and hence, also, as lie was not assignee of a Mexican grantee,
of lands excluded from the approved survey, he had no right toE pur-
chase the lands now in dispute under said section 7.
It appears, however, that on June 4, 1852, Vasques made a convey-
ance of land, of which that now applied for by Mrs. Ward is a part, to
one Buckley, who, on June 21, 1861, conveyed the same to one Brown,
now d&ceased, the former husband of Mrs. Ward. As neither Brown
nor Buckley had other right than that derived.from Vasques, who had
no right under said seventh section, I affirm your decision that Mrs.
Ward is not entitled to purchase the tracts under said section.
Mesa failed to present for confirmation within the time limited by the
act of 1851 that portion of the land granted him, which was excluded.
from his conveyance to Vasques and his other grantees. It therefore
fell within the body of the public lands and became subject to pre-emp-
tion and homestead settlement.
*P * * * e *
You rqjected Williams's filing because his improvements embrace those
of Mrs. 'Ward on land claimed by her under color of title, and that his
case is, therefore, within the purview of the decision of the case of'
Atherton v. Fowler (6 Otto, 513).
As Williams's filing is also in conflict with the homestead entry of Mc-
Laney, and with the filing of Bucklin, upon which proofs have not yet
been offered, I modify your decision in respect to him, and direct that
his filingg remain intact to await future consideration in connection witlh
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said homestead entry and said filing, and I affirm your decision holding
the several other filings and entries intact, subject to proofs of compli-
ance with the law and to priority of right.
PRE-EIMPTIO-QUALIFJCATIONS OF SETTLER.
CRITCEFIELD V. LEWIS.
While full faith and credit must be given to the decree of the court granting a di
vorce, it is competent for the Department and the General Land Office to consider
collateral facts respecting the relations of the parties for the purpose of deciding
whether or not te wife was the head of a family and a bonaefide settler.
Acting Secretary Josly t Commissioner _YcFarland, November 9, 1882.
I have considered the case of Caroline E. Critchfield v. Walter M.
Lewis, involving the N.E. I of the S.E. , the S. i of the NE. i and the
NW. 1 of the NE. i of Sec. 2, T. 8 R. W., Concordia, Kansas, on ap-
peal by Critchfield from your decision of November 21. 1881, holding
her claim for cancellation, and awarding the land to Lewis.
The record shows that one Pierson made timber-culture entry of the
tracts June 30, 1877, and that the same was canceled November 7, 1879;
that Lewis filed declaratory statement for the tracts November 10, alleg-
ing settlement November 7, 1879, and ou the day of his filing made
homestead entry for the same tracts, and that Critchfield filed declara-
tory statement November 13, alleging settlement November 7, 1879.
It appears that Alvin Critchfield, husband of said Caroline, commenced
a contest against the entry of Pierson October 29, 1878, and that pend-
inig the same, in November, 1878, Pierson, anticipating an adverse de-
cisiol, sold his possessory right and his improvements to Lewis for a
valuable consideration, who forthwith entered ou the land and has since
'coatinuously r sided on and cultivated more than forty acres thereof.
It appears, also, that on October 31, 1876, Alvin Critclfield filed a
leclaratory statement upon another tract of land in the same district,
whereby his pre-emption right was exhausted, and as Pierson's entry
was canceled because the land contained a large amount of timber and
would not be subject to another like entry, the only resource left to
{Critchfield was, if he desired to enter it, to apply for it under the home-
stead law-if that was admissible-which he did when initiating his
contest. Eis application was rejected by the Department, on appeal,
October 24, 1879, for the reason that no preferred right to enter can be
allowed a contestant of a timber-culture entry, except where failure to
,comply with the law is alleged and proven, and that this contest did
not involve that question, but the character ofthe land only.
Upon initiation of his contest Critchfield, with his wife and children,
-entered upon the land, where she continuously, with their children (and
he for a greater portion if not the whole of the time), has since resided.
Both parties to the present contest were therefore resident on the
land at the date of cancellation of Pierson's entry, but it does not ap-
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pear upon which subdivision their respective residences and improve-
ments were located; but it does appear that Lewis' house was torn down
by Alvin Critchfield, and that he was arrested and convicted thereof,
and that one or more of Lewis' houses, subsequently erected, were
burned or otherwise destroyed, but by whom is not satisfactorily shown.
It also appears from an exemplification of the records of the district
court of Mitchell County, Kansas, that a decree of divorce was entered
at its August term, 1879, in favor of said Caroline E. Critchfield against
said Alvin Critchfield, for the adultery of the latter, and that the mar-
riage relation theretofore existing between them was wholly annulled.
It must be presumed that this court had jurisdiction of the parties and
the subject matter of said proceeding, and full faith and credit must-be
given its decree and judgment. Nor will this Department, nor should
your office, attempt to review or overrule its doings. So far, therefore,
as marriage is concerned, Caroline E. Critchfield was a qualified pre-
emptor at the date of her filing. But it is quite competent for this
Department and your office to consider collateral facts respecting the
relation of the parties, for the purpose of deciding whether or not she
was at that date the head of a family, and made her filing in good faith,
in order to appropriate the land to her own exclusive use, and was a
bona fide settler.
It is claimed that the divorce proceedings were instituted solely to
enable the parties to secure, through her filing, the land which he could
not file upon nor enter, for the reasons above stated; that they were
nominal only, and not intended to affect their real relations, and that
the decree was obtained through their fraud and collusion.
The testimony shows that these proceedings were commenced in July,
1879, and that the decree was entered -in August following; that the
summons in the case was served by leaving a copy thereof with the
plaintiff, at the residence of the husband, they then occupying the same
house, which contained but one room; that he did not appear in nor
defend the case; that security for the costs of the proceedin g was filed
by a third person, upon their joint request, and upon Alvin Critchfield's
securing that person by a transfer to him of his own wagon; that they
bothA attended the hearing in this case, going to and returning fron
the land office in the same vehicle; that he assisted her in the conduct
of the case, and that since the decree of divorce the parties have con-
tinued to occupy the same house, without apparent disturbance of their
marital relations.
In view of all the facts, I cannot doubt that the proceedings in divorce
were collusively and fraudulently begun and conducted, in order to
qualify her as a pre-emptor and enable her to make a valid pre-emption
filing; that he, and not she, continues to be the head of their family;
that her tiling was not made in order to appropriate the land to her ex-
clusive use, and that she is not a bonaftde settler on the tract, competent
to make a legal filing.
I affirm your decision.
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PRE-EMPTIOY-TRESPASS-I PR OTEMENTS.
MARKs v. BRAY.
A trespass upon the public lands will not be sustained under the decision in Ather.
ton v. Fowler; nor will the claim of any person who is qualified and has com-
plied with law be subject to defeat in favor of an unlawful occupant.
The possibility of one party taking the improvements of another under the settle-
ment laws, recognized as within the contemplation of the statute.
Acting Secretary Bell to Commissioner JlEcFarland, November 9, 1882.
I have considered the case of Miles C. Marks v. Ferdinand T. Bray,
involving the N. I NW. i, and the SW. 1 of NW. 1, of section 34, T.
27 N., R. 9 E., San Francisco, Cal., on appeal by Bray from your decis-
ion of January 26, 1881, adverse to him.
The record shows that Bray filed declaratory statement September
2, 1870, alleging settlement August 20, 1879, and that Marks made
homestead entry October 18, 1879.
It also appears that the State of California selected said tracts as
lieu lands, at different times, both of which selections were canceled
by your letter of September 1, 1877. Marks purchased the State's
claim after said selections and some years prior to said cancellation,
and had occupied the land, both prior and subsequently to the date of
Bray's settlement; but, at the time, was living on other land, in sec-
tion 28, owned by himself, and occupying the land in dispute for busi-
ness purposes, as a dairyman. He has on the land a house, and twelve
or fifteen acres under cultivation, and uses the remainder for grazing
purposes. His improvements are valued at from $1,500 to $2,00(, and
his whole tract is inclosed by fence, with occasional gaps therein.
Bray entered on the land, peacably, on August 20, 1879, through a
gulch across which there was no fence, and forthwith commenced the
erection of a house upon the same subdivision on which Marks's house
was situated, and has since continuously resided there with his family.
He has about five acres under cultivation, and his improvements are
valued at about $250. Prior to this settlement he ascertained from the
local office that the tracts were vacant government land, as shown by
the records of that office. He knew of Marks's occupation and im-
provements at the date of his own settlement, but has authorized him
to remove his buildings and movable property at his pleasure.
On these facts you held the filing of Bray for cancellation, and al-
lowed the entry of Marks to remain intact, subject to his future com-
pliance with the law, referring to the cases of Atherton v. Fowler (6
Otto, 513), and Clow v. Patterson (5 C. L. 0., 147).
I think your decision was erroneous.
From the date of cancellation of the State's selection to the date of
Bray's settlement-a period of nearly two years-the tract had re-
mained vacant and unappropriated public land, subject to disposal
under the laws for the disposition of such land. No one made claim to
it. Although, as the testimony shows, Marks knew of such cancella-
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tion prior to Bray's settlement, le made no endeavor to forti fy his pos-
session and secure a right to the tract under either of said laws until
two months after Bray's settlement. His ladhes thus enabled Bray to
exercise a right the law gave him to settle and to file his declaratory
statement upon this as upon any other unappropriated public land. At
that date Marks's possession was not authorized by any law of Congress.
He was on the land i violation of law and without any legal right;
and in such a case occupation is mere trespass, and the party will not
be protected therein against one who has made a valid adverse claim.
That Marks himself regarded his own possession as invalid is apparent
from his subsequent homestead entry, whereby he endeavored to secure
rights to which he was not previously entitled.
The case of Atherton v. Fowler, as now interpreted by this Depart-
Ine'it, will not sustain a possession manifestly in violation of law , nor
defeat a claim to land by one who has complied with the requirements
of the law in favor of one who has not so complied. It also recognizes
the possibility of one party taking the improvements of another under
the settlement laws as within the contemplation of the statute. Further
consideration of the case of Atherton v. Fowler has led to a modification
of the ruling in Clow v. Patterson, i the latter cases of Molyneu v.
Young (7 C. L. 0., 107), and Powers v. Forbes (Hill's Leading Cases,
Jan., 1881). Whatever, therefore, may be the equities of the case, I am
of the opinion that as Marks's occupation of the tract was unauthorized
and illegal, and he was not a claimant therefor under any act of Congress,
and had no legal right thereto at the date of Bray's settlement and
filing, and as the latter appears to have complied with the require-
ments of the pre-emption law, and did not make forcible entry oll the
land, his declaratory statement should be held intact, subject to full
compliance with said law, and that the entry of Marks should be held
subject to his (Bray's) right to make payment and proof within the pre-
scribed period.
Your decision is reversed accordingly.
PRE-EJfPTION-SETTLEMXEyT-FORCIBLE ENTR Y.
BROWN V. QUINLAN ET AL.
Where lands are in the actual possession of one who has settled upon, improved, and
fenced the same, no right thereto can be acquired under the pre-emption laws
by another who breaks the close and takes forcible possession.
Where the lands are not inclosed by a fence, and the first settler is disqualified, or has
taken no lawful steps to acquire title, a subsequent settler, who enters without
force or intrusion upon the actual possession of the former, is not a trespasser
qu. ., and may acquire title to the lands under the pre-emption law.
Secretary Teller to Commissioner McFarland, February 15, 1883.
I have examined the case of John McAllen Brown v. John Quinlan
et al., involving certain lands in T. 4 N., R. 8, W., M. D. M., San Fran-
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Cisco, Cal., on appeal from your decision of January 12, 1882, awarding
said lauds to various claimants.
* * * * * * .* 
The township plat was first filed August 10, 1878, but was withdrawn
-because the surveys of the confirmed portions of the Soulajule grant
had not been finally approved, and was refiled February 5, 1879.
Most of the lands in controversy were situated within the exterior
iboundaries of the Soulajule grant made to Ramon Mesa in 1844, and
described as containing about three square leagues.
At different times in 1849, 1850, and 1851, Mesa conveyed parcels of
said grant to seven different parties; and among them a half league to
-one Trado, February 26, 1851, who on the same day conveyed it to
Charles A. Lauff, William C. Andrews, and James McKeever. In this
parcel are situated the lands in controversy.
Of this Trado tract Brown went into possession August, 1854, under
-au agreement with the parties holding the title, and with the intention
of purchasing it.
He built his house and made improvements upon lands which he
supposed to be within the boundaries of the Soulajule grant, but learned
,soon afterward that they in fact were upon the Laguna de San Antonio
grant, adjoining; and to secure such improvements he purchased an in-
terest in the San Antonio grant.
In 1857, he and his brother Samuel obtained, for a valuable consider-
tion, a deed of the tract from said McKeever, and sbsequently he
purchased his brothes interest therein.
In 1858 he acquired the title of said Andrews through an execution
sale. le has never had a conveyance of Lauff's interest, but it does
not appear that any claim to the lands has ever been made by Lauff, or
any one representing him.
The title to the Trado part of Soulajule grant was not presented for
confirmation under the act of March 3, 1851 (9 Stat. 631).
Notwithstanding parts of Mexican grants have been conveyed, it was
the practice to present for confirmation to the Board of Commissioners
provided for in said act the grant as an entirety, and of course the con-
firmation would inure to the benefit of grantees of parts. In the pres-
ent case that practice was not pursued, but the claims for the parts.
were presented and confirmed, on appeal to the district court, in sever-
alty-except the Trado part, not presented, and one part conveyed to
Fuller, dismissed in the district court for want of prosecution. The time
for presenting claims expired by the act, March 3, 1853.
At the time Brown went into possessioli he was informed that the
Soulajule grant had been confirmed as an entirety, and he seems to have
been under that belief at the time he made the purchases of the Trado
tract aforesaid.
In 1859, Depury Surveyor Matthewson was instructed to survey the
grant. He surveyed and located the exterior boundaries of the entire
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Soulajule grant. This survey, which embraced the land in controversy,
was approved March 3, 1860, by the surveyor-general. Separate sur-
veys were afterwards made of the five confirmed tracts within the
boundaries of the Mathewson survey. There were controversies about
the surveys, but that of Mathewson, representing the exterior boundaries
of the Soulajule grant, was held to be correct by both your office and
by this Department.
Brown seems to have labored under the belief that the grant as an
entirety had been confirmed, until MKatthewson came upon the ground,
in 1859, to make the survey. IUpon taking possession, in 18, he coin-
menced and continued extensive improvements upon the Trado tract,
with the view of making it an extensive dairy farm.
For this purpose he built a dwelling and dairy house, with other
buildings, sunk wells for water for his cattle, and maintained a dairy of
200 cows. At the time of the survey, in l859, he had the tract inclosed
with a substantial fence, built mainly by him, but in part by occupants
of adjoining lands.
In 1871, Brown made an effort to purchase the land comprising the
Trado tract from the University of California, as unsurveyed land, and
to have the same selected for him under the provisions of the Agricult-
ural College grant. He deposited money for surveying the land. For
some reasons not explained, the Board of Regents, in 1875, made an
order directing that the applications to select be abandoned (Exhibit
20). Brown does not seem to have learned of this action until 1878. He
then renewed his application, and was required to deposit one dollar
per acre, whereupon he deposited upwards of $2,500. Upon the com-
pletion of the United States surveys, the selections were, after some
controversy, rejected by your office, for the reason that the State and
University had already selected more lands than they were entitled to.
He then applied to purchase the lands under the seventh section of the
act of July 23, 1866 (14 Stat. 218), which provides for permitting persons
to purchase of the United States lands which they have in good faith
and for a valuable consideration purchased of Mexican grantees, and
which have not been included in the final survey of such grants. He,
however, was advised that on account of the Lauff outstanding interest,
as shown by the record of the title, under the rulings of this Depart-
ment, such claim to purchase could not be maintained. He then, May
15, 1879, procured the additional homestead entries now in contest, and
seeks to obtain title through these entries.
These conveyances to Brown, and the various steps taken by him to
acquire title, are recited as bearing upon the question of good faith on
his part, and as showing the color of title under which he had been in
possession. At the time of the additional homestead entries, he had
been in continuous possession of the tract, personally and by his tenants,
about twenty-five years.
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In the summer of 1878, the pre-emptors generally made forcible and
violent entry through Brown's inclosure, and in that manner effected
their alleged settlements, and with actual force and arms maintained
their possession. Brown remonstrated, and made ineffectual efforts to
eject them by force, and also resorted to the State courts for protection.
He obtained an injunction to restrain the pre-emptors from plowing thew
land and interfering with his stock; and, upon the hearing of a motion
to dissolve the injunction, it was made perpetual. He also brought.
suits of ejectment against the pre emption claimants, in which decisions
were rendered in his favor in the trial courts, and on appeal to the su-*
preme court of the State the decisions below were affirmed (8 Pacific
Coast Law Journal, 708, 717).
In these cases in the State courts the acts of the respective parties.
in respect to lawful entry and possession, and the rights of each under
the possession acquired in the manner before stated, seem to have been
fully considered both upon the law and the facts, and it was determined
that the possession of Brown was lawful, and that the pre-emptors were
trespassers and intruders.
The surveys of the confirmed grants within the exterior boundaries of
the Soulajule were finally approved January 18, 1879. Until that time
the surplus land then for the first time definitely found within the ex-
terior boundaries of that grant was not opened to settlement under the
pre-emption laws. (osmer v. Wallace, 97, U. S., 575). And certainly
these pre emption claimants could take nothing by reason of acts done-
before that time.
I think it will be found upon examination that the present case, both
as to the law and the facts, is ruled by the cases of Atherton v. Fowler
(96 U. S. 513), and Hosmer v. Wallace (supra).
In the former case (which was replevin for hay cut upon land claimed
under a pre-emption settlement), the land had been within the limits of
an alleged Mexican grant, but the claim for confirmation was decided
adversely in March, 1862; and it was held that upon such decision the-
land became public land under the act of March 3, 1851 (supra). The
land, however, after the final decision, continued to be held in possession-
by tenants and purchasers under the supposed Mexican grant, and
while so held it was forcibly invaded by persons who previously had no-
interest in it, and who dispossessed the occupants " under pretense of'
establishing a right of pre-emption to the several parts which they so,
seized."
The court below charged the jury as follows:
If you believe from the evidence that the defendants entered in good
faith, with intention to pre-empt the land on which the hay was cut,
and had actual possession of it at the time the hay was cut, your verdict.
should be for the defendants.
The plaintiff requested the court to charge the jury:
That if he was in actual possession of the land, having cultivated it
for several years previously, and the defendants broke through his in-
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closure against his consent, the entry was unlawful, though the land
anight be public land.
This request the court refused.
It was held that the charge as given, and the refusal to charge as
requested, was error, upon the ground that it was "obvious that the
,case was made by the court to turn on the assumption that the land
was, in its then condition, liable to be pre-empted by defendants,
~against the wishes of the plaintiff."
The court, in further considering the case, said:
The generosity by which Congress gave the settler the right of pre-
iemption was not intended to give him the benefit of another man's labor,
and authorize him to turn that man and his family out of their home.
It did not propose to give its bounty to settlements obtained by violence
.at the expense of others. The right to make a settlement was to be exer-
-cised on unsettled land-to make improvement on unimproved lands.
To erect a dwelling house did not mean to seize other man's dwelling.
It had reference to vacant land, to unimproved land; and it would
deave shocked the moral sense of the men who passed these laws if they
had supposed that they had extended an invitation to the pioneer pop-
ulation to acquire inchoate rights to the public lands by trespass, by
violence, by robbery, by acts leading to homicides and other crimes of
dess moral turpitude.
In the ase of Hosmer v. Wallace the doctrine in Atherton v. Fowler
-was reaffirmed, and it was held that-
The right of pre-emption only inures in favor of a claimant when he
has performed the condition of actual settlement, inhabitation, and im-
provement. As he cannot perform them when the land is occupied by
:another, his right of pre-emption does not extend to it.
In that case, as in the one at bar, the laud in controversy was part of
,a Mexican grant, but had been excluded by the approved survey of the
tract confirmed, but continued in the possession of the grantee under
the original grant, and the plaintiff claimed "a right of pre-emption to
land excluded by the survey from the tract confirmed, although it was
,at the time in the occupation of the defendant."
The principle in these cases was again reaffirmed in the case of Tren-
-outh v. San Francisco (100 U. S. 251), wherein it was held that "the
right of pre-emption under the laws of the United States cannot be ac-
*quired by intrusion and trespass upon lands in the actual possession of
others." In that case the lands were claimed as against the pre-emptor
-' under a foreign title-that of the pueblo from Mexico."
Nearly all the questions now under consideration were examined by
-the supreme court of California in the ejectment cases before referred
to, and were pertinent to the inquiry. The decision is evidently a care-
ful and well-considered one, and the court expressed the opinion that
the questions involved had been substantially determined by the case of
Atherton v. Fowler (supra).
It is insisted, by counsel for the pre-emption claimants, that Brown
-was a trespasser from his first possession, in 1854. I do not think this
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position can be maintained. I think his possession within the exterior
bounds of the Soulajule grant was lawful (losmer v. Duggan, 56 Cal.r
257; Van Reynegan v. Bolton, 95 U. S., 33; Newhall r. Sanger, 92 U.
S., 761, and cases before cited). Until final adjustment of the grant
within the exterior limits, the lands were by law in a condition oftreser-
vation, and were so reserved by your office (letter D, November 26,
1878). There can be no doubt that Ramon Mesa's possession would
have been rightful; and if so, the possession transferred to his grantee-
(Trado), and to Brown (Trado's grantee), was necessarily of the same
lawful character.
The views thus expressed are conclusive of the principal questions in,
controversy.
Settlements were made in some instances outside of Brown's inclos-
ure, but upon lands adjacent thereto, the sectional subdivisions of which
extended within the inclosure. It was said in Eosmer v. Wallace that--
Settlement, inhabitation, and improvement of one piece of land can.
confer no rights to another adjacent to it which at the commencement,
of the settlement is in the possession and use of others, though upon a
subsequent survey by the government it proves to be part of the same.
sectional subdivision.
Brown, however, is seeking to obtain title through additional home-
stead entries made subsequently to the pre-emption filings; and I COD--
cur in your opinion that where the inclosure divides the smallest sub-
division into parts, and the pre-emptor's settlement and improvements.
were made upon the part lying outside of the inclosure, since no divis-
ion can be made of such tracts, they should be awarded to the pre-emp-
tion claimants in preference to the additional homestead claimant.
*P # * * # * *
Wm. T. Farley claims the NE. 1 of Sec. 25, in ccuflict with thel
claim of Aaron F. Bradley, under homestead entry No. 3584, embracing
the SE. 4 of SE I of Sec. 24, and E. W of NE. J and SW. I NE. t Sec.
25, and in conflict with claim of Mack. above adjusted, and said Far-
lcy's claim, as to tract in conflict with Mack, is held subject to Mack's:
claim.
As to the remaining tracts, Farley's record claim is prior to Bradley'S.
Bradley, however, claims that Farley's settlement was effected by force-
within his inclosure, and upon land in his actual possession.
At the time that Farley made a settlement upon the land, the evidence
shows that it was in Bradley's possession, occupied by his tenant. Brad-
ley was living upon an adjoining tract owned by him. These tracts in
contention between Bradley and Farley had been inclosed, or nearly
so, by Bradley, and had been in his possession many years. He built.
a house and commenced to reside upon the tract in dispute in 1870, and.
resided there until 1876, when he removed to the adjoining tract, but.
returned to the land in question in 1879., it being occupied in the mean
time by his tenant; and since then he has continued to reside thereon .
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He has used the land for grazing purposes, keeping thereon some forty
milch cows. At one time he made an ineffectual effort to obtain title
by means of selections under the grant of college lands.
Farley's settlement was effected by a forcible entry. It was not ac-
companied by the acts of violence which characterized the possession
taken of the Brown tracts, but it was with force. He put the lumber
for his building from the public road over Bradley's fence, and after-
wards effected an entrance for his team and other property by taking
away the fence. He built a small house, and inclosed by a fence within
Bradley's inclosure somewhat less than an acre of ground, which he has
cultivated. Such is the extent of his possession, except that he has at
times turned some of his stock out to graze upon other parts of the
tract. The highest estimate made by himself upon the value of his
improvements is $150.
I am unable to agree with you that his pre-emption claim is valid and
lawful. The manner of his entry, and the nature of his inhabitancy, is
of such a character as prevented him, in my judgment, from obtaining
a valid pre-emption under the principles laid down in the decisions
already cited.
I am aware that a modified interpretation has been given by this De-
partment to the case of Atherton v. Fowler, since some of the earlier
rulings made after that case was decided (see Marks v. Bray, 8 C. L. O.,
139), but I do not think that any of them go to the length of holding a
pre-emption valid, attempted to be acquired under the circumstances
of this case.
In Clow v. Patterson, subsequently modified, the entry of both par-
ties was peaceful, and the actual possession of a part by one did not
interfere with the actual possession of the other; and it seems to have
been held that under the Atherton v. Fowler case the one could not
be awarded the part possessed and iproved by the other, though the
latter had no legal claim to it under the statutes relating to the public
lands. If such was the intended effect of the decision, it would man-
ifestly be wrong, and would not be justified by anything found in the'
case of Atherton v. Fowler. The opinion in that case carefully states:
Undoubtedly there have been cases, and may be cases again, where
two persons making settlement on different parts of the same quarter-
section of land may present conflicting claims to the right of pre-emp-
tion of the whole quarter-section, and neither of them be a trespasser
upon the possession of the other, for the reason that the quarter-section
is open, uninclosed, and neither party interferes with the actual posses-
sion of the other. In such cases the settlement of the latter of the two
may be bona fide for many reasons. The first party may not have the
qualifications necessary to a pre-emptor; or he may have pre-empted
other land; or he may have permitted the time for filing his declaration
to elapse, in which case the statute expressly declares that another
person may become pre-emptor; or it may not be known that the set-
tlements are on the same quarter.
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The question of a forcible entry was not in the latter case of Powers
v. Forbes (7 C. L. O., 149), referred to by you, and although a part of
the tract had been improved and was occupied by another party, it was
awarded to Forbes upon the ground that the other party had failed to
comply with the law in making proof and payment, and his holding
was, for that reason, in violation of law.
The case of Marks v. Bray (supra), decided in 1881, is a leading case.
Marks had been in possession by right of purchase from the State of
California under selections made by the State, but which were canceled
in 1877. Bray made settlement and filed pre emotion [D. S.] some two
years afterward, and soon after his settlement Marks made homestead
entry. At the time of Bray's settlement Marks lived upon other land,
but subsequently moved to his improvements on a part of the land in
dispute, and both continued to-occupy. The tract was awarded to Bray
upon the ground that it was public land (the selections having been
canceled) at the time Bray settled, and Marks had taken no steps under
the law to acquire title. It was expressly found, and is so stated il the
decision, that Bray's entry was not a forcible one.
In Atherton v. Fowler the single question decided (and the only one
before the court) was that the right of pre-emption could not be initiated
by forcible intrusion "upon the possession of one who had already set-
tled upon, improved, and inclosed that tract. And that such an intru-
sion, though made under the pretense of pre-empting the land, was but
a naked trespass." That principle has been maintained and reaffirmed
in repeated decisions in the courte, and has not been departed from in
the decisions of this Department (Molyneux v. Young, 7 C. L. 0., 107;
Belk v. Meagher, 104, U. S. 279).
In this respect I therefore reverse your decision, and dirert that Far-
ley's pre-emption filing be held for cancellation.
LOCATION-SETTLEMENT-ESTOPPEL.
CAULFIELD V. BOSWORTH.
When a claim is located upon the ground before survey, either with Valentine scrip,
or under the pre-emption laws, and other claims are afterwards made and located
with reference thereto, the party first locating and making known the extent of
his claim, will not be permitted to enlarge the same to the injury of subsequent
locators whose claims have been made to conform to such first location.
Acting Secretary Joslyn to Commissioner JlcFarland, August 10, 1882.
I have considered the case of B. G. Caulfield v. George T. Bosworth,
involving the N. I of the NE. i of See. 9, T. 5 N., R. 5 E., Deadwood,
Dak., on appeal by Bosworth from your decision of March 6, 1882,
adverse to him.
Caulfield filed Valentine scrip for the tract October 25, 1878, and Bos-
worth filed pre-emption declaratory statement for the NE. ; of the sec-
tion.February 20,1880, alleging settlement February 3, 1877.
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It appears that the tract in question is occupied as part of the town
site of Sturgis City, which was not organized as such under any statute
of the United States, but was located by an association of individuals,
who filed Valentine scrip therefor in the name of Caulfield, and after-
wards divided it into lots among the proprietors, which were sold by
them individually.
This was a private speculation, and no question arises under the
town-site laws, but only whether, as between Caulfield and Bosworth,
the tract on which the scrip was located was subject to the claim of
Bosworth.
The town site was surveyed in August, 1878, and the subdivisional
survey of the township was made in November and December follow-
ing, and the plat thereof was filed in the local office February 18, 1880.
The testimony is voluminous, and relates largely to the statements,
and admissions of Bosworth as to the location of his northern line.
The southern line of the town site conforms nearly with the government
survey but leaves between it and Bosworth's northern line a small,
wedge-shaped tract embracing from five to ten acres. Bosworth was
present at the town-site survey, and, at the request of the parties in
interest, pointed out to them the northern boundary of his claim, no
portion of which touched the N. of the NE. of the section, and the
town site was located and surveyed accordingly.
When a claim is located upon the ground before survey, either with
Valentine scrip, or under the pre-emption laws. and other claims are;
afterwards made and located with reference thereto, the party first
locating and making known the extent of his claim, will not be ler-
mitted to enlarge the same to the injury of subsequent locators, whose
claims have been made to conform to such first location.
The preponderance of testimony clearly shows that the scrip was
located in accordance with Bosworth's claim as then made, and he must
be held thereto.
Your decision holding for cancellation Bosworth's declaratory state-
ment so far as it conflicts with the scrip location is affirmed.
PRE-EMPTIO1-FLINC-SETTEMET.
GENZEL . GSCHWEND.
A filing before settlement is premature, unauthorized, and a nullity.
Acting Secretary Bell to Commissioner Williamson, August 31, 1880.
I have considered the case of Johann G. Geuzel v. John Gschwend,,
jr.) involving the N. of E. ; NE. 1 of NW..4 of Sec. 32, and thee
NW. of NW. , of Sec. 33, T. 15 N., R. 15 W., San Francisco District,,
California, on appeal by the plaintiff from your decision of February
28, 1880.
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The township plat was filed in the local office September 8, 186&
The land in contest is unoffered. Both parties claim under the pro-
vision of the pre-emption law.
Genzel filed for said tracts April 28, alleging settlement thereon April
25, 1876.
Gschwend filed for same tracts October 10, alleging settlement
thereon September 16, 1876.
At the two trials of this contest, held respectively April 4, 1877, and
June 19, 1879, Genzel failed to prove any act of settlement prior to the
filing of his declaratory statement.
So far as the testimony shows, the first work done upon the laud, by
or for him, was done in the month of May, 1876. By law, he was re-
quired to make known his claim in writing to the register " within three
months from the time of settlement." (Sec. 2265, Revised Statutes.)
He was not authorized to file before settlement. Indeed, before settle-
ment, he had no claim to make known. His filing was premature, un-
authorized, and a nullity (Lansdale v. Daniels, 10 Otto 113).
But if Genzel's filing had been valid, the testimony shows that he
has not inhabited and improved the land within the intent of the law.
Gschwend shows qualifications as a pre-emptor, and compliance with
the requirements of the pre-emption law as to settlement, filing, erec-
tion of a dwelling-house, and inhabitancy and improvement of the land;-
and he should be allowed to enter the tracts in contest, upon making
the further proof required by law.




Second filing allowed when first was made of land worthless for agricultural pur-
poses at a time when its character could not be ascertained, and relinquished
with due diligence after discovery of its character.
Acting Commissioner Holcomb to register and receiver, Grand Forks, Dak.,
July 1, 1881.
Ransom Young filed IŽ. S. 5,860 for the NW. i 26, 152, 52, January
15, alleging settlement January 13, S80. Young alleges that his se-
lection of this tract was made through the representation of his attor-
ney, and at a time, also, when the ground was frozen hard, and its
actual character could not be accurately determined.
In the spring he discovered that the principal part of it was covered
with water, and the tract worthless for agricultural purposes in conse-
quence. Young relinquished his claim March 11, 1880, and now applies
to make a second filing, for NE. I 12, 153, 55.
20309-VoL 1--28
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It appears from the foregoing, that at the date of this filing, the actual
character of the land claimed could not be easily ascertained. At the
earliest practicable time, viz, in the following spring, its worthless nat-
ure for farming purposes was discovered, and the filing immediately
relinquished. Under these circumstances, Young's pre-emption privi-
lege cannot be regarded as exhausted, and you are therefore instructed
to allow him to file for the land desired, on payment of the legal fees,
subject to any prior valid claim.
HOMESTEAD-PBE-E1PTION-BESIDENVCE.
BOWERS V. WILSON.
The act of June 4, 1880, does not change the relation or the rights of parties, but
allows only, under certain circumstances, an extension of time for making proof
and payment.
If a party has filed his notice of absence and is absent from the land, in fraud of the
act, he acquires none of the granted benefits, and this may be matter for investi-
gation at the proper time.
Secretary Kirkivood to Commissioner McFarland, July 30, 1881.
I have considered the appeal of W. P. Bowers from your decision of
March 17, 1881, rejecting his application to make homestead entry on
the W. I of SW. i and NE. i of SW. i of Sec. 12, T. 5, R. 1 WY., Kir-
win, Kans.
It appears that Joseph Wilson filed declaratory statement for said
tracts September 1, alleging settlement August 31, 1879. On Novem-
ber 24, 1880, he filed an application at the local office, alleging that lie
had broken 16 acres of the tract, and asking that, on account of the
extreme dry weather, he be allowed an absence therefrom under the act
of June 4, 1880 (Pamphlet Laws, chap. 122, p. 19). This act provides
that it shall be lawful for homestead and pre-emption settlers on the
public lands, where there has been a loss or failure of crops, from una-
voidable cause, in the years 1879 or 1880, to leave and be absent from
said lands until the 1st day of October, 1881, under such rules and reg-
ulations as to proof and notice as your office may prescribe; and during
such absence no adverse rights shall attach to said lands, such settlers
being allowed to resume and perfect their settlement as though no such
absence had occurred.
Bowers applied on February 1, 1881, to enter the tract under the
homestead laws, which the local officers rejected because of Wilson's
notice of absence, and you affirmed their decision.
I think this was erroneous. Bowers' entry, if allowed, could not affect
Wilson's pre-emption claim. That would still rest upon its own merits,
and the homestead entry would be subject thereto, as in ordinary cases.
The act of June 4, 1880, does not change the relation or the rights of
the parties, but allows only, under certain circumstances, an extension
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of time for making proof and payment. Nor do your instructions of
June 4, that " no contest involving the right of a party who has filed
notice of his intended absence, under this act, can be instituted prior
to the legal term of absence to which he is entitled," affect the present
question. That is a distinct matter. If the party has filed his notice,
and is absent from the land, in fraud of the act, he acquires none of the
granted benefits; and this may be proper matter for investigation at
the proper time, and under proper proceedings. But as the tract would
have been subject to Bowers' entry in the absence of this act, and the
act does not affect the rights of the parties, I think his entry should be
allowed, subject to Wilson's pre-emption claim, under the usual prac-
tice.
Your decision is accordingly reversed.
SUBSEQUENT FILING-ABSENCE AND RETURA-GOOD FAITH.
MILAM1 V. FAVROW.
A pre-emption filing is no bar to a subsequent filing or other entry by another person
of the same tract.
In the absence of an adverse claim of record, a pre-emption settler upon unoffered
land may, after an absence, return to the land, and if good faith is shown, make
entry thereof.
A stranger to the record cannot contest an unexpired pre-emption filing.
Commissioner AM-cFarland to register and receiver, Sioux Falls, Dakota,
August 12, 1881.
I have examined the case of Bery A. Milam v. Frank L. Favrow, in-
volving the latter's D. S. No. 11430, for the SW. Sec. 20, T. 108, R.
47, filed October 10, 1878.
Trial was had at your office, after continuance from September 10,
November 11, 1879, upon complaint of Milam, who alleged that the pre-
emptor had abandoned his claim for more than six months.
Defendant made default, but you held that the contest should be dis-
missed for the reason that defendant was incarcerated in jail. There
is no evidence in the case that such was the fact, but if there was, it
would not, in the absence of testimony as to other circumstances, be
sufficient to sustain your decision.
The Rules of Practice, approved October 9, 1878, in force at the time
this contest was brought, authorized you to order hearings upon appli-
cation of one or more of the respective parties to make due proof of
his or their compliance with the pre-emption law, or to clear the record
of an abandoned or defective homestead or timber-culture entry, so as to
leave undisturbed and undisputed the rights of the party so proceeding.
MVilam was not a party in interest; he had no claim of record that he
desired to consummate, and hence there was no authority for allowing
the contest by him. Neither the law nor the rules make provision, as
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in homestead and timber-culture cases, for the contesting of alleged
abandoned pre-emption filings by persons not having a claim of record
in conflict therewith, for the reason that the same necessity does not
exist. Where a tract is embraced in a homestead or timber-culture
entry, it is necessary that the record should be cleared thereof before
any subsequent claim can be initiated, or prior pre-emption rights com-
pleted by entry; but in the case of a filing this is not so. Any claim
may be entered of record over it, subject to the pre-emptor's prior rights.
If his claim is illegal, or if he has failed to comply with the law, the sub-
sequent claimant may, when he applies to prove up his claim, bring a
contest to clear the record of the prior filing. Moreover, the law allows
the settler on unoffered lands thirty-three months within which to make
proof and payment for his claim, and after the expiration of that period
he may at any time make entry if no valid adverse right had in the mean
time attached. It may happen, and often has happened, that the pre-
emptor leaves his claim for a period, but subsequently returns and
complies with the requirements of law. In such cases, where good
reason is shown for such absence, and the claimants good faith is
established by his subsequent acts, he is allowed to perfect his claim;
and no reason exists why he should not, if adverse rights are not
thereby prejudiced. Hence, I can see no good reason for permitting a.
stranger to the record to contest a filing which isprirmafacie valid, and
has not expired by limitation of law. If such a person desires to initiate
a claim to the land, the filing is no bar, and can, when the necessity
arises, be contested by the subsequent claimant who, as a party in
interest, has acquired the right to contest.
For these reasons your action is sustained and the case dismissed.
PRE-EMPTION-SECOND FiLING.
WILLIA M L. PHELPS.*
In the absence of adverse rights, a party may file a second declaratory statement for-
the same tract.
Secretary Kirkwood to Commissioner McFarland, November 17, 1881.
I have considered the appeal of William L. Phelps from your decision
of April 6, 1881, rejecting his application to enter certain lands in the
Kirwin land district, Kansas.
It appears that Phelps filed declaratory statement November 16, 1871,.
upon certain tracts in Sections 8 and 9, T. 7 S., 11. 14 W., which he after-
wards relinquished under advice that his pre-emption right would not
thereby be lost, and that thereafter, on December 20, 1879, he made
another filing upon certain tracts in said Section 8, which embraced the
NE. i of the NE. i thereof, which was included in his former filing.
' Overruled, 2 L. D., 854.
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You reject this second filing upon all the tracts for the reason that the
same is prohibited by section 2261, Rev. Stat., which provides that-
No person shall be entitled to more than one pre-emption right by
virtue of the provisions of section 2259: nor, where a party has filed
his declaration of intention to claim the benefits of such provision for
one tract of land, shall he file at any future time a second declaration
for another tract.
The right of a person to make a second pre-emption filing upon the
same tract was considered by the supreme court of California, in the
case of Cmens v. Cyphers (56 Cal., 383), in which it was said:
We do not understand this section (2261) as prohibiting the filing of
a second declaratory statement for the same land, when, by reason of
defects, or any other reason, the first declaratory statement has become
unavailing, and there has intervened no right of any third party. The
section in question contains two prohibitions. The first is that " no
person shall be entitled to more than one pre-emptive right by virtue
of the provisions of section 2259." It is contended on behalf of the re-
spondent that by this is meant that where a person has once filed a de-
claratory statement for one tract of land he shall never afterwards file
another statement for the same or any other tract. If this be the mean-
ing of the first prohibition contained in the section, it is plain there was
no occasion for the second found in it; for the first, under this construc-
tion, would effectually accomplish the same end. But Congress could
not have meant this when it said that " No person shall be entitled to
more than one pre-emptive right by virtue of the provisions of section
2259," for in the same section it proceeded to make provision for such
a case in the words, " Nor where a party has filed his declaration of in-
tention to claim the benefit of such provisions for one tract of land, shall
he file at any future time a second declaration for another tract."
In our opinion the meaning of the section is very plain. By its first
clause Congress intended to declare, and did in effect declare, that no
person shall be entitled to enter with the register, and thus acquire from
the government, under the pre-emption laws, more than one tract of
land. This is what we understand is meant by the declaration that no
person shall be entitled to more than pre-emptive right by virtue of the
provisions of section 2259. But it had been found by experience that
this prohibition alone was not sufficient to protect the government from
imposition, so Congress added another: Nor where a party has filed
his declaration of intention to claim the benefits of such provisions for
one tract of land, shall he file at any future time a second declaration
for another tract."
The abuses intended to be remedied by this last provision, the sub-
stance of which was also embodied in the act of 143, were pointed out
by the supreme court of the United States in the case Johnson v. Tows-
ley, 13 Wall., 89. It cannot be said that the reasons that existed for
prohibiting a party who had once filed a declaratory statement for one
tract from afterward filing a second statement for another tract existed
in a case where the party for any reason should desire to file a second
statement for the same tract in the absence of the interposition of any
rights on the part of any third person. At all events, we find no pro-
hibition in the statute in the last-mentioned case.
I have quoted at length from this decision because the views therein
expressed seem to me a correct interpretation of section 2261, and should
be the rule of your office. I therefore modify your decision, and permit
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Phelps to enter NE. i of NE. 1 of Sec. 8, if he shows a compliance with
the pre-emption law, and if there is no adverse claim, and affirm it in
respect to other tracts named in his filing.
a a by ./2 EVTRY OF LAYD IT TWO DISTRICTS.
EDWARD WESTGATE.
Where filing is intended for land situated in two districts, proof must be made for the
entire claim in both offices, separate pre-emption affidavits and two certificates,
and separate payments to the receivers of the two districts.
Commissioner AMcFarland to register and receiver, Boise City, Idaho, Feb-
ruary 8, 1882.
The attention of this office has been directed to the claim of Edward
Westgate to a tract of land, one hundred and twenty acres of which
lies in your district and 40 acres in the Lakeview (Oregon) district.
The land in Idaho is W. i- SW. I and SE. 4 SW. I Sec. 26, T. 3 S., R. (
W., and that part of Mr. Westgate's claim and upon which he resides,
in Oregon, is unsurveyed.
In view of the statement that you have informed Mr. Westgate that
he must remove to the tract in Idaho, in order to obtain title thereto,
under the preemption or homestead laws, you are advised as follows:
Upon the application of Mr. Westgate to file a declaratory statement
you will allow him to file for the tracts in your district, with a statement
in writing to the effect that he intends to file for the tract in Oregon,
upon the survey of the same and the filing of the proper township plat
in the local office at Lakeview. When said claimant applies to enter,
proof must be made for the entire claim in both offices, but the purchase
money for the tracts in your district must be paid to the receiver of
your office, and for that portion in Oregon to the receiver at Lakeview,
and receipts issued accordingly.
Two certificates, one in each office, will be required, and a separate
pre emption affidavit for the land in each district. The fact that the
entry is made in two offices, with a description of the entire tract, should
be indorsed on the certificate from each office.
Forward a copy of this letter to the local officers at Lakeview, and
advise said officers of anv action taken by you in this case.
PBE-EMPTION-FILh1YG-FIAL PROOF.
HERBERT V. REED.
As between two pre-emption claimants, both of whom were in default as respects the
filing of a declaratory statement within the statutory period, the one who first
gives notice of his claim is entitled to make the entry. 9
Secretary Kirkwood to Commissioner illcFarland, March 5, 1882.
I have considered the case of Frederick Herbert v. C. C. Reed, in-
volving the right to enter, under the preemption laws, the SE. 4 of SE..
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3 of Sec. 3, T. 6 N., R. 13 E., Sacramento, Cal., on appeal by Reed from
your decision of February 8, 1881, awarding the same to Herbert.
It appears that Herbert filed declaratory statement March 30, 1877,
alleging settlement August 11, 1876, and that Reed filed declaratory
statement August 16, 1877, alleging settlement August 15,1872.
At the date of Herbert's filing there was no claim of record to the
tract, and neither party filed his declaratory statement within three
months from the date of his settlement, as required by section 2265, Rev.
Stats. (the tract not having been proclaimed for sale).
Your decision held that as between two pre-emption claimants, both
of whom were in default as respects the filing of a declaratory statement
within the statutory period, the one who first gives notice of his claim
is entitled to make the entry; .and that consequently Herbert is so en-
titled, upon making the required proofs.
Your decision is affirmed.
SETTLEME.NT-RESIDENCE-FRA UD.
ARNOLD v. LANGLEY.
A pre-emption filing is void unless preceded by settlement, and hence is no bar to a
second filing.
A bona fide pre-emption claim should not be rejected because the claimant's house was
by mistake beyond the lines of servey bounding his land.
An entry allowed is prima facie valid, and should be disturbed only on the clearest
proof of fraud, unless shown to be absolutely void.
Commissioner McFarland to register and receiver, Qxford, Idaho, June
27, 1882.
I have considered the testimony relating to William Langley's cash
entry No. 15, embracing E. i of NE.1, and E. SE.1, Sec. 28, T. 10 S., R.
25 E., elicited by the investigation ordered by my predecessor's letter
of April 10, 1880.
Langley filed D. S. 1147, Boise City series, April 5, 1875, alleging set-
tlement November 9, 1874, and again filed, for same land, D. S. 1805, July
29, alleging settlement January 1, 1878. His said entry was made Jan-
uary 12, 1880, after due publication of notice.
Thomas L. Arnold filed D. S. 64, July 24, alleging settlement July 18,
1879, and after Langley's entry had been made filed the affidavits alleg-
ing fraud, upon which my predecessor's action was based.
Before considering the question to which the investigation was more
particularly directed, I desire to correct the erroneous conclusions ar-
rived at by you in regard to Langley's declaratory statements.
His first filing was absolutely void, not having been preceded by a
valid settlement, Genzel v. Gsch wend (8 C. L. O., 159), and hence was no
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bar to a second and legal filing. French v. Tatro (lb., p. 150). Even
were his first filing not absolutely void, his second filing for the same
tract is not within the prohibition of the statute. Case of William L.
Phelps (lb., p. 139).
There can be no doubt that Langley's second filing was based upon
an antecedent settlement, and his entry relates to and depends upon
that filing, without reference to the prior and void one. The substan-
tial allegation of Arnold's affidavit is in effect that prior to his entry
Langley had sold to him (Arnold) his improvements upon, and the right
to' the land claimed by him, upon the faith of which he had made his
settlement, and furthermore that Langley had not erected a dwelling-
house or resided upon said land prior to entry. In regard to the alleged
sale to Arnold parol evidence is introduced to show that Langley, in
consideration of $1,000, transferred in writing to Arnold all his interest
in the improvements upon, and his right to, the tract claimed by him
as a pre-emptor, and his interest in certain personal property owned by
him jointly with C. D. Lane and William Bennett, valued at $6,000, for
which he accepted Arnold's notes-one for $300, due in October, 1879,
and the other for $700, due in May, 1880. The said writing, or bill of
sale, which is in itself the best evidence of its contents, was not pro-
duced, or, in order to admit of the acceptance of secondary evidence of
its contents, its absence accounted for. Hence the testimony as to the
terms of said sale is entirely inadmissible. If it were admissible, how-
ever, it is shown by the same testimony that possession of the property
intended to be conveyed was never given; that no payment was made
,on either of the notes; and that the notes themselves were returned to
Arnold prior to the time that Langley made his entry; and it does not
appear that any attempt was made by Arnold to enforce specific per-
formance of the alleged agreement. I am, therefore, of the opinion
that there is no proper proof of any agreement existing at date of
entry by Langley contrary to the statute, and hence that in this respect
his entry was not illegal or fraudulent.
The only remaining question is in the matter of Langley's residence
upon the land. It is clearly shown by the evidence that he did not
erect a dwelling-house or reside upon the land prior to entry, but in
none of the testimony elicted by Arnold does anything appear indicative
of bad faith or fraud on the part of Langley. On the other hand, it is
the opinion of one of the witnesses (Wood) that his failure to comply
with the law was the result of ignorance. (See Record, p. 67.)
It is shown that in 1874 Langley purchased the Marsh Lake Ranch,
including the land in controversy; that there was a house upon this
farm, the exact location of which with reference to the lines of survey
was not known. Langley cultivated this ranch in connection with Lane
and Bennett, each of whom claimed 160 acres as a pre-emptor. He was
frequently seen, up to a short time before he made entry, personally
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engaged in the cultivation of his pre-emption claim, 45 or 50 acres of
which werebroken, and upon which he raised crops each year from and
including 1875.
In 1875, 1876, and 1877, his crops were destroyed by grasshoppers,
much to his financial embarrassment. He also had post-holes dug, and
hauled poles himself upon the premises for fencing purposes.
His expenditures of time and money upon this place, during a period
of three or four years prior to entry, sufficiently indicates, in my opinion,
his good faith.
It is true he did not inhabit the land, yet his purchase included a
dwelling which it appears he had no means of knowing was not upon
the land. It certainly does not appear affirmatively that he knew the
house was not on his claim.
On the other hand, it appears from the testimony of Lane that he
supposed it was there, at least until some time in 1879. In the absence
of any evidence of a fraudulent intent, and in view of the facts shown
as to his personal improvement and cultivation of the tract, it seems to
me that the case of Langley is within the spirit of the opinion of Mr.
Attorney-General Butler (3d Opin., 312), cited in 1st Lester, p. 385, to
the effect that when a pre-emptor had personally cultivated public land,
and no doubt could exist as to his intent to make a settlement on the
particular quarter section claimed, his claim should be allowed, although
his house, by mistake, was over the line. In such a case he did not
consider actual inhabitancy essential. See also letter of Mr. Secretary
Schurz, dated February 12, 1881, in the matter of Philoman Higgins's
homestead entry. In this case the party by mistake erected his house
over the line and resided there for a year before discovering and cor-
recting the mistake. It was held, upon reference to the opinion above
cited, that the entry did not require confirmation, the party being con-
structively resident upon the land.
An entry having once been allowed upon proof satisfactory to the
local officers is prina facie valid, and should, as has been repeatedly
held by this office and the Department proper, only be disturbed upon
the most clear and convincing proof of fraud, unless it is shown to be
absolutely void. In this case the evidence seems rather to sustain
Langley's good faith than to prove a fraudulent intent; and as, under
the rulings above referred to, his entry is not absolutely void, I cannot
concur in your conclusion that it should be canceled, but will approve
the same for patent should this decision become final. ....
Arnold, by reason of his filing for the land prior to Langley's entry,
being a party in interest, is entitled to appeal.
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PRE-EYMPTION-SECOND FILING.
STATE OF CALIFORNIA V. PIERCE*
Where a pre-emptor makes a legal filing prior to Jne 22, 1874, for unoffered land,
and relinquished the same, he may make a second filing after that date on an-
other tract.
Secretary Teller to Commissioner McFarland, August 1, 1882.
I have considered the case of the State of California v. John Pierce,
involving the NW. i of Sec. 12, T. 4 N., R. 1 E. H. M, Humboldt dis-
trict, California, on appeal by Pierce from your decision of September
1, 1881, holding his filing for cancellation.
It appears that Pierce filed declaratory statement No. 3446, for the
tract, August 22, alleging settlement August 21, 1876.
One John J. Ruse filed declaratory statement No. 3440 for said tract
August 18, 1876. alleging settlement the same day, and the State of Cal-
ifornia selected the same June 15, 1878, in lieu of deficiency in Sec. 36,
T.8N., B. 5E., R.andR.No.36.
The township plat was filed July23, 1868. A hearing was had March
26, 1877, and under date of October 18, 1879, your office decided, upon
the testimony adduced at the hearing, that Pierce should be allowed to
enter upon showing that his settlement was not made upon the 40-acre
tract in Huse's possession; that he is a qualified pre-emptor and had
complied with legal requirements. Said decision also found that Pierce
had settled subsequently to his filing, but that entry was permissible
under the ruling then in force, in the absence of a valid adverse claim.
Huse's claim having been found to be invalid and held for cancellation,
and the State's claim held subject to Pierce's, as not being a settler's
claim within the meaning of section 2265, Rev. Stats.
Neither Huse nor the State appealed from said decision.
Pierce having applied to make proof and payment according to the
provisions of the pre-emption law and of the act of March 3, 1879 (20
Stat., 472), the register of the Humboldt office, under date of January
7, 1880, published notice of his intention to submit proof within thirty
days thereafter. On the 4th of March ensuing the register and re-
ceiver decided, upon the proof submitted by Pierce pursuant to said
notice, to reject his application, from which action he appealed.
In your decision of September 1, 1881, you held that since the former
decision of your office the ruling had been so modified that Huse's in-
valid filing could not defeat Pierce's right to the entire quarter section;
but held his filing for cancellation because it was shown by the record
and admitted by him that he filed declaratory statement No. 778, for
another tract, October 2, alleging settlement July 24, 1869, and relin-
quished the same August 21,1871,in favor of certain parties (William and
Charles A. Fitch), each of whom had filed for half of the same March 7
preceding. Your decision was based upon the ground that as Pierce's
See 4 L. D., 187.
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filing was legal in its inception, it operated as a complete bar to the
filing of a declaratory statement under section 2261, Rev. Stat. You
further held that as his settlement under the latter filing was proved
to have been made subsequently to the date of filing, the same was
void for that reason, and should be held for cancellation.
By your predecessor's decision, Huse's rights were concluded, and
those of the State were subordinated to Pierce's. That decision has be-
come final by reason of their failure to appeal therefrom, and they must
be regarded as having waived whatever rights they may have had in
the premises.
In regard to the objection that Pierce's former filing precluded him
from making another subsequently to the adoption of the Revised
Statutes, I am of the opinion that such filing does not come within the
purview of section 2261 thereof, which prescribes as follows, to wit:
No person shall be entitled to more than one pre-emptive right by
virtue of the provisions of section twenty-two hundred aud ftfty-nine;
nor, where a party has filed his declaration of intention to claim the
benefits of such provisions for one tract of land shall he file at any
future time a second declaration of another tract.
The Revised Statutes were approved June 22, 1874, and the provisions
of section 2259 did not, therefore, obtain until that date.
Although Pierce filed as stated, it was upon unoffered land, and such
filing was no bar to a second filing under the act of March 3, 1843 (6
Stat., 620), from the fourth section of which, and the tenth section of
the act of September 4, 1841 (id., 455), section 2261, Rev. Stat., was de-
rived. He relinquished his filing, and was thereafter correctly advised
by the register that he could file a second declaratory statement for
another tract. Hence when the Revised Statutes were enacted Pierce
was a qualified pre-emptor and as competent to file a declaratory state-
ment under the provisions of section 2259 as though he had never at
tempted to exercise his pre-emption right. The act of March 3, 1843,
was no bar to his making a second filing (Johnson v. Towsley, 14
Wallace, 72).
By the same line of reasoning it follows that in order to bring him
within the prohibition of section 2261 he must have made a previous
filing under section 2259, referred to in the prohibitory statute, and not
under the provisions of the act of 1843.
In regard to the remaining objection, it should be observed that
Pierce alleges under oath that he performed acts of settlement upon
the premises two months prior to the date of his filing, and commenced
to build his house the day after, wherein he has since continuously
resided, exceptingthe time that lie was at the hospital under treatment
for his eyes, pursuant to the advice of his physician.
The ground upon which you base such objection is not well taken,
for while the records of your office show that at the date of such settle-
ment the land was covered by E. H. Hathaway's homestead entry No.
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324, they also show that the same was canceled July 31, 1876, upward
of three weeks prior to the date of his filing, and as it is virtually con-
ceded that he was residing upon and improving the tract when said
entry was canceled, no specific act was necessary to constitute a new
settlement thereon after its restoration to market. (Roach v. Myers et
oI., 9 C. L. 0., 61.)
But the question of settlement was determined by your predecessor's
decision of October 18, 1879, and it was not necessary to reopen it for
the purposes of this inquiry. He found from the testimony that Pierce
had completed a very comfortable house, built a barn and out-house,
eleared, cultivated, and fenced about half an acre of the land, which he
had made his home since settlement; that he had endeavored in good
faith to comply with legal requirements; and that no attempt had been
made to show that he had any other residence.
Inasmuch as he has evidenced his good faith in the premises, I am of
the opinion that his proof, if found sufficient, should be received and
his entry allowed in accordance with his application.
I am aware that the foregoing is a modification of existing rulings
Tespecting second filings, but a critical examination of the law convinces
me that the foregoing is the proper construction.
Your decision is accordingly reversed.
PRE-EMPTION-FILING-SETTLEMENT.
A filing based upon a settlement made at a time when the settler was qualified is
valid, although the alleged date of settlement was anterior to the time the settler
became qualified.
The date of settlement is a matter of proof, and the settler is not bound by that
alleged in his declaratory statement.
Commissioner McFarland to register and receiver, Aberdeen, Dakota. Feb-
ruary 12, 1883.
I am in receipt of register's letter of 20th ultimo, asking for a further
ruling upon the subject-matter of my letters (G) of December 4, 1882,
and January 9, 1883, which are, in his opinion, inconsistent with each
other. Said letter of December 4, 1882, advised you that a party must
be qualified at date of settlement in order to initiate a valid claim, and
that a filing made by a party whose settlement was alleged prior to the
date upon which he became qualified as a citizen is illegal and void.
The subsequent letter, that of 9th ultimo, further advised you that the
settler is not bound by the date of settlement alleged in his declaratory
statement, and that the date thereof is a matter of proof, and may be
established at the time of offering proof.
This latter proposition was stated in the case of a settler who was not
qualified in the matter of citizenship at the date of alleged settlement,
but who became qualified prior to filing his D. S.
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There is no inconsistency or error in these two propositions, although
that first stated might have been laid down with more particularity.
An alien cannot make a valid settlement, and his occupation of the
public land invests him with no rights. His filing, therefore, based on
an invalid settlement or unlawful occupation, is also illegal and void.
But if, prior to filing his declaratory statement and after becoming
qualified by declaring his intention to become a citizen, he performs an
act of settlement, that is the act of a qualified settler, and fixes the date
at which his right takes effect. In the case of one who has established
his residence upon the land, his every-day life is an act of settlement,
which takes effect from the time he becomes qualified, in the same man-
ner as does that of one who, at date of restoration of land theretofore
reserved, is residing there with an intention of claiming the same, with-
out the performance of a new and distinct act of settlement, and a filing
based upon a valid antecedent settlement, although subsequent to the
date of settlement alleged therein, is legal.
This proposition is fully elucidated in the decision of the supreme
court of Michigan in the case of Boyce v. Danz (29 Mich., 146; also re
ported in Lewis's Leading Cases, p. 744), with which the rulings and
practice of this office are in complete harmony.
In regard to the remaining proposition: The date of settlement is not
only a question of fact, but one of mixed law and fact. Many settlers,
through ignorance of what constitutes a valid settlement, allege a date
anterior or subsequent to the actual date, such allegation being upon
their part to a large extent a conclusionlof law. The uniform practice
of this office has been in contested and ex parte cases to find the date
of settlement from the evidence in the cases, and that date so found
must control the adjudication of their rights, without regard to the al-
leged date.
In the light of the foregoing, I do not think it will be difficult to recon-
cile the ruling that a filing based upon a settlement invalid for the rea-
son that the party was not qualified at date thereof is void with the
ruling that a filing based upon a settlement made at a time when the
settler was qualified is valid, although the alleged date of settlement
was anterior to the time the settler became qualified.
As to the further objection of the register, that the latter ruling is an
encouragement to perjury, although not agreeing with him in that state-
ment, I would say that the proper construction and execution of the
laws cannot be controlled by such considerations of policy. Congress
has been careful in its enactments relating to the disposal of the public
lands to provide for the punishment of perjury in connection therewith,
and it is in these enactments that the remedy for such an evil as that
suggested must be found.
The register's letter of 26th ultimo, just received, upon this same sub-
ject, has been duly considered in connection herewith.
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PRE-JFMPTIONY-FIXAL PROOF-GOOD FAITH.
FULLEN v. THOMAs.
If, where a pre-emptor applies to make final proof under his notice, he is surprised by
the introduction of adverse and unexpected evidence, he may defer is offer of
proof until any date within the time prescribed by law.
The law recognizes circumstances as well as time in the development of a pre-emp-
tor's good faith after his first act of settlement and before the date at which he is
required to make proof and payment.
Commissioner 31cFarland to register and receiver, Sacramento, California,
October 29, 1882.
I have examined the case of James Fallen v. B. W. Thomas, forwarded
with your letter of February 28, 1881, and involving title to the W. i
of SE. 4, and E. of SW. , See. 16, N., 11 E.
The records show that this tract of land was formerly covered by the
H. E. of John Fallen, which was canceled by this office November 1,
1879; that Marie Gould filed D. S. 7227, November 15, alleging settle.
ment November 13, 1879; that James Fullen filed D. S. 7232, November
19, alleging settlement November 1, 1879, and that B. W. Thomas made
H. E. No. 3072, May 12, 1880.
This contest grew out of the published notice of James Fullen to make
final proof and payment on the 18th of November, 1880.
Before entering upon the merits of the case, Thomas filed a motion
to dismiss, on the ground that Fullen had published a prior notice to
make proof and payment on the 12th of May, 1880, and that having
appeared to do so, with his witnesses declined to proceed, whereupon
the register and receiver dismissed the case.
The facts are as follows: Fullen did appear at the local office on the
12th of May, 1880, after due notice to make his final proof, but was con-
fronted by the affidavits of said Thomas and N. Radwich, alleging non-
compliance with the law on the part of Fallen. Fallen's attorney ob-
jected to the introduction of said affidavits, but his objection was over-
ruled by the register and receiver, whereupon notice of appeal was
verbally given, but never consummated, and Fallen declining to pro-
ceed, the case was dismissed without detriment expressed, and Thomas
allowed to make his homestead entry.
This action of Fullen can be looked upon in no other light than as in
the nature of a nonsuit. When a pre-emptor appears at the local office
to make his final proof it is not to be supposed that he is cognizant of
all the charges and allegations which may be brought against him, and
consequently is not fortified with evidence to successfully combat them.
The witnesses he takes with him are ordinarily for the purpose of prov-
ing certain features of his claim, and if it should appear upon reaching
the office that he is in any way surprised by the introduction of adverse
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and unexpected evidence, I cannot see how, under the law or any of
the regulations thereunder, it could affect his claim if he saw proper to
defer his offer of proof to any date within the time prescribed by law, and
when he may be fully fortified against the allegations of his adversaries.
Moreover, the objection of Fallen to the introduction of the evidence
referred to was well taken and should have been respected by the local
officers.
Neither of the parties named was of record in interest, and under the
rules of practice could not initiate a contest.
Having disposed of this feature in the case, the next thing to be con-
sidered is the bona fides of Fnllen as a pre-emptor.
The testimony shows him to be qualified as such in every respect.
In the month of October, 1879, le went upon the land and built a cabin
and was living on the land at the date of cancellation of John Fullen's
H. E., November 1, 1879. It appears that the aforesaid John Fullen
is the father of claimant, James Fallen, and an attempt is made to show
that they are in collusion, and that the son is but the agent of the father
in procuring title to the tract in dispute.
This suggestion, for it can be considered in no other light, grows out
of the fact that the father had attempted to homestead the tract, but
finding himself unable to do so advised his son to tale it under the pre-
emption law. The evidence is to the effect that the son was poor and
that he received some assistance from the father in the progress of his
improvements; also that the son has taken his meals during a portion
of the time he has been on the land at his father's house, and that his
cow was in the habit of going there to be milked; but outside of this
nothing else appears to that effect, and the suggestion is denied by the
son under oath.
It is also charged that the claimant has committed timber depreda-
tions on the land, but I think it is satisfactorily shown that the wood
was only cut from that portion of land intended for nclosure and cul-
tivation and not for the mere purpose of speculation. Indeed, the
claimant swears that he has since inclosed the land thus denuded of
timber and prepared it for cultivation.
From all the testimony in the case I am of the opinion that the claim-
ant has acted in good faith. He has built himself a house and provided
it with furniture enough to make it habitable; he has cleared a portion
of the land and fenced and cultivated it, and it matters not, as alleged,
that some or a majority of his improvements were made after his last
notice of contest. His abandonment of the land is not shown, and there
is a strong circumstantial show of good faith in the mean time.
The law recognizes circumstances as well as tine in the development
of a pre-emptor's good faith after the first act of settlement and before
the date at which under the law he is required to make his proof and
payment.
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Fullen, therefore, having offered his final proof, you will allow him to
complete his entry, and to this end the H. E. of Thomas is held for can-
cellation, as well at the D. S. of Marie Gould, who made default at the
hearing after due notice of the same.
FINAL POOF-PROTEST-HEARING.
FENTON V. COLWELL.
Upon application to make final proof, protest being filed by adverse claimant, the
proceedings should be suspended, and notices for hearing issued in accordance
with rule 8 of practice.
Commissioner 1l1cFarland to register and receiver, Dalles, Oregon, Feb-
rusary 28, 1883.
I have examined the contested case of Joseph P. Fenton v. Wm. H.
Colwell, forwarded with yourletter of April 25, 1882; and involving title
to the NW. of NE. 1, Sec. 8, 6 S., 24 E.
The records show that Colwell filed D. S. 118, December 15, 1881,
alleging settlement April 21, 1878, claiming the W. of SE. 41 and NE. 
of SW. 1, Sec. 5, and NW. of NE. , Sec. 8.
Fenton made H. E. No.832, December 16, 1881, for the E. of NW.4,
NW.- of NE. i, and NE. i SW. i, Sec. 8. Township plat filed Novem-
ber 24, 1881.
Colwell gave notice of his intention to make final proof and entry,
fixing as the date January 23,1882, when he appeared with his witnesses.
Fenton appeared at same time, with witnesses, and filed objections to
said proof and entry, whereupon you allowed him to cross-examine Col-
wells witnesses and offer the testimony of his own witnesses, the writ-
ten protest of Colwell to the contrary notwithstanding.
In this you erred. Rule 8, rules of practice, requires that at least
thirty days' notice shall be given of all hearings before you, unless by
written consent an earlier day shall be agreed upon.
In the face of Colwell's protest, therefore, it was your duty to suspend
proceedings in the matter of his entry until the expiration of the notice
required or such time as may be agreed upon by the parties.
You decide the case upon its merits in favor of Colwell, and Fenton
appeals.
The proceedings in this case are dismissed.
The proof of Colwell is regular and sufficient on its face, but you will
suspend the entry in view of Fenton's protest for a reasonable time
within which he may perfect his contest, if so desired, in accordance
with the rules of practice.
The proof is returned herewith, and you will notify all parties of this
decision.
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HOM3STEdD-X PPBOPRI XTION-PRIORITY-TIANSMUT-ITION.
;-I J g-P AD9 APP WOLF V. STRUBLE.
A homestead entry is an appropriation of the land, and removes it from liability to any
other disposition.
Parties claiming the right to enter under the 3d section of the act of May 14, 1880,
land embraced in a homestead entry, required to establish the priority of their
claims and secure the cancellation of the intervening entry prior to the allowance
of their application.
Fre-emptors applying to transmute their filings to homestead entries required to give
notice to adverse homestead claimants, who will be allowed to contest the appli-
cation to transmute.
Oommissioner McFarland to register and receiver Wa Keeney, Kansas,
September 20, 1882.
I am in receipt of your letter of 24th ultimo, reporting in the case of
Lillie B. Wolf v. Alpheus Struble, why you allowed Mrs. Wolf to trans-
mute her pre-emption filing to a homestead entry, without first giving
notice to Struble and Reese, homestead claimants to the same land.
I find upon further investigation of the matter that a difference in the
rulings in cases of this kind has inadvertently arisen, and thatyouraction
in this case is sustained by the later practice of this office.
It was always held that a homestead entry was an appropriation of
the land; that one entry could not be allowed over another, and conse-
quently, that in cases where an entry was made subject to a prior pre-
emption claim, the pre-emptor, in order to transmute, must first give
notice to the homestead party in order that the latter might show that
the former did not have a valid filing capable of transmutation, or had
not complied in good faith with the requirements of the law, thereby
preserving his own entry, which otherwise would be canceled upon the
allowance of the application to transmute.
In the case of Esrey v. Gleen (7 C. L. 0., 148), my predecessor, Mr.
Commissioner Williamson, held that the act of May 14, 1880, the third
section of which allowed a person who settled upon public land with the
intention of claiming under the homestead law, the same time within
which to make his homestead entry as is allowed pre-emptors to file
their declaratory statements, incorporated a new principle in the home-
stead law; that such settler could make his entry notwithstanding the
fact that the land was already appropriated by another entry, and that
the rights of the parties should be adjusted when either applies to make
final proof.
After a careful examination of this subject, I am unable to concur
with the views expressed in that decision.
A homestead entry is an appropriation of the land; it segregates it
from the body of public land, and removes it from liability to any other
disposition. This proposition, the correctness of which was never dis-
puted in this Department until the rendition of the decision above re-
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ferred to, is forcibly presented in the opinion of Mr. Attorney-General
MacVeagh of July 15, 1881. (8 C. L. O., 72.)
If an entry was erroneously allowed or conflicts with previously ac.
quired rights, it is voidable, and upon a proper showing may be set
aside and annulled.
Said decision will not, therefore, in the future be held to control the
action of this office.
In every case where a party applies to make a homestead entry under
the third section of the act of May 14, 1880, of land already appropri-
ated by homestead entry, he will be required to give notice to the ad-
verse claimant and establish the priority of his claim. If this is satis-
factorily done, the adverse claim will be canceled and the applicant
allowed to enter.
In cases where pre-emption claimants apply to transmute their filings,.
they will be required to give notice to subsequent homestead claimants
who will be allowed to contest the application to transmute. If the
validity of the pre-emptor's claim is not impeached, the adverse home-
stead entry will be canceled and the transmutation allowed.
In the case relativeto which your report was made, the transmutation
having been made, you will allow the adverse homestead claimants,
Struble and Reese, sixty days within which to show cause why their
entries should not be canceled for conflict with the claim of Mrs. Wolf.
RESERV 221ON-TRESPAS -SECOND FILING.
REES V. CHURCHILL.
All inchoate claims or mere pre-emption rights are extinguished by the reservation of
the land embracing them.
After the reservation, one who was before a settler in pursuance of law, is no longer
entitled to the possession of land embraced therein, and by retaining possession
becomes a trespasser.
If he has filed a declaratory statement he is entitled to file another for other land
upon which he may have settled.
Commissioner HlleFarlanii to register and receiver, Watertown, Dakota,
January 4, 1882.
I have examined the case of Cyrus B. Rees v. James B. Churchill, in-
volving the N. j NE. j and N. NW. 1, Sec. 22, T. 120 N., B. 63 W., on
appeal by plaintiff from your adverse decision. ees filed D. S. No.
3741, May 22, alleging settlement January 1 1879, and Churchill filed
D. S. No. 3935, June 25, alleging settlement April 3, 1879. You do not
report date of filing township plat in your office, but state that the
parties filed within the limited time thereafter. The township embrac-
ing these settlements was reserved for the Drifting Goose band of Sioux
Indians by Executive order of June 27, 1879, and restored to settlement
and entry by order of July 13, 1880.
This office holds that all inchoate claims or mere pre-emption rights
are extinguished by the exercise of the Presidential power, in reserving
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for public uses the land to which they relate. After the reservation
one who was before a settler in pursuance of law is no longer entitled to,
the possession of land embraced therein, and by retaining possession
becomes a trespasser and subject to removal by the proper power. If
he has filed a declaratory statement he becomes entitled, upon presenta-
tion of the facts to this office, to file again for other land upon which he
may have made settlement, because he cannot in such case be said to
have lost his pre-emption right through his own fault. But his claim
to the reserved land is, by the act of reservation, completely obliterated.
It follows from this view of the case that neither Churchill nor Rees can
claim any rights by virtue of their settlements upon and filings for the
land in contest in 1879, and hence it is not necessary to consider the
large amount of testimony submitted for the purpose of establishing the
validity or determining the priority of their respective claims, nor that
submitted by Rees for the purpose of sowing that Churchill dispos-
sessed him by threats of violence, and prevented his continued compli-
ance with law.
The proof and payment tendered by Churchill in October, 1880, must
be rejected, because the right of entry claimed by him is based upon his
settlement and filing in 1879, prior to the reservation, and upon an
alleged compliance with law during its existence, when his occupation
was that of a trespasser, and not that of a pre-emption settler.
It appears, however, that Churchill was in possession of improve-
ments and residing upon the land at date of its restoration. This con-
stituted a settlement upon which he may now base a pre-emption claim,
and, by filing his declaratory statement and by compliance with the re-
quirements of law, acquire a right of entry.
Rees was not a settler at date of restoration, and hence the claim of
Churchill would have priority over any claim he might present, which
would be allowed subject to the former's compliance with law. I there-
fore reject the claims of both parties, based upon their alleged settle-
ments in 1879, and direct that you allow Churchill, if he so desires it,
to file his declaratory statement based upon his settlement at the time
of the restoration of the land.
Advise the parties of this decision, and of their right of appeal.
RESER VATJON-COMPENSA2TION-BONA FIDE PE-EMPTORS.
ALBERT WHITE.
Although the President may reserve for Indian purposes lands upon which are exist-
ing bonafide pre-emption claims, the government should not deprive the settlers
of the fruits of their labor, against their consent, without proper compensation.
Secretary Teller to Conmissioner McFarland, February 10, 1881.
I have considered the appeal of Albert White from your decision of
April 10, 1882, rejecting his application to file a pre-emption declara-
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tory statement upon the SW. of Sec. 13, T. 29, R. 15, Santa Fe, N.
Mex., under an alleged settlement of July 1, 1879.
The tract is within the limits of the Navajo Indian reservation, and
was withdrawn from sale and settlement by the President's order of
January 6, 1880, and set apart as an addition to their (then) present
reservation. (Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 1882, p.
284.)
In reply to the request of the Secretary of War for his opinion
whether the Executive could set apart as a military reservation sur-
veyed public lands upon which pre-emption filings and homestead en-
tries nave been made in accordance with law, the Attorney-General,
under date of July 15, 1881 (8 C. L. O., 72), after reviewing sundry de-
cisions of the supreme court, and discussing the rights of pre-emptors
and homestead-entry men, says that the claim of a homestead settler
is initiated by an entry of the land, after which it ceases to be at the
disposal of the government so long as the claim or entry of the set-
tler subsists, and that his right can only be defeated by failure to com-
ply with the requirements of the law; but that public land covered by
a pre-emption filing, as to which there has been no payment and entry
by the settler, may be appropriated by Congress to public purposes, or
otherwise disposed of, without thereby involving a collision with or in-
vasion of any right or interest of the settler in and to the land, and
that such land may be as effectually reserved and set apart by the
President-who is regarded as acting by authority of Congress-as by
the direct action of Congress.
Admitting that such land may be set apart by the President as well
for an Indian as for a military reservation, and that the opinion of the
Attorney-General fairly states the legal distinction between the home-
stead and the pre-emption laws and rights thereunder, I am not con-
vinced of the justice thereof, when carried into practical operation, as
respects a pre-emptor. This person is required to settle upon land be-
fore he can file for it, and to improve and inhabit before he can enter it.
Until entry by proof of compliance with the law and payment of the
price, he does not acquire a vested right, but he has a quasi property in
the land, earned by his labor and his money, in the expectation of secur-
ing, under the pledges of the government, a home; and it does not
seem to me consistent with the fair dealing the government owes its
citizens to deprive him of the fruit of his nearly completed toils, against
his consent, without proper compensation. The condemnation of pri-
vate property to public uses without remuneration is odious to our
whole system of law, and, in my judgment, should never be resorted
to unless absolutely demanded by the exigencies of the government.
The record shows that White (and it is understood others also) set-
tled on and improved land within this reservation prior to the Presi-
dent's order, and, so far as appears, in good faith. Such settlers should,
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in the absence of compensation, if possible, be protected in their settle-
ments.
You will therefore cause an examination to be made of the dates and
location of the settlements made on this reservation prior to January
6, 1880, with the character and value of the improvements, so that if
the President should find it compatible with public interests, and
should so see fit, he may release such tracts from the reservation.
Pending such examination, and until the further action of this De-
partment, the case of White and of other settlers on said reservation
prior to the date of the President's order, will remain suspended. Your
decision is modified accordingly. Upon report of such examination
you will transmit the same to this Department.
OCCUPANCY-ACTS AND DECLARATIONS-COVVEYAYCE.
STATE OF CALIFORNIA v. ALARI. *
Mere occupancy of public land, without pre-emption claim, does not secure to onethe
benefits of that law.
It is only when the party manifests an intention, by acts or declarations, to claim its
privileges that he becomes a pre-emptor.
Where the pre-emptor, prior to entry and without fraudulent intent conveys an in-
considerable quantity of the tract claimed, the law will not, under the maxim
de minnmisnon carat lex, hold him to the strict provisions of section 2262, Rev. Stats.
Acting Secretary Joslym to Commissioner McFarland, August 11, 1882.
I have considered the case of the State of California v. Juan de Jesus
Alari, involving the E. of the SE. and lots 1, 2 and 3 of Sec 34, T. 1
S., R. 9 W., Los Angeles, Cal., land district, on appeal, by both parties,
from your decision of October 13, 1881, helding the State's selection of
the tracts subject to Alar's ability to show, when he offers final proof
and payment, a reconveyance to himself, or a release by his grantees,
or those holding under them, of the lands named in the deeds below
mentioned, or an elimination of said lands from his application.
Alari filed declaratory statement December 17, 1877, alleging settle-
ment December 15, 1857; and the State filed indemnity selection No-
vember 8, 1877.
The township plat was filed September 28, 1877.
On September 14, 1865, Alari made a quitclaim deed of about one
acre of the land to one Vejar, and in November, 1869, a warranty deed
for 3.72 acres to one Lobo, stated therein to have been originally a por-
tion of the Rancho de Los Nogales, confirmed to one Lenares.
The State claims that these conveyances, made after the date of
Alari's alleged settlement, in 1857, disqualify him as a pre-emptor, un-
der Sec. 2262, Rev. Stat., which requires a pre-emptor, before he is
$ See Commissioner's decision, L. D., 407.
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allowed to enter lands under the pre-emption law, to make oath that
he has not made any contract or agreement by which the title he might
acquire from the United States should inure in whole or in part to the
benefit of any person except himself; and this because, it is alleged,
the title Alari may acquire under the pre-emption law to the land em-
braced in said deeds, and especially to that named in the warranty deed
to Lobo, would pass by operation of law and by the statutes of Califor-
nia to his grantee.
Subsequently to the hearing, Alari moved for amendment of his de-
claratory statement, by inserting a date of settlement within the last
five or six years, alleging that the originally inserted date was by mis-
take. Counsel for the State consented that the motion "be filed as of
the date of the trial." That matter, however, becomes immaterial under
the testimony.
At the hearing in 1878 Alari testified that he moved on the land more
than twenty years previously, having married a daughter of Lenares,
the Mexican grantee of the Nogales rancho, of which the tracts are a
part; that his wife was owner in whole orin part of said rancho, as heir
at law of Lenares, deceased; that he has ever since lived thereon, with
his wife and children during her lifetime, and with his children since
her death, claiming it in her right (with the exception of the small par-
cels named) up to five or six years ago (about 1873), when he was ad-
vised by counsel that, as the tract had become government land, he
could no longer make said claim; and that he thereafter claimed the
land as a pre-emptor. His testimony is not contradicted, and being rea-
sonable in itself and without suspicion of fraud or falsity, must establish
the year of his first pre-emption claim and settlement. His prior occu-
pancy was without legal effect, because mere occupancy of public land,
without pre-emption claim, does not secure to one the benefits of that
law. It is only when he manifests an intention, by acts or declarations,
to claim its privileges, that he becomes a pre-emptor.
It is not necessary to consider the decision of the supreme court in
the case of Myers v. Croft (13 Wall., 291), to the effect that sections
2262 and 2263, Revised Statutes, were intended to apply to pre-emptors
only, and prevent them from making speculative and fraudulent settle-
ments and filings, and that what one does prior to his becoming a pre-
emptor is not within its contemplation. Section 2262 provides that
"before any person claiming the benefit of this chapter is allowed to
enter lands," he shall make the prescribed oath. On behalf of Alari it
is claimed that he may, with impunity, take this oath, because the tracts
conveyed by him were not lands title to which he had acquired from the
United States under the pre-emption law, or which he was then endeav-
oring to acquire, but were lands claimed under a Mexican grant, which
at that date, under the restrictive provisions of the act of 1851 (9 Stat.,
631) had not become a " part of the public domain of the United States."
(Newhall v. Sanger, 92 U. S., 761.)
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Without deciding this question or considering the collateral effect of
the deeds named, I am of the opinion that, as both of said deeds embrace
less than five acres of the land involved, the law will not, under the
maxim de minimis non curat leax, hold Alari to the strict provisions of
said section (Brown's Legal Maxims, 146). As said deeds were not
'executed with any fraudulent intent under the pre-emption law, and as
he has the great body of the tract in his own possession with a house
thereon and several acres of the land under cultivation, and seeks to
acquire the same solely for his own use and benefit, the title to the
small immaterial portions conveyed as recited being merely subordinate
and incidental; and as he made his filing within the time required by
law after the township plat was filed and his settlement was prior to
the State's selection, your decision should be affirmed without the con-
ditions therein named, and the land be awarded to him.
LAND DRPARTMENT-JURISDICTIOT-LAND OCCUPIED FOR BUSINESS.
WILLARDSON v. DUSTERBERSG.
The Commissioner of the General Land Office has jurisdiction, by virtue of his super-
visory authority, to examine the record in a case in which no appeal was taken
from the decision or the local officers, and, if the law has been misconstrued by
them, to reverse their decision.
Land occupied for business purposes and not for agriculture cannot be entered under
the provisions of the pre-emption and homestead laws.
Commissioner McFarland to register and receiver, Salt Lake City, Utah,
.ovember 17, 1882.
I have examined the case of Christian Willardson v. Max. Dusterberg,
involving the W. i of SE. , Sec. 10, T. 17 S., R. 3 E.
Willardson filed D. S. 1322 for the NB. 1 SW. 1 said section, June 7,
1869, alleging settlement May 15, 1866, and made pre-emption cash
entry No. 600 thereof April 5, 1871, upon which patent issued Septem-
ber 30, 1871. p
October 20, 1877, he applied for an amendment of said entry and
patent to embrace the tract in contest upon the ground that through
an erroneous survey by the county surveyor for the purpose of re-estab-
lishing the lines of the official survey which had become obliterated he
had failed to secure the tract, embracing his improvements, upon which
he had settled.
The records of this office, showing that Dusterberg had, July 31, 1877,
made homestead entry No. 3170 for said W. SE. , a hearing was
ordered by my predecessor's letter (G) of December 28, 1877, " to bring
out all the facts touching the settlement upon and improvement of the
80-acre tract, by Willardson, and as to the compliance by Dusterberg
with the requirements of the homestead law."
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Trial was duly had and your opinion rendered August 31, 18787
recommending that Willardson be permitted to make a new entry,
embracing the tract in contest, upon surrendering the outstanding
patent. There is no appeal from this decision on file in the case, but
its absence does not deprive me of jurisdiction over the matter and
render it obligatory upon me to act upon your recommendation.
The circular of November 12, 1877 (par. 3), in force at the time the
decision in this case was rendered, referring to the subject of appeals,
provides that an appeal from the decision of the local officers, when
based upon frivolous grounds, will be dismissed, except when " in the
record itself, either of the case or upon the books of this office, some
sufficient cause shall be found for further consideration under the gen-
eral power of supervision vested in the Commissioner by law.
In the case of Bell v. Hearne (19 Howard, 252), the supreme court
say:
The Commissioner of the General Land Office exercises a general
superintendence over the subordinate officers of his Department, and is
clothed with liberal powers of control, to be exercised for the purposes
of justiee, and to prevent the consequences of inadvertence, irregularity,
mistake and fraud in the extensive operations of that office for the dis-
posal of the public domain.
The facts stated in your decision are not such as to convince me of the
propriety of granting Willardson's application, and in directing the
issuance of a patent as prayed for. As an executive officer it is my
duty to ascertain that he is, under the law, entitled to the patent, and
if he is not, to suspend its issuance notwithstanding your opinion. (See
3 Opinions Attys. Genl., pp. 93 and 697; 10 lb., p. 56.)
I have not, therefore, hesitated to exercise the general power of super-
vision vested in me, and to review the whole case.
There is no controversy over the allegation that through mistake the
entry of Willardson failed to embrace the tract claimed and intended to
be entered.
In 1866 applicant purchased for $7,000 a grist mill, shown to be upon
the dividing line between the NE. 4 of SE. and SW. of SE. Sec.
10. His filing and entry were made for the purpose of securing title to
this property. To entitle him to an amendment of his entry and patent
it must appear that he in good faith resided upon, improved, and used
this tract for agricultural purposes, and that it was of the class subject
to pre-emption. His own testimony, however, shows that the land prin-
cipally is unfit for cultivation and has no value except for the mill upon
it; that for years prior to his purchase it had been used only for the
manufacture of flour; that after his purchase he used it for the same
purpose; that while he occupied he did not reside upon it, and that his
sole use of it was for business purposes.
There is, in my opinion, a complete analogy between this case and
that of the Southern Pacific Railroad CMpany v. James Newton (8
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C. L. 0., 37), wherein it appeared that Newton occupied and used the
land to carry on his business of manufacturing lime, which he sold in
the market, and that he failed to cultivate and improve it as required
by the pre-emption law. The honorable Secretary held that he was an
occupant of the land, but in no sense a pre-emptor, according to a
correct definition of that term.
This ruling applies with equal force to the case of Willardson. He
was not at date of his entry entitled to a patent under the pre-emption
law, and his application is accordingly refused.
The facts in this case show that the patent issued to him in 1871 was
inadvertently and irregularly issued, yet it was issued by this office
acting within the scope of its authority, and I have consequently no
further jurisdiction over the title to the land embraced therein. Said
patent will, if this decision becomes final, be returned to Mr. Willard-
son.
In regard to Dusterberg's entry, the evidence shows that at date
thereof the land was used for purposes of business and trade. Lands so
used are not subject to pre-emption (See. 2258 Rev. Stats.), and conse-
quently are not subject to homestead entry.
Said entry is therefore invalid and held for cancellation.
HOMfESTEAD ENTRY-AMENDMENT.
SNODDERLY v. FULTON.
A settler who for want of diligence fails to properly describe the land claimed by him
cannot subsequently be allowed to take advantage of his own ladhes to defeat
another who settled with notice of his claim as shown by the record. His entry
is notice to the world of the tracts to which he had the right of possession, and
he cannot by extending his actual possession to tracts not embraced therein, and
to which he had no lawful right, exclude settlement or entry by other qualified
persons.
Commissioner McFarland to register and receiver, Los Angeles, California,
November 28, 1881.
I haveexamined the case ofEmanuel Snodderly v.W. H. Fulton,involv-
ing the E. e NW. 1, Sec. 24, T. 7 N., R. 5 W., S. B. M., wherein you ren-
dered disagreeing opinions. Snodderly made homestead entry No. 351,
February 23, 1878, embracing NE. i said section, and was allowed by
letter (C) of February 13, 1880, to amend same to embrace in lieu of the
E. C NE. 1 the tract in contest. Fulton filed D. S. No. 1743 April 30,
alleging settlement April 22, 1879.
The testimony shows that prior to his entry Snodderly purchased the
improvements of one D. C. Young, a prior claimant of the land, con-
sisting of fences, ditches, and a small field. The house of Young was
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on the E. J NE. , and Snodderly lived therein until, as he states, he
discovered the mistake in his entry. He then built a house on the W.
H NE. 1 and established his residence there. This, according to one
Spencer, was in the winter of 1879, or more than a year after the date
of his (Snodderly's) entry. The entry as originally made embraced his
residence and the major portion of his improvements, although he also
had improvements-fencing, ditches, and part of a small field-extend-
ing upon the tract in dispute, of which he was in possession, so that
whether he had made his entry as amended or as originally, there would
still be a tract excluded upon which he had improvements, and he could
with as much reason in either case apply for an amendment upon a
change of intention. Indeed, in view of the facts shown, and of the
evidence tending to show that he was aware there was a tract west of
his original location (see testimony of Bemis) upon which the improve-
ments extended, and of the evidence of declarations made by him, I
think there is much reason to doubt that he made any mistake in the
description of the land he desired to enter. But aside from this, it ap-
pears that the settlement of Fulton was made with the knowledge and
consent of Snodderly, who witnessed the signature to his declaratory
statement, and I concur in the receiver's opinion that he cannot at this
late day plead ignorance as to what land was covered by Fulton's filing,
nor attack the same.
The land was surveyed at the date of his entry, and by the use of
proper diligence he could have discovered the proper description of the
tracts he desired to enter. Having failed to do so,,he cannot subse-
quently be allowed to take advantage of his own laches to defeat another
who settled not only with notice of his claim, as shown by the record,
but with his knowledge and consent.
Moreover, his entry was notice to the world of the tracts to which he
had the right of possession, and he could not by extending his actual
possession to tracts not embraced therein, and to which he had no law-
ful right, exclude settlement or entry by other qualified persons. In
this respect-if, as does not appear, Fulton had forcibly invaded Snod-
derly's possession of the tract in contest, or violated his enclosures-
the case would come within the decision in case of Powers v. Forbes
(C. 7, IL. 0., 149).
In regard to the mortgage shown by Exhibit B to have been executed
by Fulton, it is only necessary to state that as he has not applied to make
entry the case comes within the principles of the decision of 10th ultimo,
addressed to your office, in the case of State of California v. Alari (Law
Reporter, November 9, 1881, p. 716). The land is awarded to Fulton,
who will be allowed to enter, if this decision becomes final. The entry
of Snodderly will remain intact, subject to the former's proof. Advise
the parties of this decision and allow time for appeal.
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DECLARATORYSTATEMENT-MISTAKE OF PUBLIC OFFICER.
/aaLP /JR
'> 1 x % VETTEL V. NORTON.
Where a pre-emptor filed a declaratory statement for a tract of land that had been
" offered," but received a certificate from the register of the local office that the
land was "unoffered," and did not prove up within the time limited by law for
offered land, such party has a right to depend upon the certificate of the gov-
ernment officer, acting within the scope of his authority, and the law will protect
him.
Secretary Kirkwood to Commissioner McFar'land, December 19, 1881.
I have considered the case of William Vettel v. Michael Norton, in-
volving the E. i of the SW. i and the S. i of the SE. i of section 8, T.
24 N., R. 1 W., Marysville, Cal., on appeal by Norton from your decision
of April 29, 1881, holding his entry for cancellation, and awarding the
land to Vettel.
The record shows that Vettel filed declaratory statement January 2,
1878, alleging settlement December 31, 1877, and that Norton made
homestead entry for the same tracts March 22, 1879.
The land was " offered" June 3, 1861, and under section 2261 Rev.
Stat. Vettel was required to make his proof anl payment within twelve
months from the date of his settlement. Upon the day of his filing,
the register issued to him a certificate wherein he stated that the " land
has not been offered at public sale; " to which certificate was a foot-
note stating that, for " offered" lands, proof and payment must be made
within twelve months from the date of settlement; but if the land has
not been offered, the settler has thirty months within which to enter
and pay for it. Relying thereon, as he was justified in doing, Vettel
did not offer his proof and payment until about fifteen months from the
date of his settlement, and after the entry of Norton, when he was first
advised of the erroneous statement of said certificate, and immediately
made such application. He has a house and other outbuildings, about
140 acres broken, 70 acres under cultivation. Norton has erected a
small cabin in one corner of the land, but has made no other improve-
ments.
Strictly, Vettel failed to comply with a requirement of the law, and in
the presence of a valid adverse claim, his filing would be subject to for-
feiture. Although he was presumed to know of the proclamation of the
President offering this land for sale, and that he was required, under
section 2264, to make his proof and payment within twelve months from
his settlement, that presumption was overcome by the statement of an
official certificate that the lands were "unoffered," and that he could
make his proof and payment within thirty months. The register was
authorized to certify to the status of the lands. The certificate was is-
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sued for the sole and express purpose of instructing and protecting him
in his duties and rights; and he is fairly within the ruling of the su-
preme court in the case of Lytle v. The State of Arkansas (9 How.,
314), that if an individual fails to attain his rights by the misconduct
or neglect of a public officer, the law will protect him. His failure to
make proof and payment within the required time was not from laches
on his part, but from an erroneous statement of an officer of the gov-
ernment, acting within the scope of his authority. Having trusted to
said certificate, he should not now be made to suffer therefrom, and lose
his valuable improvements.
PRE-EMPTION-BOARD OF EQUITABLE ADJUDICATION.
LYDIA STEELE.
The entry of a married woman, where all the necessary acts, including publication of
notice of intention to make proof, have been performed prior to marriage, should
be submitted to the Board for confirmation.
Secretary Teller to Commissioner McFarland February 13, 1883.
I have considered the appeal of Mrs. Lydia Steele from your decision
of May 8. 1882, holding for cancellation her cash entry, No. 449, for the
E. of SW. of Sec. 3, and the E. of W. of Sec. 10, T. 15 N., R.
23 W., North Platte, Nebr.
Mrs. Steele filed her declaratory statement for said tracts on the 23d
of March, 1880, in the name of Lydia Graves, that being her name prior
to her marriage, which occurred on the 25th of May, 1881.
The entry was made on the 15th day of July, 1881, and consequently
after the date of marriage. For this reason, and in accordance with a
long-established practice of the Department to the effect that where a
single woman marries after filing her declaratory statement, and before
making proof, she should be treated as having abandoned her right as
a pre-emptor under the act of 1811, you decided adversely to claimant.
In this case proof has been made and the money paid for the land.
Though the entry was thus completed subsequent to appellant's mar-
riage, every other necessary act of hers, including the publication of
notice to prove up, appears to have been performed prior to her mar-
riage, and there seems to be no doubt that she acted in good faith
throughout. No adverse claim has intervened. Without discussing
the question raised by your decision, I therefore think the case a proper
one to submit to the Board of Equitable Adjudication for its action
under sections 2450 to 2457 of the Revised Statutes, and your decision
is modified accordingly.
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PRE-EMPTJOX-A CT OF MARCH 3, 1879-INTER VENING CLAIMS.
,<Kt in At> -1 RAXAGE V. MALONEY.
If notice of intention to make proof and payment under act of March 3, 1879, is given
prior to the expiration of the statutory period, the entry, when made, takes effect
by relation from the date of such notice, to the exclusion of all intervening claims.
Secretary Teller to Commissioner McFarland, April 28, 1882.
I have considered the case of J. B. Ramage v. Michael Maloney, on
appeal from your decision of July 18, 1881, allowing the latter to make
proof and payment on his pre-emption claim, notwithstanding the lapse
of more than thirty-three months from his date of settlement, and not-
withstanding the admission of a timber-culture application made by
Ramage before final proof and payment by Maloney, but after he had
filed and published notice of his intention to make such proof on a day
fixed by said notice, as required by act of March 3,1879 (20 Stat., 472).
The tract involved is the NE. I of 10, 108,45, Tracy land district, Minne-
sota. Maloney filed declaratory statement, March 22, 1878, alleging
settlement on that day. His thirty-three months expired December 22,
1880. May 2, 1881, he filed and published notice of his intention to
make final proof on the 3d of June, and made proof accordingly. May
6, 1881, Ramage made timber-culture entry No. 1429, with fall knowl-
edge of the claim, settlement, and notice of Maloney. The equities are
all with the latter. He explains his failure to make proof in December
by reason of severe and unusual storms, closing the avenues of business,
and also on account of critical illness in his family, rendering it nearly,
if not absolutely, impossible for him to offer proof and payment at that
time. He has eighty-seven acres in cultivation, and has maintained
continuous residence on the land. It is well-settled practice, in harmony
with the decisions of the supreme court, and especially in Johnson v.
Towsley (13 Wall., 72), that a person may comply with the requirements
of the pre-emption law after the expiration of the limitation fixed by
statute, if at the date of offering such compliance the right of no other
settler has intervened. Had the law remained as in 1878, when Maloney
settled, he could, at once, on the 2d of May, 1881, when he reached the
district office, have made final proof and payment, and secured his cer-
tificate before any application on the part of Ramage. The only ques-
tion to be considered is whether or not the act of 1879, having required
notice of not less than thirty days, his notice of intention to make com-
plete entry on a certain day thereafter could operate to save his right
for that period, and prevent a third party in the mean time from defeat-
ing his claim by an application for entry. You decide that such notice
was sufficient; in effect, that it was the beginning of the proper statu-
tory proceeding for making final proof, and one of the connected steps
of such proceeding; that the whole matter stands by relation to the
initial step, and when consummated, has still further relation to the
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original settlement right, entitling the claimant to a patent to the ex-
clusion of all intervening claims.
I affirm your decision. To hold a contrary view would invite any
stranger to the land, who might, for the first time, be advised by the
notice itself of the previous laches of the claimant, to step in and com-
pel the enforcement of a forfeiture upon such technical default, although
the government itself, as declared in Johnson v. Towsley, would be u-
authorized to take advantage of the laches, and the party has already
taken steps to cure the same before any adverse interest has been ac-
quired or claimed. The allowance of such a speculative interest, to
defeat an honest settler and deprive him of not only the land, but the
expenses of notice, publication, and proof, would not only work essen-
tial injustice, but encourage unauthorized trespass upon the rights and
property of others in violation of the true intent and purposes of the
law.
PRE-EMPTION-TR USTEE-P TENT-LEGAL TITLE.
JA MES AiKEN.
A person who owns land in trust for others is not the proprietor of such lands within
the meaning of the pre-emption act, and is not thereby disqualified from becoming
a pre-emptor.
An entry of land for cash or scrip gives the party making it a right to a patent, if it
be found regular and valid.
The proprietorship contemplated by the pre-emption aet is a legal and absolute one,
and not the mere equity of a land-office entry, which may or may not ripen into
such ownership.
Secretary Teller to Commissioner McFarland, June 14, 1882.
I have considered the appeal of James Aiken from your decision of
March 2, 1880, rejecting his application for reinstatement of his cash
entry No. 3464, for the SW. 4 SE. 4 of Sec. 2, and the NW. i NE. 4 of
Sec. 11, T.27 S., R. 13 W., Roseburg, Oreg.
It appears that on March 30, 1872, Aiken filed declaratory statement
for the S. SE. 4 Sec. 2, and the N. J NE. 4 of Sec. 11 of said town-
ship, alleging settlement May 20, 1869; and that on April 16, 1872, he
proved up and paid for the same.
It also appears that G. W. Pratt filed declaratory statement April
17, 1872, for (with other tracts) the SE. SE. 4 of Sec. 2, and the NE.
4 NE. i of Sec. 11, being 80 acres of the 160 acres embraced in Aiken's
filing. After contest between Pratt and Aiken, respecting the tracts in
conflict, they were awarded to Pratt, and he made cash entry therefor,
No. 3513, August 19, 1875, and they have been patented to him. Upon
the same day (your award of January 24,1874, in favor of Pratt, having
been affirmed by this Department on appeal) Aiken's cash entry, as well
for the tracts in conflict with Pratt as for those which were not, was
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canceled because he was not a qualified pre-emptor at the date of his
filing by reason of his ownership of more than 320 acres of land; and
his purchase money for all of the tracts has been refunded to him.
This decision was based on the claim that Aiken being owner in his
own right of 160 acres (part of Sec. 36, T. 26, B.. 13 W., in said land
district) on June 1, 1871, jointly with five others entered at the said
land office (cash entry No. 3071) 3,520 acres, and on the same day located
with Agricultural College scrip 2,080 other acres, and on February 1,
1872, entered at the same office (cash entry No. 3,352) 1,520 other acres,
making an aggregate of 7,120 acres, in which he was a joint owner of
one undivided sixth part. At the date of said decision affidavits were
on file to the effect that in all of said joint transactions Aiken was the
agent of the firm of Flushman & Co., who furnished all the money
therefor; that said entries and location were for the exclusive use and
benefit of said firm, and that Aiken acted in said matters as agent only,
without personal interest.
Since the date of said decision a certified copy of a deed from James
Aiken to A. G. Aiken, dated Febrnary 19,1872, has been filed, showing
a conveyance to the latter of the undivided one-sixth part of the land
embraced in said entries and location for 7,120 acres; and showing also
that at the date of his filing James Aiken had no legal interest in said
lands.
It also appears that one Ferry, to whom Pratt had assigned the lands
patented to him, recovered a judgment against James Aiken for pos-
session of said lands; and that Aiken brought a suit in equity in the
United States district court for the district of Oregon, to enjoin Ferry
from enforcing the same; that the patent to Pratt be held to inure to
his (Aiken's) own benefit, and that Ferry be required to release to him
his interest in said lands.
In his decision of the case Judge Deady says: " A person who owns
land in trust for others is not a proprietor of such lands within the
prohibition of the pre-emption act, and is not thereby disqualified from
becoming a pre-emptor." . . . . The pre-emption act provides that
'"no personwhoisthe proprietorof 320 acresofland . . . . . shall
acquire any right of pre-emption under this act." This right of pre-
emption is not an interest in the land, but only the right to be preferred
as a purchaser of a certain portion of the public lands at the minimum
price, irrespective of its real value (Myers v. Croft, 13 Wall., 296; 10
Opin, 571). . . . . An entry of land for cash or scrip gives the party
making it a right to a patent, if it be found regular and valid. But it
does not pass the title which remains in the United States until the
patent issues. The person making the entry, if there be no valid ob-
jection thereto, as against the government, has a right to the convey-
ance of the legal title, but as the government cannot be sued without its
consent such a right is little else than a mere moral one. . . . . In
my judgment the proprietorship contemplated by the pre-emption act is
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a legal and absolute one, and not the mere equity of a land office entry,
which may or may not ripen into such ownership. It follows from these
premises that the plaintiff . . . . . wasnot the proprietor of 320
acres of land, and therefore not disqualified to acquire a pre-emption
right," and, holding that the patent to Pratt " wrongfully issued upon an
erroneous construction of the law, and he took the same in trust for the
plaintiff who was entitled to the patent therefor," he directed Ferry to
convey to Aiken the tracts patented to Pratt, and enjoined Ferry from
enforcing his judgment. No appeal was taken from this decision.
In view thereof, and of the above-named deed of February 19, 1872,
I reverse your decision, and direct the reinstatement of Aiken's cash
entry upon his repayment to the officers of the local land district of the
price of said land.
PRACTICE-NOTICE OF DECISION-TIME FOR APPEAL.
ROACH V. MYERS ET AL.
When notice of decision is given to resident counsel, and to the party through the
local office, the time for appeal should be computed as commencing to run from
date of service of notice upon the party himself.
Commissioner ilkeFarland to register and receiver, St. Cloud, SMinn., Oc-
tober 17, 1881.
I have considered the motion filed by defendant's attorneys to dismiss
the appeal in the case of Milledge L. Roach v. James Myers and Har-
lan Cole, for the reason that said appeal was not filed in this office
within the period limited by the rules of practice.
The decision in said case was rendered June 25, 1881, and the appeal
was filed in this office by Roach's resident attorneys September 1, 1881.
The notices to resident counsel have even date with the decision, and
were mailed June 27, 1881, so that if the 60 days allowed for appeal by
rule 86 (exclusive of the day of mailing notice) commenced to run from
time of service of notice upon resident counsel, the time for filing appeal
expired August 26, 1881.
The local officers were, however, in accordance with the invariable
practice of this office, instructed by the closing paragraph of the decis-
ion to notify the parties in interest of the contents thereof. When
notice of decision is given by the local officers, ten days additional to
the time allowed by rule 86 are allowed for transmission of notice and
return of the appeal through the mails, thus allowing the party seventy
days from date of their notice within which to file his appeal. There
may be some question as to when, in case of notice being given both to
a party's attorney resident in this city and to himself through the local
office, the time commences to run-whether from date of notice to him-
self or to his attorney. In such a case I am of opinion that the rules
should be liberally construed that the party in interest may have every
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opportunity to secure his right of appeal, and consequently that the
time allowed for that purpose should be computed as commencing to
run from date of service of notice upon the party himself. From this
standpoint the appeal of Roach was filed in time, and the motion to
overrule the same is accordingly dismissed. The case will be trans-
mitted to the Hon. Secretary of the Interior in its regular order.
RAILROAD TITLE-SELECTION-DEFAULT, ETC.
GILBERT v. SAINT JOSEPH & DENVER B. R. Co.
While a railroad grant in prcenti is a title of record, yet as the company must make
selections and pay the required selection fees, it is amenable to citations in con-
tests where settlers' rights are involved.
When the railroad company makes default without explanation, the case as herein
becomes an ex parte one, and the question of compliance with law may be sub-
mitted to the Board of Equitable Adjudication.
Secretary Kirkwood to Commissioner McFarland, October 31, 1881.
I have considered the application of the Saint Joseph and Denver
City Railroad Company (filed March 28, 1881, by John B. Bloss, its res-
ident attorney) for a reconsideration of my decision of March 11, 1881, in
the case of Samuel N. Gilbert v. said company, holding that the com-
pany waived its right to object to the consummation of Gilbert's title to
the NW. I of Sec. 27, T. 2 S., R. 4 E., Concordia district, Kansas.
This application is based upon the ground that Gilbert having failed
to appeal from the decision of the receiver and register, the Commis-
sioner had no jurisdiction in the premises; that this case does not come
within the provisions of the second section of the act of April 21, 1876,
because there was no such claim extant upon said tract at the date of
the withdrawal for the railroad as said section contemplates; that the
company's selection pending the contest was not "gross irregularity 
on its part; that the company waived nothing by its failure to appear
at the hearing, as its claim was of record, and it was not therefore
obliged to select the land in question, although it did so select; and
that if this case was confirmed by the act of 1876, it cannot be held for
confirmation by the Board of Equitable Adjudication.
Inasmuch as my decision in question, rendered after a careful exam-
ination of the facts in this case and due consideration of the law gov-
erning the same, held that there had been such "gross irregularity
. . . . as to bring it within the category of exceptions to the
general rule and justify you in disturbing the decision of the register
and receiver," I deem it unnecessary to reiterate further upon this point.
In regard to the second point of exception, to wit, that this case does
not come within the second section of the act, for the reason stated,
that McKennett was not shown to have been a qualified pre-emptor, and
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because Gilbert did not make proof as required by said act, it is only
necessary to state that the record shows that Gilbert appeared at the
hearing had February 10, 1879, and introduced testimony establishing
the validity of John I. Brown's pre-emption claim to the land in ques-
tion, upon which he resided "until the summer of 1870," which uncon-
troverted proof rendered it competent for the Department to regard
Brown's claim as valid on April 15, 1870, the date on which the with-
drawal became effective.
As to the third point, to wit, that the company waived nothing by its
failure to appear at the hearing, as its claim was of record, and it was
not therefore obliged to select the tract in question, etc., it is only nec-
essary to state that while it is true that a railroad's right to lands within
the granted limits by virtue of a grant in pramsenti is a title of record,
which the Department, in the absence of an adverse claim thereto, would
recognize, and renders the lands properly subject to selection, itis equally
true that railroad companies are invariably required to select their lands
at the proper local office and pay the regular selection fee therefor; that
in all contested cases, when duly and regularly cited thereto upon the
motion of an adverse claimant, they are invariably held to be amenable
to such citation; it being the purpose of the law-making power to pro-
tect all homestead and pre-emption entries made in good faith, and to
require the railroad company to assert title to its lands before a bona
fide settler had obtained even color of title from the United States. Con-
sequently, when said Saint Joseph and Denver City Railroad Company
failed to assert title to the tract in question by attending said hearing,
it may be considerd as having thereby waived its right to object to the
consummation of Gilbert's title to the same.
The remaining point of exception is to the effect that if this case was
confirmed by the act of 1876, it cannot be held for confirmation by said
Board.
In reply thereto, P0am of the opinion that where a party is estopped
from asserting title in any case, and it is thereafter decided by a com-
petent tribunal, e. g., by the Department, as in this case, to be between
the United States and the party who, in the first instance, claimed ad-
versely to the party estopped, the rights, if any, of the latter are thereby
determined by relation, in so far as the Department's j urisdiction is con-
cerned, to the time when said estoppel obtained; and he has thereafter
no standing before the same. It is therefore, in such a case, competent
for the Department to regard the same as ex parte, or as between the
United States and said adverse claimant. In other words, the rule
broadly stated is, that in all cases where there are two parties to the
record, and the one is regularly cited to a hearing therein upon the
motion of the other, but fails to respond thereto, the party thus failing
shall thereafter be regarded as in default, and as having no standing
whatever in the premises before the Department, unless he shall within
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a reasonable time satisfactorily explain the cause of his default, and
obtain reinstatement to his privileges as a party to the record.
As shown by the decision in question, the railroad company, although
regularly cited to appear at the hearing had in this case upon Gilbert's
motion, failed or refused to respond, and has never pretended to offer
any explanations of its laches, but on the contrary claims the right to
ignore such citation, as well as the rule prohibiting it from selecting said
land pending said contest and while Gilbert's adverse claim therefor
was extant upon the record.
It will be observed that the cases of Gates v. California and Oregon
Railroad Company (5 C. L. ., 150), and of Conway v. The Little
Rock and Fort Smith Railway Company, decided by the Department
October 14, 1880, are clearly distinguishable from this in that there was
no default alleged or suggested therein on the part of the railroad com-
pany.
The application is accordingly rejected.
PRACTICE-APPEAL-FINALITY OF DECISION.
BROWN . JEFFERSON ET AL.
Failure to appeal from the decision of the register and receiver is a waiver of any
rights which the party may have bad in the land in controversy; and where the
decisions of the local officers have been, without appeal, reviewed by the Commis-
sionen of the General Land Office, the Department, upon appeal, will not review
the decision, but will dismiss the appeal and consider the decision of the local
officers final.
Exceptions to this rule are where fraud or gross irregularity is suggested on the face
of the papers, or the decision is contrary to existing rules and regulations.
Secretary Teller to Commissioner McFarland, September 29,1882.
I have considered the case of John Brown v. *Thomas Jefferson,
Thomas Agan, and George Sharr, involving the SE. of the SE. of
Sec. 9, the SW. of the SW. i of Sec. 10, the NE. i of the NE. of
See. 16, and the NW. i of the NW. 4 of Sec. 15, T. 6 N., R. 2 E., Dead-
wood, Dak., on appeal from your decision of June. 25, 1881, reversing
the decision of the register and receiver, and awarding such land to said
John Brown under his pre-emption filing therefor.
The decision of the register and receiver held that the defendant
Jefferson's claim was " good as to the NW. of the NW. A- of Sec. 15."
That the defendant George Sharr was justly entitled to the SE. 3 of
the SE. of Sec. 9 and the SW. of the SW. of Sec. 10." And that
said "NE. I of the NE. i of the NE. 4, See. 16, was not legally held by
any of said parties."
This decision of the local office was made on the 31st day of Decem-
ber, 1879. The letter of the register and 'receiver transmitting the tes-
timony and other papers relating to the contest bears date February 6,
1880, and states that " no appeal has been taken from our decision in
this case."
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In your letter (decision) of Jne 25, 1881, addressed to the register
and receiver, you state:
No appeal has been filed from said decision, and as you were instructed
to notify the parties in interest of the purport of the decisions and ad-
vise them of their right of appeal, it is to be presumed that by reason
of their failure to appeal the decision has become final.
And you then proceeded to examine the testimony taken in the case,
and, upon the facts found by you, reverse the decision of the register
and receiver, and award the land in controversy to Brown. It is in
proof that notice of the decision of the register and receiver, in proper
form as required by the rules of practice in force at that time, was duly
served upon Brown. The defendants, Thomas Jefferson and George
Sharr, have appealed from your decision, and ask to have the case dis-
missed, upon the ground that there was no appeal taken to you from the
decision rendered by the register and receiver.
There was no appearance before you, and you proceeded upon your
own motion to review the case and render a decision. The case is an
ordinary contest, in which a large amount of testimony was taken, but
involving only the questions of settlement, inhabitancy, and improve-
ment. " Fraud or gross irregularity " was not suggested upon the face
of the papers, nor was the decision of the register and receiver contrary
to existing laws or regulations," within the meaning of the circular of
your office of November 27, 1880, relating to "appeals from decisions of
local officers."
It has long been settled in this Department that a party who fails to,
appeal from the decision of the register and receiver is concluded, and.
by his acquiescence in such decision waives any rights which he may
have had in the land in controversy. (Brown v. White, 1 C. L. L., 298;
Shuster v. Grady et al., ib. 314; Eaton v. California and Oregon Rail-
road, 5 C. L. O., 13; Favery v. Lansdale, 4 id. 179; Clark v. Carter,
Bill's Leading Cases, 1881, p. 1; Owen v. Russell, Reporter, vol. 2, p.
107; and see Moore v. Robbins, 6 Otto, 535.) And where the decisions
of the local officers have been without appeal reviewed by you, upon
appeal to this Department the decision of your office will not be reviewed,
but the appeal will be dismissed, and the decision of the local officers.
considered as final. (Benson v. Northern Pacific Railroad, Hill's Lead-
ing Cases, 1880, p. 54.)
The exceptions to this rule are when fraud or gross irregularity is sug-
gested on the face of the papers, or the decision is contrary to existing
rules and regulations.
This case does not fall within those exceptions, and your action there-
fore in reviewing the case was erroneous.
The appeals taken from your decision by the defendants, Thomas.
Jefferson and George Sharr, to this Department are therefbre dismissed,
and the decision of the register and receiver as to the rights of the liti-
gants must be regarded as final.
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PRE-EMPTION-CIT.ATIO-HEBING-FINAL POOF.
3S C7 SPRAGUE V. ROBINSON.
(Te whose claim is of record and of acknowledged priority should not be allowed to
cite the other claimants to trial otherwise than by the required publication for
the purpose of making final proof.
Secretary Teller to Commissioner McFarland, August 2, 1882.
I have considered the case of Milo H. Sprague v. James M. Robinson,
involving pre-emption right of entry to SW. of NE. 1, and lots 1 and 2,
Sec. 4, T. 35 N., R. 5W., and SE.4of SE. 4, Sec. 33, T. 36 N., R.5W.,
Idaho. on appeal from your decision of March 28, 1882, allowing said
Sprague to enter upon satisfactory proof of compliance with the law,
and holding the filing of said Robinson for cancellation.
Sprague filed declaratory statement 958, February 7, alleging settle-
ment February 6, 1879. Robinson filed declaratory statement 1233,
December 4, 1879, alleging settlement same day.
January 12, 1880, on the application of Sprague, your office ordered
a hearing.
The trial was commenced March 12, 1880, at which time a motion
was made on behalf of the defendant to dismiss the case, upon I"the
ground that the complaint does not show the complainant entitled to a
hearing in said case." Upon this question the register and receiver
held -and returned conflicting opinions. The trial was had, and the
testimony returned.
Your office overruled the motion to dismiss the case, and upon exam-
ination of the testimony held that Sprague had acted in good faith,
and had done all that could have been expected under the adverse cir-
cumstances detailed in the proofs, and directed Robinson's filing to be
canceled, upon the ground that he proved no settlement.
Robinson, on appeal from your decision, assigns the following errors:
1. The Commissioner erred in taking jurisdiction of said contest and
refusing the motion of the respondent to dismiss the same.
2. The Commissioner erred in canceling the pre-emption filing of the
said respondent.
It will be observed that there was o question between the parties
as to the priority of Sprague's filing. His filing was of record, and its
priority conceded. There was no necessity for Sprague to contest the
filing of Robinson in advance of an application by either to make final
proof and payment. His prior right was assured to him, and in order
to secure the land it was only necessary for him to comply with the
provisions of the law in other respects. If it was true that Robinson
had made no settlement it could not avail him. He must stand upon
the strength of his own acts.
As was said in Hanson v. Berry (8 C. L. 0., 188)-
He was in no jeopardy so long as he complied with the law; and
should not have been allowed to cite the other claimants otherwise than
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by the required publication for the purpose of offering final proof and
payment.
No object is to be attained by such a contest unless it be to satisfy
the contestant as to the sufficiency of his own acts up to a certain period
in the progress of his settlement, or the insufficency of those of other
claimants.
You state that it has been the practice of your office to permit the
initiation of such contests, "in order that the parties may proceed with
the knowledge of the status of their respective claims."
Under such a rule several contests might be necessary during the
progress of a settlemant, in order to keep the parties advised of the
status of their claims. Such a practice is of doubtful utility to the
parties, and must tend greatly to the multiplicity of contests, and be-
-come the source of expensive litigation.
I think such contests are premature, and not contemplated by the
statute relating to that subject, and the order for a hearing made by
your office January 12, 1880, was therefore erroneous.
The motion to dismiss the contest should have been granted and the
filing of Robinson been permitted to stand to await further proceed.
ings. I therefore reverse your decision.
As the thirty-three months fixed by the statute for making final proof
have already expired, you will direct the district officers to call upou
Sprague to come forward, after due publication, and offer proof of his
compliance with law, and make final entry within sixty days of notice to
him of this decision, provided such proofs shall be found satisfactory.
TESTIMONY ADMISSIBLE I CONTESTS.
SHULL V. MCCORIICK.
Testimony upon matters not incident to the charges upon which the hearing was
ordered is wholly foreign to the case and should not be considered.
Evidence in contests under the land laws must be confined to the allegations, as in
trials at law, and judgment be rendered on the issues raised by the record only.
Secretary Teller to Commissioner McFarland, November 16, 1882.
I have considered the case of Martin L. Shull v. John McCormick,
involving the NE. 1 of Sec. 24, T. 4 N., R. 69 W., Denver, Colo., on ap-
peal by McCormick from your decision of January 21, 1882, holding
his declaratory statement for cancellation, and allowing the homestead
declaratory statement of Shull to remain intact.
The record shows that McCormick filed declaratory statement March
28, alleging settlement March 19, 1879, and that Shull filed homestead
declaratory statement February 17, 1881.
Shull commenced a contest February 17, 1881, alleging that McCor-
mick failed to improve and occupy the land, and had not, to that date,
erected a habitable house thereon, nor become a resident of the tract.
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McCormick's non-improvement and non-residence were, therefore, the
only matters for consideration at the hearing. As held in Schelter v.
Off, (Hill's Leading Cases, 1S81) testimony upon matters not incident
to the charges is wholly foreign to the case, and should not be consid-
ered. Proofs in contests under the land laws must be confined to alle-
gations, as in trials at law, and judgment be rendered on the issues
raised by the records only. (See also Stevenson v. Garrett,1a. L. L.,321).
It appears from the cross-examination of McCormick that he was born
in Ireland. No testimony as to his naturalization, or having filed a
declaration of intention to become a citizen, was submitted. One of
the grounds of your decision adverse to him was that he failed to show
his citizenship or such declaration.
I think this was erroneous, because his qualifications as a pre-emptor
were not in issue under this contest, and he was not required to prove
them. Had the hearing been upon his application to enter the tract, or
under some proceeding wherein that question was involved, proof of his
qualification in this respect would have been necessary. But upon a
mere question of improvement and residence, that matter was wholly
immaterial to the issue, and your decision in this respect must be re-
garded as mere obiter dietuom and not pertinent to the case.
It was equally erroneous, I think, in that you held as a ground of
decision against McCormick that he filed his declaratory statement be-
fore his settlement. However that fact may have been, and whatever
its legal effect, if true, that question was not involved in the hearing,
but was foreign to the allegations McCormick was summoned to answer.
Shull was not authorized to raise an issue at the hearing not legitimate
to his charge, nor was McCormick required to defend such matter; and
your decision thereon, as ground for cancellation of the latter's filing,
was inappropriate, because not relevant to the question submitted for
your consideration.
Having thus decided the case upon issues immaterial to the allega-
tions, you fail to decide or even to refer to the only questions involved,
viz, McCormick's want of improvement and residence on the tract.
The appeal from your decision alleges error therein in the matter of
citizenship, in the matter of settlement and filing, and in holding Me-
Cormick's filing for cancellation on these grounds. I think the first two
grounds well taken, for the reasons above stated, and the third also,
because the cancellation is based on your erroneous decision in those
respects.
The whole case upon the real issues is undetermined by your office,
and I therefore remit it to you for further examination and decision
upon the questions of fact on which the contest was brought, and you
are requested to give it early attention with the usual notice of your
decision to the parties.
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APPEALS FROM LOCAL AND GENERAL OFFICES.
LYNCH V. MERRIFIELD.
The rules for appeal from the local offices and from the General Land Office are sepa-
rate and distinct, and there is no rule or provision for applying the one to the
other.
These rules do not require that notice of appeal from the decision of the local officers
shall be served upon the opposing party.
Secretary Teller to, Commissioner McFarland, November 17, 1882.
This case, I. P. Lynch v. L. L. Merrifield (pre-emption), involves
title to the SW. of Sec. 13 and SE. of NE. of Sec. 14, T. 5. N., R.
4 E., Deadwood, Dak. The issue of fact therein was tried before the
register and receiver, who found that Lynch had the prior right to the
land. From this decision Merrifield took an appeal to your office. No
claim is made but that the appeal is regular in every respect except
that notice of the appeal was not given either to Lynch or his counsel.
For the reason that such notice was not given, Lynch-moved to dismiss
the appeal, and upon hearing you sustained the motion, and held that
the decision of the register and receiver became final under rule 47.
The case has been properly certified to this Department under rule
:83, and the question presented is whether your order dismissing the
appeal was under the rules of practice erroneous.
Rule 43 provides that appeals in every case lie from the decisions of
the register and receiver to your office; rule 44, that after the hearing
is closed the register and receiver shall notify the parties in interest of
their decision, and that thirty days will be allowed for appeal; rule
45, that the appeal shall be written or printed, and shall specify the
points of exception; and rule 46, that no such appeal will be received
at your office unless forwarded by the local officers.
These rules undertake to establish the practice to be pursued in all
appeals taken from the decision of the register and receiver to the Gen-
eral Land Office. They are simple and complete in themselves, and in
order to perfect an appeal no provision seems to be wanting. While it
might be proper that notice of such appeal should be given to the
opposite party, such notice is not necessary or essential to the preserva-
tion of any right. If the appellant has complied with the rules relating
to appeals from the local office he ought not to be eprived of his ap-
peal-certainly not unless there is such an obvious defect in the rules
as would be destructive of the rights of the appellee. No such defect
appears.
The reason stated by you for holding that such notice should be given
is, that while "the rules of practice do not expressly state that notice of
appeal must be served upon the appellee or his covnse], they do re-
,quire that otijce of appeal from the decision of this office to the Secre-
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tary of the Interior shall be served, and it is held by this office con-
structively that the same rule applies to appeals" from the local office.
The rule thus referred to is among the rules relating to "appeals
from the Commissioner to the Secretary," and is as follows, viz:
RULE S6. Notice of appeal from the Commissioner's decision must be
filed in the General Land Office, and served on the appellee or his
counsel, within sixty days of the date of the service of notice of such
decision.
This rule relates exclusively to appeals from the Commissioner to this
Department.
The rules for appeal from each tribunal are distinct and separate, and
there is no rule or provision for applying the one to the other. There is
no room for constructive application. The rules relating to appeals
from your office are quite numerous. Several of them relate to the man-
ner of giving the required notice, and if the rule under consideration is
applied by construction to appeals from the local office, it would seem
indispensable that some of such rules other than rule 86 should be ap-
plied to such appeals.
I do not think that appellants or practitioners in the land depart-
ment can be expected to understand that the rules, or any of them, re-
lating to appeals from your office, apply to appeals from the local office
and to so apply them by construction will lead to confusion and great
uncertainty in the practice. If it is essential that notice of appeal from
the local office should be given to the appellee, or his attorney, then the
rules relating to such appeals should be amended.
The reason, however, for the difference in the rules under considera-
tionisobvious. The subject matter of the controversyis in thevicinage
of the local office, and the parties litigant usually reside in the neigh-
borhood, and after receiving notice that the decision had been rendered,
could readily learn whether within the ensuing thirty days an appeal
had been taken to your office. On the other hand, the parties to cases
pending in your office usually reside at a great distance, and notice of
the appeal is therefore of vital importance. The parties indeed may
have local counsel, but that cannot be presumed.
The rules relating to these appeals seem to be analogous to the rules
and statutes relating to the practice in the courts. Notice of appeal
from the decisions of local tribunals, like those of justices of the peace, is
not required to be given to the opposite party. Nor is any notice to the
parties of the decision of the local officer required, and in this respect
the rules of your office are more liberal than the general law.
Pursuing the analogy into the higher courts, the rule changes, and
notice of appeals and of writs of error are there required to be given to
adverse parties.
Your order dismissing Merrifield's appeal must be set aside, and his
appeal reinstated.
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TRIAL BEFORE CLERK-IRREGULARITY-WAIVER.
JORDAN . WRIGHT.
The local officers cited the parties to trial before the clerk of the district court, in
- violation of Rule 35 of practice.
But the parties, by consenting to the proceedings, waived any irregularities therein.
Secretary Teller to Commissioner fcFarland, November 27, 1S82.
I have considered the case of Hugh Jordan v. Sylvanus A. Wright,
involving the NE. of Sec. 14, T. 99, R. 40 W., Des Moines, Iowa, on
appeal by Wright from your decision of November 23, 1881, holding
his filing for cancellation and allowing the entry of Jordan to remain
intact.
The record shows that Wright filed declaratory statement February
23, alleging settlement February 21,1880, and that Jordan made timber-
culture entry February 25, 1880.
It appears that Jordan filed charges against Wright's claim Septem-
ber 11, 1880; that your office ordered a hearing thereon; that the local
officers directed the case to be heard before the clerk of the district
court of Osceola County, Iowa, and that testimony was taken before
said clerk, both parties appearing and taking part in the proceedings
without objection thereto.
It also appears that on September 20, 1880, Wright gave notice of his
intention to make final proof of his pre-emption claim; that the register
ordered it to be taken before the same clerk; and that it was so taken,
Jordan not appearing. The testimony under both orders was trans-
mitted to the local officers, who, in view of Wright's equities, although
he had performed no act of settlement prior to the filing of his declara-
tory statement, nor until after the entry of Jordan, recommended can-
cellation of Jordan's entry, and that Wright's filing be allowed to stand.
On appeal, you held Wright's filing for cancellation. Arguments of
both parties were filed in the local office, in your office, and on appeal
in this Department; but no objection was taken to said references to
said clerk until October 18, ultimo, the case then pending in this De-
partment, when counsel for Wright moved the dismissal of all proceed-
ings because said orders were in violation of practice rule 35, which
provides that "registers and receivers are not authorized to cite con-
testants before any officer other than themselves." This rule is equiva-
lent to a prohibition of such citation; and although in one case the
hearing was on the motion of Jordan, at which both parties appeared,
and the other was in behalf of Wright, at which Jordan did not appear,
and notwithstanding neither of the parties at any time prior to said
motion objected to said orders of the local officers, or to the jurisdiction
of said clerk, or to the regularity of the proceedings, it is now claimed
that said testimony was irregularly taken and cannot be considered.
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If the orders of the local officers were in violation of rule 35, the
question arises whether Wright, by appearing at both hearings and
participating therein without objection, is not now estopped from deny-
ing their validity ?
The law seems well settled that consent may give a court jurisdiction
of parties to an action, bt not to the subject-matter. (Cleveland v.
Walsh, 4 Mass., 593; Plank Road Company v. Parker, 22 Barb., 323;
State v. Tappan, 29 Wis., 664; 26 N. Hamp., 232); and parties may
waive irregularities in proceedings wherein only their own ights are
concerned. (Blanton v. Russell, Hill's Leading Cases, April, 1880.)
In this case the parties only were cited, the officers retaining control
of the case and its disposition. The clerk took no otherjurisdiction than
to write the testimony of the witnesses and transmit it to the officers,
without deciding any question of right, or the subject-matter of the
controversy. The orders ot the office were merely, in effect, to take
depositions which they were authorized to do; and, I think, Wright, by
consenting to the proceedings, waived any irregularity therein.
The motion is overruled. Wright's filing of February 23 alleges set-
tlement two days previously, but in his testimony he admits that he
did no act of settlement until March 20 following, at which date the
adverse claim of Jordan was of record, and the land was under appro-
priation.
A pre emption right is initiated by settlement, without which a de-
claratory statement secures no right. The pre-emptor's declaratory
statement is mere notice of his pre-existing claim, and as Wright had
no claim at the date of his filing, but the tract had been at that date
appropriated by Jordan, the latter has the prior right.
FINAL PROOF-COYFLICTING RAILROAD CLAIM.
ATLANTIC & PAC. R. R. Co. v. FORRESTER.
Where there are two parties to the record, and the one is regularly cited'to a hearing
therein upon the motion of the other, but fails to respond, the party failing shall
be regarded as in default, and as having no standing before the Department,
unless he shall satisfactorily explain his default and regain reinstatement to his
privileges as a party to the record.
Secretary Teller to ommissioner McFarland, Norenber 27, 1882.
I have considered the case of the Atlantic and Pacific Railroad Com-
pany v. Andrew J. Forrester, involving the E. J of NE. J, SW. J of NE.
i, and SE. of NW. of Sec. 13, T. 31 S., R. 11 E., M. D. M., San Fran-
cisco, Cal., on appeal by the company from your decisions of September
2, 1881, holding Forrester's homestead entry of the tract for approval
for patent, and of January 3, 1882, denying the company's application
for a hearing.
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The tract is within the 20 miles granted limits of the grant by act of
July 27, 1866 (14 Stat., 292), to the company, which became effective,
upon filing the map of definite location, August 15, 1872, and the with-
drawal for which was made December 9, 1874.
The township plat was filed in the local office October 20, 1880.
It appears that Forrester filed declaratory statement No. 15563 for
the tract October 20, 1880, alleging settlement thereon December 6,
1874; that he transmuted his filing to homestead entry No. 4303 Feb-
ruary 14, 1881, pursuant to the provisions of the act of March 3, 1877(19 Stat., 404); and that he made final proof April 2, 1881, whereupon
final certificate No. 1568 was issued on the th of the same month.
His proof shows him to be a native-born citizen of the United States,
and a qualified pre emption and homestead claimant; that he settled
upon the tract December 6, 1874, where he has ever since resided con-
tinnously with his family, cultivating and improving the, land, his im-
provements consisting of a dwelling-house, barn, chicken-house, and
other out-houses, fencing, about 250 fruit trees, and 20 acres cultivated
to wheat, barley, and garden products, the same aggregating $1,000 in
value.
It will be observed that this proof was submitted pursuant to due
notice by publication specifying time and pliee at which the same
would be made, but that the company failed to appear. His proof being
uncontroverted, was held to be primafacie sufficient, and his entry was
accordingly held for approval as aforesaid, subject to the usual right
of appeal. But it further appears that during such period from your
decision of September 2, 1881, to wit, October 28 ensuing, the com-
pany's resident attorneys, Messrs. Britton & Gray, filed (under protest)
a motion asking for a hearing, basing such application upon certain ac-
eoinpanying affidavits, alleged to traverse Forrester's final proof, touch-ing the date of his settlement, which they claim does not, per se, affirma-
tively prove that the same antedated the railroad withdrawal " with
such precision as the law requires." Under date of January 22 last,
said attorneys filed the appeal in question, and upon the foregoing
statement of facts the question arises: What is the status of the com-pany before the Department ? In other words, are they regular appel-lants, or mere protestants, having, as such, no right of appeal ?
This question was determined by my predecessor, Mr. Secretary Kirk-
wood, under date of October 31, 1881, in the matter of the application
of the Saint Joseph and Denver City Railroad Company for a reconsid-
eration of his decision of March 1 preceding, in the parallel case of
Gilbert v. said company.
It was therein held-
That in all cases where there are two parties to the record, and the
one is regularly cited to a hearing therein upon the motion of the other,but fails to respond thereto, the party thus failing shall thereafter be
regarded as in default, and as having no standing whatever in thepremises before the Department, unless he shall, within a reasonable
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time, satisfactorily explain the cause of his default and obtain rein-
statement to his privileges as a party to the record.
In the light of this precedent, I am constrained to the opinion that
the company, having failed to answer the regular citation issued upon
Forrester's motion, was guilty of laches, by reason or which it may be
held to have waived its right to assert title to the tract in question, or
to object to the consummation of his claim to the same.
I do not think it necessary to discuss the question of practice raised
by counsel for the railroad company, inasmuch as Forrester's final
proof shows that he settled upon the tract subsequently to the date of
the definite location of the company's road, but prior to withdrawal
therefor, and has, in good faith, complied with legal requirements. His
entry undoubtedly is confirmed by the first section of the act of April
21, 1876.
Your decision is affirmed for the reasons herein stated.
BUIBDEN OF PROOF-NOTICE-APPEAL..
BALLARD V. MCKiNNEY.
The burden of proof is upon the party making the allegations upou which a hearing
is ordered.
The notice of decision in a contested case should be formal and in writing, such as
will advise the parties of the matter decided and fix a time of record from which
the right and limitation of appeal will run; and it is error to deny an appeal when
such notice has not been given, because not filed within the limited period after
alleged verbal notice.
Secretary Teller to Commissioner MlcFarland, Decemnber 29, 1S82.
I have considered the case of George Ballard v. E. F. McKinney, on
appeal from your decision of January 10, 1882, awarding to the latter
the S. J of SE. i of Sec. ], and lots 3 and 4 of Sec. 12, 12 S., 2 W., Los
Angeles district, California, and canceling Ballard's warrant location
thereon, made March 1, 1880, with warrant No. 96884, 120 acres, act of
March 3, 1855, in pursuance of my predecessor's decision of February
3, 1880, awarding him the land.
The rehearing ordered by this Department February 10, 1881, di-
rected that certain affidavits filed upon motion for review be made the
basis of investigation, and that, without regard to mere technicalities,
a fair trial and decision upon the merits be accorded.
This was, in view of manifest and repeated irregularities, fully set
forth in the case.
Instead of requiring McKinney, who had moved for the new trial, to
proceed and support his allegations as set up by the affidavits, the reg-
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ister and receiver ruled that Ballard must assume the burden of the
ease and proceed as a original claimant, notwithstanding the fact that
the former decision was vacated only upo6n the ground that there had
been no proper decision of your office from which appeal could be taken,
and that such decision by you should be had upon the case as presented,
aided by such additional matter as might be adduced at the new trial.
The burden was clearly upon McKinney to substantiate his allegations,
and the ruling of the district officers was erroneous.
The case was, however, tried, and testimony on both sides intro-
duced.
The register and receiver found for McKinney, and at the expiration
of thirty days forwarded the case, with the statement that due notice
had been served upon the parties, and no appeal had been filed. Three
days afterward they transmitted an appeal filed by counsel for Ballard,
and accompanied by a motion on behalf of McKinney to dismiss the
same, on the ground that it had not been filed in time under the rules
of practice. You allowed the motion January 10, 1882, and proceeded
to cancel the entry of Ballard upon the finding of the register and re-
eeiver, without examination of the testimony.
Afterward a motion was made for a decision on the merits, and it was
alleged that the appeal was not barred because no proper notice of the
,decision was given by the register and receiver, and it was claimed
upon oath by the attorney that he was merely told upon the street by
the register that the decision was in favor of McKinney; that he never
had written notice of the contents; that he was then about to leave
town, and that as soon as he was able to gain a knowledge of the decis-
iou by his own efforts, and examine the same, he did so, and filed his
appeal within thirty days thereafter, which was only thirty-three days
from the date of closing the hearing. You declined the request for a
decision on the merits by letter of March 15 last, and refused to consider
the appeal.
I think the request was a reasonable one, and should have been
allowed. It appears o be conceded that the affidavit was true; and
that no formal notice was given upon which a proper appeal from the
decision of the register and receiver could have been formulated. It is
not to the discredit of the attorney that he proceeded with reasonable
diligence to prepare the appeal from his own acquired knowledge of the
decision, without due notice, nor was such fact an admission of service, as
assumed by you in your rejection of his motion. The rules of prac-
tice contemplate such formal notice to contestants as will not only advise
them of the matter decided, but fix a time of record from which the right
and limitation of appeal will run; and it is a gross error, where such
notice as not been given, to deny an appeal because two or three days
over the thirty may have elapsed, after alleged verbal notice, before
appeal is filed.
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All the rules of practice, commencing with rule 9, respecting notices,
require such notice to be written or printed. Rule 10 specifies service
by copy, as the principal mode. Rule 17 requires " notice of interlocu-
tory motions, proceedings, orders, and decisions," to be in writing. Rule
44 requires the register and receiver, after hearing in a contested case,
to " notify the parties in interest of the conclusions to which they have
arrived, and that thirty days are allowed for an appeal from their de-
cisions."
It clearly was never intended that notice of this final decision might
be served by a passing remark on the street, when all of the less im-
portant and interlocutory orders and decisions are required to be re-
duced to writing and formally served. The notice to be served in this
Department must conform to the legal definition, to wit: " A writing
containing formal, customary, or presented information."
I might now insist upon a decision by you on the merits, and remand
the case; but in view of the fact that for six years the matter has been
in controversy, and to avoid further delay, I shall consider the whole
subject before me on the present appeal, and dispose of it accordingly.
The objection to the claim of Ballard relates to good faith as a pre-
emptor, it being alleged that his settlement was madle in the interest of
other parties, and that a deed of the laud made by him on the day suc-
ceeding his final entry was executed in pursuance of a prior agreement.
Both himself and his grantee swear that such was not the case, but that
the sale was bonafide, after entry, and by way of settlement of an open
account between them; that the grantee proposed to take a mortgage
only, but Ballard finally proposed direct terms of sale, which were
accepted. This is not overcome by the testimony on the other side, and
must in this Department be held conclusive of the facts.
Ballard was the first settler by several years. McKinney's only show
of settlement was upon a marginal strip beyond the inclosure of Ballard,
where he had a small garden, and where he was from time to time aided
by others, including Ballard, who had no idea that the survey would
throw him upon his own claim.' And it is reasonably shown that Mc-
Kinney himself did not intend at first to claim against Ballard, but
avowed his intention to hold an adjoining tract. This is not such a
claim as will entitle him to an award of a subdivision, or of joint entry
with Ballard, all the elements of priority or equal right being wanting.
I accordingly reverse your decision, and direct that patent issue to
Ballard upon his warrant location.
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ATTORNEY-APPEARANCE-HEARING.
RENVILLE v. GIVENS.
It is contrary to custom to require a practitioner of good standing to produce his au-
thority for appearing as attorney in a case; and this doctrine applies as well to
the initiation of contests as to the subsequent proceedings.
Rules of practice not violated by the ordering of a hearing upon the affidavit of the
attorney.
Commissioner lfcFarland to register and receiver, Bozeman, 31ontana,
February 10, 1883.
I have examined the case of Julia Renville v. N. B. Givens, forwarded
with your letter of December 27, 1882. This contest is brought in the
name of Julia Renville, S. Hl. B. scrip claimant, by her attorney, Arthur
O'Connor.
Personal service of notice was made and acknowledged.
Final proof had been made by the pre-emptor, Givens, before the
clerk of a court. You suspended the entry and allowed the protestant
to offer testimony against its allowance.
During the progress of the hearing Mr. Givens objected to any further
testimony in the case until it was shown who the contestant was.
The record shows that Givens filed D. S. for the NE. 1, Sec. 32, 1 N.
26, September 13, alleging settlement August 31, 1881, and that Julia
tenville made S. H. B. scrip location for the SE. i of NE. t, Sec. 32,
December 14, 1881.
The suit is brought upon affidavit of O'Connor, setting forth that he
is the attorney of Julia Renville. the scripee, and alleging bad faith and
non-compliance with the law on the part of Givens.
Said scrip was located by one Dickenson, attorney in fact of Julia
Renville. Dickenson's power of attorney is in the usual form, empow-
ering him to select and locate the lands which the scripee is entitled to,
and to solicit and receive patent on the location. In short, he is irrevo-
cably vested with all power and authority which the sripee might or
could personally exercise if present and acting.
The character and standing of O'Connor as an attorney is not im-
peached. He swears that he appears for a party who represents him-
self to be in interest; and the mere fact that he refuses to divulge, or
is ignorant of the means by which his client became a party in interest,
is not sufficient ground for dismissal of the case.
He could not appear directly as the attorney of Julia Renville, for
the reason that she has delegated all her powers in the premises; but
indirectly he may appear for her as the party of record throngh any
party to whom her powers may have been delegated.
In the case of Carduff v. Connack (9 . L. O., 9), it is held to be con-
trary to custom and usage to compel a practitioner of good standing
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before tribunals to produce his authority for appearing as attorney in
the case.
This doctrine will apply to the initiation of contests as well as to sub-
sequent proceedings therein, and I fail to see wherein the rules of prac-
tice have been violated in this case.
Your action in dismissing the case is overruled, and the papers are
herewith returned, with instructions to continue the hearing to its con-
elusion.
HEARING-PRE-EMPTION-TIMBER C UL TURE.
LEVI ACKROYD.
The local officers have no jurisdiction to order hearings as between pre-emption and
timber-culture claimants.
Commissioner McFarland to register and receiver, Denver, Colorado, M11arch
9, 1883.
This office is in receipt of your letter of the 9th ultimo, transmitting
the pre-emption proof of Levi Ackroyd for the N. i of SW. 1, Sec. 14,
5 S., 68 W,; also cross-examination of Ackroyd's witnesses by John J.
Nilan, party to timber-culture entry No. 966 for same laud.
Ackroyd gave published notice that he would make final proof and
payment on the 16th of January, 1883.
Nilan filed notice on the 15th of January, 1883, that lie would appear
and cross-examine witnesses, and produce testimony against the good
faith of Ackroyd as a pre-emptor. You allowed Nilan to cross-examine
Ackroyd and his witnesses, but refused his application to offer testi-
mony showing fraud and falsity of the proof, on the ground that the
rules of practice do not provide for a hearing in contest between pre-
emption and timber-culture claimants without authority for the same
from this office.
The proof was satisfactory to you, but you refused payment on the
ground that the case was not yet determined and referred the matter
to this office for instructions.
Your action under the circumstances was correct.
Under the rules of practice you have no authority to order hearings v
as between pre-emption and timber-culture claimants. Rule 5 clearly
specifies in what cases you may order hearings, and contests of the
character of the one under consideration are not enumerated therein.
I therefore return the proof, and you are hereby authorized to allow
Mr. Nilan the same remedy as in contests within your jurisdiction, and
in accordance with the rules in such cases provided.
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PRE-EMPTIONY-FYAL PB00F-FIA4L AFFIDAVFIT.
CALVIN HAWKINS.
Where the pre emptor's affidavit is taken before the clerk of a court of record it is not
required to bear even date with the entry, but will be deemed sufficient if a
reasonable time only for transmission thereof to the local office has elapsed.
Commissioner lcFarland to register and receiver, Montgomery, Alabama,
August 23, 1881.
I have examined the pre-emption cash entry, No. 16684, of Calvin
Hawkins, embracing the W. J, NW. 1, Sec. 24, T. 17 S., B. 4 W., Hunts-
ville meridian.
The proofs, including the pre emption affidavit in said case, were made
before the probate judge, ex-officio clerk of the Jefferson county court,
January 25, 1881, and were presumably transmitted immediately to
your office. You found them satisfactory, and allowed the entry Febru-
ary 2, 1881. There thus appears a discrepancy of eight days between
the date of the vre-emption affidavit and the date of entry.
This office has always required that the pre-emption affidavit required
by section 2262 Rev. Stats., should be sworn to on the date of entry, and
in eases where said affidavit antedated the entry, required a new affida-
vit which should cover that date. This requirement was for the purpose
of preventing, so far as possible, evasions of the law in respect of making
agreements or contracts whereby the title which the pre-emptor might
acquire should inure to the benefit of any other person. So long as
the affidavit was required to be sworn to before one of the local officers,
no difficulty existed in enforcing the rule. The pre-emptor might take
the testimony of his witnesses before any officer authorized to admin-
ister oaths in the county in which the land was situated; but before his
proof was complete he was required to swear to the pre-emption affida-
vit before one of the land officers, and until that affidavit was furnished
an entry could not properly be allowed.
By act of June 9, 1880, it was enacted that the affidavit required to
be made by section 2262 Rev. Stats.-
May be made before the clerk of the county court or of any court of
record of the county and State . . . . . in which the lands are
situated, . . . . . and the affidavit so made and duly subscribed
shall have the same force and effect as if made before the register or
receiver of the proper land district, and the same shall be transmitted
by such clerk of the court to the register and receiver, with the fees and
charges allowed by law.
This enactment was remedial, and obviously for the purpose of ena-
bling the settler to save the expense of, in many cases, a long journey
from his claim to the local office, by authorizing him to complete his
proof before a duly authorized officer in the vicinity of the land, and of
necessity contemplates the lapse of a sufficient interval of time after the
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execution of the proofs for transmission to the local officers, examina-
tion by them, and allowance of entry if the proof is found satisfactory.
It is evident that, unless this is so, the law can be given no effect what-
ever, for the reason that an entry cannot properly be allowed in the ab-
sence of the affidavit; and to make the affidavit bearing even date with
the entry the settler would be required to present himself at the local
office.
The act, in my opinion, designed that the pre-emption proof, includ-
ing the affidavit taken before the clerk of the county court or other
court of record, duly transmitted to the local office, should, if in other
respects satisfactory, be deemed sufficient, and entry allowed.
The effect of the act in necessitating a discrepancy between the date
of proof and affidavit and date of entry is too obvious to require dis-
cussion; and therefore, in all cases when the affidavit is executed in
accordance with the provisions of said act of June 9, 1880, if the inter-
val between the execution thereof and date of entry does not exceed a
period reasonably sufficient to permit transmission to the local office
and examination of the proof in the regular course of business, the
affidavit will be considered sufficient.
There is no defect in the entry under discussion except that you failed
to transmit register's certificate that notice of intention to make final
proof remained posted in the local office for thirty days during the pe-
riod of publication. You will supply the required paper, if notice was
so posted, without delay, and transmit the same to this office.
PRE-EMPTION-FINXAL PROOF-INASTRUCTIONS.
In cases where the pre-emption affidavit is executed before the clerk of acourt the
local officers, after considering all the circumstances in the case, must exercise a
sound discretion in determining whether a reasonable time only has elapsed be-
tween date of its execution and receipt at the local office.
Commissioner McFarland to register and receirer, Montgomery, Alabama,
April 17, 1882.
Referring to receiver's letter of March 20 last, relative to the allow-
ance of entries in cases where the pre-emption affidavit is sworn to be-
fore the clerk of the county court, in pursuance of the provisions of the
act of June 9, 1880, and as to what shall be considered "reasonable
time" for the transmission of such affidavit from the place of its exe-
cution to the local office, I have to state that no specific rule can be laid
down. In my decision of August 23, 1881, in the case of Calvin Haw-
kins, it was held that the affidavit would be deemed sufficient in cases
where the interval between date of its exec3ution and date of entry does
not exceed a period reasonably sufficient to permit transmission to the
local office and examination of the proof in the regular course of busi-
ness. 11y decision in that case, you will observe, contemplated the
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probability that the entry was not allowed on the day of the receipt of
the proofs at your office, and hence the period of eight days which had
elapsed from date of affidavit and date of entry was not considered ex-
cessive. Your action will depend upon the circumstances of each case,,
and in determining whether a reasonable time only has elapsed between
the date of execution of the affidavit and date of its receipt at your officer
you must necessarily take into consideration the distance between the
points of mailing and delivery, mail facilities, and any other circum-
stances that may be shown to exist affecting the matter, and thereupon
exercise a sound discretion in allowing or rejecting an entry.
In case of a rejection your action should be indorsed upon the appli-
cation, the party notified, and allowed to appeal as provided by the
rules of practice.
I desire to call your attention to the fact that it is made the duty of
the clerk of the court to transmit the affidavit to your office, and in this,
connection to say that an applicant to enter should not be made to suffer
where delay in transmission is caused by negligence in the clerk's office
and not by any act of himself. I would also suggest that the date of
mailing, as shown by the postmark upon the envelope, might aid you ih
determining whether proper diligence had been exercised in the trans-
mission of the affidavit.
FINAL PROOF-BOARD OF EQ UITABLE ADJUDICA XON.
JOSEPH M. DIEFFENBACHER.
Where the pre-etnptor's final affidavit and personal testimony is not sworn to before.
the officer named in his published notice, because of inability, through sickness.
and distance from the place of taking proof, to appear, but is sworn to before a,
clerk of court, the case should, in the absence of a adverse claim, be submitted
to the Board for confirmation.
Secretary Teller to Commissioner IcFarlantd, April 3, 1883.
I have considered the appeal of Joseph M. Dieffenbacher from your-
decision of May 15, 1882, rejecting his final proof for lots 1 and 2 (other-
wise WV. of NW. 1, and W. of SW. 1) of Sec. 32, T. 23, R. 25, Larned..
Kans.
Dieffenbacher filed declaratory statement for the tracts, March 25r
alleging settlement March 15, 1879, and gave notice of his intention to-
offer final proof before the local officers November 29, 1881. The printed
notice described the land, through no fault of his own, as lots 1, 2, and,
W. I of NW. , and W. J of NV. 1, of said section. On the designated
day two of the witnesses named in the notice appeared before the local
officers and testified, but by reason of sickness and distance from the
land office Dieffenbacher was unable to appear before them, but made his
final affidavit and personal proof on a subsequent day, before a clerk
of court outside of the district in which the land is located. He is a.
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qualified pre-emptor, has valuable improvements, and has continuously
resided on and cultivated the land, except when absent, under the pro-
visions of the act of June 4, 18S0, and there is no adverse claimant.
You reject this proof because the affidavit and testimony of a pre-
emptor on final proof must be made before the local officers, but with-
out prejudice to his rights who such proof is properly perfected.
I think this a proper case for the Board of Equitable Adjudication,
and your decision is modified accordingly.
PRE-EMPTION ENTRY FOR EIGHTY ACRES EXHA USTS RIGHT.
JOHN H. LESSINGER.
A pre-emptor, having filed for one hundred and sixty acres of land, and subsequently
made entry of only eighty acres thereof, has exhausted his pre-emption right, and
canuot thereafter, having made a homestead entry of the remaining eighty acres,
claim the lenefitsof the act of Congress of May27,1878, and thereby secure credit
on said entry for the period of residence under his pre-emption fiiug.
Secretary Kirkwood to Commissioner McFarland, March 25, 1882.
I have considered the appeal of John H. Lessinger from your decision
of September 12, 1881, rejecting his application for cancellation of his
pre-emption cash entry upon the east half of the SW. 4 of Sec. 12, T.
21, R. 17 W., Larned, Kans, and to be allowed to enter said tract s
additional to his homestead entry for the W. i of the SW. I of said sec-
tion, or upon refusal thereof, that he be allowed to date his homestead
entry from the date of his settlement under his pre-emption filing instead
of its actual date of record.
It appears that Lessinger filed pre-emption declaratory statement for
the SW. 4 of said section April 9, alleging settlement April 7, 1874, and
made cash entry for the E. A of said SW. 4 June 11, 1878, and home-
stead entry for the W. 4 of said SW. 4 on the same day.
The tracts are double-minimum land, and patent has issued and been
delivered to Lessinger for the E. 4 of said SW. 4. As title to this tract
is now in Lessinger and not in the government, the latter can exercise
lno further control over it, and his cash entry therefor cannot be can-
celed. Nor can Lessinger receive any benefit from the act of March 3,
1879 (20 Stat., 472), for the reasons stated by you.
The act of May 27, 1878 (20 Stat., 63), authorizes a person who has
made a settlement under the pre-emption laws, and subsequently to
-such settlement has changed his filing for a homestead entry upon the
same tract of land, to have the time required to perfect his title under
the homestead laws computed from the date of his original settlement,
made before or after the passage of the act, subject to all the provisions
of the law relating to homesteads. Lessinger asks, in case he cannot
be permitted to extend his homestead claim over the patented tract and
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have his pre-emption entry canceled, that he be permitted to claim
settlement upon the eighty acres embraced in his homestead, as of the
date of his original filing, and be allowed the time in computing the
five years of required residence and cultivation.
This, in my judgment, cannot be done. By his final proof and entry
of eighty acres under the pre-emption law he included his residence anit
used his pre-emptive right on that tract and abandoned it as to other
land; and it makes no difference that he might have included the whole
tract in his claim and paid for it under the pre-einptiou law. He elected
to take the eighty acres. Section 2261 of the Revised Statutes declares
that " no person shall be entitled to more than one pre-emptive right.
Having used this pre-emptive right and consummated title, he had no
other settlement right under the pre-emption law. He did not actually
reside on the eighty acres dropped from his pre-emption claim, but used
his residence for the purposes of his pre emption entry on the eighty
paid for. Consequently, he has no residence antecedent to his home-
stead entry to include with the subsequent residence in the period
which he will be required to prove before acquiring title, and his appli-
cation must be rejected.
Your decision is affirmed.
TIMBER-C ULTURE ENTRY-CONTESTANT.
THOMAS v. DRUMHILLER.
The preference right of entry allowed a contestant by the third section of the timber-
culture act does not reserve the land from other disposal.
After cancellation of the contested entry the land becomes subject to settlement or
entry by any other qualified person, subject to the exercise of the contestant's
privilege.
Commissioner McFarland to register and receiver, Kirwin, Kansas, Novet-
ber 26, 1881.
I have examined the case of Hezekiah Thomas v. Wim. Drumb iller,
involving the NW. See. 25, T. 4, R. 21, wherein you rendered dis-
agreeing opinions.
Thomas filed D. S. No. 15921 January 2,1880, alleging settlement
December 23, 1879, and Drumhiller made T. C. entry N-o. 6437 Jainmay
2, 1880.
The land was embraced in T. C. entry No. .'L3 of J. H. Jones, which
was canceled by letter C of December 13, 1879, and cancellation noted
on your records December 23, 1879; at that time Thomas was residing
upon the land, intending to claim under the pre-emption law, and had,
and has since, made valuable improvements.
The facts upon which Drumhiller relies are as follows:
In October, 1878, one Frank Watrons instituted contest against the
entry of Jones, and at the same time filed application under the third
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section of the timber-culture act of June 14, 1878, for the purpose of
securing to himself a preference right to enter upon cancellation of
Jones's entry.
December 16, 1878, Watrous executed a paper transferring to Drum-
hiller, in consideration of $50, all the right, title, and interest he may
have acquired to the tract in contest, by virtue of his contest, and
authorizing his attorneys to substitute Drumhiller as contestant in his
stead, and to withdraw his application to enter and substitute that of
Drumhiller.
The receiver held that Watrous had acquired an inchoate right con-
stituting him an adverse claimant to the party whose entry was con-
tested, and that he was possessed of equities which were transferable,
and that as Drumnihller had purchased those equities his entry should
be held intact, and the filing of Thomas for cancellation.
This position is not, in my opinion, tenable.
Watrous nndoubtedly, by hispreliminary proceedings, acquired prefer-
ence right to enter the land which, had it been exercised, would have
excluded all adverse claims. But, even had he not withdrawn his
application, his preference right did not reserve the land from other dis-
posal. After the cancellation of Jones's entry, the land was subject to
settlement or entry by any other qualified person, but such settlement
or entry in its turn was subject to the exercise of the privilege conferred
by law upon the contestant.
Watrons by sale could not invest Drumhiller with the privilege that
the law conferred upon him personally, as the contestant of an aban-
doned timber culture entry, and while the attempt to purchase such
rights or privileges might be considered as evidence of the good faith
of the purchaser, it could not give him superior advantages in the entry
of the land involved. He must take his chance with other qualified
persons in securing it when it becomes subject to entry.
Thomas has the prior claim, and I award the land to him. The entry
of Drumhiller will remain intact, subject to Thomas's proof of com-
pliance with law to date of application to- enter.




Because a party fails only in the matter of time in submitting proof and making
payment, he should not be subjected to forfeiture unless a valid adverse interest
has attached. Sch adverse interest must be shown by affirmative proof.
Secretary Kirkwood to Commissioner Mcecarland, December 10, 1881.
I have considered the case of Charles Larson v. Robert B. Parks, in-
volving lots 1, 2, 3. and 4, Sec. 23, T. 1 N., R. 11 E., M. ). M., Stock-
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ton, Cal., on appeal by Larson from your decision of May 14, 1881,
holding his declaratory statement for cancellation.
Larson filed declaratory statement November 12, alleging settlement
August 15, 1876.
Parks filed declaratory statement May 17, 1879, alleging settlement
the same day.
A hearing was held August 7, 1879, to determine their respective
rights, upon Larson's application to make final proof and payment.
The testimony shows that Larson erected a house on the land in
August, 1876 (which he has since continuously occupied), and other out-
buildings, and that he has fenced a small parcel for a garden. He has
never cultivated any portion of the land, but has used it for grazing
purposes, for which it is adapted. He, however, failed to offer his
proof and payment within 33 months from the date of his settlement
(Sec. 2267, Rev. Stats.), whereby his filing became forfeited in the pres-
ence of a valid adverse claim. Parks was present with counsel at the
hearing. He offered no testimony, but cross-examined the witnesses of
Larson.
The testimony submitted bv Larson shows that Parks erected a small
'shanty on the land in May, 1879, built of old lumber, and scarcely fit
for habitation; that he never occupied the house, nor resided on, nor
otherwise improved, nor cultivated any portion of the land.
Your decision holds that the evidence fails to show whether or not
Parks made a settlement and otherwise complied with the requirements
of the law, but that a filing of record is primafacie evidence of a valid
adverse claim, in the absence of proot to the contrary; and that as Lar-
son did not make proof and payment within the required time, the claim
of Park must be recognized as valid.
I think the latter clause of your decision erroneous. The claim of
Parks, to entitle it to recognition, must be sustained by the usual and
accepted affirmative proofs. These would be required in case there was
no opposing claim, and should the more especially he insisted upon
when the alleged pre-emption right is set up to defeat a prior settler
who has confessedly complied with the law in everything but the matter
of time, and should not be subjected to forfeiture except upon the posi-
tive requirements of law. All presumption in favor of the validity of
Park's claim is overcome by the testimony, which shows a want of good
faith on his part in respect to residence and cultivation of the land,
whi.h were essential in order to give him standing as an adverse claim-
ant, and insufficient, in my opinion, to defeat the claim of Larson, who,
although he did not make his proof and payment within the time re-
.quired by law, did make it-or offered to make it-before any other
valid claim had attached. It must therefore be sustained, under the
rulings of the supreme court in the case of Johnson v. Towsley (13
Wall., 72).
Your decision is reversed.
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PRE-EMPTIONT-TRFA TY WITH MEXICO-CITIZEVSHIP.
AUBREY V. CLAPP.
Uinder treaty Mexicans had the privilege within one year of electing to remain Mexi-
can citizens, or to become citizens of the United States. Sbjects of other gov-
ernments wcre not included.
Secretary Kirkuood to Commissioner McFarland, February 4, 1882.
* * * The principal question in the case respects the qualification
of Aubrey as a pre-emptor, the local officers holding that he was not
qualified for want of citizenship, and your decision the contrary;
The testimony shows that Aubrey and his father were natives of Eng-
land; that the father went to Mexico in 1837, and that in 1844 (the son
being then 15 years of age) both were resident in California, then a
Mexican province, the father dying there in 1851, and that the son re-
sided there since 1844. It does not appear that the father ever became
a citizen of Mexico, by process of naturalization or otherwise, but that
he resided there only. Neitherthefathiernor son were ever naturalized
in the United States, nor did either ever file a declaration of intention
to become a citizen. The son, however, claims to have exercised rights
,of citizenship in California, and his name was registered on the Great
Register of Placer County in December, 1877.
On these facts you held that, under the eighth article of the treaty of
,Guadalupe Hidalgo (February 2, 1848), between the United States and
Mexico, the father became a citizen of the United States, by virtue
whereof the son, when a minor, also became a citizen.
I do not concur in these conclusions.
The eighth article of the treaty provides that Mexicans then estab-
lished in territories belonging to Mexico, but which thereafter were to
remain within the limits of the United States, should be free to continue
where they then resided, or to remove at any time to the Mexican Re-
public; that those who remained in said territories might either retain
the title and rights of Mexican citizens, or acquire those of citizens of
the United States; but they were required to make their election in this
respect within one year from the date of the exchange of ratilications of
the treaty; and those who should remain in said territories after the
expiration of that year, without having declared his intention to retain
the character of Mexicans, should be considered to have elected to be.
come citizens of the United States.
This provision did not include the subjects of other governments res-
ident in Mexico, but related to Mexicans exclusively. As Aubrey, the
father, never acquired the right of citizenship in Mexico, but was resi-
{dent there only, he was not, as an. Englishman, the recipient of any
benefit or right under this article of the treaty. He had no right of
election to become a citizen of the United States thereunder, nor does
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it appear that he ever attempted to exercise such election. And as he
was never naturalized in the United States, nor declared his intention
to become a citizen thereof, but after the date of the treaty was resident
only in the United States, as he had previously been resident in Meexico.
the son can claim no right of citizenship in this country through him.
The allegation of the son that in the absence of his naturalization, or
declaration of his intention to become a citizen, he has exercised rights
of citizenship in California, and the fact that he has been registered on
the Great Register of Placer County, California, cannot aid his pre-
emption right, because this right is governed by United States laws,
which require naturalization, or a declaration of intention to become a
citizen, from an alien, as a prerequisite to the exercise of pre-emption
rights. Besides, such registration, made in December, 1877, if other-
wise of any force, could give no validity to a settlement and filing made
in 1876. A person must have the qualifications of a pre emptor at the
date of his settlement. (McMurdie v. Central Pacific Railroad Com-
pany, 8 C. L. O., 36.)
I am of the opinion that Aubrey was not a qualified pre-emptor at the
time of his settlement, and acquired no right to the land in dispute. I
therefore reverse your decision, and award it to Clapp.
REMOVAL FROM RESIDENCE IN CITY.
STURGEON V. Ruiz.
A settler is not disqualified under Section 260 who moves from his own home in a
city, town, or village to a pre-emption claim.
Secretary Teller to Commissioner lfcFarland, March 7, 1883.
* * * I* * *
The testimony shows that Sturgeon is a practicing lawyer and real
estate agent, doing business in the city of Santa Barbara, and having
his residence on a tract of eighteen to twenty acres within the surveyed
limits of said city, about one mile from its court-house. He used the
land as a residence only, without other cultivation than raising fruit
and vegetables for his-own consumption, and moved thence to the land
in dispute.
The tenth section of the act of 1811 (Section 2260, Rev. Stats.) has
been uniformly held to extend to residents upon agricultural lands only,
and not to debar a pre-emptor who moves from his own home in a city,
town, or village, upon a pre-emption claim.
Your decision is affirmed.
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INDIANS-PRE-EMPTORS-AT-TUBALIZATION.
SOLOMON SCOTT.
There is no law that confers upon Indians the right to acquire public lands as pre-
emptors, nor do the general statutes of naturalization apply to them.
Commissioner MlcFarland to register and receiver, Colfax, W. T., June 5,
1882.
I am in recept of your letter of the 19th ultimo, inclosing the appeal
by Solomon Scott (an Indian) from your ruling of April 26, last, reject-
ing his application to file a D. S. on the SE. Sec. 28, T. 26 N., B. 41 E
Your reasons for rejecting said application indorsed on the back of his.
D. S. are as follows:
The pre-emption laws do not confer upon an Indian, who has not been
made a citizen of the United States, and who is not taxed, the right to
file a pre-emption declaratory statement or provide any way for an In-
dian, not a citizen and not taxed, to assert a legal claim under pre-emp-
tion laws to the public lands. . . . . There has been no evidence
adduced to show that the applicant is a citizen of the United States, or
that he is taxed. (See sections 2259 and 1992, Rev. Stat.)
It is urged by the attorney for Scott that he was born in the United
States and having severed his tribal relations with the Deep Creek col-
ony of the Spokane Indians, of which he was formerly a member, and
being now subject to the taxes imposed by the legislature of Washing-
ton Territory, that he is a qualified pre-emptor and should be allowed to,
file his declaratory statement for the land described. Mr. Scott's at-
torney also represents that he (Scott) " would gladly avail himself of the
benefits of naturalization in the courts, but they refuse to confer upon
him that right."
There is no law which confers upon an Indian the right to acquire
title to the public lands as a pre-emptor, nor do the general statutes of
naturalization apply to Indians, as they can only be naturalized by a
special act of Congress, or by treaty. The opinion of Mr. Attorney-
General Cushing, of July 5, 1856 (7 Opinions Attorney-General, 746), is
very explicit on these points, and sets forth that Indians are not capa-
ble of pre-empting the public lands. Your decision is therefore affirmed.
I see no reason, however, why Mr. Scott, if qualified, may not avail
himself of the privilege granted in section 15, act of March 3, 1875,
(General circular, page 65), and enter said tract under the homestead
law.
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PRE-EMPTION-STA TUTOR Y INHIBITION.
INSTRUCTIONS.
'Vhether the prohibition of second clause of section 2260, Revised Statutes, will or
will not apply depends to a large extent upon the circumstances of each ease
and upon the intention of the party.
;Commissioner 1l1cFarland to register and receiver, tron, Dalcota, March
1, 1883.
I am in receipt of register's letter of 19th ultimo, requesting instruc.
-tions as to the prohibition of the second clause of section 2260, Rev.
.Stats. This provision of law is that no pre-emption right shall be ac-
jquired by any " person who quits or abandons his residence on his own
land to reside upon the public land in the same State or Territory.
If a person removes directly from his residence upon land of his own
-to settle upon the public land he is unquestionably within the prohibi-
tion of the statute. But there are many cases where the removal is
mediate or remote. In them the prohibition will apply, or not, accord-
ing to the circunistances of the case, and no general rule can be laid
Clown. For instance, if a person abandons a residence upon his own
land, goes away and engages, in business, or other pursuits, and after
.a period of time returns and makes pre-emption settlement upon public
land, in the State or Territory where he had formerly resided, the pro-
ibition would not apply. But if, on the other hand, the change of
Tesidence was intended only as a preliminary step to making a pre-emp-
tion settlement, that is, if in order to render himself qualified a party
leaves a residence upon his own land, without any other object, and
without acquiring a residence elsewhere, the prohibition would apply.
'Such cases are largely controlled by the evident intention of the party.
,Owings v. Lichtenberger (9 0. L. O., 197), Weir v. Haskins (Secretary's
decision, February 23, 1882). Applying the foregoing to the cases
stated by you, if by the language " where a man proved upon his home-
stead by commuting same," is meant a case where entry is made under
the act of June 15, 1880, by one who had failed to establish his residence
,upon the land, the prohibition would not apply because there would be
:no removal from a residence upon his own land. But if by commuta-
-tion of his entry you mean an entry under section 2301, Rev. Stats.,
then his proof of settlement would include proof of residence also, and a
removal therefrom would disqualify him as a pre-emptor. In the second
case, where one who has made final homestead proof, makes pre-emption
,settlement immediately or after a short absence from a residence upon
his homestead, such absence being only temporary and not an actual
and bona fide change of residence, the prohibition applies, and this with-
out reference to the issuance of patent. For where one has received
the patent certificate lie is possessed of he equitable title to the land,
and the right to a patent conveying the legal title of the government
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which, when issued, relates back to and takes effect from the time his.
equitable title vested. And this right is subjectonlyto be defeated by
the discovery of a radical defect in his entry which cannot be presumed
to exist.
PB-EMPTJOY-RESIDENCE-GOOD FAITH.
ALEXANDER BLAIR ET AL.
Under the rules of the Land Department, six months' residence is required of pre-
emptors, but this rule should not be indiscriminately applied, nor where good.,
faith otherwise sufficiently appears.
Secretary Kirkwood to Commissioner McFarland, April 13, 1882.
I have considered the appeals of Alexander Blair, John Roach, and
Joseph N. Austin, respectively, from your decision of June 15, 1881,.
holding for cancellation their respective cash entries . . . . . all
within the Harrison, Ark., land district.
It appears that the parties each filed a pre-emption declaratory state-
ment upon the lands named on June 17, each alleging settlement on,
June 16, 1879, and that each made cash entry therefor on August 18,.
1879, upon proof substantially the same in each case (they being wit-
nesses for each other), of the erection of a house, the setting out of a.
few trees, and the clearing of about one acre cultivated as a garden--
all valued in each case at about $30. They each subsequently conveyed
the tract named in their entry to one Massman-Blair and Austin on
August 21, and Roach on August 29, 1879; and on October 15 folloW-
ing, Massman conveyed the same to her son, Louis Haucke.
In April, 1880, before knowledge of said conveyances was received at
your office, you found the proof of residence otl the respective tracts
insufficient in each case, and allowed the parties to show contiunous-
residence thereon for six months; but they appear to have abandoned
the land upon their conveyance thereof, and have made no further resi-
dence thereon.
Your decision finds that their brief residence, their limited improve-
ments, and the immediate transfer of the lands, show that their entries
were made for speculative purposes, not in good faith, and in the in-
terest of their grantee, and hence were erroneously allowed. Section
2263, Rev. Stat., requires that prior to entries under section 2259 proof
of settlement and improvement shall be made to the satisfaction of the,
register and receiver of the district within which the land lies, agree-
ably to such rules as may be prescribed by the Secretary of the Interior.
The statute is silent in respect to residence for any prescribed period.
Pre-emptors are required to take notice of the public laws relating to-
pre-emption entries, but n t, I think, of the rules of your office, except
wheu the sanie are brought to their special notice, either by personal
communication or public promulgation. The latter are promulgated
through the local officers, and if they neglect to make known such rules,..
or erroneously advise pre-emptors in respect thereto, and the pre-emptor,.
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acting on such advice, pays his Yboney to the government for the land
in good faith (especially if there is no adverse party), he should not be
held for any failure to comply with the rule, because the fault is with
the officer, and not with the party.
The rule of your offlee requiring six months' residence on a tract of
public land, as an evidence of good faith, prior to entry, is (as held in
the case of Conlin v. Yarwood, 7 C. L. 0., 118) wise and proper as a
general rule, but not to be applied indiscriminately, nor when the good
faith otherwise sufficiently appears.
In their supplementary affidavits Blair, Roach, and Austin severally
swear that they were advised by the local officers, at the date of the
entries, that their proofs were sufficient, and the officers corroborate the
same, stating that at that time there were no instructions in their office
relative to the required time of residence by a pre-emptor prior to entry,
and that they had followed the practice of their predecessors in this
respect, who had held such proof immaterial.
After entry, the pre-emptors had the right to convey such title as
they had (Myers v. Croft, 13 Wall., 291). That the sales indicated bad
faith, and that their entries were for speculative purposes, is inferential
only from the above stated facts; and this, in myjudgment, is controlled
by the affidavits of the parties and their grantee, that the sales were
made in good faith, for a valuable consideration, and under the suppo-
sition that such sales were permitted under the law.
While the proofs as to settlement, improvement, and residence are
not wholly satisfactory to this Department, yet, as they were to the local
officers, and as the parties have paid to the government its price for the
land, and since their appeal, upon the reqirement of the Department,
have filed (as have also the said Massman and the said Haucke) affi-
davits to the effect that, prior to their respective entries, no contract or
agreement, expressed or implied; was made by either of the parties for
the sale or transfer of said land, the evidence of want of good faith
is not sufficient, in my opinion, to warrant a cancellation of the entries
in the absence of an adverse claim.
Your decision is reversed.
PRE-EMPTION-STA TE SELECTION-AD VERSE BIGHT.
GARLICK V. STATE OF CALIFORNIA.
There is no law which grants to or authorizes the selection by any State or Territory
of lands to which a valid adverse right had attached, and the approval and certifi-
cate of a selection so made is therefore null and void.
Commissioner UcFarland to register and receiver, San Francisco, Cali-
fornia, Deeember 15, 1881.
The attention of this office has been called to a discrepancy between
the decision of my predecessor of January 21, 1881, in the case of E.
L. Garlick v. State of California., as set forth in his letter C of that date,
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and my decision of the 12th September last (letter G), in the case of
William Hysell v. The University of said State.
In the former case Edward Garlick filed D. S. No. 12630, November
28, 1876, for the SW. I Sec. 14, T. 12 N., R. 16 W. M1. D. M., alleging
settlement November 23, 1876; and the 19th of May, 1879, before his
said filing had expired (under instructions containea in letter G from
this office of May 14, 1878), he transmuted same to homestead entry
No. 3623.
It appears that through some inadvertence the D. S. of Garlick was
not entered upon the record here until August 30, 1879.
The State of California selected the above described tract January
27,1873, per register and receiver No. 2984, under the indemnity school-
land grant, in lieu of part of the N. I of Sec. 16, T. 10 N., R. 24 W. S. B.
M. This selection, however, was illegal and void ab initio, the land for
which it was taken having been granted in place, and the same was
canceled by this office July 22, 1879.
On the 29th of November, 1876, the State reselected the N. W of SW.
4 and SE. i of SW. 4- of said section, per applications No. 3501 and
3502, in lieu of lands lost in Sec. 36, T. 16 N., R. 4 W., and the same sec-
tion in T. 29 S., R. 12 E. Al. D. M., and there being no adverse claini of
record at that time, the selections were approved and certified to the
State March 13 and October 3, 1877, in lists Nos. 42 and 44.
It having subsequently been ascertained that Garlick had filed de-
claratory statement for the land, alleging settlement prior to any legal
selection of the same by the State, register and receiver were instructed
by letter G from this office of May 14, 1878, to allow him to enter the
land upon furnishing proof, and with due notice to the State authority;
and in accordance with said instructions notice for a hearing was is-
sued, service of which was acknowledged by the State agent, and no
appearance having been made by the latter, Garlick's proof was ac.
cepted and his entry allowed.
A subsequent examination of the homestead entry having disclosed
the fact that it was in conflict with the State selections referred to, this
office on the 22d of September, 1879, requested the governor of the State
to relinquish; and upon his declining to do so for want of authority,
the homestead entry of Garlick, notwithstanding the same had been
made under instructions from this office, was held for cancellation.
In my decision in the case of Hysell v. The University of California
it was held that the right of the plaintiff having attached prior to the
date of the State selection, the same should be maintained notwithstand-
ingt the fact that the selection had been app roved and certified to the
State; that the wording of the certificate of approval, " The foregoing
list is hereby approved sulbject to any valid interfering rights which
may have existed at the date of selection," was intended to cover just
such cases and protect the rights of settlers whose claims, through in-
advertence or other causes, did not appear of record, or were unknown
at the time of the approval; and that the approval of a selection is of
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no effect where a prior adverse claim is shown to have existed.
The act of Congress which authorizes the certification of lands granted
to the several States and Territories by the Commissioner of the Gen-
eral Land Office expressly provides that-
* * * Where lands embraced in such lists are not of the character-
embraced by such acts of Congress and are not intended to be granted
thereby, said lists, so far as these lands are concerned, shall be perfectly
null and void, and no right, title, claim, or interest shall be conveyed,
thereby. (10 Stat., 346.)
There is no law which grants to or authorizes the selection by any
State or Territory of lands to which a valid adverse right had attached,
and the approval and certificate of a selection so made is therefore null
and void under the law.
In view of the fact-that Garliek's right was prior to that of the State;,
that he has resided continuously upon the land since the time of his
settlement, and has valuable improvements thereon; and that his entry
of the land was in conformity with and under authority of instructions,
from this office, the State having made default at the hearing ordered,
after due and legal notice thereof, I think the action of my predecessor-
in holding his said entry for cancellation was erroneous.
The decision of January 21, 1881, referred to, is therefore modified to,
conform with that of September 12 last, and the State selections R. and
R. Nos. 3501 and IQ502 are accordingly held for cancellation, leaving the:
homestead entry of Garlick intact.
You will notify the parties in interest of this decision, and allow the
usual time for appeal.
EQUITABLE RIGHT-CONTESTAZNT-LACIES.
GARDNER V. SNOWDEN.
Whoever relies upon a technicality to defeat an equitable right must himself show-
technical compliance witl' legal requirements.
If a contestant does not publish and prove his own claim within the hirty-three
months allowed by law, he is in no condition to ask cancellation of entry on the
ground of preference under section 2 '65, upon allegation of 7aches on the part of
another.
Acting Secretary Joslyn to Commiysioner McFarland, August 11, 1882.
I have considered the case of James Gardner v. Adam D. Snowdeni
pre-emption claimants for the SE. I of NE. i and NE. I of SE. -, Sec.
15, and W. j of SW. 1, Sec. 14, T. 23 S., B. 43 Wy., Pueblo district, Col-
orado, on appeal by the former from your decision of November 5, 1881..
It appears that Snowden's settlement on the land 4ontinued for sev-
eral years, commencing about 1873, without any filing of a declaratory
statement, by the occupation of a small house or cabin as bridge tender-
or watchman of the Atchison, Topeka and Santa F6 Railroad Company,,
within the 100 feet right bf way, and some little cultivation and raising-
of vegetables was done by him within such right of way.
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He afterward enlarged the house, which he had at first obtained by
gift from the railroad company, by placing in connection therewith
another which he had purchased, and has continuously resided with his
family as an inhabitant therein.
He filed February 15, 1879, alleging settlement May 27, 1878. On
the 7th of May, 1879, he changed his filing to homestead entry No.
1317, and offered final proof, after due publication, January 22, 1881.
Gardner filed February 15, 1879, alleging settlement on the 12th of
the same month, and contests the good faith and priority of Snowden
on several grounds.
* The register and receiver decided in Gardner's favor, but you reversed
their decision and awarded the land to Snowden.
Upon one ground alone I think your decision was erroneous.
Section 2265, Rev. Stats., requires every claimant to make known his
claim in writing within three months from the time of the settlement;
"otherwise his claim shall be forfeited and the tract awarded to the
next settler in the order of time on the same tract of land who has given
such notice and otherwise complied with the conditions of the law."
Under these provisions Snowden has manifestly failed to put his claim
of record prior to the settlement and filing of Gardner, and if the latter
has complied with the law, he must prevail. But whoever relies upon
a technicality to defeat an equitable and otherwise legal right must
himself show technical compliance with legal requirements.
The thirty-three months within which Gardner, under section 2267,
was required to offer final proof and payment expired on the 12th of
November last; and if he did not prior to such expiration publish and
prove his own claim as required by law, he is not in condition to ask
for the cancellation of Snowden's entry on the ground of preference
under section 2265.
Your decision is accordingly modified as above, and you will take
action in csonance with such modification.
/ PUBLIC LAND-FOBTERFIELDSCRIIP-TOJTSSITE.
~1J1 LEWIS ET AL. V. TOWN OF SEATTLE ET AL.
Land within the incorporated limits of a town, which it is not entitled to enter by
reason of its population, and which is not actually settled upon, inhabited, im-
proved, and used for business and municipal purposes, is subject to pre-emption
claim by virtue of section 1, act of March 3, 1877.
Porterfield scrip may be located upon offered or unoffered land, and upon land within
the limits of an incorporate town; is locatable upon any surveyed land of the
United States not mineral and not legally appropriated. No mere defacto appro-
priation can defeat or preclude a location by said scrip.
Secretary Kirkwood to Commissioner M1cFarland, October 26, 1881.
I have considered the case of Lewis and Hill v. The town site of
Seattle, Olympia district, Washington Territory, on appeal from your
decision of April 6, 1881.
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It appears from the record that the tracts enumerated in your decision
of April 8, 1880, in this case, were formerly covered by the donation
claim of one Catherine P. Maynard, which was rejected by decision of
Secretary Delano under date of March 1, 1873. After the rejection of
said claim the public surveys were extended over the land, and a plat
of survey filed in the local office March 18, 1874.
In 1869 the said tracts were included by act of the Territorial legisla-
ture in the incorporation of the town of Seattle, and again by a new
act of incorporation of November 12, 1875.
Certain pre-emptors, some of whose claims were initiated in the year
1869, having filed for the land in question, and applications to locate
Valentine scrip on a portion thereof having been made, the contest of
the Town site of Seattle v. Thomas B. Valentine et al. arose, and the
case was finally decided by Mr. Secretary Schurz, March 19, 1379 (6 C.
L. O., 136), infra.
On May 8, 1879, one Charles M. Bywater applied to file his D. S. for
lots 7, 8, 11, and 12 in section 4, T. 24 N., R. 4 E., in the district afore-
said, alleging settlement October 7, 1877, but the register and receiver
rejected his application because the said lots were within the corporate
limits of the said town of Seattle. This action was affirmed by your
office July 10, 1879, and Bywater appealed to this Department.
On December 9 ensuing, my said predecessor directed that proceed-
ings be instituted under the third section of the act of March 3, 1877
(18 Stat., 392), and that the application be considered in view of the fact,
as developed by such procedure, inasmuch as the allowance of the same
might depend upon the corporate limits of the city as finally deter-
mined.
On March 24, 1880, the day fixed by the register and receiver upon
which the city should elect what portion of said lands it would retain,
Bywater appeared and submitted testimony showing that the land
which the city elected to retain, to wit, all and only that portion of the
land within the corporate limits embraced within sections 5 and 6, and
the W. of Sec. 4, T. 24 N., R. 4 E., and Sections 31 and 32, and the W.
J of See. 33, T. 25 N., R. 4 E., was in the same condition respecting its
occupancy and use for municipal purposes, as shown by the evidence
taken at the former trial, upon which the departmental decision of March
19, 1879, aforesaid, was based. It seems that by a written stipulation
between said city and Bywater the testimony was closed. The former
was thereby estopped from making any further showing, and has failed
to show itself entitled to any of the land it claimed.
Thus it appears that Seattle never was entitled to claim any land (in
sections 4, 5, or 6, in said township) by virtue of the town-site laws,
inasmuch as the site thereof was wholly located on private land, and is
not, therefore, such a town as was contemplated by the said laws. From
this state of facts it would appear that no further procedure under the
said third section was necessary so far as Bywater's right to claim said
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lots by virtue of the first section of said act is concerned. By the de-
cision last cited the town-site claim, the pre-emptors' claim, and the Val-
entine scrip location were rejected, thus leaving the status of the land
in question as that of public land within the limits of an incorporated
town, to which there was no legal claim. So that when Bywater, on
May 8, 1879, applied to the local office to file his D. S. for the lots afore-
said, claiming the same under section 2259, Rev. Stat., and the act of
March 3, 1877, as well, his application should have been allowed by the
register and receiver, as the same was permissible, no adverse claim
having intervened in the interim of March 19,1879, and May 8 ensuing.
Although Bywater applied to file at a time when the records were ex-
punged of all adverse claims, it should be observed that at the date of
his filing the incorporated city of Seattle, as such, was still-extant, and
embraced within its corporate limits the lots in question, so that it was
necessary for him to invoke the remedial agency of the said act in order
to acquire title to these lots.
Inasmuch, therefore, as Bywater did so invoke the remedy provided
by said act, and as these lots were afterwards ascertained never to
have been " actually settled upon, inhabited, improved, and used for
business and municipal purposes," his claim was valid, and should be
allowed upon the usual conditions.
It is urged by counsel that Mr. Secretary Schurz, in his decision of
March 19, 1879, expressly held the pre-emption cash entry of Charles
0. Rich, covering the identical lots in question, for cancellation, because
they were within the corporate limits of the city of Seattle. It should
be observed in this connection that Rich's entry was rejected for the
further reason that he was not a qualified pre-emptor, and that he filed
his D. S. July 2, 1874, long prior to the passage of said remedial statute,
so that neither his nor any of the other pre-emptors' claims could derive
validity therefrom. My said predecessor also held that " the applica-
tion of the city of Seattle to enter the lands in question was properly
rejected. . . . . The evidence in this case shows that at the date of
this application there were not to exceed six persons residing upon the
lands applied for, and there was no error in your decision rejecting the
same." Counsel also cite the cases of Root v. Shields (1 Woolworth,
340), and city of Grantsville v. McBride (6 C. L. O., 110) as govern-
ing this case. The decision in the former of the cases cited was ren-
dered at the November term, 1868, of the United States circuit court for
the district of Nebraska, by Mr. Justice Miller, upwards of nine years
anterior to the date of the passage of the said act of 1S77.
While the general principle therein enunciated might be so contorted
as to apply to the case under consideration, it cannot be seriously main-
tained that it should be regarded as a precedent governing this case,
the said act to the contrary notwithstanding.
As regards the case of McBride, it should be observed that prior to
the year 1877 the provisions of the town-site act (March 2, 1867, 14
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Stat., 541), by an exceedingly elastic method of construction, especially
in the Territory of Utah, had been made to work wonders when the
patent showing of the corporated limits of innumerable town sites was
accepted as the criterion of actual bona fide municipal improvements
used for purposes of business. The abuses growing out of this system
had become so egregious in said Territory that it had been truly said to
be impossible for one man to step from one town site without being
within the limits of another. Such a hue and cry was raised in conse-
quence of these abuses that Congress came to the relief of the pioneers
and would-be settlers upon the public domain by enacting this law of
March 3, 1877. By this act the quantity of land that could be embraced
within corporate limits was limited to the maximum area (i. e., 2,560
acres), or one in excess of that specified if actually occupied " and used
for business and municipal purposes."
Although it thus appears that under certain prescribed conditions an
area in excessof the maximummay be embraced within a town-site entry,
it should be observed that it is held in the decision of March 19, 1879,
aforesaid, in literal accordance with the express terms of the statute,
section 2389, Rev. Stats., that the right of a town to make an entry
must be computed upon the basis of the number of occupants of the
public lands; and that in case some of the inhabitants of such town
reside upon private lands, they cannot be considered as occupants of
the public lands for the purpose of supplying the number of inhabit-
ants necessary to authorize an entry of the same.
It farther appears from the record that on January 8, 1880, J. Vance
Lewis and W. C. Hill made application to locate Porterfield scrip (per
warrants numbered 79, 101, 103, 105, 110, 118, and 127) on certain lots
in Secs. 4 and 5, T. 24 N., R. 4 E., in the district aforesaid, and within
the incorporated limits of the city of Seattle. But the register and re-
ceiver on the same day rejected the application, for the reason that " the
land applied for, herein described, being within the limits of the city of
Seattle as incorporated by the Territorial legislature November 12,
1875, and thus appropriated, the location of Porterfield scrip No. 118
must be refused." On February 6, 1880, said applicants appealed from
the action of the register and receiver.
In order to determine the question at issue, to wit, what land is sub-ject to Porterfield scrip location, and what is the meaning of the term
" appropriated,' as used in he statute, I will cite a portion of the act
of April 11,1860 (12 Stat., 836), under and by virtue of which these scrip
claimants prefer their claims. This act provides that Porterfield war-
rants may be " located on any of the public lands which have been or
may be surveyed, and which have not been otherwise appropriated at
the time of such location, within any of the States where the minimum
price for the same shall not exceed the sum of $1.25 per acre," etc. The
United states supreme court has given us an exact definition of this
term, as it is invariably used in public land legislation, in the case of
Wilcox . Jackson (13 Peters, 498): "Now, this is appropriation, for
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that is nothing more nor less than setting apart the thing for some par-
ticular use." In subsequent adjudication, involving the construction
of statutes wherein this term occurs, the foregoing definition has inva-
riably been accepted as the proper one.
I will endeavor to show that the land in question, excepting that cov-
ered by Bywater's claim, was not "otherwise appropriated at the time
of such location," or attempted location, of said Porterfield warrants, as
contemplated by the statute in question.
The status of these lands was the same on January 8, 1880, as it was
hereinbefore shown to have been at the date of Bywater's application to
file for a portion of said lands, i. e., public land within the limits of an
incorporated town to which there was no legal claim.
Now, with reference to what land may be located with Porterfield
warrants, I find departmental decision dated March 22, 1864, in the case
of Byron Reed, wherein it was strenuously urged in argument that said
warrants could be located only upon land subject to private entry, but
it is therein held that they could be located upon unoffered lands, and
'that Reed's location of said scrip within the incorporated limits of the
town of Omaha was valid (Hill's Leading Cases, vol. 1, No. 3, p. 74).
In the case of Bovard v. Bunn it was also held that a mere de facto
appropriation does not run against the government nor preclude the
location of said scrip, notwithstanding the equities of an adverse claim-
ant. In other words, that this scrip may be located upon any of the
public lands, offered or unoffered, not otherwise legally appropriated
at the time of such location.
I therefore concur in your opinion that the said scrip may be located
upon offered or unoffered land, upon land within the limits of an incor-
porated town, and that no mere de facto appropriation can defeat or
preclude the location of the same. Hence, I am of the opinion that the
scrip in question may be properly located upon lots numbered 9, 10, 13,
and 14 of section 4, and lots numbered 6, 7, 8, and 9 of Sec. 5, T. 24 N.,
R. 4 E., in the district aforesaid.
I further concur with your holding in the matter of the applications
of Hugh McAleer and Edgar A. Hansee.
Your decision is accordingly affirmed.
TOWN LOTS-NOTICE TO AD VERSE CLAIMANTS.
INSTRUCTIONS.
Claimants of town lots are not required to give notice of their intention to make entry
by publication, under act of March 3, 1879.
The notice to adverse claimants may be by personal service or through the mails.
Declaratory statements are not required to be filed within three months after settle-
ment.
Commissioner ]YcFarland to register and receiver, Boise City, Idaho, July
14, 1882.
In reply to the inquiries in the register's letter of the 30th ultimo, I
have to state (1) that persons claiming lots in a town, and upon which
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they have filed declaratory statements, with a view of purchasing the
same as a pre-emption, under section 2383, Rev. Stats., are not required
to give notice by publication of their intention to make entries, town
lots not being regarded as agricultural lands within the meaning of the
act of March 3, 1879.
Notice to adverse claimants of an intention to prove up and enter a
town lot may be made by personal service or through the mails; (2)
the law which requires pre-emption claimants to file their declaratory
statements in three months from date of settlement or the date of the
filing of the township plat does not apply in town-lot cases under sec-
tion 2382, Rev. Stats.
BESIDE\ CE-BESTRICTION-Q UA LIEICA I OFV-COXTESTS.
TOWN SITE OF KETCHUM.
The " actual settler " upon a town lot must be an actual resident.
The right of pre-emption granted by section 2382, Rev. Stats., is restricted to the lot
settled upon and one additional lot upon which the settler may have substantial
improvements.
Settlers are required to have the personal qualifications of pre-emptors and to file
their declaratory statements.
Contests between claimants for town lots will be governed by the rules of practice,
as in other cases.
Commissioner McFarland to register and receiver Boise City, Idaho,
August 14, 1882.
I am in receipt of registered letter of 25th ultimo, transmitting a let-
ter of William Hyndman of the 22d ultimo, which presents certain ques-
tions and suggestions relative to the disposal of lots in the town site of
Ketchum.
It appears from this letter that some doubt and misapprehension
exists as to the rights of settlers upon town lots, and the method of ad-
justing conflicting claims. This town site is one founded in pursuance
of the act of July 1, 1864 (13 Stats., 343), embodied in section 2382, et
seq., Rev. Stats.
In reply to the questions presented by Mr. Hyndman, I have to state:
1st. The plat filed in this office corresponds with that in your office as to
the numberings of the lots. The numberings in the blocks north of
Main street, commencing at the southeast corner, run west to No. 4, and
are continued from the northeast corner of the block, as shown in Mr.
Hyndman's diagram. South of Main street the numberings commence
at the northwest corner, running east. If the plat filed in the record-
er's office shows a variation from this method in the numberings of the
lots, it should and may easily be made to correspond with the plats filed
in your and this office.
2d. The "actual settler" upon any one lot must be an actual resident,
as stated in my instructions to you of November 11, 1881. (See also
2d Lester, p. 310, and Mr. Commissioner Wilson's report for 1866.)
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It is true that in his opinion of November 7, 1877, in the case of All-
man v. Thulon (1 C. L. L., 690), Mr. Assistant Attorney-General Smith
held that under this act actual residence upon the lot settled upon was
not required; but the Secretary (Mr. Delano), while expressing neither
dissent from nor concurrence in this opinion, declined to reverse the
cision of this office, which rejected the claim of Allman upon two
grounds, one of which was that he was not an actual resident of the lot
claimed. I am unable to discover that, in the adjudication of cases
under this act, the former construction requiring claimants to be actual
residents of the lots has ever been varied, and I do not feel justified in
now departing from the established rule.
3d. It is well settled that the right of pre-emption granted by section
2382 is restricted to the lot settled and resided upon and one additional
lot upon which the settler may have substantial iprovenients. (See
2 Lester, p. 310, before cited.)
4th. Settlers are required to file theirdeclaratory statements, and must
have the personal qualifications prescribed by the pre-emption act of
1841. This is so stated in my instructions of November 11, 1881.
5th. When contests arise between claimants for the same lots, such
contests will be governed in all respects by the rules of practice ap-
proved December 20, 1880, i like manner as other contested cases.
You will advise Mr. Hyndman of the contents of this letter.
TO WNSITE-ENTRY-PROOF-PAYMENT; MIXERAL LANVD.
TowN OF BELLEVUE.
Proceedings where the town is situated on unsurveyed land.
Commissioner McFarland to register and receiver, Boise City, Idaho, March
18, 1882.
In the receiver's letter of the 24th ultimo, referring to the application
made to you for an entry of the town site of Bellevue, he asks the follow-
ing questions:
1. After the survey has been made as required, is the pre-emption fil-
ing to be made in the name of the county judge or the trustees of the
towne
Section 2387, Rev. Stats., is explicit as to what officer shall represent
the town; if the town is incorporated, the "corporate authorities;" if
unincorporated, the judge of the county court for the county in which
such town is situated.
It is not necessary that a declaratory statement be filed at all, except
to save the rights of the town in the event of a public sale, as indicated
in section 2388, Rev. Stats. It is, however, proper to make such filing
at any time, and it should be made, if at all, by the officer authorized by
section 2387 to represent the town.
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2. Must proof be made, as in cases of pre-emption; and must notice be
given by advertisement in a newspaper; and can proof and payment
be made any time after filing?
The proof required in support of an application to enter a town site is
that showing (1) municipal occupation of the tracts claimed, (2) the num-
ber of inhabitants, (3) the extent and value of the town improvements,.
(4) the date when the land was selected and occupied as a town site, and(5) a certificate from the proper officer showing the official character of
the mayor, trustee, or judge making the entry. Whenever a town is
qualified to make a filing, it is qualified to make an entry, and, as afore-
said, an entry can be made without a filing.
A notice of intention to make entry, provided for in the act of March
3, 1879 (20 Stats., 472), is not required in ordinary town-site entries; but
where the land has been returned as mineral, or where affidavits have
been filed in your office alleging that the land is mineral in its characters
you will proceed in accordance with the instructions in circulars of Sep-
tember 23, 1880, and October 31, 1881, copies inclosed.
S WAJIP LAND-SELECTIONVS-INDEXMITY LOCATION.
STATE OF ILLINOIS.
Indemnity locations must be limited to the State in which the original selections
were situated, and to lands liable to be taken under the act of March 2, 1855, and
where no public lands are found in the State, the indemnity fails.
This question, by former decisions cited, held res j udicata.
Secretary Kirkwood to Commissioner McFarland, October 19, 1881.
I have considered the appeal of the State of Illinois from your decision
of September 6, 1880, rejecting her claim under the act of March 2, 1855Y(10 Stats., 634), to indemnity in lien of 12,346.51 acres of certain swamp
lands situate in Champaign County in said State, disposed of by the
IUnited States in the interim of the passage of the swamp grant of Sep-
tember 28, 1850 (9 Stats., 519), and the indemnity grant of March 3,
1857 (10 Stats., 251).
* It appears from the records that the proof in support of the State
claim to indemnity for said lands, located with military bounty-land
:warrants or scrip, was duly examined by your office, and a list of such
as were ascertained to be swamp and overflowed submitted to the De-
partment in the year 1863, with certificate, of which the following is a
copy:
GENERAL LAND OFFICE, August 26, 1863.
1 hereby certify that the above-described tracts, situated in Cham-
paign County, Illinois, were duly selected and claimed by said State as
swamp lands, but have been disposed of by the United States at thedates stated, and the said State would be entitled to an equal quantity
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as indemnity in other public lands within the limits of said State of
Illinois, if such lands could be found there liable to be taken under said
act of 2d March, 1855. J. M. EDMUNDS,
Commissioner.
The area of the tracts described in said list is given as 12,346.51 acres,
and the finding of Commissioner Edmunds was approved by my pred-
ecessor, Mr. Acting Secretary Otto, August 31, 1863.
In January, 1866, the agent of said State for the county aforesaid
called attention to the claim in question, and on the 5th of the follow-
ing month he was advised that such indemnity "must be limited to the
State in which the original selections were situated, and as there are
no public lands in Illinois with which to satisfy such awards, if made,
this office declines to take such cases as the one in question into con-
sideration."
It will be observed that the form of the certificates in such cases was
approved by the Secretary of the Interior, September 6, 1855, with full
knowledge of this restriction, and the action of your office in declining
to issue certificates without such restrictive clause has been uniformly
sustained by the Department, as will more particularly appear from the
following recital of precedents:
The first application for such indemnity appears to have been made
by the State of Indiana. In this case your predecessor, Mr. Commis-
sioner Hendricks, held "that selections for such indemnity must be
made out of any of the unsold public lands in said States;" and this
construction of the act was approved by the Department on the 6th of
September, 1855.
March 31, 1858, on appeal from the decision of your office by the agent
of the State of Illinois for Henry County, the action of your predecessor
in holding that such selections must be confined to said State was
affirmed by Mr. Secretary Thompson.
On May 8, 1861, Mr. Secretary Smith adhered to the policy adopted
by the Departmeut in the first instance. On January 26, 1863, the same
question was again presented to Mr. Secretary Usher, upon the appli-
cation of the agent of said State for Vermillion County for a reconsid-
eration of the matter in question, in which case Mr. Acting Secretary
Otto adhered to the rulings of his predecessors.
On February 8, 1868, Mr. Secretary Browning, the same question
having been submitted to him in the matter of the application of Liv-
ingston County, said State, held it to be stare decisis, and affirmed the
decision of your office.
February 2, 1874, Mr. Secretary Delano, after reviewing at length the
decisions aforesaid, held the question to be yes judicata, and that it
"must so remain until Congress orders otherwise."
Thus it appears to have been the immemorial policy of this Depart-
ment to confine indemnity selections in such cases to the limits of the
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respective States entitled thereto; and this policy is based upon a con-
struction of the act of 1855 aforesaid, as in pari materia with the said
swamp act of 1850, which expressly restricted the original grant to lands
within the limits of the respective States to which the grant inured.
The act of 1855 aforesaid (under and by virtue of which the claim in
question was preferred) is re-enacted in part by section 2482, Rev. Stat.,
which provides as follows:
Upon proof by the authorized agent of the State, before the Com-
missioner of the General Land Office, that any of the lands purchased
by any person from the United States prior to March 2, 1855, were
"swamp lands" within the true intent and meaning of the act entitled
"An act to enable the State of Arkansas and other States to reclaim the
swamp lands within their limits," approved September 28, 1850, the.
purchase money shall be paid over to the State wherein said land is
situated; and when the lands have been located by warrants or scrip,
the said State shall be authorized to locate a like quantity of any of
the public lands subject to entry, at $1.25 per acre or less, and patent
shall issue therefor.
The decision of the Commissioner of the General Land Office shall be
first approved by the Secretary of the Interior.
While only the latter clause of the first sentence and the whole of
the second sentence of said section are applicable to the question at
issue, I quote the same in its entirety, as showing the context in the
light of which the clause in question must be construed, and not ab-
stractly as an isolated statute.
Counsel for the State cite a number of authorities on the subject of
construction of statutes, the applicability or relevancy of which to this
case I fail to appreciate.
Said section, "in defining the right of indemnity selections, fixes its'
basis by specific reference to the act of 1850, and not to the enactment
by way of revision, thus clearly indicating an intent to bound the new
declaration of the grant by the limitations of the original statute, and
not to modify or enlarge the provisions. If other terms were employed,
indicating an intention to bring within its purview other objects of legis-
lation, or to correct any obvious misapplication of the legislative intent
depending upon former construction, effect must be given to the new
statute in the very words of its enactment; but if no new matter be
inserted . . . . . the old statute is still existing law, because
by its re-enactment it has neither been modified, enlarged, nor dimin-
ished"-my predecessor's decision of June 28, 1880 (7 C. L. O., 70).
It is further urged by the State's counsel that the questions at issue
were never before any of my predecessors " respecting the particular
lands in this case, and said decisions are binding in the case only in so
far as the conclusions upon which they are based are sound as matters
of legal construction; " in other words, that the questions involved in
the case under consideration are stare deeisis, and not res judicata.
Counsel's statement is not borne out by the record, and their position
is therefore untenable. The foregoing copy of your predecessor's cer-
tificate, dated August 26, 1863, shows the patent fact that the identical
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tracts in question, to wit, the said 12,346.51 acres, situate in Champaign
County, State of Illinois, having been duly selected and claimed by said
State, and ascertained to be " swamp and overflowed," the same were
thereby listed as such, and submitted to the Department for approval
in the year 1863; and that the finding of your predecessor, Mr. Com-
missioner Edmunds, as aforesaid, was approved by Mr. Acting Secre-
tary Otto, August 31, 1863, in literal compliance with the terms of said
section. Thus it appears that this scrip indemnity question is in all
respects res judicata, inasmuch as it has the prerequisite elements of
this well-established doctrine, to wit, identity in the thing sued for, of
the cause of action, of parties to the action, and identity of the quality
of the parties for or against whom the claim is made.
But for the purposes of argument I will grant the truth of so much of
counsel's tentative proposition as that the questions at issue were never
before any of my predecessors respecting the particular lands involved
in this case. As far as the consideration and determination of the
questions in the premises are concerned, the Department does not know
the respective counties as such, but only the State of Illinois, as con-
templated by the statute in question. Inasmuch, therefore, as theiden-
tical questions of law have been determined by my predecessors upon
exactly the same state of facts in the matter of the claims of other
counties of said State, predicated upon the same provisions of said
statute, I would be disposed, even in this view of the case (were it the
true one), to regard this indemnity question as res judicata, because In
matters involving a State's right to make selections under the provis-
ion of the act of 1855, it is obvious that in the nature of things each
parcel must be treated individually with reference to the claim pre-
sented. But while this is so, the fact of a designation by classes often
appears; so that when found to be in a particular class, such finding
in and of itself may bring certain specific tracts within a binding decis-
ion governing the class. This is especially true in the case under con-
sideration, wherein a claim is preferred by a State under the provisions
of a statute which has time and again been construed in the light of
and in harmony with another statute, which expressly restricted the
original grant to lands situate within the respective States to which
the grant inured.
If, by the decisions cited above, the State deems important interests
have been prejudiced, she has her remedy in a test case before the
courts to determine the validity of the scrip locations upon any of the
public lands claimed by her within the described limits.
She has enjoyed full opportunity since 1858 (when the adverse decis-
ion was rendered) to seek proper indemnification through Congressional
action. This Department cannot be expected to vacate decisions of
long-established authority, after such lapse of time and the repeated
refusals of successive administrations to reopen them or disturb them.
Moreover, 4the principle that the final decision of a matter before
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the bead of a Department is binding upon his Successor in the same
Department, under certain well-defined exceptions, has been so fre-
quently declared that it is now entitled to be regarded as a settled rule
of administrative law." (13 Opinions of Attorneys-General, 456, and
cases cited.) See also 15 ibid, 315, and heirs of Murray McConnell
(2 C. L. O., 83.)
It would give the foregoing doctrine an exceedingly limited construe-
tion to hold that it affected only an individual tract of land, when pre-
cisely the same question had been presented in reference to other tracts
of land. The opinion of the Attorney-General of February 21; 1881,
adopted by this Department (8 C. L. O., 59).
If, therefore, a decision previously rendered is binding upon other
tracts of land, even if they have not been specifically named, but which
come within the particular class to which the decision relates, afortiori
is such a decision binding upon the identical tracts, as in the case under
consideration.
I therefore decline to reconsider my predecessor's decisions, and ac-
cordingly affirm your decision.
SWAMP LNXD-SELECTIONS PRIOR TO ACT OF MARCH 3,1857.
STATE OF LOUISIANA.
Lands selected and reported to the General Land Office as swamp, prior to March 3,
1857, if otherwise unappropriated, were confirmed to the State by act of that date,
even though the plat of survey showed them to be the bed of a lake.
Secretary Schurz to Commissioner Williamson, January 15, 1879.
I am in receipt of your report of the 8th instant, relative to Sees. 
7, 18, 19, and 30, T. 30 N., R. 14 W., Louisiana, claimed by the State as
swamp land.
From your report it appears that sections 6, 7, iS, and 19 were se-
lected and approved as swamp lands by the United States surveyor-
general for the State of Louisiana, May 18, 1852, and transmitted to
your office on that day. These four sections were, therefore, of the
character of lands mentioned in the act of Congress approved March
3, 1857, as a "selection of swamp and overflowed lands granted to
the several States by act of Congress, approved September 28, 1850,
. . and the act of 2d March, 1849 . . . . . heretofore
made and reported to the Commissioner of the General Land Office,'>
and were confirmed to the State of Louisana by said act.
You report that on the map of the township, approved February 17,
1840, the lands in question are designated as Soda Lake. This might
raise the presumption that said sections were not swamp lands at the
date of the granting acts in 849 and 1850. On the contrary, we have
the certificates of the surveyor-general that in 1852 the lands were
swamp and that they inured to the grant.
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In accordance with the subsequent survey of January 25, 1872, the
surveyor-general reported the sections in question, together with section
30, as swamp land.
In the recent case of Martin v. Marks, the supreme court held that
when the land had been selected and reported as swamp to the Commis-
sion er of the General Land Office by the surveyor-general, prior to
March 3, 1857, and remained vacant and unappropriated at that date,
it was confirmed to the State. The tract in controversy before the court
was a portion of section 7, now under consideration.
It must be held, I think, from the action of the surveyor-general in
1852, and the presumption which arises from that act, viz:, that the land
in question was swamp at that date, that the same was confirmed to the
State by the act of March 3, 1857.
In the year 1872 your office rejected the claim of the State to the lands
in question, basing its action upon the fact that the plats of survey ap-
proved in 1840 and 1872, represented the lands in question to have been
the bed of a lake at the date of the swamp grant, hence that the same
did not inure to the grant as swamp land.
Without discussing the question of the effect of the action of the sur-
veyor-general in 1852, together with the confirmatory act of 1857, and
the recent decisions of the supreme court above cited, in case the fact
had been as assumed by your predecessor, I am of the opinion that the
evidence before your office did not justify the action taken.
There was no stficient evidence that the land was not swamp in 1849
and 1850.
If the lands in sections 6, 7, 18, and 19 were vacant and undisposed
of March 3, 1857, I am of the opinion that the same were confirmed to
the State, and that entries made subsequent to that date must be can-
celed.
As the land in section 30 was not reported to your office prior to March
3, 1857, the same was not confirmed, and the rules applicable to the just-
ment of the swamp grant should be applied thereto.




Where one grant of lands has been flly executed, no action should be had looking to
the certifying or patenting of the same lands to the same grantee under another
grant.
Therefore lands selected by the State as swamp prior to June 3, 1856, were excluded
from the operations of the grant of that date to the State for railroad purposes.
Commissioner lloarland to register and receiver, Yew Orleans, La.
February 14, 1883.
I am in receipt of an argument filed by Messrs. Pomeroy and Inger-
soll, of this city, on the 23d of March last, relative to the status of cer-
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tain lands described in the accompanying list, hereinafter described,
said to be within the limits of a grant of lands to the State of Louisiana,
dated June 3, 1856, to aid in the construction of certain railroads, and
also selected by the State as swamp lands under act of March 2, 1849.
It is claimed by said attorneys that the lands in question having been
selected as swamp prior to June 3, 1856, there was such a reservation
of the tracts as would, under the proviso of the first section of act of
that date, exclude them from the grant for railroad purposes, and
therefore they were confirmed to the State as swamp by act of March 3,
1857.
The following-described tracts within the limits of the constructed
portion of the N. O., 0. & G. W. R. Ri. east of Brashears, were selected
by the State as swamp land; but on the 29th of January, 1861, they
were approved to the State for railroad purposes under act of June 3,
1856, viz:
All of Sec. 153, T. 15 S., R. 16 E.
Lotsl&3,See. 73, T. 17 S., R. 16 E.
All of Sec. 37, T. 13 S., R. 18 E.
Lots 2, 3,
4,W. of S.
E. I and S.
W. ; of N.
W.j, See. 59, T. 15 S.,R.18E.
All of Sec. 73, T. 15 S., R. 18 E.
All of Scc. 71, T. 13 S., R. 20 E.
All of Sec. 75, T. 13 5., R. 20 E.
All of Sec. 21, T. 13 S., R. 20 E.
All of Sec. 25, T. 13 S., R. 30 E.
All of See. 103, T. 13 S., R. 20 E.
All of Sec. 105, T. 13 S., R. 20 E.
All of See. 107, T. 13 S., Ri. 20 E.
All of Sec. 109, T. 13 5., R. 20 E.
AU of Sec. 111, T. 13 S., R. 20 E.
All of Sec. 113, T. 13 S., R. 20 E.
All of Sec. 115, T. 13 S., R. 20 E.
All of Sec. 117, T. 13 S., R. 20 E.
All of Sec. 59, T. 13 S., R. 21 E.
All of Sec. 51, T. 14 S., R. 24 E.
All of Sec. 97, T. 14 S., R. 24 HE
It has been repeatedly decided by the Department that where one
grant has been fully executed, no action should be had looking to the cer-
tifying or patenting of the same lands to the same grantee under another
grant; therefore this office cannot consider the claim of the State to the
above-described tracts under the swamp grant, as they have already
been certified to under the railroad grant. (See State of Iowa v.
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Cedar Rapids and Missouri River, Dubuque and S. C., and Iowa Falls
and S. C. R. R. companies (3 C. L. O., 84; also same vol., p. 99; State
of Minnesota v. St. Paul and S. C. Railroad Company, and State of Ar-
kansas (4 id., 63).
The status of the following-described tracts selected as swamp prior
to June 3, 1856,'differs from the foregoing in this respect, that under
the provisions of the act of Congress, dated July 14, 1870, U. S. Stats',
vol. 16, p. 277, declaring forfeited the claim of the railroad to certain
lands, they were restored to the public domain, March 15, 1873, and
some of them have been entered with cash or under the homestead act,
viz:
All of Sec. 31, T. 11 S., R. 10E.; all of Sec. 1, T.3S.,R.12W.; all
of Sec. 11, T. 3 S., R. 12 W.; W. NE. See. 13, T. 3 S., R. 12 W.,
entered December 2, 1878. Homestead No. 5076.
W.4 Sec. 13, T. 3 S.,R. 12W. All of Sec. 15, T. 3 S., R. 12 W.;
W. i of SW. 4, Sec. 29, T. 2 S., R. 6 W.; homestead entry No. 974, for
which patent has issued; E. 4 of NE. 4 See. 31, T. 2 S., R. 6 W., en-
tered with cash No. 4802, September 27, 1880.
All of Sec. 23, T. 3 S.,R.12W.; SW.4of SW.4Sec.25,T.3S.,R.
12 W.; all of Sec. 27, T. 3 S., R. 12 W.; all of Sec. 33, T. 3 S., R. 12
We; all of Sec. 35, T. 3 S., R. 12 W.; all of Sec. 3, T. 4 S., R. 12 W.;
allof Sec.5,T. 4 S.,R.12W.; NE.4 ISec.3,T. 10 S.,R.5E. Lots8
and 9, or E. i of NE. 4 Sec. 9, T. 16 S., R. 12 E., entered under the
homestead act, No. 1040. F. C. 78, dated September 29,1874, and NW.
4 Sec. 29, T. 16 S., B. 12 E.
The following-described tracts were selected by the State as swamp
land, subsequent to the act of June 3, 1856, and their being included
in the list as selected prior to that date, and hence confirmed to the
State by act of March 3, 1857, as claimed, was I presume an oversight.
viz: lot 8, See. 37, T. 1 S., R. 2 E.; all of See. 1, T. 3 S., R. 2 E., and
NW. 4 Sec. 3, T. 3 S., R. 2 E.
The W. i SW. i See. 12, T. 3 S., R. 2 E., is a part of an even section,
and was approved to the State as swamp land September 15, 1870.
The following-described tract was approved to the State for railroad
purposes, and has not been selected as swamp, viz: all Sec. 21, T. 10
S., R. 6 E.
Lots 1 and 5, Sec. 33, T. 16 S., R. 2 E., were approved to the State as
swamp land May 5, 1852, and are not claimed by the railroad.
The following-described tracts do not appear to have been selected
as swamp, viz; W. 4 NE. I lots 1 and 2, Sec. 5, T. 17 S., R. 13 W.; SE.
Sec. 7, T. 17 S., R. 13 W.; NW. 41 NW. 4 and SW. 4lots 4 and 5, Sec.
17, T. 17 S., R. 13 W.
All of Sec. 5, T. 15 S., R. 13 W., selected prior to June 3, 1856, except
the S. 4 SE. 41, which has not been claimed as swamp, was approved to
the State as such May 5, 1852.
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The following-described tracts were selected by the State as swamp
land prior to the act of June 3, 1856, and the State's claim to the same
was rejected by this office January 2,1861, and on the 29th same month
they were approved to the State for railroad purposes; but the claim
of the railroad to the same was declared forfeited by act of July 14,
1870.
E. N. of NW. , SE.j of NW. , Sec. 1,T.3 S., R. E.; all of
Sec. 13, T. 3S., R.2E.; SE. of NW. Sec. 15, T.2 S., R.3E., and W.
J Sec.21, T. 2 S., R. 3 E.
The following-described tracts were selected as swamp prior to June
3, 1856, and have been approved to the railroad, but the State claim
under the swamp grant has not been rejected; in other respects their
status is the same as those last above described:
Lots 5, 7, and 8, Sec. 1, T. 17 S., R. 12 W., lots 2, 3, 5, 6, 8, N. of
NW., SE.Iof SW. ', NW. of SE.1, Sec. 15, T. 20 N., R.4E.
The following-described tracts are within the granted limits of the
contested portion of the N. O., 0. and G. W. R. R., act June 3, 1856, but
do not appear to have been selected by said road. They were, however,
selected by the State as swamp lands prior to June 3, 1856, but have
not been certified to it, viz:
All of Sec. 21, T. 14 S., R. 23 E.; all of Sec. 15, T. 10 S., R. 6 E.; Mall
of Sec. 25, T. 14 S., R. 20 E.; all of Sec. 27, T. 14 S., R. 20 E.; all of
Sec. 29, T. 14 S., R. 20 E.; all of Sec. 31, T. 14 S., R. 20 E.; all of Sec.
33, T. 14 S., R. 20 E., and all of Sec. 35,T. 145,SR. 20 E.
The following-described tracts are within the indemnity limits of the
road named, and had been selected by the State as swamp lands prior
to June 3, 1856, but the title is yet in the government, viz:
S. of NW. , NW. of SW. , SW. of SW.J, Sec. 11, T. 3S., R.
2 E.; all of See. 15, T. 14 S., R. 13 E.; lots 1, 2, 3, and 4, Sec. 19, T. 14
S., R. 23 E.
The proviso in the act of June 3, 1856, above referred to is as follows:
And provided further, That any and all lands heretofore reserved to
the United States by any act of Congress, or in any other manner by
competent authority, for the purpose of aiding in any object of internal
improvements, or for any other purposes whatsoever, be, and the same
are hereby, reserved to the United States from the operation of this
act; and in support of the views urged the following rTnited States
supreme court decisions are cited: L. L. and G. R. ER. v U. S. (2 Otto,
733); Newhall v. Sanger (2 Otto, 761); Railroad Co. v. Fremont Co. (9.
Wallace, 89).
The question for decision is, were the tracts selected and reported to
this office by the State as swamp land prior to June 3, 1856, whether
swampy or not in character, excluded from the grant of lands for rail-
road purposes of that date to the State of Louisiana 
The opinion of the Attorney-General, dated November 10, 1858 (1
Lester, 564), involving the question of respective claims under the
swamp and railroad grants, formed the basis of a letter of inquiry ad-
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dressed to the Department by this office, December 2, 1858 (see 1 Les-
ter, 565), as follows:
Were lands within the limits and description of a railroad grant which
were not in fact swamp or overflowed, but were selected and reported as
such prior to final location of the railroad, and said road became located
prior to the act of 3d March, 1857, did that act confirm such selections
as unappropriated lands, and must the lands be patented to the State
under the swamp grant ? or on the other hand, did they become appro-
priated by the railroad grant and the final location of the road, and shall
the investigations proceed upon contests made by the railroad compa-
nies with a view to ascertain the real character of the lands, whether
they be swamp or dry 
These inquiries, which involve the identical questions at issue, were
answered by the Department December 10, 1858, to the effect that the
act of 1857 did not confirm such selections, and the character of the
land was therefore a matter that could be inquired into (1 Lester, 567).
The same views were maintained and instructions issued in accord-
ance therewith by Secretary Thompson July 23, 1859 (1 Lester, 570).
It is argued that this manner of adjusting the grants is not sustained
by the United States supreme court decision cited, but that, on the
other hand, entirely opposite views are set forth.
Under the proviso in the grant of June 3, 1856, above quoted (all rail-
road grants referred to having a similar proviso), restricting the grant,
the supreme court, in case of Railroad Company v. Fremont Company,
supra, held (referring to the lands selected as swamp) " in the language
of the railroad act, the whole of the lands in controversy were ' other-
wise appropriated,' and were ' reserved' for the purpose of aiding the
States in their objects of internal improvements."
In the case of L. L. & G. R. R. Co. v. United States, supra, the ques-
tion being the construction placed upon the proviso restricting the
grant to the railroad company, the court held that " these grants have
always been recognized as attaching only to so much of the public do-
main as was subject to sale or other disposal."
The selection of a tract as swamp land, and placing the same of record,
has always been held by this office as withdrawing it from entry or loca-
tion.
Under the decisions as cited, lands herein described selected by the
State as swaL lands prior to June 3, 1856, whether swamp or dry,
were otherwise appropriated within the meaning ot the act, and were,
therefore, excluded from the operations of the grant of that date to the
State of Louisiana for railroad purposes; from which it follows that
said grant did not interfere with or prevent their confirmation to the
State as swamp lands under act of March 3, 1857, and I decide that if
they were otherwise vacant and unappropriated at that date, they were
so confirmed.
In view of this decision, the action of this office, as stated, in reject-
. ing the State's claim to any of the tracts selected as swamp prior to
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June 3, 1856, was erroneous, as was also the certifying of these lands to
the State for railroad purposes.
The action of this office was also erroneous in restoring the tracts
above named to market; and you will note on your records the fact that
the lands described as having been selected prior to June 3 1856, are
confirmed swamp selections, and refuse to allow entries of the same,
and also advise parties who have made the entries, as stated, that they
will be canceled and the purchase-money refunded; and in case of home-
stead entries the parties will be allowed to make new entries, with credit
for the fees and commissions paid, or on application the money so paid
will be returned to them.
SWAMP SELECTIOANS-FIELD NOTES.
STATE OF MICHIGAN.
The State and the United States having agreed that the field notes of survey should
form the basis of adjustment of the State's claim for swamp lands, and the same
in case of resurvey; and a resurvey having been made, in the field notes of which
the tract in question appeared to be of the character contemplated by the act of
September 28, 1850, the same inured to the State, though not embraced in the list
of selectioDs reported.
Secretary Kirkwood to Commissioner HeFarland, October 1, 1881.
I have considered the appeal of the Flint and Pere Marquette Rail-
road Company from your decision of December 16, 1880, which held the
N. of the SE. -1 of Sec. 33, T. 14 N., R. 1 W., East Saginaw, Mich., to
be swamp land, and granted to the State of Michigan under the act of
September 28, 1850.
By agreement between the State and the United States. the field notes
of survey were made the basis of adjustment of the swamp claim of the
State; and in case of a resurvey the adjustment was also to be made
on like notes.
The tract in question is embraced in a list of swamp selections for
that State, reported to your office December 24, 1852. A resurvey of
the township was made and approved in June, 1853, and a new list of
selections in lieu of the former list was reported by the surveyor-gen-
eral in October, 1853, in which the tract is not embraced. It appears,
however, from the field notes of such resurvey that the tract is of the
character contemplated by the said act. It is immaterial, therefore,
whether or not it was named in said lrst; bt being of the character
named, it inures to the State, under said agreement, regardless of the
list.
Your decision is affirmed.
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S WAMP LAXD-SELECTIOV-PRIOR SALE-EVIDENCE.J3.L- /07
ARANT V. STATE OF OREGON.*
The swamp grant act to Oregon does not include lands which the government sold,
reserved or disposed of prior to confirmation of title-i. e., the approval by the
Secretary of the Interior of the State selection
Arant made his pre-emption filing prior to the assertion of any claim by the State.
Besides the evidence fails to show that the land was swamp.
Pre-emption allowed, and claim of the State held for rejection.
Commissioner McFarland, to register and receiver, Lakeview, Oregon, April
14, 1882.
I have examined the case of W. F. Arant v. State of Oregon, involv-
ing lots 1, 2, 3, and 4, Sec. 2, 40 S., 8 E., W. M.
Mr. Arant filed pre-emption D. S. No. 82, June 13, 1873, alleging set-
tlement November 5, 1872. The State selected the tracts December 1,
1872, under the swamp land grant of March 12, 1860.
This act extended the swamp land act of 1850 to the States of Oregon
and Minnesota, subject among other conditions to the following pro-
visions:
That the grant hereby made shall not include any lands which thegovernment of the United States may have sold, reserved, or disposed
of (in pursuance of any law of Congress heretofore enacted) prior to the
confirmation of title to be made under the authority of the said act.
Land that should be so disposed of by the United States prior to
the confirmation of the State title as aforesaid was therefore not granted
to the State of Oregon.
The confirmation to be made was the adjudication and approval to
the State by the Secretary of the Interior of lands found to be swamp
in the manner provided by the act of 1850.
In the case of Crowley v. State of Oregon, the Secretary of the Interior
held that the proviso of the act of 1860 was not intended to continue the
disposal under general laws of land found to be swamp, or to dispose of
lands in the face of an asserted and undetermined claim of the State,
and the Secretary expressly declared that " to this extent only is it here
intended to construe this proviso."
In the present case the settler claimed to have initiated his pre-
emption right prior to the assertion of any claim by the State.
The evidence taken at the hearing in the case and reported by you
establishes this fact:
The land was not swamp land as shown by the public surveys or as
found by the testimony in the case.
The State relied upon the deposition of William M. Turner to prove
the swampy character of the land. Turner was one of the deputy
United States surveyors who surveyed this land in 1872. He again
*See 2 L. D., 641.
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examined it unofficially in 1876. In 1872, when an officer of the United
States, he found the land not swamp but among " the most valuable and
desirable land in the whole township." In 1876, when employed in
some other capacity, he found the land submerged. The evidence in
the case shows that there was an extraordinary overflow in 1876. It is
evident that the conclusion reached by Mr. Tarner at a period of unusually
high water, that the land was swamp, cannot be relied upon to establish
the swampy character of land which he had carefully examined and
officially reported in 1872 as " rich bottom."
The rebutting testimony shows, besides, that the general character of
the land was properly described by the survey of 1872. In 1879 another
official survey of this land was made, and the field notes of the latter
survey correspond with the survey of 1872, and both confirm the testi-
mony of the inhabitants that the land is not swampy in character, but
good arable land.
The prior right of the pre-emptor having been established, and the
land not having been found to be swamp, the pre-emption entry will
be allowed and the claim of the State held for rejection, subject to the
usual right of appeal.
CASH ENTRY-AMENDMENT.
THOMAS UNDERHILL.
Amendment cannot be allowed except in the cases provided for by law, where an
error has been made in the description by the entryman, or where the records are
defective in not showing the correct description of the land.
Commissioner McFarland to register and receiver, Gainesville, Florida, Sep-
tember 29, 1882.
Referring to your letter of 25th January last, inclosing the affidavit
of Thomas Underhill, duly corroborated, setting forth that the land
embraced in his cash entry No. 1494, for the NE. 4 of SW. i, Sec. 7, T.
15, R. 29 E, lies under water, and is totally untillable and worthless
for any purpose, and asking that he may be allowed to apply the pur-
chase money on said entry to a new entry on land such as he may se-
lect.
You are informed that it is not shown that any mistake was made by
Mr. Utiderhill in making said entry No. 1494, nor is it shown that he
intended to purchase a tract different from that purchased; no error
was occasioned by original incorrect marks made by the surveyor or by
obliteration or change of the original marks and numbers at corners of
the tract of land; neither did the mistake arise from error of the sur-
veyor or officers or the land office.
Mr. Underhill applied to purchase the NE. 4 of SW. 4, Sec. 7, T. 15
S., R. 29 B., and it is not shown that he intended to purchase any other
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tract of land, or that any mistake was made of the true numbers of the
tract purchased.
From the evidence submitted, I am of the opinion, that no mistake
was made by Mr Underhill in making entry No. 1494, and he is there-
fore not entitled to the relief provided for in sections 2368 and 2372 Rev.
Stats., to which you are referred.
The law only provides for change of entry where an error has been
made in the description by the entryman himself, or when the records
themselves are defective in not showing the correct description of the
land.
ACCO UNTS-FEES AND COMMISSIONS.
INSTRUCTIONS.
Instructions as to the fees to be charged by registers and receivers for filing and act-
ing upon applications for patent for mineral lands and the charges to be made
for writing actually done to establish proof in such cases.
Commissioner McFarland to register and receiver, Lake City, Colorado.
July 8, 1881.
I am in receipt of your letter of the 28th ultimo in reply to " M "1 of
June 21, in reference to the charge of $5 in addition to the regular fee
of $10 in applications for patents for mineral lands, and in reply have
to inform you as follows:
You are authorized by the law and by instructions from this office to
charge and collect a fee of $10 for filing and acting upon applications
for patent for mineral lands, and where any writing is done by the reg-
ister, receiver, or any other person employed by them to do such writ-
ing, a further charge of 22j cents per hundred words for writing actually
done to establish proof to such mineral claims, provided said writing is
done in the office of the register and receiver, is to be charged and col-
lected, said money to be accounted for in the receiver's monthly and
quarterly accounts as fees received for reducing testimony to writing.
Messrs.Cobb and Arnold, of Denver, Colo., have this day been furnished
with a copy of this letter.
FEES FOB RED UCIINTG TESTIMONY TO WRITING.
Instructions to registers and receivers as to their duties therein; also in examining
testimony, furnishing transcripts, etc. Fees chargeable by them therefor.
Commissioner Mc'Farland to register and receiver, La Crosse, Wisconsin,
July 29, 1881.
I am in receipt of the register's letter of the 13th of June last, re-
questing that the receiver at your office be instructed as to his duties
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in reducing testimony to writing, examining testimony, furnishing tran-
scripts, etc., and in reply have to state as follows:
Paragraph 10, section 2238, Rev. Stat., in fixing the compensation of
registers and receivers for reducing testimony to writing, provides that
" the register and receiver are allowed jointly at the rate of 15 cents
per one hundred words for testimony reduced by then to writing," im-
plying, though it does not expressly state, that it is the duty of both
officers to perform this work.
Section 2239, Rev. Stat., in reciting the duties of registers of consoli-
dated land offices in making transcripts or furnishing other information
from the records, expressly states that "the receiver shall receive his
equal share of the fees, and it shall be his duty to aid the register in
the preparation of the transcripts or giving the desired information."
Correspondence addressed to the register or receiver, or to register
and receiver, is to be answered by the officer to whom the subject espe-
cially pertains; or if the information or the business is of a joint nature
each officer will assist in giving said information or attending to the
business referred to.
It is expected and required that the register and receiver will each
cheerfully assist the other in conducting the business of the land office
for the best interests of the government and the welfare of the people.
FEES FOR REDUCING TESTIMONY TO FRITING.
Instructions to register and receiver as to proper charge therefor in mineral cases,
and as to other proper and improper charges.
Commissioner McFarland to register and receiver, Lake City, Colorado,
May 6, 1882.
I have to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 10th ultimo,
replying to ours of the 24th March, relating to fees received for reduc-
ing testimony to writing in mineral cases, and in reply thereto have to
state as follows:
You refer to the method employed by you in computing fees received
for reducing testimony to writing and detail the charges under several
heads, and say you charge for,
1st. Notice for publication; this you have a right to charge for at the
rate of 221 cents per 100 words for writing actually done by you.
2d. rriting done in filing and briefing all the papers; this is an ille-
gal charge and must not be made.
3d. Letters written to the parties, often a long correspondence; this
you must not charge for, as you are each paid a salary of $500 per an-
num to conduct the business and correspondence of the office.
4th. Writing done in final entry, embracing register's certificate and
certificate of posting, receiver's receipt, and making the application to
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purchase. You will not make any charge for these services, as they
are part of the duties connected with your office, with the exception of
the application to purchase, which is to be made out by the applicant;
but if made by you (and every facility should be given to purchasers of
lands), you can make no charge therefor.
5th. Letters to the parties again; no charge for this can be made, as
you must conduct the correspondence of your office without any charge
to your correspondents.
6th. Letters of transmittal to General Land Office; the same answer
as is given to No. 5 applies to this.
7th. Correspondence from time to time with the Department and ap-
plicants, up to the time the patent issues. No charge is to be made for
this.
You are now informed that you will be held to a strict compliance
with instructions contained in the circular letter of this office, dated
January 27, 1881 (copy herewith), and to the charges authorized by the
fee bill transmitted under date of April 7, 1881. You will inform this
office whether you keep the fee bills referred to posted in a conspicuous
place in ybur office or not.
FOBREDUCING TESTIMONY TO WRITING WHEN TAKEN BEFORE SOME
OFFICER OTHER THAN REGISTER AXND RECEIVER.
When testimony is taken as above in contested cases, the register and receiver are
not entitled to compensation aside from their salaries.
Commissioner 2llcFarland to register and receiver, Yorth Platte, Nebraska,
July S, 1882.
I have to acknowledge the receipt of the register's letter of the 12th
ultimo, inquiring " whether, in contest cases, where all the evidence is
taken before some officer other than the register or receiver, the receiver
is authorized to charge for and receive any compensation under the head
of reducing testimony to writing, for the writing done in making up the
record and decision in the case, and the transcripts thereof, and also
for the writing entering in the commission to take depositions and copy
of interrogatories," and in reply thereto, you are informed that you are
not entitled to receive any compensation for these services, as they are
a part of the duties ot your office, for which you receive an annual salary
of $500.
Your attention is called to the inclosed circulars from this office, dated
May 24, 1879, and January 27, S81, respectively, from which you will
learn the proper items to charge for under the laws and regulations re-
lating to fees for reducing testimony to writing.
The letter of this office, dated May 6, 1882, to the register and receiver
at Lake City, Colo. (9 C. L. O., 35), relating to fees allowed for testimony
reduced to writing in establishing claims to public lands, is modified to
the extent that no charge is to be made for the preparation of the notice
of publication.
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INDIA-N IANDS-PBOCEEDS OF SALES-HOF DISPOSED OF.
Receivers are to pay into the Treasury the gross amount of proceeds of such sales.
No part can be withheld for compensation of register and receiver or for clerk
hire.
Decision of First Comptroller of Treasury.
First Conmptroller Lawrence to Commissioner ieFarland, July 2, 1881.
I have received the letter of the Acting Commissioner of the Gen-
eral Land Office, under date of June 4, 1881, in which he states that.
owing to a deficiency in the appropriation for salaries, fees, and com-
missions of registers and receivers for the current fiscal year (1881),
the honorable Secretary of the Interior has directed that a pro rata
distribution be made of the unexpended balance of the appropriation,
based upon the receipts of the various offices for the quarter ending
March 31, 1881. He states that the office at Independence, Kans., is a
maximum office, and that an advance of $600 was made to the receiver
for 40 per cent. of his estimate of $1,500. In addition to the public
lands disposed of in this district are included Osage trust and dimin-
ished reserve lands, and the receiver has, under date of May 30, 1881,
requested that he be permitted to transfer to his account, as disbursing
agent, the sum of $900 from the proceeds of the sale of said Indian
lands, with a view of supplying the deficiency in the salaries, fees, and
commissions of himself and the register. He bases his application upon
a letter from the General Land Office, dated April 28, 1878. The Act-
ing Commissioner refers to section 5 of the act of May 28, 1880 (Public
Laws, page 143, chap. 107), providing that in the disposal of the Osage
trust and diminished reserve lands, the register and receiver shall be
allowed the same fees and commissions as are allowed in the disposal
of public lands, and the net proceeds of the sales of public lands, after
deducting the expenses of such sales, shall be deposited, etc. He
further states that all clerks in local land offices employed upon work
connected with the disposal of Indian lands are paid from the proceeds
of the sales of said lands, and that it has been the custom heretofore,
where a deficiency existed in salaries, fees, and commissions, to supply
it from the proceeds of the sales of Indian lands in districts where such
lands are situated. He further states that there seems to be no authori-
tative decision from this office relative to this and the proceeds of the
sales of other Indian lands; and he submits the question for my de-
cision, with a request that it be made at as early a day as practicable.
The large amount of business forced upon this office by reason of the
close of the fiscal year, and the operations of the Loan Division in con-
verting outstanding 5 per cent. bonds into 3 per cents, has necessarily
delayed an answer until this date.
I have considered the question submitted with care, and in due time
will print a decision.
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The Osage treaty, proclaimed June 1, 1867 (14 Stats., 687), and the act
of May 2S,1880 (Public Laws, page 143, chap. 107), both require the net
proceeds of sales of the lands referred to to be paid into the Treasury to
the credit of the Indian civilization fund. It is not expressly declared
what shall be done with that portion of the proceeds of sales applicable
to reimburse the United States the cost of survey and sale, but the treaty
provides that the United States shall be reimbursed the cost of survey
and sale. The entire proceeds of the sales of these lands, as well that
which is to go to the credit of the Indian civilization fund as that por-
tion which is applicable to the reimbursements of the United States
for the cost and expenses of survey and sale, are required by law to be
paid into the Treasury.
Section 3617 of the Revised Statutes expressly provides that the gross
amount of all moneys received from whatever source for the use of the
United States, except as otherwise provided in the next section, shall
be paid by the officers who have received the same into the Treasury at
as early day as practicable, without any abatement or deduction on
account of salary, fees, costs, charges, or expenses or claim of any de-
scription whatever. The exception named in this section of the Re-
vised Statutes is not material, as it does not relate to this subject. It
is entirely clear that that portion of the proceeds of sales which are ap-
plicable to the reimbursements of the United States for the expenses
of survey and sale is money received for the use of the United States,
and by the express terms of section 3617 must be paid into the Treasury.
If clerks in local land offices, who have been employed upon work
connected with the disposal of Indian lands, have been paid from the
proceeds of the sales of said lands, without an explicit provision in
some act of Congress, the payment has been unauthorized, and the
custom of supplying deficiencies in appropriations for the salaries, fees,
and commissions of registers and receivers from the proceeds of said
sales is equally unauthorized.
It is the duty of the receivers of public moneys to pay into the Treasury
of the United States the gross amount of the proceeds of all such sales.
The costs and expenses of survey and sale of these Indian lands are to
be ascertained and stated to the Treasury Department, and that por-
tion of the proceeds necessary to reimburse these costs and expenses is
to be paid into the Treasury of the United States as miscellaneous re-
ceipts, applicable to the reimbursements of the 'United States under
appropriations by Congress. That portion of the proceeds of sales not
so used of the lands now in question is to be carried to the credit of the
Indian civilization fund.
Hereafter the receivers of public moneys will be chargeable in accord-
ance with this decision, and disbursing officers cannot receive credit for
any disbursement in excess of the appropriation made by Congress.
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INDIAN LAND-HOW PAID FOR.
No purchase of the Pawnee Indian lands can be consummated until the required pay-
ment is made in money. The receipt of drafts not authorized.
Acting Commissioner Harrison to receiver, Grand Island, Nebraska, Octo-
ber 24, 1882.
I have to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 27th ultimo,
stating that the Treasury Department has called your attention to the
regulations of the same in reference to depositing the public moneys,
in which you state that the moneys remaining in your hands as shown
in your weekly statements, in excess of the amount authorized by ex-
isting regulations, is caused by you receiving drafts from purchasers of
Pawnee Indian lands, and retaining the receipts issued for said lands
until the drafts are cashed, in the meanwhile reporting the amount of
said sales as on hand in personal possession. This you state you do in
order to save trouble and loss to the purchasers of said lands, who
might otherwise, on account of the delay in having their drafts cashed,
lose the land.
While this office-appreciates the motive that prompts your actions in
the premises, yet it is not optional with you to accept payment for
lands sold in this manner.
The law provides for the sale of the Pawnee Indian lands for money,
and no purchase of the lands can be consummated until the required
cash payment is received in money; therefore, should you receive drafts
in payment for lands sold, you do so at your own risk, and you will be
held responsible for the amount of money reported as received by you
on all lands returned as sold.
In future you will receive in payment for lands sold current funds of
the United States only.
INXDIAN LAND-CERTIFICATES OF DEPOSIT.
Certificates of deposit on account of surveys cannot be received in payment for
Sioux Indian lands. The act of March 3,1863, requires such lands to be sold for
cash.
,Commissioner McFarland to receiver, Redwood Falls, Minnesota, April 12,
1882.
On July 23,1881, you received in payment for cash entry register and
receiver No. 199, Sioux Indian lands, made by Cornelius HI. Byington,
certificates of deposit on account of surveys No. 2298, issued by the First
National Bank of Santa F, N. Mex., in favor of Margarito Chavez, dated
May 13, 1881, and No. 6558 issued by the Colorado National Bank of
Denver, Colo., in favor of Samuel B. Stewart, dated June 25, 1881, for
$140 and $100, respectively.
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The above described certificates are returned to you with the follow-
ing statement:
Triplicate certificates of deposit are receivable in payment for any
public lands, entered under the homestead or pre-emption laws, but are
not to be received in payment for Indian lands, timber or stone lands,
nor for desert, coal, or mineral lands. (See marked paragraph of in-
closed circular, also decision of the Honorable Secretary of the Interior,
on the appeal of Robert Sproul, Land Office Report, 1877, p. 143.)
Under the provisions of the act of March 3, 1863 (Statutes at Large,
vol. 12, p. 819), Sioux Indian lands in Minnesota are to be sold for cash
and the proceeds thereof deposited for the benefit of said Indians.
therefore, certificates of deposit on account of surveys are not receivable
in payment for Sioux Indian lands.
The receiver's receipt, quarterly detailed and condensed accounts,
monthly account current, and abstract of Sioux Indian lands sold for
the month of January last are returned for correction.
You will require Mr. Byington to pay for the land in cash, and when
this is done inform him that on the return of the triplicate certificates
to this office a certificate will be placed thereon, allowing them to be
again used, in payment for public lands entered under the pre-emption
or homestead laws.
As soon as possible you will return the papers in the case to this
office.
MAKI-NG ABSTRACTS OF RECORDS.
Abstracts of records in the local offices, for county clerks, may be made by persons
not employed in nor paid by the office, provided the work does not interfere with
the business of the office.
Commissioner l1lcFarland to receiver, Concordia, Kansas, February 23,
1882.
I have to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 13th instant
stating that certain county clerks had made application to you for ab-
stracts of records from your office for the purpose of taxation in their
respective counties, and requesting information as to how such ab-
stracts can be made, and in reply have to state as follows: As there
is no provision of law allowing you to receive pay for transcripts of
records, and as you state that prior to 1881 it was the practice of your
office to allow a person familiar with your tract books to make such ab-
stracts and receive pay from the county clerks, you are authorized to
continue the same practice in these and like cases, providing the work
does not interfere with the business of your office and is not done by
the register and receiver, nor by any one in their employ.
Your attention is called to marked paragraphs of inclosed circular'
lated January 27, 1881.
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A CCO UNTS.
Instructions with respect to the disposition of money paid at the local offces.
Commissioner McFarland to registers and receivers, May 24, 1882.
The attention of this office having been called to a difference of opin-
ion existing among persons having business at local land offices as to the
proper officer to receive money to pay for entering lands, or for fees for
transcripts of records and other services rendered, I have to call your
attention to the following instructions:
Registers of land offices have no right, officially, to receive any moneys
whatever except such as are paid to them by receivers as salary, fees
and commissiohs, and the fee of one dollar they are especially entitled
to receive for giving notice of the cancellation of pre-emption, home-
stead, and timber culture entries, under the act of May 14, 1880.
All moneys received for other services rendered by either registers or
receivers are to be paid to the receiver, and deposited and accounted
for by him as other public moneys.
Should any money be forwarded to the register, or paid to him he
will at once pay over the same to the receiver; and where parties ad-
dress the register as to the value of any lands, or the cost of any serv-
ice required, he will instruct them that the receiver is the proper officer
to receive public funds.
REPAYME1NT.-DOUBLE MiNIMUM LAND.
J. GARAGHTY.
Where the definite location of a railroad raised the price of the land settled upon to
$2.50 per acre, prior to the date of settlement, repayment of the enhanced price
cannot be made.
Acting Secretary Bell to Commissioner M11cFarland, July 16, 1881.
I have considered the appeal of J. Garaghty from your decision of
January 22, 1881, rejecting his application for the return of 1.25 per
acre in excess of the minimum price paid by him for the NW. Sec. 36,
T. 89, R. 29, per Fort Dodge, Iowa, pre-emption cash entry No. 4766,
for the reason that the act of Congress of May 15, 1856, to aid in the
construction of certain railroads in the State of Iowa, raised the price of
the alternate sections within the six-mile limits on each side of said roads
to $2.50 per acre; and that the definite location of the Dubuque and
Sioux City Railroad on July 5, 1856, raised the price of the even alter-
nate sections, of which the tract named is one, to said price.
Garaghty's settlement was on October 16, 1856; his final proof and
payment were made June 19, 1858, and the land was patented to him on
October 1, 1859.
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On December 19, 1874, you rejected a like application of Garaghty,
and for the same reasons upon which you reject his present application.
As no appeal was taken from that decision, it therefore became final,
and his present claim rests solely upon the act of June 16, 1880, the
second section of which provides that " in all cases, where parties have
paid double-minimum price for land, which has afterwards been found
not to be within the limits of a railroad land grant, the excess of $1.25
per acre shall be repaid to the purchaser, his heirs or assigns."
The question submitted, therefore, is one of fact only, viz, whether or
not the tract is within the limits of the grant to said Dubuque and Sioux
City Railroad (afterwards the Dubuque and Pacific Railroad).
As it appears from the files and maps of your office that said tract is
within the limits of said grant, the application of Mr. Garaghty is not
aided by the said act, and your decision is accordingly affirmed.
[Re-affirmed by decision of Department of September 19, 1881, on
motion for reconsideration.]
REPAYMVENT-ADDITIONAL HOfESTEAD ENTBIES.
By the act of March 3, 1879, no fees and commissions are chargeable upon such entries,
and amounts received therefor must be returned.
Commissioner McFarland to register and receiver, lortli Platte, Nebraska,
July 26, 1881.
I have to acknowledge the receipt of the receiver's letter of the 25th
ultimo, in' reply to letter "C a A of the 18th of June last in relation to the
practice followed at your office of charging and collecting commissions
on additional homestead entries under the act of March 3, 1879, and in
reply have to inform you as follows:
The act of March 3, 1879 (see Statutes of the United States, 1878-'79,
page 472), provides that-
Anyperson who has under existing laws taken ahomestead on any even
section within the limits of any railroad or military road land graLt, and
who, by existing laws, shall have been restricted to eighty acres, may
enter under the homestead laws an additional eighty acres adjoining the
land embraced in his original entry.
It further provides that the settler may elect to have his original entry
canceled, and be entitled to make a new entry of one hundred and sixty
acres the same as though the first entry had not been made, and it is pro-
vided further that said additional entry, or a new entry after the cancel-
lation of the old one, shall be allowed to be made withowt thepayment of
fees and commissions. The statute is definite in its terms. The entry
is to be allowed " without the payment of fees and commissions."
This office understands the law to be-that no entry fees or commissions
are to be charged in such cases. There is no exception stated in the act
which would imply that final entry commissions are chargeable on mak-
ing final proof.
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The language "without the payment of fees and commissions" requires
the entry to be allowed without the payment of either original or final
entry fees or commissions, and the Secretary of the Interior has ruled
that the act is a remedial one and must be liberally construed. As the
law stands, therefore, persons making final proof on additional or new
entries under the above act are entitled to do so without the payment
of any entry fee or commissions, and the register and receiver are only
entitled to the fee for reducing testimony to writing in making final
proof, which at your office is fifteen cents per one hundred words.
The final receipts in additional homestead entries, register and receiver
Nos. 438, 447, 457, 464, 465, and 466; the register and receiver abstracts
of final proofs for the months of January, March, May, and June last;
the receiver's accounts-current and fee statements for the same months,
and his accounts for the first and second quarters of 1881, with the reg-
ister's vouchers for the same quarters, are herewith returned. The
receiver will return the commissions collected in the cases above referred
to to the parties paying the same, taking from them vouchers for the re-
spective amounts, which he will transmit to this office.
The receiver will collect from the register the amount allowed said
officer as his share of the disallowed commissions, taking from him a
corrected voucher for his salary, fees, and commissions.
The receiver will correct his accounts and return all the papers in
the cases to this office as soon as-possible. As the accounts for the thirdf and fourth quarters of 1880 have been adj asted by this office, and trans-
mitted to the Treasury Department, and the commissions received in
those quarters covered into the Treasury, there can be no relief to the
parties who made final proof in additional homestead entries Nos. 401,
412,426, 430, and 431, without a special act of Congress.
REPAYMENT-MINERAL LAND.
JOHN R. MAGRUDER.
The cancellation of a mineral entry for non-compliance with antecedent statutory
requirements does not affect the possessory rights of the applicant.
Effect of relinquishment of defective entry and repayment of purchase money in such
a case.
Distinction between mineral and agricultural entries in this respect.
Commissioner ]lc~arland to Secretary Kirkwood, July 29, 1881.
I have the honor to submit herewith for your action, an account in
favor of John . Magruder for return of purchase money for land er-
roneously sold to him by the United States, per Santa F, N. Mex.,
mineral entry, No. 8, for lot No. 38, known as the Chino Mine Claim.
It appears from the evidence herewith submitted, that the local land
officers declined to receive the money, $105, from said Magruder on the
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ground that the publication notice and application bore different dates,
and the party was allowed to appeal to this office. Upon appeal, this
office directed the local officers to accept the money from Magruder, be-
cause the objections of the local officers were not well taken. (See
copy of letter herewith, marked A.) Upon the receipt of the papers in
the case by this office, and an examination of the same, the entry was
canceled for the reason stated in the adjustment. (See copy of letter
of cancellation herewith, marked B.)
Itis my opinion that the entry was erroneously allowed, and comes
within the provisions of the act of June 16, 1880, and I therefore sub-
mit the case for your consideration.
Acting Seeretary Bell to Commissioner McFarland, August 3, 1881.
The claim of John R. Magruder, forwarded with your letter of July
29, 1881, for the repayment, under the act of June 16,1880, of $105, paid
by him at the Santa F6 land office, New Mexico, November 22, 1875, on
mineral entry No. 8, as per receiver's receipt of that date, and of $10
paid by him in the matter of said entry as fee for filing his application
for patent, amounting altogether to $115, is herewith returned with my
approval.
It must be understood, however, that the approval of this claim can-
not be treated nor considered as a precedent in cases of repayment of
moneys paid upon agricultural entries, for this reason, that in case of an
agricultural entry the lawful cancellation thereof leaves no right or title
to the land in the entryman, and therefore the requirement of the law
(sec. 2, act of June 16, 1880) and of your regulations regarding the re-
linquishment of all claim to the land should be enforced in such a case;
but it is quite different as regards a mineral entry where, as in this case,
the entry was canceled for the reason that the antecedent statutory re-
quirements necessary to authorize a sale by the local officers had not
been performed, and not for the reason that the claimant had no legal
possessory title. The cancellation of Magruder's entry therefore simply
set aside all that had been done towards the acquisition of a patent, and
left his rights of possession under his location and compliance with law
as to yearly improvements, whatever those rights were, intact, and Ma-
gruder free to sell his possessory title the same as if no entry had been
made or attempted. His conveyance, therefore, of March 1, 1876, after
the cancellation of his entry, must be treated by the Department simply
as a conveyance of his possessory title, and not an attempted disposal
of the title which he might claim under his entry; in other words not
an attempted disposal of the fee. On the other hand his relinquishment
on the back of his duplicate receipt, made April 21, 1881, whereby he in
terms relinquished to the United States all his right, title, and claim in
and to the land described in the receipt cannot be construed as a relin-
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quishment of his possessory title, but as a relinquishment of all claim
by virtue of the said receipt and entry, such a relinquishment, in my
opinion, is in this case a compliance with the second section of the act
aforesaid.
REPA YfENT-IRA UD ULE2VT PRE-EMPTION.
F. W. MARCHANT.
Where entry is canceled on the ground of fraud, repayment will not be allowed.
Commissioner McFarland to Messrs. Bird & Lowe, Salt Lake City, Utah,
November 25, 1881.
In reply to your letter of 14th instant, relative to the application of
Franklin W. Marchant for repayment of the purchase money paid on
Salt Lake City pre-emption cash entry No. 1,038, you are advised that
the records of this office show that Mr. Marchant filed for the E. of
SW. Sec. 23, T. 1 S., R. 5 E., as per declaratory statement No. 2,193,
April 12, 1870, and made final proof and payment July 11, 1872, per
cash entry No. 1,038.
By our letter " F," of October 2, 1874, Mr. farchant was called upon
to furnish additional proof as to his citizenship and actual date of set-
tlement.
On March 26, 1875, a report was received from the local officers at
Salt Lake City stating that Mr. Marchant had appeared at their office
and stated that he had relied upon his father's naturalization papers
for his citizenship, and that he was but twenty-one years of age at the
present time. Thereupon his entry was canceled April 7,1875, because
he was not a qualified pre-emptor, being a minor at date of filing and
entry.
Under section 2362 of the Revised Statutes repayment is authorized
upon satisfactory proof, " that any tract of land has been erroneously
sold by the United States, so that from any cause the sale cannot be
confirmed," while in section 2 of the act of June 16, 1880, it is provided
that the Secretary of the Interior shall cause repayment to be made,
" when from any cause the entry has been erroneously allowed and can-
not be confirmed."
In this case the proofs at date of entry showed a compliance with
law (he, Marchant, having sworn that he was twenty-one years of age);
but it was subsequently proven that he was not of age at date of said
entry (he, Marchant, having acknowledged that he was not of age when
he made said proof); therefore the proofs upon which the entry was
based were false; and in such a case it cannot be held that the entry was
erroneously allowed, for it was his (Marchant's) own fault that the entry
could not be completed.
Therefore I decline to recommend the repayment of the purchase
money as asked for. Sixty days are allowed for appeal to the honor-
able Secretary of the Interior.
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REPAYMENT-OSAGE TRUST LAND.
G. C. DAY.
Party failing to comply with provisions of act of July , 1876, is not entitled to re-
payment.
Commissioner McFarland to register and receiver, Topekac, Kansas, July
26, 1882.
Referring to your letter of 19th May, in the matter of the return of
$39.96, being the first installment paid by G. C. Day for lots 1 and 2 of
NE. 1, Sec. 3, T. 15, R. 9, per receipt No. 607, "Kansas trust and di-
minished reserve lands," you are informed that the second section of
the act of July 5, 1876 (19 Stat., 75), provides-
That if any person or persons applying to purchase land under the
provisions of this act shall fail to make payment or to perform any other
conditions required by the provisions of this act, or by rules and regu-
lations which may be prescribed in the execution hereof, within ninety
days after such payment shall become due or performance be required
by the terms hereof, or by the rules and regulations which may be pre.
scribed in the execution hereof, such person or persons shall forfeit all
rights under the provisions of this act, and all claim or right to rein-
bursement or compensation for previous action or payment by said per-
son or persons under the provisions hereof; and the land proposed to be
purchased by such person or persons shall again be subject to sale as
though no action had been had in regard to the same.
As the case of Mr. Day clearly falls within the provisions of the above-
cited section of the act of July 5, 1876, an application from said Day
cannot be favorably entertained.
REPAYMENT-RELIQUISHED DESERT LAND ENTRY.
GONZALES ET AL.
Where parties voluntarily abandon or relinquish an entry on desert land, it not hav-
ing been erroneously allowed, repayment cannot be made.
Commissioner McFarland to Messrs. Cutrtis, Earle, & Burdett. Washington,
D. C., December 5, 1881.
Referring to your letter of 26th ultino, in the matter of the applica-
tion of Jos6 Ygnacio Gonzales and Florencio Chaves, respectively, for
repayment of the purchase money paid by said parties on desert land
entries Nos. 10 and 11, La Mesilla, N. Mex., you are informed that said
entries were canceled November 29, 1881, for relinquishment, the par-
ties having relinquished their entries, for the reason that the land em-
braced therein was mountainous and hilly, and after repeated efforts
they found it impossible to condnwt water in ditches on the land to irri.
gate and improve the same.
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Section 2362 of the Revised Statutes authorizes the repayment,
"where a tract of land has been erroneously sold by the United States,
so that from any cause the sale cannot be confirmed."
The second section of the act of June 16, 1880, provides that in all
,cases where homestead or timber culture or desert land entries, or other
entries of public lands, have heretofore or shall hereafter be canceled
for conflict, or where from any cause the entry has been erroneously
allowed and cannot be confirmed, the purchase money shall be re-
funded.
At the date of said entries there were no adverse rights to the lands
embraced in said entries, neither were the entries erroneously allowed,
but the fault was on the part of the purchasers, Me ssrs. Gonzales and
Chaves.
It is the ruling of the Department that where a party voluntarily
abandons or relinquishes his entry, or fails to comply with the law
under which his entry was initiated, the purchase money cannot be re-
funded.
Therefore I decline to recommend the return of the purchase money
as asked for in these cases.
Sixty days will be allowed for appeal to the honorable Secretary.
SAME, 0 APPEAL.
Where parties voluntarily abandoned their entry on desert land for the alleged reason
that it could not be reclaimed, there being no conflict, and the entry not errone-
ously allowed, the matter complained of originating in their own misjudgment,
repayment will not be directed.
Secretary Teller to Commissioner MoFarland, October 11, 1882.
I have considered the appeals, respectively, of Jos6 Ygnacio Gonzales
and Florencio Chaves (erroneously submitted by you as one case) from
your decision of December 5, 1881, rejecting their respective applica-
tions for repayment of the purchase money paid by them on desert land
declarations Nos. 10 and 11, La Mesilla, N. Mex.
The act of March 3, 1S77 (19 Stat., 377), authorizes a declaration by
a qualified person of his intent to reclaim a specified quantity of desert
land, not exceeding 640 acres, by conducting water upon the same
within the period of three years, and upon payment of 25 cents per acre,
and upon proof of such reclamation within that time and the frther
payment of $1 per acre, a patent for the reclaimed land is required to
issue to him. Te act also describes desert land as "lands exclusive of
timber lands and mineral lands which will not, without irrigation, pro-
duce some agricultural crop."
The declarations in question were filed October 9, 1877, when Gonzales
paid into the local office the sum of $130 as his first payment on pur-
chase of 520 acres, and C haves the sum of $160 for 640 acres. Their
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declarations expired by limitation October 9, 1880, of which they were
officially notified on the 15th of the same month. It does not appear
that either of them had reclaimed any portion of the lands. On Janu-
ary 25, 1881, they each applied for repayment of their purchase money
under the act of June 16, 1880, alleging that the lands covered by their
respective declarations were mountainous and hilly, and that after
repeated efforts they had been unable to conduct water to irrigate and
improve them.
The second section of the act of June 16, 1880, provides that where
entries of public land, including desert land, have theretofore or there.
after shall be canceled for conflict, or where from any cause the entry
has been erroneously allowed and cannot be confirmed, the Secretary of
the Interior shall cause to be repaid to the person who made the entry,
or to his heirs or assigns, the fees, commissions, and purchase money
so paid upon surrender of the duplicate receipt and the execution of a
proper relinquishment of all claim to the land whenever such entry
shall have been duly canceled by the Commissioner of the General Land
Office.
Repayment of the purchase money in these cases is not, in my opin-
ion, authorized by this statute. The parties knew, or are presumed to
have known, the character of the land and the difficulties attending its
irrigation when they made their payments.
That it was more difficult than they supposed, or even that it was
impossible, does not aid their applications. There is no conflict; the
entries were not erroneously allowed, and no reason appears why they
could not be confirmed. The cases show a voluntary abandonment of
the land by the applicants, without fault, on th e part of the govern-
ment, and in such case the statute affords no relief.
Your decision is affirmed.
. v id ?REPAYMENT-FOLUNTARY ABANDONMENT.
JOHN ARLAND.
The act of Jane 16, 1880, does not provide for the payment of fees and commission
to parties who voluntarily abandon their right to complete their entry.
Commissioner lleFar land to John arland, Fort Hall, Idaho, January
20, 18S2.
In reply to your letter of 16th ultimo transmitting application for
repayment of the fee and commissions paid by you in making Bismarck,
Dak., homestead entry No. 71, you are informed that the act Congress,
approved June 16,- 1880, does not provide for the repayment of fees and
commissions to parties who volantarily abandon their right to complete
their entry.
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SAME, O- APPEAL.
Secretary Teller to Conmissioner HIeFarland, October 20, 1882.
I have considered the appeal of John Carland from your decision of
January 20, 1882, declining to recommend the ret urn to him of the fees
and commissions paid on Bismarck, Dak., homestead entry No. T.
It appears that Carland, an officer in the Army of the United States
made said entry under the supposition that the hom estead laws did not
require his residence ou the tract. being advised of his mistake, he
-voluntarily abandoned the entry, and now applies for repayment of the
fees and commissions.
The act of June 1, 1830, a lows such repayment in cases where an
entry has been canceled for conflict, or has been erroneously allowed
and cannot be confirmed.
The present case, so far as appears, is not within either of these pro-
visions. There was no conflict, the entry was i ot erroneously allowed,
and might have been confirmed. As there has been no fault or error
on the part of the government, this Departmeut is without authority
in the matter.
Your decision is affirmed.
BEPA YXEENT-HOMESTEAD ETRY.
DUTHAN B. SNODY.
The act of June 16, 1880, is remedial, and as such should be construed liberally.
Where from any cause the entry has been erroneously allowed, .no fraud appear-
ing, repayment should be made.
Secretary Teller to Conmnssioner McFarland, Marchl 9, 1883.
I have considered the application of Duthan B. Snody for repayment
of fees and comlmissions on homestead entry No. 78J, final certificate
No. 2346, Boonville, Mo., on appeal from your decision of April 25, 1882,
declining to recommend repayment.
Snody had made homestead entry previous to the one above men-
tioned, which he abandoned.
The proof shows that he made the second entry in good faith, settled
upon and improved it, and at the proper time made his final proof, be-
lieving his entry to be valid; that at that time no affidavit or other
statement was required to the effect that he never had made any other
entry, and that he did not learn until after he had made his final proof
that he could make but one entry, but supposed he could make another
because he had not obtained any land under the first. Upon learning,
however, that he could not, he executed in due form a release and quit-
claim to the United States of all his interest in the land described im
his second entry.
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At the time of the last entry there was no inquiry to develop the fact
of the former entry, and there was no fraud and no intentional conceal-
ment by the claimant.
The act of June 167 1880, provides that "where from any cause the
entry has been erroneously allowed and cannot be confirmed" the fees
and commissions shall be returned.
You say in your decision that " there was no error on the part of the
government in allowing the second entry," and seem to assume that in
order to afford the relief provided for in the act the error must always
be one committed by the government. I think such construction is
too narrow. The statute says, "where from any cause the entry has been
erroneously allowed." The entryman in a case like the present neces-
sarily forfeits his improvements, which often, as in this case, are of much
-value. The law does not favor forfeitures, and the object of this act
was to prevent them, in certain cases, to the extent of fees, commis-
sions, and purchase money.
The effect of the maxim that ignorance of the law does not excuse is
removed, to a great extent, by the act, because the eases provided for
are those of erroneous entries "from any cause," which would include
errors of law as well as of fact; and it would be a singular construction
to limit the errors to those committed by the government officers, who
are presumed to know the law at least as well as the settlers and other
persons dealing with them. The statute is one of remedies, and reme-
dial statutes "are to be construed liberally and beneficially, so as to pro-
mote as completely as possible the suppression of the mischief intended
to be remedied, and to give life and strength to the remedy." (Maxwell,
203.) The fact that the acts of the, entryman have contributed to or
caused the erroneous entry ought not, under the statute, to deprive him
of the remedy in cases where he has acted in good faith.
The claimant in this case was guilty of no fraud or intentional wrong.
He acted innocently but ignorantly; and his second entry was erro-
neous. I think his claim comes within the scope and intent of the act.
I reverse your decision, and direct repayment of the fees and com-
missions in this case.
43L Il,/TREPAYMENT-CEBTMIJICATES OF DEPOSIT.
INSTRUCTIONS.
Where lands have been paid for with certificates of deposit on account of surveys,
and the entry fails, the certificate being within the control of the Commissioner
and not in fact satisfied, may be returned and the invalid entry canceled.
Where the payment has been carried into the Treasury as cash, repayment mast be
made as provided by the statute out of money in the Treasury, etc.
In cases of exception, falling within the repayment acts, the repayment mast be made
in the same manner.
Secretary Teller to Commissioner McFarland, ]llarck 9; 1883.
I have considered your letter of 15th July last, referring to a previous
letter of May 10, 1881, respecting the repayment of purchase money
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under the act of June 16, 1880 (21 Stat., 287), in cases where payment
was made under section 2403 Rev. Stat., in certificates of deposit for
money advanced for surveys under section 2401.
Section 2103, as amended by act of March 3, 1879 (20 Stat., 352),
makes these certificates assignable by indorsement and receivable in
payment for lands entered by settlers under the homestead and pre-
emption laws.
The act of June, 1880, provides for repayment of the amount paid in
the cases specified therein, and authorizes the Secretary of the Interior
to make the payments " out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise
appropriated" by drawing his warrant on the Treasury.
As this is a specific direction of law, and as the certificates represent
money previously paid into the Treasury and confessedly due the par-
ties, I am of the opinion that repayment should be made in cash, and
not by copy of the certificate with a recognition of the right to use it in
the same manner as the original.
With respect to repayment where the payment was made in what is
known as supreme court scrip, referred by your letter of November 18,
1881, there being no alternative provision, the act of June 16, 1880, un-
less the original purchase was governed by different conditions, would
also seem to require repayment out of money in the Treasury.
This scrip is issued by your office pursuant to the decrees of the
supreme court, where it has been adjudged that the United States has
sold, as public lands, or otherwise appropriated, lands covered by grants
to individuals, and by act of January 28, 1879 (20 Stat., 274), is required
to "be received from actual settlers only in payment of pre-emption
claims or in commutation of homestead claims in the same manner and
to the same extent as is now authorized by law in the case of military
bounty-land warrants."
Section 2277, Rev. Stat., provides that "all warrants for military
bounty lands which are issued under any law of the United States shall
be received in payment of pre-emption rights at the rate of $1.25 per
acre for the quantity of land therein specified; but where the land is
rated at $1.25 per acre and does not exceed the area specified in the
warrant, it must be taken in full satisfaction thereof.
In cases of warrants, except revolutionary bounty warrants, I under-
stand that in practice the entry takes the form of a specific location,
and that upon cancellation the warrant is returned to the locator to be
relocated the cancellation operating to vacate the original location, and
it being considered in such case that the warrant has never been satis-
fied, and consequently remains the individual property of the owner in
its real character as a chattel and not as money in the hands of the
government.
The same practice also prevails with the scrip in question.
But the act of 1880 introduces a new feature into the case by provid-
ing not for cancellation of the location but for repayment of the excess
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merely of $1.25 per acre for the land, the title still remaining in the
purchaser.
In such case the warrant has been laid upon the land and was received
as payment therefor, although too much was harged, and the law re-
quires a repayment of the overcharge. It would be manifestly incon-
venient, both to the purchaser and the government, to require the
warrant or scrip to be lifted, and money or other scrip or warrant rep-
resenting the exact amount to be laid in its place. This, especially
after issue of patent, would involve confusion of records and titles with-
out good or apparent reason. It is much simpler in l)ractice to take the
words of the statute in their natural sense, and. without disturbing the
entry and title papers, make the repayment as provided, by account
with the Treasury, with an indorsement of the transaction upon your
records as in other cases under the same law, without reference to the
question whether the payment was made in money or in paper receivable
as cash under the law providing for its use. And such 1 understand to
be the true intendment of the act.
1. Wherever, therefore, the entry is made by specific location, and
wholly fails, the scrip or warrant, being within the control of your office
and not in fact satisfied, may be returned for proper location upon can-
cellation of the former invalid entry. And this, I understand, is already
the practice, the case not being one falling under the repayment laws.
2. But where the consideration is carried into the Treasury as cash,
and can only be withdrawn by application under the repayment statutes,
it seems clear that it must be repaid, in the manner provided by the
statutes, out of money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated.
3. And in cases of excess, where they fall within the provisions of the
repayment acts, the excess must also be repaid, as provided by the law,
out of such moneys.
This construction will harmonize the whole law and conduce to uni-
formity in the practice of your office.
REP'A YMENT-FRA UD ULENT EXTR Y.
JOHN LONG1ECEX.
Where one removed from his own land and made filing upon public land, negativing
the fact as to removal, etc., by his affidavit, his entry was illegal and properly can-
celed.
By such false swearing he forfeited the money paid on entry, and repayment was
properly refused.
Secretary Teller to Commissioner MllcFarland, M31arch 12,18S3.
I have considered the appeal of John Longnecker from your de-
cision of May 15, 1882, rejecting his application for repayment of pur-
chase money on cash entry No. 395, of the N. i of the NW. of See.
9, T. 3 N., R. 28 W., North Platte district, Nebraska.
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It appears that Longnecker made homestead entry No. 6164 January
10, 1872, of the S. of the NE. of See. 8 and the S. -i of the NW. 
of Sec. 9, T. 3 N., R. 28 W., and that final certificate No. 256 issued
thereon March 18, 1878.
June 11, 1879, he filed declaratory statement No. 1321 for the N. i of
the NW. of said Sec. 9, alleging settlement on the 5th of the same
month, and entered the tract per cash entry No. 395, September 29,
1880.
It appears from certain evidence in the premises that at the date of
his alleged settlement upon the latter tract he was seized of his home-
stead claim, of which he divested himself in favor of his wife by war-
ranty deed dated February 28, 1880.
He alleges, however, by way of extenuation, that he did not establish
his residence upon his preemption claim until March 10 ensuing. This
can avail him nothing, because on the one hand he is confronted with
his allegation of settlement as of June 5, 1879, which would operate as
an estoppel to his alleging settlement upon any other date; while on
the other hand he is precluded from asserting title by virtue of his
alleged settlement of March 10, 1880, because it is not permissible to
file before settlement.
Thus he appears to fall within the category of persons who are ex-
pressly prohibited by the statute (section 2260 Rev. Stat.) from acquir-
ing the right of pre-emption, because it is manifest that at the date of
the initiation of his claim he removed from his own land " to reside on
the public lands in the same State or Territory."
Hence his filing was illegal and his entry based thereon was properly
canceled.
You rejected his application for repayment because his entry was not
erroneously allowed, as at the date thereof it had not been shown that
he had removed from his own land to his pre-emption claim, "and
therefore it was no fault on the part of the government in allowing the
entry."
The fact of such removal was not known by the register and receiver
September 29, 1880, when Longnecker entered his pre-emption claim,
nor did he disclose the fact until November 23, 1881, the date of his
affidavit alleging the same. Consequently, he swore falsely in his final
proof when he stated categorically that he had not removed from his
own land, etc. In such a case, section 2262, Rev. Stat., provides that
"if any person taking such oath swears falsely in the premises he shall
forfeit the money which he may have paid for such land, and all right
and title to the same."
I am, therefore, of the opinion that Longnecker has forfeited his rights
in the premises, and your decision is accordingly affirmed.
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DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,
GENERAL LAND OFFICE,
Wqshington, D. C., July 24, 1882.
JAMES W. SHANKLIN, Esq.,
State Surveyor- General, Sacramento, Cal.:
SIR: I have to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 13th
instant requesting a definition of the words " nal location of State
selections," on which location a fee of $2 is chargeable for each 160
acres or fractional part thereof. In reply you are informed that final
location is made when the list of selections has been examined by the
register and receiver for approval, and in no case are registers and
receivers to approve and post such lists until the fees are paid. Your
attention is called to the marked paragraphs pages 7 and 8 of inclosed
circular. A copy of this ruling will be forwarded to each local office
within the State of California for the guidance of the register and
receiver.




When registers and receivers make unauthorized expenditures, claims therefor can-
not be allowed.
Commissioner McFarland to Hon. Thomas Ryan, House of Representa-
ties, January 24, 1882.
I have to acknowledge the return of our letter of the 12th instant,
with your indorsenent thereon, referring to the claim of H. L. Isbell for
$167.67, which was paid by Henry Booth, esq., receiver of public moneys-
at Larned, Kans., in December last, and requesting that the same be
allowed, and in reply have to call your attention to sections 3677 and
3683 Rev. Stat.
The work performed by H. L. Isbell was in the fiscal year ending
June 30, 1878, and was properly chargeable to the appropriation for
contingent expenses of land offices for that fiscal year, provided the
receiver had previously been authorized to incur the expenditure, as is
required by section 3683 Rev. Stat., which provides that-
No part of the contingent fund of any Department, Bureau, or office
shall be applied to the purchase of any articles except such as the head
of the Department shall deeta necessary and proper to carry on the
business of the Department, Bureau, or office, and shall by written order
direct to be procured.
This section, while it does not expressly so state, has been construed
to cover clerk hire, rent, etc.
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The appropriation for the fiscal year 1878 having been exhausted,
there is now no appropriation available for the payment of the claim
of Mr. Booth, as this office is precluded by section 3679 Rev. Stat. from
incurring or authorizing any expenditure whatever in excess of appro-
priations.
You state further that Mr. Booth desires to, have determined the
question whether this office on consideration of the merits of the claim
will or can lawfully allow it.
While the terms allow a claim and pay a claim are not synonymous,
the fact of allowing a claim would carry with it a provision for pay-
ment, and as the employment of Mr. Isbell was without authority of
law, and therefore an unauthorized expenditure, the approval of the
claim where there is no appropriation available would be a violation of
the law, and I have therefore to decline to approve the claim.
The voucher of Mr. Booth and our letter of the 12th instant are here-
with returned.
MIN.YVG CLAIM-A LLECA TIO.V-NOTICE-JUDCGMEVT.
ROBINSON ET AL. V. MAYGER.
An allegation of an adverse claim, shown upon a proper map, is good notice, and if
sufficient as a basis for court proceedings the Land Department should await the
judgment.
Secretary Teller to Commissioner McFarland, December iS, 1882.
The adverse (mining) claim was filed in time, and suit in court duly
commenced upon a stay of proceedings by the register. You dismiss
the same on the ground that it fails in the matter of a sufficient aver-
ment on account of certain matters appearing in the location paper
limiting the right to surface ground so " as not to interfere with the
location of the Saint Louis lode claim."
This you hold as so far controlling the claim that nothing could be
set up by such location within the lines of the survey plat of the pend-
ing application unless upon express averment that the patent plat had
floated the claim outside the original location; and as the conflict of
location was only shown by exhibit upon a plat of survey, with an aver-
ment of possessory right only, without explanation, you decided that
the adverse claim was bad on general demurrer to its sfficiency and
should be dismissed.
Without asserting that a better and fuller showing might not have
been made, I am of the opinion that an allegation of adverse pos-
sessory right, upon a plat showing distinctly the ground claimed, is
good notice of such claim, and if it has been found u fficient upon which
to frame a declaration for a proceeding in court, and the issue has
actually been carried before the competent legal tribunal, this Depart-
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ment should not declare it ineffective and attempt to execute title
papers without awaiting the judgment of such tribunal.
Your decision is accordingly reversed, and the proceedings will be
stayed as required by law until the final action of the court.
MLrLilV CLAIM-PENDING AD FERSE SUIT.
IOLA LODE CASE.
Where entry was allowed upon certificate that no suit was pending, and the j udg-
ment in applicant's favor was set aside and the clerk directed to recall said cer-
tificate, said entry was properly canceled upon the filing of a certificate showing
that the suit was still pending.
Secretary Teller to Commissioner McFarland, November 16, 1882.
I have considered the case of mineral entry No. 577, Leadville, Colo.,
made by T. D. Anthony, upon the Iola lode, upon appeal by Anthony
from your decision of January 4, 1882, holding his entry for cancella-
tion.
It appears that an adverse claim was duly filed, and suit commenced
thereon, which was pending May 3, 1881. Upon that day, the adverse
claimant having failed, as alleged, to file a replication to some proceed-
ing of the applicant for patent, the latter moved the court for a default
against the former which was allowed, and judgment was rendered
thereon. Upon the following day (the 4th) the clerk issued his certifi-
cate that no suit involving the right of possession to the Iola lode was
pending, which certificate was forthwith filed with the local officers, and
the entry in question was made. Upon the same day, after the entry,,
the attorney for the adverse claimant notified these officers that a suit
was pending, and he was advised that upon presentation of a certifi-
cate from the court to the effect that the certificate under which the.
entry was allowed erroneously issued, the entry would be suspended..
The matter having been brought to the attention of the court, the de-
fault and judgment were set aside, and the clerk was directed to recalk
his former certificate, .and that it be held for -naught. He, thereupon,.
issued another certificate, reciting the action of the court and showing-
pendency of a suit upon the adverse claim, which certificate was filed.
in the local office. Your decision, from which appeal is taken, was ren-
dered upon request of the local officers for instructions.
The question submitted is upon the validity of this entry. It is the,
duty of your office to pass upon the papers for application for a patent
and upon the protest of the adverse claimant. But when suit is com-
menced upon the adverse claim all questions touching the possessory
rights of the parties are transferred to the court, and action by your
office must be suspended pending determination of that question. As;
the court has exclusive jurisdiction in this matter, its proceedings musty
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'be respected. If it errs the error can only be corrected by its proper ap-
-pellate tribunal, and not by your office or by this Department, neither of
which is invested with such authority, nor will interfere with or attempt
to control or revise its decisions. It must be presumed that its action
in respect to this case was within its jurisdiction, and was legally per-
formed; and, consequently, that the first certificate erroneously issued,
and that the second was within its judicial right and discretion. As
such, it must have its due and legal force.
So far as appears, the suit is still pending, and until final determina-
tion of the questions therein involved, the entry must be held erroneous,
equally with the certificate on which it was based.
Your decision is accordingly affirmed.
COAL LAND-PRICE-HOW DETERMINED.
INSTRUCTIONS.
'The price depends upon the distance from a completed railroad. If at date of proof
and payment the land is more than fifteen miles from such road the price should
be not less than $10 per acre; if less than fifteen miles not less than $20.
Secretary Kirkwood to Commissioner McFarland, October 17, 1881.
I have considered the question submitted for my consideration by
,your letter of September 29th ultimo, viz, the price government shtould
~charge for coal lands-whether 10 or $20 per acre-where the land is
.situated more than fifteen miles from any completed railroad at the time
the claimant commenced opening and improving the mine, and at the
-date he filed his declaratory statement, but which is within fifteen miles
,of such road at the date of his application to purchase the land.
The answe rests upon a construction of sections 2347, 2348, 2349, and
:2350, Rev.-Stat.
Section 2317 provides that
Every person . . . . or association of persons . . . . shall
.. . . . have the right to enter . . . . any quantity of vacant
coal lands . . . . not exceeding one hundred and sixty acres to
~such individual person, or three hundred and twenty acres to such as-;sociation, upon payment to the rec.iver of not less than $10 per acrefor such land, where the same shall be situated more than fifteen milesfrom any completed railroad, and not less than $20 per acre for suchlands as shall be within fifteen miles of such road.
Section 2348 provides that-
Any person or association of persons . . . who have opened
.nard improved, or shall hereafter open and improve, any coal -nine or
mines upon the public lands, and shall be in atual possession of the
same, shall be entitled to a preference right of entry, under the preced-
-ing section, of the mines so opened and improved. * * *
Section 2349 provides for the presentation of all claims, under the
Preceding section, to the register oftbe proper land district within sixty
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days after the date of actual possession and the commencement of im-
provements on the, land, by the filing of a declaratory statement there-
for; and if the township plat-is not on file at the date of such improve-
ment, the filing must be made within sixty days from receipt of the plat
at the district office.
Section 2350 provides that persons claiming under section 2348 shall
prove their respective rights and pay for the land filed upon within one-
year from the time prescribed for filing their respective claims; and
upon failure to file the proper notice, or to pay for the land within the
required period, the same shall be subject to entry by any other qualified!
applicant.
These sections are a re-enactment of the act of March 3, 1873, which
was not a part of the pre-emption system for the disposition of the-
public lands, but "An act to provide for the sale of lands of the United
States containing coal." As an independent act it must, therefore, be-
construed by itself, unaided by other acts, unless by analogy. It is not,
in my opinion, difficult of interpretation.
Under the sections named coal lands, when subject to sale, may be-
disposed of by private cash entry; or a person opening and improving
the same, and in actual possession, may acquire a preference right to-
enter the same by presenting his claim to the district land office within'
sixty days after date of his actual possession and commencement of
improvements, and filing his declaratory statement therefor within the
time required by section 3249; in which case he must prove his right
and pay for the land within one year from the time prescribed for filing,
his claim; in default of which his preference right expires, and the laud-
becomes subject to entry by another, as provided in section 2350. This
preference right is a mere right of entry secured to such persons, as.
against others, and affects no other question. If waived by neglect to
prove up and pay for the land, it ceases. It has no relation to the price of-
the land, but to an entry only. The price is otherwise determined. The
provision of section 2343 that the persons named "shall be entitled to
a preference right of entry, under the preceding section," means, I thinkl
that they may enter the land upon the terms and conditions named in
section 2347, which section fixes the price of the land. The preference-
right to enter a tract, and the actual entry thereof, are quite distinct in
their legal significance and effect; and when the statute gives the "right
to enter a tract," upon payment of a certain price, it confines the entry
to that price, and does not permit the entry to be controlled. by condi-
tions affecting the price, which may have existed when the-preference
right was secured-perhaps a year previously-and when the relation
of the land to a completed railroad may have been quite different. The
preference right has reference to a subsequent entry; but the price is
to be determined at the date of entry, as if the party made private cash
entry, and notwithstanding he may have secured a preference right;
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and is regulated by the relation of the land to the road at the date of
proof of payment.
I am of the opinion, therefore, that the price of the land depends
wholly upon its distance from a completed railroad at the date of entry,
irrespective of the preferred right of entry, and that if, at the date of
proof and payment (which constitutes the entry), the land is more than
fifteen miles from such road, the price should be not less than $10 per
acre; and that if it is within fifteen miles the price should be not less
than $20 per acre.
MINING CLAIM-APPLICITION-CONFLICT.
REBELLION MINING COMPANY.
-Application for patent of a mining claim, which conflicts with a claim, embraced in
a prior pending claim, cannot be received.
The rule is derived from that provision of the statute which prescribes the method
of filing adverse claims.
Where the statute prescribes one way in which a thing shall be done, it precludes
every other way.
o9?missioner Jlicarland to register and receiver, Salt Lake City, Utah,
October 1, 1881.
On the 7th of May last, the Rebellion Mining Company presented at
your office two applications for patent, one being for the Rebellion lode,
designated as lot No. 193, and the other for the Mulkahy lode, lot No.
-194, which applications were rejected by the register for the reason that
a portion of the land embraced in each application conflicts with claims
previously applied for, to wit: The Rebellion lode conflicts with the
Bibleback, lot 177, the Samuel, lot 178, and the Fallon, lot 179; while
the Mulkahy conflicts with the Samuel and Fallon claims, for all of
which applications for patent are now pending in your office, and to
which the Rebellion Mining Company duly filed adverse claims for the
area in conflict thereafter, in due time instituting suits in court to de-
termine the right of possession.
From the register's action in rejecting the Rebellion Company's
application, an appeal has been taken to this office. Inasmuch as the
decision is in accordance with the previous rulings of this office (laggin
v. Chavanne, S. M. D., 243), and a correct construction of the law, no
error was committed.
I In the case cited, it was held that " the rule which forbids the recep-
tion of an application for patent to a mining claim which conflicts with
a claim embraced in a prior pending application, is derived from that
provision of the statute which prescribes the method of filing adverse
claims." Where the statute prescribes one way by which a thing shall
be done, it precludes every other. Chavanne, having made application
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for patent to the Elk Mining claim, Haggin, as owner of a conflicting
claim, had but one method open to him to protect his interest and have
his rights determined. It is easy, it would seem, to see that this rule
is a salutary one; for were it otherwise, application after application
might be accumulated in the local offices, all relating to the same land,
thus nullifying the law which requires adverse claims to be filed and
prosecuted.
From the argument of counsel, I understand that the Rebellion Com-
pany simply desires these proceedings for patent to progress so far that
it may, in the event of judgment in its favor by the courts, in the con-
troversies pending against the Bibleback, Samuel, and Fallon claimants,
enter its claims entire.
The proper method to accomplish this end is by excluding from its
applications the areas in conflict with the claims previously applied for,
as shown by the accompanying plats.
It is urged, however, that should this be done. it would amount to an
abandonment of all the ground in conflict. This is clearly a mistaken
conclusion. Such an exclsion is not a relinquishment. The company's
right to the land in conflict has been asserted by the filing of adverse
claims, which relate only to the land in conflict; and this was the only
way by which it could assert title to such portions of its claims. The
proposed applications will amount to an assertion of its right to the
remaining portions. Now, the plats of surveys and the field notes
properly describe and show the entire claims, also correctly represent-
ing the areas of conflet.
It would be a somewhat difficult matter to prepare, for publication and
posting, notices which shall describe only those portions of the claims
not in conflict, thus requiring no words of exclusion, without having
prepared amended surveys. In order to avoid the trouble and expense
incident to such amendment, it is regarded as sufficient for executive
purposes if words of exclusion be used in the application and notices,
which affect only the present proceedings; but patents could not issue
for the portions so applied for separately from the portions in contro-
versy without amended surveys.
The company must amend its applications so as to. exclude the con-
flicting areas therefrom, which exclusion must also be recited in the
published and posted notices; and I see no objection to adding thereto
an express declaration that it thereby relinquishes no right or title to
the areas so excluded, although I deem such declaration wholly unn ec-
essary.
Should it appear, upon proper proceedings being had,,that the com-
pany is entitled to the land so applied for, and the courts adjudge it to
be the owner of the areas in conflict, it may make entry of each lot as
if applied for entire.
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MINING CLAIM-CO-TEBNANTS-AD VERSE CLA1MANTS.
; LE <S /, gAT11PlAN LODE.
Section 2324, Rev. Stat., must be construed in connection with section 2325. Co-
tenants, who are alleged to be delinquent, even when they are not so in fact, must
protect their rights as adverse claimants.
Secretary Teller to Commissioner McFarland, August 7, 182.
I have considered the appeal of the Grampian Silver Mining Company
(Mineral entry No. 748, Salt Lake City, Utah) from your decision of July-
25, 1882.
It appears that this claim, embracing 1,4 0 linear feet, was located
August 15, 1871, by one O'Neil and nine others, and that on July 7,
1875, the possessory title thereto had vested as follows, viz: William
Plunkett, Matt. Welsh, Barney Mullen, John Kennedy, John awkes,
and J. C. Lynch, 100 feet each; Samuel HEawkes, 200 feet, and James
Ryan, 600 feet; and that upon the day last named, Samuel Hawkes
addressed a notice, under oath, to Plunkett, Welsh, Mullen, and Ken-
nedy (which notiee was recorded January 10, 1876. in the county in
which the claim is situated) setting forth that he had performed assess-
ment work on the Grampian ledge, and that unless the delinquent
owners paid their proportion of the expense within the time prescribed
by law, their interest in the mine would be forfeited, and become the
property of the co-owners.
On August 18, 1879 (John Hawkes having conveyed his interest to-
Samuel awkes and Ryan), Samuel Hawkes, Ryan, and Lynch con-
veyed the entire mine to the Grampian Company.
Section 2324, Rev. Stat., requires that upon the failure of one of sev-
eral co-owners to contribute his proportion of the required expenditure,
the co-owners who have performed the labor or made the improvements.
may, at the expiration of the year, give the delinquent co-owners per-
sonal notice in writing, or notice by publication in the newspaper pub-
lished nearest the claim, for at least once a week for ninety days, and
if, at the expiration of ninety days after such notice in writing, or by
publication, such delinquent shall fail or refuse to contribute his pro-
portion of the expenditure required by the section, his interest in the
claim shall become the property of his co-owners who have made the-
required expenditures.
Under its said purchase the Grampian Company applied, July 20.
1881, for patent. It is not objected that its publication of notice thereof,.
or any of its proceedings in that respect, were irregular; but your de-
cision holds that, as no evidence has been submitted showing in what
manner the notice of forfeiture was served upon the delinquent co--
owners, or that the delinquent co-owners did not within the required
time pay their proportionate share of the annual expenditure, the com-
pany must show, before issue of patent, the manner of serving said
notice, and that the delinquent co-owners did not pay their said pro--
portion.
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Section 2324, the only statute affecting this question, must be con-
strued in connection with section 2325. Both have reference to the
possessory title of an applicant for patent, atud41he mode of acquiring
patent; the latter providing that if no adverse claim i filed during the
period of publication, it shall be assumed that none exists. It would,
therefore, seem immaterial, after proceedings under section 2 125, whether
or not the requirement of section 2324 is complied with to the extent
named in your decision; because if parties have not been properly noti-
fied, or have paid their share of assessment work, they must still file
their adverse claim under the proceedings contemplated in section 2325.
They waive their rights by failure to file such claim. And upon such
failure the law not only assumes that no such claim exists, but if the
antecedent publication' and attendant proceedings have been regular,
all that might be set up, by suit in court has been adjudicated in favor
of 'the applicant. I will, therefore, assume in the present case that the
notice of forfeiture required by section 2324 was not only given as re-
quired, but that the delinquent co-owners did not pay their share of the
assessment work.
It appears, however, that on November 4, 1881, James Al. Graham
et al. commenced an action against the Grampian Company involving
the latter's right of possession and title to the claim in dispute, but
that, as appears from a certificate of the clerk of the proper court, dated
May 2, 1882, there was then no suit or action pending which involved
said right to any portion of the Grampian mine, and that there had
been no litigation affecting the title of said company to said mine for
two years then last past, other than what had been decided in favor of
said company. This certificate is filed in lieu of the judgment roll, and
is equally satisfactory for the lurpose of this proceeding.
I am of the opinion that, in view of the facts and the law, it is not
necessary for the Grampian Company to furnish the proofs required by
your decision, but that these matters must be held determined in favor
of the company by the failure of the objectors to file and prosecu te to a
favorable issue an adverse claim, as required by section 2325.
I therefore modify your decision, and direct that patent issue to the
Grampian Company, as applied for.
2W4C @ / 
2 , y 63NINING CLAIM-ACTS OF AN OFFICER DE FACTO.
DEAN RICHMJOND LODE.
Where the register of a land office was suspended from office and the Commissioner
directed the receiver to take charge of the office, and the receiver kept the office
open and performed the duties of register pursuant to such order, and received
and allowed an application for mineral patent and made publication thereof, such
acts were those of an officer defacto acting colore offidi and valid as to the public
and to third parties having an interest therein.
Acting Secretary Joslyn to Commissioner McFarland, August 18, 1882.
I have considered the matter of the application of Charles F. Hine
et al.-for patent for the Dean Richmond lode, and in connection there-
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with the conflicting applications of S. R. DeLong et al., claiming for
the Bronknow, and E. N. Nash for the first easterly extension of the
Bronknow mines, Tucson land district, Arizona, on appeal from your
decision of May 18, 1882, directing the register and receiver to allow
the applicants of the Dean Richmond lode to complete entry by pay-
ment of the purchase money.
October 4, 1880, C. M. K. Paulison, then register at Florence Ariz.,
was, by order of the President, suspended from office.
October 5, 1880, Acting Commissioner Holcomb addressed the fol-
lowing letter of instructions to Charles E. Dailey, the receiver:
I have this day transmitted to C. M. K. Paulison the order of the
President suspending him from the office of register of the land office
at Florence, Ariz.
My letter to Mr. Paulison covering said order of suspension has been
inclosed to Wilson T. Smith, special agent now i Florence, with direc-
tions to deliver the same to the register in person, and see that it is
obeyed.
The register is directed to immediately on receipt of said order sur-
render his office and all his records and papers to you. You are
directed to take immediate possession of the same, to refuse the regis-
ter any access to the office or records, and you will be held responsible
for the safe care and custody thereof until relieved by further orders.
Under the authority of this letter Dailey took possession of the reg-
ister's office, and, you informed me-
Continued to transact the public business of the land office. Among
other acts he received applications for patent for mining claims, and
ordered publication of notices of such applications in the proper news-
papers. He continued to so act until November 15, 1880, when my
predecessor, by teleraph, directed him to receive no further filings or
entries.
November 16,1880, your office, by letter, advised said receiver, as
follows:
Where you have admitted entries since Mr. Paulisoni's suspension,
you will at once notify the parties that such entries are defective, and
that new applications must be made to cure the defect. The affidavits
already filed in these cases may be deemed sufficient if in other respects
correct. The parties attempting to make the entries erroneously ac-
cepted by you will be allowed the preference right to make the new
entries required, and the money previously received by you will be ap-
plied on such entries.
The application for patent for the Dean Richmond lode was filed in
the local office October 30, 1880, and C. F. Dailey, receiver of public
moneys, and acting as register ad interim, designated the Tombstone
Epitaph as the paper in which publication should be made. Notice was
accordingly published in the daily issue of said paper for the full period
prescribed by law, to wit, from November 9, 1880, to January 13, 1881.
No adverse claim was filed during the period of publication.
October 29, 1880, I7. J. Osborne, attorney for the Bronknow claimant,
filed with the acting register applications for patents for the Bronknow
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and first easterly extension of the Bronknow lode. Such applications
were received, but were not accompanied by any proof that the plat and
notice had been posted upon the claim as required by section 2325, Rev.
Stat. The want of such proof was not discovered at the time the appli-
catio-ns were received, nor until the order for publication was about to
be issued.
Such applications, without such proof, had no standing, and were no
bar to the reception of the application for the Dean Richmond lode.
As the record stood, therefore, the Dean Richmond lode bad te pref-
erence right, and that right should have been maintained under the
order of your predecessor of November 16, 18S0, and the act of Register
Cousin of May iS, 1881, and subsequently, A giving preference to the
Bronknow claimants, was in violation of that order, and the Dean Rich-
mond claimants could lose no rights by neglecting to take an appeal
from the decision of the register in favor of the publication of the no-
tices of the Bronknow applications, if such appeal would have been
proper, nor by disregarding the acts of the register done in violation of
that order.
During the period of the publication of notice of the Bronknow notices,
an adverse claim was filed by the Dean Richmond claimants, and suit
was brought and is now pending thereon. The fact that this act was
compelled by the erroneous act of the register in directing such publi-
eation cannot, as is correctly stated by you, be construed as a waiver of
r any rights of the Richmond claimants.
The main question to be considered in the case, however, is as to the
legality of the acts done by Receiver Dailey while acting as register
after the suspension of Paulison.
The general doctrine that the acts of an officer de facto are valid,
whether such acts be judicial or ministerial, in so far as they affect the
rights of the public or of third persons, is elementary and too well set-
tled to admit of discussion or to require the citation of authorities. It
is a doctrine founded in necessity and upon principles of public policy.
The difficulty is in the application. of the doctrine to the facts of the
particular case under consideration.
It does not follow that because a person is in possession of an office
that his acts are necessarily legal. He may be a mere intruder or
usurper; and if so, third persons are bound to take notice of that fact,
and can acquire no rights from his acts. The test is, whether the per-
son is in possession of the office under color (colore offcii) of right or
authority to exercise its functions e
A receiver as such has no right to perform the duties of a register;
and the question in this case is, did the authority contained in the letter
of October 5, 1880, give under the rule the necessary color of right ?
The order 'was from a superior officer. It informed the receiver that
the register had been directed to immediately " surrender his office and-
all his records and papers " to him, and he was ordered " to-take imme-
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diate possession of the same." I think this order contained te neces-
sary color of authority. The receiver believed from its terms that the
business of the office, which he was directed to take charge of, was to
be continued by him. le was rightfully in possession of the place of
business and of the books and papers, and clothed by authority with all
the insignia of the office. He believed that he had the right to transact
the business done by him, and his acts were within the scope of his.
duties as register. Both parties claimant believed that he was right-
fully in the position of register, and they in good faith, and in common
with other third persons, transacted with him the usual business of the
office.
Section 1768 of the Revised Statutes does not contemplate a vacancy
in office by the suspension of au officer, but authorizes the President
"to designate some suitable person, subject to be removed, in his dis-
cretion, by the designation of another, to perform the duties of such.
suspended officer."
In this case the information respecting the suspension of Mr. Paulison
was conveyed from the President to Mr. Dailey through the order of
the Acting Commissioner, and he was not advised of any other desig-
nation, nor was there any other. He was himself designated by the
Acting Commissioner to take possession of "his office and all his records.
and papers."
He might reasonably have supposed that the term " office" included
the function as well as the rooms of the register, and that the designa-
tion was authorized by the President. It is not necessary to the legality
of his acts that the person who directed him to take charge of the office
should have had the authority to make the appointment (9 Op., 432).
I am of the opinion that Mr. Dailey was defacto register during the
period the acts aforesaid were done, and that such acts as to said third.
persons were valid. I therefore affirm your decision, and direct that
the applicants for the Dean Richmond lode be allowed to complete
entry by payment of the purchase money.
MINING CLAIM-POSTING NOTICE-" CONSPICUOUS PLACE."
LOUISVILLE LODE CASE.
After entry the presumption is in favor of the recognition of the requisite antecedent
facts, and the regularity of the proceedings.
A plat and notice posted in an open shaft-house, where no obstruction is shown, and
where in a particular locality it is customary to so post, considered such " con-
spicuous place" as required by law.
Secretary Teller to Commissioner IMceFarland, August 4, 1882.
On March 30 last you rendered a decision in the matter of the protest-
against the issue of patent to Albert J. Johnson and William M. Clay-
ton for the Louisville lode, being mineral entry No. 238, Leadville, Colo.,
which protest you dismissed for reasons stated; and on April 30 you.
denied to the locators of the Tucson, Ruby, and Idaho mines the right.
DECISIONS RELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS. 549
of appeal from said decision, for the reason that they were protestants
only.
The record is now transmitted to me for consideration under practice
rule 83.
It is claimed by the protestants, 1st, that the location of the Louis-
-ville, lode was not based upon the discovery of a vein or lode of mineral
bearing ore; 2d, that the plat and notice were not posted in " a con-
spicuous place" during the period of publication; and 3d, that the
publication and posted notices suppressed mention of claims adjoining
the Louisville lode.
In respect of the first objection, I have examined the testimony and
concur with you in the opinion that the location of the Louisville lode
was based upon the discovery of a vein or lode of mineral-bearing ore.
This sufficiently appears from the statements of credible witnesses.
The rule is well settled that when testimony is introduced on both sides
of the case, and the jury find in favor of one, from a preponderance of
the testimony, the court will not, for that reason, grant a new trial.
The same rule prevails in this Department, and the presumption is also,
after entry, in favor of the recognition of the requisite antecedent facts
and the regularity of the proceedings. In such case, except upon strong
showing, the entry will not be disturbed.
I am also of the opinion tuat the publication was regular, and that
the notice in the inside of the shaft house was posted in such conspica-
ous place, " as required by law." This was an open shaft house, and
no obstruction or difficulty in obtaining a view of the notice has been
shown. In that locality it is common for notices to be so posted, and
miners are accustomed to look in such places for the desired information.
As the record does not show that the publication and notices sup-
pressed mention of any facts required by law, or that any one was misled
by any omission therein, or that there was any fraudulent omission,
with intent t deceive, in said notices, and no undue haste u as made to
enter the tract after publication; and as the protest was not filed until
after the entry, and the protestants do not appear to have been deprived
of any right by the action of the Louisville locators, I find nothing in
the case requiring the intervention of this Department, and return the
papers accordingly.
iONING CLX Im-PLA CER-LODE-PA TENT.
WAR DANCE V. CHURCH PLACER.
Where the existence of a vein or lode in a placer claim is not known at the date of
the application, then " the patent for the placer claim shall convey all valuable
mineral and other deposits within the boundaries thereof."
Secretary Teller to Commissioner McFarland, February 2, 1883.
I have considered the case of the War Dance claimants v. the Church
Placer claimants, Russell mining district, Gilpin County, Colorado, on
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appeal from your decision holding that the lode claimants are not en-
titled to lode or surface ground lying within the limits of the placer.
The War Dance lode was located some fifteen months subsequently
to the entry of the Church Placer.
A question of fact is presented as to whether the lode (survey No.
5S5) was known to exist within the boundaries of the placer claim at the
time of the application for a patent for the placer claim.
This question as to the knowledge of the existence of lode arises upon
the first official survey made by Deputy Locke in 1876. A lode seemed.
to be indicated upon that plat. It was asserted subsequently by the
deputy surveyor, Rank, that what seemed to be a lode upon the plat of
such survey, "running through the northeasterly part of the placer,
appeared to be only a porphyry dike, which had never been surveyed
or claimed by anybody."
On the other hand, it was claimed that the so-called porphyry dike
and the War Dance lode was identical.
Such being the state of the question, November 22, 1881, you directed
the surveyor-general " to make the proper examination and necessary
inquiries to determine the question of identity."
The result of such examination, contained in the report and plat made
to the surveyor-general February 24,1882, by Benjamin H. Smith, ex-
aminer, establishes the fact that such formation designated as a por-
phyry dike is distinct from the War Dance lode, and is evidently, as
stated in such report, to be what seemed "the lode mentioned in the
original survey of the Church Placer."
As the proof stands, I think it is established that thelode claim known.
as the War Dance was not known until more than fifteen months sub-
sequently to the date of the entry of the Church Placer claim.
But, however the foregoing assertion of fact may be found, it is in-
sisted by the War Dance claimants as the law of the case, that if the
existence of that lode becomes known at any time before patent is is-
sued for the placer claim, then the lode and the surface ground pertaining
thereto must be excluded from the patent.
In the late case of Becker et al. v. Sears, I considered the construction
which I thought ought to be given to section 2333 U. S. Rev. Stats., and
held that such section " carves out from a patent to a placer claim all
known lodes found therein at date of application, together with twenty-
five feet of surface ground on both sides as incident thereto."
The converse of that proposition necessarily follows, viz: That where
the existence of a vein or lode in a placer claim is not known at the late
of the application, then " the patent for the placer claim shall convey all
valuable mineral and other deposits within the boundaries thereof."
Your decision, therefore, to the effect that, " as the War Dance claim
was not known until long after the date of entry of the placer claim,
the lode claimant is entitled to neither lode nor surface ground within
the placer limits," is affirmed.
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Xa- G. & p XFM CLAIM-SURFAICE GROUND-PLAXCER.
2 / V6 g SHONBAu LODE."
The claim exceeds twenty-five feet in width on each side of the vein. The applica-
tion has been allowed, publication regularly had, and entry made. In fact said
claimants had completed their proofs, and the same were matter of record in the
office for several months prior to the issuance of the placer patents, and no adverse
claim was filed. It would not be practicable, therefore, at this stage of the cause,
to remit these claimants to the performance, de nvo, of such preliminary require-
ments. In the absence of an adverse claim they are entitled to take their lode
and twenty-five feet on either side.
The only question remaining is whether or not the excess over that width of surface
ground can be allowed. This cannot be done. The lode claimants, in order to
protect their right to the full extent of their claim, should have filed adversely to
the placer application within the statutory period, but having failed so to do,
they are expressly restricted by the statute to theirlode "and twenty-five feet of
surface on each side thereof."
Secretary Teller to Conmmissioner jlfciartand, iarch 26, 1883.
I have considered the appeal of Anthony H. Barret et al. applicants
for patent for the Shonbar Lode, from your decisions of March 28 and
June 3, 1882, the former holding their Helena, Mont., mineral entry
No. 611 of the premises for cancellation, and the latter declining to re-
call the former.
You held the entry for cancellation because the ground covered
thereby had been previously patented as placer claims upon mineral
entries numbered 575 and 553, per patents issued April 15 and May 16,
1881, respectively.
It appears that said applicants located their claim May 5, 1879, filed
application for patent November 2, 1880, notice whereof was regularly
published from November 5 to January 6, 1881, whereupon they made
mineral entry No. 611, January 14, 1881. Their application calls for
";1497 linearfeet of the Shonbar vein, lode, or deposit, bearing silver and
other metals, together with surface ground varying from 464 to 53S
feet in wi(lth .being situated in the Summit Valley mining
district, county of Deer Lodge, Territory of Montana." Such claim is
designated as "lot No. 175," containing an area of 17.19 acres, and is
so delineated by the official survey thereof made by United States
Deputy Mineral Surveyor Baker, June 26, 1880, plat whereof was ap-
proved by United States Surveyor-General Mason, September 3d, ensu-
ing. These applicants claim to have acquired title "by purchase from
original locators."
It further appears that, under date of May 29, 1882, the applicants'
attorney filed in their behalf the affidavits of certain persons resident
in said district, alleging that the Shonbar Lode is a well-defined vein,
rich in minerals; and that its existence was known at and long anterior
to the date of said placer application.
'See 3 L. D., 388.
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Wherefore said attorney requested that your former decision be re-
called and that patent issue for the Shonbar Lode claim; but by your
decision of June 3, 1882, you declined to recall your former decision,
holding the matter to be beyond the jurisdiction of your office.
This case, so far as relates to the question of the existence of a known
lode, is within the rule established by this Department under date of
the 19th instant, in the matter of the Mammoth Quartz Mine, wherein
it was ordered that the lode claimants be permitted to proceed pursu-
ant to statutory provisions by application for patent upon the lode
claim, by regular publication, subject to the filing of an adverse claim
and the institution of suit in a court of competentjurisdiction.
But the present claim exceeds twenty-five feet in width on each side
of the vein. The application has been allowed, publications regularly
had, and the entry made. In fact, said claimants had completed their
proofs, and the same were matter of record in your office for several
months prior to the issuance of the placer patents, and no adverse claim
was filed. It would not be practicable, therefore, at this stage of the
cause to remit these claimants to the performance, de novo, of such pre-
liminary requirements. In the absence of an adverse claim they are
entitled to take their lode and twenty-five feet on either side.
The only question remaining is whether or not the excess over that
-width of surface ground can be allowed.
I think this cannot be done. The lode claimants in order to protect
their right to the full extent of their claim, should have filed adversely
to the placer application within the statutory period, but having failed
so to do, they are expressly restricted by the statute to their lode "and
twenty-five feet of surface on each side thereof."
Your decision is accordingly reversed; and if on exa mination the
proofs are found regular and sufficient, you will require a corrected plat,
properly defining the restricted surface ground, upon which patent will
issue.
c <>9J M 7 INERAL LAND-MILITAR Y RESERVATION.
FORT MAGINNIS.
Mineral lands may be included in reservations for military purposes, and they are not
subject to appropriation by mineral claimants while such reservation exists.
But where mining claims were legally located and held prior to such reservation,
the miners' rights cannot be divested by taking the land for military purposes.
Attorney General XlIac Veagh to the Secretary of War, October 21, 1881
By your letter of the 30th of August, 1831, and the nclosures received
therewith, relating to the military reservation of Fort M1aginnis in Mon-
tana Territory, it appears that this reservation was set apart by an
Executive order dated the 8th of April last; that certain miners of
Parker, Meagher County, Montana, now allege that mineral was dis-
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covered and a mining camp established by them on land included in
the reservation several months previous to the location of the post by
the military authorities; and that inquiry is made by them whether
they can " hold the mines and the surface ground connected therewith,
though they be on the reservation?" and whether mineral land can " be
located and patented on a military reservation after the establishment
of the reservation."
Agreeably to a suggestion of the Secretary of the Interior contained
in his letter of the 16th of August, 188L (one of the inclosures above
mentioned), you request an opinion upon the following questions:
1. Whether or not mineral lands reserved from sale under section
2318, Rev. Stat. of the United States, can be reserved for military pur-
poses by order of the President e
2. Where mineral lands are included within the limits of a military
reservation, are such lands open to exploration and purchase under
section 2319, Rev. Stat. e
3. Where an inchoate title to mineral lands has been acquired as
shown in the letter of the Secretary of the Interior and the accompany-
ing report of the Commissioner of the General Land Office, and such
lands have subsequently been included within a military reservation,
can the title to said mineral lands be perfected by the private owner.
For convenience, the first and second questions will be considered
together.
In an opinion heretofore given by this Department, addressed to you
on the 15th of July last, wherein the subject of the authority of the
President to reserve lands for public purposes came under considera-
tion, it was observed that the power of the President to set apart, for
those purposes, such portions of the public domain as are required by
the exigencies of the public service to be thus appropriated, is too well
established to admit of doubt; citing in this connection the case of
Grisar '. McDowell (6 Wall., 381), in which the supreme court re-
marks:
From an early period'in the history of the government it has been
the practice of the President to order from time to time, as the exigen-
cies of the public service required, parcels of land belonging to the
United States to be reserved from sale and set apart for public uses.
The authority of the President in this respect is recognized in numerous
acts of Congress.
This power is in the above-mentioned opinion retarded as extending
to any lands which belong to the public domain, and capable of being
exercised with respect to such lands so long as they remain unappro-
priated. As thus defined, the power is broad enough to include min-
eral lands belonging to the public domain, at least whilst they remain
unaffected by any privateright acquired under.the laws relating thereto
I am satisfied with that view of the subject, and accordingly the first
question is answered in the affirmative. This necessarily involves a
negative answer to the second question; since, after the lands have
once been lawfully reserved by the President for public- uses, the lands
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so appropriated become severed from the public domain, and are thence-
forth not subject to occupation and purchase under the general law.
The answer to the third question depends upon whether land covered
by a mining claim, where the locator of the claim has taken no steps to
obtain a patent, and the premises still constitute a part of the public
domain, may be lawfully reserved and set apart by the President for
public uses. Under the laws providing for the exploration, occupation,
and disposal of the mineral lands, the locator, so long as he complies
with the conditions imposed by those laws, is clothed with a possessory
right which entitles him to "the exclusive right of possession and en-joyment of all the surface included within the lines of his location."
(See sections 2320, 2322, 2324, Rev. Stats.) The object of those laws is
to promote the development of our mining resources, rather than the
sale of the mineral lands, and to that end, "Congress has, by statute
and by tacit consent," as is remarked by te supreme court, in Forbes
v. Gracey (94 U. S., 72), "permitted the individuals and corporations
to dig out and convert to their own use the ores containing the precious
metals which are found in the lands belonging to the government,
without exacting or receiving any compensation for these ores, and
without requiring the miner to buy orpay for the land. It has gone fur-
ther,' added the court, " and recognized the possessory rights of these
miners as ascertained among themselves by the rules which have be-
come the laws of the mining districts as regards mining claims." The
rights thus recognized by Congress are property of great value. Very
large amounts are invested in mines, the ownership of which rests
solely upon the possessory rights-referred to.
It seems to me that where such rights have attached to mineral land
in favor of the locator of a mining claim, the land during the continu-
ance of the claim (i. e., so long as it is maintained in accordance with
law) becomes, by force of the mining laws, appropiated to a specific
purpose, namely, the development and working of the mine located; and,
unless Congress otherwise provides, it cannot, while that right exists,
notwithstanding the title thereto remains in the government, be set
apart by the Executive for public uses.
If, then, the possessory right of the miners, in the case under con-
sideration, was full and complete previous to the establishment of the
military reservation at Fort Maginnis, I am of opinion that the inclu-
sion of their claim within the limits of the reservation was without au-
thority of law, and could not legally divest them of such right; or of
the further right (on compliance with the requirements of the statute
concerning the issue of patents for mining claims) to acquire title to the
land.
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34 . ) /AX14 NC-G CLAIM-MILL-SITE-ADVERSE RIGHT.
WARREN MILL-SITE V. COPPER PRINCE.
A mill-site claim partly or wholly embraced in an application for patent for a mine
can be protected only by an adverse claim filed in the usual manner and time.
Secretary Teller to Commissioner McFarland, May 16, 1882.
I have considered the matter of the protest of P. C orbin et al. against
the issuance of patent to the Copper Prince Mine for lot No. 38, upon
mineral entry No. 80, Tucson district, Arizona.
The record shows that the claim was originally located November 29,
1880, by one E. T. Hardy, who conveyed his interest therein by deed
dated December 14, ensuing, to John R. James and Frederick A. Tritle
the present applicants; that publication was duly made in the Tomb-
stone Epitaph ne wspaper, daily, from August 15 to October 17, 1881,
the prescribed period of sixty days.
On October 28, 1881, no adverse claim having been filed, the appli-
cants tendered the purchase money for the premises to the register and
receiver, who accepted the same and allowed the entry in question.
On January 16, 1882, the owners of the Warren Mill Site, by their-
attorney resident in this city, filed in your office certain affidavits, with.
accompanying papers, including the protest in question.
These pr6testants allege that a portion of the premises embraced
within the Copper Prince claim was previously located as a mill-site by
Corbin et al., and they cite a recent decision of the United States su-
preme court in the case of Belk v. Meagher et al. (No. 69, October
term, 1881), as sustaining the proposition that the alleged subsequent
location of the Copper Prince was, pro tanto, void.
The case cited is irrelevant, in that it involves the concomitant ques-
tions as to the relative rights of possession by virtue of a location and
relocation; whereas, the case at bar involves the sole question of failure
on the part of these protestants to file an adverse claim against the
Copper Prince, and to institute suit, as provided by statute, within the
prescribed period.
No failure on the part of the mineral applicants to comply with stat-
utory requirements is suggested by the protestants, but they simply
claim a paramount right by reason of an alleged prior location. They
do not attempt to interposeobjections based upon the applicants' record,
but they ask to be allowed to introduce evidence, aliunde such record,
touching their alleged superior right in the premises.
This is matter for judicial adjudication of which the Department can-
not take cognizance. A court of competent jurisdiction is the proper
forum in which contests between conflicting claimants can be heard, as
the facts alleged might have been presented in such court upon an ad-
verse claim duly filed. (Bodie Tunnel, 8 C. L. O., 173.).
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Where an applicant for a mineral patent gives the prescribed notice,
any other claimant of an unpatented location objecting to the issuance
of patent to such applicant on account of extent, or form, or by reason
of an asserted prior location, must interpose his objection within the
prescribed period, otherwise he will-thereafter e precluded from rais-
ing such objection. "' The silence of the prior locator in such a case is,
under the statute, a waiver of his priority." (The Eureka case, 4 Saw-
,yer, 302.)
As the record shows the procedure upon the application for patent
to be in all respects regular and in compliance with statutory require-
ments, and as it discloses failure on the part of the protestants to file
an adverse claim against such application, it follows that the-statutory
bar is presumably interposed, and it. must be assumed that no such
claim exists, and that the applicants are entitled to a patent.
Your decision of March 7, 1882, dismissing the protest in question,
and that of the 30th of the same month dismissing protestants' appeal
from such action, are therefore affirmed.
MIXING CLAIM-TOWN SITE-BURDEN OF PROOF.
? < ' C 1B ico TOWN-SITE.
The burden of proof rests with the protestants. They should show location, title,
and compliance with law as regards both lode and mill site, as required in a court
of justice to establish such claim.
Town sites may be located on mineral land. The question of the relative legal rights
of the town site and the mineral claimant as to occupation or possessory title to
the surface must be left to courts f competent jurisdiction to settle.
The practice of the Department of inserting in town-site and mineral-land patents
mutual clauses of reservation adhered to.
Secretary Teller to Commissioner McFarland, July 6, 1882.
I have considered the case of the Gulch, the Independent, and the
Maid of Athens Mill-Sites v. The Town Site of Rico, in the Lake City
land district, Colorado, on appeal by the latter from your decision of
March 4,1882, holding its entry for cancellation.
The mill sites are separate and independflent claims; but since all the
protests filed by mill-site claimants against issuance of patent for the
town site involve the same questions, they are considered as one case.
They were located, respectively, in April, May, and July, 1879, and the
petition for incorporation of the town site was filed in September fol-
lowing.
Your decision held that the land was non-mineral; that the mill sites
were duly located and recorded in connection with lode claims by the
proprietors thereof, whereby the land was legally appropriated; and
hence that their prior location precluded location of the-town site.
I think this was erroneous.
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Mill sites are recognized by section 2337, Rev. Stats., where the land
is non-mineral, and is used by the proprietor of a vein or lode, and may
be included in an application for patent for such vein or lode, and be
patented therewith, subject to the same preliminary requirements as to
survey and notice as are applicable to veins or lodes; and, second, the
owner of a quartz mill or reduction works, not owning a mine in con-
nection therewith, may also receive a patent for his mill site, as provided
in the section.
The present applications are by virtue of the first provision, under
which there can be nomillsite sunless tMereis a todeor vein to whicA itimay
attach. The mill-site claimants have not applied for a patent, and there
is no evidence of a lode, vein, or claimants therefor, except as appears
in the protest of the mill-site claimants against issue of patent to the
town site.
The protestants, seeking to have the mill sites excluded from the entry
of the town site, must first establish a title to the mill sites. To do this
they must show that it is non-mineral in character. I do not think this
is done. On the contrary, it appears to be conclusively proven that
such is not the character of the supposed mill sites. It is within a.
mineral belt, and not less than sixteen lode claims are marked on the
map of the town. The proof is uncontradicted that mineral had been
found within the town site and on some portions of the mill site. I
do not think it worth while to discuss at length the character of the
testimony on that point. The town-site entry had been made. The
protestants said that it was in fraud of their rights. The burden of
proof was then clearly on them, and they failed to show that the
land was of such character as authorized the location of it for mill-site
purposes. But in addition to having failed to show that the land might
have been taken as a mill site, they failed to show that they did so
take in accordance with the law governing such location. It is true
that the statute is silent as to the location of mill sites; but it is not
unreasonable to suppose such location must be made substantially as
that of a mining claim. Such mill site location must be made by the-
owner of proprietor of a lode or a quartz mill or reduction works. The
letter of the statute would seem to require that such mill site ought to
be used in connection with such lode for mining or milling purposes,
before a legal location can be made; it is not, however, necessary to
determine that question in this case, for there is no proof that the pro-
testants were the proprietors of any vein or lode. The protestants did
introduce location certificates of lodes, and, in connection with such
lodes, the mill-site locations; but there is no evidence that the lodes.
were taken in accordance with law; it does not appear that the locator
complied with the local laws or the United States statutes concerning
such location and the development of such lodes. Proof of location
and compliance with law concerning such appropriation ought to be the
same that would be required in a court of justice to establish a title to.
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such lode claim and mill site; in this the protestants have signally
failed. Much has been said with regard to the good faith of the pro-
testants as to the location of the mill sites, and it is charged that such
location was not made for mill-site purposes, but to secure the same for
town-site purposes. This I think is quite apparent from the evidence.
Still, if there had been a strict compliance with the law in such loca-
tion, I should not feel justified to reject the evidence of legal location
on this ground alone. But such lack of faith may well be considered in
determining whether the protestants ought to be further heard in sup-
-port of their title. I think, as full opportunity was given to establish
the title, there ought to be no further delay in this matter, and the pat-
ent for the town-site ought to issue to the proper authorities, if their
proceedings have been regular.
It has been urged that if this town site is on mineral land, the entry
ought to be canceled. That a town site maybe located on mineral land
cannot now be questioned. What are the rights of lot owners and
mineral claimants within the boundaries of such town site, after entry,
is a somewhat difficult question. Section 2386 provides as follows:
Where mineral veins are possessed, which possession is recognized by
local authority, and to the extent so possessed and recognized, the title
to town lots to be acquired shall be subject to such recognized posses-
sion and the necessary use thereof; but nothing contained in this section
shall be so construed as to recognize any color of title in possessors for
mining purposes as against the United States.
This section, taken in connection with section 2392-which is as fol-
lows: " No title shall be acquired, under the foregoing provisions of this
chapter, to any mine of gold, silver, cinnabar, or copper, or to any valid
mining claim or possession held under existing laws"-must protect the
mineral claimant in his possession of the vein or lode, together with the
surface as recognized by law. Such lots are declared to be taken bur-
dlened with the mineral claimant rights. Now, what are the rights of
the mineral claimant to the surface of the ground held in connection
-with his lode or mine Section 2322 of the Revised Statutes contains
the following:
The locators of all mining locations heretofore made, or which shall
hereafter be made, on any mineral vein, lode, or ledge, situated on the
public domain, their heirs or assigns, where no adverse claim exists on
the tenth day of May, eighteen hundred and seventy-two, so long as
they comply with the laws of the United States, and with State, Terri-
torial, and local regulations not in conflict with the laws of the United
States governing their possessory title, shall have the exclusive right
of possession and enjoyment of all the surface included within the lines
of their locations, and of all veins, lodes, and ledges throughout their
entire depth, the top or apex of which lies inside of such surface lines
extended downward vertically, although such veins, lodes, or ledges
may so far depart from a perpendicular in their course downward as to
extend outside the vertical side lines of such surface locations.
It has been claimed that by virtue of this section the town-lot claim-
ant, holding under a patent issued to the town, takes no title to the
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surface of a lode; but we must take all the provisions of the statute.
together. It is provided in section 2386 that the title to town lots to
be acquired shall be subject to such recognized possession and the neces-
sary use thereof Now, what is the necessary use of such recognized
possession? The town-site claimant takes it for building purposes; the
mineral claimant for mining purposes. The mineral claimant may desire
to use the ground for the purpose of sinking a shaft to his lode. He
may want it for the erection. of the buildings required in carrying on
his mining enterprise, for reduction works, or for a mill site; if he does,
the town-lot claimant's rghts are subordinated to his. The quasi title
of the lot owner must give way to the title of the mineral claimant in
all such cases; that is the "1 necessary use thereof " for mining purposes.
Whether the lot owner does take his lot subject to the rights of the
mineral claimant as to surface, must depend on priority of occupation. If
apportion of the public lands have been settled upon and occupied by a
town site, such occupation is a lawful one. (Chapter 8, Revised Stat-
utes of the United States.) It is not to be supposed that the recognized
right of such lot owner is to be destroyed by the subsequent discovery
of a mineral vein that may have its course through such lot. Large and
flourishing towns have been built on the mineral lands of the United
States, valuable buildings erected on such town lots, long before the
entry of such town sites. The rights of the occupants are fully recog-
nized by the custom and usages of the country as well as by the statute,
and provision is made for the completion of the title by pattent to the
corporation authorities or to the county judge in trust for such lot
owners. There ought to be no conflict between the lot owner and the
mineral claimant whose vein enters a town site; and the respective
ights are clearly defined both by law and custom. If the mineral
claimant is in possession of a mineral vein, his possession is recognized
as a valid one to the full extent of his .possession and the necessary use
thereof. If at the time of taking of the town lots the mineral claim-
ant's iights exist, the lot owner will take it, subject to the rights of such
mineral claimant, as before stated; and although the lot owner may
hold his title under the corporation authorities or county judge, having
received such patent, still the title of the mineral claimant is not differ-
ent from what it was before the issue of such patent, and the question
must still be determined whether his title was acquired subsequently
or previously to the inception of the lot-owner's claim.
All such questions must be left to courts of competent jurisdiction to
settle. This Department cannot, in the nature of things, be called on
to adjudicate such conflicting claims. Questions of priority of occu-
pancy, as well as the question, what is the necessary use of such surface
by the mineral claimant, ought to be submitted to a jury of the neigh-
borhood where such controversies arise; and such appears to have been
the legislative intent with reference to all conflicting claims concerning
mineral and town site rights. It has been the custom in the Department
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to insert in the town-site patents a clause reserving all the mineral and
mineral rights to the government, or to the legal occupant thereof, as
the case might be; and to insert in the mineral claimant's patent a
reservation reserving all town-site rights. Whether the language em-
ployed heretofore is the most exact that might have been employed, I
do not consider of any importance, for the legal effect of the patent is the
same with or without the reservation.
The statute defines and determines the rights of the different claim-
ants; and if the patent contains a reservation broader than that of tie
statute, it is a nullity, so far as it exceeds the statutory restriction;
and if it contains a reservation not authorized bylaw, such reservation
is a nullity. (See Stark v. Starrs, 6 Wallace, 402.) The custom of in-
serting such reservation in the patent has the sanction of long practice,
as well as the approval of the courts, and is in the interest of peace
and good order, and ought not now to be departed from; therefore, the
patent in this, and all other cases of like character, will be issued with
the usual reservation; and should the owners of the mineral veins within
the town site make application for patent to such mineral veins, they
will receive patents therefor, with the proper and usual reservation as
to the rights of the lot owners within such town site. (9 C. L. O., 90.)
For these reasons your decision is reversed, and the entry of the town
site will remain intact.
Zr ;2a MINING CLAIM-MINERAL lAJNDS.
Br40o W. H. HOOPER.
Gypsum and limestone are held to be minerals.
Whatever is recognized as mineral by the standard authorities where the same occurs
in quantity and quality to render the land in question more valuable on its ac-
count than for agricultural purposes, is mineral within the meaning of the min-
ig laws.
Secretary Eirkwnood to Commissioner McFarland, October 8, 1881.
I have considered the appeal of William H. Hooper and others from
your decision of January 25, 1881, in the matter of mineral entry No.
433, upon the Juab Gypsum Placer, Salt Lake, City, Utah, wherein you
held their entry for cancellation, because lands containing deposits of
gypsum are not subject to disposal under the mining laws.
Section 2318, Rev. Stats., provides that "in all cases lands valuable
for minerals shall be reserved from sale, except as otherwise expressly
directed by law."
Section 2319 provides that
All valuable mineral deposits in lands belonging to the United States,
both surveyed and unsurveyed, are hereby declared to be free and open
to exploration and purchase, and the lands in which they are found to
occupation and purchase, .under regulations prescribed by
law.
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Section 2328 provides that
Mining claims upon veins or lodes of quartz or other rock in place,bearing gold, silver, cinnabar, lead, tin, copper, or other valuable de-posits . . . . shall be governed . . . . by the customs, regu-
lations, and laws in force at the date of their location.
Under all authorities gypsum is a mineral, but your decision holds
that it is of a similar formation to limestone, and that section 2318 only
embraces such lands as contain metals or other substances which give
the land greater special value than that of land containing limestone in
any of its forms. Your office has, however, held (2 C. L. O., 66), in the
case of Rolfe, that public lands more valuable on account of deposits of
limestone and marble than for agriculture, may be patented under the
mining laws; and in its circular of July 15, 1873, it held " that what-
ever is recognized as a mineral by the standard authorities on the sub-ject, where the same is found in quantity and quality to render the land
sought to be patented more valuable on this account than for purposes
of agriculture, should be treated as coming within the purview of the
mining act of May 10, 1872," and as being " a valuable mineral deposit."
I concur in these views.
The proceedings of the appellants appear to be regular, and there is
no adverse claimant. They allege that the tract embraces a deposit of
almost pure gypsum, and is not a mere limestone bed; and that they
use the same as an article of commerce, and not for agriculture. I find,
-however, no proof as to the comparative value of the land for mineral
.or agricultural purposes.
I therefore direct that you cause an investigation to be made in this
respect. Should it be found that it has greater value for the former
than for the latter purpose, a patent should issue as applied for.
Your decision is modified accordingly.
MINERAL LANDS-VALUABLE DEPOSITS.
Regulations governing the entry of lands containing borax and alkaline earths, sul-
phur, alum and asphalt.
Secretary Teller to Commissioner McFarland, January 30, 1883.
My attention is called to the fact that these deposits, although valu-
able, are not of sufficient value to permit their being entered under the
mining laws, if the recent circular approved by me September 22, 1882,
and its amendment of December 9, 1882, is applicable to entries of lands
containing borax and other similar valuable deposits. It was early
determined by the Department that the act of May 10, 1872, which de-
scribes certain lands containing valuable mineral deposits, was applica-
ble to lands containing deposits of borax, carbonate and nitrate of soda
sulphur, alum, and asphalt; and I believe that from the passage of the
law until the present time the definition of the term " valuable mineral
deposits" has been such as to include the minerals and alkaline sub-
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stances named. I understand that entries of borate lands have been
allowed under the provisions of the act of 1872, and the regulations made
in accordance therewith.
It is the desire of the persons interested that the regulations which,
were in existence, having special reference to the application for patent
for placer claims-namely, the circular of October 31, 1881-should be
continued in force so far as they relate to deposits of borax, etc, as men-
tioned above.
Believing that practical effect should be given to the mining laws of
the United States, I am of the opinion that to apply the new regulations
to such entries would result in excluding such lands from sale, and de-
riving the people of the benefit of the use of these natural deposits.
I therefore direct you to permit the entry of public lands containing
valuable deposits of borax, the carbonate and nitrate of soda, sulphur,
alum, and asphalt in the States of California and Nevada and the Ter-
ritories of Arizona, Utah, and Wyoming-in which section of country I
am informed the deposits are present-under the regulations of October
i'f) 319 1881.
In addition, however, an applicant for patent forpublic lands contain-
ing deposits of borax, etc., as above, must affirmatively show that the
lands entered are not valuable for any other purpose than the one for
which application is made.
It will therefore follow that the circulars of September 22 and Decem-
ber 9, 18S2, are not applicable to entries of the lands thus described and
excepted.
=v a lo<7 SiALITE LANDS-MINErAL SPRINGS
PAGOSA SPRINGS.
Secretary Teller, in the Pagosa Springs case, under date of Decem-
ber 4, 1882, says:
Many springs and many waters are impregnated with minerals held
in solution; but it does not follow that the lands bearing such waters
are mineral lands, and can be patented as such. Lands of a saline
character are an exception, and are expressly provided for in the laws
relating to the disposition of the public lands. Lands containing min-
eral springs not of a saline character are subject to sale under the gen-
eral laws, and not under the acts relating to the sale of mineral lands.-
(See 9 C. L. 0., 230.)
MYINING CLAIM-APPLI ATIO O-PRECEDENCE.
BIG FLAT GRAVEL MG. CO. V. BIG FLAT GOLD MG. CO.
Applications for patent should be received at the local office in order of time-not ac-
cording as surveys are approved by the surveyor-general.
Secretary Teller to Commissioner 1 icFarland, May 11,, 1882.
I considered the appeal of the Big Flat Gravel Mining Company from
your decision of December 10, 1880, directing the register of the land
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office at Humboldt, Cal., to reject the application for patent filed by said:
company on the 24th of April, 1880, and to receive and order publica-
tion of notice in favor of the conflicting applications of the Big Flat
Gold Mining Company and Mountaineer Mining Company, offered for
filing on the 26th of the same month.
A preliminary question affecting the surveys in this case was before
my predecessor, Mr. Secretary Schurz, and was decided by the Acting
Secretary August 18, 1850, declining to interpose in any manner to af-
fect matters resting solely upon the diligence of competing parties in
placing their applications on file in a proceeding to obtain patent for
mining claims (Copp, vol. 7, 101). "First in time first in right," was
held to be the only rule of precedence, whether it should result in plac-
ing one or the other party in the affirmative position of applicant, or in
relegating him to the less enviable status of an adverse claimant upon
whom is thrown the burden of taking the affirmative in the courts.
It is true that by a subsequent decision direction was given to allow
priority in all stages of the proceeding, including delivery of the plats,
to the first applicant for a survey in the office of the surveyor-general;
but this-could not affect the surveys now in question, and only had rela-
tion to a rule of procedure upon subsequent applications for survey.
As to priority of applications for patent, it was distinctly held that the
first survey presented should be accepted, and publication ordered.
(Ivanpah v. Lizzie Bullock Claims, 7 Copp, 163.)
The ground of refusal to allow the applicant to proceed is the allega-
tion that the plats were defective in not showing conflicts with the sur-
veys subsequently filed, but alleged to have been first ordered by the
surveyor-general, and first approved and delivered.
It was shown in the case, when here, that the Big Flat Gravel Mining
Company had succeeded in making the first survey and placing the
field notes of the deputy before the surveyor-general for approval that
he held them suspended to await the subsequent return of the conflict-
ing surveys; that in consequence they were all before him at the same
moment; that he announced his intention to approve and deliver them
simultaneously; but, on order from our office, approved and first de-
livered on the same day the plats of the Big Flat Gold and the Mount-
aineer Mining Companies.
It is admitted in the present case that by reason of less work in mak-
ing the surveys, the Big Flat Gravel Mining Company did succeed, as
stated above, in first executing their field work. I, therefore, fail to see
why the omission of conflicting surveys afterwards made, even although
first approved, should under such circumstances invalidate the plat, so
as to compel its rejection, "on its face," and preclude the register from
ordering publication on an application otherwise acknowledged to be
prima facie complete. It appears that this was done on account of a
protest from a messenger of the other companies, who urged his com-
plaint before the register, claiming that after great diligence he had
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been unable to anticipate the other party and file his own application,
and demanding that the pending application should be rejected, to allow
him to gain further time in presenting his.
It is sufficient to say that this was not good reason. The parties
acknowledge that they have sufficient notice of the conflict in the claims,
and only desire to force the other company into the position of adverse
claimants, assuming that it was the intention of your office to use its in-
structions to effectuate that purpose. But, as before stated, there can
be no propriety in the assumption by this Department of any authority
whatever for the purpose of aiding or hindering the presentation of a
lawful claim, in opposition to any other such claim depending for its
consideration on the sole question of priority. The private rights of
parties are to be adjudicated upon the cases when presented, and not
admitted by privilege depending on any preconceived opinion as to the
superiority of right in either.
The Department is open to the first applicant for the consideration of
all questions here determined, and the courts are also open in mining
cases for the adjudication of adverse claims affecting the right of pos-
session. It is entirely immaterial to the government which party makes
the application. Patent is by law made to follow the judgment of the
court.
I think it was error in this instance to reject the application first
offered, and the decision of your office is accordingly reversed.
MINING CLAIM-KNO N LODE WITHIN PLACER.
ROBINSON V. ROYDOR.
Patent for placer claim in January, 1876. Robinson applied for patent for his lode
claim within the limits of the placer claim, August 30,1880, alleging that said
lode was known to exist at date of application for placer patent.
Robinson's application should have been received, and thereafter adverse claim might
he filed and the question in controversy settled in the courts.
Secretary Teller to Commissioner McFarland, March 19, 18S3.
I have considered the case of William T. Robinson, claimant of the
Mammoth Quartz Mine, v. Joseph D. Roydor, patentee of the N. 4 of the
N. j of the IW. i of the SW. 4, and S. 4 of the S. i of the SW. of the
NW. i of Sec. 5, T. 5, R. 12 E., placer location, Sacramento, Cal.
Your office having denied Robinson's right to appeal, the record in
the case is brought to this Department by certiorari allowed upon the
petition made in behalf of the owner of the Mammoth Quartz mine.
Roydor made application for a patent on his placer claim October 23,
1874, and patent was issued to him therefor January 14, 1876.
The record shows that on the 30th day of August, 1880, Robinson
made application for patent for said Mammoth lode. The register and
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receiver refused to entertain the application, because it conflicted with
the patented Roydor placer aforesaid.
September 30, 1880, Robinson made affidavit that Roydor knew at
the time when he applied for his patent of the existence of the quartz
vein located by affiant, and with his affidavit filed two affidavits of
third parties in support of the allegation. I
December 6 same year, your office ordered a hearing to determine
"whether a vein was known to exist at the date of the issuance of said
placer patent." Hearing was accordingly had. The register and re-
ceiver found from the testimony that " at the time of the issuance of the
patent to Roydor, January 14, 1876, there was no know.n ledge or lode of
quartz or other rock in place bearing gold, silver, cinnabar, lead, tin,
copper, or other valuable deposits."7 And upon appeal to your office
you reviewed the testimony and affirmed the finding of the local officers.
Although your office directed the inquiry to be made as to whether
the lode was known to exist at the date of the issuance of the placer
patent, Robinson's affidavit averred that Roydor knew of its existence
at the time that he made application for his said patent.
The averments in the affidavit, therefore, brought the case within the
rule established by this Department in the late case of Becker v. Sears,
and War Dance v. Church Placer (9 C. L. O., 212) in which it was held
that the lode must be known to exist at the " date of the application."
I am of the opinion that the register and receiver should not have
rejected Robinson's application because of its conflict with the patented
Roydor placer. I therefore direct that all proceedings subsequent to
said Robinson's application for a patent for the Mammoth lode be dis-
missed without prejudice, and that Robinson be permitted to proceed
in compliance with the statute.
The adverse claim can then be made and the controversy settled by
the court in the manner directed by the statute.2J f Hi -0
TERTIOARI; EXISTING HOMESTEAD; NON-METALLIFERO US DEPOSITS.
3 e, // / THE DOBBS PLACER MINE.
A petition to the Secretary of the Interior for certiorari under rule 84 of the rules of
practice, must fully set forth the facts relating to the antecedent proceedings in
the case, but a specific assignment of errors is. not required.
Certiorari does not lie from a decision of the Commissioner as a matter of right, but as
a matter of Executive discretion, and where the petition shows on its face that
substantial justice has been done, the application will be denied.
A mineral entry is not invalid because at the time it was made the land was covered
by a homestead entry.
Deposits of fine clay or kaolin being non-metalliferous in character, are properly sub-
ject to entry as placers, and not as lode claims.
Secretary Teller to Commissianer McFarland, May 10, 1883.
In the case of L. E. Montague, protestant, v. Stephen E. Dobbs, min-
eral entry No. 2, on lands in See. 14, T. 6, R. 9, Huntsville, Ala., I have
examined the motion made by defendant to dismiss the application of
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protestants for certiorari under Rules 83 and 84 of the rules of practice.
The motion is based on two grounds, viz:
First. That the petition shows upon its face that the protestant, Mon-
tague, has no lawful right to the land covered by the defendant's min-
eral entry.
Secondly. That there is no specific ground of complaint or assignment
of errors.
I do not think the motion upon the last ground can prevail
No assignment of errors is necessary on common law certiorari.
(Hilliard on New Trials, 688, and cases there cited.) A petition for
certiorari should state facts, and not the opinions or conclusions of the
petitioner." (lb., 696.)
Rule 84 seems to have been framed upon the well-established practice
in such cases. It is as follows, viz: "Applications to the Secretary
under the preceding rule shall be made in writing, under oath, and
shall fully and specifically set forth the grounds upon which the appli-
cation is made."
I think the " grounds" mentioned in the rule refer to the proceedings
which are to be fully set forth in the application, and not to assign-
ments of error.
Certiorari is not, however, a writ of right; but whether it shall issue
lies in the judicial discretion of the tribunal to which the petition is
addressed," and the writ will not be granted if substantial justice has
been done, though the record may show the proceedings to have been
defective and informal." (lb., 689.)
The facts in this petition, which constitute "the grounds upon which
the application is made," are, I think, set out sufficiently full and spe-
cific, and the question presented is whether they disclose a proper case
for granting an order directing the proceedings to be certified to this
Department.
The petition discloses in substance the following facts, viz:
In January, 1870, James W. Bell made homestead entry for the NW.
: of the SW. I of said section 14. In August, 1875, Minerva J. Howard
made homestead entry for the SW. I of the SW. aforesaid.
Bell having died, his heirs, May 25, 1881, executed a relinquishment
of his said entry to the United States, and by an instrument of even
date attempted to sell to William C. Kean all their interest, and to
authorize him to obtain title under the act of June. 15, 1880. May 26,
1881, the petitioner went upon said tract for the purpose of locating a
mining claim, and May 27 duly posted notice of such location on said
claim, and duly made and published a proper notice that he "had
located 1,495 linear feet on the Allen Spring lode, vein, or deposit of
fire-clay or kaolin." Attached to said notice was an affidavit sustain
ing the averments of the notice, and setting forth that the land was
more valuable for mineral deposits than for agricultural purposes. May
27, the same day that the petitioner posted notice of location, said, Kean
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applied, and was permitted by the local officers, to make cash entry of
said land under the said act of June, 1880. Upon filing said notice of
location the petitioner was informed by the register that the location
would not be allowed, because of said Kean's cash entry, and it was
accordingly rejected. From that decision no appeal appears to have
been taken, and it therefore became final. June 6 the petitioner filed
a protest in your office against said Kean's cash entry. October 31
petitioner filed in your office affidavits showing that the land entered
by Kean was mineral in character, and as such was being worked by
the petitioner, and asking that a hearing might be had to ascertain the
true character of the land before any action was taken on said entry, and
also to ascertain the circumstances under which Kean obtained his
entry. July 21, 1881, said Minerva J. Howard gave notice of a mining
claim upon certain land on the tract for which she had made the home-
stead entry aforesaid,- said mining claim being described as " on the
lode, vein, or deposit of fire-clay or kaolin in the Allen Spring lode,"
and the notice being accompanied with the affidavits of William C.
Kean and Stephen E. Dobbs, averring that the land embraced within
the boundaries of the claim was much more valuable for mineral than
for agricultural purposes. December 10 Edwin A. Crandall, Sterling
S. Lanier, Stephen E. Dobbs, W. M. Dobbs, Minerva J. Howard, and
William C. Kean gave notice of location by them of the W. J and the
NE. -of the SW. 1 of said Sec. 14 as a placer claim. June 15, 1882, the
receiver at Huntsville aforesaid issued to Stephen E. Dobbs (his co-
locators having conveyed their interest to him) duplicate receipt mineral
entry No. 2 for $300 in payment for the lands last above described,
known as the Dobbs Placer Claim. This receipt was filed in your office
June 17. June 28 attorneys for petitioner and D. P. Montague entered
an appearance in your office in opposition to the issuance of a patent on
the placer entry. July 28, 1882, Kean appeared in your office and eon-
sented to the cancellation of his said cash entry as " void ab initio."1
On said July 28 petitioner filed in writing in your office a further protest
against issuance of a patent for said mineral entry No. 2, and called
attention to the former application for a hearing to determine the min-
eral character of the land. This protest was accompanied by affidavits
showing work done on petitioner's claim, and that the deposit of min-
eral lay in a well defined lode or vein, and that it should be entered only
as a lode claim. November 23, 1882, your office canceled Kean's said
cash entry, for the reason that the land was mineral, and because the
entry was void ab initio, and Kean had requested its cancellation; and
,on the same day you canceled the Howard homestead entry, dismissed
the protest of the petitioner against the issuance of a patent for the
Dobbs placer, and rendered a decision awarding the land to Dobbs and
denying the petitioner's claim to his said location. December 11, 1882,
petitioner took an appeal to this Department from sai(i decision of No-
vember 23, with assignments of error. December 19, 1882, you denied
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the right of appeal, and dismissed it, presumably upon the ground that
a protestant, not being properly a party in interest, has no right to
appeal.
It is claimed by the defendant that all the material facts have not
been set forth in the petition; but I think those set forth are sufficient
to enable me to dispose of the question whether the order prayed for
should be made.
It appears from the facts disclosed that the defendant made application
for patent in proper form, gave the requisite notice by posting and pub-
lication and made due proof thereof; and that during the period of pub-
lication, no adverse claim was filed by Montague.
The protestant, however, claims that a patent should not be issued to
the defendant, because, under the facts stated, the Commissioner should
have first ordered a hearing and determined the question whether the
character of the land was mineral, and whether it was more valuable
for mineral than for agricultural purposes.
It seems to be conceded that the lands were returned as agricultural
by the surveyor-general, and were therefore prima facie of that char-
acter.
Both parties to this contest, however, have alleged and proved that
the lands are in fact mineral, and are more valuable for mineral than
agricultural purposes; and both have made claim to the land, or parts
of it, as mineral, and sought to obtain title thereto under the laws pro-
viding for the mode of obtaining titles to mineral lands.
The protestant cannot, therefore, now be heard to deny the mineral
character of the land, and in that way prevent a patent from being
issued to the defendant.
The particular complaint, however, which the protestant makes is,
that you refused to order a hearing, as requested by him, for the pur-
pose of determining the character of the land and clearing the record
of the homestead entries appearing thereon. He had, however, asserted
the mineral character of the land, and made a mineral location thereon,,
before such request was made.
It the lands were in truth mineral, I think the fact "that they had
been previously borne on the official records as agricultural lands" was
immaterial (Scogin v. Culver, 7 C. L. O., 23).
After such mineral locations were made, the agricultural entries were
canceled, and therefore present no obstacle to the issue of mineral pat-
ents. I do not think, under the facts of this case as they appear on
the record, that your refusal or neglect to direct a hearing to ascertain
the character of the land was such an error or maladministration of
the laws as would entitle the petitioner to the order asked for in the
petition.
It will be observed that when his mineral location was rejected on
account of Kean's cash entry, he took no appeal, nor did he file any
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adverse claim during the publication of the notice of defendant's loca-
tion.
The petitioner further claims that the Commissioner erred in holding
that the lands were valuable only as containing placer deposits, and not
veins or lodes.
I do not think that the deposit which both parties allege exists in
the lands in controversy is of the character described as existing "in
veins or lodes of quartz or other rock in place"- in section 2320, Rev.
Stats. Upon an examination of the authorities in the Federal and
State courts referred to by counsel and in your decision, I think it was
correctly held by you that fire-clay or kaolin, in the manner in which
it exists as a deposit, is properly the subject of a placer location, and
not a vein or lode. (North Noonday v. Orient, 6 Sawyer, 308; Stevens
v. Williams, 1 Mc(rary, 486; Moxon v. Wilkinson, 2 Montana, 424; The
Eureka Case, 4 Sawyer, 310; Jupiter v. Bodie, 7 Sawyer, 97.)
I am of the opinion that substantial justice has been done, and that
the order prayed for in the petition should be denied, and the motion to
dismiss the application be granted.
PRAXCTICE-CERTIORdRI-S UPEB VISORY A UTHOBITY.
CLONTARF CLAIM.
Under rule 83 the matter subject to supervision must be so presented that a reason-
able presumption is raised in the eye of the law that there has been error or over-
sight, or at least there must be such showing in the application as will convince
the Department that a proper administration of the public business requires its
intervention in order to prevent undue haste, or, possibly, injury to important
and valuable interests.
Secretary Kirkwood to Commissioner McFarland, February 14, 1882.
I forward herewith an application, dated the 12th ultimo, by A. W.
Rucker, attorney in behalf of S. G. Wright et al., protestants against
the issue of patent to the Saint Bernard Mining Company of certain
premises in Colorado known as the Clontarf claim, asking that the pa-
pers be ordered before me for examination under rule 83 of practice.
The paper (verified by oath) briefly recites that on the 29th of Octo-
ber last said parties filed in the Leadville office a protest against issue
of patent; that you on the 7th of January dismissed said protest, and
on the 13th of January denied their right of appeal to this Depart-
ment.
Inasmuch as the oath bears date on the 12th of January, and the in-
sertion of the date of January "1 thirteenth "1 in the body of the affidavit
is apparently in a different handwriting, it is manifest that the same was
prematurely made, and when so sworn to no such denial of appeal had
been made by you; nor is there filed any copy of any such denial, or of
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any ruling, order, or decision at any time made by you in the case, as a
basis for specifications of error on the part of the protestants.
The general charge of error is made upon allegation that every cause
assigned in said protest against the issue of patent s true, and espe-
cially the facts therein alleged.
This general assignment of error is followed by a showing of nine
consecutive statements of alleged fact; of the first seven of which it is
only necessary to say that they do not, in ny judgment, individually or
collectively, show a prima facie case of illegality in the presentation of
the application for patent, and therefore I am not called upon to inter-
fere with your ruling or to look into other facts not specifically recited
to see whether or not suchprimafacie case might not possibly be shown
by thepapers themselves. The eighth head presents the general allega-
tion "that a discovery of a vein, lode, or well-defined or other crevice
of mineral was never made within the limits of said Clontarf claim as
originally or since located;" and the ninth recital asserts "that the
same was never staked according to the pretended relocation.
These are the only allegations that go to statutory matter, or to com-
pliance with local customs, and contain nothing beyond the general
statement claimed to have been submitted to you originally.
There is no recital of any facts showing how far or in what manner
you examined the same, nor is there any special assignment by way of
exception to your alleged ruling.
The rules of practice were never inteded to compel this Department
to review your final decisions in every case where a stranger to the rec-
ord may by general charge allege error or oversight on your part.
The matter subject to supervision must be so presented that a reason-
able presumption is raised in the eye of the law that there has been such
error or oversight, or at least there must be such showing in the appli-
cation as will convince the Department that a proper administration of
the public business requires its intervention in order to prevent undue
haste, or, possibly, injury to important and valuable interests.
I do not regard this petition as within-the rule, and the application
for an order to certify the papers is accordingly denied.
PRACTICE-P UBL1CAT1OY-R ULE 83-RIGHT OF APPEAL.
TOmAY ET A.L. . STEWART.
The register may exercise his official judgment as to whether publication in the paper
nearest the claim will effect the object of it; if not, he may designate another.
The purpose of rule 83 is the correction of material errors in the Commissioner's decis-
ion which affect the merits of the case.
Secretary Kirkwood to Commissioner McFarland, March 22, 1882.
I have considered the protest of John Tomay et al. against the issu-
ance of patent to Oscar C. Stewart, for the Roscoe Conkling and James
G. Blaine mining claims, respectively, embracing mineral entries Nos.
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1744 and 1745, Central City, Colo., transmitted by you to this Depart-
ment, under practice rule 83. This protest is based on an alleged non.
compliance with that provision of section 2325, Rev. Stats., which re-
quires the register of the land office in which the premises are located
to publish, for the period of sixty days, notice of an application for
patent, " in a newspaper to be by him designated as published nearest
to such claim." The notice in this case was published the required
time (from July 14 to September 15, 1881) in the Georgetown Courier,
a weekly newspaper published about three miles from the land applied
for; whereas it is claimed such notice should have been published in
the Silver Plume Mining News newspaper, published about one mile
from said claim.
The latter paper was established June 3, 1881, and having reached a
circulation of about ninety-five copies weekly, expired October 21 fol-
lowing, after a precarious struggle for existence of about four months.
The purpose of the required publication is to notify persons holding
adverse claims of the application for patent, and thus give them oppor-
tunity to protect their interests. The register may, therefore, exercise
his official judgment as to whether or not a certain publication is such
newspaper within the meaning of the law; and if it is not, he may
designate another which will effect the object of publication.
But an arbitrary order, manifestly in violation of the statute and
showing an unreasonable departure from its requirement, would not be
tolerated.
In this case the register designated the Georgetown Courier for pub-
lication of the notice, as the " newspaper " " nearest " the claim; and
the record shows that all of the protestants herein took notice of said
publication, filed adverse claims, and commenced suits in pursuance
thereof; but not having commenced the same within the statutory
period, were held to have waived their adverse claims. Hence, they
lost no rights by reason of the publication in said newspaper; but, if
any, by reason of their failure to commence suits within the required
time.
The purpose of rule 83 was not the correction of errors resulting from
the party's laches, nor for technical defects in the proceedings, but for
material errors in your decisions which affect the merits of a case; and
as no wrong has resulted to the protestants from said publication (which
your decision holds a compliance with the requirement of the statute),
there is no matter in said protest which requires, in my judgment, the
intervention of this Department.
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31MDrNG CLAIM-PUBLICATIOY-COgP UTATION OF TIME-AD VERSE
CLAIM.
TILDEN ET AL. V. INTERVENOR MINING COMIPANY.
It is necessary that the notice of application for patent should be posted in the land
office during the whole period of sixty days.
Where, during the period of publication and posting, the land office is closed for a
brief time for the purpose of removal to another locality, such time should not
be computed as a part of the sixty days within which an adverse claim must be
filed. The peculiar circumstances take the case out of the general rule prescribed
by the statute.
Secretary Zirkwood to Commissioner McFarland, April 11, 1882.
I have considered the matter of the application of the Intervenor
Mining Company for issuance of patent upon its mineral entry, No. 62,
of lot No. 67, Tucson district, Arizona, on appeal from your decision of
August 25, 1881, holding said entry for cancellation.
It appears from the record that the application of said company was
filed in the local office at Florence May 4, 1881, and notice thereof was
duly published in the Tombstone Epitaph newspaper, daily, from May
10 to July 9 ensuing, the prescribed period of sixty days. The local
office was, however, removed from Florence June 30, 1881, and opened
at Tucson July 12, 1881.
On July 8, 1881, Ridgely Tilden et al., claimants of the Last Decision
mine, mailed at Tombstone, Ariz. (per registered letter), an adverse
claim, addressed to the land office at Tucson, which letter was received
at that post-office at 7 o'clock p. m., Saturday, July 9, 1881, and deliv-
ered to the register on Monday evening, at 9 o'clock a. m. Next day,
July 12, 1881, one S. E. Barren, as agent of the Benares Mining Com-
pany, also filed an adverse claim upon the Benares lode. July 13, 1881,
the register rejected the adverse claim of Tilden and others, because it
was not filed during the period of publication, as prescribed by section
2325, Rev. Stats. Next day the register certified to the receiver that
the applicants for patent were entitled, and should be allowed, to pay
for and enter the land. The receiver disagreed with the register, but
nevertheless recived the purchase money, whereupon the register issued
his final certificate of entry.
July 18, 1881, John Noble et al. filed an adverse claim upon the At-
lantic lode.
On the 4th of August ensuing, the said Ridgely Tilden filed a protest
in behalf of himself and A. Ames, as co-owners in the Assurance mine,
alleging certain irregularities in the proceedings for patent in the In-
tervenor claim.
An appeal having been taken from the action of the register and re-
ceiver,you expressed the opinion that the adverse claims were presented
in due season, and held the entry of the Intervenor mining claim for
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cancellation, at the same time suspending the proceedings for patent
until the controversy raised by the presentation of said adverse claims
could be adjudicated by a court of competent jurisdiction.
The adverse claimants of the Last Decision mine allege location of
their claim January 27,1881, and admit a prior location of the Intervenor
mine, butcharge that the latteris located across the vein orlode upon which
discovery was made and location based; that the land applied for by the
Intervenor does not conform to the lines of its original location; and
that neither the Intervenor company, nor its grantors, nor any person
acting for or claiming under it, performed any work or expended any
money for-improvements upon said claim during the year 1880, nor up
to the dateof the LastDecision location. Such allegation, if proven to
be true, would doubtless show the Last Decision claimants to have the
better right to the land in question, provided, of course, that the latter
show strict compliance with statutory requirements. But these con-
testants having been relegated to a competent tribunal, pursuant to
statutory provisions, for the adjudication of their respective rights in
the premises, it is not competent for this Department to take cognizance
of any of the questions raised by the aforesaid allegations. Pending
such adjudication it is competent, however, for this Department to con-
sider and determine the question as to the sufficiency of the compliance,
on the part of these alleged adverse claimants, with the express statu-
tory requirements.
The primal question, therefore, to be considered in the determination
of this case is: Did these alleged adverse claimants file their claims
within the prescribed period of sixty days, as contemplated by the stat-
ute? In other words, shall they be regarded as such claimants, or as
mere protestants 
The statutes provide numerous guards against the evasion of their
provisions by parties seeking a mining patent, and afford an oppor-
tunity to persons in the neighborhood of the claim to come forward and
present any objections they may have to the granting of the patent de-
sired. By sections 6 and 7 of the act of May 10, 1872, which constitute
sections 2325 and 2326 of the Revised Statutes, the procedure which a
party seeking a patent, whether an individual or an association or a
corporation, must follow is prescribed. (Smelting and Refining Com-
pany v. Kemp et al., 104 U. S., 636.)
The former of said sections prescribes that:
The register of the land office, upon the filing of such application,
plat, field notes, notices, and affidavits, shall publish a notice that such
application has been made, for the period of sixty days, in a newspaper
to be by him designated as published nearest to such claim; and he
shall also post such notice in his office for the same period.
If no adverse claim shall have been filed with the register and receiver
of the proper land office at the expiration of the sixty days of publica-
tion, it shall be assumed that the applicant is entitled to a patent,
and that no adverse claim exists.
It should be observed that the statute prescribes three concurrent
methods or complementary details of publication, to wit: (1.) Posting
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by the mineral claimant of a copy of the plat of his claim, together with
a notice of his intended application, in a conspicuous place on the land
embraced therein, at the same time filing the requisite affidavit and copy
of notice in the land office. (2.) Publication by the register of the proper
local office of notice of such application, for the period of sixty-days, in
a newspaper designated by him as published nearest such claim. (3.)
Posting by the register of such notice in his office for the same period.
It is, therefore, just as incumbent upon the register to post such notice
in his office during the whole period of publication, in order to comply
literally with the express requirements of the statute, as it is for him to
publish a notice of the mineral claimant's application, or for such claim-
ant to post a copy of the plat of his claim and a notice of his intended
application on his claim in the manner prescribed. Now, it is not quite
manifest, in the light of the foregoing state of facts, how such minute
requirements could possibly be complied with, for if the local office was
closed at and removed from Florence, June 30, 1881, to Tucson, where
it was not opened for the transaction of business until July 12 ensuing,
how could the register post the notice in question during the nine days
of such interim, i. e., from June 30 to July 9, 1881, when the sixty days
of publication would have expired had the office not been closed upon
the former dater Although the question under consideration is not
directly raised by the appeal, it is nevertheless important that such
question be determined in orderthat I may be enabled to determine the
primary question aforesaid. Although the provisions of section 2325
operate as a statute of limitations against the filing of adverse mineral
claims, and although there is no authority, either judicial or executive, to
extend or abridge the period fixed by law within which such claims may
be properly filed, nevertheless the law should never be so construed as
to require impossibilities. Said section is intended to determine, con-
trol, and protect the property rights not only of mineral claimants, but
of adverse claimants as well, allowing the latter class the full statutory
period of sixty days within which they may prefer their claims as a con-
dition precedent to the exercise of the privilege of adjudication, just as
much as it requires the continuous publication during such period of the
claim of the former class.
The peculiar circumstances of this case are such as to 'take it out of
the general rule governing mineral cases, and bring it within the cate-
gory of exceptions thereto. The general rule of practice applied by you
appears to meet the exceptional case, and in so far I affirm your decis-
ion, and direct that the applicant be required to await the issue of the
judicial proceedings.
Instead of cancelling the entry, however, you will hold the same sus-
pended, subject to cancellation in the event of an adverse decision by
the courts, but entitled to equitable confirmation in case he is declared
by such courts entitled to have his patent.
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SINI=G CLAY:f-P BLICATION OF NOTICE-IRREG ULABITY.
BECKER ET AL. V. SEARS.
The publication was madefor nineweeks Lunder the practice in forcepnriortothe
Streeter decision, and protestant failed to file an adv'erse claim.
As it is not shown that injury has been done to the rights of others by the irregularity
in publication, and as the error was one of the government, and not of the appli-
cant, the proceedings will not be declared void.
Secretary Teller to Commissioner McFarland, January 11, 1883.
I return herewith the papers submitted by your letter of 28th of Jan-
uary, 1882, under my predecessor's direction of 11th of that month, in
the matter of the protest of Theodore H1. Becker et al. against the al-
lowance of patent upon the placer claim of J. P. Sears, Central City,
survey No. 302, Ohio and Grass Valley mining district, Clear Creek
County, Colorado.
The application of Sears for patent was filed in 1873, and was, after
contest in the courts as to a portion, and in the district office under your
orders as to other portions, finally allowed, subject to a claim set up by
Becker to the effect that a known lode called the Soda Lode existed
within the placer, which had been regularly located and belonged to said
Becker.
Other matters appeared in the affidavits submitted by Becker asking
the hearing, his own affidavit, however, being limited to an assertion of
his right to said Soda vein, and a general suggestion of possible own-
ership in other parties not named, to certain houses, grounds, etc., not
specially decribed.
In filing these affidavits, the attorney of Becker suggested to your
office the fact that the original application of Sears was not published
for the full period of sixty days, according to a decision of this Depart-
ment rendered in a similar case. Becker did not rely upon or set up
this alleged fact, but stated under oath that his only reason for failure
to file an adverse claim againstthe original application, pending its pub-
lication, was a misapprehension with regard to the inclusion of said
Soda Lode within such placer claim.
These affidavits were filed in June and July, 1880, and on the 1:3th of
August your office ordered the hearing asked, limiting the inquiry spe-
cifically to the matters connected with the allegation of the claimant
Becker as to the existence and location of the Soda Lode, requiring it
to be defined by an accurate survey, etc.
On the 30th of April previously, while the application was pending
ex parte, and before any suggestion of right in Becker, your predeces-
sor had waived all objection to the alleged insufficient publication and
directed the district officers to notify Sears to come forward and com-
plete his entry within thirty days, subject to a declaration of abandon-
ment in case of default.
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I do not find any protest or objection to the limitations fixed by the
order for hearing, nor any attempt to obtain an enlarging order; and
the parties accepted notice and went to trial upon the issues defined by
your office.
The record was completed on the case thus made up, and the decision
of the district officers was in favor of Becker. One of the conditions
of the order was to the effect that if Sears should abandon the Soda
Lode ground no hearing should be had, but his right to a patent for the
residue should be admitted. After hearing and before action on his
appeal from the decision of the district officers, Sears filed notice of such
relinquishment. This, of course, closed the case, Becker having no
appeal pending, and his rights in the controversy being limited to the
issues involved at the outset. Having obtained these, there was nothing
for you to decide, and the only proceeding was the issuing of the proper
instructions for carrying the settlement into effect.
This you proceeded to do b the letter of November 21, 1881, the con-
clusions of which are now objected to, ostensibly in the name of Becker,
together with several other parties, who have since the hearing filed
affidavits setting up the existence of still other lodes within the placer,
but not asserting that the same were known prior to the application of
Sears for patent.
These you decline to recognize, and also decline further to consider
the matters set up prior to the hearing adjudicated, as you conclude,
by the action of your predecessor, and no longer factors in-the case.
There are certain irregularities apparent in these preliminary pro-
ceedings which you do not assume to pass upon, deeming them already
settled, or at least not liable to attack by a stranger to them at their
date, and it is the exercise of your discretion in this regard that I am
asked to direct by supervisory action under rules 83 and 84 of practice.
Recognizing the difficulties disclosed by the whole record, and in view
of what has been done, considering the time that has elapsed since the
filing of the application in 1873, and that every opportunity has been
presented to show any injury to others by such irregularity as appears,
and also of the fact that if error was committed in the matter of the pub-
lication it was the error of the government, and not of the applicant,
the register being designated by law as the person who shall publish
the notice, I do not feel called upon to declare the whole proceeding
void, unless it be shown that interests and rights then vested in third
persons absolutely demand for their protection the avoidance of the
same.
This I do not find. I accordingly decline to set aside your instruc-
tions, simply calling your attention to an alleged mistake in the survey
defining the relinquished Soda Lode, and directing its proper examina-
tion in connection with the usual examination of the final surveys and
papers, which should of course be made to conform to the accepted rl-
ings and practice.
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MIMjING CLAIM-SU VEY-SURFA CE GRO UND-P TE27.
BECKER ET AL. V. SEARS-REVIEW.
Section 2333, Rev. Stat., clearly carves out fron a patent to a placer claim all known
lodes found therein at date of application, together with twenty-five feet of-sur-
face ground on each side as an incident thereto. As this was a known lode, how-
ever insignificant in value, and was not legally laimed by Sears and is now at
his request excluded from his final plat of survey, it necessarily forms no part of
his claim.
Secretary Tellei, to Commissioner McFarland, January 22, 1883.
On the 11th instant I dismissed the protest of Becker et al. v. J. P.
Sears, respecting the issue of patent to the latter for his placer claim
on Central City mineral entry No. 1790, survey lot No. 302, Grass Val-
ley and Ohio mining district, Colorado.
In so doing I directed your attention to an alleged mistake in the sur-
vey, with respect to the relinquished Soda Lode claimed by Becker,
and instructed you to give it proper examination in passing upon the
completeness of the final entry, before the issue of patent.
At the outset Becker claimed this lode by virtue of an alleged loca
tion in 1861, defining it as twenty-five feet in width on each side of said
vein or lode. By your order for hearing, dated August 13, 1880, you
required a certified copy of the location and a diagram or plat showing
the boundaries and extent, and its position relative to the survey of the
placer claim.
Instead of fairly complying with this, Becker filed a copy of what
purported to be a copy of said original location made June 4, 1861, and
recorded September 22, 1873, calling for twenty-five feet of surface
ground on each side, together with an alleged relocation made Septem-
ber 16, 1880, more than thirty days after your order, claiming by new
lines and enlarging the surface ground to seventy-five feet on each side;
and filed a diagram of the relocation only, without showing the bound-
aries of the original claim.
The testimony of the deputy-surveyor shows that he did not follow
the original location boundaries and monuments, but resurveyed the
vein according to his own notions of what would be a proper location;
and fixed no permanent monuments or bounds to his survey on the
ground, but merely set temporary stakes at the north end " to indicate
the points for Mr. Becker to establish permanent monuments hereafter."
Sears objected to this attempted relocation and demanded that the
showing be confined and responsive to the order made by your office in
the case calling for the true limits of the claim originally located. After
the hearing, and before your decision, he relinquished the Soda Lode
claim, referring in his relinquishment to the survey No. 361, which
number was given to the diagram filed by Becker, but which does not
appear to have been approved by the surveyor-general as a survey of a
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claim. This number, however, appears to have properly belonged to
the original survey made in 1873, filed as an adverse claim in the case
of the Montague placer claim with which the Soda Lode location con-
flicted, said survey being but fifty feet in width, and which the present
diagram as already shown fails to show.
Sears claims that it was this proper original survey of the Soda Lode
location which he intended to describe in his relinquishment; and you
find upon the examination that as the relocation was entirely illegal the
exclusion of twenty-five feet only on each side of the vein or lode can
be insisted upon.
The attorneys for Becker ask, by letter of the 17th instant, that your
decision of 13th instant to this effect be submitted to me for final deter-
mination; but instead of basing any claim upon the relinquishment,
they take issue with all the antecedent adjudications, and flatly deny
the right of Sears to any portion of the placer claims. On the 18th you
submitted the papers accordingly.
On the 18th they also filed notice of their intention to ask for a review
of my action of 11th instant dismissing the protest, and on the 20th, in-
stead of filing such motion, they ask that the case be referred to the
Attorney-General on certain interrogatories assumed by them to be
vital, but which were held by me to be beyond the necessity for coni-
sideration with reference to the case as it now stands.
The relinquishment was in terms made by the attorney of Sears, Octo
ber 21,1881, "to the end that the applicant for patent may be no longer
delayed in securing title." It has never been accepted by Becker, who
has persisted in opposing the whole claim up to the present time, and
now, in support of his suggestion for a correction, fails to adduce any
argument in support of his understanding of the instrument; but, on
the contrary, renews his efforts to obtain a reopening of the whole
matter.
Appearing as a mere protestant, he has not, in my opinion, such
standing as will entitle him to claim anything in the case, and cannot
rely upon mere technicalities; nor can he insist upon the enforcement
of a relinquishment offered upon such conditions even though it clearly
covered, as in my judgment it does not, the spurious and unauthorized
survey and relocation. He is estopped by his own failure to observe
them.
But the law, section 2333 Rev. Stats., clearly, in my opinion, carves
out from a patent to a placer claim all known lodes found therein at date
of application, together with 25 feet of surface ground on each side as
an incident thereto. As this was a known lode, however insignificant
in value, and was not claimed by Sears in the manner provided by law,
and is now at his request excluded from his final plat of survey, it nec-
essarily forms no'phrt of his claim. The residue under your decision
may properly be patented to him, and I decline further to consider the
objections raised by the protestants in the case.
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PB4CTW E-RIGHT OF APPEAL-PARTIES IN ITEBEST.
SANTA RITA MINES.
The right of appeal to the Secretary is allowed to parties who are shown to have
some interest in a cause or matter properly pending, and in which a decision has
been made.
A claim cannot be set up by mere assertion. A person who has not shown some evi-
dence of a claim can have no standing as a party to a case before this office.
If anly other rule were adopted, a stranger could at any time, by the bare allegation
of a claim to a tract of land, appear and demand all the rights and privileges of
a party to any suit which might be pending involving the title to such land.
Commissioner llcFarland to Messrs. Ford & Brainard, Washington, D.
C., February 13, 1883.
I am in receipt of your letter of the 6th instant, in the form of notice
of an appeal from my action in reference to the matter of certain mining
claims, touching which you were advised of the position of this office
by letters, dated, respectively, January 20 and 31, 1883.
The letter of the 20th ultimo was called forth by the filing of certain
papers in this office, said to be copies of papers formerly filed and re-
jected, and filed again,with the surveyor-general, of New Mexico, alleging
the existence of a claim of title derived from the Spanish or Mexican
government to the Santa Rita mines in New Mexico.
You were advised that said papers appeared to be duplicates of papers
previously presented to the surveyor-geueral and which that officer had
found not to contain any evidence of grant or title from either the Span-
ish or Mexican government to the land or mines in question. There
was, therefore, nothing before this office upon which any action could
be taken in respect to such alleged claim.
You were also informed that as the land appeared to be subject to
entry under the mining laws of the United States, and as no legal
objections were found to the pending mineral entries, the same would
proceed to patent in usual course.
The letter of the 31st ultimo was in reply to a request from you that
the papers which had been filed in this office should be reported to Con-
gress under the eighth section of the act of July 22, 1854.
As the papers referred to contained nothing which had not already
been considered by the surveyor-general, and nothing that could be con-
strued into the basis of a claim under the treaty provisions, there being
no evidence of the existence of any claim of right or title in the alleged
grantor of your client, there was nothing to be sent to Congress, and
your request was accordingly declined.
You now desire to appeal to the Hon. Secretary of the Interior, and
you lay before me certain propositions as specifications of error, to wit:
1st. Alleged error in assuming jurisdiction in this case, contrary to
the provisions of the act of Congress of July 22, 1854.
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2d. Alleged error in refusing to lay before Congress the decision of
-the surveyor-general of Mexico, dated July 6, 1882, in regard to said
private land claim, as required by said act.
3d. Alleged error in refusing to reserve from sale or disposal the lands
embraced by said private land claim until final action thereon, as pro-
vided by said act.
4th. Alleged error in holding that there is no Santa Rita del Cobre
private land claim before this office which could be sent to Congress
'under section 8 of the act named, "inasmuch as Congress alone has
power to determine this question."
You are advised that the question before this office, and of which I
have assumed jurisdiction, is the question of the rights cf certain
mineral claimants under the mining laws of the United States.
No adverse claim was filed in those cases daring the period of pub-
lication, and no reason has since been shown to me why the usual
course of mineral adjudication should be suspended or delayed, and I
have so informed you.
The right of appeal to the Secretary is allowed to parties who are
shown to have some interest in a cause or matter properly pending,
and in which a decision has been made.
A claim cannot be set up by mere assertion. A person who has not
shown some evidence of a claim can have no standing as a party to a
case before this office.
It any other rule were adopted, a stranger could at any time, by the
bare allegation of a claim to a tract of land, appear and demand all the
rights and privileges of a party to any suit which might be pending
involving the title to such land.
For the same reasons, it is provided by rule 83 of the rules of practice
that an order can be applied for, to have proceedings certified up to the
Secretary, only by a party to a case.
Your client, Mr. Hays, has not made himself a party to the case now
pending in this office involving the Santa Rita mineral entries.
The previous correspondence addressed to you by this office, and to
which exception is now taken by you, consisted merely of letters of
advice, informing you. as a matter of official courtesy, of the status of
the mineral entries. Information so given does not constitute an ap.
pealable decision. Mr. Hays is not before this office as an appellant,
showing an affirmative right in his own behalf, nor as a protestant, alleg.
ing failure of the mineral claimant to comply with the law.
It may be proper for me here to say for your information that the
adoption of any different rule, upon the assumption that such course is
required or authorized in carrying out the provisions of the eighth sec-
tion of the act rf 1854, would be in my judgment to impute to that
statute an intention that the whole public domain within the Territories
of New Mexico and Arizona may be placed in reservation at the will or
instance of any person or persons who might choose to assert a claim
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by mere allegation, unsupported by evidence of grant or muniment of
title from former sovereignties-a result repugnant to public policy and
destructive of public and private rights. I do not think the act of 1854
susceptible of such interpretation.
Congress unquestionably has the power, and the sole power, to deter
mine the validity- or invalidity of claims arising under treaty stipula-
tions with Mexico; and all claims, whether adjudged by the surveyor
general to be valid or invalid, must be presented to Congress for final
action; but such submission, with its accompaniment of a statutory
reservation of the land claimed, is restricted by the terms of the act to
claims cognizable under the laws, customs, and usages of Spain and
Mexico. It can hardly be supposed that imaginary claims, not so cog-
nizable, or claims unsupported by some evidence of grant or title from
the former governments, can possess sufficient dignity to authorize their
submission to Congress, or to work a legal reservation of public lands
of the United States.
MINIAG CLAIM-APPLICATION FOB SUB VEY.
PHILIP DEPHANGER.
Application for a mining survey must be declined where the location was not prop-
erly marked and recorded. Bearings and distances must be given in a survey
from the respective survey corners to the location corners, and tie same must be
shown on the plat.
Commissioner McFarland to U. S. surveyor-general, Virginia City, Ne-
vada, January 26, 1882.
Further proof as to the identity of the claim of Philip Dephanger
et atl. upon the Eagle lode as located, and the same as surveyed, is
desired. The notice of location filed with the papers is regarded as in-
sufficient to determine this satisfactorily. You will call upon the ap-
plicant to furnish a certificate of identity signed by any disinterested
party. In this connection I desire to call your attention to the neces-
sity of furnishing for the benefit of this office more reliable information
upon this point than the entry papers generally afford.
The act of Congress of May 10, 1872, expressly provides that "the
location must be distinctly marked upon the ground so that its bound-
aries can be readily traced," and "that all records of mining claims
hereafter made shall contain the name or names of the locators, the
date of the location, and such a description of the claim or claims
located by reference to some natural object or permanent monument,
as will identify the claim."
These provisions of the law must be strictly wo it n ' each
case to entitle the claimant to a survey and patent, and therefore should
a claimant under a location made subsequent to the passage of the act of
May 10, 1872, who has not complied with said requirements in regard to
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marking the location upon the ground and recording the same, apply for a
survey you will decline to make it. (Circular N, November 20, 1873.)
If the Eagle lode was located in accordance with the requirements of
the statute, it was marked upon the ground. If the survey was prop-
erly executed, it was made within the limits thus marked. There is,
however, nothing in the entry or survey papers to show that this was
done, save the bare statement that the survey was made in accordance
with the notice of location; as the location notice is exceedingly blind,
this statement can hardly be considered satisfactory.
To enable this office to determine satisfactorily, and at a glance, that
the provisions of the law and its instructions are obeyed, you will in
future require in the field notes a particular reference to all the data
upon which a survey is based, to wit: From each established corner of
the survey a bearing and distance must be given to the corresponding
corner of the location.
Upon the plat the lines of the location as found upon the ground must
be laid down in such a manner as to contrast and show their relation to
the lines of the survey.
If the location and survey are identical, this fact should be clearly
and distinctly stated in the field notes.
After a reasonable time has elapsed in which to notify your deputies
of the foregoing, no survey not complying with these requirements will
be Ajlowed to go to patent.
MINES-AD VERSE CLAIM-REG UL4XYONS- WAIVER.
J. S. WALLACE.
When it is impossible to procure the survey of the adverse claim, the adverse claim-
ant may show the nature, extent, and boundaries of the claim as nearly as prac-
ticable from information in his reach, and present under oath the reasons for not
following the official regulations. If the facts justify such action the regulations
may be waived,
Secretary KirkEwood to o wmissioner McFarland, February 21, 1882.
I have examined your report of December 1, 1881, upon letter of J.
S. Wallace, of Hailey, Idaho Territory, dated November 11, 1881, and re-
ferred to your office by this Department under date of November 19 last.
Mr. Wallace represents in effect that there are mines located high up
in the Sawtooth Mountains, in new districts near the headwaters of
Wood River in the said Territory, and that, in case parties should make
applications for patents of such mines during the period from about
December to April, it would be impossible, in a majority of instances,
if not in all, for adverse claimants to procure surveys in accordance
with present regulations within the period of publication, on account of
the severity of the climate, deep snows, etc., in that locality.
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In view of these facts, Mr. Wallace, who is acting as superintendent
of mining property located in said mountains, suggests that the rights
of all parties owning claims in the above-mentioned districts would be
most effectually preserved and protected if the surveyor-general of the
Territory were instructed to postpone the granting of any order for ad-
vertisement of applications for patents until the country is open in the
spring, when adverse claimants can procure their surveys.
Mr. Wallace doubtless meant that the local land officers should be
instructed to postpone publication of notices of applications for patents.
But it is evident that under existing law such instruction would be im-
proper.
You suggest that your office might issue instructions waiving the
present requirements as to surveys of adverse claims, in cases in which
the adverse claimants shall show under oath that such surveys cannot
be executed and platted within the period of publication on account of
climatic or other temporary difficulties, anid allowing adverse claimants
to file such plats of surveys within a reasonable time after the obstacle
to making surveys shall have been removed.
I do not agree with this suggestion. Adverse claimants should be
held to reasonable diligence under the law in taking necessary steps
to protect their interests. If there is danger or likelihood of applica-
tions for patents being presented during a season in which surveys can-
not be made, the parties might anticipate such proceedings by securing
surveys of their claims during the season in which no obstacles to mak-
ing the same are present.
But, if application for patent in any case should be made at a time
when it is impossible to secure a survey of a claim adverse thereto,
then, as the law does not require impossibilities, the adverse claimant
might show the nature, extent, and boundaries of his claim as nearly as
practicable from information within his reach, and present under oath
his reasons for not following more clearly the regulations of your office,
and submit whether, under all the circumstances, he had not properly
presented an adverse claim. This would give opportunity to waive the
regulation requirement in a given case when the facts were presented
justifying such action, and would be preferable to a general waiver of
the rule in anticipation of a case calling for any such waiver.
To waive the requirement as to surveys of adverse claims in advance
of the presentation of reasons therefor would tend to encourage care-
lessness and indifference on the part of adverse claimants respecting
such requirement, and would, I think, be equivalent to an invitation to
adverse claimants to present excuses for laches, whereas they should
exercise all reasonable diligence in their efforts to comply with the regu.
lations. I -
Mr. Wallace's letter is herewith returned for the files of your office,
and you will advise him of the action thereon.
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BODin TUNNEL & MG. CO. v. BECHTEL CONSOLIDATED MG. CO.
ET AL.
A tunnel location under the United States mining laws is a mining claim, and can beVa 0 an adverse claim.
/D f 1, Having failed to file an adverse claim and commence suit as provided by statute, the
tunnel company must be held to occupy the position of protestant.
The jurisdiction assumed by the courts prior to legislation granting such jurisdiction
to determine conflicting rights as between adverse mining claimants recognized
and continued in force by the mining statute.
The case of Corning Tnnnel Company v. Pell (4 Colorado, 507) does not support the
position that there may be adverse mining rights under tunnel locations that can-
not be adjudicated in the courts.
While the Department has no jurisdiction to determine controversies as between ad-
verse mining claimants where sufficient allegations have been made to indicate,
if true, that the applicant for patenthas notcompliedwithlaw, oris not entitled
to a patent, an investigation should be held as in agricultural cases.
Secretary Kirkuood to Commissioner elycarland, December 12, 1881.
I have examined the papers forwarded with your letter of the 29th
October last, in the matter of the protest of the Bodie Tunnel and Min-
ing Company against the several applications of the Tioga Consol-
idated Mining Company and the Bechtel Consolidated Mining Company,
for patents for certain mining claims in Bodie land district, California.
On the first day of July, 1880, the Tioga Company filed several appli-
catibns for the following-named mining claims: The Red Lyon, the Mid-
summer, the Lady Locke, the Central, the Northern Extension Stand-
ard, the Sutro, the Clipper, the Tioga South, and the December, and
entered the same October 8, 1880.
The Bechtel Company filed like applications, July 1, 1880, for the
Sitting Bull, the Central, the Argentine, the San Francisco, the Penn-
sylvania and the Ohio mining claims, and entered the same October 15,
1880.
During the period of publication of said applications, to wit, on Au-
gust 31, 1880, the said tunnel company filed with the register of the
Bodie land office a written instrument in the nature of a protest, styled
by the company as follows: Sworn statement and petition of the Bodie
Tunnel and Mining Company." The paper was sworn to by Thomas
Buckley, superintendent of said Tunnel and Mining Company, and set
forth that, on the 28th day of September, 1877, F. Tagliabue, a citizen
of the United States above the age of twenty-one years, duly located a
tunnel claim under section 2323, Rev. Stats., on the west side of Bodie
Bluff, in the Bodie mining district, Mono County, California.
The description of the claim contained in a certified copy of the tun-
nel notice, attached to the said petition or protest, is as follows:
This claim commences at this notice, being 10 feet westerly from the
month of the Old Bodie tunnel, and about 1,000 feet, more or less, in a.
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northerly direction from the Blasdel tunnel, and runs in an easterly
direction 3,000 feet; and I hereby claim 750 feet on each side of said
tunnel, and each blind and undiscovered ledge struck by said tunnel.
This notice was filed for record in the office of the county recorder of
Mono County, September 29, 1877.
The claim was surveyed November 14, and the field notes and plat
thereof filed for record in the office of said county recorder, November
15, 1877, as appears from copy of said plat and field notes attached to
said petition or protest, from which it would also appear that the line
of the tunnel and the exterior boundaries of the surface claimed were
marked by posts; but whether so marked before survey does not appear.
The surface ground claimed is in the form of a rectangular parallelo-
gram, 3,000 by 1,500 feet.
The petition or protest further sets forth that work upon said tunnel
has been continuously and diligently prosecuted ever since the date of
said location; that said tunnel and mining company is the owner of
said claim by purchase; that of all the above named mining claims of the
said Tioga and Bechtel companies lie across the central course of said
tunnel; that the work on the tunnel has not progressed far enough to
discover veins or lodes within or under the surface ground of the several
claims applied for by the Tioga and Bechtel companies; and that the
affiant is informed and believes that several of the locations thereof
are mere surface locations, in which no vein or lode has ever been found
at all, and the locations of which were made subsequently to the tunnel
location. The names of the claims alleged to have been thus located
are not given, but reference is made to the abstracts of title accompa-
nying the applications for patents for ascertaining what claims of the
said Tioga and Bechtel companies were located subsequently to the
location of the tunnel claim.
From a statement in your decision of August 24, 1881, it appears that
the Midsummer, Lady Locke, Central, North Extension Standard, Clip-
per, and December, of the Tioga company's claims, and the Sitting Bull,
Argentine, San Francisco, Ohio, and Pennsylvania, of the Bechtel com-
pany's claims, were located subsequently to September 28, 1877.
The said tunnel company declared that it claimed all veins, lodes, or
ledges which it may discover in extending its said tunnel, which cannot
be traced upward to the surface; in other words, veins, lodes, or ledges
which were not known to exist prior to the tunnel location.
The tunnel company did not in terms protest against the issue of pat-
ents to the Tioga and Bechtel companies; but after the recital of facts
and allegations upon which it relied, closed the petition with two pray-
ers to the following effect:
First. That in the event of patents being issued upon~agy of said ap-
plications they should contain words making the grant subject to the
lawful rights and claims of the Bodie Tunnel and Mining Company.
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Second. That in the event of such patents being granted for any of
said claims, the location of which was subsequent to the date of the
tunnel location, a clause be inserted therein, excepting and excluding
from the grant any and all veins, lodes, ledges, or mineral deposits that
may be cut, intersected, or discovered by said tunnel company in rn-
ning and excavating said tunnel, which had not been discovered and
located prior to September 28, 1877.
Upon this paper the company rested, and did not institute proceed-
ings in court as provided by -section 2326, Rev. Stats.
Upon the argument of the matter the counsel for the Bodie Tunnel
and Mining Company raised objections to the validity of some of said
applications not alleged in the petition or protest, one of which was that
the Red Lyon location was invalid in this, that the location was 4S9 feet
in width, while the mining laws or rules and customs of miners in that
district limited the width of lode claims to 100 feet, and it was con-
tended that patent to said claim could not issue for more than 100 feet in
width.
In your decision of August 24, 1881, you held substantially as follows:
First. That it was necessary for the rights of the tunnel company that
suit should have been brought in court as provided by section 2326,
Rev. Stats., and that, as said company failed to institute such proceed-
ings, its adverse claim was waived, and that it cannot be adjudicated
by this Department.
Second. That the Bodie Tunnel and Mining Company having failed
to establish any claim, or right, or interest, present or prospective, to
or in the tracts applied for by the Tioga and Bechtel companies, it is not
competent toinsert any clauses of reservation in the patents to be issued
upon said applications.
Third. That the Red Lyon location was not limited to 100 feet in
width, because it appears that after the year 1869 the Bodie mining
camp was abandoned, and for many years the laws, rules, and customs
thereof were disused: that during this period the act of 1872, allowing
600 feet in length to a lode claim, was passed; and that before any local
law or regulation was thereafter adopted by miners in the district in
which said claims are situated, limiting the width of claim to less than
thie statute allows, the Red Lyon was located, and hence that at the
time of its location it was lawful to locate to the extent of 1,510 feet in
length and 600 feet in width in that district.
Fourth. That as the Midsummer, Lady Locke, Central, North Exten-
sion Standard, Sutro, Clipper, and a portion of the Tioga South, are
within the limits of theRed Lyon, and subsequent ill loc ation, the entries
thereof are invalid, and were held by you for cancellation.
Fifth. Without deciding that the other claims should pass to patent,
you decided that they should be regularly disposed of, and dismissed
the petition- or protest.
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From all your rulings and decisions in this matter the tunnel com-
pany filed an appeal, which you dismissed by decision of October 5,1881,
upon the ground that the said tunnel company held the position of pro-
testant merely, and was not entitled to appeal under the rule laid down
in MeGarrahan . Boston Mine (S. M. D., 330); Boston Hr. Mining Com-
pany v. Eagle Copper Company (Id., 320), and Lombard v. Mount Pleas-
ant Mining Company (Id., 279). Thereupon the matter was brought
here under Practice Rule 83.
Without intending to question or infringe the rule above stated as to
appeals, I deem it proper, in view of the importance of some of the
questions raised and of the earnestness and ability of the arguments
presented by counsel on both sides, to briefly review your decision, by
virtue of my supervisory powers, and not in my appellate capacity. In
doing this, I do not consider it necessary to set out the specific points
of exception noted in the appeal. It will be sufficient to take up the
several points decided by you as above set forth, they, in my opinion,
covering the whole case, and being altogether excepted to.
As to the first point, it is evident tome that the claim of the said tun-
nel and mining company must of necessity be a mining claim. It is a
claim under the mining laws of the United States, if it is any claim at
all. It follows that if this claim conflicted with the claims of the Tioga
and Bechtel claims, which are mining claims, it was an adverse claim.
Due publication of notice of the applications of the Tioga and Bechtel
companies was had. This is not questioned. Section 2325, Rev. Stats.,
provides that-
If no adverse claim shall have been filed with the register and receiver
of the proper land office at the expiration of the sixty days of publication,
it shall be assumed that the applicant is entitled to a patent, upon the
payment to the proper officer of $5 per acre, and that no adverse claim
exists; and thereafter no objection from third parties to the issuance
of a patent shall be heard, except it be shown that the applicant has
failed to comply with the terms of this chapter.
It is not claimed that the paper filed by'the tunnel company was in-
tended as an adverse claim under sections 2325 and 2326 Rev. Stats.;
but if it had been, the tunnel company would be in no better position
than if no adverse claim had been filed; because s ection 2326, Rev. Stats.
provides that-
It shall be the duty of the adverse claimant, within thirty days after
filing his claim, to commence proceedings in a court of competentjurisdiction, to determine the question as to the right of possession and
prosecute the same with reasonable diligence to final judgment: and a
failure so to do shall be a waiver of his adverse claim.
It is therefore evident that the tunnel company must be held as
occupying one of two positions. It either filed no adverse claim at all,
and the Land Department must assume that none exists, or else, hav-
ing filed one, it waived it by failure to institute proceedings in court,
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and hence it must be assumed that none exists. As affecting the mat-
ter under consideration, it is immaterial which position it is held to
occupy, as the result is the same in either event. This Department has
not otherwise construed these two sections as regards adverse claims,
and Mr. Justice Field in the Eureka case said: "The silence of the first
locator is, under the statute, a waiver of his priority." (See opinion of
c urt in 4th Sawyer, at page 318.) This judgment was affirmed by the
supreme court. (See 13 Otto, 839.) 1
But it is urged by counsel for the tunnel company that it has not
such a claim as can stand in court; that the rights claimed cannot be
protected in a court of competent jurisdiction, &c.
To say this, is to say that the tunnel company has no rights at all.
But counsel insist that it has rights granted by statute. If that be so,
then clearly they can be protected in court against any conflicting min-
ing right or claim. In the view I take of the mining law, there is not
a right that can be acquired thereunder which cannot be fully protected
'in court as against any other conflicting right or claim arising under
the same laws, except that of the United States. This is the very foun-
dation of the system of te mining laws. Prior to Congressional enact-
ment of mining laws, miners had their local laws, rules, and regula-
tions, by which they were governed, regarding their mining claims, and
all their rights thereunder when in dispute or conflict were adjudicated
by the courts. Courts, of course, did not undertake, any more than
now, to dispose of the title of the government, over which they had no
jurisdiction. But as regarded the rights of miners, not as against the
United States, but as against each other, courts took jurisdiction, and
that jurisdiction was recognized and continued by Congress when it
framed and enacted the mining laws. The United States mining laws
are in a sense supplemental to the system that had already grown up
in the absence of Congressional enactment. They in no sense wiped
out, destroyed, or essentially changed that system, but continued it in
vogue. (Broder v. Water Co., 11 Otto, 274.) So far as the actual op
erations of mining were or are concerned, that system was and is all-
sufficient. Congress made certain definitions as to what should be
deemed mining claims, as regards location, etc., and enacted the man-
ner of making locations, amount of labor and money to be expended,
etc.; but the prominent feature of the mining system, of asserting rights
in courts under the local rules of miners and the laws of the States and
Territories, w as not changed, but especially authorized by section 2324,
2325, and 326. Rev. Stats.
I know of no case wherein the courts have refused to recognize rights
tnder tunnel locations. The attorney for the tunnel company at San
Francisco cites the case of the Corning Tunnel Company v. Pell et al.
(4 Colorado, 50?), to support the position that there may be adverse
mining rights or claims under tunnel locations that cannot be adjudi-
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eated by the courts; but as I understand that case, it gives no support
to that position. Section 2323, Rev. Stats., provides that where a tunnel
is run for the development of a vein or lode, or for the discovery of
mines, the owners of such tunnel shall have the right of possession of
all veins or lodes within 3,000 feet from the face of such tunnel on the
line thereof, not previously known to exist, discovered in such tunnel, to
the same extent as if discovered from the surface, and that locations on
the line of such tunnel of veins or lodes not appearing on the surface,
made by other parties after the commencement of the tunnel and while
the same is being prosecuted with reasonable diligence, shall be invalid.
Now, in the case of Corning Company v. Pell et al., the court defined
what is meant in the law by the words, " on the line of such tunnel."7
It was insisted in that case, as is claimed here by the protest or petition,
that the line of the tunnel means 1,500 by 3,000 feet, as surveyed and
staked as the tunnel claim; and that a location within such limits was
invalid.
But the court construed the line of a tunnel, as intended by the act,
as designating " a width marked by the exterior lines or sides of the
tunnel." The evidence showed that the slide lode, which was claimed
by the tunnel company, was 55 feet from the center line of the tunnel;
and the court, therefore, under its construction of the law, held that the
location of said lode "was not on the line of appellant's tunnel." The
court then stated as follows: " What the appellant's rights would have
been had this fact been otherwise, it is not necessary to determine."
The tunnel company in that case was defeated in court, because it
showed no right or claim to the slide location, under the court's con-
struction of the law; and the case was not defeated upon the ground
that there are no rights under tunnel locations that courts can maintain
or preserve.
But counsel for the tunnel company insist that this Department
should hold all of the locations of the Tioga and Bechtel companies
which are made subsequently to the tunnel location to be invalid,
because the law provides that such location shall be invalid. From
what has been said it is clear that this Department cannot pro-
nounce any such judgment, because it has no jurisdiction to inquire
into the facts upon which the demand is founded. It is said that the
fact that these locations are on the line of the tunnel is one that appears
of record in the Department, and that I am bound to take notice thereof;
but it is only necessary to call attention to the fact that there is no
record of mining locations in the land department. They are recorded
with a mining recorder, under local rules of miners, or in the county
records of the county in which the claims lie, and the facts relative to
mining locations can be shown in the land department and the courts
only by evidence delors the proper records of such Department or the
courts. It is a matter of proof that does not appear from our records.
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It may be made to appear as an item of evidence in the.record of a,
case, but not from the records of the Department of which I am bound
to take notice. That fact might have been presented in court, but it
cannot be made to appear here in the case as it now stands.
From the view, therefore, which I take of the mining law, the only
place in which the controversies between conflicting mining claim-
ants or adverse claimants can be heard, is a court of competent juris-
diction.
What has already oeen said disposes of the second point decided by
you. It is not competent to insert clauses of reservation of rights fully
waived. In saying this I do not intend to hold that patents ought to
issue to the Bechtel and Tioga companies, that question not being be-
fore me.
As to the third point, your holding as to the Red Lyon location seems-
to be in accordance with prior rulings of your office, this Department,
and the courts, as per your citation. (General Land Office letter to this.
Department, September 2, 1878, and concurrence therein by my prede-
cessor Sept. 28, 1878, to Attorney-General; and Jupiter Mining Con-
pany v. Bodie Mining Company, 8 C. L. O., 0.)
On the fourth point, as no appeal has been taken from your decision
holding the entries of the Midsummer, Lady Locke, Central, North Ex-
tension Standard, Sutro, Clipper, and Tioga South for cancellation, so
far as they conflict with the Red Lyon entry, it must stand.
Finding no error in your conclusions as above set forth, I must of
necessity also find that there was no error in your decision of October
5, 1881, dismissing the appeal, and the same is affirmed.
I desire to say that while I am of opinion that controversies between
adverse mining claimants cannot be heard and determined before this
Department, I am nevertheless of the opinion that where, under the
last clause of section 2325, third parties present evidence by affidavits,
etc., to show that an applicant has failed to comply with the mining
statutes, if the evidence is of such character as to entitle it to credit,
anbd if the allegations are such as, if proven in regular proceedings,
would show that the law has not been complied with, that patent under
the law ought not to be issued, or that you have no jurisdiction to issue
the patent, then it is your duty to order an investigation as between
the government and the applicant, as in similar cases of agricultural
entries.
With this rule in view, I submit for your consideration the allegations
contained in the affidavit accompany ing the application of the tunnel
company under Practice Rule 83.
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INING CLAIM-AD VERSE LOCAXTIOT-WA4E.
GUSTAVUS HAGLAND.
Under Section 2325 Revised Statutes, if no adverse claim is filed during the required
period of publication, it is assumed that the applicant is entitled to patent, and
no agreement of parties can control this statutory provision.
If either party claims a non-fulfillment of such agreement by the other, the remedy
must be found in the courts, and not before the Department.
When one is seeking a patent for his mining location, and gives notice of the fact as
there prescribed, any other claimant of an unpatented location objecting to the
patent of the claim, either on account of its extent or form, or because of as-
serted prior location, must come forward with his objections and present them,
or he will afterwards be precluded from objecting to the issue of the patent.
The silence of the first locator is, under the statute, a waiver of his right.
Secretary Kirkwood to Commissioner McFarland, March 8, 1882.
I have considered the application of Gustavus Hagland for patent
on the Metropolitan Lode No. 2 (mineral entry No. 1192, lot No. 797,
Idaho mining district, Central City, Colorado), and the protest of Theo-
dore H. Lowe as owner of the Kangaroo Lode No. 2, (survey No. 281),
against the same, on appeal by Hagland from your decision of July 6,
1881, holding said entry, No. 1192, for cancellation.
It appears that the Metropolitan Lode was located prior to March 3,
1873, and recorded as of that date; that on November 9, 1873, the locat-
ors thereof filed a protest against the issuance of a patent to the claim-
ant of the Kangaroo Lode No. 2, for the reason that the ground was
part of that claimed and located by themselves; that the Metropolitan
Lode was re-located July 12, 1878, by Hagland, the grantee of the orig-
inal locators, for the purpose of embracing all the land allowed by the
mining laws, and that an additional re-location was made by Hagland
June 5, 1879, the more accurately to describe the re-location of July
12, 1878.
It also appears that an application for a survey of the Metropolitai
Lode was made and rejected by the surveyor-general because its loca-
tion was not sufficiently definite to fix the locus of the claim, and that on
the filing of an amended certificate of location July 18, 1878, the survey-
or-general directed survey thereof by one Peregrine, a U. S. deputy min-
eral surveyor, whose survey was rejected because the discovery shaft
of -the Metropolitan Lode was located within the side lines of said
Kangaroo Lode; that, on June 19, 1879, by direction of Peregrine, a
further amendment of the Metropolitan claim was made, in which its
discovery'shaft was made to appear outside the side lines of the Kan-
garoo Lode, whereas, in fact, no such discovery shaft existed. Affida-
vits having been filed to the effect that Peregrine knowingly and falsely
located said shaft outside the lines ot the Kangaroo Lode, and had so
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admitted, you instructed the surveyor-general, January 7, 1881, to make
personal examination in the field touching the truth of said allegations,
who reported the same as true.
The entry No. 1192 was based on said false survey, but there is no
evidence tending to show that HEagland, or any person associated with
him, had part in or was cognizant of said falsity.
Patent for the Kangaroo Lode, No. 2, issued August 25, 1874, and
said claim appears to have been located upon grounds which belonged
to the applicant for the Metropolitan Lode by prior location.
The applicants for the Metropolitan Lode did not file an adverse
claim during the period of publication, for the ground sought to be
patented by the owner of the Kangaroo Lode, by reason of (as appears)
an agreement between the parties under which the applicants for the
Metropolitan Lode relinquished all right to protest against the issuance
of patent to the owners of the Kangaroo Lode, for a valuable considera-
tion to be made them under certain contingencies. The purposes or
effect of this agreement are, however, immaterial, because under sec-
tion 2325 Revised Statutes, if no adverse claim is filed during the re-
quired period of publication i is assumed that the applicant is entitled
to patent, and no agreement of parties can control this statutory pro-
vision. If either party claims a non-fulfillment of such agreement by
the other, the remedy must be found in the courts, and not before your
office or this Department.
Mr. Justice Field said, in the Eureka case (4 Sawyer 302), that under
the act of 1872, when one is seeking a patent for his mining location,
and gives notice of the fact as there prescribed, any other claimant of
an unpatented location objecting to the patent of the claim, either on
account of its extent or form, or because of asserted prior location,
must come forward with his objections and present them, or he will
afterward be precluded from objecting to the issue of patent. .
The silence of the first locator is, under the statute, a waiver of his
priority. %
As the discovery of the Metropolitan Lode appears to be within the
side lines of the patented Kangaroo claim, and as said patent passed
the government's title to the land, so that all control of the executive
department over the title has ceased, and as the applicants for the
Metropolitan Lode failed to file an adverse claim to the applicant for
patent by the owners of the Kangaroo Lode, I affirm your decision.
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S.AME, ON REVIEW.
The development and possession of a lode, so far as it runs on public lands, is not in-
terfered with in any way by the waiver of a portion, even though the orginal
discovery shaft was included in the portion disposed of.
Section 2326 of the Revised Statutes recognized portions of claims as entitled to
patent, and the issue of separate patents on such portions as adverse parties may
rightfully possess. But no patent can issue for any portion of a lode lying within
the patented surface ground, nor for any surface ground appurtenant thereto.
No part of an entry can stand under the proceedings based upon a false survey and
publication.
Secretary Teller to Commissioner McFarland, April 11, 1882.
From the papers and the oral argument before me, the following facts
appear:
That on the 3d day of March, 1873, the grantors of Hagland filed for
record the original notice of location of the Metropolitan No. 2, cover-
ing fifteen hundred feet in length and twenty-five feet on each side of
the vein in width, said location having been made in January previous.
That on the 20th of the same month the location of Kangaroo tunnel
lode No. 2 was made, covering one thousand feet in length and twenty-
five feet on each side in width. It also appears that the order obtained
from the surveyor-general for the survey of said claim was dated
February 25, and the plat and field notes on which patent afterward
issued were approved March 18, 1873, prior to the date of alleged loca-
tion.
For upward of seven hundred and fifty feet on the easterly end of the
Metropolitan, and embracing the point claimed as the discovery shaft
and a portion of the tunnel, the surface ground of these two originaL
locations appears to be nearly, if not exactly, identical, which would
necessitate the presumption that but one lode was made the basis for
both if accurately located, although it is claimed by the applicant for
the Metropolitan that the true Kangaroo vein runs diagonally across the
westerly end of the said common surface ground, and leaves the Met,
ropolitan vein more than forty feet distant at the nearest point, leaving
also the surface ground a few feet from the westerly end; and that the
only vein within such common surface ground, except the short diagonal
portion, is the Metropolitan vein No. 2.
On the 8th of May, 1873, patent was applied for on the Kangaroo No.
2, and was issued thereon August 25, 1874. The entry was made
October 9, 1873, no adverse claim being filed by the owners of the
Metropolitan.
This adverse claim was not filed because of a stipulation and bond to
the effect that if the Kangaroo lode should be found not to be identical
with any one of Metropolitan lodes 1, 2 and 3, a good and sufficient
deed of said lodes should be made by the owners and patentees of the
said Kangaroo claim, or if identical with one, then the others should be
so deeded.
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About 700 feet of the Metropolitan lode on the westerly end do not
lie within any other survey.
July 12, 187 8, Hagland relocated the Metropolitan claim, embracing
in its side lines 75 feet on either side, instead of 25 feet as originally
located, and on the 5th of June, 1879, he again relocated the claim, for
the purpose, as alleged, of making a correction of the recorded descrip-
tion in the notice of 1878.
It appears that the 50 feet additional surface ground on each side
-was claimed in the new location so as to take the full quantity allowed
by the amended local law, the claim at the date of original location
being limited to 25 feet.
Upon the amended relocation, Hagland procured a plat and posted
it on the ground July 21,1879, and filed his application at the district
-office July 23, 1879, whereupon publication was had for sixty days-no
adverse claim being filed-and entry was admitted November 19, 1879.
In 1880 it was alleged that the survey and plat were incorrect, and
)upon full investigation it was shown that the relative position of the
various conflicting surveys and locations was by deliberate design of
the deputy surveyor falsely returned in the field notes, and the dis.
ecovery shaft and middle line of the lode were represented upon public
land north of the patented Kangaroo claim, instead of running along
or near its center line where a true survey would have shown it to be.
A subsequent plat, approved by the surveyor-general April 3, 1881,
-is conceded to show the correct location. By the first and published
survey all the surface ground claimed east of the original discovery
shaft lies on the north side of the patented claim. By the amended
survey nearly one-half the additional ground is thrown upon the south
side of said claim. As before stated, upward of 700 feet of the lode,
commencing a few feet west of the discovery shaft and running to the
westerly end line, are not in conflict with the Kangaroo.
It is claimed and shown that shafts have been sunk and work done
along the vein at intervals of considerable distance on both sides of
the discovery shaft, and six of these shafts and a portion of the tunnel
itself are situated on the public land outside the patented ground.
Three questions present themselves in connection with the facts re-
-cited:
1. Did the waiver of the discovery shaft and the portion of the lode
,within the Kangaroo survey, by failure to file an adverse claim, have
-the effect to vitiate the entire Metropolitan location and bar an applica-
tion for any part of the same 
2. If not, how far may the original location be held good, and for
what portion may a patent lawfully issue ?
3. Can any part of the entry stand under the proceedings had upon
a false survey and publication ¶
On the first point I am of the opinion that the development and pos-
session of the lode so far as it runs upon public land was not interfered
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with in any manner by the waiver of a portion, even though the original
discovery shaft was included in the portion disposed of.
The continued possession and working of such outside portion under
the original ownership and location ought not to be held as forfeited
while the good faith of the owner toward the United States is not im-
paired; and opportunity should not be given to a stranger to appro-
priate under United States laws the property and improvements which
he has aequired and made upon a good and sufficient location properly
asserted at the time of his original discovery.
Section 2326 of the Statutes recognizes portions of claims as entitled
to patent, and the issue of separate patents on such portions as adverse
parties may rightfully possess. Assignment of any interest whatever
in these mining possessions has been declared valid by the supreme
court, even by a parol transfer without a written instrument.
If the existence of the lode be shown beyond the lines of the conflict-
ing survey, and application be made for patent, it would seem to work
a complete abrogation of a property and statutory right to deny a patent
thereon because of a sale or surrender of some other portion of the lode
originally embraced in the discovery and location.
IJpon the second point I am of the opinion that no patent can issue
for any portion of the lode lying within the patented surface ground,
appurtenant thereto. The attempt to relocate the claim in 1878 and
attach the additional surface as an extension was long subsequently
to the issue of patent and at a time when the applicant had surren-
dered the claim to the lode, his only right thereto resting in the bond
and agreement of the private owner. He had manifestly in 1878 no
discovery of mineral within the limits of this extension, so far as the
lode at that time lay within the patented Kangaroo claim. Nor is it
alleged that any mineral has been discovered within such lines, outside
the patented ground, on which an independent location could be made.
To the westward of the surveys in conflict, I see no objection to the
new location so as to embrace the full width of surface allowed by law.
Upon the third point I am of the opinion that the claimant must com-
mence anew, and proceed by a proper publication upon a correct plat,
in order to entitle him to a patent. The alleged amendment of 1879
was notoriously incorrect, while the location of 1878 is shown by com-
parison with the corrected plat now exhibited to have been substan-
tially correct. When he made this location he appears to have known
all about the position of the mine and the claim attempted to be located.
It is said that having failed to obtain an approval of a correct plat, he
procured a false one, and upon that proceeded to publish his applica-
tion. Inspection of the published notice, as well of the plat, shows that
it was false in description, and the plat was also false in area of non-
conflicting surface. He attempts to deny his responsibility for these
falsifications, and charges them upon the United States deputy sur-
veyor. But he adopted them, signed them, published them, and pur-
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sued his application upon them. He is the only party who could appa-
rently obtain any benefit from them, and they were grossly misleading
in point of fact, as descriptive of the position of the claims represented.
The law requires a certificate from the surveyor-general " that the plat
is correct." The incorrect plat and notice should not be permitted to
stand as sufficient while a fair opportunity remains for a satisfactory
compliance with law by a new publication.
I therefore conclude that the order for cancellation should stand with-
out prejudice to the right of the applicant to proceed de novo in accord-
ance with the views herein expressed; and to that extent I modify my
decision of 8th ultimo.
TIMBER TRESPASS-PUBLIC LANDS.
WILLIAM REBNINGER.
Accretions formed by washing or recession become part of the lands they adjoin.
Removing timber from accretions that are public lands, except for improvement of
the same or other domestic use, is trespass upon such lands, and liable to punish-
ment as such.
Commissioner cFarland to William Reninger, Jackson, Nebraska, Oc-
tober 4, 1881.
Yours of 10th ultimo, addressed to the honorable Secretary of the
Interior, has been referred to this office for action and reply.
In relation to the matter therein stated, you are informed that where
land is formed by accretion, either by the washing up of the soil or by
the recession of the waters, and adjoins land owned by private parties,
it becomes a part of same; and the owners of said adjoining lands are
entitled to exercise any and all acts of ownership over the same that
they may deem proper.
Where accretions form upon or adjoin any portion of the public do-
main, they become a part of it in like manner, and title rests in the gov-
ernment. Islands and all accretions thereto, formed in the channels of
all navigable and meandered streams, or new formations therein (that
are not a private property), are a part of the public domain, and are not
to be trespassed upon.
You are also informed that any parties claiming the right to cut and
remove any timber from any accretion lands that are a part of the pub-
lic domain, or from any homestead or pre-emption entry other than for
the actual improvement of the same, or for other domestic use, are guilty
of trespass, and liable to punishment therefor. The cutting and remov-
ing of timber from such lands or entries for the purpose of speculation
or private gain is prohibited, and will not be permitted until such time'
as final proof is made and final papers issue thereon.
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ACTJUNE3, 1878.-TIMBER FOB DOMESTIC USE, MINES, QUARTZ MILLS,
ETC.
FRANK P. HARDIN ET AL.
As contemplated by the timber-cutting act of June 3, 1878, any use to which timber
can be put within the State or Territory, for the comfort or convenience of its
people, is a domestic use-but such timber cannot be transported beyond the
State or Territory but may be bought and sold within their limits.
The same act contemplates the cutting of timber for use in timbering mines or in con-
nection with quartz mills or reduction works.
Secretary Teller to Commissioner McFarland, May 25, 1882.
My attention has been called to a number of cases reported by Special
Agent Harlan, of so-called trespasses in cutting timber on mineral lands
in the Territory of Dakota-notably the cases of Frank P. Hardin, who
is charged with cutting seventy-two cords of wood; Peter T. Bye,
-charged with cutting twenty-five cords; Henry Bressert, with cutting
sixty cords; J. H. Damon, a like amount; and Albert Holtman, one
hundred cords.
All this wood appears to have been cut off of the mineral lands of the
United States. It also appears by the report of the special agent that
the persons charged with the trespass have, in cutting this wood, con-
formed to the rules of the Department as to the size of the timber to be
cut, etc., and it is now proposed to compromise with these persons by
allowing them to pay for the wood cut, at the rate of fifty cents per
cord.
I do not think on the statement of facts made by Special Agent flar-
lan, in the case of Peter T. Bye, that he has been guilty of trespass in
cutting such wood. I understand the facts are substantially the same
in all the cases mentioned. The act of Congress approved June 3, 1878,
entitled "An act authorizing the citizens of Colorado, Nevada, and the
Territories, to fell and remove timber from the public domain for min-
ing and domestic purposes," learly authorizes the cutting of timber on
the mineral lands of the United States for domestic use. It does not
appear that Peter Bye or any other of the parties complained of cut
the wood for transportation from the Territory, and if cut to be used in
Dakota it is clearly for domestic use. It has been alleged that the act
of June 3, 1878, does not apply to persons cutting timber on the mineral
lands for sale, and that to enable any person to have the benefit of that
act, he must cut the timber for his personal use, and not for sale. Such
a construction defeats the very-intent of the act, which was to allow
the settler on the mineral lands to have the benefit of the timber thereon
growing for use within the Territory or State where it grew. It cannot
be supposed that Congress intended to say by that act to the inhabit-
ants of the mineral regions, that while they might go on the lands of thea
United States and cut timber for their own use, yet they could not em-
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ploy others to cut timber for them, or purchase it of those who had cut
and prepared it for use.
Large and prosperous communities had settled on the mineral lands
of United States by and with the consent of Congress. Statutes had
been passed declaring such occupation lawful, and provisions were made
for securing title to mines that should be discovered and improved on
such lands. Yet no provisions had been made by which title could be
made to the timber growing on such land until a mine had been dis-
covered thereon. To have restricted the inhabitants to the use of such
timber as should be found on the mineral claims alone would have
been folly, for in many instances the mineral claims are destitute of
timber. Whole mining districts are frequently compelled to procure
their supply outside of their districts either because the timber in such
districts had been cut off and used, or because the district was without
timber when first settled. The area of territory occupied by actually
located mineral claims is entirely too small to.supply the communities
with timber from such claims alone; and so it became a necessity to
appropriate the timber on government lands, in the absence of law
authorizing the purchase of either te timber or the land oii which it
grew. From the first settlement of the mineral regions to 1878, such
had been the custom of miners in all the mineral regions. Cities and
towns with churches and school houses had been built with the timber
go taken from the public lands. Appeals had been made to Congress
from time to time to provide by law for securing the title to the timber
on the mineral lands. Congress, with the wise policy of keeping the
mineral lands of the United States open to further exploration and oc-
cupation, had declined to pass any law by which the timber on such
lands could be monopolized by speculators and capitalists. Wood-
choppers and lumbermen had, from the first settlement of the mineral
regions, cut from the mineral lands wood, mining-timbers, lumber for
building, and sold the same to those who could not or did not wish to
cut such timber for their own use. It was practically impossible for the
mill-men, the miners, and other inhabitants of the country to go out
and fell the trees that were to be used to build their mills, timber their
-mines, or supply their families with fuel. About the time of the pas-
sage of the act of Th78 it was alleged that such cutting was in viola-
tion of law, and ought not to be allowed. To have prevented such
cutting would have compelled the abandonment of nearly if not quite
all the mineral regions of the States and Territories named in the act.
'The act was passed to establish by positive enactment a right claimed
and exercised without interference on the part of the government for a,
period of about thirty years, and the construction heretofore given to
,it by this Department has defeated the purpose of the act, and has not
been of advantage either to the government or the people residing on
such mineral lands. In most of the regions included in the act referred
to, the timber is of little value for use outside of the neighborhood in
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which it grows. Comparatively a small amount of it would bear trans--
portation out of the State or Territory, and it cannot be used more ad-
vantageously to the people and the government than in the production
of the precious metals. If the timber is cut having reference to the:
rules established by the Department as to size, etc., no complaint ought
to be made. It has been suggested that the use of wood in quartz;
mills and reduction works in the mineral regions is not a use for min-
ing purposes. I do not think there is anything in that suggestion..
Quartz mills and reduction works are indispensable to a mining com-
munity, and such use is clearly within the provisions of the law, and
the consumer as fully protected by it as if he consumed it in his dwell-
ing. You will therefore instruct the special agents now in the States
and Territories named in the act of June 3, 1878, to conform to theb
suggestions herein. The great object of the governmental supervisioa
of the cutting of timber in those States and Territories ought not to bea
to compel payment for timber so cut, but to prevent unnecessary waste,
the cutting of the small trees under the size prescribed by the. Depart-
ment, and to prevent waste by fires and other means.
TIMBER C UT.TNG-HOMESTE.AD CLAIMANTS.
The decision of' the Secretary of May 25,1882, relates only to the public mineral lands;
not to public lands in Missouri.
A homestead claimant may cut and remove timber upon the land he is preparing to
cultivate; and if more is found than is necessary for building and other improve-
ments, the surplus may be sold. But cutting and removing it from any other por-
tion of the tract than that being cleared for cultivation is prohibited, etc.
Commissioner McFarland to B17. I. 3enhan, Star, Missouri, June 22, 1882.
Your favor of 10th instant duly received. You ask for information
relative to the recent decision of the honorable Secretary of the Interior
regarding the cutting and removing of timber from thb public lands of
the United States (Frank P. Iardin et al.); also as to the propriety of
citizens in your vicinity going onto the public lands to cut timber for
the improvement of their farms.
In reply, I have to state that the recent decision of the Secretary of
the Interior, and to which you refer, relates only to the public mineral
lands of the United States within the States and Territories embraced!
by the act of June 3, 1878; copy herewith.
The decision of the Secretary does not refer to any of the public lands;
within the State of Missouri, as the act of Congress approved May 5,.
1876, withdrew all public lands in said State from the operations of the
act of May 10, 1872, and declared that all lands in said State should bew
subject to disposal as agricultural lands.
In regard to persons going upon the public lands to cut and remove
timber therefrom for the purpose of improving their farms or for any
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other purpose, except for the actual cultivation and improvement of the
land from which the same is cut or removed, you are informed that such
act would be regarded as a violation of law, and the parties so offending
are liable to punishment under section 2461, Rev. Stat.
In order that you may be fully advised, I will state that the law per-
mits homestead claimants to cut and remove the timber growing or being
upon the actual tract they are preparing to cultivate.
If, however, in clearing said piece or parcel of land there is found
more timber than is required for building or otherwise improving said
entry, then it is permitted that such surplus may be sold. But the cut-
ting or removing for sale of any timber from any other portion of his
said 'claim than the particular tract being cleared for cultivation, is pro-
hibited until such time as the claimant by a full compliance with the
homestead laws obtains title to the land so claimed.
TIMBER CUTTING OX PUBLIC LAYD-ACTS OF JUNE 3, 1878.
d,~ 4 / ?7/ DtKL ~ / INSTRUCTIONS.
The object of the act (Chapter 150) was to enable the inhabitants of the States and
Territories referred to, to cut and remove timber from the class of public lands
withheld from the operation of the pre-emption and homestead laws.
If mineral districts are found outside of the States named, they are also included in
the provisions of the act.
The land to be sold in California, Nevada, and Washington Territory, under Chapter
151, is non-mineral land. The mineral lands are excluded. The object was to
enable the inhabitants to purchase certain timber lands, and to prevent waste
upon the public lands, the miner and agriculturist being permitted to cut timber
in clearing for tillage and improving mines, as prescribed in the act.
Secretary Teller to Commissioner McFarland, August 7, 1882.
I have yours of August 1st instant, in which you ask instructions as
to chapters 150 and 151 of the acts of 1878 (20 Stat., 88-89).
First. The meaning of the words "all other mineral districts of the
IUnited States," found in the first section of chapter 150. The object of
this chapter is so very evident that I do not think there can be any
difficulty in determining the meaning of these words. The object of
the act was to enable the inhabitants of said States and Territories
to fell and remove the timber from that class of public lands withheld
from the operations of the pre-emption and homestead laws,>which by
existing laws they were not allowed to do.
The act, after specifying the States and Territories, contains the fol-
lowing: " All other mineral districts of the United States." If mineral
districts are found outside of the States and Territories named in the
act, such districts are included within the provisions of the act as fully
as if the States containing such mineral districts had been specifically
named in the act. The mineral districts of California were thus in-
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eluded in the act, and all privileges granted to inhabitants, of mineral
districts of the States and Territories named in that act were granted
to the inhabitants of such mineral districts of California, subject, of
course, to the restrictions of the act also; and the rules applied to the
mineral districts of States and Territories named in chapter 150 must
apply to such districts in California.
If you confine the second question to mineral land, you have the answer
in the answer to the first question. As chapter 150 does not authorize
the cutting of timber, except on mineral land, I do not see the object of
extending your inquiry to any other than mineral land.
As to question three, I do not understand that it is at all material,
under any provisions of chapter 150, whether the transportation from
one part of the State or Territory named in the act to any other part be
by railroad, steamboat, or otherwise. All thp act provides that bears
on the question of transportation is that it shall not be exported. Sec-
tion 4 of chapter 151 applies to the States and Territories named in
that chapter, and not those named in chapter 150, except as to Nevada,
named in both acts.
The land to be sold in California, Nevada, and Washington Territory
under chapter 151 is non-mineral land, or land not known to contain
valuable deposits of gold, silver, cinnabar, copper, or coal. By the ex-
press provision of section 2 the mineral lands in the broadest sense of
that term are excluded from the provisions of said chapter. It inustbe
borne in mind that there were two main objects to be accomplished in
chapter 151: One was to enable the inhabitants of Nevada, California,
and Washington Territory to purchase certain timber lands; and, sec-
ondly, to prevent the committing of waste on the public lands of the
States and Territories named in the act, and to punish the persons com-
mitting the same. But it was not the purpose to interfere with the
agriculturist and miner who might, without committing any actual waste,
cut timber from the public lands; therefore it was provided in section
4 as follows:
" Provided, That nothing herein contained shall prevent any miner or
agriculturist from clearing his land in the ordinary working of his min-
ing claim or preparing his farm for tillage or from taking the timber
necessary to support his improvements, or the taking of timber for the
use of the United States."
The miner is allowed to cut the timber in the ordinary working of his
mining claim, and the agriculturist in preparing his land for tillage.
In both these cases the reference is to land claimed by such miner or
agriculturist. If a mineral claim it is a piece of land not exceeding
1,500 feet in length by 600 in width; if an agricultural claim, not ex-
ceeding 160 acres. If the rights saved to the miner and agriculturist
by the proviso of section 4 were intended to apply only to such land as
they claimed, the words " or from taking timber necessary to support
his improvements" are useless. The words were not happily chosen,
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and it may be somewhat difficult to say what is intended by the words
"to support his improvements." If applied to a miner it must, I think,
be intended to mean all the timber he might need to make the working
of his mine possible, and if a farmer or agriculturist, all the timber he
might need for the use of such farm.
If the timber he uses is only such as he needs "to support his im-
provements," I consider it immaterial whether he cuts it himself or
whether he purchases it of one who cuts it for that purpose, and if it
becomes necessary for a miner or agriculturist to have timber " to sup-
port his improvements," and his neighbor cuts it for him, I think such
neighbor is as flly protected by the proviso as if he had cut it for the
purpose of supplying his own improvements.
TIMBER CUTTING ON MINERAL LAND.
Timber may be taken from mineral lands to be applied solely to the purposes specified
inthe act of June3,1878,i.e.,mining and domestic purposes; butnone less than
8 inches in diameter may be cut.
Timber may be taken from near mineral public lands by miners and agriculturists,
for improvement of their mines and farms, when their respective claims do not
furnish the necessary quantity; bat not for their private gain or commercial
purposes.
It is unlawful for mill men or others to cut timber on the public lands for sale or for
exportation.
Commissioner McFarland to J. L. Mills, Milton, W. T., March 3, 1883.
This office has received, by reference from the Hon. Secretary of the
Interior, your communication of the 29th January last, in which in-
quiry is made "if a man who runs a saw-mill doing a strictly local or
neighborhood business is liable to prosecution for selling timber on
public lands."
In reply thereto you are informed that the cutting and removing of
timber from the public lauds of the United States is permitted, if taken
from mineral lands and applied solely for the uses and purposes specified
in the act of Congress approved June 3, 1878 (copy herewith), entitled
"An act authorizing the citizens of Colorado, Nevada, and the Territories
to fell and remove ti mberfrom the public domain for minin g and domestic
purposes."
You are advised, however, that the cutting of timber less than 8 inches
in diameter is strictly prohibited, as well as the destruction of timber
or the committing of any wanton waste. (See circular of September 21,
inclosed herewith.)
In addition to the advantages allowed citizens and residents under
the act above referred to, the miner and agriculturist, under section 4
of the act of June 3, 1878, " for the sale of timber land in the States of
California, Nevada, Oregon, and in Washin gton Territory,"~ are permit-
ted to take from non-mineral public lands such timber as they may re-
quire in the improvement of their farms or mines, there not being suffi-
cieut timber on their respective claimsfor the usesand purposes specified;
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but the right to enter upon non-mineral lands is restricted to the cutting
and removing of such timber only as may be actually required for the
development of their particular claims and farms, or they may employ
others to procure such timber for them, provided that such persons en-
gaged or employed in supplying such timber to the parties lawfully
authorized to use the same for the purposes indicated, shall not, under
color of such employment, engage in cutting or removing any timber
from the public lands for their own private gain or commercial specu-
lation.
The cutting and removing of timber from the public non-mineral lands
being confined by section 4, chapter 151, of the act of June 3, 1878, to
the resident miner and agriculturist or for the use of the United States,
it is therefore unlawful for mill men or others to cut or cause to be cut
and removed from such public non-mineral lands any timber to be sold
in the general market or for exportation, or to be used for any purposes
other than those specified. Any violation of the statute renders the
parties offending liable to prosecution and punishment therefor, as pro-
vided in said section 4, chapter 151.
MINING CLAIM-ADVERSE PROCEEDING.
REED V. HOYT.
Secretary Teller to Commissioner Mc'arland, December 11, 1882.
January 20, 1882, the adverse claim of Silas Reed against an application for a mine
in Utah was rejected by Commissioner McFarland because sworn to in Boston,
Mass.
The Secretary says: As it appears, however, that suit was commenced
on this claim within the required time, and is now pending, I am un-
willing, upon technical reasons, to interpose objections to an adjudica-
tion of the claim by the appropriate tribunal.
I therefore modify your decision and allow the adverse claim to stand.
TIMBER ON PUBLIC LAND-SETTLER.
CHARLES CONNER.
Where timber has been cut upon a tract afterwards entered as homestead, and is
going to waste, the entryman may use so much thereof as is needful for clearing
the portion he wishes to cultivate, for building, fencing, etc., and in case of an excess
may sell the same; but may not sell from other portions of the tract.
Commissioner McFarland to Charles Conner, St. Ignace, Michigan, Janu-
ary 27, 1882.
I have received by reference from the honorable Secretary of the
Interior your letter of the 30th ultimo, in which you make the following
statement and inquiry:
"A" locates a homestead. Previously to the location by "A" a large
amount of valuable timber had been cut and is now going to waste.
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,Jan " A" remove and dispose of this timber, which is cut and wasting,
or must he wait until he has acquired title to the land e In reply, you
are informed that if a person locates a homestead with the honest in-
tent of actually residing upon and cultivating the same, he may remove
and dispose of so much of the timber thereon as is needful for clearing
the portion he wishes to cultivate, and for building, fencing, and other-
wise improving the land entered.
Furthermore, if, upon the portion to be cleared and cultivated, there
should be more timber than would be required for improvements upon
the land in the way of building, fencing, etc., the homesteader would be per-
mitted to sell that excess of timber; and, if there be such an excess, he
has no right to cut, or cause to be cut, the timber, or to sell any timber
standing or fallen that may be found elsewhere upon the lands entered,
until be shall have obtained final proof papers. If he does so cut, cause
to be cut, or sells the timber found anywhere else than upon the por-
tion to be cleared-provided there be upon that portion a sufficiency of
timber for all the purposes of improvement and cultivation-he will be
held liable for timber trespass, and subject to the penalty therefor under
the law, the same as if the lands had not been entered by him.
lIMBER TRESPASS-ENTRY-HOMESTEAD.
No estate in land ebraced in a homestead entry vests in the claimant until the entry
is perfected and patent issued.
Trespass upon a tract covered by an unperfected homestead entry is trespass upon
property of the United States; not upon that of the homestead claimant.
Commnissioner McFarland to U. S. District Attorney Charles C. Waters,
Little Rock, Ark., February 24, 1882.
I am in receipt of your letter of the 9th ultimo, relative to the case of
the United States v. Creed Wiley, who was convicted on November 9,
1881, in the United States district court for the eastern district of Ar-
kansas, for unlawfully cutting pine logs from land embraced in the
homestead entry of Sebastian Leinhardt. You state that defendant
moved for new trial upon the ground of error in the refusal of the court
to grant the instructions to the jury asked for by defendant, a copy of
which you inclose. The instructions asked for were in substance that
the homestead land was the private property of the homestead party;
the theory of the defense being that a homestead entry is an "estate
with a condition subsequent." You ask for some suggestions from this
office on that head.
The distinctions between conditions precedent and conditions subse-
quent are well defined The authority referred to by you is adequate
upon this point.
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" A precedent condition is one that must take place before the estate
can vest. (Kent's Commentaries, 4, 125.)"
No estate in land embraced in a homestead entry vests in the home-
stead party until the entry is perfected and patent issues.
The homestead entry vested no title in the defendant, but it gave to
him, under the law, a right of possession which he might perfect by
continued occupancy and improvement. If he failed to so perfect it
what right he had reverted to the United States. (Flint and Pere Mar-
quette Railroad Company v. Gordon, Michigan Supreme Court, October
term, 1879.)
This reversion occurs at any period of time, by change oS residence,
or upon abandonment for more than six months. No judicial decree or
legislative declaration of forfeiture is necessary to extinguish the home-
stead claim. Any individual can assail a homestead entry, and contests
of this character are numerous under the operations of the homestead
laws, and aerecognized by current legislation. Section 2 of the act of
May 14, 1880 (21 Stat., 141), makes certain provisions for securing the
preference right of entry to persons who contest and procure the can-
cellation of homestead and certain other entries. If the conditions of a
homestead entry were conditions subsequent nobody but the grantor
could take advantage of their failure, and his right could only be en-
forced by judicial proceedings or by legislative declaration of forfeit-
ure. (Schulenberg v. Harriman, 21 Wall, 44.)
The universal practice of the Land Department of the government,:
which has never been called in question by the courts, is the summary
cancellation of homestead claims for failure of conditions. Were these
conditions of a subsequent nature this could not be done.
What is called an original or preliminary homestead entry, that is to
say, the initiated but unperfected homestead claim, is in fact a home-
stead application only, and is so described in the papers subscribed by
the party and which constitute the notice and basis of his claim. He
may acquire an estate by compliance with the requirements of law for a
certain period, but until this is done he has no property in the land
itself that is recognized by law or that can be protected by the courts.
The transfer by him of any improvements he may place upon the land
is recognized under local laws as the conveyance of personal prop.
erty, but he can make no conveyance whatever of the land under the
laws of the United States, nor can any contract made by him create a
lien upon it, neither is it taxable by the local authority. There is noth-
ing in the unconsummated homestead entry that partakes of the nature
of private property in the land.
It is probably unnecessary to pursue this subject further. The re-
fusal of the court to grant the instructions asked for was of course cor-
rect.
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TIMBER CUTTING-HOMESTEAD ENTRY,
PATRICK BRADY.
On homestead entry made in good faith, for purposes of residence and cutivation,
timber on the land to be cleared may be disposed of by the party to enable him
to continue improvements upon the land.
Commissioner McFarland to George W. Bell, Cheboygan, Michigan, May
31, 1882.
Your letter of April 8th last, inclosing certain affidavits in relation
to the sale made by Patrick Brady of timber from his homestead entry,
viz, S. of NE. I and NW. I of SE. * Sec. 11, T. 36 N., R. 3W., M1ichi-
gan, has been received.
The evidence since derived from the report of the special agent of this
office investigating the case tends to corroborate the facts set forth in
your letter and the affidavits therewith, to the effect that Mr. Brady
made said entry in good faith for the 'purpose of actual residence and
cultivation, and that the timber in question stood upon the portion of
said land to be cleared and cultivated.
I am satisfied, therefore, that Mr. Brady should not be disturbed in
the right which he has to dispose of said timber, and become thereby
enabled to continue the improvements upon the- land embraced in his
said homestead entry.
TIMBER SALE BY PRE-EMPTOB-ENVTBY uNPEBriCTED.
A pre-emptor acquires no title and no right to secure title under the pre-emption law
until all the provisions, including proof and payment, are performed.
Trespass upon the land before patent is trespass upon the property of the United
States.
The pre-emptor cannot make sale or disposal of timber upon the tract other than that
cut upon land cleared for cultivation and not necessary for building, fencing, etc.,
* upon the tract.
Commissioner McFarland to C. Hll. Babcock, Republic, Michigan, November
22, 1882.
In reply to your letter of the 10th instant requesting to be referred
to the law against timber cutting on the public lands of the United
States, I have to advise you that the act of Congress approved March
.2, 1831, sec. 2461 U. S. Rev. Stat., makes it an offense, punishable by
fine and imprisonment, to cut timber upon any of the public lands of
the United States except for naval purposes.
Vou present the following case, viz:
"1 S. pre-empted land and before perfecting title cut and sold timber
to H. The United States district attorney arrested HI. for trespass."
And you state that you are unable to find any law that gives the
right.
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With reference thereto you are advised that a pre-emptor acquires
no title to land claimed under the pre-emption law, and no right to se-
cure title until all the provisions of law, including proof and payment,
are fully complied with. The legal title remains in the United States
until patent issues. (F. and P. AL R. B. Co. v. Gordon, Michigan Su-
preme Court, October term, 1879.)
Trespass upon lands claimed under the pre-emption law before the
claim is perfected and patent issues is trespass upon the property of
the United States. (See 8 C. L. O., 24; A. G. Ladda v. C. B. Hawley,
Supreme Court California, January term, 1881.)
The right of a pre-emptor is the right to acquire title by due compli-
ance with law; but the title must be acquired before he is authorized
to treat it as his property.
The regulations of this office restrict the pre-emptor (and homesteader)
to the cutting of timber from such portion of his claim as may require
clearing for the purposes of cultivation, occupation, and improvement,
and any surplus of timber so felled, which is not required for fencing,
building, or other improvements, he may sell or dispose of, but he can-
not make sale or disposal of any other timber upon his claim.
You further ask, Ad If the suit for trespass is discontinued, where is
the law allowing them to sue for value of timbers
In reply I have to state that the United States, as proprietor of the
timber unlawfully cut -from the public lands, may sue for the value
thereof. (See Bly v. The United States, 4 Dillon, p. 465.)
TIMBER TRESPASS-BOXI-YG TREES FOR TURPENTINE.
P. G. (CROMARTIE.
Boxing trees for turpentine is injurious, killing them if continued; and as title to the
land remains in the United States until the law as to tillage, etc., has been fully
complied with, any act by the entryman, in the mean time, that would injure or
destroy the timber would constitute a trespass, and render him liable to prosecu-
tion and punishment.
Commissioner McFarland to P. G. Cromartie, Castleberry, Alabama, No-
vember 25, 1882.
Your letter of 26th ultimo, addressed to the honorable Secretary
of the Interior, and referred by him to this office for reply, has been
received. You state that-
Some months ago I paid the entry fee and entered a homestead of
160 acres pine land. 1 propose to cultivate a portion and gather tur-
pentine from the trees not felled. I desire to know if I am allowed to
cultivate the forest in turpentine.
In reply you are informed that the boxing of trees for turpentine is
held by this office to be injurious to the tree, ultimately killing it if con-
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tinued for a series of years. As the title to the land entered by you
remains in the United States until acquired by you by a strict compli-
ance with the law as to tillage, improvement, and residence, any act in
the mean time committed, authorized, or permitted by you, or by any
other person with your knowledge or consent, that would in any way
injure or destroy the timber or trees thereon would constitute a trespass,
and render you liable to prosecution and punishment.
I-TDIAN RESEBVXATIO.V-ALLOTTEE-O WFNTRSIP.
By the treaty setting apart the reservation the lands were to be allotted and patented,
to one class in fee and to the other with conditions as to sale, etc., and until the
character of the title is determined by the patent, the allottee can exercise no
right of ownership over the land or timber thereon.
In preparing the land for cultivation, he may, to that extent, cut such timber as may
be necessary, and sell any surplus not necessary for improvements.
Commissioner McFarland to Special Timber Agent John H. TVelch, Ionia,.
Michigan, March 22, 1881.
In reply to your letter of January 23 last, asking to be informed if
the applicant for lands in the Indian reservation, Isabella County, Mich-
igan, can sell or dispose of the timber from such lands before receiving
his patent, you are advised that the Commissioner of Indian Affairs
states with reference thereto as follows:
The treaty with the Chippewas of October 18,1864 (14 Stat., 657), by
which the Isabella reservation was set apart, provides for the separa-
tion of the Indians entitled to make selections under the treaty into two
classes, viz, competent and those not so competent. It also defines the
interpretation to be put upon these terms, and provides for the issue of
patents as follows, viz:
"To those belonging to the class denominated competents, patents.
shall be issued in fee simple, but to those belonging to the class of those
not so competent he patent shall contain a provision that the land shall
never be sold or alienated to any person or persons whomsoever, with-
out the consent of the Secretary of the Interior for the time being."
From the wording of the treaty I am of opinion that until the charac-
ter of the title is determined, and evidence by the patent, the Indian
allottee can exercise no absolute right of ownership over the land or
timber thereon. He may, the allotment being duly approved by the
Department, prepare his tract for cultivation and improvement, and to
that extent may cut such timber as may be necessary, and sell any sur-
plus thereof which may not be required for use on the preises, but he
cannot at this stage cut timber for sale or speculation.
After patent issued-as to those holding title in fee simple there is,
of course, no question as to their power to dispose of the timber if they
see fit to do so-but as to those whose patent is restricted, following the
course adopted by the Department in the recent case of the Chippewas
of Wisconsin (La Pointe Indians), they will only be allowed to cut and
sell the standing timber under authority of the Department and subject
to such limitations as it may see proper to impose.
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In view, therefore, of the foregoing opinion of the Commissioner of
Indian Affairs you will be particular to investigate and report upon all
cases coming to your knowledge of unlawful timber cutting upon un-
patented lands in the Indian reservation, Isabella County.
TIMBER FOR CONSTRUCTING RAILROAD-SCHOOL LAND.
Neither railroad companies nor settlers have a right to take timber from school lands
for any purpose whatever.
Commissioner McFarland to Special Agent William F. Prosser, Seattle,
TV. T.. November 16, 1881.
I have received your letter of July 30, 1881, desiring to be instructed
concerning certain questions. @ *
You also ask:
"Are railroad companies permitted to take timber for purposes of
construction from school lands ?"
Neither railroad companies nor settlers have a right to take timber
from school lands for any purpose whatever. Such lands are reserved,
and are not to be considered as included in the license to take timber
from the public lands, or to settle upon the public lands.
TIMBER USED JR THE COANSTRUCTION OF RAILROAD.
NEW MEXICO & SOUTHERN PAC. R. R. Co.
The right of a railroad company to take material from the public lands for construc.
tion purposes ceases upon the day when such road completes the laying of its
tracks between terminal points.
Commissioner McFarland to . S. Fletcher, Santa Fe, New Mexico, Feb-
ruary 20, 1882.
You are informed that this office holds that under the act granting
the right of way to railroad companies through the public lands, ap-
proved March 3, 1875, the right therein conferred to take material from
the public lands for construction purposes ceases upon the day when
such road completes the laying of its track between terminal points.
As to whether such road has been turned over from " the hands of its
construction department " or not, is a matter which can have no weight
with this office in determining the period when said road was actually
a constructed road within the meaning of the law.
23 V * * * *
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TIMBER CUTTIYG-' ADJACENT PUBLIC LANTDS"-BAGET-TRESPASS.
GEORGETOWN, BRECKENRIDGE AND LEADVILLE R. R. CO.
Material to construct a right-of-way railroad may be taken from any of the public
lands within the neighborhood. Such lands need not adjoin or be near the road.
The agent of such railroad company may hire men to cut ties or contract at a cer-
tain price per tie. But such company cannot sell the ties so obtained to other
parties or railroad companies.
Secretary Teller to Commissioner McFarland, February 7, 1883.
I have your l etter of the 1st instant concerning the cutting of railroad
ties by A. J. Chaffee, in Clear Creek County, Colorado, as agent of the
Georgetown, Breckenridge and Leadville Railroad Company.
It appears that Mr. Chaffee is the agent of the said railroad company
for the purpose of securing ties for that road; but it is alleged that he
cuts ties by men not borne on the rolls of the company, and buys ties
of men who have cut the same on the public land. The railroad com-
pany comes within the provisions of the act of March 3, 1875, and is
entitled to take timber from the adjacent public lands for the purpose
of the construction of its road. I do not understand the word " adja-
cent " to mean that the lands from which the timber is taken must adjoin
the line of the road. Theword adjacent" may mean "adjoining,"
and it may mean " in the vicinity of."
The act of March 3, 1875, was passed for the benefit of railroad com-
panies, and now to restrict the word " adjacent," and make it synony-
mous with the word " adjoining," is notjustified by any canon of inter-
pretation. Webster defines "adjacent"7 as "'lying near or close ad-
joining; contiguous; neighboring, etc." So it appears that timber
growing within the neighborhood of a railroad that comes within the
provisions of the act of March 3, 1875, may be cut for ties to be used in
the construction of the road, although the land may not be contiguous.
What is meant by " within the neighborhood " must be determined by
the circumstances of the case. If the initial point is in a section desti-
tute of timber, and no timber grows on the land along the side of
such road for a considerable distance, it is consistent with the spirit of
the act that the company be allowed to cut timber at or even beyond the
terminus of the road, if timber otherwise could not be obtained; and it
is not a fair construction to put on the word " adjacent " to say thattim-
ber must grow opposite the line ot the road and within the terminal
points of the road. The right is given to cut timber, and it is imma-
terial to the government whether it is within 1 mile of the road or 50
miles distant. The spirit of the act is, that from the country having the
benefit of the railroad the timber must come. The country beyond and
away from the terminus of the road may receive equal and perhaps
greater benefits than the country within the terminal points. The rail-
road company should be allowed to cut timber at any point within the
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neighborhood of the line of road so being constructed. If it is found
necessary to take earth and stone for such construction, such material
must be taken where it is found most practicable for the company to take
it. If the adjoining land is of such a character that no stone can be had
on it, the company must be allowed to go away from the line of the road
where it can be obtained. Any other construction will defeatthe intent
of the act. In all cases where the timber can be obtained in the immedi-
ate vicinity and along the line of the road, it should be so taken; but the
company must not be deprived of the benefit of the act because the tim-
ber may not be found on the land adjoining the line of its road, and
within the terminal points thereof.
I do not see any objection to allowing the agent of the company to
employ men not borne on the company's roll to cut ties, and it is imma-
terial whether they cut such ties by the day or for a certain price per
tie. In either case the company is liable if they go beyond the authority
conferred on the company by the act of March 3, 1875.
If the Georgetown, Breckenridge and Leadvile Railroad Company
cut ties on the public land and sell the same to the Union Pacific Rail-
road Company, such cutting becomes a trespass, for the right given is
not to cut timber to sell, but to use; and the government may proceed
against such company for such cutting, and will doubtless also have its
remedy against the Union Pacific Railroad Company for the value of
the ties so cut, if it choose to secure its damages from that company
instead of the original trespasser.
Mr. Chaffee will e allowed to remove the ties cut, and if used in the
construction of the Georgetown, Breckenridge and Leadville Railroad,
or in the construction of an extension of the Colorado Central Railroad,
neither he nor said companies can be charged with any violation of the
law. If other disposition is made of such ties you will determine the
right of the matter in the light of the circular of July 15, 1881, and this
letter.
TIMBER CUTTNGS ON NEARYED LANDS WITHIN GRANTED LIMITS.
There can be no propriety in the United States prosecuting cases of trespass on odd
sections within railroads limits, whether earned or unearned.
There is no legal reason why a railroad company, when its grant is a present one,
cannot institute proceedings for trespass on its lands.
Secretary Teller to Commissioner McFarland, February 26, 1883.
I have received yours of the 13th instant, transmitting report of
Special Agent T. F. Shoemaker, dated the th ultimo, in relation to
timber trespass alleged against one Thomas Jenkins, of Wasco County,
Oregon, in cutting 1,000 cords of fir wood from the NE. of Sec. 1, T.
2 N., R. 8 E., W. M., in said State. In your letter you say:
The described land is within the limits granted to the Northern Pa-
cific Railroad Company; but the same being yet unearned by the said
company, the legal title thereto is in the United States, according to adecision rendered in the United States district court, Oregon, in the case
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of the United States v. William Childers, wherein suit was brought by
the government for timber trespass upon the same section, township,
and range as in the trespass under consideration.
I think that, under the decision of the supreme court in the case of
Schulenberg v. Harriman (21 Wall., 44), there can be no propriety in
the United States prosecuting cases of trespass on odd sections of lands
within railroad limits, whether earned or unearned. In the case of
Jenkins-report whereof is transmitted by you-the timber is alleged to
have been cut and removed from an odd section. I return the agent's
report for the files of your office.
For the same reason I return herewith the agent's report in the case
of Richard L. Nicholson, transmitted by you on the 10th instant, in
which timber trespass is alleged upon the NW. 1 of Sec. 1, T. 2 N., R.
S E. , W. M., Oregon; also the agent's reports transmitted to me by you
the 23d ultimo, in which timber trespass is alleged against William
Grant, John H. Stone, Henry E. Davis, Arthur C. Phelps, George
Broughton, Thomas Borthwick, and Walter Train, all upon Secs. 17,20,
21, and 29, T. 3 N., R. 8 E., W. M., the same being within the limits of
the grant to the Northern Pacific Railroad Company.
You are directed to submit these and other cases in which trespass
is alleged, including only the timber cut from even sections within rail-
road limits, omitting therefrom the timber cut from odd sections.
You are also directed to give instructions to the special timber agents
who may be called upon to report cases of trespass upon lands within
the limits of railroad grants, not to include cases of alleged trespass
upon odd sections.
There is no legal reason why any railroad company, when its grant of
lands by Congress is a present one, cannot institute proceedings against
a trespasser on its lands, since no valid objection could be raised on the
trial of such case on account of want of title in the company, inasmuch
as title to the company can be questioned only by the United States,
as. is fully set forth in Schulenberg v. Harriman (supra).
TIMBER CUT FROM PUBLIC LAND-RAILROAD LUMBER.
When rejected lumber is left on the hands of the mill owner or contractor, if it was
taken from mineral lands, it may be disposed of by him to the miners, settlers,
and others, bona fide residents of Colorado, for the purposes specified in the act
of June 3,1878, but if taken from non-mineral land, it is subject to stumpage
valuation.
Export from the State is not allowed, except, etc.; nor is an agent peimitted to set-
tle and receive money on account of trespass, etc.
Commissioner 3M-cFarland to Special Timber Agent William MI. Clark, Du-
rango, Colorado, Aarch 17, 1883.
Your communication of February 24th, presenting therein your ob-
servation in Gunnison County, Colorado, has been received.
In reference to the timber furnished by B. J. Wolf and Eckerly &
Co., under contract to the Denver and Rio Grande Railroad Company,
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to aid in the construction of the said road, you are informed that under
the Secretary's ruling of February 7th (copy of circular in relation
thereto herewith inclosed), railroad companies are allowed to go out-
side the terminal limits of their line of road to procure material for its
construction, provided the same is not to be obtained within the ter-
minal points thereof. This rule is doubtlessly applicable to the case
mentioned, but you will ascertain, however, if the timber used by said
railroad company is procured strictly in accordance with the rules and
regulations of circular herein referred to.
In reference to mill men supplying railroad companies with material
for construction purposes as permitted by the act of March 3, 1875,
the same must be done under contract or the direct orders of
the duly appointed timber agent of such road or roads. When, after in-
spection by the company's officer, there are cull ties or rejected lumber
left on the hands of the mill owner or contractor, you will ascertain if
the timber was taken originally from mineral or non-mineral lands. If
it was taken from mineral lands, then the culled or rejected lumber
may be disposed of by the mill men or contractors to the miners, set-
tlers, and other bonafide residents of the State of Colorado, for the uses
and purposes specified in the act of June 3, 1878, " authorizing the cit-
izens of Colorado, Nevada, and the Territories to fell and remove timber
on the public domain for mining and domestic purposes." Should,
however, the timber, from which the lumber or ties has been manufact-
ured, have been taken from non-mineral lands, then all culled or rejected
lumber on hand is subject to stumpage valuation.
You will, therefore, closely observe the operations of mill men in re-
lation to the matter above referred to, and report to this office in accord-
ance therewith.
You are further advised that in no case is it permitted to ship or ex-
port lumber so manufactured from Colorado, except the same may be
required by railroad companies, and then only upon he conditions as
hereinbefore stated. You are also advised that in no case is n agent
permitted to settle with or receive any money on account of trespass,
or infringement of the laws or rules and regulations made thereunder.
All cases must be reported to this office for settlement, and instructions
received from it in relation to the manner and basis of settlement.
# * * # # * *
TIMBER CUTTING FOR GOVERNMENT PURPOSE.
ISAAC OPPENHEIMER.
Cutting timber to supply a military post in fulfillment of a contract for wood, is not
such a depredation as is contemplated by law, unless waste is alleged.
Secretary Teller to Commissioner McFarland, September 26, 1882.
I received yours of the 23d instant, inclosing report of Special Agent
William F. Prosser, dated Seattle, Washington Territory, the 25th
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ultimo, in relation to certain timber cut from public lands by one Isaac
Oppenheimer, of Idaho Territory, "for the use of the" military " post at
Fort Cour d'Alene, and for the benefit of Oppenheimer in fulfilling the
contract awarded to him to supply said post with 2,000 cords of wood."
Agent Crosser, in his report, says that he considers such cutting " a
violation of the law, demoralizing in the community, and destructive of
the timber, because of the wasteful habits which it promotes in choppers
and contractors." Therefore he recommends civil and criminal suits
against Oppenheimer.
It is but reasonable to presume that the War Department has a right
to procure timber for its own use from the public lands. If sfich tmber
is procured by contract given to the lowest bidder, it is presumable that,
from the competition among bidders, the contracts will be let on terms
so low as to pay for little more than the expenses of cutting and haul-
ing; in other words, to pay for the work, rather than the wood. It is
certainly for the interest of the contractors to obtain timber for such
use from government lands, and so long as they commit no waste, the
government is the gainer by furnishing itself from its own timber-pro-
viding, as before suggested, it does not pay for the timber, but only for
the cutting and hauling. If wanton waste and destruction of timber
were alleged and proven, there would be sufficient cause for prosecu-
tion; but in the absence of such allegation I must decline to recommend
further proceedings in the case of the said Oppenheimer.
MILL SITE-CUTTING AND USE OF TIMBER THEREON.
A. B. PAGE.
If such claim be timbered, claimant may out for construction of mill, but not for sale
for private gain.
Commissioner McFarland to A. B. Page, Jasper, Colorado, March 22,1883.
Yours of 5th instant received and contents noted. I reply thereto
you are advised that any miner holding the possessory right to a vein
or lode, or any owner of a quartz mill or reduction works, and not own-
ing a mine in connection therewith, may make location of a mill site as
provided by section 2337, Rev. Stats., and upon complying with the con-
ditions specified therein may obtain patent therefor. The quantity of
land embraced in each mill-site claim cannot exceed five acres, and must
be non-mineral in character. If the mill-site claim is timbered there
would seem to be no good reason why the lawful claimant should not be
permitted to cut and remove the timber thereon for the purpose of con-
structing a mill, reduction works, tramways, or other accessory required
in the development of his mining interests. In permitting the removal
of the timber from such mill-site or tract of non-mineral land prior to
the issuance of patent therefor, it is strictly forbidden to make such
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timber an article of sale for private gain or speculation, but the same
must be used and applied to the actual development of the mining inter-
ests of the individual claimant.
EINLYG CIM-TRESPASS ON-LOCATOR'S RIGHT.
LEWIS SMITH, J. S. JONES, ET AL.
Locators of mining'claims, so long as they comply with the law governing their pos-
session, are invested by Congress with " the exclusive right of possession and enjoy-
ment of all the surface included within-the lines of their location."
This amounts to a property capable of being employed or transferred, subject to all
the ordinary rules governing the employment of other property, entirely separa-
ble and separate from the fee of the land.
It is the duty of the possessor to care for his own if trespass be attempted by a
stranger.
The government cannot be made a party in a suit for trespass on said location.
Secretary Teller to Commissioner McFarland, September 30, 1882.
I am in receipt of your letter of the 23d instant, inclosing copies of
communications from Lewis Smith, J. S. Jones, and others, respect-
ing the right of mill owners and residents upon the mineral lands of the
United States to cut wood and timber from such lands within the lines
of mining claims regularly located and possessed under the local laws
and customs and the laws of the United States governing the location
of such lands.
You express the opinion that-
The locator upon such lands is unable to protect himself in the courts,
or otherwise, as he has only a possessory right to said land, subject to
certain subsequent conditions, before he can obtain patent, and although
the title to the land is still in the United States, the government can-
not protect him, as the act of June 3, 1878, and the rules and regula-
tions prescribed thereunder, now in force, authorize the settlers and
residents in mineral districts to cut and remove timber from the min-
eral lands for any purpose except for export, or under a prescribed
size.
In view of the provision of the act that the right confirmed thereby
shall be " subject to such rules and regulations as the Secretary of the
Interior may prescribe for the production of the timber and of the under-
growth growing upon such lands, and for other purposes," you indicate
the further opinion that reservation may be made by departmental reg-
ulation in favor of mining locators, of the timber growing upon their
claims, and that trespassers may be punished for a violation of such reg-
ulations under the general provisions of the law against the cutting of
timber on the public domain; and you request instructions accordingly.
I do not concur in your view of the law. Locators of mining claims,
so long as they comply with the law govering their possession, are in-
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vested by Congress with "the exclusive right of possession and enjoy-
ment of all the surface included within the lines of their locations." This
amounts to a property capable of being employed or transferred, sub-
jectto all the ordinary rules governing the enjoyment of other property-
entirely separable and separate from the fee of the land.
It may consequently be protected in the courts; and it is the duty of
the possessor to care for his own, if trespass be attempted by a stranger.
If he neglects to protect himself and his possession, the law does not
assume that the United States is injured by the cutting and use of the
timber on such claim; nor does it impose upon the government the duty
of intervening to save to the individual occupant what has been de-
clared to be his private property by virtue of his location. Having
armed the locator with a complete grant of the possession, he alone is
concerned for its protection, and may undoubtedly maintain suit to that
end; but he can no longer, after availing himself of the exclusive right,
ask the government to bring action for what is no trespass except
against such individual right of possession.
You will so advise the parties presenting their requests for action by
this Department.
TIMBER CUTTING ON MINERAL AND NON-MINERAL LACED.
"All other mineral districts," etc., act of June 3, 1878, include the mineral district
of California, and all privileges, under chapter 150, to felltimber for mining, ag-
ricultural, and domestic purposes, attach to citizens and residents of those dis-
tricts.
And by chapter 151 these are permitted to go upon non-mineroai public lands to procure
timber for the purposes above (when it is not found upon their respective claims),
but not for sale, etc., and trees of less diameter than eight inches must not be cut.
Comnmissioner McFarland to register, Susanville, California, November 10,
18S2.
Your communication of July 11 last has been received and the sub-
ject matter thereof duly considered. In reply to your inquiry as to just
what extent it is your duty to prevent the cutting of timber on gov-
ernment lands in an agricultural community, and'also to your wish to
be informed as to the construction to be placed upon the words found
in the first section of the act of June 3 1878, " authorizing the citizens
of Colorado, Nevada, and " the Territories " to fell and remove timber
from the public domain for mining and domestic purposes," viz, " all
other mineral districts of the United States," and their relation to timber
trespass upon mineral lands in your district, I inclose herewith copy of
letter of the honorable Secretary, received by this office in reply to my
letter of August 1 last, asking instructions as to chapters 150 and 151
of the act of 1878, which information was desired by me in order to
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definitely answer the inquiries made by you in your said letter of July
11 last.
You will find from the inclosed letter that the words " all other min-
eral districts of the United States " are construed therein to include the
mineral districts of California, and that all the rights and privileges
granted underchapter 150 to citizens of Colorado, etc., to fell and remove
timber for mining, agricultural, and other domestic purposes from the
public minerallands, attach to the citizens and residents of the mineral
districts of California.
In addition to the privileges conferred on citizens and residents under
chapter 150, the miner and agriculturist within the mineral districts of
California are permitted, under section 4, of chapter 151, to go upon
the non-mineral public lands to procure such timber as they may re-
spectively need for use in the development of their mining claims or for
the improvement of their farms, should there not be upon theirrespect-
ive claims or farms a sufficient amount of timber for the uses and pur-
poses specified.
In the procurement of such timber from the non-mineral lands they
are restricted to the cutting and removing of such timber only as may
be actually required for the development and improvement of their par-
ticular claims and farms, or they may employ others to procure such
timber for them, provided such persons engaged or employed in supply-
ing such timber to the parties lawfully authorized to use the same f6r
the purposes indicated shall not, under color of such employment, en-
gage in cutting or removing any timber from the public lands for their
own private gain or for commercial speculation. You are advised, how-
ever, that in the procurement of all timber from the public lands the rule
prohibiting the cutting of trees less than 8 inches in diameter or the
committing of any wanton waste or destruction of timber will be strictly
enforced; also, that all parties who may enter upon any of the public
lands to procure timber must strictly comply with the conditions of
Department circular dated September 21 last. A failure to do so will
subject the party to prosecution, as therein provided.
One of the most important points to be determined in connection with
timber trespass upon the public lands is the establishing of the mineral
or non-mineral character of the land trespassed upon. Inclosed here-
with find circular letter of this office, together with form of affidavit,
containing the essential facts that witnesses should be called upon to
state regarding same and their personal knowledge of the character of
the land in question.
The cutting and removing of timber from the public non-mineral lands
being confined, by section 4, chapter 151, to the resident miner and
agriculturist, or for the use of the United States, it is, therefore, unlaw-
ful for mill men or others to cut or cause to be cut and removed from
such public non-mineral lands any timber to be sold in the general mar-
ket or for exportation, or to be used for any purposes other than those
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specified. Any violation of the statute renders the parties offending
liable to prosecution and punishment therefor, as provided in said chap-
ter 151.
REMOVA4L OFTIMBER ALBEADY CUT-USES, ETC., FOR WHICHALLOWED.
P. D. HURLBUT.
Removal from mineral lands only permitted for mining, domestic, and agricultural
purposes; and from non-mineral lands only for the development of the mine or
farm of the party procuring the removal.
Persons removing it from non-mineral lands for sale are liable to punishment as tres-
passers.
Commissioner Jl1cFarland to P. D. Hurlbut,, Verrillville, California, No-
vember 13, 1882.
This office is in receipt of a communication from you, dated 4th
ultimo, in relation to certain timber cut from public lands, requesting
permission to remove the same to your mill.
You are advised that the cutting or removing of timber from mineral
lands is permitted for the following purposes, viz, mining, agricultural,
and domestic purposes, but not for exportation from the State or Terri-
tory where cut; also that the cutting and removing of timber from non-
mineral public lands is only allowed when the material is used i the
actual development or improvement of the mine or farm of the partic-
ular person for whom the cutting or removing is done. MIill men and
all others who enter upon the public non-mineral lands for the purpose
of cutting and removing timber therefrom to sell and dispose of the
same in the general market, and not for the specified prposes named
herein, are liable to prosecution and punishment as trespassers under
section 4 of chapter 151, act of 1878.
The eutting of any timber upon any of the public lands less than 8
inches in diameter, the wanton waste or destruction of any timber, or
a failure to comply with the terms of general circular of September 21,
1882 (inclosed herewith), renders the party offending liable to prosecu-
tion and punishment.
This office cannot therefore permit the removal of the logs in ques-
tion until the character of the land upon which they were cut, and also
the purposes to which said timber is to be applied, are established.
A copy of your communication will therefore be at once forwarded to
Mr. Erastus Bond, a special timber agent of this office, with instructions
to make a thorough examination of all the circumstances surrounding
the case, and to report thereon to this office. Upon receipt of which
report you will be advised in regard to what steps this office will take
in the matter.
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TRESPASSERS-CONTBAdCTORS-PURCR .ASERS-LI-dBILITY.
A party hiring hands by the day to out and remove timber from the public lands is
liable to civil and criminal prosecution.
Where one contracts with others to cut and remove, all parties to the contract are
liable as above.
Where one cuts, removes, and sells to a mill owner or other party without previous
understanding, the seller isliable as above, and the purchaser to civil prosecution
for the fall value of the timber.
Any one who cuts timber on the public lands, hires others to do so, or in any way
encourages or promotes the same, is liable therefor.
Commissioner McFarland to receiver, Boise City, Idaho, February 15, 1882.
In reply to your communication of January 27 last, wherein you ask
if mill owners who do not cut logs themselves, but "contract with per-
sons for so inany feet of lumber in the log at a stated price," should be
called on to make affidavit in accordance with copy sent you in office
letter of the 16th ult., which reads "1 we have cut or caused others to
cut timber, etc.," you are informed that any person who contracts for
or purchases timber, knowing or having reason to believe the same was
cut from public lands, by so contracting or purchasing encourages and
provokes such cutting, and is therefore indirectly the cause and respon-
sible for the same. If mill men and others would refuse to purchase or
saw timber cut from the public land, such trespassing would cease, as
the cause would be removed.
Where a party hires hands by the day to cut and remove timber
from the public lands, the party so hiring is liable to both civil and
criminal prosecution, the same as though he himself actually cut the
timber; where a party contracts with others to cut and remove timber
from the public lands at a stipulated price per log or thousand feet, all
parties to the contract are alike subject to both civil and criminal pros-
ecution. Where a party cuts timber from the public land and then
sells same to a mill firm, or other party, without any previous under-
standing or contract, the party so cutting and removing is liable to
both civil and criminal-prosecution, and the party purchasing, or saw-
ing and disposing of, the same is liable to civil prosecution for the full
value of the lumber.
Certain laws have been enacted for the purpose of saving the timber
on the public lands from spoliation, and, in the view of this office, any
person who cuts such timber, or who hires others to cut such timber, or
who in any way encourages or provokes others to cut such timber, is a
violator of said laws and should be punished accordingly.
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TRESPASS-LANDS SOLD AND PATENTED.
Damage may be sustained against timber trespassers after the land in question has
been sold to parties other than the trespassers.
Commissioner McFarland to Don A. Dodge, Special Timber Agent, Duluth
Minn., February 9, 1883.
You desire to be informed if the government can claim damages for
timber taken from the public lands where title to the lands has subse-
quently vested in parties other than the trespasser.
In reply thereto, you are advised that it is the opinion of this office
that a claim for damages can be sustained on the part of the govern-
ment in all cases for any trespass committed on the public timber lands
prior to sale of same, except in cases of trespass which come under the
provisions of the act of June 15, 1880. It may not, however, always be
good policy to prosecute cases of this kind, particularly so where the
trespasser has purchased and improved the land and made actual set
tlement. But where it can be shown that the party is an old offender,
or that mill-owners or others have incited the trespass, or have been
parties thereto, either before or after the act of trespass, an investiga-
tion should be had, and the facts and circumstances connected there-
with reported to this office for its consideration and further action.
SCRIP LOCATION-TIMBER TRESPASS.
INSTRUCTIONS.
One who has placed scrip on unsurveyed public lands is not permitted to cut and
remove timber from the location, except for actual and necessary improvements
thereon and surplus on portion cleared, not needed for improvements, which may
be sold.
The same rule applies to locations by such scrip on surveyed public lands.
Commissioner McFarland to Special Agent Dodge, Duluth, Minn., Novem-
ber 4, 1882.
This office is in receipt of your letter of 28th ultimo, in which you ask
"if persons that have placed Sioux half-breed scrip upon portions of
unsurveyed public lands have a right to cut and remove timber there-
from."
In reply you are informed that such locators are not permitted to cut
or remove any timber from locations so made, except it be for the actual
and necessary improvements thereon; or should there be a surplus of
timber over and above that needed for such improvements growing or
being upon the particular tract cleared for cultivation, then the locator,
if an actual settler and resident thereon, may sell and dispose of sch
surplus.
DECISIONS RELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS. 621
Any person infringing the above rule, when reported to this office with
proper and necessary evidence to base legal proceedings upon, will be
promptly recommended for prosecution, both criminal and civil.
For your further information- you are advised that the cutting or re-
moving of timber from any of the surveyed public lands of the United
States under color of title derived from the mere location of such scrip
thereon, will not be permitted, except such cutting and removal be for
the purposes and in the manner hereinbefore stated. In short, title to
the lands located must have absolutely passed from the United States
before any right attaches to the timber thereon.
TIMBER CUTTING ON PRIVATE CLAIM.
Lands claimed under private grant are lauds of the United States until the claims
have been confirmed, and, mean time, the laws against cutting timber on govern-
ment land will be enforced as to these lands, except, the claim being made in
good faith, the timber is taken for the use of the claimant in the improvement of
the land.
Commissioner ifMcFarland to Messrs. Conway, Risque & Childers, Albu-
querque, New Mexico, July 25, 1881.
Referring to your letter of the 5th instant, wherein you state that a
gentleman who is engaged in saw-mill business in the vicinity of Albu-
querque, N. Mex., desires to cut timber from government land without
violating the law, if it is possible to so, and wishes to know if arrange-
ments can be made with the government, and on what terms; also that
he wishes to know how the Department treats lands in said Territory
actually occupied and claimed by Mexicans from a period antedating
the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, both under unconfirmed grants from
Spanish and Mexican governments, and without such grants.
In reply, you are advised: First, that the cutting of timber from pub-
lic lands of the United States situate in the Territory of New Mexico
is made an offense by section 2461 of the Revised Statutes, punishable
with fine and imprisonment, except in such cases as come within the
provisions of the act of Congress approved June 3, 1878; and I know
of no law under which arrangements can be made with the government
which would afford protection to the person cutting the timber from the
penalties imposed by the above-named section, of the Revised Stat-
utes. Second, all lands claimed under unconfirmed Mexican grants are
lands of the United States until such claims have been confirmed, and
as it cannot be known in advance of confirmation what claims will be
confirmed and what claims will be rejected, the law against cutting
timber on government lands will be enforced as to lands which are so
claimed, as well as to lands which are not claimed except when, in the
judgment of this office, the claim is made in good faith and timber is
taken for the actual use of the claimant and for the improvement of
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the land, and for no other purpose. If timber is taken for market or
other speculative purposes, such claimant will be prosecuted the same
as other trespassers. Claims which, in the judgment of this office, are
not made in good faith will afford no protection.
TIMBER CUTTINGL-PRIVATE CLAIM-RAILROAD.
CIENEGUILLA GRANT.
Claimant has the same right as a homestead party to cut and remove timber for the
purpose of improving the land; but no more right to do so for sale until his title
is perfected.
The land is in reservation, and railroads have no right to enter upon and take timber
therefrom for purposes of construction.
Commissioner 111cFarland to Secretary Teller, JTtly 15, 1882.
I have the honor to acknowledge receipt by reference from the De-
partment under date of 28th ultimo, for report thereon, of letter ad-
dressed to you by C. H. Gildersleeve, esq., dated 26th ultimo, together
with inclosures therein.
Mr. Gildersleeve says:
I inclose you herewith communication of Elias Brevoort, one of the
owners of the Cieneguilla grant in New Mexico, as also memorandum
of Spanish and Mexican decrees referring to power the owners of land
grants could exercise under the granting power; complaining that W.
S. Fletcher, one of the timber agents of your Department, is warning
owners of private land grants in New Mexico, that he has orders from
your Department to stop the cutting of timber from off these grants.
In reply, I respectfully submit the following statement relative
thereto:
The records of this office show that there are two private land grants
in New Mexico having the name of Cieneguilla; one made to Francisco
Anaya Almazan, dated September 2, 1693, approved by the surveyor-
general for New Mexico, March 17, 1879, and reported to Congress
through the honorable Secretary of the Interior May 17,1880; the other
to Jose Sanchez, et al., dated February 12, 1795-, approved by the sur-
veyor-general for New Mexico, June 13, 1872, and transmitted to Con-
gress December 20, 1872.
As confirmation of title in both of said cases is still pending before
Congress, it is unnecessary to raise the question as to which of said
grants Mr. Gildersleeve or Mr. Brevoort refers.
It only remains to pass upon the general proposition submitted by
them in regard to the rights of owners or claimants of such private land
grants to cut and remove the timber growing or being thereon prior to
such time as the grant shall be confirmed by Congress, and the final
adjustment by this office of area and location of same. Mr. Gilder-
sleeve holds that upon the approval of said claims by the surveyor-
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general, and their survey and segregation from the public domain, the
owner or claimants thereof have the right to cut and remove the tim-
ber thereon, and exercise other acts of ownership, and that such rights
have never, to his knowledge, been questioned.
Mr. Gildersleeve also holds that if the owners or claimants have not
the right to sell and dispose of the timber upon their claims or grants on
the ground that they are a part of public domain, that railroad com-
panies under the act of March 3, 1875, would therefore have the right
to go upon the same and take the timber for construction purposes free
of charge, which he thinks would be an expense to the United States,
and an annoyance to the grant owners.
Both the points raised by Mr. Gildersleeve have been decided by this
office. I find that under (late of January 7, 1880, Acting Commissioner
Armstrong, in a letter to Agent Fletcher relative to the very points
raised by Mr. Gildersleeve, decided that until such claims or grants
had been confirmed by Congress, neither the owners nor claimants
thereof had a right to cut and remove the timber thereon. Also, under
date of March 19, 1880, Commissioner Williamson, by letter to Mr.
Fletcher, took the same ground, not only referring therein to the ille-
gality of the owners or claimants cutting or removing the timber, but
also refusing to recognize the right of railroad companies to enter upon
said grants for the procurement of timber for construction purposes.
Commissioner Williamson says, after quoting the 8th section of the act
of Congress approved July 22, 1854 (10 Stat., 308):
Therefore a grant which has been examined and reported on favorably
by the surveyor-general in accordance with the above requirements,
although not a complete title, is so far perfected as would in my judg-
ment justify a court in restraining railroad companies or other parties
from removing the timber from the lands covered by such grants; but
until such grants are perfected by Congressional action, as provided in
the 8th section of the act of Congress above referred to, and the lands
covered by such grants are segregated from the public domain, the
executive branch of the government cannot recognize in the reputed
owner thereof the right to remove, or to give permission to others to
remove, the timber therefrom.
Under this act of 1854, all lands embraced within Mexican grants are
reserved from sale or other disposal by the government, as provided in
said act, and are excepted from the operations of the law granting to
railroad companies the right of way through the public domain, with
authority to use material taken from the public lands in the construc-
tion of their roads; and it devolves upon the government to afford the
same protection to lands covered by grants, before the same are con-
firmed and located, as to the reserved public lands of the United States,
and to secure such protection against all trespassers.
I see no good reason to change the ruling of my predecessor in rela-
tion to the control of this Department over lands embraced within the
claimed limits of said grants, being of the opinion that while the claim-
ants may have an equitable title pending adjudication, the legal title
remains in the United States until relinquished.
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The claimant may have a similar right to that of a homestead party
to fell and remove timber for the purpose of improving the land, but
no more right to cut and remove timber for sale, than has the home-
stead claimant, until such time as he shall have received the legal title
thereto. Neither has a railroad company the right to enter upon any
of such lands and take therefrom timber for construction, or for any
other purpose, as said lands are in state of reservation, as heretofore
stated. The act of March 3,1875, referred to by Mr. Gildersleeve grants
the right to take timber from "epublic lands" only, which terms, as
used i the public land laws of Oobgress, and construed by the courts,
do not refer to lands that are reserved.
TIMBER TRESPASS-STUMPA GE-HOMESTEAD.
CHAUNCEY HAURIS.
Public lands entered under homestead law belong to United States until patented to
claimant.
Therefore stumpage for timber cut on such claim belongs to the government, and there
is no legal way in which it may be paid to the homestead claimant.
Commissioner MeFarland to Chauncey Harris, Kindred, Jfinn., February
23, 1882.
In reply to your letter of the 6th instant, inquiring if you can collect
of the United States Land Department stumpage for timber taken from
your homestead claim in he NW. of Section 2, T. 138, R. 34, Minne-
sota, before you entered said land, you are informed that public lands
entered under the homestead law belong to the United States until pat-
ent therefor has issued to the homestead claimant, and all timber thereon
is property of the United States until the title to the lands has passed
by such patent from the LTnited States. Therefore stumpage for timber
cut on your homestead claim belongs to the government, and there is
no legal way by which it may be paid to you.
TIMBER AGENTS-TBESPASS-COMPROMISE.
The special timber agents in New Mexico and Colorado are authorized to investigate
and report on cases of depredation, but not to receive money on account of the
same,
There are no regular stumpage rates established by the Department upon public tim-
ber unlawfully cut since June 17, 1879. All persons who unlawfully cut and re-
move such timber are liable to the legal penalties therefor.
Process of compromise, where the same is advisable.
Commissioner HcFarland to Henry Sturges, Trinidad, Colorado, May 2,
1882.
I have received, by reference from Honorable James B. Belford, your
letter of the 10th ltimo, in which you inquire whether government
timber agents have been sent to New Mexico and Colorado to make
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demand for stumpage2' and what are the "government demands for
stumpage."
- In reply I have to advise you that the Department has special timber
agents in the localities named, whose duty it is to investigate and re-
port to this office upon any cases they find where parties are unlaw-
fully felling and removing the public timber for purposes of trade and
gain, but they are not authorized to receive any money on account of
such depredations.
There are no regular stumpage rates established by the Department
upon public timber unlawfully cut since Jane 17, 1879. Railroad tie
cutters, saw-mill owners, and all persons who unlawfully fell and re-
move the public timber, are liable to the penalties of the law therefor.
Sometimes trespassing has been found to have been committed under
such circumstances as would seem to justify the Department in grant-
ing the trespassers an opportunity to offer compromise. therefor. When
the offers submitted have been found worthy of acceptance, the timber
agents have been instructed to notify the trespassers of the acceptance
of compromise, and to direct that payment be made, not to the agent
but to the receiver of public moneys in the land district where the tres-
pass is committed.
TIMBER FOR CONSTB UCTING TELEGRAPH LINE.
INSTRUCTIONS.
A telegraph company, duly organized by the laws of any State, and having complied
with all legal requirements, may take material for construction from the public
lands.
Otherwise in case of a line to be constructed by an individual, or individuals unin-
corporated, etc., as above, such would be liable to prosecution for trespass for
taking public timber, etc.
Cornmissioner McFarland to Special Timber Agent Harlan, Deadwood,
Dakota, July 29, 1882.
Yours of 6th inst. received. You ask for information in cases of
trespass "where parties have taken timber from 'mineral lands, and
made merchandise of it." Your attention is called to circular of June
30 last, forwarded to you under date of 11th inst.
You desire to know how you shall proceed in relation to taking of
timber from the public lands to construct a telegraph line from Rapid
City to Sheridan. If said telegraph line was constructed by a company
duly organized under the laws of any State, and if, as such, they have
otherwise duly complied with all the requirements of law (see secs. 4263
to 69 inclusive, Rev. Stat.), such company would have a right to take
material for the purpose specified, and under the late ruling of the
honorable Secretarv of the Interior would be entitled to take the same
from public mineral lands.
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Should, however, the telegraph line to which you refer have been
constructed by an individual or by an association of individuals not
duly incorporated under the laws of any State, and the requirements
of law have not otherwise been complied with, the said individual or
association of individuals would be liable to prosecution for trespass
upon the public lands, whether the same were mineral or non-mineral
in character, in which event, you will proceed to obtain all the facts in
relation thereto and forward same to this office as in any other case of
trespass.
TIMBBR CULTURE CONTEST-PREFERENYCE RIGHT-
WEU1I V. MICKELSON.
Without a right of contest under the timber culture laws, there can be no prefer-
ence right under the act of May 14, 1880.
Secretary Teller to Commissioner MoFarland, November 18, 1882.
I have considered the case of Emma J. Weum v. Englebreit Mickel-
son, involving the latter's timber culture entry, made July 28, 1876, on
the E. of the N. W. i of See. 6, Tp. 124, R. 40 W., Benson, Minnesota,
on appeal by Weum from your decision of November 23, 1881, holding
the entry intact.
It does not appear from the record of the case that Weum has applied
to enter the tract either under the homestead or the timber culture laws,
and hence, as held by this Department on the 14th inst. in the like case
of Frank Bundy, which involved a construction of section three of the
act of June 14, 1878, relative to contests against timber culture entries,
she is not authorized to contest Mickelson's entry; and having no right
in this respect, she could acquire no preference right under the second
section of the act of May 14, 1880, which awards such preference right
to one who has contested, paid the land office fees, and procured the
cancellation of a pre-emption or timber culture entry. The latter right
is conferred only on one who may contest and prosecute to cancellation
a former entry. Without the right of contest, there can be therefore
no preference right; and as Weuim has neither, her appeal must be dis-
missed.
Your decision is affirmed.
R4ILBOAD GRANT-JOINT RESOLUTION OF JUNE 28, 1870.
SOUTHERN PAC. R. R. Co. v. MCCARTHY.
Although a grant was made by the act of 1863, the lands upon which it would operate
were not identified untiL the adoption of said joint resolution, and the rights of
all parties who were actual settlers at that time were saved thereby.
Acting Secretary Joslyn, to Commissioner llceFarland, October 31, 1,S82.
I have considered the case of the Southern Pacific Railroad Co mpany
v. John McCarthy, involving the SW. J of section 21, township 10 S.,
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range 10 E., M. D.AM., Stockton, California, on appeal from your decis-
ion of November 14, 1881.
The facts appear as follows: The land is within the indemnity limits
of the grant of July 27, 1866, to said company. Withdrawal was made
for the benefit of the company May 7, 1867. MCarthy on the 9th of
June, 1881, applied at the local office to make pre-emption filing for the
tract in question, alleging settlement September 15, 1869. His applica-
tion was rejected upon the ground that the tract was a part of an odd-
numbered section within the limits of the withdrawal for the Southern
Pacific Railroad Company. On appeal to your office you decided in
favor of allowing the filing, and from that decision the company ap-
peals. The proofs show that McCarthy was a naturalized citizen of the
United States, and a qualified pre-emptor; that he settled on the land
September .5, 1863; that he has resided thereon continuously to the
present time, and has made valuable improvements, having, in addition
to the erection of a dwelling house and other buildings, broken and
cultivated the entire tract. This tract has not been selected by the
company, and therefore it can have no specific claim thereto.
The land being within the indemnity limits, the principle laid down by
the supreme court of the United States, in the case of Ryau v. the Cen-
tral PacificRailroad Company ( Otto, 382),is applicable,since the grants
to the Central Pacific and the Southern Pacific Railroad Companies,
respectively, are similar so far as the rights to indemnity are concerned.
In the decision cited the doctrine is, that the right to indemnity or
"lieu lads" is only a float, and attaches to no specific tracts until actual
selection.
The withdrawal of Mav 7, 1867, was based upon map filed in the de-
partment May 3, 1867.
Congress by joint resolution of June 28, 1870 (16 Stat., 32), authorized
the Southern Pacific Railroad Company to construct its road upon the
line of route designated upon said map "expressly saving and reserving
all the rights of actual settlers," etc. In the construction of the joint
resolution the department has held (see case of Tome et al. . Southern
Pacific Railroad Company, 5 C. L. O., 85), that although a grant of lands
was made to the company by the act of July 27, 1866, the lands upon
which it would operate were not identified until the date of the passage
of said joint resolution, and that the rights of all parties who were actual
settlers at that date were saved.
The decision which, I may add, embodied the opinion of the Attorney-
General, clearly covers the case under consideration, and saves the rights
of appellee as a settler. I see no good reason for holding a different
view.
Your decision is accordingly affirmed, and you will permit McCarthy
to make his filing for the land in question.
No valid adverse right having attached since sett lement, the fact that
application to ile was not made within the period prescribed by the
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statute is, as you suggest, a matter between Mr. McCarthy and the gov-
ernment, and calls for no consideration in this connection. That will be
considered when final proof is offered, pursuant to publication, as re-
quired by the act of March 3, 1879.
MINING CLAIM-APPEAL-CERTIORABI.
2- Z~~:7 Z2 z
7/ CEDAR HILL MG. CO.
A protestant, or party without interest, in a mining case cannot appeal as a matter
of right, but where the right of appeal is for such reason denied the case should
be transmitted to the Department after dismissal by the General Land Office.
Rules 83 and 84 of practice have their origin in this requirement.
Acting Secretary Bell to Commissioner Williamson, June 8, 1881.
On the 17th ultimo, the Cedar Hill Mining Company filed an applica-
tion for an order directing the Commissioner of the General Land Office
to certify the proceedings in the matter of application of the Jacob
Little Consolidated-Mining Company for a patent for the Samson lode,
Carson City district, Nevada, under rules 83 and 84, Rules of Practice,
in order to have your decisions therein of January 26, 1881, in favor of
the applic ant for patent, and of April 30, 1881, dismissing the appeal of
the Cedar Hill Company from said decision of January 26, 1881, re-
viewed by the Department.
This application is opposed by the Gold Lead Gold and Silver Mining
Company, whose attorneys have filed a motion to dismiss the same,
stating their grounds therefor as follows:
"First. Because same (Cedar Hill Company's application) does not
correctly state all the facts, nor the controlling facts upon which the
Commissioner's decision was based.
"Second. Because the facts as stated therein do not disclose any
sufficient grounds for the action prayed by said company.
"Third. Because said company are mere protestants, and hence are
not entitled to bring the case before you (Secretary of the Interior), by
appeal or otherwise."
The point stated under the third paragraph above is not well taken.
It is true that a protestant or party without interest in a mining case,
cannot appeal as a matter of right; but in cases in which a party is
held by your office to be a mere protestant, without interest and right
of appeal, and whose appeal is therefore denied, the rule has been for
years such as to require the case to be forwarded to this Department
after dismissal of appeal in your office. Boston Quicksilver Mine (S.
M. D., 330), Boston Hydraulic Mining Company (id. 320).
Indeed, rules 83 and 81 grew out of the above decisions and the de-
cision in the case of Bell et al. . Aitkiu et al. (4 C. L. O., 66). In the lat-
ter case the proceedings by which the case was brought before mY pred-
DECISIONS RELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS. 629
ecessor were almost precisely like those required by said rules, except
perhaps that the application to have the case forwarded to this Depart-
ment was not sworn to, nor copy served on opposing counsel. Upon
examination my predecessor found that Bell and Murray were parties
in interest and entitled to appeal, and upon the merits of the case re-
versed the decision of your office.
It is not the rule, therefore, that parties whom your office holds to be
mere protestants in mining cases cannot have any standing under said
rules 83 and 84. But I am of the opinion that the points stated in par-
agraphs 1 and 2 are well taken. Rule 84 requires the application to be
in writing, under oath, and to "fully and specifically set forth the
grounds upon which the application is made."
The application sets forth three reasons why it should be allowed.
The first one is, " because said Cedar Hill Company are in fact parties
in interest, and entitled to the right of appeal."
This is a mere general allegation, and is not supported by a single spe-
cific allegation or recital. Enough appears in the application to show that
the Jacob Little Company did, at some time, file an application for pat-
ent; but when this was done is not shown. This would seem to put the
Jacob Little Company all right on the record, for there is not an allega-
tion from first to last in the application of the Cedar Hill Company that
the applicant for patent has not complied with statutory requirements
relative to its application for patent, or to show that the Cedar Hill
Company filed an adverse claim within the statutory period.
The Cedar Bill Company sets forth that on September 30, 1880, the
register and receiver transmitted to your office papers in the matter of
Jacob Little Mining Company's application, and asking instructions
whether entry should be allowed by the Gold Lead Gold and Silver
Mining Co., assignees of the Jacob Little Mining Co.: that in due time
the Cedar Hill Co., " claiming adversely," filed argument against the
application for entry; that your office, on the 26th of January, 1881, de-
cided in favor of the Jacob Little Company, and adversely to the Cedar
Hill Company; that on the 26th of March last, the latter company filed
specifications of error and argument on appeal from said decision; and
that the appeal was dismissed on the 28th of April, " upon the ground
that said Cedar Hill Mining Company did not enter suit against the ap-
plicant within the statutory period, therefore stood as protestants in the
eye of the law, and are not entitled to appeal."
There is not an allegation in the application under consideration, ex-
cept the general one above quoted; tending to show that the findings
,of the Commissioner were not strictly true.
It is true that, under the second paragraph stating reasons why the
'case should be reviewed by this Department, it is alleged " that it had
already been once determined and adjudged, May 20,1880, by the court,
that said Cedar Hill Company is entitled to all its said claims, and
every portion thereof, and that the Jacob Little and their assigns, the
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Gold Lead, is not entitled to the possession of any portion thereof," and
that this judgment remains in full force.
But it is not shown when said suit was commenced, nor that it was en-
tered in pursuance of any adverse claim filed against the Jacob Little
Company's application, or within the period as required by law. Now,
if the Cedar Hill Company has any such judgment against the Jacob
Little Company, as is contemplated by section 2326 of the Revised
Statutes, its case is without difficulty, and it would be the easiest mat-
ter in the world to make the fact appear and secure all its rights in the
premises. That section provides that "after such judgment shall have
been rendered, the party entitled to the possession. of the claim, or any
portion thereof, may, without giving further notice, file a certified copy
of the judgment-roll with the register of the land office, together with
the certificate of the surveyor-general, that the requisite amount of
labor has been expended or improvements made thereon, and the de-
scription required in other cases, and shall pay to the receiver five dol-
lars per acre for his claim, together with the proper fees, whereupon the
whole proceedings and the judgment-roll shall be certified by the reg-
ister to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, and patent shall
issue thereon for the claim, or so much thereof as the applicant shall
appear, from the decision of the court, to rightly possess."
It is not alleged that the foregoing requirements have been complied
with, or that any attempt has been made to comply with them. It is
not shown or alleged in any manner that there has been injustice done
the Cedar Hill Company by your decisions, nor has the company alleged
such facts as to present probable grounds for believing that any error
has been committed or injustice done in the premises.
This Department will not throw obstacles in the way of claimants
who desire the directory or supervisory power of the Secretary to be
exercised; but, within the established rules, that power will not be ex-
tended or exercised unless there be some ground, some reason appeal-
ing to executive discretion presented, calling for its exercise.
I see no reason from the papers before me for interfering with the
action of your office in this matter, and therefore dismiss the applica-
tion of said Cedar Hill Mining Company.
SCHOOL LAND IN COLORADO-PRE-EMPTIO.N.
CHARLES W. LowE.
A settler on a school section, prior to survey, claiming as a pre-emptor, must assert
his claim within the statutory period, or the right of the State will take effect as
of the date of survey.
Acting Commissioner Armstrong to register and receiver, Leadvtille, Colo-
rado, December 27, 1879.
I have considered the matter of the claim of Charles W. Lowe, to the
S. E. i, 16, 10 5., R. 77 W., who filed D. S. No. 58, May 24, 1877, alleg-
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iug settlement June 1, 1866, and transmuted the same May 6, 1878, to
homestead entry No. 118.
The subdivision lines of said township were surveyed between October
26 and November 2, 1868, and plat filed in the local office January 22,
1869.
By section 14 of the act of February 28, 1861 (12 Stat., 176), " to pro-
vide a temporary government for the Territory of Colorado," sections
sixteen and thirty six in each township were reserved for the purpose of
public schools in the States thereafter to be erected out of the same.
By act of June 2, 1862 (12 Stat., 413), providing for the establishment
of a lana office in said Territory, the provisions of the pre-emption act
of September 4, 1841, were extended thereto with the proviso " that
when unsurveyed lands are claimed bypre-emption,notice of the specific
tracts claimed shall be filed within six months after the survey has been
made in the field, and on failure to file such notice, or to pay for the
tract claimed within twelve months from the filing of such notice, the
parties claiming such lands shall forfeit all right thereto, provided said
notices may be filed with the surveyor-general, to be noted by him on
the township plats."
Under this provision of law, which was not repealed until the pas-
sage of the act of July 14, 1870 (16 Stat., 279), Lowe should have filed
his declaratory statement on or prior to May 2, 1869, but it does not ap-
pear from the plat of said township on file in this office, nor is it shown
that he did so file his notice with the surveyor-general, nor did he file
it in the local office, although the plat was filed there in January, 1869,
over five months prior to the expiration of the time allowed him within
which to file.
In the case of Mette v. State of California, decided October 18, 1878,
and affirmed by the Honorable Secretaty of the Interior May 27, 1879
(5 C. L. O., 164), this office, construing the 6th section of the act of
March 3,1853, granting pre-emption rights in California, which provided
that when unsurveyed lands are claimed by pre-emption, the usual
notice of said claim shall be filed within three months after the return
of the plats of survey to the land office, and proof and payment shall
be made prior to the day appointed . . . . for the commencement
of the sale including such lands, " held that there was an abandonment
by the settler where there was a failure to assert his claim by filing the
usual notice thereof, or the failure to make payment as provided in said
section, as one of the conditions upon which the right of pre-emption
was granted, and in the case of Water & Mining Co. v. Bugbey (6 Otto,
165) the supreme court of the United States held that where the set-
tler on a school section, being under no obligation to assert his claim,
abandoned it, the right of the State became absolute as of the date the
surveys were completed.
These decisions apply as well to Colorado as to the State of Califor.
nia; the same grant of sections sixteen and thirty-six for school pur-
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poses was made to her as to the latter State, subject to be defeated as
to portions of the particular sections granted by the claims of settleis
before survey which were duly prosecuted to completion in conformity
with law.
Viewed in the light of those decisions, it is evident that whatever
rights Lowe acquired by his settlement in 1866, were lost by his failure
to give the notice required by law, and thereafter to make proof and
payment within the periods limited; and upon this failure to comply
with law or abandonment of his claim, the right of the State to the
land settled upon immediately vested as of the date the survey was
completed.
Under these circumstances, Lowe's said homestead entry was unau-
thorized and illegal, and has, therefore, been held for cancellation.
Note.-The foregoing decision was affirmed by Secretary Schurz, June
22, 1880.
SCHOOL LANDS IN UTAH-PRE-EMPTION.
JANE1 HODGERT.
the territory has no vested interest in sections sixteen and thirty-six. The law
creates merely a reservation for a prescribed use, but the legal title remains in
the Unitel States.
The reservation does not attach if, at date of survey, a settlement with a view to
pre-emption had been made on said section, even though the settler fails to file
his declaratory statement within the time prescribed by law.
Secretary Schurz to Commissioner Williamson, November 16, 1880.
I have considered the appeal of Jane Hodgert from your decision of
April 19, 1880, holding for cancellation her cash entry, No. 1830, of the
N. , N W. 1 section 36, town. 6 S., range 2 E., Salt Lake City district
Utah Territory.
The record shows that the township plat was filed in the local office,
March 15, 1869; that Mrs. Hodgert filed declaratory statement 5517,
April 8, 1876, alleging settlement in 1855, and that she proved up her
claim and entered the land April 5, 1878. Certain affidavits filed with
the appeal show that appellant is the widow of one Robert Hodgert,
who settled upon the tract in question in the year 1855, wherebe died in
May, 1867; and that his widow has since continuously resided thereon.
You held that Mrs. ilodgert, by reason of failure to make known her
claim in the manner prescribed by law within three months fronf the
date of filing the township plat in the local office, and to make proof
and payment within thirty three months from that date, forfeited all
right acquired by virtue of settlement prior to survey, as upon her fail-
ure to comply with the requirements of the law, the right to the tract
in question vested in the Territory of Utah, as of the date of survey,
and cited the cases of Mette v. State of California, (5 C. L. O., 164,) and
Natoma W. & M. Co. v. Bugbey, (6 Otto, 165,) as authority therefor.
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In this I think you erred-; because there has been no grant of" school
lands"2 to Utah, consequently the territory has no vested interest in
the 16th and 36th sections.
Section 15 of the act of September 9, 1850, (9 Stat., 457,) provides as
follows:
"That when the lands in the said territory shall be surveyed under
the direction of the government of the United States, preparatory to
bringing the same into market, sections numbered sixteen and thirty-
six in each township in said territory shall be, and the same are hereby,
reserved for the purpose of being applied to schools in said Territory
and in the States and Territories hereafter to be erected out of the
same."
The foregoing section is substantially embodied in section 1946, Re-
vised Statutes; but before the latter became operative and before the
land in question was surveyed, the section quoted above was limited by
the act of February 26, 1809, (11 Stat., 385, now sections 2275-76, Re-
-vised Statutes,) in the following terms, to wit: " That where settlements
with a view to pre-emption have been made before the survey of the
lands in the fields which shall be found to have been made on sections
sixteen and thirty-six. said sections shall be subject to the pre-emption
claim of such settler, and if they, or either of them, shall have been or
shall be reserved or pledged for the use of schools or colleges in the
States or Territory in which the lands lie, other lands of like quantity
are hereby appropriated in lieu of such as may be patented by pre-
emptors. . . . . "
This creates merely a reservation of the sections in question for a pre-
scribed use, but the legal title thereto remains in the United States.
Just here the question arises, has Mrs. Hodgert a pre-emption claim
to which the land is subject, in contemplation of the act of 1859, and
said section 2275 ?
I think she has.
The case under consideration does not fall within the rule laid down
by either of the cases cited by you, but it falls within the exception pro-
vided for in the acts cited as aforesaid, and the reservation thereby
created did not attach as of the date of survey.
In the cases cited by you there was an adverse claim, and the tracts,
which were the subject of controversy, were included in a specific grant
of lands to the State of California, by virtue of which she acquired title
thereto, and the right to control and dispose of the lands so granted,
for the purposes specified, upon the failure of the settler to record his
claim; in other words, to take advantage of a failure to comply with
the legal requirement of filing his claim within the prescribed time.
In the case under consideration, however, the'Territory of Utah has
no such right or title, and the matter in controversy is virtually between
the United States and the appellant, and the former alone can take ad-
vantage of the lattei's failure to comply with the letter of the law in
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point of filing her declaratory statement, and proving up and making
payment within the prescribed period. The case should, therefore, be
treated in all respects as between the United States and the appellant
alone. This case, therefore, comes within the rule laid down in the cases
of Johnson v. Towsley, (13 Wallace, 72,) Lansdale v. Daniels, (10 Otto,
113,) Walker v. Walker, (1 C. L. L., 293,) and Erastus Kimball, (Ibid.,
295;) and the same reason for the United States to decline to take ad-
vantage of the appellant's failure to file and enter the tract in question
within the prescribed period exists in this case as in those last cited.
By admitting the appellant's claim, the quantity of lands pledged by
the United States to Utah for school purposes is not diminished; be-
cause provision is made by the statute for selection by said Territory,
when erected as a State, of lands in lieu thereof for the purposes in-
tended.
Your decision is accordingly reversed.
,PRICE OF LAKD-PIVATE ENTRY.
s? in;EF fOSIPCHEN V. Ross.*
Land once offered at $2.50 per acre, but reduced in price to 125, is not subject to
private entry until re-offered at the reduced rate.
Acting Secretary Joslyn to Commissioner McFarland, October 30, 1882.
I have considered the case of John J. Sipehen v. John D. Ross, in-
volving the NW. of Sec. 26, T. 43 N., R. 35 W., Marquette district,
Michigan, on appeal by Ross from your decision of November 9, 1881,
holding his entry for cancellation and allowing the claim of Sipchen.
The record shows that Sipchen filed declaratory statement June 7,
alleging settlement June 1, 1877; that Ross made private cash entry
November 22 1870; and that the land was offered July 16, 1860; at $2.50
per acre, being within the limits of a railroad grant.
There is a further and conclusive objection to the entry of Ross. It
is admitted by the counsel for both parties that the tract lies within the
limits of the grant of June 3, 1856, to the State of Michigan, in aid of
the Marquette and State Line Railroad, and also within the common
granted limits of that road and the State Line and Ontonagon Railroad-
neither of which roads, nor any part thereof, has been con structed; that
the State Line route was abandoned by the State, and under the joint
resolution of Congress of July 5, 1862 (12 Stat., 620), a new route was.
adopted, and, as required, the lands within the six-mile limits were re-
linquished to the United States; and that by the fourth section of this
* See Weimar et al. v. Ross, 3 L. D. 129; id. 441; Pecard . Camens, 4 id. 152.
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resolution, the even sections of public lands, reserved to the United
States by the act of June 3, 1856, along the originally located route of
the Marquette and State Line Railroad. became subject to sale at $1.25
per acre. It is also admitted that the tract in question falls within this
class-being on an even-numbered section, reserved to the United
States by the act of 1856.
It does not appear from the records of your office that since the joint
resolution of 1862 [changing route of railroad] the land in question has
been re-offered at public sale at the reduced rate of $1 25 per acre. It
has therefore been unoffered land since that date, and hence, under the
ruling of the supreme court in the case of Eldred v. Sexton, 19 Wallace
189 (from which I quote at length because it so clearly settles the law
of the present and like cases), the entry of Ross was unauthorized.
The court says:
"It is a fundamental principle underlying the land system of this
country that private entries are never permitted until after the lands
have been exposed at public auction at the price for which they are
afterwards subject to entry. . . . There is an obvious reason for
requiring a public sale before leaving the lands open to private entry.
It is to secure to all persons a fair and equal opportunity of purchasing
them, and to obtain for the government the benefit of competition in
case the lands should be worth more than the price fixed by Congress.
Since 1820 " the great body of the public domain has been
brought into market, after proper notice, at this reduced price (of $1.25
per acre), and, unless Congress by special act ordered otherwise, private
entries have never been allowed unless the land applied for had been
previously offered at public sale to the highest bidder at the same price.
The inquiry arises whether Congress intended to change this
system, in the new policy adopted by it to aid states by grants of land
to build railroads. . . . . There is nothing that we are aware of in
any of the various acts on the subject, which tend to show that it was
the purpose of Congress, in its land-grant legislation, to alter the man-
ner in which the public lands have been brought into market, and made
subject to private entry. It is true the minimum price of the lands
within certain prescribed limits was doubled,-on the supposition that
the construction of the contemplated roads would enhance the value of
the lands to such an extent that the government would be enabled to
realize as much for them as if the grants had not been made, but in all
other respects the general system for the disposition of public lands
was preserved. It is difficult, therefore, to see how the plaintiff can
succeed, unless the legislation on which he rests his title was designed
to be exceptional, which we think was not the case. The grant was an
ordinary one to build a road in Wiscunsin, for which a change of route
was desirable after the line had been lo'cated. This change was author
ized by Congress, but before the line was re-located, the lands in ques-
tion, being within the six-mile limits, had been, at a public land sale,
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offered for sale at $2.50 per acre, and not being sold, were subject to
entry at that price, but not at any less sum. The location of the new
route left them outside of the required distance, and legislation was
necessary to take them out of the condition of lands affected by the
construction of a railroad, and to restore them to the general body of
the unsold lands, so that they could be sold in the same manner and at
the same price that the public domain is usually subject to sale. This
object was accomplished by the joint resolution of April 25, 1862, which
declares that these lands- should hereafter be. sold at $1.25 per acre.'
"6 It is true the lands in question were once offered at public sale at
$2.50 per acre, but the reason of the rule required that they should be
again offered to the highest bidder, because their condition as to price
had been changed, and there had been no opportunity for competition
at the reduced price. Congress meant nothing more than to fix $1.25
as their minimum price, and to place them in the same category with
other public lands not affected by land grant legislation. When they
,were withdrawn from the operation of this legislation, and their excep-
tional status terminated, the general provisions of the land system at-
tached to them, and they could not, therefore, be sold at private entry,
until all persons had the opportunity of bidding for them at public auc-
tion. It follows that the plaintiff's entries were invalid and rightly
canceled, because they were made before the lands had been proclaimed
for sale at the minimum, price, of $1.25 per. acre."
Like reasons apply to the case of Ross, and the tract not having been
re-offered under its reduced price, his entry must be canceled.
3 HOMESTEAD ENTRY-DECEASED CLAIMANT.
STEWART V. JACOBS.
The heir or devisee of a deceased entryman is not required to reside on the tract en-
tered, but must cultivate the same for the statutory period.
Secretary Schurz to Commissioner illiamson, May 14,1878.
I have considered the appeal from your decision of December 31,
18777 dismissing the contest initiated by Joseph C. Stewart against
the heirs and administrators of the estate of Henry R. Jacobs, deceased,
for abandonment of his entry of March 24, 1874, upon the S. E. 1 See.
25, T. 7, R. 5 W., Concordia, Kansas. The contest was held Nov. 7,
1877, notice thereof was personally served on the administrator, and
also published in a newspaper, as required by law. The heirs are non-
residents of the State of Kansas. Neither the administrator nor the
heirs appeared at the hearing.
The affidavit initiating the contest, and the testimony at the -hearing,
November 10, 1877, show that Jacobs died June 25,1874, not having
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entered upon or cultivated the land, and that neither his heirs nor ad-
ministrators have since resided upon or cultivated it.
You dismissed the contest for the reason that a homestead entry can-
not be contested for an abandonment subsequent to the death of the
party making the entry, but must remain subject to final proof, within
the time prescribed by law, unless relinquished at an earlier day by the
legal representatives of the deceased as held in the case of Dorame v.
Towers, decided by my predecessor December 4,1875 (2 C. L. O., 131).
In that case, Towers died eleven days after making his homestead
entry, without entering on the land; and six months thereafter a con-
test was initiated for abandonment of the land, entered under section
2297 Revised Statutes, and the question presented was whether the
failure of the heirs or devisees to take. up a residence on. the land within
six months from the date of entry, rendered it liable to such proceed-
ings. In his discussion of Sections 2290, 2291, and 2297, Revised Stat-
utes, my predecessor held that Section 2291 does not require the heir or
devisee to reside in person upon the land, but that its provisions are
substantially complied with by continued cultivatiou of the tract, for
the prescribed period-in other words, that, while in such a case, resi-
dence on the land is not necessary, cultivation i necessary; and
decided that the entry of Towers could not be vacated within the stat.
utory period of five years, except by direct relinquishment of the party
or parties succeeding to his interest, he having died without changing
his residence or abandoning the land.
I concur in the views expressed in said decision upon the state of
facts upon which it was made; but the heirs or devisees, though not
required to reside upon, must, nevertheless, show continued cultivation
of the land, otherwise the death of the party, the day after his entry,
may withhold the land from further entry for five years, without either
residence or cultivation, without subjection to a charge of abandon-
ment.
Applying this decision in Dorame v. Towers, as thus modified, to the
case under consideratioli, the testimony showing that, from the date of
entry, March 24, 1874, to the date of hearing, Nov. 10, 1877, there had
been neither residence upon nor cultivation of the land. by any party
in interest, I think the charge of abandonment sustained, and, there-




A cting Commissioner Harrison to registers and receivers, October 25, 1882.
In order to insure the prompt delivery of patents, and to preserve in
the proper local offices a complete record of the issue and delivery
thereof, you will, upon the receipt of any patent forwarded to you by
this office for delivery, at once notify the patentee by mail (or otherwise
as the case may be) of the receipt of the patent and how it may be ob-
tained, and you will make due record of such notice.
You will, in each case of the receipt of a patent for delivery, also note
in your tract books, opposite the entry or location, the name of the
patentee, the date of the patent, and the volume and page of the record
thereof in this office.
When any patent is delivered you will further note upon the tract
books. in the appropriate place, the date of delivery aul the name and
post-office address of the party to whom delivered.
Upon receipt of official notice of delivery of a patent by this office




Commissioner McFarland to registers and receivers, February 1, 1882.
Your attention is called to the following regarding timber-culture
entries under the several acts of Congress and the manner in which
final proof may be made:
The act of March 3, 1873, (17 Stats., 605), entitled "An act to encour-
age the growth of timber on the western prairies," provided that any
person might make an entry under that act on any quarter-section of
the public lands.
Entries under that act were not restricted to heads of families, per-
sons twenty-one years of age, citizens, or those who had declared their
intention of becoming citizens of the United States.
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Persons making entries under said act were required to plant, protect,
and keep in a healthy growing condition for ten (10) years forty acres
of timber on the quarter-section entered. The trees were to be not more
than twelve (12) feet apart each way. Only one quarter of any section
could be entered. Entries were to be made for the cultivation of tim-
ber. Final proofcould be madeat the expiration of ten (10) years from
the date of entry or at any time within three (3) years thereafter.
In making final entry under this act the party, or, if he be dead, his
heirs or legal representatives, must " prove by two credible witnesses
that he, she, or they have planted, and for not less than ten years have
cultivated and protected," the quantity and character of timber above
mentioned.
The act of March 13, 1874 (18 Stats., 21), was an act amendatory of,
and, from said March 13, 1874, a substitute for, the act of March 3, 1873.
All timber-culture entries made between March 13, 1874, and June 14,
1878, were made under the act of 1874. This act provided that citizens
of the United States, or persons who had declared their intention of
becoming citizens, and who were heads of families or had arrived at the
age of twenty-one years, could make such entries.
Entries were to be made for the cultivation of timber.
Forty acres of timber on a quarter-section, and the like proportion of
timber on less than a quarter-section, were required to be planted, pro-
tected and kept in a healthy growing condition for eight (8) years. The
trees were to be not more than twelve (12) feet apart each way.
Only one quarter-section, or its equivalent, could be entered by any
one person under this act.
The party making an entry of one-quarter section was required to
break ten (10) acres of the land the first year, ten (10) acres the second
year, and twenty (20) acres the third year after the date of the entry;
and to plant ten (10) acres of timber the second year, ten (10) acres the
third year, and twenty (20) acres the fourth year after the date of the
entry, and in the same proportion when the entry was for a less area
than one-quarter section. Final proof could be made at the expiration
of eight (8) years from the date of entry or at any time within five (5)
years thereafter.
In making nal entry under this act the party, or, if he be dead, his
heirs or legal representatives, must "s prove by two credible witnesses
that he, she, or they have planted, and for not less than eight years
have cultivated and protected," the quantity and character of timber
mentioned in this act.
In case of the death of a person who had complied with the provisions
of the act for three (3) years the heirs or legal representatives had the
option to continue the compliance for the remainder of the eight years
and to receive patent accordingly, or to receive patent for forty (40)
acres outright by relinquishing all claim to the remainder.
640 DECISIONS RELATING TO, THE PUBLIC LANDS.
Entries made under the act of March 3, 1873, can be completed, and
final proof made under the act of March 13, 1874, upon compliance
with the provisions of the latter act.
By the act of May 20,1876 (19 Stats., 54), amendatory of the act of
1874, it was provided that whenever a party holding a claim or making
final proof under said act should prove, by two credible witnesses, that
the trees planted and growing on said claim were destroyed by grass.
hoppers during any one or more years, the time allowed in which to
plant the trees and make final proof should be extended the same num-
ber of years as the trees planted were so destroyed.
It was also provided that the planting of seeds, nuts, and cuttings
should be considered a compliance with the timber-culture act, when
such seeds, nuts, and cuttings should be properly and well planted, and
the ground properly prepared and cultivated.
It is not necessary under this act that the planting shall be done in
one body, " provided the several bodies, not exceeding four in number,
planted by measurement, aggregate the amount required and in the
time required by the original and amended act."
It was provided that in case the seeds, nuts, or cuttings should not
germinate and grow, or should be destroyed by the depredations of
grasshoppers, or from other inevitable accident, the ground should be
replanted, or the vacancies filled within one year from the first plant-
in. Parties claiming the benefit of this provision were to prove, by
two good and credible witnesses, that the ground was properly pre-
pared and planted, and that the destruction of the seeds, nuts, or cut-
tings was caused by inevitable accident.
The act of June 14, 1878 (20 Stats., 113), is al act amendatory of, and,
as to all entries made since June 14, 1878,. is a substitute for, the act of
March 13, 1874.
The persons authorized to make entries under the act of 1878 are
heads of families or single persons who have attained the age of twenty-
one years, and who are citizens of the United States or have declared
their intention to become citizens, and who have made no previons
entry under the timber-culture laws.
Entries are restricted to not more than one quarter-section, and one
entry only can be made by any one person.
Only tracts embraced in sections which are prairie lands, or other
lands devoid of timber, are subject to entry under this act.
The entry must be made for the cultivation of timber, and for the
exclusive use and benefit of the person making the entry. It must be
made in good faith, and not for speculation, nor for the benefit of
another.
Five (5) acres on a quarter-section are require(1 to be broken or plowed
the first year, and five (5) acres the second year. The second year the
first five acres must be eultivated to crop or otherwise. The third year
the second five acres must be cultivated to crop or otherwise, and the
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first five acres must be planted in timber, seeds, or cuttings. The fourth
year the second five acres must be planted in timber, seeds, or cuttings.
Ten (10) acres are thus to be plowed, planted, and cultivated on a quar-
ter-section, and the same proportion when less than a quarter section
is entered. The whole ten (10) acres, or the due proportion thereof,
must be prepared and planted within four years from the date of the
entry, five (5) acres being prepared the first and second years and
planted the third year, and (5) acres being prepared the second and
third years and planted the fourth year.
If the trees, seeds, or cuttings are destroyed by grasshoppers or by
extreme and unusual droughts, the time of planting may be extended one
year for every year of such destruction, upon the filing in the local office
of an affidavit by the entryman, corroborated by two witnesses, setting
forth the destruction and asking the extension of time provided for by
the act.
Final proof can be made at the expiration of eight (8) years from the
date of entry, or at any time within five years thereafter.
The requirements in making final proof under this act are as follows:
1st. It must be shown that not less than twenty-seven hundred (2,700)
trees of the proper character were planted on each acre of the ten acres
required to be planted.
2d. It must be shown that the quantity and character of trees as
aforesaid have been cultivated and protected for not less than eight
years preceding the time of making proof.
3d. It must be shown that at the time of making proof there are
growing at least six hundred and seventy-five (675) living and thrifty
trees to each acre of the ten acres planted.
All entries made since June 14, 1878, are made under this act. Par-
ties who made entries under either of the former acts are permitted to e
complete the same and to make final proof under the act of 1878, upon
full compliance therewith.
Section 7 of the act defines the meaning of the term " full compliance"
as used in that section. It is, that the parties shall show that they have
had under cultivation, as required by the act, an amount of timber suf-
ficient to make the number of acres required therein; that at the time
of making full entry the required number of living and thrifty trees
are growing on the land.
It is not requisite, in making proof under the act of 1878, that the
manner of planting as prescribed by that act should be shown to have
been followed by persons who made entries under the acts of 1873 and
1874.
The planting in such cases may have been done in the manner pre-
scribed by the acts of 1873 or 1874, or in the manner prescribed by the
act of 1878.
The character of the trees should be such as are recognized in the
neighborhood as of value for timber, or for commercial purposes, or for
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firewood and domestic use. The enumeration of species on page 27 of
the General Circular of October 1, 1880, is only intended as a general
guide, and is not to be construed to exclude any trees falling within the
foregoing characterization.
In computing the period of cultivation the time runs from the date of
entry, if the necessary acts of cultivation were performed within the
proper time. The preparation of the land and the planting of trees are
acts of cultivation, and the time authorized to be so employed, and actu-
ally so employed, is to be computed as a part of the eight years of cul-
tivation required by the statute.
If there have not been eight (8) years of cultivation, or if there are
not the requisite number of living and thrifty trees growing on the land
at the expiration of eight years from the date of entry, then final proof
cannot be made until these requisites shall have been complied with.
The proof required in final entry will be the affidavit and testimony
of the party, corroborated by the testimony of two witnesses, setting
forth, specifically and in detail, all the facts of the case, showing when
cultivation was commenced, the acts performed, amount of land plowed,
cultivated, and planted, what was done in each year, the total number
of trees planted, the total number growing, and their size and condition
at date of proof, and any other facts or circumstances material to the
case.
In making final proof the timber-culture claimant must appear in per-
son with his witnesses, at the district land office of the district in which
the land is situated, and there make the necessary proofs; or the affi-
davit of the party may be made, and his testimony, and the testimony
of his witnesses, given before a judge or clerk of a court of record in
such land district.
The officer administering the oath or taking the testimony must cer-
tify to the indentity and credibility of the party appearing before him.
In every case, when final proof is offered or submitted, the register
and receiver will carefully examine the evidence, and if found sufficient
as showing that the claimant has fully complied with the law (and on
payment of the final commissions allowed by law), they will proceed to
issue the final certificate and receipt in the same manner as in final
homestead cases.
The payments required by law on a timber-culture entry are as fol-
lows:
ORIGINAL ENTRIES.
For more than 80 acres, a fee of $10, to be paid at date of entry, and
$4 commissions; total, $14.
For 80 acres or less, fee $5, commissions $4; total, $9.
FINAL ENTRIES.
The total payment required in each case of final entry is $4, payable
when final proof is made.
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No additional or other fee, charge, gratuity, or reward is permitted to
be paid or received for any services rendered at district land offices in
connection with such entries.
Annexed will be found forms A, B, C, D, and E.





Acts of March 3, 1873, March 13, 1874, and June 14, 1878.
I, - , having on the - day of , 18-, made a timber-culture entry
No.-, of the - of section -, in township - of range -, subject to entry at
-I -, under the timber-culture laws of the United States, do hereby apply
to perfect my claim thereto by virtue of the seventh section of the act of June 14
1878, entitled "An act to amend an act entitled 'An act to encourage the growth of
timber on the western prairies"' and for that purpose do solemnly that my
aforesaid entry was made in good faith, and not for the purpose of speculation, or
directly or indirectly for the use or benefit of any other person or persons whomso-
ever; that I have not heretofore made any other entry under the timber-culture laws
of the United States; and I do further that the section of land specified in my
aforesaid entry is composed exclusively of prairie lands or other lands devoid of
timber; that said entry was made for the cultivation of timber, and that I have
planted on said land, cultivated, protected, and kept in a healthy, growing condition
for and during the period of eight (8) years last past, - acres of (here describe
the cinds of timber) timber; that not less than trees were planted on each acre,
and that there are now at least (here state the number of trees) living and thrifty trees
to and upon each acre, aggregating in total the number of - trees.
(Signature of claimant.)
Sworn to and subscribed before me this- day of--, 18-.
B.
TIMBER-CULTURE PROOF-'iESTIMONY OF CLAIMANT.
(Acts of March 3, 1873, March 13, 1873, and June 14, 1878.)
-- -- , being called as a witness in - own behalf in support of--tim-
ber-culture entry No. - for - section-, township -, of range -, in the district
of lands subject to entry at -- , testifies as follows:
Question 1. What is your name written in full and correctly spelled, your age, and
post-office address ?
Answer.
Question 2. Describe your timber-culture entry, giving the date thereof and the
number of acres embraced therein.
Answer. -
Question 3. What number of acres of said land was broken by you during the first,
year, what number broken during the second year, and what number broken during
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the third year, respectively, after the date of your entry ? Give the day, month, and
year as nearly as practicable in each instance, when the several breakings were done;
describe the method of breaking, and in what way your measurements were made.
Answer. -
Question 4. Describe the way in which the ground was prepared, and state how
many acres of said tract were planted to trees during the second year of your entry,
giving the day, month, and year, as nearly as practicable, when the planting was
done, the kind or kinds of trees planted; and state how you know the area or num-
iher of acres so prepared and planted during said second year.
Answer.
Question 5. Describe the way in which the ground was prepared, and state how
many acres of said tract were planted to trees during the third year of your entry,
giving the day, month, and year, as nearly as practicable, when the planting was
done, the kind or kinds of trees planted; and state how you know the area or num-
ber of acres so planted during said third year.
Answer. -
Question 6. Describe the way in which the ground was prepared, and state how
many acres of said tract were planted to trees during.the fourth year of your entry,
giving the day, month, and year, as nearly as practicable, when the planting was
done, the kind or kinds of trees planted; and state how you know the area or num-
ber of acres so planted during said fourth year.
Answer. -
Question 7. If you have received an extension of time for planting on account of
the destruction of your trees, seeds, or cuttings, by grasshoppers or by extreme and
unusual drought, state the year or years in which extension was had and give all the
particulars. How did you proceed to obtain such extension?
Answer. -
Question 8. How many acres of timber have you planted, cultivated, protected, and
kept in a healthy growing condition for the period of eight (8) years last preceding
on the tracts embraced in your entry ?
Answer.
Question 9. Describe the condition of the trees now growing on said tract, giving
their average diameter and height as near as you can, the kind or kinds of trees, the
number of trees per acre now growing thereon; and state how you know the factslo
which you testify.
Answer.
Question 10. Have you ever heretofore made any other timber-culture entry ? If
so, describe such entry or entries and state all the particulars.
Answer. -
Question 11. Is the section specified in your entry composed of prairie land, or was
it devoid of timber at the date of your entry ?
Answer. -
Question 12. State anything farther within your personal knowledge which you
have to offer regarding your aforesaid entry.
Answer.
(Signature of claimant.)
I hereby certify that each question and answer in the foregoing testimony was read
to the claimant before signed name thereto, and that the same was sub-
scribed and sworn to before me this day of , 18-.
NOTE.-The officer before whom the testimony is taken should call the attention of
the witness to the following act of Congress, which is made by statute specifically ap-
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plicable to all oaths, affirmations, and affidavits required or authorized under the tim-
ber-culture acts:
Act of March 3, 1857 (11 Statutes, p. 250).
"SEc. 5. And be it further enacted, That in all cases where any oath, affirmation, or
affidavit shall be made or taken before any register or receiver, or either or both of
them, of any local land-office in the United States or any Territory thereof, or where
any oath, affirmation, or affidavit shall be made or taken before any person author-
ized by the laws of any State or Territory of the United States to administer oaths or
affirmations, or take affidavits, and such oaths, affirmations, or affidavits are made,
used, or filed in any of said local land-offices or in the General Land Office, as well in
cases arising under any or either of the orders, regulations, or instructions concern-
ing any of the public lands of the United States, issued by the Commissioner of the
General Land Office or other proper officer of the Government of the United States, as
under the laws of the United States, in any wise relating to or affecting any right,
claim, or title, or any contest therefor, to any of the public lands of the United States,
and any person or persons shall, taking such oath, affirmation, or affidavit, know-
ingly, willfully, or corruptly swear or affirm falsely, the same shall be deemed and
taken to be perjury, and the person or persons guilty thereof shall, upon conviction,
be liable to the punishment prescribed for that offense by the laws of the United
States."
(See also section 5392 United States Revised Statutes.)
C.
(The testimony of two witnesses in this form, taken separately, required in each
case.)
TIMBER- CULTURE PROOF.-TESTIMONY OF WITNESS.
(Acts of March 3, 1873, March 13, 1874, and June 14, 1878.)
- - , being called as a witness in support of the timber-culture entry of
-, No. -, for the - of section -, township-, range -, in the district of lands
subject to entry at -- , testified as follows:
Question 1. What is your name, age, occupation, and residence?
Answer.
Question 2. Are you well acquainted with ,the claimant; and, if so,
since what time have you known him ?
Answer.
Question 3. If you have personal knowledge regarding claimant's timber-culture
entry, give the date when said entry was made, describe the tract or tracts, and state
the number of acres embraced therein.
Answer.
Question 4. How far do you reside from the land described, and have you had con-
tinuous personal knowledge of said land and the improvements thereon during the
last eight (8) years ?
Answer.
Question 5. Was the section embracing the entry of the claimant composed of prairie
lands or other lands devoid of timber? Describe the land embraced in said section,
whether undulating or otherwise, and if any natural timber was growing on the tract
named at the date of entry, state the kind or kinds of trees so growing, and their
number, situation, and size.
Answer.
Question 6. How many acres of the land embraced in claimant's entry were broken
by him during the first year, how many during the second year, how many during
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the third year, respectively, after the date of entry? Give the day, month, and year
in each instance, as near as practicable, when the several breakings were done, de-
scribe the method of breaking, and in what way your measurements were made, or
how you know the area, or number of acres broken.Answer.-.
Question 7. Describe the way in which the ground was prepared, and state how
many acres of said tract were planted to trees during the second year of said entry.
giving the day, month, and year, as near as practicable, when the planting was done,
the kind or kinds of trees planted, and state how you know the area or number of
acres so prepared and planted during said second year.
Answer.
Question 8. Describe the way in which the ground was prepared, and state how
many acres of said tract were planted to trees during the third year of said entry, giv-
ing the day, mmth, and year, as near as practicable, when th3 planting was done,
the kind or kinds of trees planted, and state how you know the area or number of
acres so prepared and planted during said third year.
Answer.
Question 9. Describe the way in which the ground was prepared, and state how
many acres of said tract were planted to trees during the fourth year of said entry,
giving the day, month, and year, as near as practicable, when the planting was done,
the kind or kinds of trees planted, and state how you know the area or number of
acres so prepared and planted during said fourth year.
Answer.
Question 10. Has the claimant ever had the trees, seeds, or cuttings on the tract
embraced in his timber culture entry destroyed by grasshoppers or by extreme and
unusual drought ? If so, state the year or years in which the destruction took place,
and give all the facts within your personal knowledge.
Answer. -
Question 11. How many acres of timber on the tract described has the claimant
planted, cultivated, protected, and kept in a healthy growing condition for the period
of eight (8) years last preceding, and from what source is your knowledge upon this
point obtained ?
Answer. -
Question 12. Describe the condition of the trees now growing on said tract, give
their average diameter and height as near as you can, the kind or kinds of trees, the
number of trees to the acre, and state how you know the facts to which you testify.
Answer.
Question 13. Has the claimant, to your knowledge, ever made any other timber-
culture entry?
Answer.
Question 14. Have you any interest, direct or indirect, in this claim ?
Answer.
Question 15. State any further facts which you may know of your own personal
knowledge regarding the aforesaid timber-culture entry.
Answer.
(Signature of witness.)
I hereby certify that the above-named personally appeared before
me, and that he is a credible witness; that the foregoing testimony was read to him
before being subscribed, and was sworn to by him before me this - day of
16-.
NOTE.-The officer before whom the testimony is taken should call the attention of
the witness to the following act of Congress, which is made by statute specifically
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applicable to all oaths, affirmations, and affidavits required or authorized under the
timber-culture acts:
Act of March 3, 1857 (11 Statutes, p. 250).
"SEC. 5. And be itfurther enacted, That in all cases where any oath, affirmation, or
affidavit shall be made or taken before any register or receiver, or either, or both of
them, of any local land-office in the United States, or any Territory thereof, or where
any oath, affirmation, or affidavit shall be made or taken before any person author-
ized by the laws of any State or Territory of the United States to administer oaths or
affirmations, or take affidavits, and such oaths, affirmations, or affidavits are made,
used, or filed in any of said local land-offices, or in the General Land Office, as well
in cases arising under any or either of the orders, regulations, or instructions, con-
cerning any of the public lands of the United States, issued by the Commissioner of
the General Land Office, or other proper officer of the Government of the United
States, as under the laws of the United States, in anywise relating to or affecting
any right, claim, or title, or any contest therefor, to any of the public lands of the
United States, and any person or persons shall, taking such oath, a ffirmation, or af-
fidavit, knowingly, wilfully, or corruptly swear or affirm falsely, the same shall be
deemed and taken to be perjury, and the person or persons guilty thereof shall,
upon conviction, be liable to the punishment prescribed for that offense by the laws
of the United States."
(See also section 5392 United States Revised Statutes.)
D.
TIMBER CULTURE.
(Acts of March 3, 1873, March 13, 1874, and June 14, 1878.)
RECEIVER'S FINAL RECEIPT, } APPLICATION,No.-. S No.-.
RECEIVER'S OFFICE,(Date.) -, 188-.
Received from , of , the sum of - dollars, being the balance
of payment required by law for the timber-culture entry of the - of sec-
tion -, in township-, of range-, containing - acres, under the acts of March
3, 1873, and March 13, 1874, and the act of June 14, 1878, amendatory thereof, enti-
tled " An act to amend the act entitled ' An act to encourage the growth of timber




FINAL CERTIFICATE, APPLICATION,No.-. No.-.
TIMBER CULTURE.
(Acts of March 3, 1873, March 14, 1874, and June 14, 1878.)
LAND OFFICE AT ,
(Date.) - day of , 18-.
It is hereby certified that, in pursuance of the provisions contained in the acts of
Congress of March 3, 1873, and March 13, 1874, and the act amendatory thereof of
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June 14, 1878, entitled "An act to amend the act entitled An act to encourage the
growth of timber on the western prairies," -- -- , of -- , has made pay-
ment in full for -- , of section number -, in township -, of range number-,
containing acres.
Now, therefore, be it known, that on presentation of this certificate to the Commis-
sioner of the General Land Office the said shall be entitled to a patent
for the tract of land above described.
Registe7.
SOLDIERS' HOMESTEAD DECLAR4TORY STATEMENTS.
CIRCULAR.
Commissioner MeFarland to registers and receivers, December 15, 1882.
In view of extensive frauds in the matter of declaratory statements
of homestead applicants under Sections 2304 and 2309 of the Revised
Statutes, the privilege conferred by the filing of such claims having
been made the occasion of barter and sale, without attempt on the part
of the soldier to comply with the statute by making formal entry at the
district office, and commencement of settlement upon the land within
the prescribed period of six months, the following regulations are pre-
scribed for the admission of such filings:
1. Proof of qualification as an honorably discharged soldier must be
furnished in accordance with existing regulations in case of entry by
soldiers who make direct homestead application without availing them-
selves of the preliminary filing. Oath of the soldier, setting forth his
residence and post-office address, must accompany the filing, to the
effect that the claim is made for his exclusive use and benefit, for the
purpose of actual settlement and cultivation, and not either directly or
indirectly for the use or benefit of any other person; and it must also be
shown by such oath that he has not theretofore either made a homestead
entry or filed a declaratory statement under the homestead law.
2. Where the declaratory statement is offered for filing by an agent
under Section 2309,the oath must further declare the name and authority
of such agent, giving the date of the power of attorney or other instru-
ment creating the agency, and also aver that the name was inserted
therein before execution. It will be observed that with the filing of
the declaratory statement the power of the agent, under the law, is at
an end. He has thereafter no right or control with respect to the
matter nor over the land selected, and has no authority to relinquish
the claim or do any other act in the premises. The further declaration
of the statute is express, that "such claimant in person shall within
the time prescribed make his actual entry, commence settlements and
improvements on the same, and thereafter fulfill all the requirements-
of law." Nevertheless, the oath of the soldier and the power of attorney
should show that such is the understanding of the matter, and he should
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swear in terms that such agent has no right or interest direct or indirect
in the filing of such declaratory statement.
3. In addition t the proper power of attorney in such cases, the agent
must file his own oath to the effect that he has no interest either pres-
ent or prospective, direct or indirect, in the claim; that the same is filed
for the sole benefit of the soldier, and that no arrangement has been
made whereby said agent has been empowered at any future time to
sell or relinquish such claim either as agent or by filing an original re-
linquishment of the claimant.
4. As above implied by the requirement of the oath, a soldier will be
held to have exhausted his homestead right by the filing of his declara-
tory statement; it being manifest that the right to file is a privilege
granted to soldiers in addition to the ordinary privilege only in the mat-
ter of giving them power to hold their claims for six months after selec-
tion; but it is not a license to abandon such selection with the right
thereafter to make a regular homestead entry independently of such
filing. This is clear from the statutory language. Section 2304 provides
that "the settler shall be allowed six months, after locating his home-
stead and filing his declaratory statement, within which to make his
entry and commence his settlement and improvement;" and section
2309 requires him "in person" to "make his actual entry, commence set-
tlements and improvements on the same, and thereafter fulfill all the re-
quirements of law." These must be done " on the same" land selected
and "located" by the filing.
5. The foregoing ruling will not be so construed as to require the re-
jection of an application to enter the tract filed upon, after the lapse of
six months, where climatic reasons are shown which will justify an al-
lowance of one year under the act of March 3, 1880 (21 Stat., 511); nor
in cases where the failure results from sickness, misfortune, or any in-
surmountable cause, which shall be properly alleged and satisfactorily
shown, and where no adverse right has intervened. Where such cause
has prevented entry and an adverse right has been admitted, it will be
held proper within the discretion of this office to allow an entry upon
another tract: Provided, That it shall be shown to the full satisfaction
of the Commissioner that the default was practically beyond the power
of the claimant to avoid. This was formerly the rule, as prescribed by
circular of May 17, 1873; but later practice and instruction have
extended it far beyond its original scope, and allowed entry to be made
upon simple default without showing of cause for non-compliance with
law.
6. Following the accepted practice in pre-emption cases, the filing of
a declaratory statement will not be held to bar the admission of other
filings and entries; but any person making entry or claim during the
period allowed by law for entry of the soldier will do so subject to his
right, and his application when offered within such time will be allowed
as a matter of right and operate to exclude the intervening claim.
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7. Where you have cause to believe that any "filing" off
record is not presented in good faith, you will note such cause upon the
same, and if it be sufficient to warrant rejection, such as a want of proper
authentication or any palpable defect, you will reject the same, and
allow an appeal from your ruling according to the regular practice.
Where such cause is not sufficient to warrant an authoritative ruling
you will admit the filing subject to investigation, and immediately pro-
ceed to make proper inquiry into the matter, reporting your action at
once to this office.
Forms of affidavit are hereto appended, and blanks will be furnished
as soon as they can be prepared.






I - , of County and State or Territory of , do solemnly
swear that I served for a period of- in the Army of the United States during the
war of the rebellion, and was honorably discharged therefrom, as shown by a state-
ment of such service herewith, and that I have remained loyal to the government;
that I have never made homestead entry orfiled a declaratory statement under Sections
2290 and 2304 of the Revised Statutes; that I have located as a homestead nuder said
statute the [describe land], and hereby give notice of my intention to claim and
enter said tract; that this location is made for my exclusive use and benefit, for the
purpose of my actual settlement and cultivation, and not either directly or indirectly
forthe use or benefit of any otherperson. My present post-office address is [give P. O.]
Sworn and subscribed before me this - day of , 188
[SEAL.]




I , of County and State or Territory of , do solemnly
swear that I served for a period of in the Army of the United States during
the war of the rebellion, and was honorably discharged therefrom, as shown by a
statement of such service herewith, and that I have remained loyal to the Govern-
ment; that I have never made homestead entry or tiled a declaratory statement under
Sections 2290,2304, or 2309 of the Revised Statutes; that I have appointed, by power f
attorney duly executed on the day of , (or I do hereby appoint) , of
County and State of , my true and lawful agent, under Section 2309 afore-
said, to select for me and in my name, and file my declaratory statement for a home-
stead right under the aforesaid sections; and I hereby give notice of my intention to
claim and enter said tract under said statute; that the location herein authorized is
made for my exclusive use and benefit, for the purpose of my actual settlement and
cultivation, and not either directly or indirectly for the use or benefit of any other
person; that my said attorney has no interest, present or prospective, in the prem-
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ises, and that I have made no arrangement or agreement with him or any other per-
son for any sale or attempted sale or relinquishment of my claim in any manner or
for any consideration whatever, and that I have not signed this declaration in blank.
Sworn and subscribed before me this day of - , 188 , and I certify that
the foregoing declaration was fully filled oat before being subscribed or attested.
[SEAL.]
By virtue of the foregoing, and of a certain power of attorney therein named,
duly executed on the - day of , and filed herewith, I hereby select the
- as the homestead claim of - , the aforesaid, and do solemnly-swear that
the same is filed in good faith for the purposes therein specified, and that I have no
interest or authority in the matter, present or prospective, beyond the filing of the
same as the true and lawful agent of the said , as provided by Section 2309 of
the Revised Statutes of the United States.
Agent.
Sworn and subscribed before me this day of--, 188
[SEAL.]
NOTE.-This form may be used where the declaratory statement is filed by an agent
under Section 2309, Revised Statute-
TIMBER-C ULTURE CONTESTS..
CIRCULAR.
Commissioner McFarland to registers and receivers December 20, 1882.
Your attention is called to section 3, of the timber-culture act of June
14, 1878, which provides:
That if at any time after the filing of said affidavit, and prior to the issuing of the
patent for said land, the claimant shall fail to comply with any of the requirements
of this act, then and in that event such land shall be subject to entry under the home-
stead laws, or by some other person under the provisions of this act: Prorided, That
the party making claim to said land, either as a homestead settler or under this act,
shall give, at the time of filing his application, such notice to the original claimant
as shall be prescribed by the rules established by the Commissioner of the General
Land Office, and the rights of the parties shall be determined as in other contested
eases.
On the 14th ultimo the honorable Secretary of the Interior held, in
Frank Bundy's appeal, Oberlin, Klans., that this statute restricts con-
tests against a prior timber-culture entry to one who seeks to enter the
land covered thereby under the homestead or timber-culture laws, and
that in the absence of sucb application there is no right of contest, nor
does a preference right attach under section 2 of the act of May 14,
1880. You are therefore directed to dismiss all contest suits now pend-
ing in your office against timber-culture entries coming within the pur-
view of said decision! The filing of the application aforesaid is a col-
dition precedent to the right of contest under said statute, and the party
so applying must be qualified to make an entry.
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These instructions are not to apply to entries contested on the ground
of illegality at inception. (See case of Wallace Benedict v. Frank D.
Boyer, decided by the honorable Secretary of the Interior, November 22,






Commissioner McFarland to registers and receivers, February 13, 1883.
By circular letter of this office dated December 20, 1882, your atten-
tion was called to the provisions of section 3 of the timber-culture act
of June 14, 1878, and it was therein announced that on the 14th of
November, 1882, the honorable Secretary of the Interior held, in Frank
Bundy's appeal-Oberlin, Kans.-that said statute restricts contests
against a prior timber-culture entry to one who seeks to enter the land
covered thereby under the homestead or timber-culture laws, and that
in the absence of such application to make entry there is no right of
contest, nor does a preference right attach under section 2 of the act of
May 14, 1880. You were therefore directed to dismiss all contest suits
then pending in your respective offices against timber-culture entries
coming within the purview of said decision, and informed that the filing
of the application aforesaid is a condition precedent to the right of
contest under said section 3 of said act of June 14, 1878, and that the
party so applying must be qualified to make an entry.
On the 2d instant the honorable Secretary of the Interior, in the case
of Albert L. Bartlett v. Edwin Dudley-Visalia, Cal.-among other
things, held as follows:
Further consideration confirms me in the opinion that the decision in the case of
Bundy was a correct interpretation of the third section of the act of 1878, as respects
a contestant, and that it is not inharmonious with the second section of the act of
1880. In order, however, that a contestant whose contest has been or hereafter may
be, dismissed, for failure to file an application to enter the contested tract at the date
of initiating his contest, may yet have opportunity for entering it, under a valid pro-
ceeding, I know of no objection to his initiation of anew contest with an application
to enter the tract ; or that, in such case, in order to the saving of expense and delay,
the parties may stipulate, in writing, that the testimony formerly taken may be used
in the new contest, with such other testimony as they may see fit to submit. The
new contest will, of course, be subject to any intervening right initiated prior thereto
and, in view of the time which has elapsed since the initiation of the former contest,
should receive your early consideration.
You will post a copy of this circular in some conspicuous place in
your respective offices, and, in cases arising, be governed in accordance
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TIMBER CULTURE.
FORMS IN CASES OF CONTEST.
Many defects and considerable irregularity having heretofore pre-
vailed in the matter of notices served and affidavits filed in contests
against timber;culture entries, the following forms have been adopted
and are the only ones now in use in contests against this class of entries:
[4-346.]
NoTicm-TIMBER CULTURE.
U. S. LAND OFFICE,
_-, 188-. 
Complaint having been entered at this office by against 
for failure to comply with law as to timber-culture entry No. , dated--,
18-, upon the - , section , township - , range , in county,
with a view to the cancellation of said entry; contestant alleging that
the said parties are hereby summoned to appear at this office on the
day of-, 188-, at - o'clock - ., to respondand furnish testimony concern.
ing said alleged failure.
NOTE.-The fact and date of service upon the timber-culture claimant should be
indorsed on this notice, and publication must be resorted to where personal service
cannot be had, and that fact is established by an affidavit that, after using due dili-
gence, it has been found impossible to make personal service upon the claimant.
[4-090.]
AFFIDAVITS TO BE FILED BEFORE CONTEST OF TI2IBER-CULTURE ENTRY.
U. S. LAND OFFICE,
-, l8d-. 
Personally appeared before me, of the land office,- -- of
-.- county, State of , who upon his oath says: That he is well acquainted
with the tract of landembraced inthetimber-culture entryof - --- No.--,
made , 18-, and knows the present condition of the same; also that the
said ,* and this the contestant is ready to prove at such time and place
as maybe named by the register and receiver for a hearing in said case; and he there-
fore asks to be allowed to prove said allegations, and that said timber-culture entry,
No. -, may be declared canceled and forfeited to the United States-he, the said
contestant, paying the expenses of such hearing.
Sworn to and subscribed the day and year above written before
Also appeared at the same time and place - and , who,
being duly sworn, depose and say: That they are acquainted with the tract described
in the within affidavit of , and know from personal observation that
the statements therein made are true.
Sworn to and subscribed before me this day of ,188-.
H ere state that the claimant did not perform certain acts required by law to be
done during the year or years in which the failure is alleged to have occurred, speci-
fying said requirements in full. Thus, if the tract be 160 acres and failure during
the first year after entry be alleged, the affidavit should state that the claimant failed
to break, or cause to be broken, five acres of the tract claimed, and in a similar man-
ner should specify any failure alleged to have occurred in subsequent years.
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RE VISED REGULATIONS RELATIVE TO SOLDIERS' AND SAILORS' AD-
DITIONAL HOVESTEAD ENTRIES.
Iomnissioner 31cFarland to registers and receivers, February 13, 1883.
Section 2306 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, provides
that any person entitled to make a homestead entry under section 2304
(providing for the benefit of soldiers and sailors of the late war), who
had, prior to June 22, 1874, made a homestead entry of less than 160
acres, may enter an additional quantity of land sufficient to make, with
the previous entry, 160 acres.
The right granted by this section, and extended by section 2305 to
the widow, if unmarried, or otherwise to the minor orphan children by
proper guardian, is a personal one and is not transferable, nor subject to
assignment or lien, nor can it be exercised by another. It can lawfully
be exercised only by the soldier or sailor, or by the widow or guardian,
as the case may be, in his or her own proper person.
The practice which has hitherto prevailed of certifying the additional
right as information from the records of this office and permitting the
entry to be made by an agent or attorney is hereby discontinued.
The following regulations will hereafter be strictly observed:
1. The party desiring to make an additional entry, and being entitled
thereto, must present himself at the land office of the district in which
the land he wishes to enter is situated, and make his application in the
same manner as in case of an original entry. (Form No. 4-008.)
2. In addition to the usual homestead affidavit the claimant must
make a special affidavit showing-
First. His identity as the soldier he represents himself to be, reciting
his military service, and stating his present residence and post-office
address.
Second. The facts, in detail, respecting his right to make the addi-
tional entry, and that he has fully complied with the provisions of the
homestead laws in the matter of residence upon, and cultivation and
improvement of his original entry, and whether or not he has proved
up his claim and received a patent for the land.
Third. That he has not in any manner previously exercised his addi-
tional right either by entry or application, or by sale, transfer, or power
of attorney, but that the same remains in him unimpaired.
3. The foregoing affidavits must be sworn to and subscribed in the
presence of the register or receiver. This rule must be strictly adhered
to in order to avoid false personation; and applications and affidavits
presented to the register and receiver with signatures attached will not
be received. Department circulars of May 17, 1877, and September 1,
1879, are modified accordingly.
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4. These rules will not be deemed to apply to cases where the addi-
tional right has heretofore been certified by this office, nor to cases





LANVDS I ALABAMA-COAL ANVD IRON.
DEPARTAIENT OF THE INTERIOR,
GENERAL LAND OFFICE,
Washington, D. C., April 9, 1883.
GENTLEkIEN: The act of March 3, 1883 (copy herewith), enacts that
all public lands within the State of Alabama, whether mineral or other-
wise, shall be subject to disposal only as agricultural lands; provided,
that all lands which have heretofore been reported as containing coal
and iron shall first be offered at public sale, and, further, that any bona
fide entry under the provisions of the homestead law of lands within
said State heretofore made may be patented without reference to the act
of M ay 10, 1872, in cases where the persons making application for such
patents have in all other respects complied with the homestead law re-
lating thereto.
In order to carry out the provisions of said act, it will be necessary
to prepare a list of all public lands heretofore reported as mineral that
have not been entered, and have them offered by President's proclama-
tion. In the mean time you will be careful not to allow an entry to be
made for any lands, lists of which were transmitted to your office Octo-
ber 23, 1879, nor of other tracts that have been since investigated and
reported as valuable for minerals, a list of which I inclose herewith.
All existing bona fide entries, under the homestead laws, may be per-
fected regardless of the mineral character of the land, in accordance
with rules and regulations governing the same.
Any contest pending before you where the only allegation is the min-
eral character of the land must be dismissed.
The law requires the offering to embrace all lands heretofore re-
ported as containing coal or iron which remain undisposed of by entry
or sale.
Entries, whether by cash or location, already allowed and reported
to this office will be examined and disposed of upon their merits with-
out reference to the question of mineral.
Very respectfully,
N. C. McFARLAND,
To DISTRICT LAND OFFICERS, Commissioner.
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AN ACT to exclude public lands in Alabama from the operation of the laws relating
to mineral lands.
Be it enacted by the Senate and HIouse of Representatives of the United States of America
in Congress assenbled, That within the State of Alabama all public lands, whether
mineral or otherwise, shall be subject to disposal only as agricultural lands: Provided,
however, That all lands which have heretofore been reported to the General Land
Office as containing coal and iron shall first be offered at public sale: And provided
further, That any bona fide entry under the provisions of the homestead law of lands
within said State heretofore made may be patented without reference to an act ap-
proved May tenth, eighteen hundred and seventy-two, entitled "An act to promote
the development of the mining resources of the United States," in cases where the
persons making application for such patents have in all other respects complied with
the homestead law relating thereto.
Approved March 3,1883.
CIRCULAR ISTRBUCTIONS BELATIVE TO ENTRIES UNDER THE HOME-
STEAD, PRE-EMPTION, AND TIMBER CULTURE LA WS.
Commissioner McFarland to registers and receivers, March 20, 1883.
You are instructed to deliver to applicants for land under the home-
stead, pre-emption, or timber culture acts, a copy of this circular, and
to especially call the attention of the applicant to the requirements of
the law under which the application is made.
RESIDENCE OF APPLICANT.
1. The applicant must in every case state in his application his place
of actual residence, and the post-office address to which notices of contest
or other proceedings relative to his entry shall be sent,
SECOND FILINGS AND ENTRIES.
2. A party making a legal filing or entry under any one of the fore-
going acts exhausts his right under that act and cannot thereafter make
another filing or entry under said act.
ALTERATIONS IN APPLICATIONS.
3. Applications to amend filings or entries should be filed with the
register and receiver and by them transmitted for the consideration of
this office. Registers and receivers will not change an entry or filing
so as to describe another tract or change a date after the same has
been recorded.
RELINQUISHMENTS.
4. Entries and filings made for the purpose of holding the land for
speculation and the sale of relinquishments are illegal and fraudulent,
and every effort in the power of the government will be exerted to pre-
vent such frauds and to detect and punish the perpetrators.
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5. The first section of the act of May 14, 1880, provides that when a
pre-emption, homestead, or timber-culture claimant shall file a written
relinquishment of his claim in the land office, the land covered by such
claim shall be held as open to settlement and entry without further ac-
tion on the part of the Commissioner of the General Land Office.
6. This act refers to bona fide relinquishments of bona fide entries.
An entry fraudulent in its inception is not an entry capable of being re-
linquished. It is au entry to be canceled upon a proper showing of the
facts and circumstances of the case, whereupon the land will become
subject to proper entry by the first legal applicant.
7. Purchasers of relinquishments of fraudulent filings or entries
should understand that they purchase at their own risk, so far as the
United States is concerned, and must seek their own remedies under
local laws against those who, by imposing such relinquishments upon
them have obtained their money without valuable consideration.
SETTLERS ON UNSURVEYED LANDS.
S. Homestead and pre-emption settlers on uusurveyed lands are al-
lowed three months after the filing of the township plat of survey within
which to put their claims on record. Accordingly no party will be per-
mitted to make final proof in any case until after the expiration of said
three months.
THE HOMESTEAD LAWS.
9. homestead entries can be made for not more than one-quarter
section, or 160 acres of land.
10. The laud-office fees and commissions, payable when application is
made, are as follows:
In Alabama, Arkansas, Dakota, Florida, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana,
Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, and Wisconsin-
Land at $2.50 per acre. Land at $1.25 per acre.
For 160 acres ................... $18 00 For 160 acres.................... $14 00
For 80 acres ..................... 9 00 For 80 acres .................. 7 00
For 40 acres .............. 7 00 For 40 acres ........ 6 00
In Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New
Mexico, Oregon, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming-
Land at $2.50 per acre. Land at $1.25 per acre.
For 160 acres .........-...-..... $22 00 For 160 acres .................... $16 00
For 80 acres ..... 11 00 For 80 acres- -. 8 00
For 40 acres .......... . 8 00 For 40 acres ..---- ....- 6 50
11. When a person desires to enter a tract of land upon which he
has not established a residence and made improvements, he must appear
personally at the district land office and present his application, and
must make the required affidavits before the register or receiver.
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12. He must then establish his actual residence (in a house) upon
the land within six months from date of entry, and must reside upon
the land continuously for the period prescribed by law.
13. In the case of a single person the actual residence must be estab-
lished within the same time, and must be continuously and actually
maintained for the same period.
14. The homestead affidavit can be made before the clerk of the
county court only in cases where the family of the applicant, or some
members thereof, is actually residing on the land which he desires to
enter, and on which he has made bona fide improvement and settle-
ment, and when he is prevented by reason of distance, bodily infirmity,
or other good cause, from personal attendance at the district land
office.
15. In such cases the applicant must state in a supplemental affidavit
the facts of such settlements, improvement, and residence; what acts
of settlement have been performed, and when made; the nature, extent,
and value of the improvements; what member or members of his family
are residing on the land, and the length of time such residence has
been maintained, and the cause, specifically, why the applicant cannot
appear at the local office.
16. A false oath taken before a clerk of a court is perjury, the same
as if taken before the register or receiver.
17. The period of actual inhabitancy, improvement, and cultivation
required under the homestead law is five years.
18. In case of the death of a homestead party, before making final
proof, the widow succeeds to the homestead right.
19. In case of the death of both father and mother the right and fee
inure to the minor children, if any.
20. A homestead right cannot be devised away from the widow or
minor children.
SOLDIERS' HOMESTEADS.
21. A union soldier or sailor of the late war is entitled to a deduction
from the five years of the length of time (not exceeding four years) of
his military service. But the soldier (or his widow, as the case may
be), must actually reside on the land at least one year before final proof
can be made.
22. In case of the death of a soldier, and the death or remarriage
of the widow, the minor children of the soldier, by a duly appointed
guardian, are entitled to the privileges of the father.
23. Neither the guardian nor the minor children are required to re-
side upon the land, but the same must be cultivated and improved for
the period of time during which the father would have been required
to reside upon the tract.
24. The soldier may file a declaratory statement for a tract of land
which he intends to enter under the homestead laws. The fee is $2,
except in the Pacific States and Territories, where the fee is $3.
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25. This statement may be filed either personally or by an agent, and
the soldier is thereafter allowed six months within which to make his
entry and commence his settlement and improvement.
26. The entry can be made only by the soldier in person at the local
land office, and he must commence his settlement on the land within
six months after his filing, and must continue to reside on the land and
cultivate it for such period as, added to his military service, will make
five years. But he must actually reside upon the land at least one
year whatever may have been the period of his military service.
27. Entries cannot be made for a soldier by an agent or attorney.
28. After a declaratory statement has once been filed, whether by an
agent or otherwise, the soldier cannot file again. His rights are ex-
hausted by the first filing, and if he does not within six months make
his personal entry at the land office and commence his settlement as.
required by law he obtains no right to the land.
29. A soldier's homestead declaratory statement for a tract of land
does not prevent anybody else from making an entry of the same land,
subject to such right as the soldier may acquire by virtue of an actual
residence on the land and full compliance with law. If the soldierdoes
not establish his residence on the tract as required the next comer may
take the land.
30. Soldiers are not entitled to land, nor to bounty land warrants,
for theirmilitary service in the late war, nor can title to land be obtained
for them by agents or attorneys. All representations to the contrary
are false, and soldiers and sailors are warned against imposition by
parties who offer to locate land for them, or to sell their rights.
FINAL PROOF.
31. A settler desiring to make final proof must file with the register
of the proper land office a written notice, in the prescribed form, of his
intention to do so, which notice will be published by the register in a
newspaper to be by him designated as nearest the land, once a week for
six weeks, at the applicant's expense.
32. Applicants should commence to make their proofs in sufficient
time so that the same may be completed and filed in the local office
within the statutory period of seven years from date of entry.
33. The final affidavits and proof should be made before the register
or receiver, but may be made before the judge, or in his absence before
the clerk, of a court of record in the county and State, district, or Ter-
ritory, in which the land is situated. If in an unorganized county the
proof may be made in a similar manner in any adjacent county in the
same State or Territory.
34. When proof is made before the county officers mentioned the
same must be transmitted by the judge or clerk of the court to the
register and receiver, together with the same fees and commissions that
the land officers would have been entitled to receive if the proof had
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been made before them and the testimony reduced to writing by them.
35. The land office commissionspayable at time of making final proof,
are as follows:
In Alabama, Arkansas, Dakota, Florida, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana,
Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, and Wisconsin-
Land at $2. 50 per acre. Land at $1.25 per acre.
For 160 acres -- . $8 00 For 160 acres .. - .... $4 00
For 0 acres . -. 4 00 For 80 acres . .-.-. .... 2 00
For 40 acres .-................. 2 00 For 40 acres ...................... 00
In Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New
Mexico, Oregon, Utah, Washington, and WyomiDg-
Land at $2.50 per acre. k Land at $1.25 per acre.
For 160 acres . .. ............. $12 OC For 160 acres ..................... $6 00
For 80 acres ----------..- 6 00 For 8O acres . -........... . 3 00
For 40 acres ....... . 3 00 For 40 acres ...................... 1 50
36. The fees for reducing testimony to writing in making final proof
are, in the former States, 15 cents, and in the latter States and Terri-
tories, 22k cents for each 100 words. No other land office fees than those
stated in this circular are payable or allowable in homestead cases.
COMMUTED HOMESTEADS.
37. Homestead entries can be commuted to cash only after actual in-
habitancy of the land by the homestead party, and his improvement and
cultivation of it for a period of not less than six months.
38. A person who commutes a homestead entry cannot move from the
tract and settle upon other public land in the same State or Territory
as a pre-emptor.
.39. Proof of settlement and cultivation for the prescribed period is
to be made in the same manner as in pre-emption cases.
40. A person commuting a homestead entry when he has not actually
resided upon the land and improved and cultivated it as required by
law,forfeits all right to Ve land and to the purchase money paid, and
in addition thereto renders himself liable to criminal prosecution.
THE PRE-EMPTION LAW.
41. The qualifications required of a pre-emptor are that he (or she)
shall be a citizen of the United States (or have declared an intention
to become such); over 21 years of age or the head of a family; an actual
inhabitant of the tract claimed; and not be the proprietor of 320 acres
of land in any State or Territory.
42. A person who has removed from land of his own to reside on
public land in the same State or Territory, or who has previously exer-
cised his pre-emption right, is not a qualified pre-emptor.
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43. Lands included in any reservation, or within the limits of an in-
corporated town, or selected as the site of a city or town, or actually
settled and occupied for purposes of trade and business and not for
agriculture, or on which there are any known salines or minerals, are
not subject to pre-emption.
44. If the land is surveyed, but has not been "offered," the declara-
tory statement must be filed within three months from date of settle-
ment. If upon 'offered" land, the filing must be made within thirty
days.
45. If the laud is unsurveyed at the time of settlement, the declara-
tory statement must be filed within three months after the date of filing
the township plat in the local office.
46. Failure to file a declaratory statement within the time prescribed
makes the land liable to the claim of an adverse settler who does file
notice of his itention at the proper time.
47. The land office fee for filing a declaratory statement is $2 except
in the Pacific States and Territories, where the fee is $3.
48. A pre-emption filing can be made only by an actual settler on the
land. A filing without settlement is illegal, and no rights are acquired
thereby.
49. The existence of a pre-emption filing on a tract of land does not
prevent another filing to be made of the same land, subject to any valid
rights acquired by virtue of the former filing and actual settlement, if
any.
50. On offered lands proof and payment must be made within twelve
months from date of settlement.
51. If the land is unoffered, proof and payment may be made within
thirty-three months from date of settlement.
52. A failure to make proof and payment as prescribed by law, ren-
ders the land subject to appropriation by the first legal applicant.
53. The requirements of actual inhabitancy and improvement must
be observed as strictly under the pre-emption law as under the home-
stead law.
54. Failure to inhabit and improve the land in good faith, as required
by law, renders the claim subject to contest and the entry to investiga-
tion and cancellation.
55. Final proof in pre-emption cases must be made to the satisfaction
of the register and receiver, whose decision, as in other cases, is subject
to examination and review by this office.
56. Publication of notice to make proof is required as in homestead
cases.
57. The final affidavit must be made before the register or receiver,
or before the clerk of a court of record in the county and State or Terri-
tory where the land is situated. If in an unorganized county the proof
may be made in a similar manner in any adjacent county in the same
State or Territory.
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58. The pre-emptor is required to make oath that he has nt previ-
ously exercised his pre-emption right; that he is not the owner of 320
acres of land; that he has not settled upon and improved the land to
sell the same on speculation, but in good faith to appropriate it to his
own exclusive use; that he has not made any contract or agreement,
directly or indirectly, in any way or manner, with any person whomso-
ever, by which the title he may acquire from the United States shall
inure in whole or in part to the benefit of any person except himself.
59. Any person swearing falselyforfeits all right to te land and to the
.purchase money paid, besides being liable to prosecution under the crim-
inal laws of the United States.
THE TIMBER CULTURE ACT.
60. A timber culture applicant is required to make oath that his entry
is made for the cultivation of timber and for his own exclusive use and
benefit; that he makes the application in good faith and nt for the
purpose of speculation, nor directly or indirectly for the use or benefit
of any other person or persons whomsoever; and that he intends to
hold and cultivate the land and to wholly comply with the provisions
of the act.
61. Claimants under the timber culture act will be held to a strict com-
pliance with the terms and conditions of the law.
62. Not more than one-quarter of any section can be entered under
this act.
63. Where 160 acres are taken, at least five acres must be plowed
within one year from date of entry. The following, or second year, said
five acres must be actually cultivated to crop or otherwise, and another
five acres must be plowed. The third year the first five acres must be
planted to trees, tree seeds, or cuttings, and the second five acres actu-
ally cultivated to crop or otherwise. The fourth year the second five
acres must be planted to trees, tree seeds, or cuttings, making, at the
end of the fourth year, ten acres thus planted to trees.
61. Perfect good faith must at all times be shown by claimants.
Trees must not only be planted, but they must be protected and culti-
vated in such manner as to promote their growth.
65. Final proof may be made at the expiration of eight years from
date of entry. It must be shown that for the said eight years the trees
have been planted, protected, and cultivated as aforesaid; that not less
than 2,700 trees were planted on each of the ten acres, and that at the
time of making proof there are growing at least six hundred and seventy-
five (675) living thrifty trees to each acre.
66. Where less than one quarter section of land is entered, the same
proportionate amount of plowing, planting, and cultivating of trees
must be done as required in entries of 160 acres.
67. If the trees, seeds, or cuttings are destroyed in any one year they
must be replanted. A party will not be released from a continued at-
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tempt to promote the aetual growth of timber or forest trees. A failure
in this respect will subject the entry to cancellation.
6S. Only an applicant for the land under the timber culture or home-
stead laws can institute a contest under the third section of the act of
1878.
69. Contestants have a preference right of thirty days after cancella-
tion in which to make entry of the laud.
70. The government will at any period, upon proper application to
contest, or upon its own information, investigate alleged fraudulent or
illegal timber culture entries, or alleged failure to comply with the law
after entry, and such entries will be canceled upon sufficient proof either
of illegality or failure to comply with the law.
71. The land office fee for an entry of more than S0 acres is $14; for
SO acres or less, $9.
C AUTION TO APPLICANTS.
Persons making filings or entries under the homestead, pre-emption,
or timber culture acts are cautioned that the laws authorize entries to
be made only for the use and benefit of the party making the same, and
that entries or filings are not allowed by law to be made for the benefit
of others nor for speculation, but all entries must be made in good faith
and the requirements of law must be honestly and faithfully complied
with.
Approved.
H. M. TELLER, -
Secretary.
[Revised Statutes of the United States.]
SEC. 2246. The register or receiver is authorized, and it shall be their duty to ad-
minister any oath required by law or the instructions of the General Land Office, in
connection with the entry or purchase of any tract of the public lands; but he shall
not charge or receive, directly or indirectly, any compensation for administering such
oath.
SEc. 5392. Every person who, having taken an oath before a competent tribunal,
officer, or person, in any case in which a law of the United States authorizes an oath
to be administered, that he will testify, declare, depose, or certify truly, or that any
written testimony, declaration, deposition, or certificate by him subscribed is true,
willfully and contrary to such oath states or subscribes any material matter which
he does not believe to be true is guilty of perjury, and shall be punished by a fine
of not more than two thousand dollars, and by imprisonment at hard labor not
more than five years; and shall, moreover, thereafter be incapable of giving testi-
mony in any court of the United States until such time as the judgment against him
is reversed.
SEc. 5393. Every person who procures another to commit any perjury is guilty of
subornation of perjury, and punishable as in the preceding section prescribed.
SEc. 5440. If two oy mqre persons conspire either to commit any offense against the
United States or to defraud the United States in any manner or for any purpose, and
one or more of such parties do any act to affect the object of the conspiracy, all the
parties to such conspiracy shall be liable to a penalty of not less than one thousand
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dollars and not more than ten thousand dollars, and to imprisonment not more than
two years.
SEC. 5479. If any person shall falsely make, alter, forge, or counterfeit, or cause or
procure to be falsely made, altered, forged, or counterfeited, or willingly aid or assist
in the false making, altering, forging, or counterfeiting, any bond, bid, proposal,
guarantee, security, official bond, public record, affidavit, or other writing for the purpose
of defrauding the United States, or shall utter or publish as true, or cause to be ut-
tered or published as true, any such false, forged, altered or counterfeited bond, bid,
proposal, guarantee, security, official bond, public record, affidavit, or other writingfor
the purpose of defrauding the United States, knowing the same to be false, forged,
altered, or counterfeited, or shall transmit to, orpresent at, or cause or procure to be trans-
mitted to, orpresented at, the office of any officer of the United States any such false, forged,
altered, or counterfeited bond, bid, proposal, guarantee, security, official bond, public
record, affidavit, or other writing, knowing the same to be false, forged, altered or coun-
terfeited for the purpose of defrauding theUnited States, shall be punishable by a fine
of not more than one thousand dollars, or by imprisonment at hard labor for not more
than ten years, or by both such punishments.
UNITED STATES LAND OFFICES.
ALABAMA: DAK. TER-Cont'd: MICHIGAN: NEBRASKA-Cont'd:Huntsville. Watertown. Detroit. Valentine.Montgomery. Fargo. East Saginaw. McCook.
ARKANSAS: Yankton. Reed City. NEVADA:Little Rock. Bismarck. Marquette. Carson City.Camden. Deadwood. MINNESOTA: Eureka.Harrison. Aberdeen. Taylor's Falls. NEW MEXICO TER.:Dardanelle. Grand Forks. Saint Cloud. Santa F6.ARIZONA TEa.: Huron. Duluth. Las Cruces.Prescott. Creelsburgh. Fergs Falls. OREGON:
Tucson. FLORIDA: Wortb ngton. Oregon City.
CALIFORNIA: Gainesville. Tracy. Roseburg.San Francisco. IDAHO TER.: Benson. Le Grand..Marysville. Boise City. Crookston. Lakeview.Humboldt. Lewiston. Redwood Falls. The Dalles.
Stockton. Oxford. Mississippi: UTAH TER.:Visalia. Hailey. Jackson. Salt Lake City.Sacramento. IOWA: MISSOURI: WASHINGTON TER.:Los Angeles. Des Moines. Boonville. Olympia.Shasta. KANSAS: Ironton. Vancouver.Susanville. Topeka. Springfield. Walla Walla.Bodie. Saline. MONTANA TER.: Spokane Falls.
COLORADO: Independence. Miles City. Yaki ma.I Denver City. Wichita. Helena. WISCONSIX:Leadville. Kirwin. Bozeman. Menasha.Central City. Concordia. NEBRASKA: Falls ofSt.Croix.Pueblo. Lared. Neligh. Wausau.
Del orte. Wa-Keeny. Beatrice. La Crosse.Lake City. Oberlin. Lincoln. Bayfield.Gunnison. Garden City. Niobrara. Eau Claire.
Durango. LOUISIANA: Grand Island. WYOMING TER.:DAKOTA TER.: New Orleans. North Platte. Cheyenne.Mitchell. Natchitoches. Bloomington. Evanston.
NOTE.-By act of July 31, 1876, the land offices in Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois were
abolished; and by act of March 3, 1877, the vacant tracts of public land in Ohio, In-
diana, and Illinois are made subject to entry and location at the General Land Office,
Washington, DC.
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DEPOSIT FOR SUBVEYS.
CIRCULAR.
Commissioner McFarland to surveyors-general, September 5, 1881.
In order to prevent as far as possible the perpetration of frauds and
fraudulent surveys, which have already assumed alarming proportions
under the system of deposits by individuals, it is hereby ordered:
I. The surveyors-general shall exercise the most searching scrutiny
into the statements of applicants for survey, to satisfy themselves ot the
truth thereof, and unless found to be bonafide in every respect they shall
not accept such applications nor furnish the estimates requested.
II. Believing that in a great many instances applications for survey,
particularly in sections of country unfit for settlement, have been pro-
cured or invited at the instance of deputy surveyors seeking contracts,
you are instructed that such proceedings on the part of deputy survey-
ors are unlawful, and that contracts thus unlawfully procured will not
be recognized as valid. The surveyor-general must minutely examine
into all applications for surveys under the deposit system. If he is
satisfied that the deputy has acted in the manner described, the com-
mission of such deputy shall be forthwith revoked, and the surveyor-gen-
eral shall report all the facts, with his findings in the case, to this office.
Upon approval thereof such deputy shall be deemed unfit to exercise
the functions of a deputy surveyor, and the approval of a finding
against a deputy will be communicated by this office to each surveyor-
general for his information and guidance; and any surveyor-general
who shall fail to report such deputy, or who shall employ any deputy
so barred, will be open to charges to be preferred by the Commissioner
of the General Land Office to the Secretary of the Interior.
III. Surveyors-general are required to exercise the utmost care and
vigilance to prevent frauds and irregularities of any kind regarding sur-
veys under the system of deposits by individuals, as also of surveys
made under any other appropriation of moneys by Congress, whether
general or special, and they will report each and every fact that may
come to their knowledge of any attempted fraud, by whomsoever made,
with all obtainable particulars, to this office for consideration and action.
IV. The plates and field-notes of surveys under the system of deposits
by individuals, as returned to this office, do not usually show the settle-
ments and improvements of the settlers at whose instance the surveys
are ostensibly made. In a majority of instances the location of the set-
tler, whether bona fide or otherwise, is entirely omitted, while the im-
provements, if any, are never noted. In order, therefore, to still further
check the abuses and dishonest practices to which this system of sur-
veys has become subject, the attention of surveyors-general and deputy
surveyors is specially directed to the requirements of pages 18 and 19
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of the Manual of Surveys, and pages 43 and 44 of the Instructions of
the Commissioner of the General Land Office, dated May 3, 1881. The
requirements therein contained must be strictly adhered to, and sur-
veyors-general are required and enjoined to see to it that their deputies
comply therewith.
V. Surveyors-general are directed to instruct their deputies that they
must designate in the field-notes and plats of their surveys the location
of each and every settlement within a township surveyed under the
deposit system, whether it be permanent in character or not together
with the names of sach settlers and their improvements, if any. Cattle
corrals are not considered as constituting improvements.
VI. When no settlers are found within a township surveyed under
the system of individual deposits, the field notes of survey must distinctly
and unequivocally state that fact, and any omission so to describe and
designate the settlements and their surrounding improvements, or the
absence of one or both in the field-notes and plat, will be deemed a suffi-
cient cause to infer fraud, and the accounts of the deputy will be sus-
pended until such omission shall have been supplied to both plat and
field-notes. A suspension-of the commission of the deputy will in the
mean time take place, and all the facts will be reported to this office for
consideration and action.
VII. Surveyors-general are directed to make known to their several
deputies the provisions and nature of this order, and will be held
strictly accountable for its faithful execution. Ignorance of the terms
of this order will not be held an excuse for failure to comply therewith
by deputies.
VIII. This order will be observed bv deputies now in the field, and
surveyors-general are directed to so inform them with the least practi-
cable delay.
IX. Surveyors-general are reminded of the important trust confided
to them, and are instructed to exercise their whole -authority to secure
correct and honest surveys and returns by their deputies.
X. This order will take effect from and after the receipt of the same,
and its receipt will be immediately acknowledged by each surveyor-
general. I--
XI. I every case of a contract heretofore approved which the sur-
veyor-general has reason to believe was fraudulently procured, such
contract and the accounts thereunder must be immediately suspended
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FORM OF APPLICATION FOB SURVEYS ON DEPOSIT.
INSTRUCTIONS TO SURVEYORS-GENERALS REGARDING. WITH BLANE
FORMS.
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,
GENERAL LAND OFFICE,
Washington, D. C., January 20, 1882.
To UNITED STATES SURVEYORtS-GENERAL:
Owing to the great diversity in forms of application used in the sev-
eral surveying districts by applicants for surveys under the system of
special deposits, from the date of receipt hereof by you the following
blank formi. will be used exclusively, and the several requirements
therein contained will be insisted upon before furnishing estimates of
moneys to be deposited, as contemplated by sections 2401 and 2402,
Revised Statutes.
Any failure to comply strictly with the foregoing will subject the








To THE UNITED STATES SunvEYoR-GENERAL -:
I, the undersigned settler-upon uusurveyed land, believed to be in township-,
range -, - principal meridian, State or Territory of - , a citizen of
the United States and entitled to enter land under the laws thereof, do hereby apply
for an estimate of the cost of field and office work in the survey of the above-named
township, or so much thereof as can by law be surveyed under the provisions of sec-
tion 2401 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, and in compliance with the
regulations established and prescribed by the Hon. Commissioner of the General
Land Office. And I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I am an actual and bona fide
settler upon said unsurveyed land of the United States, which, as near as I can ascer-
tain, will be township -, range -, - principal meridian; that I make this
application in good faith, and intend to make the deposit required for survey, as pro-
vided in sections 2401,2402,2403, of the Revised Statutes of the United States, and
to perfect the title under the laws to my claim, situated in approximate sec-
tion No. - of the above-named unsurveyed township; that I know the greater
portion of said township is not known to be mineral, but is agricultural (timber or
grazing land), and so far as I know is not reserved by the government.
* Here insert the character of claim, whether pre-emption, homestead, or other.
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And I farther swear (or affirm) that my improvements consist of , and that






STATE OR TERRITORY OF ,
County of -, s:





e, - and , of County, State or Territory of ,
do solemnly swear (or affirm) that we are well acquainted with , who
signed the above application for the survey of township -, range -, principal
meridian, and know the statements therein made to be tree; and further that we are





STATE OR TERRITORY OF ,
County of , ss:
Subscribed by the above-named persons, competent witnesses, and sworn to before




Application of , township -, range -,-P. M.
Settler's application for survey under Sec. 2401, Revised Statutes of the United
States.
Filed - day of -, 18-.




For survey ... ..
Office work and expenses..
Certificates of deposit Nos. -, dated - day of--, 18-.
Included in contract No. - , dated day of , 18-.
U. S. Deputy Surveyor.
'Or other official having a seal.
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BONDS OF UNITED STATES DEPUTY SURVEYORS.
INSTRUCTIONS TO SURVEYORS-GENERAL, Foizm, ETC.
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,
GENERAL LAND OFFICE,
Washington, D. C., June 16, 1882.
United States Surveyor-General,
SIR: Inclosed herewith please find one blank copy of United States
deputy surveyor's bond, six copies of instructions for properly executing
the accompanying bond, and four copies of blank form of affidavit of
sureties, for your information and government in the future when for-
warding bonds of United States deputy surveyors and United States
deputy mineral surveyors for the approval of this office.
The eightli paragraph is not applicable to deputy surveyors' bonds,
inasmuch as section 2230, Uiiited States Revised Statutes, controls, and
your present practice in this respect will continue.
Said section 2230, Revised Statutes, also provides that the sufficiency
of the sureties to the bonds shall be approved and certified by the
proper surveyor-general, and hence the twelyth paragraph will not con-
trol you.
In all other respects said instructions must be carefully complied
with, and any omission or departure therefrom will subject te bonds
to rejection by this office.
Contracts made under bonds heretofore accepted by this office, the
amount of which is largely in excess of contracts already approved, if
otherwise regular, will be approved under such bond.
New bonds will be made out in accordance with the accompanying
instructions and directions.





INSTRUCTIONS REFERRED TO IN ABOVE CIRCULAR FOR PROPERLY EXECUTING THE
ACCOMPANYING BOND.
First. The bond and oath of office must be dated.
Second. There must be not less than two sureties.
Third. The full name of the principal and each of his sureties should be written
in the body of the bond and so signed to the bond. Where principal or surety has
more than one Christian name, the one by which he is generally known will be suf-
ficient. The place of residence of each surety must be designated in the body of the
instrument.
Fourth. There must be a seal of wax or wafer, or other adhesive substance, at-
tached to each signature. The printed word " seal" or a scroll is not sufficient.
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Fifth. The signature of the principal and of each of the sureties must be made in
the presence of two persons, who must sign their names as witnesses, stating their
present residence; and it must appear for whom each witness signs.
Sixth. Each surety must make and sign an affidavit in accordance with the ac-
companying form.
Seventh. It is required that the sureties shall state under oath the nature of the
property which they offer as security, that is, whether real or personal, describing
each class of property specifically as indicated in the form of affidavit inclosed. It
must be made to appear that the property offered is available upon execution or the
bond will be rejected.
Eighth. The several sums in which the sureties justify must aggregate at least
double the penalty of the bond.
Ninth. The acknowledgments and oaths called for may b made before any officer
dnly qualified by the local laws of the place where the bond is executed. An affirm-
ation in judicial form will be accepted instead of an oath.
Tenth. Whenever the officer before whom any of the acknowledgments are made
or oaths taken has an official seal he should use it. There should be a separate and
distinct impression of the official seal for each acknowledgment or oath.
Eleventh. Whenever any acknowledgment is made or oath taken before any offleer
not a clerk of a court of record, the official character and standing of such officer,
whether notary public, justice of the peace, United States commissioner, or other
officer qualified to administer oaths, should be evidenced by the formal certificate of
the clerk of the proper court of record or other competent authority.
Twelfth. The sufficiency of sureties must be certified bythe United States districtjudge or attorney.
Thirteenth. Sureties must not be bonded officers of the United States.
Care should be taken that no erasures or mutilations of any kind be made, and, if
made, all such must be stated and certified before signing.
CORRECTING DUPLICATE PLATS.
INSTRUCTIONS TO SURVEYOr-GENERAL-DIAGRAMS HOW TO BE
M1 ADE, ETC.
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,
GENERA LIAND OLFICE,
Washington, D. C., March 19, 1883.
United States Surveyor-General,
SIR: The practice of correcting the duplicate plats in this office from
authenticated diagrams forwarded by surveyors-general has been dis-
continued, and in future all such diagrams will be attached to the town-
ship plats instead of being transferred thereon as has heretofore been
done.
With a view to convenience in binding the diagrams of amendments
with the plats, I have to direct that all such diagrams which may be
found necessary, including those ordered by this office, be made upon
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RESTORATION OF LOST CORNERS.
SYNOPSIS OF ACTS OF CONGRESS REGULATING SURVEYS.
RULES FOR THE RESTORATION OF LOST AND OBLITERATED CORNERS
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,
:GENERAL LAND OFFICE,
- Washington, D. C., 111arch 13, 1883
The increasing number of letters from county and local surveyors re-
ceived at this office, making inquiry as to the proper method of restor-
ing to their original position lost or obliterated corners marking the
survey of the public lands of the United States, or such as have been
willfully or accidentally moved from their original position, have ren-
dered the preparation of the following general rules necessary, particu-
larly as in a very large number of cases the immediate facts necessary
to a thorough and intelligent understanding are omitted. Moreover,
surveys having been made under the authority of different acts of Con-
gress, different results have been obtained, and no special law has been
enacted by that authority covering and regulating the subject of the
above-named inquiries. Hence the general rules here given must be
considered merely as an expression of the opinion of this office o the
subject, based, however, upon the spirit of the several acts of Congress
authorizing the surveys, as construed by this o ffice. When cases arise
which are not covered by these rales, and the advice of this office is de-
sired, the letter of inquiry should always contain a description of the
particular corner with reference to the township, range, and section of
the public surveys, to enable this office to consult the record.
To restore extinct boundaries of the public lands correctly, the sur-
veyor must have some knowledge of the manner in which townships
were subdivided by the several methods authorized by Congress. With-
out this knowledge he may be greatly embarrassed in the field, and is
liable to make mistakes invalidating his work, and leading eventually
to serious litigation. It is believed that the following synopsis of the
several acts of Congress regulating the surveys of the public lands will
be of service to county surveyors and others, and will help to explain
many of the difficulties encountered by them in the settlement of such
questions.
The differences resulting from Congressional legislation at different
periods resulted in two sets of corners being established on towship
lines at one time; at another time three sets of corners were established
on range lines, while the system now in operation makes but one set of
corners on townshiip boundaries, except on standard lines, i. e., base and
correction lines, and in some exceptional cases.
The following brief explanation of the modes which have been prac-
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ticed will be of service to all who may be called upon to restore oblit-
erated boundaries of the public land surveys:
Where two sets of corners were estab lished on township boundaries
one set was planted at the time the exteriors were run, those on the
north boundary belonging to the sections and quarter sections north of
said line, and those on the west boundary belonging to the sections and
quarter sections west of that line. The other set of corners was estab-
lished when the township. was subdivided. This method, as stated, re-
sulted in the establishment of two sets of corners on all four sides of
the townships.
Where three sets of corners -were established on the range lines, the
subdivisional surveys were made in the above manner, except that the
east and west section lines, instead of being closed upon the corners pre-
viously established on the east boundary of the township, were run due
east from the last interior section corner, and new corners were erected
at the points of intersection with the range line.
The method now in practice requires section lines to be initiated from
the corners on the south boundary of the township, and to close on
existing corners on the east, north, and west boundaries of the town-
ship, except when the north boundary is a base line or standard parallel.
SYNOPSIS OF ACTS OF CONGRESS.
The first enactment in regard to the surveying of the public lands
Ordinance was an ordinance passed by the Congress of the Confed-
the Congress of eration, May 20, 1785, prescribing the mode for the sur-
theonfeMayd vey of the " Western Territory," and which provided that
17 5. L S nd711
~aw5sp: 49. said territory should be divided into townships of six
Edition 1828. miles square, by lines running due north and south, and
others crossing them at right angles" as near as might be.
It further provided that the first line running north and south should
begin on the Ohio River, at a point due north from the western terminus
of a line run as the south boundary of the State of Pennsylvania and the
first line running east and west should begin at the same point and
extend through the whole territory. In these initial surveys only the
exterior lines of the townships were surveyed, but the plats were marked
by subdivisions into sections of one mile square, numbered from 1 to 36,
commencing with No. I in the southeast corner of the township, and
running from south to north in each tier to No. 36 in the northwest
corner of the township; mile corners were established on the township
lines. The region embraced by the surveys under this law forms a part
of the present State of Ohio, and is generally known as " the Seven
Ranges."
The Federal Congress passed a law, approved May 18, 1796, in regard
Act f MaY to surveying the public domain, and applied to " the terri-18, 1796, U. Spbi plid~ enStatutes at tory northwest of the Ohio River, and above the mouth ofLarge, vol. p.
485. Section the Kentucky River."
2395, S. te-
'Vised Statutes,
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Section 2, of said act, provided for dividing sch lands as had not
been already surveyed or disposed of, " by north and south lines run
according to the true meridian, and by others crossing them at right
angles, so as to form townships of 6 miles square," etc. It also pro-
vided that " one-half of said townships, taking them alternately, should
be subdivided into sections containing, as nearly as may be, 640 acres
each, by running parallel lines through the same each way at the end
of every two miles, and marking a corner on each of said lines at the
end of every mile." The act alsoprovided that "sections shall be num-
bered, respectively, beginning with the number one in the northeast sec-
tion, and proceeding west and east alternately through the township,
with progressive numbers till the thirty-sixth be completed." This
method of numbering sections is still in use.
An act amendatory of the foregoing, approved May 10, 1800, re-
quired the " townships west of the Muskingum, which are Actof3uaylO,
directed to be sold in quarter townships, be subdivided uts at Large,
vol. 2, p. 73. Sec-
into half sections of 320 acres each, as nearly as may be, tion 2393, .s
by running parallel lines through the same from east to Revsed Stat-
west, and from north to south, at the distance of one mile from each
other, and marking corners, at the distance of each half mile on the
lines running east and west, and at the distance of each mile on those
running from south to north. And the interior lines of townships in-
tersected by the Muskingum, and of all townships lying east of that
river, which have not been heretofore actually subdivided into sections,
shall also be run and marked. And in all cases where the exterior
lines of the townships thus to be subdivided into sections or half sec-
tions shall exceed, or shall not extend six miles, the excess or deficiency
shall be specially noted, and added to or deducted from the western or
northern ranges of sections or half sections in such township, accord-
ing as the error may be in running the lines from east to west or from
south to north." Said act also provided that the northern and western
tier of sections should be sold as containing only the quantity expressed
on the plats, and all others as containing the complete legal quantity.
The act approved June 1, 1790, " regulating the grants of land appro-
priated for military services," etc., provided for dividing Act of June 1,
1796. U. S. Stat-
the "Virginia Military Tract," in the State of Ohio, into utesattarge vol.
townships 5 miles square, each to be subdivided into '~p4 9 0 .
quarter townships containing 4,000 acres.
Section 6 of the act approved Al arch 1, 1800, amendatory of the fore-
going act, enacted that the Secretary of the Treasury was Act of March 1,
authorized to subdivide the quarter townships into lots of 1800. U. S. Stat-utes at Lage, vol.
100 acres, bounded as nearly as practicable by parallel 2, p. 14
lines 160 perches in length by 100 perches in width. These subdivis-
ions into lots, however, were made upon the plats in the office of the
Secretary of the Treasury, and the actual survey was only made at a
20309-VOL 1-43
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subsequent time when a sufficient number of such lots had been located
to warrant the survey. It thus happened in some instances, that when
the survey came to be made the plat and survey could not be made to
agree, and that fractional lots on plats were entirely crowded out. A
knowledge of this fact may explain some of the difficulties met with in
the district thus subdivided.
The act of Congress approved February 11, 1805, directs the subdi-
ActofFebruary vision of the public lands into quarter quarter sections,
11 1805. iT. S. and provides that all corners marked in the field shall beStatutes at Large,
vol.2,p.31. Sec- established as the proper corners of the sections or quartertion 2396, U.S. Rie-
vised Statutes. sections which they were intended to designate, and that
corners of half and quarter sections not marked shall be placed as
nearly as possible " equidistant from those two corners which stand on
the same line." This act further provides that "the boundary lines
actually run and marked" (in the field) "shall be established as the
proper boundary lines of the sections or subdivisions for which they
were intended; and the length of such lines as returned by the sur-
veyors shall be held and considered as the true length thereof, and the
boundary lines which shall not have been actually run and marked as
aforesaid shall be ascertained by running straight lines from the estab-
lished corners to the opposite corresponding corners, but in those frac-
tional townships where no such opposite or corresponding corners have
been or can be fixed, the said boundary line shall be ascertained by
running from the established corners due north and south, or east and
west, as the case may be, to the external boundary of such fractional
township."
The act of Congress approved April 24, 1820, provides for the sale of
Act of April 24 public lands in half quarter sections, and requiresw that in
u~t~es atU L i every case of the division of a quarter section the line for
2b7,U. S the division thereof shall run north and south, and frac-
Statutes. tional sections, containing 160 acres and upwards, shall in
like manner, as nearly as practicable, be subdivided into half quarter
sections, under such rules and regulations as may be prescribed by the
Secretary of the Treasury; but fractional sections, containingless than
160 acres, shall not be divided."
The act of Congress approved April 24, 1824, provides " that when-
Actof May24, ever, in the opinion of the President of the United States,
1824, U. S. Stat- a departure from the ordinary mode of surveyi land onutsat Large, odnr rem
vol. 4, p- 34 any river, lake, bayou, or water course would promote the
public interest, he may direct the surveyor general in whose district
such land is situated, and where the change is intended to be made,
under rules and regulations as the President may prescribe, to cause the
lands thus situated to be surveyed in tracts of two acres in width,
fronting on any river, bayou, lake. or water course, and running back
the depth of forty acres."
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The act of Congress approved April 5, 1S32, directed the subdivision
of the public lands into quarter quarters; that in every case Act of April
of the division of a half quarter section the dividing line 5. 1832 Ul S.Stttsat
should run east and west, and that fractional sections Largevol 4, p.
should be subdivided, under rules and regulations pre- 2397, U. S. Re-
scribed by the Secretary of the Treasury. Under the latter vised Statutes.
provision the Secretary directed that fractional sections containing
less than 160 acres, or the residuary portion of a fractional section,
after the subdivision into as many quarter quarter sections as it is sus-
ceptible of, may be subdivided into lots, each containing the quantity of
a quarter quarter section as nearly as practicable, by so laying down
the line of subdivision that they shall be 20 chains wide, which dis-
tances are to be marked on the plat of subdivision, as are also the areas
of the quarter quarters and residuary fractions.
These two acts last mentioned provided that the corners and contents
of half quarters and quarter quarter sections should be ascertained as
nearly as possible in the manner and on the principles prescribed in the
act of Congress approved February 11, 1805.
From the foregoing synopsis of Congressional legislation it is evi-
dent-
1st. That the boundaries of the public lands established and returned
by the duly appointed government surveyors, when approved by the
surveyors general and accepted by the government, are unchangeable.
2d. That the original township, section, and quarter section corners
established by the government surveyors must stand as the true cor-
ners which they were intended to represent, whether the corners be in
place or not.
3d. That quarter quarter corners not established by the government
surveyors must be planted equidistant and on line between the quarter
section and section corner.
4th. That all subdivisional lines of a section must be straight lines,
running from the proper corner in one exterior line to its opposite cor-
responding corner in the opposite exterior line.
5th. That in fractional sections where no opposite corresponding cor-
ner has been or can be established, any required subdivision line of
such section must be run from the proper original corner in the boundary
line due east and west, or north and south, as the case may be, to the
water-course, Indian reservation, or other exterior boundary of such
section.
From the foregoing it will be plain that extinct corners of the gov-
ernment surveys must be restored to their original locations, whenever
it is possible to do so; and hence resort should always be first had to
the marks of the survey in the field. The locus of the missing corner
should be first identified on the ground by the aid of the mound, pits
line trees, bearing trees, etc., described in the field notes of the original
survey
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The identification of mounds, pits, and witness trees, or other objects
noted in the field notes of survey, afford the best means of relocating
the missing corner in its original position. If this cannot be done,
clear and unquestioned testimony as to the locality it originally occu-
pied should be taken, if such can be at all obtained. In any event,
whether the locus of the corner be fixed by the one means or the other,
such locus should always be tested and proven by measurements to
known corners. No definite rule can be laid down as to what shall be
sufficient evidence in such cases, and much must be left to the skill,
fidelity, and good judgment of the surveyor in the performance of his
work.
Where retracements of lines have to be made for the purpose of
either testing or relocation of a missing corner, or by direct measure-
ment between known corners intersecting at the point sought to be re-
established, it will almost invariably happen that a difference of meas-
urement is developed between the original measurement, as stated in
the field notes, and the new measurement made for the purpose of re-
establishment or proof. When the differences occur, the surveyor must
in all cases re-establish or prove his corners at intervals proportionate
to those given in the field notes of the original survey. From this rule
there can be no departure, since it is the basis upon which the whole
operation depends for accuracy and truth.
TO RESTORE LOST OR OBLITERATED CORNERS.
1. To restore corners on base and correction lines.-Run a right line be-
tween the nearest existing corners on such line, whether base or correc-
tion line, which corners must, however, be fully identified, and at the
point proportionate to the distance given in the field notes of the origi-
nal survey, establish a new corner. This point should be verified by
measurements to the nearest known corners north or south of the base
or correction line, or both.
Where several corners are missing between the corners to be con-
nected, as directed above, their location will be determined upon the
same principle and in the same manner; that is to say, the original
distance of the entire line between the recognized corners is to the
entire distance remeasured between the same corners as the original
distance of the first, second, third, etc., interval of the original survey
is to the new distance to be laid off for the corresponding new interval.
After having checked each new location by measurement to the nearest
known corners north or south of the line, new corners will be established
permanently, and new bearings and measurements taken to prominent
objects, which should be of as permanent a character as possible, and
the same recorded for future reference.
As has been observed, no existing original corner can be disturbed,
and it will be plain that any excess or deficiency in measurements be-
tween existing corners cannotin any degree affect the distances beyond
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said existing corners, but mast be added or subtracted proportionately
to or from the intervals embraced between the corners which are still
standing.
2. Be-establishment of township corners common to four townships.-
Inasmuch as township lines are sometimes run in a direction not true
north and south, or east and west, a line should first be run connecting
the nearest known corners on the north and south township lines and
a temporary corner established at the proportionate distance. This will
establish the location of the township corner only so far as its relative
position north and south is concerned. The nearest known corners on
the east and west township lines will then be connected in the same
manner, independent of the temporary corner previously set, and the
proportionate point determined in that direction; any difference east or
west of the temporary corner which may be developed by the last opera-
tion, by intersection with the line previously run north and south, will
then be laid off in the direction required from the temporary corner,
and a permanent corner established at such point, marked and witnessed
as in the foregoing case.
3. Re-establishmient of corners common to to townships.-The two near-
est known corners on the township line, the same not being a base or a
correction line, will be connected as in case No. 1, by a right line, and
the missing corner established by proportionate distance as directed in
that case; the location thus found will be checked upon by measure-
ments to nearest known section or quarter section corners north and
south, or east and west, of the township line as the case may be.
4. Re-establishment of closing corners.-ieasure from the quarter see-
tion, section or township corner east or west, as the case may be, to the
next preceding or succeeding corner in the order of original establish-
ment, and reestablish the missing closing corner by proportionate
measurement. The line upon which the closing corner was originally
established should always be remeasured, in order to check upon the
correctness of the new location.
5. Re-establishanent of interior section corners.-This class of corners
should be re-established in the same manner as corners common to four
townships. In such cases, when a number of corners are missing on
all sides of the one sought to be re established, the entire distance must,
of course, be remeasured between the nearest existing recognized cor-
ners both north and south and east and west, in accordance with the
rule laid down, and the new corner re-established by proportionate
measurement. The mere measurement in any one of the required diree-
tions will not suffice, since the direction of the several section lines run-
ning northwards through a township, or running east and west, are only
in the most exceptional cases true prolongations of the alignment of
the section lines initiated on the south boundary of the township; while
the east and west lines running through the township, anl theoretically
supposed to be at right angles with the former, are eldom in that con-
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dition, and the alignment of the closing lines on the east and west
boundaries of the township, in connection with the interior section lines,
even less seldom in accord. Moreover, the alignment of the section
line itself from corner to corner, in point of fact, also very frequently
diverges from a right line, although presumed to be so from the record
contained in the field notes and so designated on the plats, and become
either a broken or a curved line. This fact will be determined, in a
timbered country, by the blazes which may be found upon trees on
either side of the line, and although such blazed line will not strictly
govern as to the absolute direction assumed by such line, it will assist
very materially in determining its approximate direction and should
never be neglected in retracements for the re-establishment of lost cor-
ners of any description. Sight trees described in the field notes, together
with the recorded distances to same, when fully identified, will, it has
been held govern the line itself, even when not in a direct or straight
line between established corners, which line is then necessarily a broken
line by passing through said sight trees. Such trees, when in existence
and properly identified beyond a question of doubt, will very materially
assist in evidencing the correct relocation of a missing corner. It is
greatly to be regretted that the earlier field notes of survey are so very
meager in the notation of the topography found on the original line,
which might in very many instances materially lessen a surveyor's
labors in retracement of lines and reestablishment of the required mniss-
ing corner. In the absence of such sight trees and other evidences re-
garding the line, as in an open country, or where such evidence has been
destroyed by time, the elements, or the progress of improvement, the
line connecting the known corners should be run straight from corner
to corner.
6. Re-establishment of quarter section corners on townshij) boundaries.-
Only one set of quarter section corners are actually marked in the field
on township lines, and they are established at the time when the town-
ship exteriors are run. When double section corners are found, the
quarter section corners are' considered generally as standing midway
between the corners of their respective sections, and when required to
be established or re-established, as the case may be, theyshouldbe gen-
erally so placed; bt great care should be exercised not to mistake the
corners of one section for those of another. After determining the
proper section corners marking the line upon which the missing quarter
section corner is to be re-established, and measuring said line, the miss-
ing quarter section corner will be re-established in accordance with the
requirements of the original field notes of survey by proportionate
measurement between the section corners m arking the line.
Where there are double sets of section corners ontownship and range
lines, and the quarter section corners for sections south of the township
,or east of the range lines are required to be established in the field, the
said quarter section coiners should be so placed as to suit the calcula-
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tion of areas of the quarter sections adjoining the township boundaries
as expressed upon the official township plat, adopting proportionate
measurements when the present measurements of the north and west
boundaries of the section differ from the original measurements.
7. Re-establishment of quarter section corners on section lines closing
upon the north and west fownship boundaries.-This class of corners must
be re-established according to the original measurement at forty chains
from the last interior section corner. If the measurements do not agree
with the original survey, the excess or deficiency must be divided pro-
portionately between the two distances, as expressed in the field notes
of original survey. The section corner started from and the corner
closed upon should be connected by a right line, unless the retracement
should develop the fact that the section line is either a broken or curved
line, as is sometimes the case.
8. Re-establishmnent of interior quarter section corners.-In some of the
older surveys these corners are placed at variable distances, in which
case the field notes of the original survey must be consulted, and the
quarter section corner re-established at proportionate distances between
the corresponding section corners, in accordance therewith. The later
surveys being more uniform and in stricter accordance with law, the
missing quarter section corner must be re established equidistant be-
tween the section corners making the line, according to the field notes
of the original survey. The remarks made under § 5, in relation to sec-
tion lines, apply with full force here also; the caution there given not
to neglect sight trees is equally applicable; since the proper re-estab-
lishment of the quarter section corner may in some instances very
largely depend upon its observance, and avoid one of the many sources
of litigation.
8. Where dotle corners were originally established, one of which is
standing, to re-establish the otler.-It being remembered tat the corners
established when the exterior township lines were run belong to the
sections in the townships north and west of those lines, the surveyor
must first determine beyond a doubt to which sections the existing cor-
ner belongs. This irtay be done by testing the courses and distances to
witness trees of other objects noted in the original field notes of survey,
and by remeasuring distances to known corners. Having determined
to which township the existing corner belongs, the missing corner may
be re-established in line north or south of the existing corner, as the
case may be, at the distance stated in the field notes of the original
survey, by proportionate measurement, and tested by remeasurement
to the opposite corresponding corner of the section to which the miss-
ing section corner belongs. These double corners being generally not
more than a few chains apart, the distance between them can be more
accurately laid off, and it is considered preferable to first establish the
missing corner as above, and check upon the corresponding interior
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corner, than to reverse the proceeding; since the result obtained is
every way more accurate and satisfactory.
9. Where double corners were originally established, and both are miss-
ing, to re-establish, the one established when the township line was run.-
The surveyor will connect the nearest known corners on the township
line, by a right line, being careful to distinguish the section from the
closing corners, and re-establish the missing corner at the point indi-
cated by the field notes of the original survey, by proportionate meas-
urement. The corner thus restored will be common to two sections
either north or west of the township boundary, and the section north
or west, as the case may be, should be carefully retraced; thus check-
ing upon the re established corner, and testing the accuracy of the re-
sult. It cannot be too much impressed upon the surveyor, that any
measurements to objects on line noted in the original Survey are means
of determining and testing the correctness of the operation.
10. Where double corners were originally established, and both are miss-
ing, to re-establish the one established when the township t-as subdivided.-
The corner to be re-established being common to two sections south or
east of the township line, the section line closing on the missing section
corner should be first retraced to an intersection with the township line,
in the manner previously indicated, and a temporary corner established
at the point of intersection. The township line will of course have been
previously carefully retraced in accordance with the requirements of
the original field notes of survey, and marked in such a manner as to be
readily identified when reaching the same with the reti aced section line.
The location of the temporary corner planted at the point of intersec-
tion will then be carefully tested and verified by remeasurements to
noted objects and known corners on the township line, as noted in the
original field notes of survey, and the necessary corrections made in
such relocation. A permanent corner will then be erected at the cor-
rected location on the township line, properly marked and witnessed,
and recorded for future requirements.
11. Where triple corners were originally established o range lines, one
or to of which have become obliterated, to re-establish either of tem.-It
will be borne in mind that only two corners were established as actual
corners of sections, those established on the range line not correspond-
ing with the subdivisional survey east or west of said range line. The
surveyor will, therefore, first proceed to identify the existing corner or
corners, as the case may be, and then re-establish the missing corner or
corners in line north or south, according to the distances stated in the
original field notes of survey in the manner indicated for the re-estab-
lishment of double corners, and testing the accuracy of the result ob-
tained, as hereinbefore directed in other cases. If, however, the dis-
tances between the triple corners are not stated in the original field
notes of survey, as is frequently the case in the returns of older sur-
veys, the range line should be first carefully retraced' and marked in a
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manner sufficiently clear to admit of easy identification upon reaching
same during the subsequent proceedings. The section lines closing
upon the missing corners must then be retraced in accordance with the
original field notes of survey, in the manner previously indicated and di-
rected, and the corners re-established in the manner directed in the case
of double corners. The surveyor cannot be too careful, in the matter of
retracement, in following closely all the recorded indications of the
original line, and nothing, however slight, should be neglected to insure
the correctness of the retracement of the original line; since there is no
other check upon the accuracy of the re-establishment of the missing
corners, unless the entire corresponding section lines are remeasured by
proportional measurement, and the result checked by a recalculation of
the areas as originally returned, which, at best, is but a very poor check,
because the areas expressed up-m many plats of the older surveys are
erroneously stated on the face of the plats, or have been carelessly cal-
culated.
12. Where triple corners were originally established on range lines, all of
which are missing, to re-establish same.-These corners should be re-estab-
lished in accordance with the foregoing directions, commencing with the
corner originally established, when the range line was run, establishing
the same in accordance with previously given directions for restoring
section and quarter section corners; that is to say by remeasuring be-
tween the nearest known corners on said township line, and re-estab-
lishing the same by proportionate measurement. The two remaining
will then be re-established in conformity with the general rules for
re establishment of double corners.
13. Re-establishment of meander corners and meanders.-Before proceed-
ing with the re-establishment of missing meander corners, the surveyor
will carefully rechain at least three of the section lines between known
corners of the township within which the lost corner is to be relocated,
in order to establish the proportionate measurement to be used. This
requirement of preliminary remeasurement of section lines must in no
case be omitted; since it is the only data upon which the fractional sec-
tion line can be remeasured proportionately, the corner marking the
terminus, or the meander corner being missing, and which it is intended
to re-establish. The missing meander corner will be re-established on
the section or township line retraced in its original location, by the pro-
portionate measurement found by the preceding operations, from the
nearest known corner on such township or section line, in accordance
with the requirements of the original field notes of survey. To retrace
the original meander lines, between the meander corners re-established
as above, is generally an operation of much greater difficulty, owing
to the fact that the line connecting the meander corners is, in most
instances, a broken line, and is, moreover, unmarked at each point of
change in direction intermediate between the said meander corners, thus
affording no check upon the work as it progresses through a section-
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The several deflections of line comprising the meanders in any one section
being originally run by compass, their retracement by compass at a late'r
period offers too many opportunities for error; inasmuch as the varia-
tion of the needle, as noted in the original field notes of survey, may
have undergone violent changes by removal of the cause, such as tim-
ber, etc., or increased attractions by exposure of minerals, thus giving
no nieans of correction to be applied in that direction at the time of
retracement. Moreover, the variation of the needle as noted is not to
be implicitly depended upon, since the observations for variation are
in many instances crude and rough, and at best afford but an approxi-
mation in such work. It is, therefore, deemed preferable, where such
variation has been carefully noted in the original field notes of survey,
and the lines have been run with a true meridian throughout, to retrace
the meanders by the angles made by the several successive courses.
For instance, supposing the first; course of a meander in a section to be
initiated from a north and south section line, and the course by compass
to be N. 300 15' E., true meridian, the surveyor will lay off the angle of
300 15' in the direction required; the second course being N. 850 45' E.,
makes an angle with the preceding course of 550 30'; the next course
being S. 230 30' E. makes an angle with the preceding course of 660 30',
and so on through the section. The required distances on each course
being carefully chained, the excess or deficiency of the aggregate dis-
tance should be proportionately distributed on each course between the
meander corners from the data thus found; also any error that may
develop itself in the angles will be proportionately distributed upon the
several angles, and the entire meanders corrected in accordance there-
with. Where no variation has been noted in the original field notes of
survey, the meanders can only be retraced by trial lines, on the courses
and distances originally given, and corrected by proportionate measure-
ment of angle and distance as above. The surveyor will, of course, take
cognizance of any information furnished by the original field notes of
survey, as to objects on each course to which distances may be given or
bearings taken, as well as at the meander stations themselves.
14. Fractional section lines.-County and local surveyors being some-
times called upon to restore fractional section lines closing upon Indian,
military, or other reservations, private grants, etc., such lines should be
restored upon the same principles as directed in the foregoing pages,
and checked whenever possible, upon such corners or monuments as
have been placed to mark such boundary lines.
In some instances corners have been moved from their original posi-
tion, either by accident or design, and county surveyors are called upon
to restore such corners to their original positions, but owing to the ab-
sence of any and all means of identification of such location, are unable
to make the result of their work acceptable to the owners of the lands
affected by such corner. In such cases the advice of this office has
invariably been to the effect that the relocation of such corner must be
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made in accordance with the orders of a court of competent jurisdiction,
the United States having no longer any authority to order any changes
where the lands affected by such corner have been disposed of.
The original evidences of the public land surveys in the following
States, viz: Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin, Iowa, Mis-
souri, Arkansas, Mississippi, Alabama, and Kansas have been turned
over under the provisions of sections 2218, 2219, and 2220, United
States Revised Statutes, to the State authorities, to whom application







UNLEWTFUL INYCLOSURES OF PUBLIC L BNDS.
CIRCULAR.
Commissioner XIfcarland to registers and receivers and special agents,
.April 5, 1883.
You are instructed to circulate the following notice in your district:
NOTICE RELATIVE TO UNLAWFUL INCLOSURES OF PUBLIC LANDS.
In view of the numerous complaints of the unlawful inclosures of
public lands for stock range purposes, and consequent impediment to
settlements, all persons are hereby notified as follows:
The public lands are open to settlement and occupation only under
the public land laws of the United States, and any unauthorized appro-
priation of the same is trespass.
Such trespass is equally offensive to law and morals as if upon pri-
vate property.
The fencing of large bodies of public land beyond that allowed by
law is illegal, and against the right of others who desire to settle or
graze their cattle on the inclosed tracts.
Until settlement is made, there is no ob jectiou to grazing cattle or
cutting hay on government land, provided the lands are left open to all
alike.
Graziers will not be allowed, on any pretext whatever, to fence the
public lands and thus practically withdraw them from the operation of
the settlement laws.
This Department will interpose no objections to the destruction of
these fences by persons who desire to make bonafide settlement on the
inclosed tracts, but are prevented by the fences, or by threats, or violence,
from doing so.
684 DECISIONS RELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS.
The government will take proper proceedings against persons unlaw-
fully inclosing tracts of public land whenever, after this notice, it shall
appear that by such nclosures they prevent settlements on such lands
by others who are entitled to make settlement under the public land




UNLAW FUL ICLOS URES OF PUBLIC LANDS.
CIRCULAR.
Commissioner McFarland to registers and receivers, and special agents,
July 19, 1883.
Your attention is called to Department Circular of April 5, 1883, rel-
ative to unlawful inclosures of public lands, in which the following
paragraphs appear:
"The fencing of large bodies of public land beyond that allowed by
law is illegal, and against the right of others who desire to settle or
graze their cattle on the inclosed tracts.
" Graziers will not be allowed, on any pretext whatever, to fence the
public lands and thus practically withdraw them from the operation of
the settlement laws.
"This Department will interpose no objection to the destruction of
these fences by persons who desire to make onafide settlement on the
inclosed tracts, but are prevented by the fences, or by threats of vio-
lence, from doing so.
"The government will take proper proceedings against persons un-
lawfnlly inclosing tracts of public land whenever, after this notice, it
shall appear that by such inclosures they prevent settlements on such
lands by others who are entitled to make settlement under the public
land laws of the United States."
In order that proper action may be taken to cause the removal of
all such unlawful inclosures as may now exist, or may be hereafter
erected, you are directed to promptly report the number and extent of
all such nclosures now known to you, or which may be brought to
your notice, with the necessary corroborating evidence, so that the
cases may be promptly transmitted to the Department of Justice for
proper action.
This Department has no authority to remove fences or prosecute tres-
passers, and when the cases have been referred to the Department of
Justice for appropriate action the duty of this Department is performed
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MINING CLAIM-ADVERSE PROCEEDINGS.
CIRCULAR.
Commissioner AlcFarland to registers and receivers, May 9, 1882.
Your attention is directed to the provisions of the following act of
Congress, approved April 26, 1882:
AN ACT to amend section twenty-three hundred and twenty-six of the Revised Statutes, in regard to
mineral lands, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and Houmse of Representatives of the United States of America
in Congress assenibled, That the adverse claim required by section twenty-three hun-
dred and twenty-six of the Revised Statutes may be verified by the oath of any duly
authorized agent or attorney-in-fact of the adverse claimant cognizant of the facts
stated; and the adverse claimant, if residing or at the time being beyond the limits
of the district wherein the claim is situated, may make oath to the adverse claim be-
fore the clerk of any court of record of the United States or the State or Territory
where the adverse claimant may then be, or before any notary public of such State
or Territory.
Szc. 2. That applicants for mineral patents, if residing beyond the limits of the
district wherein the claim is situated, may make any oath or affidavit required for
proof of citizenship before the clerk of any court of record, or before any notary pub-
lic of any State or Territory.
1. It will be observed that the act is not retroactive, and hence can-
not affect proceedings had prior to its approval; where citizenship,
however, has not been proven, it may be established as provided by
section 2 of this act.
2. Where an agent or attorney-in-fact verifies the adverse claim, he
must distinctly swear that he is such agent or attorney, and accompany
his affidavit by proof thereof.
3. The agent or attorney-in-fact must make the affidavit in verifica-





2 9 -z /// X SMINING CLAIM-PA TEVT FOR PLACER.
CIRCULAR.
Commissioner Ml cFarland to registers and receivers, and surveyors-general,
September 22, 1882.
The following regulations are promulgated as amendatory of-circular
of October 31, 1881, entitled "United States Mining Laws and Regula-
tions thereunder," and have special reference to applications for patents
to placer claims. They are to be considered in connection with para-
graphs 53 to 60 of regulations contained in said circular:
1. The first care in recognizing an application for patent upon a placer
claim must be exercised in determining the exact classification of the
lands. To this end the clearest evidence of which the case is capable
686 DECISIONS RELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS.
should be presented. If the claim be all placer ground that fact must
be stated in the application and corroborated by accompanying proofs.
If of mixed placers and lodes it should be so set out, with a description of
all known lodes situated within the boundaries of the claim. A specific
declaration, such as is required by section 2333 Rev. Stats., must be
furnished as to each lode intended to be claimed. All other known
lodes are, by the silence of the applicant, excluded by law from all claim
by him, of whatsoever nature, possessory or otherwise.
2. Section 2395, Rev. Stats. (subdivision 7), requires the surveyor to
"note in his field-books the true situation of all mines, salt licks, salt
springs, and mill seats which come to his knowledge"; also "all water
courses over which the lines he runs may pass." It farther requires
him to "note the quality of the lands." These descriptive notes are
required by subdivision 8 to be incorporated in the plat by the surveyor-
general.
3. If these duties have been performed, the surveys will furnish a
reasonable guide to the district officers and to claimants in prosecuting
their applications. But experience has shown that great neglect has
resulted from inattention to the law in this respect, and the regular
plats are of very little value in the matter. It will, therefore, be re-
quired in the future that deputy surveyors shall, at the expense of the
parties, make full examination of all placer claims, and duly note the
facts as specified in the law, stating the quality and composition of the
soil, the kind and amount of timber and other vegetation, the locus and
size of streams, and such other matters as may appear upon the surface
of the claims. This examination should include the character and ex-
tent of all surface and underground workings, whether placer or lode,
for mining purposes.
4. In addition to these data, which the law requires to be shown in
all cases, the deputy should report with reference to the proximity of
centers of trade or residence; also of well-known systems of lode de-
posit or of individual lodes. He should also report as to the use or
adaptability of the claim for placer mining; whether water has been
brought upon it in sufficient quantity to mine the same, or whether it
can be procured for that purpose; and finally, what works or expendi-
tures have been made by the claimant or his grantors for the develop-
ment of the claim, and their situation and location with respect to the
same as applied for.
5. This examination should be reported by the deputy under oat to
the surveyor-general, and duly corroborated; and a copy of the same
should be furnished with the application for patent to the claim, consti-
tuting a part thereof, and included in the oath of the applicant.
6. In case of a proposed claim for lands not yet surveyed, the fore-
going regulations -ill govern the application for survey.
7. In controversies hereafter to be determined respectingthe mineral
vdlue of lands, their value for all purposes, whether agricultural or
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municipal, or as seats for towns, will be considered, without reference
to the decisions heretofore made in particular cases. No decision finally
executed, however, will be reconsidered under this modification.
8. No application by an association of persons for patent to a placer
claim will be allowed to embrace more than one hundred and sixty
acres, nor will any application be entertained that embraces more than
one location.
9. Applications awaiting entry, whether published or not, must be
made to conform to these regulations, both with respect to amount of
ground and examination as to the character of the land. Entries al-
ready made will be suspended for examination by the Commissioner,
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's I ; _ELES OF COAL LA.NDS-RULES A-ArD REGULATIONS.
Z2f ;/444 +/ at CIRCULAR.
3 f$nnissioner llicFar land to registers and rceivers, July 31, 1882.
J- i•feollowing sections of the Revised Statutes provide for the sale
of coal lands of the United States:
TITLE XXXII, CHAPTER SX.-Mieeral lands and mining reo TWeC.
SEC. 2347. Every person above the age of twenty-one years, who is a citizen of the
United States, or who has declared his intention to become such, or Entry of coallands. 3 March.
any association of persons severally qualified as above, shall, upon 1873, .279, a, , v,
application to the register of the proper land office, have the right to 17, p. 607.
enter, by legal subdivisions, any quantity of vacant coal lands of the United States
not otherwise appropriated or reserved by competent authority, not exceeding one
hundred and sixty acres to such individual person, or three hundred and twenty
acres to such association, upon payment to the receiver of not less than ten dollars
per acre for such lands, where the same shall be situated more than fifteen miles
from any completed railroad, and not less than twenty dollars per acre for such lands
as shall be within fifteen miles of such road.
SEC. 2348. Any person or association of persons severally qualified, as above pro-
vided, who have opened and improved, or shall hereafter open and Pre-em ptionof
calds Ibid.improve, any coal mine or mines upon the public lands, and shall be s. 2.
in actual possession of the same, shall be entitled to a preference-right of entry, under
the preceding section, of the mines so opened and improved: Prorided, That when
any association of not less than four persons, severally qualified as above provided,
shall have expended not less than five thousand dollars in working and improving
any such mine or mines, such association may enter not exceeding six hundred and
forty acres, including such mining improvements.
SEC. 2349. All claims under the preceding section must be presented to the register
of the proper land-district within sixty days after the date of actual Pre-empti o nclaims of coalpossession and the commencement of improvements on the land, by land to be pro-
the filing of a declaratory statement therefir; but when the township sented withinsixty days, &e.,
plat is not on file at the date of such improvement, filing must be made bid., s 3.
within sixty days from the receipt of such plat at the district office; and where the
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improvements shall have been made prior to the expiration of three months from the
third day of March, eighteen hundred and seventy-three, sixty days from the expira-
tion of such three months shall be allowed for the filing of a declaratory statement,
and no sale under the provisions of this section shall be allowed until the expiration
of six months from the third day of March, eighteen hundred and seventy-three.
SEC. 2350. The three preceding sections shall be held to authorize only one entry by
Onlyoneentry the same person or association of persons; and no assaciotion of per-
allowed. Ibid.,
s.4. sons, any member of which shall have taken the benefit of such sec-
tions, either as an individual or as a member of any other association, shall enter or
hold any other lands under the provisions thereof; and no member of any association
which shall have taken the benefit of such sections shall enter or hold any other
lands under their provisions; and all persons claiming under section twenty-three
hundred and forty-eight shall be required to prove their respective rights, and pay
for the lands filed upon within one year from the time prescribed for filing their re-
spective claims; and upon failure to file the proper notice, or to pay for the land
within the required period, the same shall be subject to entry by any other qualified
applicant.
SEC. 2351. In case of conflicting claims upon coal lands where the improvements
Confl i c t i n g shall be commenced after the third day of March, eighteen hundred
claim. Ibid., anfpsesonadfloe5. and seventy-three, priority of possession and improvement, followed
by proper filing and continued good faith, shalldeterminethepreference-right to pur-
chase. And also where improvements have already been made prior to the third day
of March, eighteen hundred and seventy-three, division of the land claimed may be
made by legal subdivisions, to include, as near as maybe, the valuable improvements
of the respective parties. The Commissioner of the General Land Office is authorized
to issue all needful rules and regulations for carrying into effect the provisions of this
and the four preceding sections.
SEC. 2352. Nothing in the five preceding sections shall be construed to destroy or
Rights reserved. impair any rights which may have attached prior to the third day of
Ibid., s. . March, eighteen hundred and seventy-three, or to authorize the sale
of lands valuable for mines of gold, silver, or copper.-
RULES AND REGULATIONS.
Under the authority conferred by said section 2351 the following rules
and regulations are issued for carrying into effect the provisions of said
law:
1. Sale of coal lands is provided for-
By ordinary private entry under section 2347.
By granting a preference-right of purchase, based on priority of pos-
session and improvement, under section 2348.
2. The land entered under either section must be by legal subdivisions,
as made by the regular United States survey. Entry is confined to sur-
veyed lands; to such as are vacant, not otherwise appropriated, reserved
by competent authority, or containing valuable minerals other than
coal.
3. Individuals and -associations may purchase. If an individual, he
must be twenty-one years of age, and a citizen of the United States, or
have declared his intention to become such citizen.
4. If an association of persons, each person must be qualified as
above.
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5. A person is not disqualified by the ownership of any quantity -of
other land, nor by having removed from his own land in the same State
or Territory.
6. Any individual may enter by legal subdivisions as aforesaid any
area not exceeding 160 acres.
7. Any association may enter not to exceed 320 acres.
8. Any association of not less than four persons, duly qualified, who
shall have expended not less than $5,000 in working and improving
any coal mine or mines, may enter under section 2348 not exceeding 64
acres, including such mining improvements.
9. One person can have the benefit of one entry or filing only. He is:
disqualified by having made such entry or filing alone, or as a member
of an association. No entry can be allowed an association which has
in it a single person thus disqualified, as the law prohibits the entry or
holding of more than one claim either by an individual or an associa-
tion.
10. Lands that are sufficiently valuable for gold, silver, or copper to,
prevent their entry as agricultural lands cannot be entered as coal-
lands; and you will not allow any entry to be made under the above-
named provisions of law of lands valuable for their deposits of said
minerals.
11. The present rules relative to " hearings to establish the character
of lands," contained in General Land Office regulations of October 31p
1881, issued under the mining laws, will, as far as applicable, govern
your action in determining the character of lands sought to be entered
as coal land.
12. The price per acre is $10 where the land is situated more than
fifteen miles from any completed railroad, and $20 per acre where the
land is within fifteen miles of such road. The price of the land, how-
ever, must be determined by its distance from a completed railroad at
the date of payment and entry irrespective of the preference-right of
entry.
13. When application is made to purchase coal land at the rate of $1(1
per acre, you will in all cases require satisfactory proof that the land
applied for is, at date of entry, situated more than fifteen miles from
any completed railroad. This proof may consist of the affidavit of the
applicant, or that of his duly authorized agent, corroborated by the
affidavit of some disinterested credible party showing personal knowl-
edge of the facts.
14. Where the land lies partly within fifteen miles of such road and in
part outside such limit, the maxitnum price must be paid for all legal
subdivisions, the greater part of which lie within fifteen miles of such
road.
15. The term "completed railroad" is held to mean one which is actu-
ally constructed on the face of the earth; and lands within fifteen miles
2 03 0 9 -VOL 1--44
890 DECISIONS RELATING TO THE PUBIC LANDS.
of any point of a railroad so constructed will be held and disposed of at
$20 per acre.
16. Any duly qualified person or association must be preferred as
purchasers of those public lands on which they have opened and im-
proved, or shall open and improve, any coal mine or mines, and which
they' shall hAve'i~ta al-j~os
17. Possession by agent is recognized as the possession of the prin-
tipal. The clearest proof on the point of agency must, however, be
required in every case, and a clearly-defined possession must be estab-
lished.
18. The opening and improving of a coal mine, in order to confer a
preference-right of purchase, must not be considered as a mere matter
of form; the labor expended and improvements made must be such as
to clearly indicate the good faith of the claimant.
19. These lands are intended to be sold, where there are adverse
claimants therefor, to the party who, by substantial improvements,
actual possession, and a reasonable industry, shows an intention to con-
tinue the development of the mines in preference to those who would
purchase for speculative purposes only. With this view, you will re-
quire such proof of compliance with the law, when lauds are applied
for under section 2348 by adverse claimants, as the circumstances of
each case may justify.
20. In conflicts, where improvements have been or shall hereafter be
ecommenced, priority of possession and improvement shall govern the
award when the law has been filly complied with by each party. A mere
possession, however, without satisfactory improvements, will not secure
the tract to the first occupant when a subsequent claimant shows his
full compliance with the law.
21. After an entry has been allowed to one party, you will make no
investigation concerning it at the instance of any person except on in-
structions from this office. You will, however, receive all affidavits con-
cerning such case and forward the same to this office, accompanied by a
statement of the facts as shown by your records.
22. Prior to entry, it is competent for you to order an investigation,
on sufficient grounds set forth under oath of a party in interest and
substantiated by the affidavits of disinterested and creditable witnesses.
MANNER OF OBTAINING TITLE.
23. When title is sought by private entry the party will himself make
oath to the following application, which must be presented to the reg-
ister:
I, - -, hereby apply, under the provisions of the Revised Statutes of the
United States relating to the sale of coal lands of the United States, to purchase
the quarter of section , in township of range , in the dis-
trict of lands subject to sale at the land office at , and containing -- acres;
and I solemnly swear that no portion of said tract is in the possession of any other
party; that I am twenty-one years of age, a citizen of the United States (or have
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declared my intention to become a citizen of the United States), and have never held
nor purchased lands under said act, either as an individual or as a member of an
association; and I do further swear that I am well acquainted with the character of
said described land, and with each and every legal subdivision thereof, having fre-
quently passed over the same; that my knowledge of said land is such as to enable me
to testify understandingly with regard thereto; that said land contains large deposits
of coal and is chiefly valuable therefor; that there is not to my knowledge within the
limits thereof any vein or lode of quartz or other rock in place bearing gold, silver,
or copper, and that there is not within the limits of said land, to my knowledge, any
valuable deposit of gold, silver, or copper. So help me God.
24. Thereupon the register, if the tract is vacant, will so certify t'
the receiver, stating the price, and the applicant or his duly authorized
agent must then pay the amount of purchase money.
25. The receiver will then issue to the purchaser a duplicate receipt,
an(d at the close of the month the register and receiver will make returns
of the sale to the General Land Office, from whence, when the proceed-
ings are found regular, a patent or complete title will be issued; and on
surrender of the duplicate recoipt such patent will be delivered, it the
option of the patentee, by the (Jommissioner at Washington or by the
register of the district land office.
26. This disposition at private entry will be subject to any valid prior
adverse right which may have attached to te same land, and which is
protected by section 2348.
27. Second. When the application to purchase is based on a priority
of possession, etc., as provided for in section 2348, the claimant must,,
when the township plat is on file in your office, file his declaratory state-
ment for the tract claimed sixty days from and after the first day of his
actual possession and improvement. Sixty days, exclusive of the first
day of possession, etc., must be allowed.
28. The declaratory statement must be substantially as follows, to wit:
I, , do solemnly swear that I am - years of age, and a citizen of
the United States (or have declared my intention to become a citizen of the United
States), that I never have, either as an individual or as a member of an association,
held or purchased any coal lands under the provisions of the Revised Statutes of the
United States relating to the sale of coal lands of the United States, and I do hereby
declare my intention to purchase, under the provisions aforesaid, the quarter
of section , in township - of range , of lands subject to sale at the
district land office at-, and that I came into possession of said tract on the
day of , A. D. 18-, and have ever since remained in actual possession continu-
ously; that I have located and opened a valuable mine of coal thereon; and have
expended in labor and improvements on said mine the sum of dollars, the labor
and improvements being as follows: (here describe the nature and character of the
improvements); and I do furthermore solemnly swear that I am well acquainted with
the character of said described land, and with each and every legal subdivision thereof
having frequently passed over the same; that my knowledge of said land is such as to
enable me to testify understandingly with regard thereto; that there is not, to my
knowledge, within the limits thereof any vein or lode of quartz or other rock in place
bearing gold, silver, or copper, and that there is not within the limits of said land, to
my knowledge, any valuable deposit of gold, silver, or copper. So help me God.
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29. When the township plat is not on file at date of claimant's first
possession the declaratory statement must be filed within sixty days
from the filing of such plat in your office.
30. One year from and after the expiration of the period allowed for
filing the declaratory statement is given within which. to make proof
and payment; but you will allow no party to make final proof and pay-
ment except on notice to all others who appear on your records as
claimants to the same tract.
31. A party who otherwise complies with the law may enter after the
expiration of said year, provided no valid adverse right shall have inter-
vened. He postpones his entry beyond said year at his own risk, and
the government cannot thereafter protect him against another who com-
plies with the law, and the value of his improvements can have no weight
in his favor.
32. Each claimant at the time of actual purchase must make affidavit
as follows:
I, -- , claiming under the provisions of Revised Statutes of the Unite&
States relating to the sale of coal lands of the United States, the right of purchase to.
the - quarter of section , in township of range -, subject to
sale at -, do solemnly swear that I have never had the right of purchase under-
the aforesaid provisions of law either as an individual or as a member of an associ-
ation, and that I have never held any other lands under its provisions; I further
swear that I have expended in developing coal mines on said tract in labor and im-
provements the sum of-- dollars, the nature of such improvements being as fol-
lows: -- ; that I am now in the actual possession of said mines, and.
make the entry for my own use and benefit, and not directly or indirectly for the use
and benefit of any other party; and I do furthermore swear that I am well acquainted
with the character of said described land, and with each and every legal subdivision
thereof, having frequently passed over the same; that my knowledge of said land is
such as to enable me to testify understandingly with regard thereto; that the same is
chiefly valuable for coal; that there is not, to my knowledge, within the limits thereof
any vein or lode of quartz or other rock in place bearing gold, silver, or copper, and
that there is not within the limits of said land, to my knowledge, any valuable de-
posit of gold, silver, or copper. So help me God.
33. The application, declaratory statement, and the affidavit required
at the time of actual purchase-the forms of which are given above under
paragraphs 23,28, and 32-may be sworn to before any officer author-
ized by law to administer oaths, but the authority of such officer must
be properly shown.
34. Any party duly qualified under the law, after swearing to his ap--
plication or declaratory statement, may, by a sufficient power of attor-
ney, duly executed under the laws of the State or Territory in which
such party may then be residing, empower an agent to file with the reg-
ister of the proper land office the application, declaratory statement, or
affidavit required at the time of actual purchase, and also authorize him
to make payment for and entry of the land in the name of such qualified
party; and when such power of attorney shall have been filed in your-
office you will permit such agent to act thereunder as above indicated.
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35. Where a claimant shows by affidavit that he is not personally
acquainted with the character of the land, his duly authorized agent
who possesses such knowledge may make the required affidavit as to
its character; but whether this affidavit is made by principal or agent,
it must be corroborated by the affidavits of two disinterested and cred-
ible witnesses having knowledge of its character.
36. Nothing in these regulations shall be so construed as to prevent
a party from proving his citizenship or age, or establishing the status
of the lands sought to be entered in accordance with ordinary rules of
evidence; and any proof regularly introduced for that purpose that
would be-competent in a court or before a commissioner charged with
the ascertainment of facts may be considered.
g /7. Assignments of the right to purchase will be recognized when
properly executed. Proof and payment must be made, however, within
the prescribed period, which dates from the first day of the possession
of the assignor who initiated the claim.
- 38. The " Rules of Practice in cases before the United States dis-
trict land offices, the General Land Office, and the Department of the
Interior," approved December 20,1880, will, as far as applicable, govern
all cases and proceedings arising under the sections of the Revised
Statues above quoted providing for the sale of coal lands of the United
States.
39. You will report at the close of each month as " sales of coal
lands" all filings aid entries in separate abstracts, commencing with
num ber one, and thereafter proceeding consecutively in the orderof their
reception. Where a series of numbers has already been conmenced by




SUR EY OF MINING CLAIMS.
INSTRUCTIONS.
Commissioner McFarland to U. S. surveyors-general, November 16, 1882.
The regulations of this office require that the plats and field-notes of
surveys of mining claims shall disclose all conflicts between such sur-
veys and prior surveys, giving the areas of conflicts. 
-
The rule has not been properly observed in all cases. Your attention
is invited to the following particulars which should be observed in the,
survey of every mining claim:
1. The exterior boundaries of the claim should be represented on the
p]at of survey and in the field-notes.
2. The intersection of the lines of survey with the lines of conflicting
prior surveys should be noted in the field-notes and represented po}
the plat.
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3. Conflicts with unsurveyed claims, where the applicant for survey
does not claim the area in conflict, should be shown by actual survey.
4. The total area of the claim embraced by the exterior boundaries
should be stated, and also the area in conflict with each intersecting
survey, substantially as follows: Acres.
Total area of claim ................................................ 0.......... l. 5
Area in conflict with survey No. 302 ................. 1. 56
Area in conflict with survey No. 948 .......................... 2.33
Area in conflict with Mountain Maid lode mining claim, unsurveyed ... . 1. 4&
In a number of instances that have come to the attention of this office
the total area in conflict has been given but not the area in conflict with
each intersecting claim. The portion of the plat not in conflict has been
colored and the remainder left uncolored. The language of the field-
notes has been such as to convey the idea that the conflicting areas
were excluded from the claim, whereas such was not the intention. It
does not follow that because mining surveys are required to exhibit all
conflicts with prior surveys the areas of conflict are to be excluded.
The field-notes and plat are made a part of the application for patent,
and care should be taken that the description does not inadvertently
exclude portions intended to be retained. It is better that the applica-
tion for patent should state the portions to be excluded in express
terms. A survey executed as in the example given will enable the
applicant for patent to exclude such conflicts as may seem desirable.
For instance, the conflict with survey No. 302 and with the Mountain
3aid lode claim might be excluded and that with survey No. 948 in-
cluded.
Your attention is also invited to another matter. The practice of
coloring portions of surveys, leaving other portions uncolored, is open
to the same objections that have been stated concerning the field-notes.
In the future no coloring will be used.
PLACER CLAIM-AREA-EXPENDITURE.
INSTRUCTIONS.
Commissioner Mlcarlan d to registers and receivers, and surveyors-general,
December 9, 1882.
By directiou, contained in letter dated the 7th instant, from the hon-
orable Secretary of the lnterior, paragraph No. S of the preceding cir-
cular of September 22, 1882,relating to placer mining claims, has been
amended so as to read as follows:
8. No application by an association of persons for patent to a placer claim will be
allowed to embrace more than 160 acres; and not less than $500 worth of work must
be shown to have been expended upon or for the benefit of each separate location
embraced in such application. If an individual becomes the purchaser and possessor
sf several separate claims of twenty acres each or less, he may be permitted to include
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in his application for patent any number of such claims contiguous to each other, not
exceeding in the aggregate 160 acres; but upon or for the benefit of each original
claim or location so embraced, he or his grantors must have expended the sum of $500'
in improvements.
You are instructed to observe this modification of my said circular of
September 22, 1882.
/2_6 Z7 § 5 J TIMBER TRESPASS-DAMAGES.
INSTRUCTIONS.
Commissioner McFarland to special timber agents, March 1, 1883.
Respecting the measure of damages to which the government is en-
titled in settlement for timber trespass upon the public domain, the
United States supreme court has recently decided that-
1. Wherethe trespasser is a knowing and willful one, the full value of
the property at the time and place of demand, with no deduction for
labor and expense of the defendant, is the proper rule of damages.
2. Where the trespasser is an unintentional or mistaken one, or an
innocent purchaser from such a trespasser, the value of the timber at
the time when first taken by the trespasser, or if it has been converted
into other material, its then value, less what the labor and expense of
the trespasser and his vender have added to its value, is the proper rule
of damages.
3. Where a person or corporation is a purchaser without notice of
wrong from a willful trespasser, the value at the time of purchase should
be the measure of damages.
You will, therefore, in cases where settlement is contemplated, state
the facts and circumstances attending the cutting and the purchase of
the timber in such clear and definite manner that the supreme court
decision above referred to can be readily applied.
In cases where settlement with an innocent purchaser of timber cut
unintentionally through inadvertence or mistake is contemplated, you
are instructed to report as nearly as possible the damage to the govern-






Commissioner McFarland to registers and receivers, and special timber
agents, October 12, 1882.
The rules and regulations heretofore prescribed in relation to the cut-
ting and removing of mesquite growing and being upon any of the
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public lands of the United States-mineral in character-are hereby
modified as follows:
The cutting and removing of mesquite is restricted and confined to
actual settlers and bonafide residents of the State or Territory, who are
citizens of the United States.
The cutting and removal of mesquite from the public lands of the
,United States-said lands being mineral-is permitted for all building,
agricultural, mining and domestic purposes needed in the development
and improvement of the homes or mining interests of such actual set-
tlers, residents, or miners.
It-is further permitted that mesquite may be cut and removed from
the public mineral lands for the purpose of selling the same to any
actual settler or resident of the State or Territory, but only for the uses
.and purposes hereinbefore prescribed.
The cutting and removing of mesquite from any of the public mineral
lands of the United States for export from the State or Territory, or by,
,or for sale to, any railroad company, as an article of fuel or repair is
strictly prohibited, the person or persons so offending being liable to
.civil and criminal prosecution, as provided by Section 3 of the act ap-
proved June 3, 1878, entitled " An act authorizing the citizens of Colo-
;rado, Nevada, and the Territories to fell and remove timber on the public
domain for mining and domestic purposes."
The cutting and removing of mesquite from any of the public lands
~of the United States-non-mineral in character-is strictly prohibited
for any purpose, except the same is to be used in building, fencing, or
,otherwise improving and cultivating the land-or claim from which the
same is cut or removed.
Any person cufting and removing mesquite from non-mineral public
-lands of the United States except for the purposes and uses above
stated, is liable to punishment therefor under Section 2461 Revised
tatutes, both civilly and criminally.
The foregoing is hereby aipproved.
H. M. TELLER,
Secretary.
PROTECTION OF TIMBER ON PUBLIC LAND.
INSTRUCTIONS.
Commissioner McFarland to special timber agents, September 19, 1882.
The fact having been brought to the notice of this Department that
.extensive forest fires from time to time, in different sections of the coun-
try, are destroying vast amounts of timber upon the public lands, and
-no means have heretofore been provided by the government for the
purpose of checking or preventing the same and preserving the public
timber from such destruction, you are hereby informed that it will here-
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after be a part of the duty of the special timber agents of the General
Land Office to protect and preserve the public timber from this kind of
waste and destruction, as well as from destruction by the woodsman, or
from any other source.
You are, therefore, hereby instructed to keep yourself fully informed
as to the condition of the timber upon the public land in your district,
and to use your best endeavors to protect it from waste and destruction
ftom any and all sources; and to this end-where there are State or
Territorial laws for the preservation of timber-you are authorized and
directed to co-operate with the State or Territorial authorities and to
aid and assist them in enforcing said laws.
Should you at any time receive information of any forest fire being
in progress in your district, you will at once proceed to the locality of
the same and use all possible means to check its progress and to ex-
tinguish it.
Should it be necessary to employ assistance in such a case, and the
emergency be such that it would be impossible to inform this.offlce of
that fact and to receive special instructions, you are hereby authorized
to expend a reasonable sum for such purpose, but you will at once in-
form this office, by telegraph, of the number of persons so employed and
the total probable expense.
One of the most dangerous elements to contend with in case of forest
fires, and one of the principal auxiliaries to the spread of the same, is
the dry tops of trees which parties leave upon the ground after having
cut and removed the timber for saw logs and other purposes. When
the tree-tops can be profitably cut into wood, the person cutting such
trees on public land-when such cutting is authorized by law-must
cut the tops into wood, or at least cut up and pile the brush in such
manner as to prevent the spread of fires.
A failure on the part of woodsmen to utilize all of the tree that can
profitably be used, and to take reasonable precaution to prevent the
spread of fires, will be regarded at this office as a wanton waste, and






T IMBER TRESPASS-A CT OF JUNVE 3, 1878.
CIRCULAR.
Commi ssioner MifcFarland to registers and receivers, and special timber
agents, June 30, 1882.
The rules and regulations heretofore prescribed by this Department
under act of Congress approved Jane 3, 1878, entitled " An act author-
izing the citizens of Colorado, Nevada, and the Territories to fell and
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remove timber from the public domain for mining and domestic pur-
poses," are hereby modified as follows:
All citizens and bona fide residents of the States and Territories men-
tioned therein are authorized to fell and remove, or employ others to fell
and remove, or to purchase from others who fell and. remove, any timber
growing or being upon the public mineral lands in said States or Terri-
tories: Provided.
1. That the same is not for export from the State or Territory where
cut.
2. That no timber less than eight (8) inches in diameter is cut or
removed.
3. That it is not wantonly wasted'or destroyed.
The above regulations apply also to right-of-way railroad companies
procuring timber for construction purposes from the public lands under
the act of March 3, 1875.
Every right-of-way railroad company, however, obtaining public tim-
ber under said act, whether from lands mineral or non-mineral in char-
acter, must in addition observe the following regulations:
1. The company must appoint some one or more persons as its agent
or agents for the procurement of such material; such appointment must
be in writing; a copy of the same must be filed in this office,* and suc
person or persons so appointed must be borne upon the pay-rolls as
employed by the company, in order to be regarded by this office as the
agent or agents of the company.
2.-In-the procurement of- timber -or other-material-for 'construction,
each and every person employed by or under said company or its agents,
must also be borne upon the monthly pay-rolls of the company, and be
paid as other regular employes of the company.
3. No public timber is permitted to be taken or used in the repair or
improvement of such road after the original construction of the same.
4. No public timber is permitted to be taken and used as fuel by any
railroad.
As the rules and regulations in relation to the cutting and removing
of timber from the public mineral lands are modified, as hereinbefore
stated, all agents and officers of this Department are hereby instructed
that in reporting cases of alleged trespass they will be governed in
their report upon the mineral or non-mineral character of the land by
the following general rule:
Where the lands are situated in districts of country that are mount-
ainous, interspersed with gulches and narrow valleys, and minerals are
known to exist at different points therein, such lands, in the absence of
proof to the contrary, will be held to be mineral in character; but where
there are extensive valleys, plains or mountain ranges, and no known
minerals exist, the land may be considered and treated as non-mineral.
The requirements-specified in paragraphs numbered 1 and 2 are modified by para-
graph numbered 5, of circular instructions issued by the General Land Office, March
3, and approved by the Secretary of the Interior, March 5, 1883.
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Said ageuts and officers are further instructed that hereafter, in for-
warding reports in eases of timber trespass, a simple statement to the
effect that the lands in question are mineral or non-mineral in character
will not be regarded by thi~floffice as sufficient. proof; evidence estab-
lishing that fact, must in all cases accompany and form a part of said
report.
In investigating cases of timber trespass in mineral districts said
agents and officers will be careful hereafter to report only those cases
in which there has been a violation of the rules and regulations above
specified.
All rules and regulations heretofore prescribed by this Department
in cases of timber trespass upon public lands non-mineral in character,
remain in force.
All rules and regulations or instructions heretofore prescribed under
said act of June 3, 1873, by this department, inconsistent with the pro-






Commissioner 1MceFarland to registers and receivers, and special timber
agents m~i!V-32a 1883;
The first section of the act of Congress, approved March 3, 1875 (18
Stat., p. 482), granting to railroads the right of way through the public
lands of the United States, provides that any railroad company organ-
ized as therein described shall have " the right to take from the public
lands adjacent to the line of said road, material, earth, stone, and tim-
ber necessary for the construction of said railroad."
In determining the rights of railroad companies under the foregoing
provision you will be governed by the following instructions:
1. Said provision refers exclusively to contemplated or unconstructed
roads. Companies have no right to take timber or other material under
this act for repairs, fuel, or for the further improvement of roads already
constructed.
2. The right granted to any railroad company under this act to take
timber or other material from the public lands " adjacent to the line
of said road" for construction purposes is construed to mean that, in
procuring timber or other material for the purposes indicated in the
act, the same must be obtained from the public lands in the neighbor-
hood of the line of road being constructed, and within the terminal
points of such road,-if possible. If, however, it should befound that
the material required in the construction of such road cannot be pro-
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cured from the public lands in "the neighborhood of, and within the ter-
minal limits of, such road, then it is permitted that such company may
obtain the material required outside the terminal limits of the road under
construction; such material, however, to be taken from such points as
are most accessible and nearest to the terminal limits thereof.
3. All duly organized railroad companies under this act, upon the
filing acceptance of properly authenticated copy of their articles of in.
corporation and organization, and map of definite line of location, are
entitled (as provided in paragraph numbered 2 of this circular) to take
timber from any of the public lands not otherwise reserved or previously
occupied according to law, whether the same be mineral or non-mineral
in character.
4. In the procurement of timber or other material for construction
purposes, such company must, before causing the cutting or removal
thereof, appoint in writing one or more persons as their duly authorized
agent, or agents, for that purpose. Copies of all such appointments
must be filed in this office for its information, in order that such com-
pany may be held responsible for any violation of the rules and regula-
tions, as herein prescribed, in relation to the cutting or removal of tim-
ber or other material from the public lands by such agent, or those em-
ployed by, or under him.
5. Alt such duly appointed agents have authority to employ others to
procure from such public lands and deliver to them, for the use of such
company, all material required f r the purposes specified in the act. It
is immaterial whether such persons are eployed by the day or by the
piece; but no authority can be given by such railroad company to the
general public to cut-tim.ber .froufithe public lands.
6. No railroad company organized according to the provisions of this
act is entitled to procure, or cause to be procured, either by itself or
through any of its agents, any timber or other material from the public
lands for sale or other disposal either to other companies or to the gen-
eral public.
7. The right to take timber from the public lands by such railroad
company, or its agents, is confined to such timber or other material as
is actually necessary in original construction of same, and ceases when
such road is open to the public for general use.
8. In the procurement of such timber from the public lands, none
less than eight inches in diameter is permitted to be cut or removed;
no waste or destruction of timber is allowable, and the tops and laps of
all trees must be cut and piled in order that the spread of forest fires
may be checked thereby.
All rules and regulations or instructions heretofore prescribed under
said act of March 3, 1875, by this Department, inconsistent with the
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TIMBER TRESPASS-HOMESTEAD AND PRE-EMPTION.
INSTRUCTIONS.
Commissioner McFarland to Special Agent Prosser, October 24, 1881.
Yours of September 5, at hand and contents noted. rom what you:
say in relation to the numerous saw mills in the section of country
drained by the Palouse, Touchet, and Spokane Rivers, and the amount
of timber driven from Idaho to the mills i Washington Territory, it is
presumable that the public timber lands are being extensively depre-
dated upon, not only by the mill men but by pretended homestead and
pre-emption claimants, who file on timber lands for the sole purpose of
removing the timber and abandoning their entry thereafter.
In relation to the Oregon Improvement Company (a State organiza-
tion) and the mill men obtaining control of large quantities of timber
land under the act of June 3, 1878, it would be well for you to make
inquiries as to how it was done, as the said act provides that no person or
association of persons shall be entitled to purchase more than 160 acres.
If larger quantities have been obtained, fraud would seem to be mani-
fest.
As a timber agent you, of course, are not expected to look up fraud-
ulent land entries, but in connection with your duties you may at times:
be able to obtain information on the matters above referred to, which,
hereafter, may be of service to this office in detecting frauds.
While it is desirable that the legitimate occupation of lumbering
should not be interfered with, yet it is proper to see that the timber
upon the public lands is protected and saved from wanton waste and,
destruction, by all the means lawfully atyour command, and that par-
ties engaged in the business of lumberinr are not pursuing their occu-
pation in an unlawful manner. P *
Your position in regard to the liability of Messrs. Cannon and War-
ner (or any others in the same business) is correct. They cannot be
permitted to purchase logs or timber coming from public lands of irre-
sponsible parties, and escape their full share or even the entire respon-
sibility for the trespass. They are as liable criminally and civilly as.
the original depredator, and will be proceeded against.
In relation to the school lands, or sections sixteen and thirty-six, it
matters not if surveyed or not, so far as the act of cutting and remov-
ing the timber therefrom; it is an unlawful act and the person so dep-
redating is a trespasser and must be dealt with accordingly. The title
to this class of lands remains in the government until it is passed to
the State. You will report all cases of trespass on said lands for pros-
ecution.
02 DECISIONS RELATIN6 TO THE PUBLIC LANDS.
RESERVATIONS.
MEMORANDUM OF DIFFERENT PROVISIONS BEARING UPON THE
SUBJECT OF RESERVATIONS BY TE PRESIDENT.
1st. The Executive poer is expresgly vested in the President by
the first section of the second article of the Constitution of the United
States.
2d. By the fourth section of the act of Congress approved April 24,
1820, vol. 3, page 567, making further provision for the sale of the
public lands, that is known as the law establishing the cash land
system, authority is conferred on the President for offering the public
lands for sale by proclamation "at such time or times as the President
shall by his proclamation designate for the purpose," etc.
3d. Under this delegation of authority, proclamations from time to
time have been issued and sales held, and in those proclamations terms
were ijxserted_ to-the effeet-.".lands al)propriated-bylaw for. the use of
schools, military, or other purposes be excluded. from, sale." These laws
have in practice been regarded as designed to exclude all interests that
had an inception tnder law or pursuant to law and as excluding from
such sales reservations for military, naval, or other public uses.
4th. In the pre-emption law of 29th May, 1830, vol. 4, page 421, there
is the following-clause:
Nor shall the right of pre-emption, contemplated by this act, extend
to any laud which is reserved from sale by act of Congress, or by order
of the President, or which may have been appropriated for any purpose
whatsoever.
Here is an express exclusion used of the highest grade of interest
under the law, from interference with lands reserved "by order of the
President."
5th. By the tenth section the act of 4th September, 1841, voL 5, page
456, the acquirement of pre-emption nder that general and Pemanent
prospective pre-emption is expressly excluded from "lands included
in any reservation by any treaty, law, or proclamation of the President
,of the United States or reserved for salines or other purposes."
6th. By the act of Congress approved March 3, 1853, vol. 10, page
.246, it is declared that all public lands in California shall be subject to
pre-emption, and to be offered at public sale with certain specified ex-
ceptious and with the general exception, viz, " reserved by competent
authority." The stipulations in the aforesaid acts of 1830 and 1841 ex-
pressly indicate that that competent authority is by the President.
7th. Then in the twelfth section of said act of 3d March, 1853, there
are excluded from disposal certain lands, viz, mineral, " or lands reserved
for any public purpose whatsoever," vol. 10, page 248.
8th. By the act of 3d March, 1863, vol. 12, page 754, it is made the
duty of the President to reserve town sites from the public lands, either
surveyed or unsurveyed town sites on the shores of harbors, at the
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juncture of rivers, important portages, or any natural or productive
centers of population.
9th. Then there is the act of March 1, 1817, vol. 3, page 347, confer-
ring authority on the Secretary of the Navy, under the direction of the
President of the United States, to reserve live oak and red cedar lands,
with peftattyrffr cutting and-deE troyinfg trees
March 2,1831, another act was passed extending the interdict against
spoliation.
The supreme court in the case of United States v. Briggs, 9 Howard,
considered this statute as authorizing the protection of all timber on
public lands, and punished for trespass.
That the power resides in the Executive from an early period in the
history of the country to make reservations has never been denied either
legislatively or judicially, but on the contrary has been recognized. It
constitutes in fact a part of the land office law, exists ex necessitate rei,
as indispensable to tfie public weal, and in that light, by different laws
enacted as herein indicated, has-beenreferredtoas- an existng-undis-
puted power too well settled ever to be disputed.
'PRO VISIONS OF LAW.
IN REFERENCE TO TE AUTHORITY OF TE PRESIDENT TO MAKE
RESERVATIONS OF THE PUBLIC LANDS.
April 12, 1792.-Fort Washington for the accommodation of a garri-
son at the fort. Vol. 1, p. 252.
March 26, 1804, Sec. 6.-Salt Springs in Indiana Territory, with con.
tiguous sections. Vol. 2, p. 280.
April 21, 1806, Sec. 11.-Public lands in the W. Territory of Orleans,
may reserve from sale for schools, seminary, salt spring. U. S. Laws
vol. 2, p. 394.
March 31, 1807, Sec. 5.-Lead inines-in Indiana Territory, which were
excepted in the President's proclamation of November 19, 1807, for the
sale of public lands in Indiana Territory. U. S. Laws, vol. 2, p. 449.
February 10, 1811, Sec. 10.-In Territory of Louisiana, school, semi-
nary, salt springs, lead mines. Vol. 2, p. 621.
MAarch 3, 1811, Sec. 10.-In Territory of Louisiana, schools, seminary,
salt springs, lead mines. Vol. 2, p. 665.
March 3, 1815, Sec. 5.-Part land south of the State Tennessee, for
sale, except reservations for schools, etc. Vol. 3, p. 229.
March 5, 1816, Sec. 1.-In Indiana Territory, salt springs, lead mines,
school sections. Vol. 3, p. 257.
May 29, 1830, Sec. 4.-No pre-emption attaches to any land which is
reserved from sale by act of Congress or by order of the President, or
which may have been appropriated for any purpose whatever. Vol. 4,
p. 421.
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June 28, 1832, Sec. 1.-Lots and building in Saint Augustine and Pen-
sacola for public purposes. Vol. 4, p. 550. i
June 26, 1834,. Sec. 4.-Sale of public lands in Illinois, Missouri, and
Wisconsini except school and such other reservations as the President
shall retain for military posts, any law of Congress heretofore existing
to the contrary notwithstanding. Vol. 4, p. 687.
March 3, 1863, vol. 12, p. 754.-Town sites on the shores of harbors,
at the junction of rivers, important portages, or any natural prospective
centers of population.
March 3, 1863, vol. 12, p. 819.-"-Reservation for Indians.
April 8 1864, vol. 13, p. 39.-Indian reservation in California.
October 21, 1869, vol. 18, p. 689.-President may reserve military posts
and set aside permanent reservations.
(See (Grisar v. McDowell, 6 Wallace Reports, p. 31, relative to rights




See Relinquishsuent. Execution of mortgage by pre-emptor
Mere non-user does not necessarily consti- prior to entry, to secure purchase price of
tute ........... 114 land is not ........----- 409
Of land by pre-emptor pending contest The execution of a warranty deed, by pre-
defeats his claim ----------- 404 emptor prior to entry, is a legal biar thereto,
Of claim by husband is abandonment by but does not vitiate the pre-emption right,
wife . 401 hence the entry may be admitted on recon-
veyance by the grantee .............. 407, 453
Accounts. Of inconsiderable quantity of land with-
out fraudulent intent, not regarded under
See Fee8. Sec. 2262, R. S-...............453
Payment of public funds should be made Of land, after final entry, but before
to the receiver ----------------------------- 524 patent, not prohibited ................. 493
Claims for unauthorized expenditures not
allowed -11 537 Aniendment.
Expenditure in excess ofappropriation not See Application, Entry. Practice.
authorized----------------- 537
Section 3683, R. S., construed to include Appeal.
clerk hire, rent, &c., for local offices ........ 537 See Practce.
Deficiency in salaries, &c., not chargeable
to fund arising from sale of Indian lands... 520 Application.
See Contest.
Accretions. Should be noted of record ............... 81
See Public Land. Cannot be acted upon during vacancy in
the office of receiver 150
Affidavit. All presented at opening of new land of-
See Application. fice treated as simultaneous ................ 157The rule to be observed in case of simul-
Preliminary, in timber-culture entry may taneous, under the timber culture law-...157
be received though executed while the land To enter accompanied by relinquishment
was covered by a prior entry .............. 121 of former entry 121
Date of filing should be considered in con- A companied by relinquishment takes the
nection with date of execution ......... .... 12I land on cancellation of the former entry ... 155
Preliminary, in timber-culture entry, in- Intervening adverse claim cuts off right
valid if sworn to before the township pslat to amend defective ... ........... 164
is filed ...................................... 157 And affidavit therewith considered as one
Made as the basis of an entry while the paper in timber culture entry 157
land is under appropriation cannot be re- Failure to make written, held without
ceived ................... 164 prejudice, on account of erroneous advice of
On final proof, not required to bear even the local officers-............................ 151
date with entry when made before clerk of
court. . 482 Attorney.
Reasonable time for transmission allowed On appearancenotrequired to produce au-
when executed on final proof before clerk of thrt...................48
court .. 483................................. 480
Certificate.
Alien. Of deposit to secure survey receivable
Right of election as to citizenship only in payment for any public land entered un-
conferred upon Mexicans by the treaty of der the homestead or pre-emption law 522
1848 ............. ................. 489 Of deposit for surveyreturnedifthe entry




Cerlification, Of divorced wife againstformer husband's
See Patent. claim for abandonment permissible . . 89
Certiorari. HOMESTEAD.
Application for must set forth specifically Homestead entry not the proper subject
antecedent proceedings ................. 565, 628 of, seven years after date of entry .......... 112
Does not lie as a matter of right, but of PRE-EMPTION.
Executive discretion . .. . 565 Not allowed against a filing by a stranger
Assignment of errors not required on ap- to the record ............................ 435,446
plication for .......-......-... ....... .. 565 Against pre-emption filing prior to the
Application should raise reasonable pre- offer of final proof premature ........... . 46D
sumption of error or oversight requiring Local office may not direct, as between
correction ..............-.-. 569 pre-emptor and timber-culture claimant.. . 481
Does not lie to correct errors arising from TIMBER CLTURE
negligence of parties ...................... 570
The origin of, in the requirement that on Forms for use in beginning ............... 653
denial of right of appeal the case shall be Rules governinghomestead,are applicable
forwarded to the Department . - . 628 in timber culture ............-. 132
Supervisory authority not exercised with- Will not lie unless initiated before the de-
in established rules except upon grounds fault is cured- .................... 142,146
appealing to Executive discretion .......... 628 Right of, not limited to one person or one
contest, iftheprior suit has been disposed of. 132Circulars and Instructions. Allegations of non-compliance must be
See tables on page xv. established to warrant cancellation-. 129,153
Also table of Circulars and Instructions No authority for, in the absence of appli-
cited, modified, and revoked, page xvi. cation to enter ... 152,160, 626
Section 3, act of June 14, 1878, not in con-
Citizenship. flict with section 2, act of May 14, 1880. A
contestant under the later law is defined bySee Alien, Nlaturaization. theearlier ...... - ...... 160, 626
Coal Land. Second allowed, where first was dismissed
under the rule in Bundy's case, with permis-Price of dependent upon its distance from sion to use on stipulation evidence already
a completed railroad at date of entry, irre- taken ..........-..... ... ...... 160
spective of the preferred right of entry . .. 540 Circular of December 20, 1882, issued on
And iron lands in Alabama, circular of the Bandy-Livingston ruling ...... 651
April 9, 1883 .-.......... 655 Circular issued under Bartlett-Dudley de-
Sale of, circular of July 31, 1882 - 7.... 687 cision February 13, 1883 .... -........ 652
Commissioner of the General Contestant.
Land Offlice. See Entry.
See Land Department. Right of first, recognized by the act of
May 14,1880 ........ 76Commutation. Cannot transfer right of contest ...... .... 76
See Final Proof, Homestead. As defined by the act of June 14, 1878.... 160
Contest. PREFERENCE RIGHT.
See Contestant, Practice. Rests upon the establishment of allega-
tions . . -... 103GENERALLY. Acquired by successful contestant, can-
The Government a party in interest .-. 76 not be assigned ...........-....... .42,76, 486
But one allowed at a time . 36 Section 2, act of May 14, 1880, construed
Second not allowed till final determina- with the act of March 3, 1879 . 93
tion of first .-........... . ..... 132,155 Right of successful, does not operate to
No rights acquired by second, if the prior reserve the land during the period allowed
pending suit results in cancellation ........ 42 for the exercise of such right . 162, 486
Withdrawal of, at or before hearing, Without the right of contest under the
treated as a default, and a bar to second con- timber-culture law there can be no prefer-
test by the same party, on the same ground. 163 ence right acquired . - .... 626
Proof in, should be confined to the allega- Should not be deprived of the results of
tions .-............. 113 his contest unless there are controlling rea-
Oppression under color of, not permitted. 163 sons why the entry should not be canceled 77
Should not be allowed where the corrob- Is not accorded for successful contest
orating witness swears to the facts set forth againt timber-culture entry for illegality 421
as true "to the best of his information Awarded without respect to the allega-
and observation' ............................ 140 tions on which the contest was initiated ... 145
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Continuance. Claim maybe relinquished and taken by
See Practice. the donee either as a homestead or pre-emp.tin- .........---------- 283
Costs. The occupancy and improvements of
See Fees. claimant, though not of such character as to
entitle him to the land under the donation
Cultivation. law, may be protected under the homestead
See Residence. or pre-emption law .284
Deposition. Entry.
See Evidence. See Final Proof.
Desert Land. GENERALLY.
See Entry. Manner of making, under homestead, pre-
Is not reclaimed unless water in suffi- emption, and timber-culture laws, general
eient quantity for cultivation is carried circular of March 20, 1883 -. 56
upon the land ......... . 26 Of record and prima facie valid, reserves
Title to water used for reclamation must the land covered thereby from the opera-
be by bona fide prior appropriation 6 2 tion of any subsequent law, grant, or sale.. 362
The word "reclaim" considered and de- Effect of, relates back to theproper initial
fined- 26 steps -.. 461
Reclamation shown by crops actually Is notice of the land claimed, and pos-
raised .. 2............8......... 6 session must be limited thereby as against
subsequent settlers ..... ........ 457
Donation. Accorded to first legal applicant, subject
See Residence. to the adverse right of a successful con-
Provided to secure permanent settlemen testant ---------------------------------- 162,486
Pod scurationofte pemnt settlement.. Purchaser of, prier to patent not entitled
alin opa ation oftheoutry - 279segreg to be heard in proceedings against the en-Fling notification o)perates to segregate try-0the land ................................... i 303 ent of not granted.. theab-
Patent to but one claim can issue to any senmfgo fait-455
'peron  hs on rg t................292 sence of good faith ................ .. ... 455person In his own right . 292 A mendment not granted in the absence of
Under the New Mexican act selections Ath
were required to be made prior to January diligence. ....occurring......... .457
1,1858 .. 279, 284 Defect in, occurring through ignorance,
Where no certificate has issued the claim may be cured . - - - -- - - 46
cannot be docketed in the General Land DESERT LAND.
Office. .............- 284 Restricted to 640 acres for any one person . 28
Rights of bonaide settlers, who failed in Not assignable ........... 28
the matter of filing notification, protected
by the act of 1864. 305 HOMESTEAD.
On the death of claimant certificateshould Constitutes a segregation of the land
issue in the name of the heirs at law ... 291, 304 from the public domain .............. 30, 362, 449
On the death of the settler a new grant is In conflict with previously acquired
made by the statute to the heirs at law, in- rights is voidable -.. 449
eluding the widow, if there is one; and Not allowed under section 3, act of May
proof of compliance with the law up to the 14,1880, until the record is cleared of ad-
time of his death is sufficient .------------- 293 verse claims ........ 9.... .................. 449
There is no authority for partitioning the Made under section 2293 Revised Statutes
land among the douees in the event of the without the required settlement and im-
claimant's death ........................... 293 provement ratified by the subsequent en-
If the husband could not have become a actment of section 2308 Revised Statutes . - 362
resident before December 1, 1850, or any Right to make second, recognized on re-
time thereafter, no right was conferred upon linquishment of the first, which was illegal
the widow by section 8 of the act of 1853 - 296 because of conflict ......................... 45
Under the Oregon act title does not vest Second, allowed where the land covered
in the settler until all the conditions are by the first was not cultivable . 56
fullyperformed ..........-....... .......... 279 Second, allowed in case of lack of water
Patent cannot issue for land within the for domestic purposes and cultivation . 54
formal claim of another, though such action Deserted wife may make 59
is sought as the result of an agreement be- Deserted wife as the head of a family en-
tween the parties .... ........ 294 titled to commute ....................... 59
Amendment of claim, on completion of Joint entry not allowed in case of con-
residence, to include other land, not permit- flicting homestead settlements prior to sur
ted. 303 vey . 414
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PRE-EMPTIONg. Local office must not exclude ............. 106
Jointentryonlyallowedwherethebound- In taking depositions ten days allowed
ary of the prior location excludes a portion for filing cross-interrogatories ... ......... 106
of a legal subdivision ........... ........... 414 Taken by deposition on due application-- 132
TIMBER CULTURE. Fees.
Is an appropriation of the land .......... 152 See Accounts.
Restricted to sections devoid of timber 154 See f ctir
Made on land containing cottonwood Allowed for acting on mineral applica-
trees, when such trees were held not to be cation-517
timber trees, is legal - .... ...... .. .......... 165 For writing done in making proof on min-
Married woman cannot make ........... 127 Foreral app icat ion 517, 518
The marriage of a single woman subse- For exa.iningtestimony, frnishingtran-
quent to application, but prior to action scripts, &c 517
thereon, does not invalidate None allowed for correspondnce................ 1
Not affected by acts of entryman in pro- Fee bill to be kept posted in a conspicuous
curing another, to be fraudulently made in place in the local office .......... .......... 518
the nane of his wife ....................... 135 Local officers not entitled to, when testi-
Amendment allowed to correspond with mony in contest is taken elsewhere - 519
occupancy and improvement 159 Belonging to the register should be paid
Second, not allowed ------------------- 1.25 to the receiver ........................... 524
Circular of February 1 882with blank Or commissions not allowed for additional
CirculaofFerar, 882, wientries made under the act of March ,
forms-618 1879 525
For State selections must be paid before
Equitable Adjudication, approval and posting 517
Adverse claim bars action of the Board . . 78
A contestant's preference right is in the Filig.
nature of an adverse claim ................. 78 See Final Proof, Settlemoent.
The power of the Board to confirmiaay be
exercised at any time after the defect if the Is public notice of claim -of-a vali..clai 405
case is in condition for the issue of patent Is ri e fac evidence of a valid claim. 79
in due course ............................... 99 Land covered by, is not appropriated as
The Board of, has exclusive jurisdiction against the Government -y or-filing1of0
within the sphere of the powers conferred No bar to the original entry, or filing of
upon it by statute ............... ...... 411 another -4stleeti4,vld.......... 431,435
The Board may, on showing of fraud, re- o alien is invalid-444
voke its confirmation ............... ..... ... 411 Of Mfien is invalid.. ..................... ............ 444
vorce-it conrmatio -41 mar woman sub- The words " next settler " in section 2265
Pre-emptionent of ied woman sub- .... 460 are not necessarily confined to a pre-emptor 380
mitted for-460 First made given the precedence as be-
Entry on railroad land confirmed where tween two settlers that were both in default. 438
company made default at hearing - 458. 65 Failure to file in time does not defeat the
Case involving irregularity in dunal proof cam nteasneo nte ete h
may be submitted for - ..484 claim, in the absence of anotheyr settler whohas complied with the law .... 336, 355, 380, 496
Though made after the legal period, is
Evidence. valid, if before the intervention of an ad-
Should be confined to the charge as laid verse claim ................. ............... 142
in the information ............ .. 113,470 Second allowed where the first was for
In proceedings involving forfeiture the landsubsequentlyincluded within an Indian
same strictness of proof is required as under reservation ....... :..-.. 450
a penal statute ..........-.............. 146,153 Secondallowedwherefirstcovered worth-
Though irregularly taken, will be consid. less land, and due care was manifest 433
ered when no objection was made at the Second allowed for the same tract in the
proper time ................................ 474 absence of adverse claim. (Overruled, 2 L.
Of secondary character not received with- D., 854) ......................... ... 436, 439
out proper foundation laid therefor 439 Second allowed where first was on un-
Records ofExecutive Departments keptas offered land, made prior to June 22, 1874,
evidence of transactions, not for purposes of and canceled on relinquishment. (See 4 L.
notice - - - - 18 D. 189) ........... - ............... 442
Borden of proof rests upon the contestant Second allowed where first was illegal. . . 439
to prove his allegations ............. 129,146, 477 For town lots not required within three
Burden of proof is with an applicant for months after settlement .................. 501
reinstatement0............................. 76
For the impeachment of a witness admis- Final Proof.




Witnesses must be disinterested ......... 96 See Practice.
Witnesses must testify from their per-
sonal knowledge ......... - ... 96 Honestead.
Dependence upon attorney for witnesses See Entry, Final Proof, Residence.
suggests collusion ........................... 96 The claim of the settler is initiated by
On protest against, hearing should be or- entry of the land- 3%
dered on due notice 86, 448 Right of, entry protected by the act of
Notice of, published in paper nearest the May 14, 1880 . 83
land by the usual route of travel. 308 Laws liberally construed 63
flow made for land in two districts ... 438 Entry will be canceled at the expiration
Failure to submit in due time excused of seven years if proof is not submitted after
where the default was caused by error of due notice 112
the local office 459 Right of one now in military or naval serv-
On submission of, after due notice, the ice to take, dependent upon his ability to
failure of a railroad company to assert its comply with the requirements of the law. 98
claim is conclusive 361, 475 Order of succession on death of entry-
Publication of notice under act of March man 64, 86
3, 1s79, similar to the requirements of the Entryman cannot by will defeat the rights
mining law 108 of the children 86
On rejection, reasons to be indorsed on Devise of, must be of the land and not of
application : -. 483 the proceeds from the sale thereof 64
'When submitted may be attacked for im- Adevisee is entitledto the same privileges
proper absence, under the act of June 4, that would descend to the heirs .- . 47
1880 ... 434 Heirs of deceased entryman must show
HOMESTEAD . cultivation for the statutory period 8 638
Eutryman cannot by will defeat the statu-
New final affidavit required ase of - tory succession .- ......... .41
fant children succeeding to the right to Right of commutation not defeated by fail-
make .. 86 ure to establish residence within six months
When made for the heirs the final affidavit after entry 39
should be made by one of the heirs 103 Right cnferred upon Indians by act of
Sufficient on commutation, if it shows set- March 3, 1875 . -. 491
tlement and cultivation satisfactory under
the pre-emption law, though residence was ADJOINING FARM.
not established within six months after en- Original entry treated as adjoining farm,
try . 39 to save the rights of the entryman ......... 71
PRE-EMPTION. Adjoining farm requires five years' resi-
dence except when there may be credit forIs submitted in time if notice thereof is military service . 68
given within the statutory period . 461 Owner of an undivided portion of a tract
Failure to make, within statutory period (ess than 160 acres) may make adjoining
does not defeat claim in the absence of an- farm entry-38
other settler who has complied with the Adjoirnig farm, allowed after sale of orig-
law . . 355, 401, 487 inal farm and before patent therefor -. 61
Prior to the act of July 14, 1870, pre-empt
or on unoffered land was not required to ADDITIONAL.
make, until the land was offered . 379 Limitations of right to additional .. 29
Resolution of March 3, 1871, extended The right to make additional, extends to
time for, one year 379 all persons entitled by entry or succession,
Act of May 9, 1872, extended time for, in to make final proof -24, 51
Minnesota one year .................... .. 379 Act of March 3, 1879, construed with the
Submission of, may be deferred within the second section of act of May 14,1880 .. 93
statutory period, though notice of making, The law subserved if original and addi-
has been given and an adverse claimant ap- tional are together used as a home . 62
peared .-. 446 Land covered by original and additional
TsmBER CULTURE, entries regarded as a compact body ....... 62,68
Cultivation of land taken as additional
Entry made under act of 1874 may be not required ................................ 62
proved up under act of 1878 ................ 123 Additional cannot he made if the original
has been canceled 92Fraud. Widow of original entryman may make
Vitiates title without respect to subse- additional under the act of March 3, 1879.-- 24
quent conveyance . 407 Right to make additional not lost by the
Must be clearly established to warrant purchase of original under the act of June
the cancellation of an entry ... 439 15,1880 .............-........................ 29
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A married woman, who, previous to mar- Purchase can be made after cancella
Tiage, had made an entry wherein she was tion . 57, 689, 6
restricted to 80 acres, may make an addi- Purchaseallowed where final proof failed. 75
tional entry ....... 38 Purchase allowed though entry was void
One who had purchased his original entry at inception .... ........ 25
under the act of June 15, 1880, could not Intervening vested rights protected as
make new entry under act of March 3,1879 29 against said act ............................ 69
Relinquishment of original accepted and The term "homestead laws" used in the
new entry allowed pending contest against second section of saidact in a genericsense- 69
the original for abandonment .............. 93 Right of purchase defeated by intervening
Claimant may take land embraced in his timber culture entry, or right of pre-emp-
former timber culture entry as additional, if tion ................................ .... 69
be is the first legal applicant after relin- Transferee by bona fide instrument of the
quishment ...... ........ .... 125 entryman's improvements and possessory
May be embraced within commutation right can purchase under said act .. ........ 53
entry 100 Possession of duplicate receipt not such
-) evidence of transferas toauthorize purchase 67
SOLDIERS. Transfer subsequent to act confers no
Declaratory filing is not an appropriation right of purchase upon transferee .......... 75
of the land ................ ...... . 79 Attempted transfer prior to act carries
Soldier's declaratory statement, circular right of purchase, though the deed was not
of December 15,1882, with blank formbs ..... 648 made till after the passage of the act 72
Entry, settlement, and improvement must Transfer of land must be in writing to
follow filing within six months-...-......... 79 carry right of purchase 67
The right of a soldier relates back to his "Bora jide instrument in writing" not
filing, if the entry is regular, and the right necessarily a deed in legal form 53
to an additional entry goes therewith 48
Fraudulent acts and inducements of cer- Improve nents.
tain agents ...... 79 See Residence.
SOLDIERS' ADDITIONAL. Indemnity.
Right of soldier not restricted to couitigu- See Railroad Grant, School Land, Sicenp
ousland ...............-.................... 48 Land.
Allowed when a quantity less than 160
acres was entered before June 22, 1874..... 48 Indiaf Lands.
Certificates should be delivered to the Settlement rights on, acquired prior to
agent who filed the claim if he has properly January 1, 1874, recognized by the act of
discharged his duty, though a later power - March 3,1875 ............................... go
of attorney may have been filed by another. 34 No homestead or pre-emption rights al-
Circular of February 13,1883, discontinu- lowed in the disposition of, in Bitter Root
ing practice of certification ................ 654 Valley .........-.... ........ 368
ACT OF JUNE 15, 1880.- Preference right of Indians to lands in
ACT OF JUTNE 15, 1880. ' Bitter Root Valley recognized............. 368
Right of purchase not personal ........... 50 Proceeds of, from sale, how disposed of . 520
Purchase may be made by any person who Drafts not received in payment for Paw-
through entry or by operation of law has nee ............... -........... 522
succeeded to the right to make final proof. 50, 56 Certificates of deposit for survey not re.
Right of purchase accorded the first ap- ceived in payment for Sioux .522
plicant where several entries had been can-
celed....................................... 96 Instructions and Circulars.
Alien heirs may purchase ................ 98 See table of, page xv also table of circu-
Register who was appointed after entry lars and instructions cited, modified and re.
allowed to purchase ....................... 73 voked, page xvi.
Entry of alien may be purchased by
widow- ........................ 55 Islands.
If a single woman makes entry and then See Public Land.
marries, the husband is not entitled to pur-
chase in his own name in the event of her Judgment.
death. Patent in such case must issue to
the heirs-84 ~~~~~~~See Jurisdiclion, tcs ,Tudicatrc.the heirs ....... .. ........ ..... ... . 84
Widow or heirs, not administrator, may Jurisdiction
purchase- -35
Rightof widow or heirs defeatedbytrans- Over public land and the title thereto re-
fer .-............ - ............ 35 mains in the Land Department till the re-
Alienation of land no bar to purchase - 74 cord of completed patent is made ........ 18,22
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The question of, may be raised at any Coal and iron lands in Alabama; circular
stage of proceedings, and upon slight sug- of April 9,1883 .......... 655
gestion in all tribunals ................. 232,173 Sale of coal land; circular of July 31,1882. 687
Presumption in favor of, when exercised In Alabama disposed of as agricultural.. 96
by judicial tribunal .............. 173, 223, 422 In Missouri disposed of as agricultural . 599
Apparent want of authority in an execu- May be included within military reserva-
tive officer of the Government to set aside vation and while thus reserved is not sub-
the decree of a Federal court where the Uni- ject to other appropriation ................. 552
ted States was a party to the suit .......... 173 Town site may be located upon .......... 556
Of Federal courts discussed ........... 173, 223
Judement rendered eune pro tunl of the Mining Claim.
same force and effect as though entered at See Patent.
the proper time .......-.................. 210
A term of the district court having been GENERALLY.
held by United States circuit judge it will The right conferred by a valid mining lo-
be presumed that the formalities prescribed cation amounts to a property, capable of be-
by the act of March 2, 1855, were duly ob- ing employed or transferred, entirely sepa-
served ................. ................... 223 rate and distinct from the fee of the land.. 615
Where created by special statute, for spe- Mining laws recognize prior local laws,
cial purpose, may be properly questioned . 223 rules, and regulations ........- . 584
Judgment or order without, is no protec- Assignments of interests in mining pos-
tion to those acting thereunder ............ 222 sessions are valid, even by parol transfer 593
In matters of general, courts properly Mininm laws recognized jurisdiction as-
constituted determine their own ........... 223 sumed by the courts...................... 584
Where affirmatively shown by the record Requisite compliance wth law presumed
conclusive ................................ 223 after entry- ...................... ... 548
Judgment of tribunal of competent, con- Includes a tunnel location .. -..... 584
clusive upon all parties, unless declared er- Cancellation of mineral entry does not af-
roneous upon appeal ....................... 232 feet possessory rights 526
May he conferred by consent as to par- Miners' rights not divested by subsequent
ties, but not as to subject-matter 478 appropriation of the land for a military res-
Land Department. ervation ........................... 552The Land Department will inquire into
See Officer. questions affecting compliance with the law 584
COMMISSIONER. Patent will not issue for location within
General supervisory authority conferred prior patented lines ......... ...... 593
upon .. . . . 455 Mineral entry not invalid because at the
time made the land was covered by a home-
REGISTER AND RECEIVER. stead entry5................................. 565
Duties of ................................... 517 Sections 2324 and 2325 should be construed
The duties of the register and receiver are together ..... 544
distinct, and neither can discharge the duty APPLICATION.
of the other in the absence of express au-
thority .................... ... 150, 545 In application for survey the location must
LOCAL OFFICE. be properly marked and recorded .......... 581Application for lode patent, within limits
List of 664 of patented placer, alleging that the exist-
Term "Land office," used for local office ence of the lode was known at date of placer
in the act of May 27, 1880 3, 5,11 application, should be received, subject to
Access to records accorded for the purpose adverse proceedings of placer claimant.... - 564
of making abstracts for the use of county Application in conflict with prior pending
clerks .. 523 claim not received 542
Application allowed by the receiver in-
Mineral Land. stead of the register not disturbed ......... 545
Rule laid down as to what constitutes . . 560 Applications should be received in the
Regulations governing entry of lands con- order of time as presented ................ 562
taining borax and alkaline earths, sulphur,
alum, and asphalt ... ....... 561 ADVERSE CLAIMS.
Fire-clay or kaolin subject to mineral en- Adverse proceedings circular of May 9,
try 565 1882 . 685
Gypsum and limestone held to be miner. Tunnel location should be protected by
als 560 adverse suit as other mining claims - 584
Lands containing mineral springs, not of a Extent and nature of adverse claim may
saline character, are subject to sale under be shown by means best practicable if sur-
the general laws ... ........ 562 vey cannot be made ......... ...... 582
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Adverse claimants held to reasonable dili- Fire-clay, or kaolin, properly the subject
gence...................................... 582 of placer location ............ 565
Eights as between adverse claimants must NOTICE.
be determined by the courts ............... 584
Courts must determine legal rights be- Each of the three concurrent details in
tween town-site and mineral claimants..... 556 publication of notice must be equally ob-
Preliminary proofs accepted, though pat- served ..................................... 572
ent must issue for claim as diminished by Notice of application must be posted in
adverse placer ........-.......... .... 551 local office during the whole period of pub-
Alleged delinquent cotenants must pro- lication ................. .................. 572
tect their rights as adverse claimants 544 Posting in open shaft-house held sufdi-
Entry should be cancelled where the cer- cient .. ....... 548
tificate showing non-existence of suit was Publication Of notice in paper designated
recalled .... . . 539 I by the register sufficient ................... 570
Stay of proceedings warranted on allega- Insufficiency of publication, not the fault
tion of adverse claim shown on plat filed. . 53 of applicant, waived in the absence of ad-
In the absence of adverse claim it is as- verse rights 575
sumed that the applicant is entitled to pat- Exclusion of conflicting areas must appear
ent, and no agreement of parties can affect in published and posted notices 542
this statutory provision .................... 591 PROTESTANT.
Failure of prior locator to file adverse Protestant has no right of appeal - 584
claim is a waiver of his right ............... 591 Protestant cannot rely on technicalities.. 577
Failure of adverse claimant to institute
suit a waiver of his claim ... .. 584 SURVEY.
Adverse claim, though informal, held suf- Survey of; circular of November 16,1882. 693
ficient where suit had been duly brought Proceedings based upon a false survey and
thereon ...-.......... . ...... 603 publication are invalid ................. 593
Separate patents may issue for such por-
tions of claims as adverse parties may right- 1iortgage.
fully possess ............................... 593 See Alieseation, Eety.
Time for filing adverse claim not com-
puted to include period during which the Naturalization.
local office was closed ............ ..... 572 Recordof court without clerk not received
LODE CLAIM. as evidence of .............................. 61
Lode within placer claim, not known at Through the father's act during the son's
application, passes with patent of placer... 549 minority requires the latter's residence, at
Lode claim within placer restricted to such time, to be within the United States . 66
25 feet on each side of the lode on failure to In the matterof, in Ohio the probate court
properly protect the full extent of the claim may be presumed to have a clerk .......... 83
by adverse proceedings ............. ...... 551 General statutes of, are not applicable to
Waiver ef a portion of lode claim, includ- Indians .. . . 491
ing original discovery shaft, does not affect
rights of possession and development as to Notice.
the remainder . ........ 593 See Practice.
MILLSITE. Officer.
Mill-sites provided for and recognized by Failure of local, to make due record will
secio 237,R.S ....... same.....as . 556 not jeopardize the claimant's right. - 81
Mill-site location made the same aActs of defacto, valid as to third persons
eral claim-and the public-.1 5545
Under the first class of mill-sites there a nd the advic of, sold
must be a lode or vein shown in connection be without prejudiceunless required by the
therewilth .................... 556 bewtotpjdieulsrqiedythMill-site claim mte rtewith-556 ad- absolute demands of the law ............ 151, 451Mill-site claim must be protected by ad-
verse proceedings in case of conflicting ap- Presumption that the duty of, was prop-
plication .- ...... 555 erly performed .................. ... 223On suspension of, the vacancy filled by
PLACER CLAIM. designation of the President 545
All known lodes at date of placer applica-
tion are excepted from patent issued there- atent.
on, together with 25 feet on each side of said Can only issue only on specific authority 5, 11
lodes ....................................... 577 Departmental contr ol over title ceases on
Area of placer, expenditure; circular of the issue of ........ 591
December 9, 1882 694 Issue of, though inadvertent, deprives
Patent for placer; circular of September the Department of jurisdiction over the ti-
22,1882 .685 tle .455
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Relates back to the time when equitable Rules regulating, from the General Land
title vested ....... -, 492 Office not applicable to cases before local
Title passes by, record .. 18,91 office ....................................... 472
Till the record thereof is complete title Does not lie from action of board of equi
does not pass .. 18,22 table adjudication- .................... 411
Object of recording ..................... 18 Right allowed to parties shown to be in
As recorded is evidence of equal dignity interest and affected by the decision . 579
with the original-........................ 18 The action of the local office, where pri-
Delivery of; instructions of October 25, vatelandelaimantswerebystatuterequired
1882-61 ... , 638 to "establish their claims to the satisfaction
Delivery of, issued on military bouhty of the register and receiver,' is the proper
land warrant to be governed by the rule in subject of ---------------------------------- 269
United States v. Schrz I- 1 Notice to opposite party of, not required
The Secretary of the Interior no author- in case before the local office - 472
ity to direct the delivery of an incomplete. 22 - From the local office, not requisite to the
Title not dependent upon delivery ....... j u 9 jrisdiction of the Commissioner . 455
Will not be delivered while the right of In the absence of, from the decision of the
possession is in dispute; though if essen- local office the Commissioner should not,
tial in pending litigation it may be deli with certain exceptions, review the same -, 467
ered in trust for the party legally eatitled From Commissioner's decision must con-
thereto ... - . 287 tamn specification of errors ................. 109
Requirements in case of issue to minor From Commissioner's decision must be
heirs .- ,. . . . . 99 served on the opposite party ............... 109
For private claim may not issue under Seventy days allowed for filing, when no-
section 2447 Revised Statutes .............. 223 ties of the Commissioner's decision is given
For private claim exhaust the jurisdic- through the local office1 .................... 1
tion of the Land Department .............. 229 Ten days additional allowed for where no-
In private claim should follow the terms tice of local officer's decision is sent through
of the grant or judgment 287 the mail .- ......... 117,118
In townsite and mineral, mutual clauses Allowed where date of notice was in
of reservation inserted1 ................... 556 doubt, and the default in filing, if any, but
For lands in the Virginia Military Dis- one day ....................... 110
trict, Ohio ............................. 4, 5,11,17 Time waived on account of diligence
Suit to set aside, not advised where the shown 103
land had been sold by the patentee, though
under later rulings the patent would not CONTINUANCE.
have issued ....... -1 377 Allowed in case of surprise 105
Affidavit for, how executed ,- , 106
Payment. Affidavit for, can be made before the day
See Final Proof. of hearing 106
Practice. HEARING.
See Evidence. Authority of local office to order, fixed by
Rule 5 ........ ..- . .. 481
GENERALLY. May be ordered on the affidavit of the at
torney- ...... . . . ., .. 480Rules of, cited and construed ............ XVII Local office may not cite contestants be-
Rights acquired not disturbed by changed fore other officers .......................... 474
rulings1 ........... 8,...,., 165  416 If neither party appears at day set for,
Irregularity waived by consenttothepro- the case should be dismissed ............... 112
ceedings -- F .......... u.......... rther hearing should be ordered in case
Objections waived by proceeding with of new issues arising on the trial that were
contest- ....... . .. . .. .123 not included in the original charge-. . 113
Procedure in taking depositions .......... 106 Ordered on protest against final proof. -- 448
After the trial has closed the defendant Proceeding to secure, on issue raised by
cannot take advantage of variance between protest against final proof ................ 86
the notice and affidavit of contest -....... , 114
Rules of, govern contest between town-lot NOTICE.
claimants ....... -10..2...... ........ 50 Rules with respect to, must be strictly
Default in appearance afterduenotice con- followed .....-.- ,,,,,. ..... 106
elusive-1... ............. ,65,475 Personal service required possible if
APPEAL, the party to be served is a resident of State, 107
By publication only authorized on due
Rules relative to, analogous to practice n showing of diligence to ascertain the where.
the courts- ............................ 472 abouts of defendant . 85,107, 299
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When by publication a copy to be mailed Qualification of pre-emptor not affected
by registered letter to the last-known ad- by the ownership of land as a trustee ....... 462
dress and one posted on the land ........... 107 Claim of one who removes from land of his
Rules of 1878 regulating service same as own to settle on public land in same State
those of 1881 ........ ............... 107 invalid ..................................... *405
Informality of, waived by general appear- Removal from home in town or city not
ance ............ ................ 116 within the inhibition of sec. 2260 R. S ...... 490
When given to both the party and his at- Second clause of settion 2260 R. S, dis-
torney through the local office, dates from cussed generally .4..............0......... 492
service on the party .......- ....... 464 Right within the incorporated limits of
Proceedings may be dismissed for want a town, under act of March 3,1877 ...... 497
of, though the entry is canceled on the ad- Cirehmstances as well as time recognized
missions of the claimant .................. 107 in the development of the settler's good faith 446
In the absence of, a decision does not be- Pre-emptor may file ftr 160 acres, though
come final . 366 claiming less at settlement, if contiguous
Of decisions should be formal and in writ- tract is vacant ----------------------------- 405
ing ...............-............. . 477 Right exhausted by the entry of eighty
Of decision to one of several attorneys acres ....................................... 485
representing the party is sufficient 119
Purchaser before patent not entitled to 106 TOWN LOTS.
Of town lots under sec. 2383 R. S .......... 501
REVIEW. Right restricted to the lot settled upon
Not granted on the ground that the decis- and one additional on which the settler has
iou is against, if there was contradictory ev- improvements .............................. 502
idence on both sides ....................... 111 Of town lots confined to settlers having
Not granted unless the case is brought the qualifications of a pre-emptor 502
within the rules and principles relating to
new trials-............................. 209,232 Private Claim.
Decisions of Board of Equitable Adjudi. See Res Judicata.
cation not subject to ..................... 411 Pendingfinal settlement of, the lands cov-
ered thereby are in astate of reservation. 166,167
Preference Right. Land embraced within, as presented for
See Centestaint. confirmation, is reserved from other disposi-
tion until final rejection or location.. 167,181
Pre-emption. Ambiguity in a decree of confirmation
cannot be explained by testimony, unless
See Alienation, Filissg, Final Proof, Resi- the terms are wholly indefinite . 181
dence, Settlement. Decree of confirmation, nuncpro tune, has
Assertion of claim under the law required the same force and effect as if entered at
to constitute a legal claim 4 3 4 the actual time of the decision ........... .. 210
Benefits of, not secured by mere occu- The sold power of determining the valid-
pancy of public land 453 ity of claims arising under treaty stipula-
A conditional claim is unknown to the tions with Mexico rests in Congress ....... 579
law 404 The act of June 19, 178, gave to the
The first in time in the commencement United States district courtjurisdietion as
of proceedings is the first in right if such to title, and to the Land Department the
proceedings are regularly followed up 0 44 location of the claim ............... -....... 262
Laws do not include Indians ............. 491 Withdrawal of, from Congress not neees-
Right to make entry recognized on return sarily abandonment-............. 166
to land after absence 435 The translation of the original title papers
The possibility of one party taking the adopted in the decree of confirmation must
improvements of anotheris within the scope be followed in construing said decree ...... 181
of the law ........... ...................... 423 The General Land Office has no authority
A divorced woman cannot claim the bene- to declare claims under foreign grants to be
fit of acts performed by her former us- held by complete title ................. 272
band, but must rely on her own compliance Grants made y the representative of
with the law as a single woman or head of a France, after the cession to Spain, void un-
family .. 401 less recognized by the latter before the
Entry of married woman who had com- transfer to the United States ............... 272
plied with the law and published notice of Discussion of " sobrante " grants - 1 81, 248
final proof prior to marriage sent to the The term " sobrante " means simply sur-
Board of Equitable Adjudication ........... 460 plus; a grant for a sobrante is not a grant
Fraudulent claim as a divorced wife ...... 421 by name .................................... 181
The purchaseof a dwelling-house is equiv. The words " lying in between " construed
alent to its erection ........................ 137 in the location of El Sobrante .............. 181
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Section 7 of the act of July 23, 1866, was Where hills, mountains, or mountain
not repealed by the revision ................ 417 ranges are named as boundaries the foot or
Right of purchase under section 7, act of base is to be taken as the boundary meant,
23, 1866 ...-.......-...... ... 417 unless the top or ridge is clearly indicated 288
The proviso limiting claims confirmed by When confirmed the sole duty of the De-
the act of February 5, 1825, to one league partment is to ascertain the extent and place
square is general and not restricted by the thereof .-...........- 8... 392
recommendation of the local officers that Resurvey of town grant allowed on cor-
certain claims should be limited to one mile reeted description of the boundary lines -.. 285
square .. . 275 Publication of survey made and certified
Confirmed by the act of February 5, 1825, under the act of 1860, is conclusive upon all
should pass to patent if the survey did not parties ....-.. - ....... .. 260, 377
embrace morethan one square league ---- 275 A survey made after the passage of the
By the act of February 25, 1869, approved act of 1860, duly advertised, and not taken
plats were made evidence of title .......... 269 into the district court, is final .............. 260
The delivery of approved plat, as evi- A survey approved after the passage of
deuce of title, directed....... ........ . 2 '9 the act of 1860, was such a survey as that act
Supervisory authority of the Laud De- contemplated ............................ 260
partment in the survey of ............... 181,213 As to claims pending in the district courts
The date of approval is the date of a sur- for correction or confirmation of survey,
vey ..-...... 2............ 60 new jurisdiction was confe:red by the act of
Authority of surveyor-general, ceases on 1864 .................................. 173
approval of survey .... 210 A survey approved prior to the act of
A survey approved by the surveyor-gen- June 14, 1860, published and ordered into
eral is the official survey, and must be pub- the U. S. district court under said act, and
lisbed as such .......... .. .. 248 pending therein at the passage of the act
After survey and patent, corrections must of July 1, 1864, was within the jurisdiction
be secured in the courts 229 of said court, and its approval thereof was
Survey made prior to decree rendered, fnal . 173
nunc pro tune, but subsequent to the actual Though survey had been published nuder
decision is valid ............................ 210 the act of 1860, and approved by the court,
It is the duty of the Commissioner to see as republication was ordered under the act
that the location follows the decree of con- of 1864, the case should proceed in the usual
firmation as closely as practicable .... 213 manner ........... 246
Survey of, instead of juridical measure- Objections to survey are not required to
ment- ..-..-........... 181 be under oath by the act of 1864 ............ 262
The delivery of juridical possession in- Survey made and approved prior to the
volved the establishment of boundaries. -24 248 act of July 1, 1864, must be published in ac-
Confirmation presumes definite bound- cordance therewith ........................ 210
aries .-... 181 Appeal from action taken in the execu-
Survey of, in conflict with military reser- tion of an order for a modified survey brings
vation ..........-................... ... 168 up only new matter ..................... 232
The location of, within limits embracing A decision of the Department under the
larger quantity may be controlled by the act of 1864, as to whether a grant is one of
General Land Office ..................... 179, 245 boundary or quantity is conclusive . 232
The survey must correspond with the The act of 1864 contemplated final adjudi-
terms of the decree 248 cation of all questions affecting boundaries
A grant cannot be extended beyond the and extent, on objections to the first survey
decree of confirmation ..................... 248 under publication, and that subsequently
Whether the surveyor-general properly no objections could be raised against such
construed and followed the decree of con- adjudication under cover of attack upon the
firmation must be determined by appeal to reformed or modified survey ............... 212
the General Land Office .................... 232 Procedure under the statute of 1864, on
Extent and boundaries of, are matters objections to survey ............... ... 232
properly within the jurisdiction of the board
of land commissioners ..................... 22 Private Entry.
Extent of, not diminished or boundaries
changed, because a river, that marked a Amendment of, when allowed 516
boundary line, has changed its course 213 Land offered at double minimum, and sub-
Conflicting rights arising from premature sequently reduced, not subject to, without
survey protected in the location of ...... 179, 245 re-offering at the reduced price ............ 634
In survey of, reasonable, not arbitrary,
discretion should be exercised ...- .. 179 Public Land.
Reference in decree to expediente and Island subject to sale or other disposal
grant makes that instrument a part of the under the general laws 392
decree ..-................................ 181 Islands and all accretions thereto are.... 596
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Accretions formed by washing or reces- The settlement right of a pre-emptor, who
sion become part of the lands they adjoin.. 596 had failed in the matter of filing, proof and
A tract of railroad land released under the payment, existing when the right of the road
act of June 22, 1874, is subject to entry at attached, excepts the land from the grant.. 355
single tinimum- ........................... 327 Does not take effect upon land covered by
Unlawful enclosures of; circular of April pre-emption claim, though filing was not
5,1883 ...................................... 683 made in time, such default being only to the
Unlawful enclosures of; circular of July advantage of the "next settler .............. 380
19,1883 684 Does not take land embraced within apre-
emption at date of definite location . 366
Purchaser. Homestead entry of record excepts the
See ntry Homstea, Ac of une 5, 180. laud covered thereby from the effect of with-See Entry, Heneestced, Act f June12, 1880. drawal ....... 1. ......... ..... 352
Pre-emption claim existing at date of
Railroad Graiat.withdrawal on general route (Texas Pacific)Baliroad Grant. ~~~~~~~~~excepts the laud therefrom ...... 388
Nature and scope of, generally dis- Land not excepted from, by fraudulent
cussed ... 3.........1..... 36, 362 pre-emption claim existing when the grant
Construed most strongly against the took effect ................................. 390
grantee ... 331,336,362,368 Burden of proof upon company to show
Rights under, must be asserted in accord- that a pre-emption filing for land within
ance with established procedure ... ........ 465 the limits of grant is not valid ........... . 379
Does not take land covered by homestead Duplicate of map showing definite loca
entry at date of granting act, though such tion accepted in place of original .359
entry was subsequently canceled ........... 387 The lands upon which the grant of 1866
Selectionsnot received wheretheroad was would operate were not identified until the
not constructed within the required period. 330 passage of the joint resolution of 1870,
Congress reserved all claims recognized which saved the rights of actual settlers
by the government from the operation of (Southern Pac.) ............................ 626
the grant (Central Pacific) ................. 336 Relinquishment in favor of entries made
The Department cannot enforce forfeiture prior to withdrawal and while the map of
though the company has not complied with definite location was not on file ............ 359
the terms of the grant ...................... 328 The stipulation in the grant of July 2,
Patent cannot be refused on the ground 1864, with respect to the extinction of In-
that the road was not completed within the dian titles, did not include permanent res-
time required by the granting act .--------- 378 ervations, or land reserved before the
Completion of road within time allowed is grant was made ............................ 368
a condition subsequent of which no one can The lands in the Bitter Root Valley, be-
take advantage except the grantor ........ 359 ing reserved for the use of the Indians,
If the grant is a present one, and the title were not public lands free from " othcr
doesnotvestwhenthegranttakes effect,it , claims or rights" when the Northern Pa-
cannot vest afterward .............. 336, 362,366 cific Railroad Company filed its map, and
Does not take effect upon land reserved therefore were not affected thereby ........ 368
for the benefit of another grant ............ 332 The Indian title resting in occupancy
Does not take effect upon land held under alone was that which the grant of July 2,
donation settlement at date of definite loca- 1864, undertook to extinguish .............. 368
tion, though the donee had failed in the Section 6, act of July 2, 1864, authorizes
matter of filing notification . . 305 withdrawal for the benefit of the Northern
Lawful possession under the settlement Pacific.................................... 380
laws a valid appropriation of the land as Odd sections to which a pre-emption
against the rights of a grant attaching sub- claim had attached at the date of with-
sequently thereto .. ............. 336 drawal, or at definite location, do not pass
Subsisting pre-emption and homestead under the grant to the Northern Pacific.-_ 380
claims, at the date when the grant took ef- The withdrawals of 1873 and 1879, on gen-
fect, excluded the lands covered thereby oral route of the Northern Pacific (branch
(Central Pacific) ....................... ... 336 line) and amendment thereof confer no right
Land covered by priena facie valid entry as against a settlement made after the first
when the right of the road attached is not and before the second. (Reversed, 2 L. D.,
granted .----------------------------------- 362 551.) ..... : ............. ........ 397
Does not take effect upon land within the Title does not pass by certification, under
claimed limits of an unadjudicated private the grant of March 3, 1865. (Reversed, 2 L.
claim .9------------------------------ 392 D., 498.) .... ...................... 366
Where settlement is made on the day the The phrase "sold or otherwise disposed
Tight of the road attaches, the land should of " occurring in section 3, act of July 1,
be awarded to the settler .33... 331 1862, considered and construed ............ 345
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Patent required to pass title under the The clause " at a time subsequent to the
grant of July 4, 1866, to the State of Minne- expiration of such grant," in See. 3, refers
sota. (Reversed, 2 L. D., 492.) -..-........ 351 to the dates fixed for the completion of the
No authority conferred upon the Depart- roads, and not to the date when forfeiture
ment to enforce the last clause in section 3, might be declared .............- 33
act of July 1, 1862 (Sioux City and Pae.) ... 345 W
A provision that all lands not disposed of RIGHT O AY.
within three years after the completion of The question of priority between two
the road shall be subject to settlement as roads claiming right of way under act of
other lands (the purchase price to be paid March 3, 1875, must be determined i the
to the company) is a condition subsequent, courts ....................... 396
and default therein does not defeat the The act of 1875 only requires approval of
grant ..- .......... 345 map on surveyed lands -.................. 397
Selections not allowed beyond the ter-
minal limits as defined by a line drawn at Record.
right angles with the general route of the See Evidesnee.
road at such terminus . 394
The revival of the grant in aid of the Ala-
bama and Chattanooga Railroad Company Rellnquishment.
did not relieve it from the limitations orig- See Application.
inally provided for the disposition of the Treated as pioof of abandonment ..... 114,155
granted lands --------- ... . ....... 343 Equivalent to cancellation under the act
Title should be conferred for lands earned of May 1, 1880 ............................. 121
by construction ..........-.-. 373 The summarv action authorized by the
The State (Alabama), as trustee, must de- first section of the act of May 14,1880, not
termine what lands the conpany shall to be taken where there is a pending ad-
receive as indemnity, and the Department verse right ....... - .... 155
has no authority to direct the State in such Not voluntary when made because of
matter ... 374 conflict. .... 45
Certification of lands, within the common Of timber culture entry must be signed
limits of a completed road and one not con- by the heirs, in case of entryman's
structed will not be made until the State death........................... ... 121,138
(the grantee in trust) indicates the lands Of timber culture entry by administrator
belonging properly to the constructed should be with authority of heirs 149
road -------------------------------- 343, 376 Of timber culture entry exhausts the
Failure of pre-emptor, who settled prior right of the entryman ................. . 125
to indemnity withdrawal, to make final Inures to the benefit of prior pending con-
proof within the required period does not test .-... 145
inure to the benefit of the grant - 400 If filed, pending contest before local office
Filing allowed within limits of indemnity and before the testimony is closed, it inures
withdrawal for wagon-road grant subject to the benefit of the contestant ...... . 103, t55
to the company's right of selection ........ 389 Obtained and filed by stranger to contest,
Does not take effect upon indemnity land and subsequent thereto, of no avail to con-
prior to selection ........... 332, 336, 389, 626 testant ............................ 103
ACT OF JUNE 22, 1874. epayment.
Lands released under said act are held in The act of June 16, 1880, should be con-
trust by the government for the settler---- 327 strued liberally 532
Indemnity not allowed if the settler's Should be allowed if " from any cause "
claim is superior to that of the company . 359 the entry was erroneously allowed . 532
ACT OF APRIL 21, 1876. Laws providing for, applicable where the
consideration is carried into the Treasury
Entry made under instructions, confirmed as cash ....-............................. 533 V
by said act- ............................... 357 Not allowed where entry is canceled for
Entry of land withdrawn and subse- false swearing on final proof ............... 535
quently restored, confirmed by said act. 353, 354 Not allowed because the character of the
Entry after definite location, but prior to land does not suit the entryman . 40
withdrawal thetefor, confirmed by Sec. 1 . . 475 Not allowed on relinquishment made for
Entry reinstated and held to be confirmed the sole purpose of recovering the purchase-
by Sec. 2, of said act, though application moe ....... . 40
for repayment had been made after cancel- Not allowed for alleged double minimum
lation .-....................... 387 excess paid fir land in railroad limits ...... 524
Settlement and filing protected by See. 3, Allowed for fees and commissions charged
of said act, as well as an entry ............. 333 on additional homestead entries ............ 523
718 INDEX,
Page. Page.
Allowed on cancellation of mineral entry Within the Territory, and settlement on
erroneously admitted ................ 526 the tract, must be shown to have corn-
Hot allowed if entry was canceled for menced within the statutory period.....29, 284
fraud ..-..... 528 And cultivation must be in good faith.. 297
Hot entitled to, on failure to comply with HOMESTEAD.
terms of purchaseof Indian trust land . 529
Not allowed on voluntary relinquishment - Dates from entry-94
of entry .... 531, 529 An essential under the homestead law.. - 78No credit for, while the land is covered
EReservation. by the entry of another ................ 37, 46, 52
See Entry, Mineral Land, Mining Claim, Credit for, not allowed before the entry-
Private Claim. man is a qualified citizen 36
May not under order of the President in- The absence permitted by the act of June
clude land covered by an existing homestead 4, 1880, is constructive ... 24, 434
entry ..- ........ 30, 451 Actual, personal, and continuous presence
Land embracedwithin a pre-emptionfiling on the land not essential to ................. 63
may be set apart at any time prior to final Widow cannot, under entry in her own
proof and payment ................... 30, 450, 451 right, claim for, during the lifetime of her
The power of the President to create, ex- hushand-36............................ . 36
tends to any unappropriated publio land30, 552 Not required of the heirs or devisee of de-
The President in setting apart land is re- ceased entryman......................... 636
garded as acting under authority of Con- On original farm will not be held as, on
gress-....................................... 30 adjoining farm prior to entry thereof. 68
Authority of President to create, and pro- Service in the regular Army since the
visions of law relative thereto 702 close of the rebellion not equivalent to 98
Permanent Indian, defined, as well as Must be established and maintained un-
"common Indian title - 101 der additional entry where the original was
Action of the War Department in fixing purchased under the act of June 15, 1880--- 29
boundary line of military, conclusive 168 Of one year required in case of additional
The legal appropriation of land for any homestead ......... 100
purpose severs it from the public lands, and Actual service of soldier at date of entry
it is not thereafter subject to other disposi- equivalent to -------. . .....  -362
tion ................................... 336, 392 Good faith is shown by making home on
Of land for special purposes, made to the land, and improvements thereon ....... 63
the end that the government may enforce PRE-EMPTION.
them ......-. ............................. 368
Compensation recommended where set- The period of, is a matter of departmental
tler's claim was appropriated to govern- regulation ---------.....------. 493
ment use ......- --.-----.-..... 307 The rule requiring six months should not
Claims initiated prior to order of, should be enforced indiscriminately where good
be protected if compatible with public in. faith is otherwise shown ................... 493
terests ... 451 Credit for, on abandoned pre-emption
claim not allowed on attempted transmuta-
Residence. tion .-............. .... 485
GENERALLY. Credit allowed for previous, on transmu-
Largely a matter of intent. -..................... 89 tation of filing to homestead entry ...... 3... 55Largelyamatter of Itenth ................. 89 Allowed as a pre-emptor while the land
Held sufficient, though by mistake not on was covered by the settler's timber-culture
the claim ..... entry............................. 58
Want of continuous, may be excused Res Judicata.
where good faith is apparent, and no ad- The decision of the head of a Department
verse claim has intervened is binding upon his successors............. 
Threats of violence and an unfavorable Cancellation of an entry and award of the
decision of the local office accepted as ex laud to another is a final adjudication - 362
cusing want of ............................. 43 Irregularity of proceeding warrants the
Laws requiring improvement and, not sat- Commissioner of the General Lad Office in
isfied by occupation for business purposes- 459 reviewingthedecisionof his predecessor.362, 366
Total want of, not excused by election to Authority of Secretary to set aside the
a public office .......... lation .o e 95 approval of his predecessor on list of rail-
Nature of claim or relations of parties to road selections questioned ................. 378
the land not affected by the act of June 4, Decision of Board of Equitable Adjudi-
1880..............4........ ...... .. 434 cation is final and conclusive ............... 411
DONATION. Doctrine of, applicable where the case falls
And settlement must be contemporane- within a particular class covered by former
ous under the donation acts 279 decision - 504
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Though the questions involved in a pri- Failure of settler before survey to assert
vate claim may be similar to those settled his claim within statutory period does not
in a prior case the confirmee has the right inure to the benefit of the reservation,
to a full hearing ........................ 246 (Utah) .. . . . 632
Action of the War Department on mat- Distinction noted between the " grant "
ters within its j urisdiCtIon must be accepted made to California and the " reservation "
by this Department as conclusive .......... 168 for Utah ................................... 032
Doctrine not applied where the question
appeared to have received ut little con- Scrip.
sideration-................................. 173
This Department should accept as final Identity of assignee must appear ........ 300
what was so regarded by the proper De- Erasures in assignment of, must be a-
partinent having charge of the interests of counted for ....... - ............. 301
the government ............................ 173 Assignment of, in blank not accepted .... 301
The tribunal created to execute a decree Assignment of, required from the legal
cannot go behind it 181 representative of the party to whom it was
The final location of one of several con issued ...- -.......... 302
tiguous claims does not preclude full exam- Attorney in fct must show authority for
ination in the location of the remainder, assignment of .......... .... ...... ......... 302
though it may result in conflict with the Twopieces foronehundred and sixty acres
previous adjudication ................ 213 each may issue in lieu of one for three huu-
dred and twenty acres .......... ........... 303
Revised Statutes. Location of, prior to sorvey .............. 431
See Statutes. Also table of Revised Stat- Porterfield, may be located upon offered
utes cited and construed, page xvii. or unoffered land ........................... 497No mere defacto appropriation will defeat
Review, a Porterfield location ....................... 497
Returned if the entry, made by specific
See Practice. location fails ............................... 533
Right of Way. Settlement.
See Bailroad Grant.
See Entry, Filing, Residence.
River. Date of, is question of mixed law and
See Surey. fact - 444
Of unqualified persons is invalid -. . 489
School Land. Of one becoming qualified to make, while
on the land, dates from such time 444
On which settlement or cultivation was Protected under the act of May 14, 1880- 83
found at survey did not pass to the State Date of, is a matter of proof without re-
(Cal.) ............. 336, 401 spect to allegation in declaratory statement 444
On failure of settler, prior to survey, to Of no avail on appropriated land ......... 52
perfect his claim, the title to the land And filing considered as an entry ....... 333
vests in the State (Cal.) as of the date of On entered land takes effect on cancella-
survey .-.... 401 tion of the entry- 112, 442
The right of settler on, prior to survey is Priority of, before survey when marked
personal and cannot inure to the benefit of by boundaries will be protected as against
another ........... ....... 401 subsequent settlers - 414
Indemnity selection is not confirmed by Priorto survey, markedby distinct bound-
the act of 1877, if the basis therefor was aries may not be enlarged to the injury of
found in place and subject tothe grant (Cali- subsequent settlers ................. 414,431
fornia) ..-.-........................... 401 Rights extinguished by Executive order
Certification on indemnity selection of creating reservation ------- ...... 450
land to which a prior adverse right had at- Required on town lot, includes residence. 502
tached is null and void ................ 4 94 The case of Atherton v. Fowler will not
Selection void where the basis therefor sustain possession in violation of law.. 423, 424
was found in place .............. 494 Based on forcible intrusion confers no
Settler prior to survey claiming as a pre- right-. ...- - - ....................... 424
emptor must assert his claim within the Recognized though made outside of en-
legal period or the right of the State will closure ....-........................... 424
take effect as of the date of survey, (Col-
orado) .. . 630 Stare Decisis.
The legal title remains in the govern-
ment,thelandbeingonlyreservedforapre- The doctrine of, recognized in depart-
scribed purpose, (Uttah).................. 632 mental otion-232
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States. The sea-coast as the terminal point of a
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The act of May 27, 1880, affects no land Sudden change of a river's course does
sold by the Ohio Agricultural College under not affect title or boundary 213
the act of 18A1 ......... College.... 3 Rules for the restoration of lost and ob-the act of 5871 - ~------:.... literated corners-.............671
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Sense and meaning to be given to every Not granted for tract not claimed or
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Words should be construed in connection Bonds for United States deputy; instruc-
with the context08,45 tions of June 1, 1882..................... 
To be so construed as to give its designed Deposit for; circular of September 5, 1881,
effect . ... 11 with blank forms . 6......................... 65
There is no authority to import a word The right to make deposits not enlarged
into a statute in order to change its mean- by the act of March 3, 1879 ................ . 308
ing ...................................... 173, 275 Railroad company cannot procure, under
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Continuous uniform construction has the Certificates of deposits for, may be as-
effect of law ...-. ........... I signed under act of March 3, 1879 . 308
Construction of, impliedly by subsequent
legislation 1
Courts will take judicial notice of the con- S wa nmp Land.
dition of the country and titles to land at The act of 1850 was a present grant to
the time of the passage of an act ........... 279 the State (California) of the lands then
The Department will not consider the con- swamp ................ . ..... .. 312, 320
stitutionality of ..........- ....... 333 Section 2448, R. S., relates to lands in Cali-
Proviso to be construed strictly, as it fornia that were swamp at the date of the
carves special exceptions only out of the granting act- . 12
enacting clause .......... . . 275 gruProceedings under section 2488 R. S .... :. 320
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it is made is law as well as a conveyance... 279 the State is res adjudicata --- 1-------------- 504
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in law ........-... ......................... 419 March 3, 1857, if otherwise unappropriated,
Repeal of, does not affect previously ac- confirmed thereby (La.) ................. 508, 509
quired rights ....... -.......... 417 Claim for, not considered where the land
Local and temporary not repealed by the hasbeen certified under railroad grant (La.) - 509
revision .................................... 417 Selected and repoted as such prior to date
Survey, of raiload grant, are excluded therefrom
Survey. whether swampy or not (La.) .............. 509
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Amendment of field notes by deputy sur- Land disposed of by the government prior
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Circular of February 1, 1882, with blank J For railroad construction; circular of
forms .. 8............................... 638 March 3, 1883 ..........-.. 699
Good faith an essential-................... 148 Authorized in construction of railroad,
Work maybe done at any time within the ceases on completion of the road ........... 609
required period . ........................... 137 In construction of railroad, timber maybe
Work may be done by an agent, but the taken from any of the public lands in the
entryman will be responsible therefor. - 120 vicinity ................................. 610
Work may be done by entryman, his agent, Agent of railroad company may hire men
or his vendor............................... 137 to out ties, but maynot sell to other parties. 610
Entry made in arid country, at the claim- Railioad companies to be supplied under
ant's risk ..... . 123 contract ----- ........................... 612
Requirements of the law may not be Timber may not be taken from private
waived by the General Land Office......... 120 claim for construction purposes, under act
As late as 1879 the cottonwood was not of March 3,1875 . .......... 622
classed among timber trees . 165 Authorized in the construction of tele-
The honest efforts of the entryman will graph line by duly organized and qualified
be protected ........-..... .. 142 company ................-........... . 625
The act of 1874 did not specify the oharac- Rejected lumber, if from mineral land,
ter of land subject to entry, but left such may be sold to miners and settlers ......... 612
matter to the regulation of the General 1 ACT OF JUNE 3, 1878.
Land Office .............................. 165 ,
Rights of deceased claimant descend to Object of the act to enable the inhabit-
the heirs and not to the widow ...... 121, 127,136 ants of the States and Territories to appro-
Rights of the widow under Kansas laws. 149 priate timber from land not subject to the
Entryman not required to reside in the settlement laws ............................ 600
State or Territory wherein the land is situ- Authorizes, onminerallandsoftheUnited
ated ........................................ 148 i States for domestic uses - ........... .... 597
Requirements of the law like that of the I Authorized by said act for any use within
pre-emption law ............................ 142 the State (or Territory) for the comfort or
convenience of its people 597, 602, 618
BREAKING. Departmental decision of May 25,1882, re-
Breaking may be done in advance of time lates only to public mineral lands .......... 599
required .....-.. - ...... 137 Refers only to mineral lands .......... 600, 602
Failure to break not excused by reason of Mineral districts outside of the States
drought ....-................. ...... 141 named are within the terms of the act. .600, 616
Mistake as to amount broken excused . .. 126 Is not permitted by said act for purposes
Breaking in Coloradopossible withoutirri- of transportation beyond the State or Terri-
gation ..-.... 123 tory .-. 597
Breaking done under previous entry fully Restricted to trees not less than eight
available ....... 137 j .inches in diameter ......................... 02
PLANTING. I .................Allowed for Government use . 613LANTING. Provides for, in mining operations -597, 614
Planting of first five acres must be done Permits sale of timber within the State
third year-.................................. 135 for domesticuses ............ 1.. 597
Slight failure to plant excused ........... 130
Replanting must follow when trees are de- Timber Trespass.
stroyed ....- ....... 128 Any one who unlawfully cuts timber on
CULTIVATION. the public lands, hires others to do so, orin
any way encourages or promotes the sameCultivation is such care and attention as is liable therefor-.............619
will best promote the healthy growth of The United States may sue for the valuo
trees .......... - ...... 130 of timber unlawfully out ................... 607
Mulching may be regarded as cultiva- Action formaybemaintainedsubsequent-
tion ... .. ... 130 ly to the sale of the land to other parties.. 020
Replowingoffiveacressecondyeartreated Removal of timber from land cowered by
as cultivation .1................... 135 homestead entry or pre-emption filing not
Want of cultivation not presumed from permitted except for purposes of improve-
the small number of trees growing at the mentorother domestiouse 596, 599, 600, 604, 606
end of three years .......................... 127 624.
Effective cultivation must be shown. 117 Rights within an unconfirmed private
Timber Cutting. claim the same as recognized in a home-
steader..0................................. 622
Instructions of June 30, 1882 ............. 697 Locator of scrip, until title has passed,
Circular of October 12, 1882, relative to may not remove timber, except for improve.
cutting mesquite-6 ............ 695 ment ....................................... 620
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man .. - ... ........... 603 In proceedings to secure, See. 2387, R. S.,
Section 4, act of June 3, 1878, accords to confers authority upon judge of the county
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Not permitted within limits of uncon- cept to save the rights of the town in the
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ecute for, in his own right . -. 615 Procedure when the land applied for is al-
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The United States will not prosecute for,
committed on railroad lands .- . 611 Waiver.
Neither railroad companies nor settlers See Mining Clain, Piactice.
may take timber from school lands . 609
Unlawful for millmen to cut timber from Warrant
public non-mineral land for exportation. - -. 602
By millmen, entrymen, &c, instructions See Patent, Survey.
of October 24, 1881 . ..... ........ 701 Military bounty, in the hands of inno-
Committed in boxing trees forturpentine- 607 cent assignee may not be canceled by the
Committed upon public lands formed by Commissioner of Pensions ................. 1
accretion -........... ...... 596 Commissioner of General Land Office to
Stumpage for timber cut on land within determine as to the bonefide of holders . . 1
homesteadentrybelongstothegovernment 624 Purchaser of, issued in the name of one
Protection of timber from fire, circular of deceased without heirs, or of a fictitious
September 19, 1882 . -.. ...... ............. 696 person, not an innocent holder ............. 1
Measure of damages for; circular of March Innocent purchaser of, defined 1
1, 1883 .-.-. .. ............................ 695 On file in the Pension Office to be returned
to the General Land Office ..
Timber and Stone Act. The act of May 27, 1880, cures no de-
Mineral lands excluded from sale ........ 600 fects originating under the act of March 3,
Protection of timber; circular of Septem- 1855 . . * . 3, 11
ber 19, 1882 .- ....... 600 Locations of Virginia military, surveyed
and returned before March 3, 1857, recog-
Town Lots. nized 8 1117Patents provided by the act of May 27,
See Filitg, Pre-enptb~in. t 1880, for certain entries made under Vir-
Townsite. ginia military . 3,5,11,17History of legislation with respect to lo-
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Laws only apply to locations on the pub- The third section of the act of May 27,
lie land ...-... .................... 497 1880, in effect a new grant ... 3.... 5,11
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